

Siniša Bilić-Dujmušić

Farska bitka

Siniša Bilić-Dujmušić
Hrvatsko katoličko sveučilište
Ilica 242
HR, 10000 Zagreb
sibil1962@gmail.com

UDK: 355.48(497.583Stari Grad) “-219”
(398Faros)
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Autor rekonstruira bitku koju je 219. g. pr. Kr. rimski konzul Lucije Emilije Paulo vodio protiv Demetrija Farskog nedaleko od grada Fara. Analizom Polibijevih podataka i osvrtom na dosadašnju znanstvenu literaturu nastoji definirati slijed vojne operacije i smjestiti je na konkretan teren. Bojno polje smješta na poluotok Kabal, a odlučnom uzvisinom smatra 50-70 m visok greben koji se proteže približno sredinom ovog poluotoka, te rekonstruira bitku na tom položaju.

Razmatra posljedice koje je za Rim imao ovaj sukob, a implicira ih Polibije, kao i posljedice za druge uključene strane.

U mjeri u kojoj je to trenutno moguće, a na nekim mjestima i više od toga, ovaj rad će nastojati rekonstruirati bitku koja se godine 219. pr. Kr. odigrala

The Battle of Pharos

Siniša Bilić-Dujmušić
Catholic University of Croatia
Ilica 242
CROATIA, 10000 Zagreb
sibil1962@gmail.com

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(398Faros)
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The author reconstructs the battle waged in 219 BC by Roman Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus against Demetrius of Pharos near the settlement of Pharos. Based on an analysis of the data from Polybius and a review of the previous scholarly literature, he attempts to define the sequence of military operations and place them in specific locations. The battlefield was located on the Kabal Peninsula, and the 50-70 m high ridge that extends roughly down the middle of the peninsula is deemed the decisive high ground; the battle at that position is reconstructed.

The repercussions this conflict had for Rome, as implied by Polybius, are considered, as are the consequences for the other involved parties.

To the extent that it is currently feasible, and at some points even beyond this, the work shall constitute

nedaleko od današnjega Staroga Grada na otoku Hvaru. Ta je bitka okončala doba najvećeg političkog prosperiteta toga grada i njegov položaj glavnoga grada države puno veće od grčkog polisa, čiji se utjecaj prostirao preko Pelješca i Boke kotorske sve do duboko u albanske planine.¹

Ključne riječi: Far, Farska bitka, Emilije Paulo, Demetrije Farski, Ilirski ratovi

an attempt to reconstruct the battle which was waged not far from today's town of Stari Grad on the island of Hvar in 219 BC. This battle ended the era of the town's greatest political prosperity and its status as the capital of a state much larger than a Greek polis, with a sphere of influence extending across the Pelješac Peninsula and Boka Kotarska and deep into the mountains of today's Albania.¹

Key Words: Pharos, Battle of Pharos, Aemilius Paullus, Demetrius of Pharos, Illyrian wars

* Branku Kiriginu. Magistro et amico libens, merito

1 Jednako kao što je kasnije haranje Omišana u toj mjeri razorilo Stari Grad da je otočno središte premješteno u Hvar: Skok 1950, str. 182.

* Dedicated to Branko Kirigin. Magistro et amico libens, merito

1 Just as the later raids of Omiš pirates devastated Stari Grad so much that the island's main settlement was moved to the town of Hvar: Skok 1950, p. 182.

Izvori

O problemima koje nam predstavljaju izvori o boju pod Farom godine 219. pr. Kr. već smo ranije pisali.² Zato ću na ovome mjestu samo sumirati problematiku i naglasiti neke točke koje nisu bile zanimljive za tematiku ranijeg rada.

Drugi ilirski rat bio je prilično značajan događaj u okvirima rimske povijesti 3. st. pr. Kr. i na ovaj ili onaj način spominje ga velik broj antičkih autora. No njihove su bilješke o tome vrlo kratke, sabijene i ne donose puno detalja. Naime, ovaj rimski pohod u Jadranu odigrao se simultano s izbijanjem sukoba protiv Hanibala na drugom kraju Sredozemlja, pa je manje dramatičan obračun s Demetrijem Farskim nužno pao u sjenu daleko veće i značajnije priče. Nažalost, najizdašniji izvor za koji znamo da je postojao, 20. knjiga Livijeva mega-djela *Ab urbe condita*, nije do nas preživjela. Kratka bilješka koju donose sačuvane *Periochae* potpuno je neinformativna: *Iliri su se ponovo pobunili, ali su svladani. Njihova predaja bila je prihvaćena.*³ Za povijest naših krajeva uvijek neizbježni Apijan donosi priču koju je malo teže uskladiti s kronologijom drugih izvora. Po njemu je Demetrije iskoristio rimsku zauzetost ratom protiv Gala u Padskoj nizini i u savezu s Histrima počeo gusariti. Nakon što ga je rimska flota svladala, pobjegao je u Makedoniju, ali se ubrzo vratio gusarenju u Jadranu pa su ga Rimljani ubili i razorili njegov rodni grad Far koji je s njim bio povezan u zločinu.⁴ Po Apijanu, dakle, farska bitka ne bi uopće spadala među događaje Drugog ilirskog rata, već se dogodila u nekom nespecificiranom vremenu Demetrijeva povratka.⁵

Dion Kasije donosi nešto širu priču, ali ona stvara više problema nego što ih rješava. Demetrije je, po Dionu, zloupotrebjavao prijateljstvo s Rimljanima da bi napadao susjedna plemena, a kada su ga zbog toga konzuli Emilije Paulo i Marko Livije pozvali preda se, nije se odazvao, već je nastavio s napadima. Nato su konzuli pokrenuli vojsku na njega i napali ga na otoku Visu, jer su saznali da se ondje usidrio sa svojom flotom. Poslali su mali dio rimskih brodova na drugu stranu otoka, a nakon što su se Iliri otisnuli kako bi napali taj laki plijen, rimska flota je neometano uplovila na položaj ilirskog sidrišta i ondje postavila logor. Domorodci, bijesni što su prevareni, napali su rimski logor, ali su odbijeni. Nakon tog poraza Demetrije

Sources

I have already written previously about the problems presented by the sources on the Battle at Pharos in 219 BC.² So here I shall only summarize the problems and stress certain points that were not pertinent to the topic of that earlier work.

The Second Illyrian War was a rather significant event within the framework of Roman history in the 3rd century BC, and it was mentioned in one way or another by numerous Classical writers. But their notations on it are very brief, terse and lacking in detail. That is because this Roman push into the Adriatic proceeded at the same time as the outbreak of the conflict with Hannibal on the other side of the Mediterranean, so the less dramatic confrontation with Demetrius of Pharos was necessarily overshadowed by a far greater and more important story. Unfortunately, the most extensive source known to have existed, the twentieth book of Livy's monumental work *Ab urbe condita*, has not survived to this day. The short note contained in the preserved *Periochae* is entirely uninformative: "The Illyrians revolted again, but were subdued. Their surrender was accepted."³ Appian, always unavoidable for the history of the lands that would later become Croatia, recounted a story that is difficult to align with the chronology of other sources. According to him, Demetrius exploited the Roman preoccupation with its war against the Gauls in the Po valley to begin engaging in piracy together with the Histrians. After the Roman fleet overcame him, he fled to Macedonia, but soon returned to piracy on the Adriatic, so that the Romans killed him and razed his native town of Pharos, which was complicit in his crimes.⁴ So according to Appian, the Battle of Pharos was not even among the events of the Second Illyrian War, rather it happened during the unspecified time when Demetrius had returned.⁵

Cassius Dio provided a somewhat broader story, but it creates more problems than it solves. Demetrius, according to Dio, misused his friendship with the Romans in order to attack neighbouring tribes, and when the consuls Aemilius Paullus and Marcus Livius called on him to surrender, he did not respond, but rather continued his raids. The consuls then sent their armies against him and they attacked him on the island of Vis, because they learned that he had berthed

2 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, str. 34-42.

3 Liv. *Per.*, 20.13.

4 App. *Illyr.*, 8.

5 Za detaljnu analizu Apijanove ilirske knjige vidi Dobiáš 1930, te najnovije Šašel Kos 2005, posebno str. 267-279.

2 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, pp. 34-42.

3 Liv. *Per.*, 20.13.

4 App. *Illyr.*, 8.

5 For a detailed analysis of Appian's Illyrian book, see Dobiáš 1930, and the latest by Šašel Kos 2005, esp. pp. 267-279.

bježi za Far, a rimska flota ga slijedi i zauzima grad, ali tek nakon što je Demetrije uspio pobjeći makedonskom kralju Filipu. Ovaj odbija Demetrija izručiti Rimljanima, no kad se Demetrije poslije vratio u Iliriju, Rimljani ga uspiju zarobiti te ga pogubiše.⁶

Ovu je priču teško pomiriti s onom Polibijevom (vidi dalje): ako čak i dopustimo mogućnost da je Demetrije zagospodario Visom pa rimski napad pričekao usidren u nekoj viškoj uvali i da se neka bitka ondje odigrala, teško je prihvatiti da bi rimski konzul Demetrija dva puta zaredom u nekoliko dana upecao na isti trik s odvajanjem manjeg dijela flote. O bitci pod Farom saznajemo jedino to da je Rimljanima ondje pružen otpor. A za jedini podatak u kojemu su Dion i Apijan suglasni, da su Rimljani uspjeli pogubiti Demetrija nakon što se vratio na ove prostore, iz drugih izvora znamo da nije točan: Demetrije je ostatak života proveo kao savjetnik makedonskog kralja Filipa V. i stradao je pet godina nakon svoga grada, pokušavajući za Filipa osvojiti grad Mesenu na Peloponezu.⁷ Čini se da s Dionom Kasijem opet imamo isti problem kao i s njegovim opisom opsada Salone 49. g. pr. Kr. i Andetrija 9. g. po. Kr. Naime, on je tijekom karijere bio upravitelj provincije Dalmacije i očito je obilazio mjesta poznata u povijesti, pa nam često prenosi zanimljive jedinstvene priče o ovdašnjim ratnim događajima, ali ne one koje je našao zapisane kod kolega povjesničara, već one koje je osobno čuo od domaćeg stanovništva na terenu. Ratne priče koje se prenose usmenom tradicijom, kao i sve mjesne legende, s protokom vremena mijenjaju se i iskrivljuju, a u ovom slučaju riječ je o događaju koji se odigrao više od 300 godina od Dionova doba.⁸

Da su nam, kojim slučajem, preostali samo ovi, ne baš kompatibilni podaci iz Livija, Apijana i Diona Kasija, imali bismo potpuno drugačiju sliku Drugog ilirskog rata, a o događajima pod Farom ne bismo znali ništa. Na svu sreću, ovdje raspoložemo i Polibijevom trećom knjigom *Historija*, koja je tek dvije generacije udaljena od događaja i daleko je najopširniji

there with his fleet. They sent a small contingent of Roman vessels to the other side of the island, and after the Illyrians set off to attack this easy prey, the Roman fleet sailed into the Illyrian anchorage unimpeded and set up camp there. The natives, infuriated at the deception, assaulted the Roman camp, but were repelled. After this defeat, Demetrius fled to Pharos, but the Roman fleet followed him and occupied the town, albeit only after Demetrius had managed to escape to the court of Macedonian King Phillip. The latter refused to extradite Demetrius to the Romans, but since Demetrius later returned to Illyria, the Romans captured and then executed him.⁶

This story is difficult to reconcile with that of Polybius (see below): even if we allow for the possibility that Demetrius had taken control of Vis and awaited the Roman attack anchored in one of the island's coves and that a battle was then waged there, it is scarcely believable that the Roman consul would have managed to deceive Demetrius with the same ruse of separating a smaller part of his fleet twice over the course of only a few days. All we learn about the battle at Pharos is that some resistance was mounted against the Romans. The only detail upon which both Dio and Appian concur, that the Romans managed to execute Demetrius after he had returned to the area, is known to be inaccurate based on other sources: Demetrius spent the rest of his life as an adviser to King Phillip V of Macedonia and he was killed five years after his town was captured when he attempted to conquer the city of Messene on the Peloponnese for Phillip.⁷ It would appear that in the case of Cassius Dio we have the same problem that arises with his description of the siege of Salona in 49 BC and of Andretrium in 9 AD. Namely, he was the governor of the province of Dalmatia during his career and he had obviously toured the sites known from history, so he often recounted interesting and unique stories about local wartime events, although not those he found written down by his fellow historians, but rather those he had heard personally from local residents in the field. War stories passed down by oral tradition, like all local legends, change over time and become distorted, and

6 Dio, 12 fr. 53 = Zon., 8.20.10-13.

7 Polyb., 3.19.11; Paus. *Perieg.* 4.29; 4.32 - s time da Pa-uzanija ovdje miješa Demetrija Farskog s istoimenim sinom kralja Filipa V. Princ Demetrije ubijen je 181. g. pr. Kr. u Herakleji u Peoniji (Liv., 40.24). Drugačije mišljenje vidi kod Šašel Kos 2005, str. 279, koja smatra da je Polibije taj koji je ovdje mogao zamijeniti Demetrija Farskog s nekom drugom osobom istog imena, te da ne treba isključivati njegov eventualni kasniji pokušaj obnove dominacije u Jadranu.

8 Iscrpna analiza ovog dijela Dionove *Rimske povijesti* može se naći kod Šašel Kos 1986, str. 55-85.

6 Dio, 12 fr. 53 = Zon., 8.20.10-13.

7 Polyb., 3.19.11; Paus. *Perieg.* 4.29; 4.32 - although here Pausanias confuses Demetrius of Pharos with the son of Phillip V, who had the same name. Prince Demetrius was killed in Heraclea in Paeonia in 181 (Liv., 40.24). A different view can be found in Šašel Kos 2005, p. 279, who believed that it was Polybius who may have confused Demetrius of Pharos with another person of the same name, and that the possibility of a later attempt by him to restore his domination over the Adriatic should not be excluded.

i najpouzdaniji izvor o njemu.⁹ No ni ovdje nismo bez problema, jer je očevidno da Polibije svoj tekst o Drugom ilirskom ratu, a posebno onaj dio o sukobu pod Farom, piše s figom u džepu. Nije uopće teško uvidjeti da je njegov tekst tendenciozan i pisan s krajnjom nakanom da izgradi pozitivnu sliku o konzulu Emiliju Paulu i prikaže ga kao iznimno sposobnog i mudrog zapovjednika. To, samo po sebi, ne bi bilo nešto odveć loše da ne nalazimo kako nam Polibije prešućuje i iskrivljuje neke činjenice koje bi se loše odrazile na tu sliku - pa se, onda, s pravom možemo pitati do koje mjere Polibije spreman ići i u kojoj su mjeri relevantni njegovi podaci koje nismo u stanju potvrditi ili opovrgnuti usporedbom s drugim izvorima.

O čemu se radi? Podatak koji ćemo naći istaknut baš u svakoj Polibijevoj biografiji kaže da je on u Rim dospio kao talac i da je za boravka u Rimu uspio ući u tada elitni intelektualni krug oko Scipiona Emilijana,¹⁰ vjerojatno poznatijeg kao Scipion Afrički Mlađi. Pri tome Scipionu Emilijanu nije bio samo partner za ugodno ćaskanje, već mu je u mladosti bio učitelj, a u rat protiv Numancije prati ga kao vojni savjetnik. Među njima dvojicom razvio se intimni prijateljski odnos. E sada, ono što je u tome bitno za našu priču jest da Scipion Emilijan nije rođen u obitelji Scipiona, nego je u nju adoptiran, a njegov biološki otac je Lucije Emilije Paulo, slavni pobjednik nad Makedonijom, što znači da mu je naš Lucije Emilije Paulo, pobjednik nad Demetrijem Farskim, biološki djed.¹¹ Upravo je Emilije Makedonski unajmio Polibija kao učitelja svojim sinovima. Tako, kad Polibije piše o Drugom ilirskom ratu, on piše o djelima rođenog djeda svog prijatelja i zaštitnika i ne čudi da brani reputaciju njegovih predaka koja je u rimskoj političkoj areni iznimno bitan čimbenik.¹² Veliki problem koji pri tome Polibije ima s Emilijem Paulom, konzulom godine 219., je taj što je on ponovo bio konzulom 216. g. pr. Kr. i tom prilikom bio jedan od zapovjednika koji su povelili rimsku vojsku u katastrofu kod Kane. Polibije, naravno, Emilija nastoji oprati od odgovornosti za najveći poraz rimskog oružja koji se ikad dogodio. Zato

in this case the events in question had transpired over 300 years prior to Dio's time.⁸

Had these not quite compatible data from Livy, Appian and Cassius Dio been all that remained for us, we would have had an entirely different picture of the Second Illyrian War, and we would have known nothing about the events at Pharos. Fortunately, we also have at our disposal the third book of *The Histories* by Polybius, which was written only couple generations after the events and which is by far the most extensive and reliable source on it.⁹ Even this source is not without its drawbacks, however, for it is apparent that Polybius wrote his text on the Second Illyrian War, and particularly the section about the conflict at Pharos, "with his fingers crossed," so to speak. It is not at all difficult to see that his text is tendentious and written with the intent of building a positive perception of Consul Aemilius Paullus and portraying him as an exceptionally capable and astute commander. In and of itself, this would not be such a bad thing, if Polybius had not suppressed and twisted certain facts that would have reflected poorly on this picture; so we may then justifiably pose the question of the extent to which Polybius was prepared to go and the degree to which we can rely on his information, which we can neither confirm nor deny by comparing it to other sources.

What are we dealing with here? Something underscored in literally every biography of Polybius is that he came to Rome as a hostage and that during his stay in the city he managed to join the then elite intellectual circle of Scipio Aemilianus,¹⁰ probably better known as Scipio Africanus the Younger. Here he did not simply serve Scipio Africanus as a partner for pleasant conversation, rather he was the latter's teacher in his youth, and during the war against Numantia he accompanied him as a military adviser. A very intimate friendship developed between them. But the important part of this for our story is that Scipio Aemilianus was not born into the Scipio family, rather he had been adopted into it, and his biological father was Lucius

9 Za širu studiju Polibijeva djela vidjeti Champion 2004, posebno str. 113-140, te Walbank 1957, posebno vol. 1, str. 292-450, kao i Moore 1965, posebno str. 10-52.

10 Danas u znanosti postoji prijepor je li "scipionski krug" stvarno postojao kao, modernim rječnikom rečeno, stalni debatan klub ili se radi o pogrešnom tumačenju Ciceronovih navoda (poglavito u Cic. *De amic.*, 69). O tome vidi primjerice: Brown 1934; Hanchey 2013, *pass.*, Zetzel 1972, str. 173-179. Polibija se ubraja u taj krug na osnovi podataka u Cic. *De Rep.*, 2.27; 4.3.

11 Plut. *Emil. Paul.*, 2; 5; Polyb. 31.26.1; 31.28.1.

12 Polibije iskazuje veliku naklonost i zahvalnost Emilijima: vidi primjerice njegov tekst u 31.22-30.

8 An exhaustive analysis of this part of Dio's *Roman History* can be found in Šašel Kos 1986, pp. 55-85.

9 For a broader study of the works of Polybius, see Champion 2004, especially pp. 113-140, and Walbank 1957, especially vol. 1, pp. 292-450, as well as Moore 1965, especially pp. 10-52.

10 Today there are scholarly disputes over whether the "Scipionic Circle" actually existed as - in modern parlance - an actual debate club or whether this was simply an erroneous interpretation of Cicero's statements (primarily in Cic. *De amic.*, 69). On this, see, e.g.: Brown 1934; Hanchey 2013, *pass.*, Zetzel 1972, pp. 173-179. Polybius was counted among this circle based on the information in Cic. *De Rep.*, 2.27; 4.3.

težište priče o Drugom ilirskom ratu stavlja na lukavstvo kojim je Emilije nadmudrio Demetrija, kako bi o njemu unaprijed stvorio sliku kvalitetnog vojskovođe kakav sigurno ne može biti odgovoran za poraz tolikih razmjera, te je onda u opisu bitke kod Kane krivnju lakše pripisao nekom drugom.¹³

Pri tom veličanju lika i djela Emilija Paula Polibije se služi i nekim sredstvima koja danas ne bismo smatrali moralnima, a ni prihvatljivima. Tako, recimo, potpuno prešućuje Emilijeva kolegu i suzapovjednika Marka Livija Salinatora.¹⁴ Polibijev tekst ostavlja dojam da je sve operacije, od početnih sukoba do pada Fara, vodio konzul Lucije Emilije. Istini za volju, može se primijetiti da Polibije, kada govori o operacijama oko Dimala, rabi izraz „rimski vojskovođa“ (ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων), a ni u jednom trenutku ne spominje njegovo ime. Emilija će neposredno imenovati tek kao osvajača Fara. No kako nigdje nije spomenuo nekog drugog konzula, čitatelju se nameće zaključak da je cijelo vrijeme riječ o Emiliju. Jasno je i zašto to Polibije radi: da je spomenuo kako je zajedno s Emilijem u tom ratu bio i puno čuveniji i kasnije uspješniji vojskovođa Livije Salinator, Emilije ne samo da bi morao dijeliti uspjeh, nego bi svaki čitatelj veći dio zasluga automatski pripisao slavnim Salinatoru.¹⁵ Ovdje je lako zamijetiti Polibijev manevar jer postoji cijela pregršt izvora koji nezavisno potvrđuju da su u Drugom ilirskom ratu zapovijedala oba konzula te godine, da su obojica za to dobili trijumf i da su obojica kasnije izvedeni pred sud pod optužbom da su vrlo mali dio plijena podijelili vojnicima.¹⁶ Kako rekoh, kada to znamo, ostaje otvorenim pitanje: koje je još detalje Polibije bio spreman „uštimiti“ eda bi bolje odgovarali njegovoj krajnjoj namjeri, a koje ne možemo provjeriti preko drugih izvora?

