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# A LESS-KNOWN BOSNIAN CAMPAIGN DURING THE 1566 SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR

## *MANJE POZNATA BOSANSKA BITKA IZ 1566. ZA VRIJEME OPSADE SIGETA*

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## ABSTRACT

*Though the magnitude of the presented Christian military ventures in the Croatian-Venetian perimeter should not be overrated, it is worth noting that the attacks against Novi Grad and Kostajnica took place during the sieges of Szigetvár and Gyula, which must have been a serious disruption to the Ottoman military command; Ákos Csányi's letter dated August 31 states that 4000 cavalrymen from the camp besieging Szigetvár were recalled to Constantinople. This information is most probably false, the unit in question actually being the Turkish rescue army that arrived at the Sava to aid against the assault of the Hungarian troops. Apart from the numbers and the Bosnians' involvement, the timelines also match. It suggests that archduke Charles not only led a successful campaign in the Turkish borderlands in Bosnia, but they also managed to divert major forces from the siege of Szigetvár. It is not their fault, however, that despite long-nurtured plans, neither Maximillian's troops in Győr, nor the other unit in Komárom followed suit and they never launched counterattacks against Esztergom, Visegrád or Székesfehérvár. The tactics that had been successfully employed during 1555-56, namely disrupting a Turkish campaign by attack on a stronghold or by nearby mobilization, was abandoned everywhere in 1566, except in the Croatian borderlands.*

**Key words:** Bosnian campaign, Miklós Zrínyi, Péter Erdődy, archduke Charles, Herward Freiherr von Auersperg, Joseph Freiherr von Thurn, Ferenc Frangepán, Kostajnica, Novi Grad
**Ključne riječi:** Bosanska bitka, Miklós Zrínyi, Péter Erdődy, nadvojvoda Charles, Herward Freiherr von Auersperg, Joseph Freiherr von Thurn, Ferenc Frangepán, Kostajnica, Novi Grad

Due to the anniversary, the main events of 1566, the fall of Szigetvár and Gyula have been much discussed nowadays. However, the same year also witnessed events that are studied less or are virtually unknown. The present paper addresses one of these, an imperial-royal counterattack in the Croatian and Bosnian lands.

On May 1 1566, the 72-year-old Suleiman launched his seventh and last campaign in the Kingdom of Hungary. Similarly to the events of 1552, this war was also fought for Transylvania, even if outside Transylvania. The Habsbug court was intent on claiming the Szapolyai lands from János Zsigmond's

control. At the Augsburg imperial diet in December 1565, the emperor called to the nobility for support, who decided to set up a major force of 40 000 footmen and 8000 riders. Parallel to the Augsburg sessions, archduke Charles was ordered to summon the Hungarian nobles in Pozsony.[1] Needless to say, the Porte was soon aware of the emperor's intentions as well. The sultan was unwilling to lose control over Transylvania by any means, thus at the turn of 1565-1566 he commanded the organization of a new campaign. The development was soon evident to the Habsburg Monarchy as well.[2] Ákos Csányi, high prefect of the Nádasdy estates wrote the following in January 1566: *»I can certainly inform your highness that news about the Turkish Emperor's arrival has reached our castles. I have seen a letter from Babócsa as well, which show clearly that they are terrified of the news. I have told nobody else, but some four or more months ago I heard this from a Turk. God be my witness I thought before, that after claming the lands and keeping our emperor under threats through diplomacy, and even taking tax from them, after all these years he would commit himself to raise armies with his wealth; this and more things are to come, and even risking dying in the campaign, his name is enemy. Indeed my lady, it is clearly spoken that he is arriving, and if it is not talked about in order not to upset our emperor, still, boatmaking along the Danube, collection of food, and counting the population of the lands could be started soon. Yesterday a prisoner of Ambrus Pálfy came from Buda, who was subjected to agha Piri. He spent three weeks in Buda at the pasha, he claims it for certain that the emperor is indeed arriving in time, but even before that the beglerbey is moving to Sziget, then to send up troops to king János's son and to hold the Danube with the main army, but my lady if our good Lord wills it so, none of this comes to aught.«*[3]