No takva situacija s Polibijem ima i svojih dobrih strana. Ponajprije, ona je vjerojatno jedini razlog zašto

Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, the famed conqueror of Macedonia, which means that ‘our’ Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the victor over Demetrius of Pharos, was his biological grandfather.¹¹ It was in fact Aemilius Macedonicus who hired Polybius to serve as the teacher for his sons. Thus, when Polybius wrote about the Second Illyrian War, he was writing about the actions of the biological grandfather of his friend and patron, so it is not surprising that he would have defended the reputation of the latter’s ancestors, which was exceptionally vital in the Roman political arena.¹² A major problem that Polybius encountered concerning Aemilius Paullus, the consul in 219 BC, is that the latter once more served as consul in 216 BC and on that occasion he was one of the commanders who led the Roman army at the disastrous Battle of Cannae. Polybius, naturally, attempted to absolve Aemilius of responsibility for this greatest defeat ever suffered by the Roman armed forces. This is why, when recounting the story about the Second Illyrian War, he placed emphasis on the cunning manner in which Aemilius outwitted Demetrius, so that at the very outset he could create an image of a canny military leader who certainly could not have been culpable for such a major defeat, for then he could more easily lay the blame on someone else in his description of the Battle of Cannae.¹³

In his exaltation of the life and times of Aemilius Paullus, Polybius resorted to certain means that would be considered neither moral nor acceptable today. Thus, for example, he entirely ignores Aemilius’ colleague and fellow commander, Marcus Livius Salinator.¹⁴ In his text, Polybius created the impression that all operations, from the initial conflicts to the fall of Pharos, were led by Consul Lucius Aemilius. To be sure, it may be noticed that Polybius, when speaking of the operations around Dimallum, used the term “Roman army leader” (ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων), without mentioning his name at any point. He only indirectly named Aemilius as the conqueror of Pharos. But since he never once mentioned the

13 Usp. Polyb., 3.110; 3.116. Tim više što je u masama postojalo uvjerenje da je upravo Emilije najveći krivac za poraz kod Kane, jer je on nosio loše znamenje time što je mrzio plebs, zato što su ga ranije plebejski tribuni podvrgnuli sramotnom suđenju. Takvo uvjerenje prenosi Silije Italik (*Punica*, 8.289-290).

14 Bilo bi vjerojatno točnije reći Marko Livije, kasnije nazvan Salinator, jer je ovaj *cognomen* dobio zbog uvođenja poreza na sol kao cenzor 204. g. pr. Kr. (Liv., 29.37).

15 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, str. 38.

16 *Vir. ill.*, 50; Liv., 27.34; Front. *Strat.*, 4.1.45; Suet. *Tib.*, 3; Val. Max., 4.2.2; 2.9.6; Plut. *Fab. Max.*, 14; Dio., 12 fr. 53; Zon., 8.20.10-13. Na Trijumfalnim fastima nije sačuvan popis trijumfatora između 221. i 197. pr. Kr. Livijev trijumf: *Vir. ill.*, 50; usp. Suet. *Tib.*, 3. Emilijev trijumf: Polyb., 3.19.12; 4.66.4-8.

11 Plut. *Emil. Paul.*, 2; 5; Polyb. 31.26.1; 31.28.1.

12 Polybius demonstrated a great affinity for and gratitude to the Aemilii; see, e.g., his text in 31.22-30.

13 Cf. Polyb., 3.110; 3.116. All the more so since the prevailing conviction among the public was that Aemilius actually bore the most blame for the defeat at Cannae, as he had a poor reputation for despising the plebs, because the plebeian tribunes subjected him to a humiliating trial. This conviction was conveyed by Silius Italicus (*Punica*, 8.289-290).

14 It would probably be more accurate to call him Marcus Livius, later called Salinator, because he was only given this cognomen when he introduced a salt tax when he served as censor in 204 BC (Liv., 29.37).

kod njega uopće nalazimo opis bitke pod Farom, koju svi ostali antički historiografi ne nalaze toliko bitnom i ne opisuju je: za razliku od njih, Polibije je imao dobar razlog da njezin opis uvrsti u svoj tekst. Osim toga, lako bi moglo biti da je Polibije ovako intoniranu priču našao u arhivima svoga mecene. Ne bi bilo nimalo neobično da neka rimska obitelj u prvi plan stavlja zasluge svoga pretka i istodobno umanjuje zasluge njegova kolege. Tako bi Polibijev opis ratnih događaja pod Farom 219. g. pr. Kr. mogao imati prvorazredan izvor, opis iz pera samoga rimskog zapovjednika, što bi ga činilo vrlo pouzdanim osloncem za proučavanje operativnih detalja.

Opće okolnosti¹⁷

Polibije smatra da su pokretanjem rata protiv Demetrija Farskog Rimljani počinili lošu stratešku procjenu - i to s katastrofalnim posljedicama. U samo nekoliko rečenica iznosi jednu finu i kompleksnu stratešku analizu, koja bi lako mogla biti rezultatom rasprave i procjene elitnih intelektualaca unutar *scipionskog kruga*. I, po svemu sudeći, pogađa na pravo mjesto.¹⁸

Svi ti u našim izvorima naredani razlozi za pokretanje rata protiv Demetrija samo su pusta opravdanja koja je, ruku na srce, malo teško progutati i teško je pristati da su u njima sadržani pravi rimski motivi. U gusarski pohod uvukao je Histre i odvratio je Atintane od Rima?¹⁹ Osim što zanimljivo upućuje na dvije

other consul anywhere, the reader is led to conclude that he was referring to Aemilius the entire time. It is clear why Polybius did so: had he mentioned that Aemilius had been accompanied in this war by the much better known and later far more successful military leader Livius Salinator, Aemilius would not only have had to share the success, for any reader would have automatically accorded more credit to the famed Salinator.¹⁵ Here the manoeuvre by Polybius is rather obvious, because there is an entire series of sources which independently confirm that both of that year's consuls served as commanders in the Second Illyrian War, that both were awarded a triumph and that both were later charged for unfairly dividing the spoils with their troops.¹⁶ As I stated, knowing this, one question remains open: what other details was Polybius prepared to "doctor" so that they would correspond to his ultimate aim, but which cannot be verified with other sources?

However, this situation with Polybius also has its positive aspects. First and foremost, this is probably the sole reason why he even included a description of the battle at Pharos, which all other Classical historians did not consider sufficiently important, so that they never even bothered describing it: as opposed to them, Polybius had good reason to include a description of it in his text. Additionally, it may very well have been that Polybius found stories with this tone in the records of his patron. It would not have been in the least unusual for a Roman family like this to put the merits of its ancestor in the forefront and simultaneously belittle the services of his colleague. In this case, Polybius may have had a first-class source for his description of wartime events at Pharos in 219 BC: a description written by the Roman commander himself, which would make it a very reliable source to study the operative details.

General circumstances¹⁷

Polybius believed that the Romans made a poor strategic assessment when they launched a war against

17 U ovom članku ne želim ulaziti u složenu historiografsku analitiku, koje se s vremenom poprilično nakupilo, o odnosu Rima i Ilirije, o Polibijevu portretiranju Demetrija Farskog, o Demetrijevoj politici i uzrocima Drugoga ilirskog rata - iako ćete ponešto od toga naći u bilješkama, tamo gdje sam smatrao potrebnim nešto pojasniti čitateljima koji nisu stručnjaci za ovo razdoblje. Ista, slična i neka različita mišljenja od ovdje iznesenih vidi kod: Badian 1964, str. 81-88; Eckstein 1994, str. 46-59; Eckstein 2008, str. 42-73; Errington 1989, str. 91-95; Petzold 1971, str. 210-233; Šašel Kos 2005, str. 267 i d. Osim navedenih, interpretacije uzroka i tijeka Drugoga ilirskog rata vidi kod: Bresson 1995, str. 285-287; Coppola 1991, str. 111-124; Coppola 1993, str. 85-100; Fine 1936, str. 24-39; Gruen 1984, str. 368-373; Holleaux 1954, str. 272 i d.; Kirigin 2004, str. 192-202; Šašel Kos 1986, str. 70; Wilkes 1969, str. 19-21; Zaninović 1998., *pass*.

18 Polyb., 3.16.

19 App. *Illyr.*, 8. Usp. Eutrop. *Brev.*, 3.7.1., te Diod. Sic., 25.14.1, kao i Šašel Kos 2005, str. 272, i ondje navedenu literaturu. Kombinacijom podataka u ova tri izvora izvlači se zaključak da je riječ o rimskom angažmanu protiv Insubra i Boja 225. g. pr. Kr., koji je prerastao u pokušaj potpunog slamanja Kelta u cisalpinskom

15 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, p. 38.

16 *Vir. ill.*, 50; Liv., 27.34; Front. *Strat.*, 4.1.45; Suet. *Tib.*, 3; Val. Max., 4.2.2; 2.9.6; Plut. *Fab. Max.*, 14; Dio., 12 fr. 53; Zon., 8.20.10-13. The list of triumphators between 221 and 197 BC were not preserved in the *Fasti Triumphales*. Triumph of Livius: *Vir. ill.*, 50; cf. Suet. *Tib.*, 3. Triumph of Aemilius: Polyb., 3.19.12; 4.66.4-8.

17 It is not my intention in this article to delve into the complex historiographic analysis, which has become quite extensive over the years, on relations between Rome and Illyria, or on the portrait of Demetrius of Pharos painted by Polybius, or on the former's policies

krajnje točke istočnog Jadrana kao područja Demetrijeve aktivnosti, valja se upitati što ova Apijanova izjava uopće znači. Odnosi li se ona na Histre i Atintane kao narod ili govori da su se neki Histri i neki Atintani (ili čak mnogi Histri i Atintani) kao pojedinci priključili Demetriju privučeni njegovim unosnim aktivnostima? Sjetimo se govora mlađeg Korunkanija Teuti: Rimljani ilirsku državu smatraju odgovornom za to što čine neki Iliri kao privatnici,²⁰ a takav *lijepi običaj* (κάλλιστον ἔθος) očito nije baš bio prihvaćen na suprotnoj obali Jadrana. Pri tome bi Atintani lako mogli biti više nevoljne žrtve Demetrijeve političke ucjene negoli dobrovoljni suradnici.²¹ Nadalje, pljačkao je teritorij susjednih plemena, od kojih su barem neka od njih bili rimski saveznici, kaže Dion Kasije.²² Osim što je poprilično nespecificirana optužba (kakve rimske pravne predodžbe ne podnose), pa o njoj zbog toga ne možemo ni raspravljati, lako ćemo se složiti da to baš i ne bi bio dovoljan razlog koji će mu dovesti rimske legije za vrat. Polibije donosi ozbiljnije optužbe, koje na prvi pogled izgledaju dosta logično, ali zajedno predstavljaju potpuni pravni nonsens: ... *Demetrije Farski je pljačkao i pokoravao svojoj vlasti gradove Ilirije koji su bili podanici Rima i, u suprotnosti s mirovnim sporazumom, plovio je dalje od Lisa s 50 lembe i popljačkao mnoge Kiklade.*²³ Cikladi tada

prostoru i potrajao do 222. g. pr. Kr. Ovu su situaciju jadranski pirati koristili da bi napadali brodove koji su sicilsko žito transportirali prema rimskoj vojsci u Padskoj nizini. Budući da je rimska intervencija na histarske pirate uslijedila godine 221., većinom se drži da bi te piratske aktivnosti pripadale u godinu 222. pr. Kr. No Demetrije tada nije mogao znatnije sudjelovati u njima jer je tu ratnu sezonu proveo na Peloponezu, gdje je ratovao na strani Antigona III. Dosona i sudjelovao u bitci kod Selasije (Polyb., 2.65.4; 2.66.5). A ako se krajem plovne sezone uspio još posvetiti i gusarstvu, daleko je vjerojatnija situacija obrnuta od one koju implicira Apijan: da su Histri ti koji su otpočeli s napadima na rimske konvoje te kasnije u to uvukli i Demetrija. No ova rekonstrukcija možda ne pogađa bit, a možda ni pravi opseg Demetrijeve suradnje s Histrima.

20 Polyb., 2.8.10.

21 Šašel Kos 2005, str. 277.

22 Dio, 12, fr. 51.

23 Polyb., 3.16.3. Zanimljivo je i da se takva optužba nigdje ne iznosi protiv Skerdilaide, koji u to doba zasigurno jest, makar formalno, podanik ilirskoga kralja i na njega su se ove odredbe o plovidbi odnosile. Isti Polibije na drugome mjestu (4.16.6) opisuje kako su Demetrije i Skerdilaida zajedno prešli liniju Lisa s 90 brodova. Skerdilaidi to Rimljani vjerojatno nisu uzeli za velik prekršaj jer se u tom pohodu kasnije uključio u sukob protiv Makedonije. U tom kontekstu valja

Demetrius of Pharos - one that had disastrous consequences. In just a few sentences he made a refined and complex strategic analysis, which may very well have been the result of debate and assessments by the elite intellectuals in the Scipionic Circle. And, by all indications, he hit the mark accurately.¹⁸

All of these reasons for launching the war against Demetrius listed in our sources are simply justifications which, truth be told, are rather difficult to accept, just as it is difficult to agree that they reflect Rome's genuine motivations. Demetrius drew the Histrians into piracy and turned the Atintani away from Rome?¹⁹ Besides intriguingly pointing to two extreme ends of the eastern Adriatic as the sphere of his activities, it is worthwhile asking just what this assertion by Appian even means. Does it refer to the Histrians and Atintani as peoples or just some Histrians and Atintani (or even

and the causes of the Second Illyrian War - even though some of this will be covered in the footnotes, when I felt it necessary to clarify certain aspects for readers who may not be well versed in this period. For opinions identical or similar to, and some differing from, those put forth herein see: Badian 1964, pp. 81-88; Eckstein 1994, pp. 46-59; Eckstein 2008, pp. 42-73; Errington 1989, pp. 91-95; Petzold 1971, pp. 210-233; Šašel Kos 2005, p. 267 ff. Additional interpretations of the causes and course of the Second Illyrian War can be found in: Bresson 1995, pp. 285-287; Coppola 1991, pp. 111-124; Coppola 1993, pp. 85-100; Fine 1936, pp. 24-39; Gruen 1984, pp. 368-373; Holleaux 1954, pp. 272 ff.; Kirigin 2004, pp. 192-202; Šašel Kos 1986, p. 70; Wilkes 1969, pp. 19-21; Zaninović 1998, *pass.*

18 Polyb., 3.16.

19 App. *Illyr.*, 8. Cf. Eutrop. *Brev.*, 3.7.1., and Diod. Sic., 25.14.1, also Šašel Kos 2005, p. 272, and the literature cited therein. By combining the data from these three sources, one may draw the conclusion that this pertained to the Roman engagement against the Insures and Boii in 225 BC, which grew into an attempt to crush the Celts in the Cisalpine zone and lasted until 222 BC. Adriatic pirates exploited this situation to attack the vessels transporting Sicilian grain to the Roman army in the Po valley. Since the Roman intervention against the Histrian pirates followed in 221 BC, it is widely believed that this piracy was carried out in 222 BC. But Demetrius could not have participated in this to any great degree, because he spent that season in the Peloponnese, where he fought with Antigonus III Doson and participated in the battle of Sellasia (Polyb., 2.65.4; 2.66.5). Even if he had managed to engage in piracy at the end of the sailing season, a situation opposite to the one implied by Appian was far more likely: that the Histrians initiated the attacks on Roman convoys and then drew Demetrius into them. But this reconstruction may not clarify the essence, and perhaps not even the extent, of the collaboration between Demetrius and the Histrians.

nisu u sastavu rimskog dominija i ne mogu biti rimskim povodom za rat. Jasno je da se ovdje Polibije poziva na kršenje mirovnog sporazuma nametnutog Teuti nakon Prvog ilirskog rata. Ali ako su te odredbe nametnute Teuti, tj. ilirskoj državi, jesu li se nužno odnosile i na Demetrija? On jest dobio na upravu neke (možda čak i mnoge) bivše Agronove posjede, ali kao jasno naznačen poseban entitet. Dapače, uvedemo li pretpostavku da on kasnije osvaja neke gradove Ilirije,²⁴ to samo po sebi znači da nije gospodar te države, pa zašto bi se na njega odnosila ograničenja plovidbe nametnuta toj državi? Time što je oženio ilirsku princezu (kraljicu majku, jednu od kraljica udovica, bivšu kraljicu od koje se kralj razveo ili što god da je Triteuta bila)²⁵ i tako postao očuhom maloljetnoga ilirskog kralja, vjerojatno je znatno učvrstio svoj položaj na ardijejskom dvoru, ali time sigurno nije zasjeo na tron njihova kraljevstva²⁶ - i Apijan i Dion

postaviti i pitanje na koji je način godine 222. pr. Kr. Demetrije uopće došao na bojno polje kod Selasije na južnom Peloponezu. Ako je svojih 1600 Ilira doveo na brodovima (što je daleko vjerojatnije nego da je išao kopnom), tada je ponovo morao prekršiti odredbu o plovidbi iza Lisa, ali sada Polibije o tome šuti.

- 24 To se ne odnosi na podatak kod Polibija jer on govori o prostoru koji nije pod suverenitetom ilirske države, već je nakon Prvoga ilirskog rata stavljen pod zaštitu Rima. Odnosi se na interpretacije (Errington 1989, str. 92; Hammond 1968, str. 11 i drugdje; slično Šašel Kos 2005, str. 262-263) da je Demetrije neposredno pred Drugi ilirski rat oteo Ilirima Dimale i možda još neke utvrde.
- 25 Ovisno, naravno, o tome je li ona bila Agronova supruga ili samo prilježnica i je li na ardijejskom dvoru uopće bila dopuštena vladarska poligamija. Osim za Agrona, naši nam izvori bilježe još samo za Gencija da je imao dvije supruge (Etuta: Liv., 44.30.4 i Etleva: Liv., 44.32.3), ali ne znamo jesu li to bile istodobno ili u slijedu. Walbank smatra da poligamija nije vjerojatna u ilirskom slučaju jer je u poligamnim društvima općenito utjecaj žene vrlo nizak i bilo bi teško da neka žena dođe na položaj kakav je imala Teuta (Walbank 1976, str. 268).
- 26 Da je Demetrije ovim brakom postao regent maloljetnom kralju, pa onda i praktički gospodar ilirske države, samo je znanstvena pretpostavka koja nigdje nije izričito potvrđena u izvorima. Prema Dionu Demetrije je nakon Teutine smrti Pinesov ἐπιτροπέουσεως (Dio, 12, fr. 51; Zonaras, 8.20), skrbnik, namjesnik, kurator - što ne znači nužno da je postao regent kraljevstva, nego da je on taj koji se u ime Rima brine o dobrobiti mladog kralja. A Rimljani su ga, po Dionu (12, fr. 39; Zonaras, 8.19) na taj položaj - ovdje opisan potpuno istim terminom (ἐπιτροπέουσεως) - postavili dok je Teuta još bila živa i na vlasti kao regent, tj. vjerojatno istim dokumentom kojim Teutu prisiljavaju na abdikaciju,

many of them) who joined Demetrius as individuals, attracted by his lucrative activities? To paraphrase the statement of the young Coruncanus to Teuta, the Romans held the Illyrian state accountable for the private wrongs perpetrated by individual Illyrians,²⁰ and this "most excellent custom" (κόλλιστον ἔθος) obviously did not take hold on the opposite shore of the Adriatic. In all of this, the Atintani may have easily been the reluctant victims of political extortion by Demetrius rather than willing collaborators.²¹ Furthermore, he plundered the territory of neighbouring tribes, among whom some at the very least were Roman allies, according to Cassius Dio.²² Besides being a rather un-specific accusation (of a type not tolerated by Roman legal precepts), so that it cannot even be discussed, we may easily agree that this did not quite constitute sufficient grounds to prompt Roman legions to give chase. Polybius made more serious accusations, which at first glance appear rather logical, but, when taken together, become complete legal nonsense: "... Demetrios of Pharos (...) was sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities subject to Rome, and, sailing beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of the treaty, with fifty boats, had pillaged many of the Cyclades."²³ At the time the Cyclades were not encompassed within the Roman system of dominion and could not serve as grounds for a Roman march to war. Polybius was here clearly referring to the violation of the peace treaty imposed on Teuta after the First Illyrian War. But if these provisions were imposed upon Teuta, i.e., the Illyrian state, did they also bind Demetrius? He did, in fact, obtain control over some (perhaps even many) of Agron's former possessions, but as a clearly designated separate entity. To be sure, if we introduce the hypothesis that he later conquered certain cities in

20 Polyb., 2.8.10.

21 Šašel Kos 2005, p. 277.

22 Dio, 12, fr. 51.

23 Polyb., 3.16.3. It is interesting that such an accusation was nowhere made against Scerdilaidas, who at that time, at least formally, was a subject of the Illyrian king, so that these restrictions on sailing applied to him. Polybius elsewhere (4.16.6) described how Demetrius and Scerdilaidas together crossed the line at Lissus with 90 vessels. The Romans did not consider this a grave violation by Scerdilaidas, because later in this advance he joined in the battle against the Macedonians. It is also in this context that one should pose the question of how Demetrius even arrived at the battlefield at Sellasia in the southern Peloponnese in 222 BC. If he brought his 1,600 Illyrians on boats (which is far more likely than overland travel), then he once more had to violate the restriction on sailing beyond Lissus, but in this instance Polybius remained silent on the matter.

jasno kažu da je Pines još uvijek taj koji je kralj.²⁷ I ne samo da je kralj nego ne slijedi Demetrijevu politiku, niti se ona provodi preko njegova trona, jer je po završetku Drugog ilirskog rata Pines još uvijek u vrlo prijateljskim odnosima s rimskom državom.²⁸ Iz te lepeze različitih opravdanja za pokretanje rata protiv Demetrija upravo je razvidno da antički autori lutaju u traženju odgovora i svaki za sebe nalazi drugačiji *casus belli* - što sugerira da u tom pogledu stvari baš nisu bile do kraja jasne.

Ne mora baš biti ni da je Demetrije vodio neku izrazito proturimsku politiku. Vjerojatno nije bio toliko nepromišljen da bi nasrnuo izravno na Rim. On se samo ponaša kao tipični helenistički tiranin svoga vremena. Demetrije je vodio vlastitu politiku i vukao poteze za koje je smatrao da mu idu na korist, ne vodeći računa odgovaraju li oni istodobno i Rimljanima. Pri tome je koristio položaj rimskog saveznika i pozdanika kao osobni štit i element pritiska na druge. Ono što mu Rimljani zapravo zamjeraju jest da se ne ponaša kao tipičan klijentski vladar koji svoju vlast duguje isključivo milosti Rima; nakon što je ojačao, on odbija biti rimski poslušnik i zato se Rimljani više ne mogu pouzdati u njegove buduće postupke.

Očito je da su Demetrijevi postupci u zadnjih nekoliko godina privukli pozornost rimskih državničkih krugova. Doduše, vjerojatno ne toliko postupci koliko njihov učinak. Svima je bilo jasno da je uspješnim pothvatima u Jadranu i Egeju, pa i u ratu protiv Kleomena III., Demetrije prilično ekonomski, vojno i politički ojačao; toliko ojačao da sada može držati vlast nad dijelom Ilirika vlastitim autoritetom i za to

neposredno nakon Prvog ilirskog rata. Tako Dionov opis Demetrijeva položaja prema Pinesu i ilirskom kraljevstvu nakon Teutinog silaska s vlasti nije izjava da je Demetrije nakon Teute postao regent, nego samo pozivanje na ranije iznesenu činjenicu da ga je Rim zadužio za skrb o Pinesu (a koju Demetrije sada počinje zloupotrebjavati, kao što zloupotrebjava i status rimskog saveznika). Izbor regenta unutarinja je stvar ardijejskog kraljevstva u koju se Rim vjerojatno ne želi formalno miješati, ali preko Demetrija nastoji osigurati svoje pozicije prema Pinesu. Drugačije mišljenje vidi kod Eckstein 1994, str. 57 i d.; Eckstein 2008, str. 58-73; Errington 1989, str. 91; Hammond 1968, str. 10 i d., koji Demetrija drže regentom i praktičnim vladarom ardijejskog kraljevstva, premda uz prilično međusobnih razlika u nekim drugim stavovima o Demetriju i Drugom ilirskom ratu.

27 App. *Illyr.*, 8; Dio, 12, fr. 51. Polibije Pinesa uopće ne spominje. Usp. Šašel Kos 2005, str. 261-267.

28 App. *Illyr.*, 8. Drugi ilirski rat ni u jednom trenutku nije bio usmjeren protiv Pinesa i ilirske države; oni su cijelo vrijeme vjerni rimski saveznici: Šašel Kos 2005, str. 279-280.

Illyria,²⁴ this by definition means that he was not the master of that state, so then why would restrictions on navigation imposed upon that state apply to him? The fact that he had married an Illyrian princess (a queen mother, one of the widow queens, a former queen who had been divorced by a king or whatever Triteuta was)²⁵ and thus became the step-father of the still underage Illyrian king, probably reinforced his status in the Ardiaean court significantly, but he did not thereby ascend to their kingdom's throne²⁶ - and both

24 This does not pertain to information provided by Polybius, because he dealt with areas not under the sovereignty of the Illyrian state, which were furthermore placed under Roman protection after the First Illyrian War. This does pertain to interpretations (Errington 1989, p. 92; Hammond 1968, p. 11 and elsewhere; similar in Šašel Kos 2005, pp. 262-263) that Demetrius seized Dimallum and possibly even a few more fortifications from the Illyrians immediately before the Second Illyrian War.

25 Depending, naturally, on whether she was Agron's wife or merely concubine and whether polygamy by its rulers was even allowed in the Ardiaean court. Besides Agron, our sources note that only Gentius also had two wives (Etuta: Liv., 44.30.4 and Etleva: Liv., 44.32.3), but we do not know whether these marriages were simultaneous or consecutive. Walbank believes that polygamy was not likely in the Illyrian case, because in polygamous societies women generally have very little influence, so it is very unlikely that a woman would acquire the status that Teuta had (Walbank 1976, p. 268).

26 That Demetrius had become the underage king's regent with this marriage, and thus practically the ruler of the Illyrian state, is only a scholarly hypothesis that is nowhere explicitly confirmed in the sources. According to Dio, after Teuta's death, Demetrius became the ἐπιτροπέυσεως (Dio, 12, fr. 51; Zonaras, 8.20), guardian, legate, curator to Pinnes - which does not necessarily mean that he became the kingdom's regent, but rather that he was the one who saw to the young king's well-being on behalf of Rome. And the Romans, according to Dio (12, fr. 39; Zonaras, 8.19) placed him at the post - here described by the same term (ἐπιτροπέυσεως) - while Teuta was still alive and in power as the regent, i.e., probably under the same document that forced Teuta to abdicate, immediately after the First Illyrian War. Thus, Dio's description of the position of Demetrius vis-à-vis Pinnes and the Illyrian kingdom after Teuta's descent from the throne was not an assertion that Demetrius had become the regent after Teuta, but just a reference to an earlier known fact that Rome had charged him with caring for Pinnes (and which Demetrius then began to abuse, just as he was abusing his status as a Roman ally). The selection of a regent was an internal matter of the Ardiaean kingdom in which Rome probably did not want to formally

mu više nije nužna potpora Rima. Demetrije više ne mora biti, a po svoj prilici i ne želi biti, rimska lutkica na koncu. Čovjek se do sada pokazao iznimno sposobnim i očekivati je da će s vremenom postajati sve moćniji, sada kada je odlučio voditi samostalnu politiku i zanemariti interese Rima i dobrobit rimskih saveznika, što su bile kočnice koje su ga sputavale dok se za ostanak na vlasti morao oslanjati na Rim. Rimljani se, naravno, nisu plašili da bi Demetrije s vremenom mogao postati moćnijim od Rima, njihova kolosalna arogancija jednostavno nije dopuštala takav zaključak. Rimske je saveznike povrijedio vjerojatno više nego dovoljno da bi se mogao opravdati rat protiv nje. Dobrobit ovdašnjih saveznika Rimljane je sigurno do neke mjere brinula, ne zbog samih saveznika, nego zbog mogućeg slabljenja utjecaja i vojno-političkog oslonca na drugoj strani Jadrana. Ali da su mogli sa sigurnošću računati na Demetrija, itekako bi bili spremni gledati na drugu stranu: jer bi im Demetrije, u tom slučaju, postao najvažniji oslonac na Jadranu.²⁹

Ono što Rimljane najviše brine u vezi s Demetrijem nije što je on rastuća sila koja je izvan njihove kontrole, već što je sila koja bi se zbog toga mogla okrenuti prema Makedoniji. Svi današnji autori to iznose kao jedan od razloga za pokretanje rata,³⁰ ali, zanimljivo, u izvorima nitko ne donosi nikakav konkretan dokaz bilo kakve Demetrijeve promakedonske politike: nekoć je ratovao na strani kralja Antigona, oni su dijelili ratne opasnosti pa su sigurno postali prijatelji³¹ ... zvuči li to nekome kao ozbiljan razlog zbog kojega bi jedna država zaratila s drugom? Ali to upravo jest: Rimljani su u Demetrijevim postupcima, a vjerojatno više u svojim glavama, jednostavno pronašli dovoljno posrednih indicija koje su upućivale na to da je Demetrije politički nestabilan i da bi ga trenutno rastuća Makedonija mogla odvući pod svoje okrilje. U rimskim političkim krugovima Demetrije je dobio etiketu rizičnog elementa. To vjerojatno samo po sebi ne bi dovelo do neposrednog pokretanja rata protiv njega, ali, kako u životu biva, situacija se zakomplicirala na drugoj strani.

Appian and Cassius Dio stated that Pinnes was still the king.²⁷ And he was not only the king, but he also did not comply with the policies of Demetrius, nor did were the latter implemented through his throne, for at the end of the Second Illyrian War Pinnes still had very friendly relations with the Roman state.²⁸ It is abundantly clear from this kaleidoscope of differing justifications for launching a war against Demetrius that Classical writers lurched from one to another seeking an answer, and each found a different *casus belli* - which suggests that in this regard matters were not entirely clear.

It need not have even been the case that Demetrius was carrying out a flagrantly anti-Roman policy. He probably was not so rash as to directly assault the Romans. He was simply behaving like a typical Hellenistic tyrant of his time. Demetrius was implementing his own policies and making moves that he deemed beneficial to himself, not taking into account whether they suited the Romans of that time. In this, he exploited his status as a Roman ally and client as a personal shield and lever to exert pressure on others. What actually bothered the Romans was that he was not behaving like a typical client ruler who owed his authority exclusively to Rome's clemency; he refused to be a Roman lackey and that was why the Romans could no longer stand behind his future actions.

It was obvious that Demetrius and his activities had drawn the attention of Roman statesmen in the preceding few years - albeit not so much his activities as their consequences. It was clear to all that Demetrius had gained considerable economic, military and political power thanks to his successful undertakings in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, as well as the war against Cleomenes III. He had in fact become so strong that he could rule over parts of Illyria under his own authority, and he no longer needed Roman backing for this. Demetrius no longer had to be, nor did he want to be, a Roman marionette. He was a man who had proven himself as eminently capable up to that point, so it was to be expected that he would only

29 Rimljani su vjerojatno diplomatski pokušali opipati puls Demetriju u ovom smislu. Sjetimo se da su ga konzuli 219. g. pr. Kr. *pozvali preda se* (Dio, 12, fr. 53).

30 Fine 1936, str. 29-39, odbija ideju da je Filip V. u nekoj mjeri nagovarao Demetrija na rat protiv Rima, dok istodobno pretpostavlja da je takvo nagovaranje bilo usmjereno prema Skerdilaidi. Zahvaljujem F. Milivojeviću koji mi je skrenuo pozornost na ovaj podatak. Nasuprot njemu, Martin 1993, str. 71, drži da je Filip V. namjeravao ostvariti kontrolu nad Otrantskim vratima preko Demetrija.

31 Polyb., 3.16.3.

involve itself, but through Demetrius it could attempt to secure its position with regard to Pinnes. For a different opinion see Eckstein 1994, pp. 57 ff; Eckstein 2008, pp. 58-73; Errington 1989, p. 91; Hammond 1968, pp. 10 ff, who saw Demetrius as the regent and practical ruler of the Ardiaean kingdom, although with considerably different mutual differences in some other views on Demetrius and the Second Illyrian War.

27 App. *Illyr.*, 8; Dio, 12, fr. 51. Polybius did not even mention Pinnes. Cf. Šašel Kos 2005, pp. 261-267.

28 App. *Illyr.*, 8. The Second Illyrian War was never at any time directed against Pinnes and the Illyrian state; they remained Roman allies for this entire time: Šašel Kos 2005, pp. 279-280.

Novi element u cijelu priču donijele su Hanibalove aktivnosti u Hispaniji; diplomatske note bile su već razmijenjene i iz svega je Rimljanima bilo jasno da će ubrzo, po svoj prilici već sljedeće godine, morati krenuti u novi punski rat. Računali su da se taj može lako pretvoriti u iznimno velik sukob i odmah su mu posvetili dužnu pozornost te otpočeli sa sastavljanjem ratnog plana. Plan je predviđao da će Rim svoje postrojbe poslati na Iberski poluotok i, koristeći se savezničkim gradom Saguntom kao bazom, prenijeti operacije na Hanibalov teritorij.³² Dalo se pretpostaviti kako bi taj sukob mogao glavne rimske resurse vezati na dulje vrijeme, što bi znatno umanjilo mogućnost rimske prisutnosti i pritiska na drugim područjima. Pri tome se potencijalno najopasnijom činila situacija s brzim ponovnim rastom Makedonije. Ta je zemlja nekoć dala i jednog Aleksandra i jednog Pira, a makedonska vojna mašinerija bila je nešto što je još uvijek izazivalo strahopoštovanje. Makedonija je oduvijek željela pod svoju vlast staviti jugoistočnu obalu Jadrana³³ i moglo se očekivati da će nešto u tom smjeru poduzeti iskorištavajući rimsku zauzetost na drugoj strani Mediterana. Rim je na toj obali imao priličnu bazu svojih saveznika kao mostobran - ali te saveznike ugrožava upravo Demetrije, svojim napadima slabeći i njih i njihovo povjerenje u autoritet rimske države. U tim je okolnostima računica po kojoj bi se Demetrije čak mogao udružiti s Makedonijom iznenađavajuće postala jako opasna. Zato, ako se treba obračunati s Demetrijem Farskim i učvrstiti položaj među iliričkim saveznicima, to se moralo obaviti sada, amputirati faktor opasnosti dok rat protiv Hanibala još nije otpočeo. I tako su konzuli poduzeli posljednji diplomatski pokušaj, pozvavši Demetrija u Rim; nakon što se on oglušio, pokrenuli su vojsku.

Ulazak u rat protiv Demetrija bila je, po svoj prilici, jedna ishitrena i nedovoljno dobro promišljena odluka. Ne zato što je Demetrije bio previše moćan, nego upravo zato što nije. Rat je jako brzo pokazao da se Demetrije nije bio u stanju suprotstaviti rimskoj sili. Što je najgore, to su Rimljani i znali. Ovom su prilikom dopustili da ih zaslijepi vlastita arogancija: taj drznik sve duguje Rimu, Rim mu je oprostio grijeh, nagradio ga za pomoć, dao mu vlast nad teritorijem i svoju zaštitu, Rim ga je učinio moćnim, a mogao ga je jednako tako prodati na tržnici robova. Rimljani i dalje u Demetriju vide svoju kreaturu, a ne državnika:

32 Polyb., 3.15.13.

33 Za povijest odnosa između Makedonije i ilirskog prostora vidi, na primjer, Greenwalt 2010, str. 279-305, i Eckstein 2010, str. 227-234; za njihov odnos nakon uklanjanja Demetrija Farskog posebno May 1946, str. 48-56.

become more powerful over time once he decided to engage in independent policies and neglect Rome's interests and the well-being of Rome's allies, which were hindrances that held him back when he still had to depend on Rome to remain in power. The Romans were naturally unafraid that Demetrius could become more powerful than Rome over time, for in their colossal arrogance they simply could not even conceive of such a notion. His trespasses against Rome's allies were probably more than enough to justify a war against him. The well-being of local allies certainly concerned the Romans to a certain degree, not for the sake of these allies themselves, but rather due to the possible weakening of their influence and their military and political strongholds on the Adriatic's opposite shore. But if they had been able to depend on Demetrius with certainty, they doubtlessly would have been prepared to look the other way, for in this case Demetrius would have become their most important confederate on the Adriatic.²⁹

What troubled the Romans regarding Demetrius more than anything else was not that his power was growing out of their control, but rather that he was a rising power who could possibly turn to Macedonia. All modern scholars cite this as one of the reasons for the decision to go to war,³⁰ but, interestingly, nobody in the sources provided concrete evidence of any pro-Macedonian policies on the part of Demetrius: he had formerly waged war on the side of King Antigonos, they faced wartime perils together, so they had certainly become friends³¹ ... does this seem like a serious reason for one state to declare war on another? But that was what it actually was: in the activities of Demetrius, and probably more so in their own minds, the Romans simply found sufficient indirect indications that Demetrius was politically suspect and that Macedonia, whose power was waxing at the time, could pull him under its wing. Demetrius was labelled a risky element within Roman political circles. In and of itself, this would not have led to the direct launch of a war against him, but as often occurs in life, the

29 The Romans probably attempted to diplomatically take his pulse in this regard. Let us recall that in 219 BC the consuls "summoned him before them" (Dio, 12, fr. 53).

30 Fine 1936, pp. 29-39, rejected the idea that Phillip V had to some degree goaded Demetrius to wage war against Rome, while he simultaneously speculated that such goading was directed against Scerdilaidas. I would like to thank F. Milivojević for bringing this to my attention. By contrast, Martin 1993, p. 71, held that Phillip V intended to seize control of the Strait of Otranto through Demetrius.

31 Polyb., 3.16.3.

zato su ga i pozvali u Rim pred konzule, kako bi ga ucijenili položajem optuženika. Nije im na pamet padalo s njim pregovarati kao s naizgled ravnim i nešto mu ponuditi što bi ga ponovo učinilo ovisnim o Rimu, barem tijekom nekoliko sljedećih godina.³⁴

Opasnost na koju se reagiralo pokretanjem ovog rata uopće nije bila realna - nego procijenjena; to nije ni bio Demetrije, nego neka buduća Makedonija. Time su Rimljani pozornost, resurse i *nota bene* oba konzula, usmjerili prema sporednom bojištu, bojištu koje nije ni postojalo dok ga sami nisu kreirali - i zbog potencijalne opasnosti zanemarili su onu stvarnu. Tu su pogrešku i tu aroganciju jako, jako skupo platili. Naime, logika vojne sile koju su Rimljani ovom prilikom zanemarili vrlo je jednostavna: ako imate jaku vojsku, ona je potencijalna prijetnja i element odvratanja istodobno za sve vaše neprijatelje. Ali nakon što su postrojbe upućene u rat, one prestaju biti potencijalnom prijetnjom svim drugim neprijateljima; one su upotrijebljene i ne mogu se istodobno koristiti na drugome mjestu. Hanibal stvarno nije morao biti veliki mudrac da bi shvatio tu pouku: ako su oba konzula upućena u Jadran, tada ni jedan od njih ne može doći istodobno u Hispaniju. Zato je iskoristio priliku koju su mu Rimljani ponudili na pladnju te brzim udarom stavio Sagunt pod opsadu i zauzeo ga, čime je potpuno poremetio rimske planove. Ideja kampanje na Hanibalovu terenu je propala jer u dalekoj Hispaniji više nije bilo baze iz koje bi se ona mogla voditi. Da su Rimljani svoje efektivne umjesto u Jadran poslali u Hispaniju i na vrijeme osigurali Sagunt, povijest Hanibalskog rata izgledala bi prilično drugačije.³⁵ Krajnja posljedica pokretanja rata protiv

situation was exacerbated by complications from another side.

Hannibal's activities in Hispania brought a new element into this whole story: diplomatic notes had already been exchanged and all of this made it clear to the Romans that they would soon - already in the following year - march for a new Punic war. They estimated that it could rather rapidly become an exceptionally large conflict, so they immediately gave it their due attention and began drawing up a war plan. The plan called for Rome to deploy its units to the Iberian Peninsula and, using the allied city of Saguntum as their base, move their operations into Hannibal's territory.³² It was realistically assumed that this conflict could tie down the main Roman resources for an extended period, which would have considerably lessened the Roman presence and pressure in other regions. The most potentially hazardous situation in this regard was that involving the rapid, renewed growth of Macedonia. This country had once produced men such as Alexander and Pyrrhus, and the Macedonian military machine had always aroused awe. Macedonia had long wanted to put the south-eastern coast of the Adriatic under its control³³ and it was to be expected that they would undertake something in this direction by exploiting Rome's preoccupation on the other side of the Mediterranean. Rome had a considerable base of its allies on this coast serving as a bridgehead - but these allies were being threatened by none other than Demetrius, whose attacks were weakening them and their confidence in the Roman state's authority. Under such circumstances, speculation that Demetrius could even join forces with Macedonia suddenly became a very real threat. This is why dealing with Demetrius of Pharos and reinforcing their status among their Illyrian allies meant that Rome had to take immediate action, amputating the risk factor before the war against Hannibal even began. And so the consuls made their final diplomatic attempt, summoning Demetrius to Rome; after he rejected their summons, they launched their army.

The move to war against Demetrius was something of a hasty and rather ill-conceived decision. Not because Demetrius was too powerful, but precisely because he was not. The war very rapidly showed that Demetrius was in no condition to oppose Roman might. The worst thing was that the Romans knew this. On this occasion, they allowed their own arrogance

34 Držim da Eckstein (2008, 69) nije u pravu kad tvrdi da je povod ratu protiv Demetrija to što je on odbio rimski *rerum repetitio* (službeni, diplomatski zahtjev za naknadom učinjene štete pod prijetnjom objave rata). To je upravo ono što je učinio Hanibal godine 220. pr. Kr., pa se pretpostavlja da je isto, približno u isto vrijeme, učinio i Demetrije. Nemamo ni jedan podatak da je ikada senatsko izaslanstvo bilo slano Demetriju, a podatak u Dio, frag. 53 = Zon., 8.20 nije informacija da mu je senatsko izaslanstvo bilo poslano, iako je pomalo neobična, kako misli Eckstein. Na tome mjestu vrlo jasno piše da su Demetrija konzuli *pozvali preda se*, i to *odmah čim su čuli* za njegove prekršaje, a kada se nije odazvao, pokrenuli su vojsku. Iz toga je razvidno da nikakve druge diplomatske aktivnosti nije bilo, a najmanje volje i vremena za upućivanje senatskog izaslanstva. Meni nije vjerojatno da su Rimljani Demetriju slali službeno senatsko izaslanstvo jer bi ga na taj način priznali kao nezavisnog suverena. Dapače, konzuli su ga pozvali da se pojavi pred njima u Rimu, time naglašavajući njegov podređeni položaj.

35 B. D. Hoyos pretpostavlja da su se konzuli već bili uputili preko Jadrana kada su do Rima došle vijesti o

32 Polyb., 3.15.13.

33 For the history of relations between Macedonia and the Illyrian area, see, for example, Greenwalt 2010, pp. 279-305, and Eckstein 2010, pp. 227-234; for their relations after the removal of Demetrius of Pharos, see in particular May 1946, pp. 48-56.

Demetrija bila je užasna za Rim: umjesto da se rat protiv Hanibala vodi na Pirenejskom poluotoku, on se premjestio na onaj Apeninski.

Pri tome nije zanemariva ni činjenica da je rat protiv Demetrija iskorišten i za unutrašnje političke obračune u Rimu, zbog kojih su dva vrlo kvalitetna zapovjednika, dvojica *triumphatores* (ništa manje), završila na sudu i izbačena iz javnog života na više godina, upravo u vrijeme kad će Rimu biti očajnički potrebni sposobni vojskovođe.

Da, Polibije je u pravu, pokretanje rata protiv Demetrija Farskog, u okolnostima u kojima se odvijao, bilo je loša strateška procjena.

Na onom operativnom i taktičkom planu, pak, Rimljanima je išlo jako dobro. Kako su za vođenje operacija bile potrebne i kopnena vojska i ratna mornarica, sukladno tada već dobro uspostavljenoj praksi, u rat su poslana oba konzula.³⁶ Konzul Livije dobio je zapovjedništvo nad kopnenim snagama, a konzul Emilije nad pomorskim.³⁷ Prvi i vjerojatno daleko najvažniji cilj napada bile su Demetrijeve tvrđave u albanskom zaleđu. Naime, po završetku Prvoga ilirskog rata Rimljani su Demetriju, tada dobrom savezniku, dali na upravu neke utvrde koje su do tada pripadale ilirskoj državi.³⁸ Koje su to utvrde, nije nam poznato, osim da je jedna od njih možda jako orlovsko gnijezdo koje se

to blind them: this upstart owed everything to Rome, Rome forgave his sins, awarded him for his assistance, gave him authority over a territory and its protection; Rome made him powerful, and it could have just as easily sold him on a slave market. The Romans continued to view Demetrius as their own creature, and not a statesman: this is why they summoned him to Rome before the consuls, to extort him with the status of a subordinate. They had absolutely no intention of negotiating with him as a nominal equal and offer him something that would make him dependent upon Rome, at least over the next few years.³⁴

The threat which prompted the launching of this war was not at all real, it was assumed; it was not even about Demetrius, but rather some future Macedonia. The Romans thereby directed their attention, resources and, *nota bene*, both consuls, to an ancillary theatre, one that did not even exist until they had created it themselves - and so due to a potential threat they neglected a very real one. They paid dearly for this mistake and their own arrogance. The logic of military power that the Romans neglected on this occasion was very simple: if you have a strong army, it is a potential threat and an element that simultaneously crows all of your enemies. But once actual troops are deployed to war, they cease being a potential threat to all other enemies; they are in use and they cannot be deployed to another place at the same time. Hannibal truly did not need to be genius to comprehend this lesson: if both consuls were sent to the Adriatic, then not one of them could come to Hispania at the same time.