The preparations of the sultan were known in Vienna by the end of January or early February, as archduke Ferdinand's letter from February 21, 1566 gives evidence. On the 9th of the same month, the archduke in Prague was informed by Holy Roman emperor and Hungarian king Maximillian II about the news from Albert Wyss, a Habsburg diplomat sent to Istanbul. According to these, the Porte was preparing for war on land and on water. The emperor asked his brother for advice on how to react in the situation: peace negotiations were underway between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, with the latter intending to exclude János Zsigmond from the process.[4] An active correspondence started between the brothers, as the emperor sent first a Latin letter on February 23 and a German one two days later, inquiring about advice on preparing for the war. Archduke Ferdinand replied on February 29, which letter reveals that the Court Military Council and the emperor were concerned about potential attack on three castles: Szigetvár, Eger and Gyula. They planned to fortify these and to deploy additional troops. In his response the archduke also suggested that in case Miklós Zrínyi or László Kerecsényi resigned from their offices, the emperor should appoint a new, competent person to lead the local troops.[5]

It is a less known fact that the Court Military Council had a complete campaign plan as early as April 1566. István Földvári, one of Zrínyi's servitors wrote to Ákos Csányi on April 28, 1566 from Alsólendva: *»his majesty the emperor wrote to duke Charles from Augusta (today Augsburg, Germany) and ordered to provide rations for two hundred people. According to his majesty's intentions, the prince shall have a significant army and he himself shall wage war, hurrying from Augusta. His majesty will be at Vienna with his camp, and ordered Ferdinand to move to Nagyszombat (today Trnava, Slovakia) or Sempte (today Šintava, Slovakia), along with his Czech and Moravian troops. He gave orders to duke Charles to be at Potoly (today Ptuj, Slovenia) with his armies from Styria, Korontál (today Carintia)*

1 Forgách Ferenc: Emlékirat Magyarország állapotáról Ferdinánd, János, Miksa királysága és II. János erdélyi fejedelemsége alatt. Budapest, 1982. 244-256.; Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairől írt históriája. Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában. Budapest, 2003. 388-389.

2 Varga Szabolcs: Leónidász a végvidéken. Zrínyi Miklós (1508-1566). Pécs-Budapest, 2016. 192.

3 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (MNL) Országos Levéltár (OL) Magyar Kamara Archivuma (MKA) E 185 Nádasdy család levéltára (lt.) Missiles 9. doboz (db.) numerus (nr.) 66.

4 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA) Kriegarchiv (KA) Alte Feldakten (AFA) 1566-2-1.; Forgách 1982. 256.; Istvánffy 2003. 389.

5 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-2-ad1.

*and Kranjola (today Slovenia). The good troops with whom his majesty the emperor shall travel in person shall be led by the duke of Saxona (Ágost Saxon prince-elector) as Obrist Feldhauptmann and Count Kinter Schwarzenberg as marshall.«*[6]

As the letter shows, archduke Charles had the role of uniting the Styrian, Carinthian, Krajnian, Croatian and Slavonian armies at Ptuj. Some of these troops was not condemned for waiting, they also launched raids into the lands under Ottoman occupation, as related in Farkas Giczy's[7] letter to Orsolya Kanizsai dated September 4, 1566 from Sjeničak Lasinjski (today Sjeničak Lasinjski, Croatia),[8] or as discussed in the military report of the Court Military Council at the end of the year.[9] Let us recount what took place in the Croatian-Venetian borderlands. The archduke, who had been still in Vienna in July 1566, moved out to the appointed armies. As an overture for the campaign preparations, on the night before August 10, a Turkish army of 800 infantrymen and 300 riders attacked Topusko (today Croatia). The old outer stockades were breached easily, and because most stationed soldiers were at the moment away, the attackers captured 203 prisoners, 300 animals and 20 horses. Farkas Giczy, the prefect at Sjeničak Lasinjski, gave the following witness account in his letter to Ákos Csányi: *»The Turks came to Topusko the previous month, the night before the last Saturday prior to Our Lady's day. I was present at the castle and the Turks who arrived were 800 footmen and 300 riders strong, and as the outer stockade walls were indeed old, they had easy entry; the positioned soldiers were not on duty, but each away at their homes. As the castle folk had no sentries, two hundred and three were taken captive, together with children, girls and women, three hundred cattle and even more than twenty horses were stolen.«*[10]

Péter Erdődy, ban of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalamtia was ordered by the emperor to call an assembly. The letter of king Maximillian was read out to the Croatian-Slavonian noblemen in Zagreb, informing them that duke Charles, the emperor's brother, was arriving to defend Croatia with a great army, and the lands along the river Una would be freed from Turkish rule. Archduke Charles was in Graz at the time and sent an order to the same assembly that the ban and the nobility should take care of the provisions for the arriving army on the one hand, and prepare for warfare themselves on the other hand. Erdődy and all other officials in the borderlands were ordered to launch attacks into the occupied lands, until Charles arrived to take over the command.[11] The nobility organized the responsibilities of provisions and enlistment, marking Sjeničak Lasinjski, south-east from Zagreb, as the camp for the Croatian armies that gathered south of the Sava and Kupa rivers. After much persuasion on the ban's and the Zagreb bishop's part, Farkas Giczy took the office of lieutenant in the nobility's forces. He was also responsible for appointing units from the Croatian army in case the defense of the Perner, Hrezna, Topusko and Bović strongholds becomes necessary.