Hanibalovu napadu na Sagunt, te su se senatori odlučili na akciju, ali su odgodili pokretanje vojske dok novi konzuli ne uđu na službu (Hoyos 1998, str. 221-226). U ovom dijelu Polibijeve priče neki su kronološki detalji problematični, ali je razvidno da je opsada Sagunta počela kada je ratna sezona već bila prilično odmakla, krajem svibnja godine 219. (Polyb., 4.37.3-4: kada je Arat postao strateg Ahejske lige). Iz toga je razvidno da je Hanibal pokrenuo svoju vojsku preko rijeke Ebro tek nakon što je dobio vijest da su oba konzula u Jadrinu. Sagunt je pao tek negdje krajem godine (Polyb., 3.17.9; Liv., 21.15.3; Zon., 8.21.10; Oros., 4.14.1; Florus, 1.18.6; *De Vir. ill.*, 42.2), pa je jasno da se rasprava o tome u Rimu prilično razvukla: takvoj političkoj nefokusiranosti zacijelo je pridonijela i odsutnost obojice konzula.

36 Postavljanje jednog od konzula na mjesto zapovjednika flote redovito se bilježi od godine 260. do 242. te 229. g. pr. Kr.: Broughton 1951, str. 205-218; 228. Godine 217. pr. Kr. također je jedan od konzula, Servilije Gemin, imenovan zapovjednikom flote, ali je zbog većih potreba za kopnenim zapovjednicima predao flotu pretoru Otaciliju Krasu te preuzeo zapovjedništvo nad kopnenim snagama; Broughton 1951, str. 242-244, ad a. 217. Tek se u makedonskim ratovima začinje običaj da jedan od konzula zapovijeda vojskom, dok mornaricom zapovijeda podređeni mu pretor.

37 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, str. 39-40.

38 App. *Illyr.*, 8. Polyb., 2.11.17.

34 I believe that Eckstein (2008, p. 69) was incorrect when he claimed that the motive for the war against Demetrius was because the latter had rejected the Roman *rerum repetitio* (an official, diplomatic request for reparations for incurred damages under the threat of war). This was actually what Hannibal had done in 220 BC, so it was assumed that the same thing, at roughly the same time, was done by Demetrius. There are no data to confirm that a senatorial delegation was ever sent to Demetrius, and what was written in Dio, frag. 53 = Zon., 8.20 does not state that a senatorial delegation had been sent to him, although that is somewhat unusual, as Eckstein believed. At this point, it very clearly states that the consuls had "summoned him [Demetrius] before them" as soon as they heard of his wrong-doing, and when he failed to heed them, they sent their army. This makes it quite clear that there were no other diplomatic activities, to say nothing of the will and time to send a senatorial delegation. I find it unlikely that the Romans would have sent an official senatorial delegation to Demetrius, because they would have thus acknowledged him as an independent sovereign. Indeed, the consuls summoned him to come before them in Rome, thereby underscoring his subordinate status.

zvalo Dimale (Διμάλη, Δίμαλλον, *Dimallum*, danas gradina Krotinë).³⁹ Ono je smješteno u planinskom zaleđu Apolonije, uzdizalo se 400 m iznad strateške doline *Myzeqija*, imalo je pregled nad cijelim područjem Apolonije i nadzor nad komunikacijama koje su odavde vodile u pravcu Makedonije. Štoviše, samo kojih 13 km istočnije nalazio se makedonski grad Antipatreja (danas Berat), što znači da se tadašnja granica između rimskog protektorata i makedonskog posjeda protezala između ova dva uporišta, vjerojatno dolinom rijeke Osum.⁴⁰ Ako možemo suditi po tom primjeru, ono što je Demetrije ovom prilikom dobio niz je planinskih utvrda koje su kontrolirale strateške pravce koji vode u Makedoniju, čime su Rimljani ardijejsku dinastiju odsjekli od njezina makedonskog saveznika, a čak je moguće da je taj Demetrijev teritorij mogao biti zamišljen kao tampon-zona između preostalog teritorija ardijejske dinastije i gradova koji su stavljeni neposredno pod Rim.⁴¹

Iz toga je jasno zašto su ove Demetrijeve utvrde bile prioritetan cilj. One nisu samo baze iz kojih se ugrožavaju okolni rimski saveznici nego i položaji koji kontroliraju moguće pravce nastupanja makedonske vojske. Ovdje je bio ključ cijelog rata: prisijecanjem te veze onemogućava se Makedoniji da intervenira preko Demetrijeve države. Napad na ta uporišta spadao je svakako u zadatak zapovjednika kopnenih snaga, Livija Salinatora. Livije najprije udara na najjače mjesto, Dimale. Iako je tvrđava bila na glasu kao "neosvojiva", a Demetrije je ondje smjestio jaki garnizon, Rimljani je uspijevaju zauzeti na juriš nakon tjedan dana opsade. Ovako brz pad navodno neosvojivih Dimala učinkovito je slomio moral Demetrijeva ljudstva u ostalim uporištima i ona redom kapituliraju. Tako su brzom pobjedom kod Dimala Rimljani zauzeli ključni strateški prostor i više-manje ostvarili ono zbog čega su došli na drugu stranu Jadrana. I više od toga: brzina pada ovih uporišta potpuno

That is why he exploited the opportunity the Romans served to him on a platter and swiftly besieged and then captured Saguntum, thereby entirely disrupting Roman plans. The idea of conducting a campaign in Hannibal's territory fell through, because there were no longer any bases in distant Hispania from which it could be launched. Had the Romans deployed their assets to Hispania - instead of the Adriatic - on time and secured Saguntum, the history of Hannibal's warfare would have been rather different.³⁵ The ultimate consequence of going to war against Demetrius was horrible for Rome: instead of waging the war against Hannibal on the Iberian Peninsula, he moved it to the Apennine Peninsula.

A not insignificant fact is that the war against Demetrius was also fomented by internal political squabbles in Rome, due to which two very worthy commanders, two *triumphatores* (no less), ended up on trial and were banished from public life for several years, precisely at a time when Rome desperately needed capable military leaders.

Yes, Polybius was correct: the war against Demetrius of Pharos under the circumstances in which it proceeded was a poor strategic move.

The Romans nonetheless did very well in those operative and tactical aspects. Since the operation required both an infantry and a navy, both consuls were sent to war in line with a practice that had already become well-established by that time.³⁶ Consul Livius

39 Grad je lociran zahvaljujući nalazu crjepova s pečatima *DIMALLITAN*, Hammond 1968, str. 12-15 i fig. 4; Cabanes 2002, str. 125; Dautaj 1965, str. 65-71. Rezultate istraživanja ove gradine donio je B. Dautaj u cijelom nizu članaka u časopisu *Iliria* između 1972. i 1994. U znanosti postoji rasprava je li ova moćna utvrda predana Demetriju neposredno nakon Prvog ilirskog rata ili je to njegova kasnija stečevina. Cijela rasprava počiva na vrlo krhkim argumentima i ovdje nema smisla u nju ulaziti. Pred izbijanje Drugog ilirskog rata utvrda je sigurno u Demetrijevim rukama.

40 Antipatreja je sigurno makedonska 216. g. pr. Kr., kada ju privremeno otima Skerdilaida (Polyb., 5.108), pa je stoga vrlo vjerojatno da je i tri godine ranije bila u makedonskim rukama.

41 Hammond 1968, str. 8.

35 B. D. Hoyos assumed that the consuls had already been sent across the Adriatic when Rome received the news of Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, and that the senators decided to take action, but delayed the deployment of the army until new consuls assumed office (Hoyos 1998, pp. 221-226). Certain chronological details are problematic in this section of the text by Polybius, but it is apparent that the siege of Saguntum began when the war season had already progressed considerably, the end of May 219 BC (Polyb., 4.37.3-4: when Aratus had become the strategos of the Achaean League). It is consequently apparent that Hannibal marched his army across the Ebro River only after he had received word that both consuls were in the Adriatic. Saguntum fell somewhere near the end of that year (Polyb., 3.17.9; Liv., 21.15.3; Zon., 8.21.10; Oros., 4.14.1; Florus, 1.18.6; *De Vir. ill.*, 42.2), so it is clear that the debate on this in Rome had been rather drawn out: the absence of both consuls had certainly contributed to this lack of focus.

36 The appointment of one of the consuls to the post of fleet commander was regularly recorded from 260 through 242 BC, and in 229 BC. Broughton 1951, pp. 205-218; 228. In 217 BC, Servilius Geminus, also one of the consuls, once appointed to command the fleet, but due to the greater need for land-force commanders, he relinquished the fleet to a praetorian,

je onemogućila eventualnu intervenciju Makedonije na Demetrijevoj strani.

Ali, rat još nije bio gotov. Demetrije, neprijatelj kojemu je rat objavljen, bio je na udaljenom Hvaru i još nije bio do kraja slomljen. Dok god on postoji kao moćna figura na ovom prostoru, Makedonija može intervenirati u njegovu korist i poništiti trenutne rimske uspjehe. Ili to može učiniti i sam Demetrije oslanjanjem na preostale simpatizere među Ilirima i drugim lokalnim plemenima, koristeći zauzetost Rima u predstojećem sukobu protiv Hanibala. Zato Rimljani nisu mogli zaključiti ovaj rat dok Demetrija ne uklone sa scene. Udaljenost Hvara od dosadašnjega ratnog poprišta donekle je predstavljala problem - jer je u slučaju reakcije Makedonije ono moglo ponovo postati aktivno. Rimljani su ovdje još neko vrijeme morali zadržati svoje postrojbe kao snage odvratanja. Zato je konzul Livije sa svojim legijama ostao na ovom prostoru, kako bi primio kapitulaciju ostalih gradova, ponovo uredio prilike u Iliriji, razmjestio rimske garnizone i, ono najvažnije, prisutnošću svojih snaga osiguravao područje i odvrtao Makedoniju i neke od domorodaca od intervencije dok se rimska postignuća ne stabiliziraju. Tako je zadaća napada na Far dopala konzula Emilija Paula. Na kraju, Far se nalazio na otoku pa je bilo sasvim logično da se na njega krene flotom.⁴²

Do sada se uloga Emilijeve flote svodila na zaštitu vojnih transporta i opskrbe iz Italije, blokiranje luka i eventualno onemogućavanje dovlačenja ilirskih pojačanja morskim putem - što nije baš posao koji može donijeti veliku slavu, ali svakako jest vrlo kompleksna i zahtjevna zadaća koja traži vještog organizatora. Kako su sada vojni ciljevi na ovom prostoru bili ostvareni, nije više bilo potrebe za pružanje zaštite transportima većih vojnih kontingenata. Goleme količine provijanata zarobljene su u Dimalama,⁴³ pa se rimska vojska barem neko vrijeme mogla prehranjivati na terenu, bez potrebe za opskrbom iz Italije, a padom Demetrijevih uporišta i tako je najveći dio opasnosti za transportno brodovlje bio uklonjen. Stoga se veliki dio pomorskih snaga mogao osloboditi dosadašnjih zadaća i uputiti prema dvjestotinjak milja udaljenom Hvaru.

Tako je konzul Emilije dobio priliku ugrabiti vlastiti trenutak slave. S te je strane imao sreće kakva se ne događa često vojnim zapovjednicima: nije morao odmah uletjeti u bitku i imao je nešto vremena upoznati i uvježbati svoje posade i brodove, pa je bio

was granted command over the land forces, while Consul Aemilius assumed command of the navy.³⁷ The first and probably by far most important objective of the attack was the fortifications held by Demetrius in the Albanian hinterland. Upon the close of the First Illyrian War, the Romans ceded to Demetrius - then still a trusted ally - certain fortifications which had belonged to the Illyrian state up to that point.³⁸ Which fortifications is not known, except that one of them was perhaps the mighty eagle's nest called Dimalum (Διμάλη, Δίμαλλον, today the hillfort known as Krotinë).³⁹ It is situated in the mountainous hinterland of Apollonia, rising 400 m above the strategic valley of Myzeqija, offering a view of the entire area of Apollonia and control over communication routes that led from there in the direction of Macedonia. Moreover, only about 13 km farther east, there was a Macedonian city Antipatreia (today Berat), which means that the border between the Roman protectorate and Macedonian holdings extended between these two strongholds, probably down the valley of the Osum River.⁴⁰ To the extent that it is possible to assess based on this example, what Demetrius obtained on this occasion was a series of mountain fortifications which granted control over strategic routes leading into Macedonia, whereby the Romans cut the Ardiaean dynasty off from its Macedonian ally, and it is even possible that this territory controlled by Demetrius could have been conceived as a buffer-zone between the Ardiaean

Otacilius Crassus, and assumed command over the army; Broughton 1951, pp. 242-244, ad a. 217. It was only during the Macedonian wars that the custom of one of the consuls commanding the army, while the navy was commanded by a praetorian subordinated to him, began.

37 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, pp. 39-40.

38 App. *Illyr.*, 8. Polyb., 2.11.17.

39 The citadel was located thanks to roof tiles bearing stamps with the inscription *DIMALLITAN*, Hammond 1968, pp. 12-15 and fig. 4; Cabanes 2002, p. 125; Dautaj 1965, pp. 65-71. The results of research into this hillfort were published by B. Dautaj in an entire series of articles in the journal *Iliria* between 1972 and 1994. Among scholars, there is some debate as to whether this sturdy fortress was handed over to Demetrius immediately after the First Illyrian War or if he had acquired it later. The entire debate rests on rather flimsy arguments and there is no point in delving into it here. Just prior to the outbreak of the Second Illyrian War, the fortress was certainly held by Demetrius.

40 Antipatreia was certainly Macedonian in 216 BC, when it was temporarily taken by Scerdilaidas (Polyb., 5.108), so it is therefore quite possible that it was in Macedonian hands three years earlier.

42 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, str. 40.

43 Polyb., 3.18.1.

puno pripravniji kada je došlo vrijeme da krene na daleko ozbiljniji zadatak.⁴⁴

Demetrijeve snage

Znamo da je Demetrije svoj glavni grad ojačao sa 6000 elitnih ratnika.⁴⁵ Kako Polibije u cijelom tekstu o njima referira kao o Ilirima, razvidno je da oni u najvećem dijelu, a možda i svi, nisu Grci, tj. nisu neka građanska milicija Fara, već snage uvedene s drugog prostora. Budući da je Far na otoku, to je istodobno značilo i kojih 120 ilirskih velikih lembe⁴⁶ na kojima su ove postrojbe doplovile. Kako smo vidjeli, imamo izvješća da su u godinama pred izbijanje rata Demetrijevi gusari napadali u pravcu Istre, iz čega je razvidno da su otok Hvar koristili kao gusarsku bazu i odskočnu dasku za lansiranje pohoda prema sjevernom Jadranu. Zbog toga ove ilirske postrojbe ne bi nužno morale sve biti *ad hoc* dovedena vojska kojom se nastojalo pojačati obranu Demetrijeve prijestolnice nakon izbijanja rata s Rimljanima. One bi mogle, barem dijelom, predstavljati upravo taj kontingent koji je više-manje redovito stacioniran u Faru tijekom plovne sezone i namijenjen poduzimanju gusarskih pohoda.

Ali oko 6000 ratobornih Ilira nije bilo sve čime je Demetrije ovdje raspolagao. To su bila samo pojačanja, a Far je zasigurno imao i vlastite snage - i to poprilične, iako ih izvor izravno ne spominje. Naime, teško da bi Demetrije ranije stekao tako prominentnu ulogu među časnicima Agronova stožera i teško da bi mogao postati zapovjednikom Krfa da Ilirima nije mogao pridonijeti vlastitim postrojbama. Iz toga bi se dalo zaključiti da su Farani u to vrijeme imali ne samo obrambeni garnizon koji se mobilizira u slučaju potrebe, nego i mogućnost formiranja znatnih pohodnih snaga - bilo od vlastitog stanovništva bilo od plaćenika. Kako te snage godine 229. pr. Kr. nalazimo na Krfu, sva je prilika da su imali i mornaričke efektivne bez kojih ne bi mogli doći na otok i pogotovo ne organizirati obranu otoka od Rimljana. Ovdje se otvara mogućnost da je barem dio farskih brodova rađen u

dynasty's remaining territory and the cities placed directly under Rome's authority.⁴¹

It is therefore clear why these fortifications held by Demetrius were a priority. They were not just bases from which nearby Roman allies could be threatened, but also positions that oversaw possible routes for advances by the Macedonian army. Herein lay the key to the entire war: severing these links prevented Macedonia from intervening through the fortifications held by Demetrius. The attack on these strongholds certainly came under the purview of the commander of the land forces, Livius Salinator. Livius first hit the strongest point, Dimallum. Even though it had a reputation as being "unconquerable", and Demetrius had stationed a strong garrison there, the Romans managed to take it in a charge after a one-week siege. This rapid fall of the allegedly unconquerable Dimallum very effectively shattered the morale of Demetrius' forces in other strongholds, and they capitulated one after the other. Thanks to this swift victory at Dimallum, the Romans occupied a key strategic zone and more or less accomplished everything they had set out to do on the opposite shore of the Adriatic. It did even more, in fact: the rapidity at which these strongholds fell entirely prevented any potential intervention by Macedonia on behalf of Demetrius.

But the war was not over yet. Demetrius, the enemy against whom war had been declared, was on the distant island of Hvar and had not been completely broken. As long as he remained as a powerful figure in this area, Macedonia could intervene on his behalf and nullify Rome's momentary success. Demetrius could have also done so by leaning on his remaining sympathizers among the Illyrians and other local tribes, taking advantage of Rome's preoccupation with its pending conflict against Hannibal. This is why the Romans could not conclude this war until Demetrius was entirely removed from the scene. The distance between Hvar and the previous scene of warfare posed something of a problem - because the latter could have been reactivated in case Macedonia decided to respond. The Romans had to keep their units there for a time as a rear guard. This is why Consul Livius remained there with his legions, in order to receive the capitulation of the remaining cities, once more bring order to the situation in Illyria, post Roman garrisons and, most importantly, secure the area by their very presence and deter Macedonia and some of the natives from intervening until Roman successes in the field were cemented. So the task of attacking Pharos fell to Consul Aemilius Paullus. And after all, Pharos

44 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, str. 39.

45 Polyb., 3.18.2.

46 Iz izvora je jasno da su brodovi koje nazivaju lembima građeni u nekoliko veličina, pa možda i s različitom konstrukcijom veslačkog dijela. Postojali su oni koji mogu ukrcati 50 vojnika (Polyb., 2.3.1), zatim lembe od 30 vesala (Polyb., 21.43.13), a bilo je i onih od 16 vesala i manje (Liv., 34.35.5). Livije spominje i lembe s dvostrukom klupom (Liv., 24.40), tj. vjerojatno s dva reda veslača. Dakle, najveći lembe za koje znamo bili su oni kapaciteta 50 vojnika. Tako ovdje pojam velikih lembe stoji u smislu "najveći lembe za koje znamo" (jer je očividno bilo i manjih).

41 Hammond 1968, p. 8.

tradiciji grčke ratne brodogradnje. Bez obzira na to je li Far raspolagao brodovljem klase trirema ili kvadrirema, sva je prilika da je u trenutku izbijanja Drugog ilirskog rata Demetrije pod svojim zapovjedništvom imao brodova ovakve klase. Naime, ako je osobno zapovijedao u bitci kod Paksa, vjerojatno je još uvijek raspolagao s one 4 kvadrireme koje su zarobljene od Ahejske lige⁴⁷ - jer nakon predaje Krfa Rimljani nisu imali razloga svog novog saveznika i ratnog savjetnika kažnjavati oduzimanjem brodova. Nadalje, nešto je takvih brodova mogao zaplijeniti i za pohoda na Ciklade: potreba da se njegovi brodovi prevuku preko Korintske prevlake, kako bi izbjegli progon rodske flote,⁴⁸ sugerirala bi da se nije radilo samo o manjim lembima plitkog gaza koje vjerojatno može prenijeti vlastita posada.

Iz izvora je razvidno da u međuratnom razdoblju Demetrijev položaj jača i unutar ilirske zajednice i u širem prostoru. Pokazao se kao uspješan zapovjednik, a financijski je znatno ojačao gusarskim plijenom iz Jadrana i pljačkom po Cikladima. Logično je očekivati da zajedno s Demetrijem jača i politički i trgovački utjecaj grada Fara te da grad u to vrijeme doživljava svoj gospodarski vrhunac. Farski polis je, po svoj prilici, raspolagao vlastitim vojnim snagama i prije Prvoga ilirskog rata te u ovim okolnostima nije očekivati da su te vojne efektivne slabjele u međuratnom razdoblju; one su, naprotiv, neprestano jačale kako bi mogle podupirati Demetrijevu agresivnu politiku. U trenutnom stanju istraživanja nemoguće je procijeniti kolike su bile te domaće farske snage, ali, po svoj prilici, bile su dovoljno velike da im ilirski gusarski element, koji je smješten među njima, ne predstavlja realnu prijetnju.

Danas je dobro dokumentirana činjenica da su farski Grci organizirali razvijeni sustav obrane. Istraživanja na lokalitetima Tor i Maslinovik otkrila su manje grčke fortifikacije, po svoj prilici promatračke kule, *phylakteria*.⁴⁹ U istu svrhu vjerojatno je služila i uzvisina Purkin kuk,⁵⁰ na kojoj postoje ostaci slične arhitekture,⁵¹ a, po svemu sudeći, i Glavica, na kojoj su ostaci fortifikacije gradinskog tipa.

No taj sustav obrane, koji je arheološki dokumentiran, nije bio organiziran za razinu opasnosti kojoj je Far bio izložen godine 219. pr. Kr. Položaji na Purkinu kuku, Glavici, Toru i Maslinoviku jasno pokazuju da su oni dio sustava promatračnica koje služe za nadzor Starogradske polja, koje je ekonomski

was situated on an island, so it was entirely logical that the fleet should be sent after him.⁴²

Up to that point, the role of the fleet commanded by Aemilius had been to safeguard military transports and supply lines from Italy, blockade harbours and possibly prevent the withdrawal of Illyrian reinforcements by sea - which was not a task that could have brought much glory, but certainly was very complex and demanding, requiring a skilled organizer. Since the military objectives in this area had been achieved, there was no longer a need to protect transports conveying large military contingents. Enormous quantities of provisions had been seized in Dimallum,⁴³ so the Roman army could be fed for a time in the field without the need for supplies from Italy, while the fall of Demetrius' strongholds and thus the greatest threat to transport vessels had been eliminated. Thus, most of the maritime forces were freed from their tasks up to that time and could set off for Hvar, roughly 200 miles away.

So Consul Aemilius was given an opportunity to seize his own moment of glory. In this regard, he had the type of good fortune that is rarely experienced by military commanders: he did not have to charge into battle immediately and he had a little time to train with his crews and vessels, so he was much better prepared when the time came to take on a far more serious task.⁴⁴

The forces of Demetrius

We know that Demetrius reinforced his capital with 6,000 elite warriors.⁴⁵ Since Polybius referred to them as Illyrians throughout his text, it is apparent that most, if not all, were not Greeks, i.e., they were not some civic militia of Pharos itself, but rather forces brought in from other areas. Since Pharos was on an island, this simultaneously meant the presence of roughly 120 large Illyrian galleys (*lembi*)⁴⁶ on which

47 Polyb., 2.10.5.

48 Polyb., 4.19, usp. 3.16; 4.16.

49 Kirigin 2004, str. 100-113.

50 Kirigin 2004, str. 31-32, 113-114.

51 Zaninović 1984, str. 42.

42 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, p. 40.

43 Polyb., 3.18.1.

44 Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2014, p. 39.

45 Polyb., 3.18.2.

46 The sources make it clear that the vessels called *lembi* (sing. *lembus*) were built in several sizes, and perhaps even with different compositions in the oar banks. There were those that could carry 50 soldiers (Polyb., 2.3.1), followed by *lembi* with 30 oars (Polyb., 21.43.13), and those with 16 or fewer oars (Liv., 34.35.5). Livy also mentioned *lembi* with double-benches (Liv., 24.40), i.e., probably with two rows of oarsmen. Thus, the largest *lembi* known had a carrying capacity of 50 soldiers. So the term large *lembi* is meant in the sense of "the largest *lembi* of which we know" (because there were obviously smaller ones).

najvažniji prostor, ali zato ujedno i najizloženiji pljačkaškim upadima. Te promatračnice nisu velike, mogu primiti samo manju posadu, koja je u stanju brzo intervenirati protiv manje skupine razbojnika. Njihove utvrde očividno nisu planirane za odbijanje napada veće vojske, već nekolicini ljudi svoje posade mogu pružiti relativno kratkotrajnu zaštitu od slabije naoružane i opremljene razbojničke skupine - dok ne pristignu pojačanja iz grada. To su promatračnice koje su sve usmjerene na rano otkrivanje i dojavljivanje opasnosti niskog intenziteta i nadziru vrlo ranjivo Starogradsko polje, vjerojatno od pljačkaša koji dolaze s mora - što je ona vrsta opasnosti kojoj je Far bio neprestano izložen, u svakom slučaju, daleko češće negoli opasnostima visokog intenziteta, tj. napadu organizirane vojske koja broji tisuće ili desetine tisuća.

Sami za sebe, ovi su objekti previše mali i odveć raštrkani za organizirani otpor velikoj vojsci. To, naravno, ne znači da ih se nije moglo uklopiti u daleko širi, uvezani, sustav obrane, ako se i kada se za to ukazuje potreba.

Razmatranje o mogućoj Demetrijevoj organizaciji obrane protiv rimske vojske slijedi u daljnjem tekstu.

Rimske snage i ideja napada

Pretpostaviti je da su rimske snage dovedene pod Far obuhvaćale dvije legije koje se u to vrijeme standardno dodjeljuju svakom konzulu. Istina, u ovom ratu sudjeluju oba konzula istodobno, te vjerojatno sa sobom imaju ukupno četiri legije, ali napad na Far pokrenut je tek nakon pada Dimala te je dobar dio ukupnih snaga morao biti ostavljen u garnizonu Dimala i drugih Demetrijevih tvrđava na jugu koje su se predale. Te garnizonske snage morale su biti znatne jer su istodobno služite i kao snage odvratanja, zbog mogućnosti intervencije Makedonije. Zato je najprihvatljivije rješenje da je konzul Livije ostao na jugu sa svojim postrojbama, a konzul Emilije, koji je bio zapovjednik flote, upućen da napadne neprijatelja na otoku. Dvije legije značile su 9-10 tisuća legionara, ojačanih približno istim brojem rimskih saveznika. Ti su pješaci dijelom formirali palubno pješništvo (marine) na ratnim brodovima, a ostatak je ukrčan na transportno brodovlje koje je plovilo pod zaštitom ovih ratnih lađa. Znamo da su Rimljani u to doba imali u Brundiziju stacioniranu flotu od oko 200 velikih ratnih brodova (u što nisu uračunati transporteri koji se rekviriraju po potrebi), koji su im preostali iz Prvog punskog rata i poslije korišteni u ratovima protiv Hanibala i Makedonije.⁵² To su bili veći ratni brodovi,

these units sailed. As seen above, we have reports that in the years preceding the outbreak of the war, the pirates commanded by Demetrius attacked in the direction of Istria, from which it is apparent that they used the island of Hvar as their base and launching platform toward the northern Adriatic. Thus, these Illyrian units need not have been troops sent *ad hoc* in an attempt to reinforce the defence of Demetrius' capital after the outbreak of the war with the Romans. They could have - at least in part - been precisely that contingent which was more or less regularly stationed in Pharos during the sailing season and intended for carrying out raids.

But these roughly 6,000 bellicose Illyrians were not all Demetrius had at his disposal. They were only the reinforcements, and Pharos certainly had its own forces, of which there were a considerable number, even though the source does not mention this directly. For it is highly unlikely that Demetrius would have earlier gained such a prominent role among the officers of Agron's command staff and that he could have become the commander of Corfu if he had not been able to bring his own units to the Illyrians. From this one could conclude that at that time the people of Pharos not only had a defensive garrison that could be mobilized in case of need, but also the possibility of mustering significant invasion forces - either from their own population or from mercenaries. Since these forces were stationed on Corfu in 229 BC, there is every indication that they had naval assets without which they would not have been able to travel to the island and, especially, to organize the island's defence against the Romans. This indicates the possibility that at least a part of the Pharos vessels were made in the tradition of Greek naval shipbuilding. Regardless of whether Pharos had trireme or quadrireme class vessels at its disposal, there is every likelihood that Demetrius had vessels of this class under his command when the Second Illyrian War broke out. If he had personally commanded at the battle of Paxos, it is likely that he still had at his disposal those four quadriremes that had been captured from the Achaean League⁴⁷ - because after the surrender of Corfu, the Romans did not have a reason to punish their new ally and military advisor by taking his vessels. Furthermore, some of these vessels could have also been seized during the raid on the Cyclades: the need to pull his boats over the Isthmus of Corinth to evade the Rhodes fleet⁴⁸ suggests that they were not solely smaller *lembi* with shallow draughts that could be carried by their own crews.

52 Casson 1995, str. 120, bilj. 80. Thiel (1946, str. 35, bilj. 11) pretpostavlja da su većina brodova te flote bili oni

47 Polyb., 2.10.5.

48 Polyb., 4.19, cf. 3.16; 4.16.

kvinkvireme, znatno moćnije jedinice od lembe, koji su činili veći dio ilirske ratne mornarice,⁵³ a eventualno farsko ratno brodovlje grčkog tipa nadmašivali su ako ne klasom, onda zasigurno brojem.

Koliko god čudno izgledalo, tih oko 20.000 vojnika predstavljalo je tek manji dio ljudstva koje je imao konzul Emilije. Možda čak i dvostruko više mogle su brojati posade njegovih brodova: veslači i mornari.⁵⁴ To nije bilo ljudstvo koje se moglo iskoristiti kao ozbiljna, uvježbana vojna sila, ali je bilo vrlo brojno i moglo se upotrijebiti kao radna snaga kojom će se znatno skratiti vrijeme izvođenja potrebnih opsadnih radova i izrade ratnih sprava ili povećati iskoristive vojne efektivne time što će na sebe preuzeti barem neke stražarske i promatračke dužnosti.

Najvažnija prednost koju su Rimljani ovom prilikom imali na svojoj strani bila je kvaliteta obavještajnih informacija. Iz teksta izvora razvidno je da je konzul bio dobro upoznat sa snagom branitelja i elementima organizacije njihove obrane. Zato je i procijenio da bi u tim uvjetima moglo doći do dugotrajne opsade, kakvu je želio izbjeći - bilo zbog želje da izjednači uspjeh kolege Livija u brzini osvajanja utvrde, bilo zbog nedostatka vremena (tj. straha da bi se opsada mogla razvući do isteka njegova mandata

porinuti godine 242. pr. Kr. ili te godine zarobljeni od Kartage, tj. sada stari 23 godine. Iz toga ne valja brzati sa zaključcima o njihovoj smanjenoj upotrebljivosti: u antici su ratni brodovi bili pravljani da traju, a ni tehnološki nisu brzo zastarjevali. Cezar 48. g. pr. Kr. u ratu protiv Pompeja koristi brodove koji su stajali u Utici od rata protiv gusara, 19 godina ranije (*Caes. Bell. civ.*, 2.23). Livije (35.26.5-9) spominje kvadriremu staru više od 80 godina, koja još plovi, nije nigdje trula i ne propušta, već je samo oronula zbog zanemarivanja. Na pobjedničkom povratku iz Makedonije u Italiju Emilije Paulo je 167. g. pr. Kr. u Tiber uplovio na admiralskoj hekaidekeri ("šesnaestici") Filipa V., koju je porinuo Demetrije Poliorket oko 130 godina ranije, a ona je još uvijek, očito, bila dorasla zadaći.

53 Iliri su pak imali taktiku napada kojom su uspijevali nadvladati brodove puno veće od svojih lembe, što pokazuje ilirska pobjeda nad ahejskom flotom. Kako se lembe klasom nisu mogli nositi s ratnim brodovljem grčkoga i rimskog tipa, ta je taktika međusobnog povezivanja lancima po četiri lembe očividno ciljala na ostvarivanje brojčane nadmoći. Naime, neka bi kvadrirema mogla eventualno kljunom udariti samo jedan od tih brodova, ali time bi sama inercija udara ostala tri lembe dovukla uz bok kvadrireme, u idealan položaj za abordaž: na četiri velika lembe bilo je 200 vojnika, a na palubi kvadrireme možda stotinjak ili manje.

54 Suprotno dojmu koji stvaraju moderni filmski pregaoči, na antičkim ratnim brodovima nisu veslali robovi ili okovani galijoti, već plaćeni veslači ili za to unovačeni saveznici.

The sources make it clear that in the interwar period, Demetrius bolstered his position within the Illyrian community and in the wider area. He proved to be a successful commander, and he derived significant financial benefits from the plunder seized by piracy on the Adriatic and looting on the Cyclades. It is logical to expect that together with Demetrius the political and mercantile influence of the town of Pharos also grew, and that it experienced its economic zenith at this time. The Pharos polis had military forces at its disposal prior to the First Illyrian War, and under these circumstances one cannot expect that these military assets deteriorated during the interwar period; indeed, they were constantly enhanced in order to support the aggressive policies pursued by Demetrius. At the current level of research, it is impossible to estimate the extent of this domestic forces in Pharos, but they were probably of sufficient size that the Illyrian pirates, who were accommodated among them, did not constitute a genuine threat.

Today it is a well-documented fact that the Pharos Greeks had organized a refined defensive system. Research at the Tor and Maslinovik sites uncovered small Greek fortifications, probably observation towers, *phylakteria*.⁴⁹ The heights called Purkin kuk probably served the same purpose,⁵⁰ for the remains of similar architecture were found there,⁵¹ as did, by all indications, Glavica, where there are fortifications of the hillfort type.

But this defence system, which has been documented archeologically, was not set up for the level of the threat to which Pharos was exposed in 219 BC. The positions at Purkin kuk, Glavica, Tor and Maslinovik clearly show that they were part of a system of sentry posts that served to oversee the Stari Grad plain, which was the most economically important area, but also the one most exposed to looting raids. These observation posts were not large, they could accommodate small crews that could rapidly intervene against small groups of raiders. Their fortifications obviously were not foreseen to repel attacks from a larger army, rather the small numbers in their crews could mount a relatively brief defence against poorly armed and equipped raiding parties - until reinforcements from the settlement could arrive. These were observation posts which were all oriented toward early detection and notification of low-intensity threats and supervision of the very vulnerable Stari Grad plain, probably from raiders arriving by sea - which was the type of threat to which Pharos was constantly exposed, in any case for more often than high-intensity threats, i.e.,

49 Kirigin 2004, pp. 100-113.

50 Kirigin 2004, pp. 31-32, 113-114.

51 Zaninović 1984, p. 42.

i da bi ga, u tom slučaju, smijenio konzul iz naredne godine). Nedostatak vremena mogao bi biti realna prijetnja jer Far nije napadnut odmah na početku ratnih operacija. Rimljani su se najprije koncentrirali na ono što su smatrali većom prijetnjom: Demetrijeve tvrđave koje su kontrolirale komunikacije s Makedonijom. Tek nakon što su one neutralizirane i nakon što je otklonjena prijetnja iznenadnog prodora makedonske vojske, tek tada je pokrenut napad na Far. Istina, ove Demetrijeve tvrđave pale su relativno brzo i u samom početku ratne sezone. No onaj dio mornarice koji se nakon toga mogao osloboditi prethodnih zadaća sada je trebalo koncentrirati, popuniti i organizirati premještanje težišta operacija iz prostora albanskih voda u srednji Jadran. To su aktivnosti koje su sigurno potrajale tjednima, a mogle su oduzeti i nekoliko mjeseci, pogotovo u slučaju loših vremenskih prilika.

Rješenje za kojim je konzul u ovoj prilici posegnuo da bi pokušao vremenski skratiti opsadu je, u biti, vrlo jednostavno - onaj koji se bavio operativnim planiranjem u ratu jako dobro zna da su jednostavna rješenja u pravilu najbolja jer se puno manje stvari može zakomplicirati i cijelu ideju gurnuti nizbrdo kao grudu snijega. Tako nam jednostavnost rješenja ne daje nekakvu veličanstvenu stratešku ideju kojoj bismo se mogli diviti, ali pokazuje mudrost i kvalitetu plana - konzul je uvidio potencijalnu slabost neprijateljeve obrane i iz nje doslovno stvorio situaciju u kojoj ne može izgubiti: ako se protivnik upeca na bačenu udicu i svoje snage izvede iz grada, tada Rimljani imaju dobru priliku da ostvare prednost i skrate vrijeme opsade; ako, pak, neprijatelj ne posegne za mamcem i ne izađe iz grada, tada im ne može ni onemogućiti da brzo ponovo koncentriraju svoje snage i pokrenu opsadu iz pravca na kojemu ih neprijatelj ne očekuje.

Kritika predloženih taktičkih rješenja

Zanemarimo li danas nadiđene rasprave o ubikaciji grčke kolonije imenom *Pharos*⁵⁵ i, sukladno odbačenoj lokaciji, traženju obližnje uvale u kojoj su se Rimljani mogli iskrcati, preostaje nam vrlo malo toga. Zapravo, preostaje nam samo Nikolancijev članak iz 1957., dok ostali radovi koji se bave ovom bitkom uglavnom prihvaćaju ili pokušavaju nadopuniti rješenje koja je ponudio M. Nikolanci.

Nikolancijev članak zapravo nije pokušaj sustavne rekonstrukcije bitke. U članku je tome posvećeno ravno devet rečenica i jedna (puno rječitija) prostoručna skica. Ovdje se uglavnom nastoji na dokazivanju da je

attacks by an organized army numbering in the thousands or tens of thousands.

By themselves, these structures were too small and too far apart to provide organized resistance to a large army. This, naturally, does not mean that they could not have been incorporated into a far wider, interconnected defensive system if and when the need arose.

Consideration of the potential organization of defence against the Roman army by Demetrius follows.

Roman forces and the idea behind the attack

It has been assumed that the Roman forces brought to Pharos encompassed the two legions which during that period were the standard contingent assigned to each consul. To be sure, both consuls participated in this war simultaneously, and probably had a total of four legions with them, but the attack on Pharos was launched only after the fall of Dimallum, and a goodly portion of the total forces had to be left to garrison Dimallum and the other fortresses in the south formerly held by Demetrius, which had surrendered. These garrison forces had to be significant, because they simultaneously served as a rear-guard due to the possibility of intervention by Macedonia. This is why the most acceptable solution was for Consul Livius to remain in the south with his units, while Consul Aemilius, who was the fleet commander, was deployed to attack the enemy on the island. Two legions meant nine to ten thousand legionnaires, reinforced with roughly the same number of Roman allies. This contingent of foot soldiers partially consisted of deck infantry (marines) on the warships, while the remainder embarked on transport vessels that sailed under the protection of the latter naval galleys. We know that the Romans at that time had a fleet of approximately 200 large warships (not counting transport vessels that were requisitioned as needed) in Brundisium, left over from the First Punic War and later utilized in the wars against Hannibal and Macedonia.⁵² These

55 Stariju literaturu o tom pitanju vidi kod Nikolanci 1957, str. 52-53, i Kirigin 2004, str. 66-72, 200-201.

52 Casson 1995, p. 120, note 80. Thiel (1946, p. 35, note 11) assumed that most ships in this fleet were launched in 242 BC or seized from Carthage in that year, thus making them 23 years old at the time. One should refrain from drawing hasty conclusions about their reduced capability on that basis: in Antiquity, warships were made to last, and they did not become technologically outmoded very quickly, either. In his war against Pompey in 48 BC, Caesar used ships that had been docked in Utica since the war against pirates 19 years earlier (Caes. *Bell. civ.*, 2.23). Livy (35.26.5-9) noted that a quadrireme over 80 years old, which was still seaworthy, had no rot anywhere on it nor did it leak, rather it had only deteriorated due to neglect. On his triumphant return to Italy from Macedonia in 167 BC,

ključni položaj na koji su Rimljani izbili kako bi odsjekli branitelje od povratka u grad (Polibijev λόφος ἔρμυος), bilo brdo Glavica (tt. 111, prije poznato pod nazivom Zastrazišće⁵⁶). Zato se mjesta rimskog iskrcavanja, i onog tajnog i onog fingiranog, stavljaju u uvala najbliže tom uzvišenju: one sjeverno od sela Rudine, tj. u uvalu Zavala. Braniteljske snage koncentriraju se na zapadnoj obali te uvala kako bi spriječile iskrcavanje Rimljana, a prethodne noći iskrcane rimske postrojbe neprimjetno zaposjedaju položaj Glavica i odsijecaju braniteljima mogućnost povratka u grad.

Ovakva rekonstrukcija bitke vrlo je dosjetljiva, potpuno zaokružena i uklapa sve relevantne informacije koje nam donosi Polibije. No, s njom postoje dva problema: 1) ovaj prostor naprosto nema dovoljan operativni kapacitet; 2) brdo Glavica nije tako smješteno da bi se njegovim zaposjedanjem moglo spriječiti kretanje branitelje uz obalnu liniju smjerom uvala Zavala - Stari Grad.

Brdo Glavica zasigurno je imalo iznimno bitnu ulogu unutar obrambenog potencijala antičkog Fara, ali isključivo kao promatračnica. U uvjetima antičke bitke s velikim angažiranim snagama ono jednostavno nema strateški potencijal koji mu se nastoji pripisati. Teško da ondje uopće možete razviti u bojni poredak, recimo, kohortu (a kamoli legiju) vojnika, a svaki juriš niz krševitu padinu završio bi velikim brojem slomljenih nogu i iščašenih zglobova te potpunim raspadom bojne formacije. Brdo je od sjeverne obale Starogradske zaljeva udaljeno 650 m, a učinkoviti domet antičkog luka nije veći od 200 m. Čak i ako streličarima dodamo nešto dometa na razliku u visini, još uvijek ne bi bili u stanju dobaciti ni polovinu potrebne udaljenosti. U slučaju da su se Rimljani rastegnuli još za tih 650 m, od Glavice do obale nasuprot Starom Gradu, tada bi braniteljima stvarno presjekli mogućnost povratka u grad, ali u tom slučaju ih oni ne bi morali napadati uzbrdo, već upravo nizbrdo: s nadmorske visine od oko 50 m prema razini mora.

Starograđani cijelog života vide brdo Glavicu (tt. 111) kao najvišu i dominantnu točku svoga obzora i logično je da ga doživljavaju kao iznimno bitan i jak taktički položaj u odnosu na grad. No u ovom slučaju Glavica nije imala nikakvu ulogu u obrani grada - preciznije, ako jest, ta je uloga bila negativna, u smislu

were larger warships, quinqueremes, considerably more powerful individually than the *lembi*, which formed the majority of the Illyrian navy,⁵³ while they surpassed any possible Pharos naval vessels of Greek type in numbers if not in class.

As odd as it may have appeared, these roughly 20,000 soldiers constituted only a minor part of the manpower Consul Aemilius had at his disposal. The crews of his ships, the oarsmen and sailors, may have accounted for as much as twice that number.⁵⁴ These were not men who could be used as a serious, trained military force, but they were numerous and could be put to use as a work force that would significantly cut the time needed to perform necessary siege tasks and assemble military devices or increase the deployable military assets by, at the very least, taking on certain sentry and monitoring duties.


The most important advantage the Romans had on that occasion was the quality of their intelligence. The texts in the sources clearly show that the consul was well-apprised of the strength of the defenders and the organizational elements of their defence. This is why he assessed that under these circumstances a long-term siege could arise, the kind he wanted to avoid - either due to the desire to equal the feats of his colleague Livius in the speed of capturing fortifications, or due to a lack of time (i.e., the fear that the siege could outlast his term in office, so that he would be replaced by the following year's consul). The lack of time may have been a genuine concern, because Pharos was not attacked right at the beginning of military operations. The Romans first concentrated on what they perceived the greater threat: the fortresses of Demetrius which oversaw communications with Macedonia.