The leaders who were already at camp, Herward Freiherr von Auersperg, Oberstleutnant of Croatian border,[12] the ban Péter Erdődy, the Hauptmann of the Krajnian nobles, Joseph Freiherr von Thurn and other officials, held a war council and decided that Novi Grad (today Bosnia-Herzegovina) must be attacked.[13] Why was this stronghold their chosen target? The decision was influenced by strategic and

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6 MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 12 d. nr. 1. See in the Appendix.

7 Farkas Giczy was related to the palatine Tamás Nádasdy. In 1555-57, he served in the palatine's cavalry, first in Kanizsa, then in the Rábaköz. He took part in the 1556 campaign against the Turk, in the battle of Babócsa and the siege of Korotna. He became the prefect of Sjeničak Lasinjski in 1559. His brother János served under László Kerecsényi during the 1566 siege of Gyula, belonging to those few who survived and were not even captured.

8 MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d.. nr. 11. See in the Appendix.. MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d. nr. 8.

9 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.

10 MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13. d. nr. 9.

11 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.

12 Pálffy Géza: Kerületi és végvidéki főkapitányok és főkapitány-helyettesek Magyarországon a 16–17. században. Történelmi Szemle 39 (1997: 2. sz.) 257-288. 281.

13 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.

psychological arguments. The castle at the bank of the Una was owned by Miklós Zrínyi, like the other riverside stronghold, Bosanska Kupa (today Bosnia-Herzegovina). In late June of 1565, both was captured by Bosnian bey Sokollu Mustafa, a nephew of grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed. The defenders were all slain.[14]

In accordance with the Court Military Council's decree, 3000 Hungarian, Croatian and German cavalry and 800 infantrymen were combined on August 24 at Topusko, 30 km south-east off Sjeničak Lasinjski. They marched to the Una, with the infantry carrying orders to charge the Novi Grad castle. Part of the cavalry was sent to the castle of Kostajnica (today Bosnia-Herzegovina) with Giczy and Ferenc Fragepán as lieutenants, which place had been captured by the Ottomans long ago; this enabled the Christians to raid and plunder the lands up to the Sava river and they could block a potential Turkish counterattack.[15] According to Giczy, the Vlach-populated region was pillaged, with more than 300 prisoners taken.[16] Beside this, they went to ambush the guards of Kostajnica as well. The plan involved the Croatian light cavalry as bait, which was to lure the enemy riders from the castle. The German and Hungarian light cavalry units were standing by at their hiding place and had to ambush the deceived pursuers. The Turks in the Kostajnica garrison did make the sortie out, trusting that backup would arrive from the neighboring strongholds. They got trapped soon, though, and lost many: some were taken captive and others cut down. However, many of them made it back to the castle.[17] After their glorious victory, Giczy and Frangepán returned with the troops and their 300 captives to the siege camp under Novi Grad.

Giczy's account relates the following: *»From where we were descending to the castle, there were outcries from behind, and the calls came also from other directions, »Turks! Turks!« Bey Hlewnay Husrem were camped between Krupa and Novi Grad and heard the shots; thus he saddled up and rode out with some entourage toward the shot; my lord Zlúny (Ferenc Frangepán) were not with the Germans at that time and thus my lord Zlúnyi hit them. Even though the bey had the better numbers than my lord Zlúny. But the bey fell from his mount and was captured by the Germans. No one has been allowed to speak with him, except the Ban and my lord Asperger. One reason for not allowing talk is that the prisoner is severely wounded. The barber who tends to his wounds says talking is hard for his head yet.«*[18] Giczy relates that Ferenc Frangepán left the camp with a small squad and attacked bey Husrem and his entourage, who had separated from the Turkish army gathering between Krupa and Novi Grad. They took the wounded bey with them as prisoner. During interrogation, the captives told differing alternatives about the purpose of bey Husrem and his troops coming from the Krupa castle: *»…these could not equivocally tell why the bey had mobilized; some claim there were news about my lord the ban intending to take Podravska Moslavina and they went to aid that; others state they bey wanted to march to Bović with the purpose of raiding it; yet others do not know whether any of these were causes for him to arrive.«*[19]

Meanwhile, the Christian infantry took and burned the town under Novi Grad. The ban and Auersperg were discussing attacking the upper castle when they received word that the Bosnian pasha who had been busy at the siege of Szigetvár, came to the Sava with a 4000-strong army to lift the siege.[20] Therefore Erdődy and Auersperg changed their minds and went against these, ambushing the enemy off Novi Grad. The Turks were badly defeated in the battle, with many Bosnian officers and soldiers fallen. The Christians pursued the retreating troops and took their cannons and war gear, too.[21]

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14 Forgách 1982. 236.; Istvánffy 2003. 388.; Varga 2016. 196.

15 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.

16 MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 12 db. nr. 11.

17 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.; MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d. nr. 11.

18 MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d. nr. 11.

19 MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d. nr. 11.

20 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.

21 ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.


**Fig 1.** The progress of the campaign. Hungarian mobilizations in red, Turkish mobilizations in green.

Burdened with a large amount of pillaged goods, Erdődy's and Auersperg's armies withdrew to the Glina river, where the seriously injured bey Husrem was interrogated. His confession is known via Giczy's account: »*as to the emperor's army, he knows this: they shall not leave Sziget before winning it. From there the emperor shall move to Eger and proceed to capture that. He also said that there was news about Gyula taken, but even if Gyula was not captured, the emperor is to march to Gyula after Eger and he shall take that castle as well. There he shall divide the army and move to Buda for the winter; he does not know about the emperor's plans for the coming spring.*«[22]

According to the year-closing military report of the Court Military Council, there were skirmishes in the Croatian-Venetian borderlands even after the events in late August. A part of archduke Charles' troops attacked Pozsega, burned up the place and plundered most of the surrounding land. In late September, the ban's units were prowling and raiding up as far as Velike.[23]

Though the magnitude of the presented Christian military ventures in the Croatian-Venetian perimeter should not be overrated, it is worth noting that the attacks against Novi Grad and Kostajnica took place during the sieges of Szigetvár and Gyula, which must have been a serious disruption to the Ottoman military command; Ákos Csányi's letter dated August 31 states that 4000 cavalrymen from the camp besieging Szigetvár were recalled to Constantinople.[24] This information is most probably false, the unit in question actually being the Turkish rescue army that arrived at the Sava to aid against the assault of the Hungarian troops. Apart from the numbers and the Bosnians' involvement, the timelines also match. It suggests that archduke Charles not only led a successful campaign in the Turkish borderlands in Bosnia, but they also managed to divert major forces from the siege of Szigetvár. It is not their fault, however, that despite long-nurtured plans, neither Maximillian's troops in Győr, nor the other unit in Komárom followed suit and they never launched counterattacks against Esztergom, Visegrád or Székesfehérvár. The tactics that had been successfully employed during 1555-56, namely disrupting a Turkish campaign by attack on a stronghold or by nearby mobilization, was abandoned everywhere in 1566, except in the Croatian borderlands.

[22] MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d. nr. 11.

[23] ÖStA KA AFA 1566-13-3.; MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 13 d. nr. 12.

[24] MNL MOL MKA E 185 Nádasdy család lt. Missiles. 9 d. nr. 95.