Aemilius Paullus sailed down the Tiber in an admiral's hekkaidkeres ("sixteen") of Philip V, which had been launched about 130 years earlier by Demetrius Polioctes, and it was still, obviously, up to the task.

56 Zanimović 1984, str. 39, donosi nešto drugačiju toponomastiku: po njemu se Zastrazišća zove predio oko 500 m sjeverozapadno od Glavice, te bi se, iz toga, Glavica nekoć zvala Stražišće. Za nas tu nema velike razlike, jer oba naziva jasno govore da se na brdu nekoć držala straža, tj. o njegovoj taktičkoj pogodnosti u tom smislu. M. Katić utvrđenje na Glavici interpretira kao predgrčko pribježište (*un abri*), Katić 1999, str. 62.

53 The Illyrians employed an assault tactic with which they managed to overpower vessels much larger than their *lembi*, as demonstrated by the Illyrian victory over the Achaean fleet. Since the *lembi* could not match the class of naval vessels of the Greek or Roman type, this tactic of chaining together four *lembi* was obviously aimed at creating numerical superiority. A quadrireme could only possibly ram one of these boats, but the inertia would thereby pull the remaining three *lembi* astride the quadrireme, in an ideal position for abordage: four large *lembi* held 200 soldiers, while the deck of a quadrireme had perhaps a hundred or less soldiers on it.

54 Contrary to the impression created by the modern motion picture industry, the oars on ancient ships were not manned by slaves or chained prisoners, but rather paid oarsmen or allies recruited for this purpose.



da je motrilačka posada na tom položaju davala lažnu sigurnost braniteljima, jer s Glavice nije mogla vidjeti položaj noćnog iskrcavanja rimskih snaga. Da ne spominjemo kako svaki napadač mora računati da je u uvjetima neposredne ratne opasnosti to uzvišenje sigurno posjednuto motriteljima, koji nisu neka brojna snaga, ali mogu upropastiti element iznenađenja koji je, u ovom slučaju, ključan za uspjeh plana.

Još je važnije što se s Glavice vidi cijeli prostor grada i sva njegova neposredna okolina. Zato je to točka koju branitelji nužno moraju pokušati održati u svojim rukama, jer ako je prepuste Rimljanima, tada će oni biti u stanju nadzirati svaki njihov pokret i vidjeti mjesta koncentracije. S ovog je položaja rimski zapovjednik mogao imati situaciju kao na dlanu: prepustiti napadačima Glavicu bilo je jednako kao unaprijed ih obavijestiti o svim svojim planovima. To je položaj koji je u svim obrambenim planovima morao biti visoko među prioritetima i morao je biti uređen i posjednut. Zato rimski konzul nije mogao računati da ga može brzo, tiho i neopazice zauzeti. Ukratko, da su Rimljani krenuli u napad preko Glavice, slabe su šanse da bi uspjeli učiniti ono što nam je opisano da su učinili.

Uvala Zavala danas zadire u kopno oko 600 m, a po sredini je široka oko 160 m. U antičkim uvjetima, kada je morska razina bila niža, njezine su dimenzije bile znatno manje: oko 450 x 110 m. Taj prostor jednostavno ne može primiti 20 velikih ratnih brodova: u njemu bi problema s manevriranjem imala i jedna

Only after these were neutralized and after the threat of a surprise incursion by the Macedonian army was eliminated was the attack on Pharos launched. To be sure, these fortresses formerly held by Demetrius fell relatively rapidly, at the very beginning of the warfare season. But that part of the navy which was thereafter freed from its previous tasks now had to be concentrated, additionally provisioned and organized to transfer the focus of operations from Albanian waters to the central Adriatic. These were activities which certainly lasted weeks, and could have even taken several months, especially in the event of inclement weather.

The solution to which the consul turned on this occasion in an attempt to cut down the duration of the siege was essentially quite simple: anyone who has developed operational plans during war knows very well that simple solutions are generally the best, because then there are far fewer aspects that can complicate matters and push the idea downhill like an avalanche. So the simplicity of the solution does not give us some magnificent strategic idea that we can admire, but does reflect prudence and the quality of the plan. The consul saw a potential weakness in the enemy's defence and used it to literally create a situation in which he could not lose: if the enemy took the bait and moved his forces from the settlement, then the Romans would have an ideal opportunity to create an advantage and reduce the duration of the siege; if, however, the enemy did not take the bait and refused to leave the settlement, then they could not prevent a rapid re-concentration of forces and the launch of a siege from a direction that the enemy would not anticipate.

Critique of the proposed tactical solutions

If we ignore the today superfluous debates over the precise location of the Greek colony named Pharos⁵⁵ and, in line with the selected location, the search for the nearby cove in which the Romans could have disembarked, very little of this is left over. Actually, all that is left is Nikolanci's article from 1957, while the remaining works dealing with this battle generally accept or attempt to supplement the solutions offered by M. Nikolanci.

Nikolanci's article was not, in fact, an attempt at a systematic reconstruction of the battle. Exactly nine sentences and one (far more eloquent) simple sketch in the article are dedicated to this. It was mainly an attempt to prove that the key position at which the Romans advanced to cut the defenders off from their

55 See the older literature on this in Nikolanci 1957, pp. 52-53, and Kirigin 2004, pp. 66-72, 200-201.

jedina kvinkvirema dimenzija približno 50 x 10 m, koja na bokovima ima vesla izbačena za još 9 m.⁵⁷

Zamislimo samo kako je to trebalo izgledati. Ne zaboravimo da Rimljani u prvoj fazi ovdje samo fingiraju iskrcavanje, bez ozbiljne namjere da stvarno i pošalju svoje pješake na obalu gdje će ga nagomilane braniteljske snage masakrirati prije nego što uspiju formirati ikakav bojni poredak. Oni nastoje na sebe privući pozornost neprijatelja i zabaviti ga dramatičnim pokušajima iskrcavanja dok mu druge snage ne zađu za leđa. Izvor vrlo jasno kaže da su se postrojbe s ovih 20 brodova iskrcale tek nakon što im je neprijatelj okrenuo leđa i odstupio od obale kako bi navalio na Rimljane koji su se postrojili na uzvisini.⁵⁸ To se nije moglo izvesti tako da se 20 brodova nasukalo na obalu i onda ušlo u okrašaj s onima na plaži s povišenih paluba svojih brodova, jer bi se izložili vrlo ozbiljnom riziku da branitelji prodru na brodove i jednostavno ih pregaze: na palubama 20 kvinkvirema ima manje od 2500 legionara⁵⁹ i branitelji su ih višestruko

return to the settlement (λόφος ἐρωμος in Polybius), was the hill called Glavica (tp. 111, before known under the name Zastrazišće⁵⁶). This is why the site of the Roman landing, both the secret and the feigned one, were placed in the coves closest to this hill: those north of the village of Rudine, i.e., in Zavala Cove. The defence forces were concentrated on the western shore of that cove in order to prevent the Romans from landing, while on the preceding night Roman forces disembarked unnoticed and captured the Glavica position, cutting the defenders off from returning to the settlement.

Such a reconstruction of the battle was quite resourceful, entirely well-rounded and corresponds to all relevant information provided by Polybius. But there are two problems with it: 1) this area simply lacks sufficient operational capacity; 2) Glavica is not situated such that its occupation could prevent the defenders from proceeding on the shoreline from Zavala Cove to Stari Grad.

Glavica Hill certainly played an exceptionally essential role within the defensive potential of ancient Pharos, but exclusively as an observation post. Under the conditions of an ancient battle with the engagement of numerous forces, it simply did not have the strategic potential that some have attempted to ascribe to it. It is unlikely that, say, a cohort (much less a legion) of soldiers could muster into combat formation there, and any charge down the rocky slope would result in a high number of broken bones, dislocated joints and a complete disintegration of the battle formation. The hill is 650 m from the northern shore of Stari Grad Bay, and the effective range of the ancient bow was no greater than 200 m. Even if some additional range in the height difference is added by archers, they still would not have been able to clear even half of the necessary distance. If the Romans had extended themselves over these additional 650 m, from Glavica to the shore opposite Stari Grad, then they would have truly blocked the ability of the defenders to return to the settlement, but in this case the latter would not have had to attack them uphill, but rather downhill, from an elevation of 50 m to the sea level.

57 Točne dimenzije kvinkvireme ovoga vremena nisu nam poznate, osim što znamo da ih je bilo raznih vrsta (Liv., 28.30.3-12). Zato se one u znanosti proračunavaju u odnosu na poznate značajke trireme. Eksperimenti s *Olympias*, rekonstrukcijom antičke trireme porinute 1987., pokazali su da njoj za okret od 360 stupnjeva treba oko dvije dužine broda. Daleko manje maritimno sposobnoj kvinkviremi sigurno je trebalo puno više prostora za okret (oko 10 % duža, dvostruko teža, 15 % sporija, sa 70 % dubljim gazom, za 40 cm višim težištem i zbog daleko većeg momenta svijanja građena 25 % debljim daskama u odnosu na triremu). Značajke trireme vidi kod Morrison 1995, str. 47-65. Konstrukcijski proračuni za kvinkviremu: Morrison 1996, str. 285-291. Antički autori smatraju kvinkviremu superiornijim ratnim brodom od trireme (Polyb., 1.63.8; Liv., 28.30). Osim većeg broja marinaca i bacačkih sprava te tvrde građe, prednost kvinkvireme nad triremom bila je i u većoj stabilnosti na otvorenome moru: puno manje se "valjala" na valovima i puno je bolje odgovarala na kormilo (Morrison 1996, str. 65).

58 Polyb., 3.19.6.

59 Broj marinaca na kvinkviremi: Polyb., 1.26.7, Casson 1995, str. 107, bilj. 41; 113; 121; Morrison 1996, str. 285. Naravno, na palubu kvinkvireme možete utrpiti i puno više od 120 legionara: i to ćete možda učiniti ako ih samo trebate prevesti s jednog mjesta na drugo. No to sigurno nećete učiniti ako očekujete da biste usput ili na odredištu mogli ući u bitku. Jer, osim što će dodatna težina ljudstva, opreme i vode usporiti brod, prostor na palubama ograničen je i na mjestima sužen konstruktivnim elementima broda i ratnim spravama, pa se natiskani pješaci neće moći organizirano braniti i onemogućit će korištenje ratnih sprava. Na kraju, na kvinkviremu se "formacijski" smješta 120 legionara (na kvadriremu vjerojatno 100, a na triremu 80)

56 Zaninović 1984, p. 39, provided somewhat different toponomastics: according to him, Zastrazišće was the name for the tract roughly 500 m north-west of Glavica, and, after that, Glavica would have once been called Stražišće. For us, there are no significant differences here, as both names clearly indicate that a watch (*straža*) was once posted on the hill, i.e., it had tactical advantages in this regard. M. Katić interpreted the fortifications on Glavica as a pre-Grecian refuge (*unabri*), Katić 1999, p. 62.

nadmašivali brojem, sve više i više kako su nove snage pristizale iz grada. Uska paluba koja ograničava manevar, pogotovo ako je zbog nasukavanja još i nagnuta u jednu stranu, nije dobra površina za vojsku koja se nastoji boriti u sredenom bojevom poretku. “Fingirano iskrcavanje” zahtijevalo je puno manevra brodovima koji su se približavali obali, dajući dojam da žele iskrcati snage, a nakon što bi branitelji blokirali taj dio obale, brodovi su se odmicali i upućivali k drugome mjestu, navlačeći branitelje da se i oni ponovo prestroje, pa bi se brodovi ponovo odmicali od obale, manevrirajući među lembima koji su im nastojali blokirati izlaz iz Starogradskog zaljeva ... Ta igra nije potrajala dugo, možda sat ili najviše dva. Za cijelo vrijeme vjerojatno je razmjenjivana velika količina projektila, što je dodatno davalo na dramatičnosti i usmjeravalo koncentraciju prema izvoru opasnosti. Svojom “neodlučnošću” Rimljani su kod protivnika stvorili osjećaj nadmoći i želju za obračunom s očevidno slabijima, čime su na sebe navukli svu njihovu pozornost i, iznad svega, sugerirali neprijatelju da čini poteze koji mu donose prednost.

Takav scenarij nije moguće smjestiti u usku uvalu. Unutar Starogradskog zaljeva postoji samo jedno mjesto gdje se taj dio priče mogao odigrati, a to je širi prostor Luke Tiha.⁶⁰

Tako je temeljni nedostatak Nikolancijeve rekonstrukcije u tome što ne vodi računa o količini uključenih snaga i prostoru potrebnom za razvijanje tolikog broja brodova i ljudstva. Sljedeći je da ne vodi računa o braniteljima Fara. Oni na kraju jesu izgubili bitku, ali se ni u kojem slučaju ne radi o vojnim nestručnjacima. Izvor jasno kaže da su ovamo dovedene jake elitne postrojbe, koje, osim toga, predvodi čovjek koji se i prije i poslije pokazao kao vješt taktičar. To su snage koje su bile pripravne napustiti sigurnost bedema (što je psihološki jako teško za nedovoljno organizirane i neiskusne rezerviste), kako bi pokušale onemogućiti neprijatelja u desantu na obalu, zato što su jako dobro znali da je to prilika u kojoj neprijatelju mogu nanijeti najveće gubitke dok su mu postrojbe još raspršene i neuvezane u bojni poredak. Kada im se neprijatelj neočekivano pojavio iza leđa, nisu se raspali i počeli nekontrolirano bježati prema sigurnosti iza bedema, nego su vrlo brzo i organizirano povukli

upravo zato što je procijenjeno da je to najveći mogući broj pješaka koji se mogu organizirano boriti na tolikoj palubi.

60 Kritiku Nikolancijeva lociranja iskrcavanja u uvali Zavala zbog nedostatnog prostora i pomicanje konzulova “fingiranog” iskrcavanja više na zapad, prema Luci Tiha, donosi i Tarbušković 2013, str. 24-25. Zahvaljujem recenzentu koji me je upozorio na postojanje ovog magistarskog rada.

The residents of Stari Grad see Glavica Hill (tp. 111) for their entire lives as the highest and dominant point on their horizon, so it is logical that they perceive it as an exceptionally vital and strong tactical position with regard to their town. But in this case, Glavica did not play any role in the town’s defence - specifically, if it had, that role would have been negative, in the sense that the sentry crew at this position would have given the defenders a sense of false security, because the site of the night-time landing of Roman troops could not be seen from Glavica. To say nothing of the fact that under the circumstances of a clear and present military threat, any attacker had to count on the fact that this hill would be manned by observers, who were not numerous but could spoil the element of surprise which, in this case, was the key to the plan’s success.

More importantly, the entirety of the town and its immediate surroundings can be seen from Glavica. This is why it was necessary for the defenders to try to keep this point in their hands, for if they had relinquished it to the Romans, then the latter would have been able to observe their every move and note all points of concentration. From this position, the Roman commander could have had the entire situation in the palm of his hand: relinquishing Glavica to the attackers would have been tantamount to disclosing all of one’s intelligence to them in advance. This position was necessarily high on the list of priorities in all defensive plans and it had to be fortified and manned. This is why the Roman consul could not count on seizing it rapidly, silently and without notice. In a word, had the Romans decided to launch their attack via Glavica, there is little chance that they would have managed to do what has been described to us.

Zavala Cove today penetrates approximately 600 m inland, and it is roughly 160 m wide down its middle. In Antiquity, when the sea level was considerably lower, its dimensions were far smaller: ca. 450x110 m. This space simply could not receive 20 large warships: even a single quinquereme, with dimensions of nearly 50 x 10 m, with an additional 9 m of oars on its sides, would have had trouble manoeuvring in it.⁵⁷

57 The exact dimensions of the quinqueremes of that time are not known; all that is known is that there were different types (Liv., 28.30.3-12). This is why scholars calculate it in relation to the known features of triremes. Experiments with the *Olympias*, a reconstruction of an ancient trireme launched in 1987, showed that it requires two ship lengths to make a complete, 360-degree, turn. The far less seaworthy quinquereme certainly required much more space to turn (it was approximately 10% longer, twice as heavy, 15% slower, a 70% deeper draught, a 40 cm higher centre of gravity, and because of the far higher bending moment it was

najbolji potez koji su imali na raspolaganju - i dijelom se uspjeli povući u Far. Na kraju, ilirske snage ovamo su dovedene ili ovdje zadržane upravo zato što se očekivalo da će Rimljani napasti Far i izuzetno je očito da su poduzeli opsežne obrambene pripreme - sve do sakrivenih brodova kojima će se evakuirati s otoka u slučaju neuspjele obrane grada. Čak je i sam rimski konzul smatrao da su te obrambene pripreme vrlo kvalitetne, pa je očekivao dugotrajnu opsadu. Far ovom prilikom nisu branili paceri koji su se unutar bedema izležavali kao ovce u toru, nesvjesne da ih čeka klanje. Oni su se pripremili i bili su spremni poduzeti inicijativu.

Zaninović načelno pristaje uz Nikolancijevu teoriju i dijelom iznosi dodatne argumente o brdu Glavici kao ključnom položaju u cijeloj priči, ali je dijelom cijelu rekonstrukciju zakomplicirao dajući neke alternative Nikolancijevim topografskim rješenjima, pri čemu je uglavnom ostavio nejasnim kako se ti novi elementi uklapaju i u kojoj mjeri mijenjaju Nikolancijevu rekonstrukciju.

Zaninović opisuje kako je vrh Glavice okružen ostacima prstenastog suhozidnog bedema promjera oko 50 m. Glavicu opisuje kao idealan motrilački položaj. Iz toga zaključuje da postojanje gradinske fortifikacije na ovom brdu *jasno dokazuje da se jedino na nj može odnositi Polibijeva oznaka "Iofos erymnos" - "prirodno utvrđeni brežuljak"*.⁶¹ Kako se vidi iz prethodnog teksta, potpuno se slažem s vrijednošću Glavice kao promatračnice. Štoviše, iako je ono što Zaninović opisuje, i što sam osobno vidio, ostatak lokalne pretpovijesne fortifikacijske arhitekture, mislim da je ovaj vrh u toj mjeri bitan za obranu položaja Staroga Grada da ga farski Grci sigurno nisu ostavili nezaposjednutog i neutvrđenog (tj. da su vjerojatno koristili i održavali bedeme koje su ovdje zatekli). Ali sada ulazimo u problem onoga što je Polibije napisao, tj. čudne i upravo izvrnute Zaninovićeve interpretacije Polibijevih riječi. Polibije stvarno piše λόφος ἔρυμνον, a to se doista može prevesti kako prevodi Zaninović,⁶² ali

Let us imagine how this should have appeared. It should not be forgotten that in the first phase, the Romans only feigned their landing here, without the serious intent of actually sending their infantry onto the shore, where the amassed defence forces could massacre them before they could assemble into any type of combat formation. They attempted to attract the enemy's attention to themselves and preoccupy them with their dramatic landing attempts, while the other forces came from behind them. The source clearly recounts that the units from these 20 vessels landed only after enemy forces turned their backs on them and moved away from the shore to march on the Romans who had assumed position on the heights.⁵⁸ This could not be done by beaching the 20 vessels and then engaging in battle from the elevated decks of said vessels, because they would have been exposed to a very serious risk of the defenders pushing their way to the ships and simply trampling them: there were less than 2,500 legionnaires⁵⁹ on the decks of the 20 quinqueremes and the defenders outnumbered them many times over, with new forces arriving from the settlement. The narrow deck which limited room for

constructed with 25% thicker boards in comparison to a trireme). For the features of a trireme, see Morrison 1995, pp. 47-65. Construction specifications of a quinquereme: Morrison 1996, pp. 285-291. Classical writers considered the quinquereme superior to the trireme as a warship (Polyb., 1.63.8; Liv., 28.30). Besides a higher number of marines and catapult devices and a sturdier build, the advantages of the quinquereme over the trireme also consisted of greater stability on the open seas: it "rocked" far less on the waves and responded much better to the helm (Morrison 1996, p. 65).

58 Polyb., 3.19.6.

59 On the number of marines in a quinquereme: Polyb., 1.26.7, Casson 1995, pp. 107, note 41; 113; 121; Morrison 1996, p. 285. To be sure, far more than 120 legionnaires could be packed onto the deck of a quinquereme, and this could be done if all that had to be done was conveying them from one place to another. But this would certainly not have been done if any battles along the way or at the final destination were expected. For besides the additional weight of persons, gear and water slowing the vessel, the space on the decks would be limited and narrowed near the vessel's structural elements and military engines, so that the crowded foot soldiers would not be able to organize a defence and use of the engines would be prevented. Ultimately, 120 legionnaires were "formationally" accommodated on a quinquereme (probably 100 on a quadrireme and 80 on a trireme) precisely because it was estimated that that was the highest possible number of foot soldiers whocould engage in organized combat on a deck of that size.

61 Zaninović 1984, str. 35, 39-41.

62 No postoji mogućnost da Zaninovićev prijevod ipak neće biti dobar, tj. da se može raditi i o prirodno jakom položaju i položaju koji je umjetno fortificiran jer LJS s.v. ἔρυμνον-ός, ή, όν, izričito dopušta i takvu mogućnost. Ali, s druge strane, na većini drugih mjesta gdje Polibije rabi ovu riječ (1.30.8, 1.74.6, 2.25.9, 3.83.1, 4.57.5, 4.73.5, 9.7.9, 10.35.7) ona se odnosi na strmi ili po prirodi jak položaj koji nema umjetnih fortifikacija. U svim tim slučajevima ona je u kombinaciji s λόφος ili τόπος. U samo jednom slučaju (4.70.10) odnosi se na "po prirodi jako brdo na kojemu je sagrađen bedem" (βουνός ἔρυμνός ἐπίκειται τετειχισμένος), što i ne mora biti iznimka.

u tom slučaju upravo znači ono što Zaninović i kaže: prirodno utvrđeni položaj (za razliku od umjetno utvrđenog položaja); položaj koji je jak sam po sebi, bez ikakve ljudske intervencije na njemu; od prirode stvorena fortifikacija. Pa bi takva interpretacija upravo nedvosmisleno dokazivala da se u tom opisu nikako ne može prepoznati brdo Glavica, na kojem postoji ljudskom rukom sagrađena utvrda.