## APPENDIX

### István Földvári for Ákos Csányi, Lendava, 28 April 1566

Szolgálatom ajánlása után, bizodalmas uram, az én régi és szolgált kegyelmes uram. Zrínyi uram kivel tegnap voltam szemben, és elég bőven beszédes, mind ebéd előtt, s mind ebéd után, jelenté, hogy holnapi napon akar indulni Csáktornyáról, Csorgóra. Panaszkodék eléggé, hogy kevés kísérő népet adott az fejedelem melléje, nem többet, száz lovag fegyveresnél, és két száz huszárnál. Mert ha ő felsége oly módon való népet adott volna melléje, kivel valamit kísértetné meg, minden szándéka ez volt, hogy ez mostani útjában valamire elég lehetett volna, mindent meg akart volna kísérteni, kiről ő fölségét egy néhány levelében meg találta és szorgalmaztatta. Jelenté fő Commissarius úr lészen vele, Ansperger uram az hadakozó tanács. Továbbá ez híreket jelenté ő nagysága, hogy császár ő fölsége írt volna Károly hercegnek Augustából, és azt parancsolta, hogy kétszáz ezer emberre való élést szerezzenek. Az ő nagysága mostani értelme szerint lészen az fejedelemnek ugyan bizonyában való hada, és személy szerint hadban lészen, ki immár nem késik Augustából alá jönni. Ő maga derék táborával Bécsnél lészen, Ferdinánd herceget, csehországi és morvai hadával Nagyszombatnál, avagy Sempténél végezte lenni. Károly herceget pedig Stájer, korontáli és Kranjolabeli hadával Potolynál végezte lenni. Az derék hadnak, kiben császár ő fölsége személye szerint lészen, főhadnagya az saxonai herceg és marsallja gróf Kinter svarczenburgi lészen. Jelente ezt is ő nagysága, hogy az hadba való készületet erősen meg parancsolta császár őfölsége minden országiban, de ezen csodálkozik, hogy ő fölsége magyar országbelieknek erről nem parancsol. Ezeket akarám meg írnom kegyelmednek a kegyelmed parancsolatyára, és ez levélnek elküldését bíztam Kun Mátyás uramra, az Bánfy István uram udvarbírájára, mert az Szemenye révre nem lén visszatérésem. Ajánlom kegyelmednek örök szolgálatomat. Az Úr isten tarcsa kegyelmed mindenkoron jó egészségben. Alsólendváról vasárnap, Szentgyörgy nap után, 1566.

Kegyelmed szolgája, Földvári István

Hosszútóti György egy pénzt sem vitt, hiszem hogy jól érti kegyelmed.

### Farkas Giczy for Orsolya Kanizsai, Castle of Sjeničak Lasinjski, 4 September1566

Tekéntetes és nagyságos, kegyelmes asszonyom, éltemig való szolgálatomat nagyságodnak, mint kegyelmes asszonyomnak. Innénd, ez földnek állapatyáról nagyságodnak egyéb hírt nem írhatok, hanem Bán uram és Aspergár uram az töb német urakkal és Zluny, Tersachyky és Blagay uraimmal mentenek vala az Ón víze felé, Újvár alá. Énis innénd az nagyságod szolgáival, mind lovaggal, gyaloggal el mentem vala. Az Ón vízén által mentönk vala és Újvárnak az városát mind el égették, az vár felé. Ki házak voltanak agáké, vajdáké, azokat mind el égeték, jóllehet, hogy Aspergár uram Bán urammal azt végezték volna, hogy az kik az száguldásba az rablóban lesznek, azokat Zlúny urammal mi őrízék, hogy ha Kosztanyicáról török jüne, de Zlúny uram éjel el szakadot vala tűlem, hanem szolgái voltanak velem. Az oláhokat bizony választig rablójok, és égetnyék, hogy az egész had háromszáz rabnál többet hoztönk, hogy mi az rablóból meg tevénk úgy érkezénk Újvár alá, hogy immár az váras éget. Az honnand mi az vár alá ereszkedönk vala alá, háttúl meg sialkodának, más felőlis mondák, hogy török, török. Az Hlewnay Huszrem bég hált volt azon éjel Krupa közöt, és Újvár közöt, hogy az lővést hallotta, úgy ült volt fel egy paripájára egynéhán magával, az lővésre megyen volt, Zlúny uram akkor nem németekkel volt, és reá ütöt Zlúny uram. Jóllehet, hogy mikor az bégre reá ütötenek, az bég többed magával volt, hogy sem Zlúny uram. De az paripa az békkel el eset, és az németek fogták meg az béget. Még senkit nem hadtak vele beszélleni, hanem Bán uram és Asperger uram beszéllet vele. Ez okáért sem hagynak vele beszélleni, hogy fölötte igen sebes. Az barbély az ki kötözi, azt mongya, hogy nehéz az fejének, ha beszélnek vele. Hogy Újvár alól meg térénk az Glyna vizén innénd vagyon egy víz, Csjemernicának híják, Bán uram és Aspergár uram szállottanak volt meg ot az víz mellet. Aspergár uram Bán uramat hítta volt hozzá és mentenek volt az béghez, hírt kérdeztenek tűle. Bán uram nekem mondá, hogy azt monta az bég, hogy ne báncsjatok mast, mert hogy szólók nehéz az fejemnek, ingyen csjászár hada felől ezt tuggya, hogy Szigetet el nem haggya, míg meg nem veszi. Onnand osztán Eger alá megyen, aztis meg veszi. Eztis monta, hogy hírön az, hogy Gyulát meg vették, de ha meg nem vettékis, Eger alól Gyula alá megyen, aztis meg veszi. Onnand osztán népet el osztya, és űmaga Budára megyen ót telel, kikeletre való szándékát nem tuggya. Eszt ez dolgot, ez előttis nagyságod tudására adtam volna,

de miúta az útról meg jütönk, minden éjel vagyon az sok lővés, vártam ha mi más hírem jünne, hogy nagyságodnak meg írnám. Azért ím ez jövendő vasárnapra hadta Bán uram, hogy minden ember az nyereséget Metlikére vigye. Bán uram monta vala nekem, hogy, ha az bég töb híreket beszéll, hogy nekem meg mongya, ha mi hírt értek, nagyságodnak meg írom. Nagyságodnak könyörgönk mindnyájan, kik it nagyságod szolgái vagyonk, hogy te nagyságod ezből az nyereségből az harmadát engednéje meg nagyságod, mert károsok sokan vagyonk, kinek lova sebes, kinek lova veszet oda. Nekemis oly lovam veszet oda, hogy látya isten nem adtam volna száz arany forinton. Mind lovaggal, gyaloggal töben voltonk oda innend nagyságod szolgái két száznál, az nyereség penig két oláh aszony ember, két oláh leányocsjka, horám oláh, egy török. Nagyságodnak könyörgönk, mint kegyelmes asszonyonknak, hogy nagyságod ezből lenne kegyelmes, ezk az foglyok sem tuggyák egy arány mondani, miért gyülekezet volt egybe az bég, hanem ki mongya, hogy híre volt, hogy Monoszlót akarja Bán uram meg szállani, annak sgétségére, ki mongya hogy Bowychra akart az bég jüni, hogy azt égesse meg, ki mongya, hogy nem tuggyák, ha mind ezekért vagy Magyar országra, az csjászár hadához kellet volna mennie. Az tenger mellé el bocsjáttám emberemet, ha nagyságodnak új tengeri újságot hoz, nagyságohoz ki küldöm. Nagyságodnak eztis adhatom tudtára, hogy az fű takaráson mast vagyonk az kölestakaráson, mert it fű elet az köles, búza it igen kevés lén ez idén. Az it való dologról nagyságodnak ezt írhatom, hogy az vár előt, mely hegy vagyon, kit palánkal csináltanak volt, az igen ó vala, és mast azt bontatom, és újonnand csináltatom. Nagyságodtól kegyelmes választ váronk mindnyájan, kik it az nagyságod szolgái vagyonk. Az Úristen tarcsja meg nagyságodat minden javaival, nagy sok jó esztendőkig, mind az nagyságod egyetlen fiával az én kegyelemes urammal egyetemben. Datum ex castro Sztenyicsjnyák, 4 die 7'bris. 1566.

Te nagyságodnak szolgája, Giczy Farkas

## SAŽETAK

Iako ne bi trebalo precijeniti značaj zabilježenih Kršćanskih vojnih pohoda u sklopu hrvatsko-mletačkih ratova, vrijedi spomenuti da su se napadi na Novi Grad i Kostajnicu zbili za vrijeme opsade Sigeta i Gyule, te da su vjerojatno uzrokovali značajnu pomutnju u vojnom zapovjedništvu Osmanlijskog carstva; Pismo koje je Ákos Csányi napisao 31. kolovoza navodi da je 4000 pripadnika konjice koja je Siget držala pod opsadom bilo pozvano u Konstantinopolis. Ova je informacija vrlo vjerojatno netočna, jedinica u pitanju je zapravo turska obrambena vojska koja je stigla do Save da pomogne prilikom napada mađarskih snaga. Osim samih brojki i uključenosti Bosne postoji i podudarnost na vremenskoj crti. Može se naslutiti da je nadvojvoda Charles ne samo vodio uspješnu bitku na granicama Osmanlijskog carstva u Bosni, već je uspio i preusmjeriti glavne snage od opsade Sigeta. Nije njihova greška što, usprkos pomnom i dugotrajnom planiranju, niti Maksimilijanova vojska u Győur, niti ostale jedinice u Komáromu nisu slijedile naredbe i nikada nisu izvršile protunapad na Esztergom, Visegrád ili Székesfehérvár. Taktika koja je uspješno korištena 1555.-1956., a svodila se na uzrokovanje pomutnje Osmanlijske vojske napadima na tvrđave ili pak putem mobilizacije, prestala se 1566. koristiti svugdje osim u graničnim područjima s Hrvatskom.