No, želimo li detaljizirati oko toga, postoji još nešto: riječ ὁ λόφος ne znači baš “brdo”, niti “brežuljak”, već više nešto što se uspinje i što je zakošeno (stražnji dio vrata konja, hrbat, padina brda, greben, strmo ili okomito uzvišenje, perjanica na kacigi - poput onih na hoplitskim kacigama).⁶³ A taj bi opis puno više odgovarao položaju o kojemu ćete čitati dalje u ovom tekstu negoli brdu Glavici.

Osim toga, Zaninović nudi i alternativno mjesto konzulova fingiranog iskrcavanja. Ne odbacuje izrijeckom Nikolancijev prijedlog o uvali Zavala, ali dodaje: *mogla je to, po našem mišljenju biti i neka uvala na južnoj strani zaljeva, kao Konopjikova ili Maslinica, koja je bliža Starome Gradu i koja je, kako veli Polibije “engista tēs poleos limên” - “luka najbliža gradu”*.⁶⁴ Ovdje Zaninović staje, ne pojašnjava nam više ništa o ideji iskrcavanja na južnoj strani Zaljeva i ostavlja nas s pregršti problema. Prvo, uvalu Konopjikova nisam u stanju pronaći ni na jednoj karti Hvara kojom raspolazem, uključujući i one na internetu.⁶⁵ Drugo, da se konzul sa svojih 20 brodova uputio u uvalu Maslinica, tada bi to odlučno uzvišenje na koje su izbili Rimljani moralo biti brdo Zeleminac, između uvale Maslinica i uvale Zeleminac. Ali zapadna padina ovog brda (prema uvali Maslinica) toliko je strma (od 0 do 110 m nadmorske visine u oko 250 m zračne udaljenosti), da je naprosto nemoguće da je ovdje netko jurišao uzbrdo u sredenom borbenom poretku.

63 LSJ s.v. λόφος, ὁ.

64 Zaninović 1984, str. 39.

65 Moja početna zbunjenost bila je veća jer sam nekoliko puta bio u uvali Konopjikova (i svima preporučam posjet): radi se o lijepoj, romantičnoj uvali nedaleko od Pučišća, na sjevernoj strani otoka Brača. No, mještani, *Starograjani*, kažu mi da je naziv Konopjikova drugi naziv za uvalu Sv. Ante, koju zovu još i *Grobajska vala* (očito jer je najbliža pomorska komunikacija za selo Velo Grablje). Radi se u vrlo maloj uvali iz koje uski klanac omeđen strmim brdima izbija u zaselak Zaninović. Može biti da ju je prof. Zaninović uključio iz nekih sentimentalnih razloga, ali ona stvarno ne dolazi u obzir kao mjesto iskrcavanja veće vojske. Na ovome mjestu moram zahvaliti Hvaranima (u značenju otoka, a ne grada) bez čije pomoći ne bih mogao raspetljati lokalnu problematiku, ponajprije Branku Kiriginu i Aldu Čaviću.

manoeuvre, especially when tilted to one side due to beaching, was not a good surface for an army attempting to fight in an orderly combat line. The “feigned landing” required a great deal of manoeuvring by the vessels approaching the coast, creating the impression of the desire to disembark their forces, and after the defenders blocked this part of the shore, the ships moved and set off for another site, compelling the defenders to redeploy, then the vessels would once more move away from the shore, manoeuvring between the *lembi* that attempted to block their departure from Stari Grad Bay. ... This game did not last long, an hour, perhaps two. Throughout this time, many projectiles were probably exchanged, adding to the drama and drawing concentration toward the source of the peril. Through their “indecision,” the Romans created a sense of superiority among their enemies, and a desire to clash with an obviously weaker force, thus drawing all attention onto themselves, suggesting to the enemy above all that they should undertake moves to give themselves an advantage.

Such a scenario could not have proceeded in a narrow cove. There is only one place in Star Grad Bay where that part of the campaign could have taken place, and that is the wider area of Tiha Harbour.⁶⁰

So the fundamental shortcoming in Nikolanci’s reconstruction is that he did not take into account the number of troops involved and the space required to move this number of vessels and manpower. Next, he failed to take into account the defenders of Pharos. They did ultimately lose the battle, but they were by no means military novices. The source clearly states that formidable elite troops were brought in, and they were additionally led by a man who had previously and afterward proven himself as an adept tactician. These were troops prepared to leave the safety of the fortified walls (something rather psychologically difficult for inadequately organized and inexperienced reservists), in order to attempt to prevent their enemy from landing on shore, because they knew very well that this was an opportunity in which they could inflict the greatest losses on their opponents while their forces were still dispersed and not mustered into combat formation. When their enemy unexpectedly appeared behind their backs, they did not scatter and begin to frantically retreat to safety behind the fortified walls, they rather quickly and systematically made the best move at their disposal - and partially succeeded in

60 A criticism of Nikolanci’s location of the landing in Zavala Cove due to the lack of space and the movement of the consul’s “fake” landing farther west, toward Tiha Harbour, can also be found in Tarbušković 2013, pp. 24-25. I would like to thank my peer reviewer for pointing out the existence of this master’s thesis.

Treće, tada nam valja tražiti i drugo mjesto rimskoga noćnog iskrčavanja, po svoj prilici negdje na južnoj obali otoka. Četvrto, u tom slučaju brdo Glavica ne može biti to ključno uzvišenje, što se upravo nastoji dokazati na sljedećim stranicama istog članka.

Vidimo da se Zaninović poveo za Polibijevim izričajem ἔγγιστα τῆς πόλεως λιμένα,⁶⁶ ali se taj izričaj ovdje ne može shvatiti toliko doslovno. Čini mi se da na ovome mjestu Polibijevo λιμένα ne valja prevoditi kao “luka” jer to zbunjuje. Naime, ovdje se ne mora raditi o mjestu s uređenim dokovima i izgrađenom lučkom infrastrukturom. Isti pojam se koristi i za pribežište u koje se brodovi sklanjaju pred olujom, koje nema lučku infrastrukturu,⁶⁷ dakle nešto što je samo pogodan zaljev ili uvala. Riječ “luka” ovdje je, po svoj prilici, u značenju da je mjesto pogodno za brodove i za iskrčavanje, da su konzulovi brodovi mogli ovamo uploviti bez opasnosti od jake struje ili nasukavanja na kakvu podvodnu pličinu ili hrid.⁶⁸ Riječ ἔγγιστος stvarno označava nešto što je najbliže (čak ima značenje i: “najbliži rođak”). Pomalo je nejasno zašto je Polibije “luku” konzulova fingiranog iskrčavanja okarakterizirao kao “najbližu gradu”. Jer ona to nikako ne može biti. Naravno da Polibije nije bio osobno ovdje da bi svoj izbor riječi što bolje prilagodio stvarnoj situaciji. Iz cijelog opisa jasno je da ta “luka” ne može biti jako blizu gradu, niti tik uz sam grad, jer tada cijela ideja o odsijecanju branitelja koji izađu ne bi mogla funkcionirati. Osim toga, između grada i “luke” mora biti neka uzvisina koju su Rimljani iskoristili. Sve to potpuno isključuje upravo one uvale koje su najbliže položaju Staroga Grada. Zato vjerojatno valja odustati od superlativnog značenja ove riječi i iz Polibijeve konstrukcije razumjeti da se radi o položaju koji je dosta blizu grada, u smislu da je bio relativno brzo dohvatljiv braniteljima koji su u gradu. A to nam onda daje gotovo cijeli rub Starogradske zaljeva.

U novije vrijeme svoje viđenje bitke donio je i V. Tarbušković. On opravdano smatra da je uvala Zavalala previše mala da bi u nju ušlo sve brodovlje koje je sa sobom poveo konzul Emilije i zato “fingirano” iskrčavanje pomiče prema Luci Tiha. Nakon toga pokušava pomiriti Nikolancijevo rješenje s tom nešto zapadnijom lokacijom: Demetrijevi vojnici suprotstavljaju se ovom iskrčavanju, zbog čega su izvučeni na priličnu udaljenost od grada. To koriste Rimljani iskrčani prethodne noći, vrše pokret iz pravca uvala Žukova i odsijecaju neprijatelju povratak u grad

retreating to Pharos. Illyrian forces were, after all, brought or retained here precisely because the Romans were expected to attack Pharos, and it was patently obvious that they had undertaken extensive defensive preparations - including the concealment of ships to evacuate from the island in case the settlement's defence failed. Even the Roman consul himself considered the preparations very sound, and thus anticipated a long-term siege. In this instance, Pharos was not defended by incompetents who simply stood behind their walls liked sheep in the fold, unaware that a slaughter awaited them. They had prepared and were ready to take the initiative.

Zaninović generally accepted Nikolanci's theory and partially offered additional arguments for Glavica Hill as the key point in this entire story, but he also partially complicated the entire reconstruction by proposing some alternatives to Nikolanci's topographic solutions, wherein it remained unclear as to which new elements fit into Nikolanci's reconstructions and to what extent they altered it.

Zaninović described the top of Glavica as encircled by the remains of a ring-shaped stacked-stone wall with a 50 m diameter. He further described Glavica as an ideal observation site. He therefore concluded that the existence of fortifications in the style of a hillfort on this hill “clearly proves that the designation by Polybius of a ‘*lofos erymnos*’ - a ‘naturally fortified hillock’ - could only pertain to it.”⁶¹ As seen in the preceding text, I entirely agree about the value of Glavica as an observation post. Moreover, even though what Zaninović described, which I have seen for myself, are the remains of local prehistoric fortification architecture, I believe that this peak was essential to the defence of Stari Grad to that extent that the Pharos Greeks certainly did not leave it abandoned and unfortified (i.e., that they probably used and maintained the fortified walls they had found there). But now we come to the crux of the problem of what Polybius had described, and Zaninović's odd and actually contrary interpretation of what the words written by Polybius meant. Polybius did actually write λόφον ἐρυμνόν, and this may indeed be translated as Zaninović did,⁶² but

61 Zaninović 1984, pp. 35, 39-41.

62 There is the possibility that Zaninović's translation was nonetheless inadequate, i.e., that it may have been both a naturally strong position and a position that was also artificially fortified, for LJS s.v. ἐρυμν-ὸς, ἦ, ὄν, explicitly allowed for such a possibility. However, on the other hand, at most other places in which Polybius used this word (1.30.8, 1.74.6, 2.25.9, 3.83.1, 4.57.5, 4.73.5, 9.7.9, 10.35.7), it refers to a steep or naturally reinforced position on which there are no artificial fortifications. In all of these cases, it is combined with λόφος or τόπος. In only a single case (4.70.10) does it refer

66 Polyb., 3.18.11.

67 LSJ s.v. λιμήν, -ένοσ. Polibije u sačuvanom tekstu riječ koristi 54 puta i upotrebljava je u oba ova smisla.

68 Slično značenje ove riječi i u Polyb., 1.56.7, 2.16.12 i drugdje.

zauzimanjem položaja na 300 m udaljenim Vratima od Kabla. Istodobno s tim zauzimaju i položaj na gradini Glavica, koja je i po Tarbuškoviću onaj strmi brijeg na kojemu bitka biva odlučena.⁶⁹ Na žalost, on ovom rješenju posvećuje svega nekoliko rečenica i ne razrađuje ga detaljnije. U odnosu na Nikolancija donosi zanimljiv pomak, ali otvara i sasvim nove probleme. Prvo, ovakvo rješenje podrazumijeva, iako to autor izričito ne kaže, da su se Iliri morali sukobiti s Rimljanima na Vratima od Kabla i ovdje u potpunosti razbiti njihovu blokadu, jer u protivnom ne bi mogli doći na Glavicu da bi se ovdje ponovo borili. Također, suženje Vrata od Kabla je udolina koja je 20-ak metara niža od okolnog terena, te nije baš vjerojatno da bi se Rimljani ovdje postavili i protivniku prepustili dominantno uzvišenje nasuprot svom položaju. Drugo, problematičan je položaj konzula i njegovih 20 brodova u odnosu na “odlučno uzvišenje”. Kako smo ih odmaknuli više od 2 km zapadnije, on i njegove postrojbe više nemaju pogled na Glavicu i sa svog položaja uopće ne mogu vidjeti što se na njoj događa. A Polibije izričito tvrdi da su snage koje su se upravo iskrcale s 20 brodova jasno vidjele kako se razvija bitka na uzvisini i da su na to reagirale.⁷⁰ Ako “odlučno uzvišenje” stavljamo na Glavicu, to bi značilo da konzula i cijelo njegovo stvarno iskrcavanje vojnika ponovo moramo vraćati u Zavalu, ili neku Glavici bližu manju uvalu - iako smo krenuli od pretpostavke da to nije prihvatljivo rješenje.

Tarbušković uvodi i jednu novu ideju u raspravu, koja jest zanimljiva pa i domišljata, ali ipak neće biti prihvatljiva. Naime, smatra da je Demetrije možda s neke promatračnice primio pogrešan signal o snazi rimske vojske i da ga je to moglo ohrabriti da joj se suprotstavi izvan grada, te u nastavku raspravlja o položajima s kojih je takav signal mogao biti poslan.⁷¹ Početni dojam o inferiornosti rimskih snaga sigurno je prisutan kod Demetrija i vrlo vjerojatno je utjecao na njegove odluke, ali on nije nastao nekakvim nesporazumom u komunikacijama, već ga je svjesno i namjerno stvorio sam konzul Emilije: upravo da bi kod Demetrija izazvao reakciju kakvu opisuje Tarbušković. Ta je “prikazana” inferiornost bila više nego znatna: prisjetimo se da je Demetrije uza se imao najmanje 6000 ratnika (a po svoj prilici i puno više), a na 20 brodova je 2400 vojnika (ukoliko su sve bile

in this case, it would actually mean what Zaninović had said: a naturally fortified position (as opposed to an artificially fortified position); a position that was strong in and of itself, without any human intervention thereon; a naturally formed fortification. So such an interpretation actually unambiguously proves that this description certainly cannot be recognized as Glavica Hill, on which there was a fortification built by human hands.

But if we wish to go into details on this matter, there is something else: the word ὁ λόφος does not exactly mean “hill” nor “hillock”, but rather more something that ascends and which slants (the back side of a horse’s neck, a spine, the slope of a hill, a ridge, a steep or entirely vertical rise, the crest on a helmet - like those on hoplite helmets).⁶³ And this description much better suits the position which will be covered farther below in this text than Glavica Hill.

Zaninović additionally offered an alternative site for the consul’s feigned landing. He did not explicitly reject Nikolanci’s proposal on Zavala Cove, but he added: “in my opinion, it could have also been a cove on the southern side of the bay, like Konopjikova or Maslinica, which is closer to Stari Grad and which is, as Polybius said, ‘*engista tēs poleos limēn*’ - ‘the port closest to the town.’”⁶⁴ Zaninović stopped here, not explaining anything more about the idea of a landing on the southern side of the bay and left us all with the bulk of the problem. First, I have been unable to find Konopjikova Cove on any map of Hvar at my disposal, including those found online.⁶⁵ Second, if the consul had directed his 20 vessels to Maslinica Cove, then

to “a naturally strong hill on which a fortified wall was built” (βουνὸς ἔρυμνὸς ἐπικείται τετειχισμένος), which need not also be an exception.

63 LSJ s.v. λόφος, ὁ.

64 Zaninović 1984, p. 39.

65 My initial confusion increased, because I had been to a Konopjikova Cove several times (and I recommend that everyone do so): this is a lovely, romantic cove not far from Pučišće, on the northern side of the island of Brač. But local residents, *Starograjani*, say that Konopjikova is another name for Sveti Ante (St. Anthony’s) Cove, which they also call *Grobajska vala* (obviously because the closest maritime communication to the village of Velo Grablje). This is a very small cove from which a narrow ravine bordered by steep hills leads to the hamlet called Zaninović. It may be that Prof. Zaninović included it for sentimental reasons, but this cannot be considered a place for the landing of a larger army. Here I must express my gratitude to the residents of Hvar (the entire island, and not the town), without whose assistance I would not have been able to unravel this local problem, first and foremost Branko Kirigin and Aldo Čavić.

69 Tarbušković 2013, str. 24-25.

70 Polyb., 3.19.6.

71 Tarbušković 2013, str. 26. Od tri predložena položaja onaj na Gračišću je vrlo prihvatljiv za ovakvu namjenu (usp. Zaninović 1984, str. 43), dok za druga dva, na Purkinu kuku i kuli Tor ponad Jelse, nije vjerojatno da su imali namjenu intenzivnog promatranja plovidbe Hvarskim kanalom.

kvinkvireme). Iliri, koliko god da ih je ovamo pristiglo, mogli su se odmah svrstati u bojni poredak na samoj obali, dok su Rimljani bili raspršeni na 20 nezavisnih dijelova, te sigurno nisu mogli koordinirati istovremeno iskrcavanje pješaka, pri čemu bi ti pješaci kada dođu na obalu bili potpuno međusobno izolirani u skupine neuvezane u jedinstveni bojni poredak. Svaki pokušaj rimskog iskrcavanja u tim uvjetima rezultirao bi potpunom katastrofom - i to je upravo bio smisao konzulove "ponude" kojom je Demetrije bio privučen.

I samo još jedan, relativno manje važan, komentar o pošumljenosti. Kako Nikolanci ulazi u tu raspravu s Vrankovićem,⁷² vjerojatno bi valjalo dati svoje mišljenje. A mislim da je prilično deplasirano raspravljati koji je dio terena u antici bio pošumljen, a koji nije, a poglavito koristeći se argumentom da on danas nije pod šumom. Takva istraživanja nikada nisu provedena, a i da jesu, teško da bi nam dala odgovor o stanju forestacije baš u proljeće i ljeto 219. g. pr. Kr. Šumarski stručnjaci drže da je otok Hvar u antičko vrijeme u potpunosti bio prekriven borovom šumom.⁷³ No, i potpuna deforestacija nekog prostora mogla je

the decisive height on which the Romans advanced would necessarily have been Zeleminac Hill, between Maslinica and Zeleminac Coves. But the western slope of this hill (toward Maslinica Cove) is so steep (from 0 to 110 m above sea level in roughly 250 m straight line), that it would have simply been impossible for someone to have charged uphill in an orderly combat formation. Third, it would then be worthwhile to seek another place for the Roman night-time landing, possibly somewhere on the island's southern shore. Fourth, in this case, Glavica Hill cannot be that crucial height, and the following pages in that same article contained an attempt to prove precisely that.

We can see that Zaninović was guided by Polybius' expression ἔγγιστα τῆς πόλεως λιμένα,⁶⁶ but this term cannot be taken so literally here. It seems to me that here the use of λιμένα by Polybius should not be translated as "port," because this is confusing. Here this need not mean a place with functioning docks and a port infrastructure. The same term was also used for the safe harbours in which ships berth in storms, and which do not have any infrastructure,⁶⁷ therefore a place that is simply a suitable inlet or cove. The "port" here probably means that the place was suitable for vessels and disembarking, that the consul's ships could have sailed in here without danger from powerful currents or grounding in shoals or submerged reefs.⁶⁸ The word ἔγγιστος truly signifies something that is nearest (it even has the added meaning of "closest cousin"). It is somewhat unclear as to why Polybius characterized the "port" of the consul's feigned landing as "closest to the town." For it simply could not be this. Naturally, Polybius was never here personally in order to ensure that his choice of words could best reflect the actual situation. From the entire description, it is clear that the "port" could not be very close to the settlement, nor right next to the settlement itself, because then the entire idea of cutting off the defenders who come outside could not have functioned. Additionally, there had to be some elevated point between the settlement and the "port" which the Romans exploited. All of this entirely excludes precisely those coves nearest to the site of Stari Grad. This is why it is probably advisable not to insist on the superlative meaning of this word and perceive the construction by Polybius that it was a position that was rather close to the settlement, in the sense that it could be reached relatively rapidly by defenders in the


72 Nikolanci 1957, str. 57-58; Vranković 1891.

73 Osloncem na vrlo staro tumačenje iz Unger 1864, str. 211 i d. (prijevod: Kauders 1954, str. 329). U novije vrijeme Meštrović *et al.* 2011, str. 25 i d. S druge strane, argumenti koji se za to ovdje iznose izgledaju mi vrlo sumnjivi. Malo je problematično je li se otok Hvar u antici nazivao *Pytíea* (sic.), kako navode autori: u *Argonautici* se spominje Jazonova plovidba nakon Liburnida put otoka Isa - Diskelad - dražesna Piteja - Korkira (koju zovu Crna Korkira) - Melita (Apol. *Argonaut.*, 4.565-572). Ali navedeni niz ("Ἴσση τε Δυσκέλαδος τε καὶ ἱμερτὴ Πιτύεια) smješta dva nepoznata naziva između Visa i Korčule, pa bi se Hvar mogao skrivati i iza imena Diskelad, a opis "dražesni" radije bi se odnosio na neki manji otok, poput Šćedra. Ne slažem se da ima razloga pretpostaviti (Zaninović 1992, str. 38) da bi Diskelad bio Brač, pa bi onda Piteja bio Hvar. Kojih to razloga ima za tu pretpostavku? Tim više što Apolonije sugerira da otoke navodi redom (ἔξείης ... εἰν ἄλλῃ νῆσοι), te na tom plovidbenom pravcu prvospomenuti nakon Visa jednostavno mora biti Hvar: do Brača ne možete a da ne prođete pokraj Hvara, a, osim toga, zašto bi netko s Visa za Korčulu uopće plovio preko Brača? Niti mi naziv *Pytíea* ili *Pityea* nalikuje na grčku riječ koja bi značila "bor" (*Pitys* je nimfa koju je proganjao Pan i pretvorena je u stablo, ali ne u bor, nego u jelu), a prilično sam siguran da ni jedna emisija farskog novca nema prikaz stabla bora na reversu. Također, sudeći po Skokovu toponomastičkom istraživanju, na Hvaru je još u predslavensko vrijeme, osim raznih borova (*pinaceae*), raslo poprilično različitih vrsta stabala i makije: Skok 1950, str. 181-191, posebno 183-184.

66 Polyb., 3.18.11.

67 LSJ s.v. λιμήν, -ένος. Polybius used the word, in both of these senses, 54 times in the preserved text.

68 A similar meaning of this word in Polyb., 1.56.7, 2.16.12 and ff.



nastati izuzetno brzo: za to je dovoljan jedan ljetni požar ili iznimno hladna zima koja će stanovništvo natjerati na pojačanu sječu. Dapače, razlog traženju u antici pošumljenih dijelova otoka Hvara uopće nije relevantan. To što Polibije naglašava da su se Rimljani iskrcali na mjestu koje je bilo pošumljeno (ἀπεβίβασεν εἰς ὑλώδεις καὶ κοίλους τόπους),⁷⁴ ne mora značiti da je riječ o izrazito šumovitom dijelu Hvara, jer se to ovdje odnosi na tajnost, neprimjetnost samog iskrcavanja, pa se moglo raditi i o obali pod visokom makijom. Također, njegova izjava da su Rimljani na putu do uzvisine διὰ τόπον ἀδήλων ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν,⁷⁵ pomalo je okrnjena uobičajenim prijevodom “marširali sporednim stazama” (radije: “kretali se prostorom na kojem nisu mogli biti viđeni”).⁷⁶ U svakom slučaju, ona ne mora značiti da Rimljani nisu mogli biti zamijećeni zato što su se kretali šumom, nego naprosto da su išli prostorom na kojemu ih prethodno spomenuti Demetrijevi vojnici nisu mogli vidjeti s mjesta na kojemu su se tada nalazili - tj. s obale na kojoj su pokušavali spriječiti konzulovo iskrcavanje.

74 Polyb., 3.18.10.

75 Polyb., 3.19.2.

76 LSJ s.v. ἀδηλόω = render invisible (učiniti nevidljivim, ostati nevidljiv).


settlement. And this then opens the possibility of the rim edge of Stari Grad Bay.

More recently, V. Tarbušković presented his views on the battle. He justifiably believes that Zavala Cove is far too small for entry by the naval fleet Consul Aemilius brought with him, and thus moved the “feigned” landing toward Tiha Harbour. After this, he attempts to reconcile Nikolanci’s solution with this somewhat more westerly location: Demetrius’ troops came out to meet this landing, which is why they were drawn to a considerable distance from the settlement. This was exploited by the Romans who had landed on the preceding night, advancing from the direction of Žukova Cove and cutting off their enemy’s return to the settlement by assuming a position at Vrata od Kabla, 300 m away, which according to Tarbušković is the steep hill on which the battle was decided.⁶⁹ Unfortunately, he only dedicated a few sentences to this solution, without going into further detail. It is an intriguing step forward in comparison to Nikolanci, but it creates some entirely new problems. First, this solution implies - although Tarbušković never explicitly says so - that the Illyrians had to have fought the Romans at Vrata od Kabla and entirely pierced their blockade there, because otherwise there would have been no way for them to reach Glavica to once more engage with them there. Additionally, the narrowing of Vrata od Kabla is a depression that is roughly 20 meters lower than the surrounding terrain, and it is not very likely that the Romans set up here and allowed their opponents to assume a dominant height facing their position. Second, the position of the consul and his 20 ships in relation to the “decisive height” is problematic. Now that they have been moved 2 km farther west, he and his units no longer have a view of Glavica and cannot see what is happening on it from their position. But Polybius expressly claimed that the forces which had just disembarked from the 20 ships could clearly see the battle proceeding on the height and thus responded to that.⁷⁰ If the “decisive height” is set on Glavica, this would mean that the consul the entire actual landing of his troops would have to be returned to Zavala, or some cove closer to Glavica - even though we have set forth from the assumption that this is not an acceptable solution.

Tarbušković introduced another new idea to the debate, which is indeed intriguing and even inventive, but which will nonetheless prove unacceptable. He believes that Demetrius may have received an erroneous signal from one of the observation posts on the power of the Roman army and this may have encouraged him to confront them outside of the settlement,

69 Tarbušković 2013, pp. 24-25.

70 Polyb., 3.19.6.



Rekonstrukcija bitke

Iz Polibijeva opisa razvidno je da se bitka odigrala u 4 faze:

1) Rimljani noću na otok neopazice iskrcavaju dio pješništva.

2) Konzul na čelu 20 brodova uplovljava u Starogradski zaljev i ostavlja pred neprijateljem dojam da želi iskrcati svoje snage. Na to branitelji reaguju izlaskom iz grada i pokušajem blokiranja tog dijela obale.

3) Prethodne noći iskrcana rimska vojska izbija na uzvisinu za leđima branitelja i odsijeca im put za povratak u grad. Na to se branitelji okreću od obale i jurišaju na novu prijetnju.

4) Konzul iskrcava pješništvo sa svojih 20 brodova na sada ispražnjenu obalu i udara u leđa braniteljima koji se bore s Rimljanima na uzvisini, što dovodi do raspada njihove formacije.

Mjesto iskrcavanja rimske vojske - i tajno i fingirano - trebalo bi tražiti na obalama poluotoka Kabal. Riječ je o uskoj i dugačkoj istaci kopna koja sa sjeveroistočne strane zatvara Starogradski zaljev. Ovaj poluotok ukupne je dužine oko 6 km i širine 800 do 2200 m, površine 865,90 ha,⁷⁷ s najvišom točkom od 129 m na uzvisini Bila glava, koja se uzdiže iznad sjeveroistočne strane morskog ulaza u Starogradski zaljev. Promatran iz ptičje perspektive, čini se izlomljenih oblika nalik na slovo Z, s vrlo razvedenom

and in the continuation of his analysis he speculates as to the positions from which such a signal may have been sent.⁷¹ The initial impression of the inferiority of Roman forces was certainly present in Demetrius, and it very likely that it influenced his decisions, but it was not the result of any misunderstanding in communications, rather it was purposefully and deliberately created by Consul Aemilius, to provoke the response from Demetrius as described by Tarbušković. This “displayed” inferiority was more than significant: recall that Demetrius had a minimum of 6,000 soldiers (and probably more) backing him, while the 20 ships held 2,400 soldiers (insofar as all were quinqueremes). The Illyrians, however many of them had arrived, could immediately take up a combat formation on the seashore itself, while the Romans were scattered into 20 unconnected parts, and certainly could not coordinate the simultaneous landing of foot soldiers, wherein the latter, once they reached the shore, would be entirely isolated from each other in groups not linked into a consolidated combat formation. Every attempt at a Roman landing under the conditions would have resulted in a complete disaster - and that was in fact the sense of the consul’s “offer,” which enticed Demetrius.

And just one more, relatively less important, comment on forest cover. Since Nikolanci opened this line of contention with Vranković’s earlier work,⁷² it would probably be worthwhile to share my own opinion. I believe it is rather pointless to debate which parts of the terrain were or were not forested in Antiquity, and primarily depend on the argument that it is not forested today. Such research has never been conducted, and even if it had been, it would hardly have given us an answer as to the state of forestation in the spring and summer of 219 BC. Forestry experts maintain that the island of Hvar had been entirely covered with pine forests in Antiquity.⁷³ Even so, the


71 Tarbušković 2013, p. 26. Out of the three suggested positions, the one on Gračišće is very acceptable for this purpose (cf. Zaninović 1984, p. 43), while it is unlikely that the other two, at Purkin kuk and the Tor tower above Jelsa, were used for intense observation of vessels navigating the Hvar channel.

72 Nikolanci 1957, pp. 57-58; Vranković 1891.

73 Based on a very old interpretation from Unger 1864, pp. 211 ff. (translation: Kauders 1954, p. 329). More recently, Meštrović *et al.* 2011, pp. 25 ff. On the other hand, the arguments made here appear rather suspect to me. It is debatable whether the island of Hvar was called Pytiea(sic.) in Antiquity, as the authors claimed: in the *Argonautica* there is mention of Jason’s voyage after the Liburnian isles, passing the islands of Issa, Dyscecladus, and lovely Pityeia and then Coreyra (which was called Coreyra the Black) and Melite (Apol. *Argonaut.*,

77 Buratović 2007.

Faza 3



obalnom linijom, s oko 30 uvala i zaljeva. U uvjetima od prije 2000 godina, kada je more bilo niže, neke od uvala bile su nešto pliće i uže, ali su, kao i danas, gotovo sve bile lako pristupačne i s kopna i s mora. Kabal se s otokom spaja na položaju Vrata od Kabla, između uvale Zavala i uvale Žukova, te se prostire lučno približno prema sjeveru oko 4 km do rta Travna. Oko 1 km južnije odvaja se nastavak prema zapadu, dugačak oko 2,8 km do rta Kabal, koji s istoka zatvara ulaz u Starogradoski zaljev. Ovim prvim traktom, koji se lučno giba prema sjeveru, dominira oko 2,5 km dugačak greben koji se proteže uzduž sredine poluotoka, s nizom od tri istaknute visoravni: Zemunjava gomila (tt. 66) - tt. 56 - Priluka (tt. 70). U sedlima između njih visina grebena nigdje se ne spušta ispod 50 m nad morem. Plato na vrhu grebena vrlo je širok i lak za hodanje. S njega su lako pristupačne sve uvale istočno i zapadno, pri čemu nagib terena prema Starogradskom zaljevu iznosi približno 20-25 stupnjeva, a padine su travnate uz nešto manjeg kamenja. Nije vjerojatno da su ove padine i plato u antici bili pod šumom jer su stanovnicima Fara bile najdohvatljiviji izvor drva za kućna ognjišta i radionice, pa ako je ovdje šume izvorno i bilo, zasigurno nije puno preostalo nakon stoljeća i pol eksploatacije.

Ono što je ovdje bitno jest sljedeće:

1) Središnja uzvisina ne dopušta da se s unutrašnje strane zaljeva vidi sjeverna i istočna obala poluotoka, i neprijatelj koji se uspinje istočnom padinom bit će vidljiv tek kad se popne na rub platoa.


complete deforestation of a certain area could have been completed rather rapidly: all that is required is a summer wildfire or an exceptionally cold winter that compelled residents to cut more wood. However, seeking the forested parts of the island of Hvar in Antiquity is completely irrelevant. The fact that Polybius stressed that the Romans landed at a place that was forested (ἀπεβίβασεν εἰς ὑλώδεις καὶ κοίλους τόπους),⁷⁴ need not mean that this was an exceptionally forested part of Hvar, because here the emphasis was placed on secrecy, on the fact that the actual landing went unobserved, so it may have involved a beach covered by high macchia. Additionally, his statement that the Romans were on their way to a higher position διὰ τόπον ἀδήλων ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν,⁷⁵ is rather truncated by the translation “they marched on side paths” (preferable: “they proceeded through an area in which they could not be seen”).⁷⁶ In any case, this does not have to mean that the Romans could not be observed because they were moving through a forest, but rather simply that they were passing through an area in which the previously mentioned troops of Demetrius could not see them from their position at the time - the beach at which they were attempting to prevent the consul’s landing.

4.565-572). But this series (Ἴσσα τε Δυσκέλαδος τε καὶ ἱμερτὴ Πιτύεια) puts two unknown names between Vis (Issa) and Korčula (Corcyra), so Hvar could have been concealed behind the name Dysceladus, and the description ‘lovely’ may have referred to some smaller island, such as Šćedro. I do not agree that there is a reason to assume (Zaninović 1992, p. 38) that Dysceladus is Brač, so that Pityeia would then be Hvar. What are the reasons for this assumption? All the more so since Apollonius suggested that the islands were named in order (ἐξείης ... εἰν ἅλι νῆσοι), and that on this route, the first mentioned after Vis must be Hvar: Brač cannot be reached without passing Hvar, and, additionally, why would someone travelling from Vis to Korčula even sail past Brač? Not even the name Pityeia or Pitye are semples a Greek word that would denote “pine” (Pitye was a nymph pursued by Pan and transformed into a tree, but not a pine, rather a fir), and I am fairly certain that not a single issue of Pharos coins bore an image of a pine tree on the reverse. Also, based on Skok’s toponomastic research, in the pre-Slavic times, quite a few different species of trees and macchia grew on Hvar besides various types of pines (*pinaceae*): Skok 1950, pp. 181-191, particularly 183-184.

74 Polyb., 3.18.10.

75 Polyb., 3.19.2.

76 LSJ s.v. ἀδηλόω = render invisible.

Faza 4

2) Taj dio obale ne može se vidjeti s promatračnice na brdu Glavica, a ni iz samoga grada.

3) Središnji plato dovoljno je prostran da se na njemu u bojni poredak razviju prilično jake snage.

4) Širi prostor Luke Tiha s južne strane dovoljno je prostran za manevar brojnih ratnih brodova.

5) Postrojbe koje se uspinu istočnom padinom poluotoka izbit će na plato točno iza leđa snagama koje pokušavaju onemogućiti iskrcavanje vojnika u Luci Tiha.

6) Zaposjedanjem platoa snage koje se nalaze u prostoru Luke Tiha u potpunosti se mogu odsjeci od položaja Vrata od Kabla, tj. može im se presjeci jedini kopneni pravac za povratak u grad.

7) Zapadna padina relativno je blaga i nije krševita, pa omogućuje organizirano nastupanje i juriš nizbrdo (a i uzbrdo).

8) Zahvaljujući ovakvom taktičkom potencijalu i uskoći terena, organizirane snage na grebenu velika su prijetnja protivniku koji se nalazi ispod njih na zapadnoj obali i koji bi se pokušao povući natrag prema gradu.

9) Braniteljima koji pokušavaju spriječiti iskrcavanje Rimljana u širem prostoru Luke Tiha greben je za leđima i točno prema istoku. Kako se bitka odigrava ujutro, izlazeće sunce će im dijelom onemogućiti da vide pokrete na platou, a kada krenu u juriš na tamo postavljene Rimljane, sunce će im udarati ravno u oči. A to je prednost koju će uvijek prvu tražiti svaki obrazovani helenistički vojskovođa.

Reconstruction of the battle

According to the description by Polybius, the battle proceeded in four phases:

1) The Romans landed a part of their infantry on the island at night, unobserved.

2) The consul, leading 20 ships, sailed into Stari Grad Bay and gave his enemy the impression that he wanted to land his forces. The defenders responded by leaving the settlement and attempting to block that part of the shore.

3) The Roman troops who had landed the night before advanced to the heights behind the backs of the defenders and cut them off from the settlement. The defenders responded by turning from the shore and charging against the new threat.

4) The consul landed the infantry from his 20 ships onto the now empty beach and hit the defenders, who were fighting the Romans on the heights, from the back, leading to the disintegration of their formations.

The site of the Roman army's landings - both the secret and feigned - should be sought on the shores of the Kabal Peninsula. This is a long and narrow spur of the island which encloses Stari Grad Bay from the north-east. This peninsula has a total length of 6 km and width ranging from 800 2,200 m, and a total surface of 865,90 ha,⁷⁷ with its highest point at 129 m on the height called Bila glava rising above the north-eastern side of the mouth of Stari Grad Bay. From a bird's eye view, its discordant shape resembles the letter Z, with a very indented coastline and over 30 coves and inlets. Under the conditions that prevailed 2000 years ago, when the sea level was lower, some of these coves were shallower and narrower, but, like today, they were almost all easily accessible by land and sea. Kabal is connected to the island at the point called Vrata od Kabla ('Kabal's Gate'), between Zavalu Cove and Žukova Cove, and extends in an arc roughly northward approximately 4 km to Cape Travnica. About 1 km farther south, an approximately 2.8 km extension forks westward to Cape Kabal, which closes Stari Grad Bay from the east. The first tract, which arc northward, is dominated by a roughly 2.5 km long ridge that extends lengthwise down the middle of the peninsula, with a row of three prominent plateaus: Zemunjara gomila (tp. 66) - tp. 56 - Priluka (tp. 70). In the saddles between them, the height of the ridge never falls below an elevation of 50 m above sea level. The plateau atop the ridge is very wide and easy to traverse by foot. All coves to the east and west can be easily accessed from it, wherein the grade of the terrain toward Stari Grad Bay is roughly 20-25

⁷⁷ Buratović 2007.

O smjeru nastupanja Rimljana nemamo podataka. Ali, podrazumijevajući da je konzul Emilije nastojao sačuvati tajnost svoga plana, otoku se želio približiti neprimijećen, te sigurno nije plovio uzduž Hvara izlažući se pogledu s neke od Demetrijevih promatračnica. Tako su moguća dva pravca njegova nastupanja.

Nakon prolaska linije Pelješca konzul je skrenuo u Neretljanski kanal i, držeći se obalne linije, obišao Brač kroz Brački kanal; prije Splitskih vrata skrenuo je u prostranu uvalu Milne, gdje ga je poluotok Zaglav zaklanjao od pogleda s Hvara. Nakon što je u toj uvali pričekao spuštanje noći i obavio zadnje pripreme, otišao se na posljednjih 13 nautičkih milja do sjeverozapadne obale otoka Hvara. Za tu udaljenost trebalo mu je nekoliko sati, upravo toliko da se vanjskoj strani poluotoka Kabal približi u gluho doba noći.

Još duboko na jugu konzul se odmah dao na sredinu Jadrana i otvorenom pučinom doplovio do Visa. Ovdje se zaklonio za otok ili unutar isejske luke i s padom mraka isplovio te na većoj udaljenosti obišao otok Hvar, tempirajući vrijeme da istočnoj strani poluotoka Kabal priđe duboko u noć. Tako bi Dion Kasije bio barem djelomice u pravu što u cijelu priču uključuje Vis i to bi objasnilo njegovu zabunu između dvaju otoka.

Na istočnoj strani Kabla najveći je dio pješaka iskrčan na obalu, na nekom mjestu, ili vjerojatnije na nekoliko mjesta, u uvalama približno između rta Žukova i rta Ploče. Nakon toga flota se vjerojatno odmakla od mjesta iskrcavanja i zašla za sjevernu stranu poluotoka Kabal kako u zoru ne bi bila zamijećena s promatračnica i kako bi zauzela položaj s kojega može spriječiti bijeg neprijateljevim brodovima iz Starogradske zaljeva. Zatim je konzul pokrenuo 20 za to unaprijed određenih brodova i s njima u cik zore uplovio u Starogradski zaljev.

Prizor rimskih ratnih brodova koji su osvanuli u Starogradskom zaljevu i uputili se prema Luci Tiha, izazvao je očekivanu reakciju druge strane. Branitelji su iz pravca gibanja neprijatelja vrlo brzo shvatili da on ne namjerava poduzeti proboj prema Faru, već pokušava iskrcati pješništvo na Kablu. Samo za sebe to iskrcavanje u dohvat protivnikovih snaga nije se činilo kao odveć pametan potez neprijatelja, već više kao prilika da se iskoristi njegova loša procjena i obračuna s njegovim vojnicima i barem dijelom brodova. Sada je sve bilo pitanje brzine reakcije: do mjesta iskrcavanja trebalo je stići prije nego neprijatelj iskrca svoje pješništvo ili barem prije nego što se ono uspije okupiti i formirati u bojni poredak, kako bi se Rimljane ispresijecalo i likvidiralo kao razdvojene skupine. Branitelji Fara imali su tu brzinu reakcije - ili im je konzul Emilije svojim "šeprtljanjem" omogućio da u to povjeruju. Na kraju, oni baš i nisu imali velikog izbora; jedina alternativa im je bila ostati nepomičnima i Rimljanima dopustiti da se iskrcaju,

degrees, and the slopes are covered with grass and some smaller stones. It is not likely that these slopes and the plateau were covered with forests in Antiquity, as they were the nearest source of wood for heating households and supplying workshops in Pharos, so even if there had been forests here originally, not much would have remained after a century and a half of exploitation.

At this point, the following aspects are essential:

1) The central height does not provide a view of the northern and eastern shores of the peninsula from the inside of the bay, and enemies ascending up the eastern slope will only be visible when they climb to the edge of the plateau.

2) This part of the shore cannot be seen from the observation post on Glavica Hill, nor from the settlement itself.

3) The central plateau is sufficiently spacious for a rather strong force to muster into combat formation on it.

4) The wider area of Tiha Harbour on the southern side is sufficiently spacious for many battleships to manoeuvre.

5) Units which climb up the peninsula's eastern slope will emerge on the plateau precisely behind the backs of the forces attempting to prevent a landing of soldiers in Tiha Harbour.

6) By occupying the plateau, the forces in Tiha Harbour can be entirely cut off from the Vrata od Kabla position, i.e., their sole land route to return to the settlement can be severed.

7) The western slope is relatively gentle and not rocky, and allows for organized action and downhill (but also uphill) charges.

8) Thanks to this tactical potential and the narrowness of the terrain, organized forces on the ridge are a great threat to an opponent situated below them on the western shore and who would attempt to withdraw back to the settlement.

9) The ridge stood behind the backs and precisely to the east of the defenders attempting to prevent the landing of Romans in the wider area of Tiha Harbour. Since the battle took place in the morning, the rising sun partially obscured their view of movements on the plateau, and when they charged the Romans set up there, the sun hit them directly in the eyes. And this was an advantage that every educated Hellenistic military leader sought.

There are no data on the direction of the Roman movement. But understanding that Consul Aemilius attempted to preserve the secrecy of his plan, he wanted to approach the island unnoticed, and he certainly did not sail along the length of Hvar, exposing himself to viewing from one of the observation posts set up by Demetrius. Thus, two directions for his approach were possible.

koncentriraju i na grad krenu pravcem kojim nisu očekivani: zato su u ovo i ubacili sve svoje snage koje su im bile u dohvat.

Izvor jasno kaže da nisu svi branitelji stigli istodobno, nego se s vremenom njihov broj povećavao,⁷⁸ te je vjerojatno da se dio ukrcao na lembe kako bi brže stigli do Luke Tiha, a ostali su se uputili iz grada pješice. Demetrije je sigurno imao razrađen plan za slučaj pokušaja prodora rimske flote kroz Starogradoski zaljev, te je moguće da je, sukladno tom planu, dio Ilira ostao na svojim lembima pokušavajući rimskim brodovima blokirati izlaz. Kako su se ovi trebali suprotstaviti puno težim ratnim jedinicama, moguće je da su se međusobno vezali lancima, kako su učinili u bitci kod Paksa.⁷⁹

Luka Tiha vrlo je razvedena brojnim uvalama. Samo njezin sjeverni i istočni dio (od uvale Srednja lokva do uvale Uza) ima više od 4000 metara obalne linije. To je sasvim dovoljno prostora da ga branitelji nisu mogli cijeloga istodobno pokrivati, već su se morali raširiti po prostoru i u skupinama grupirati na onim mjestima gdje su rimski brodovi naizgled pokušavali iskrcati postrojbe. To je omogućilo Rimljanima da ih šecu po obali, “odustajući” od iskrcavanja na mjestu na kojemu su se branitelji okupili i upućujući se prema susjednoj uvali. Pri tome su nastojali zaukupiti svu pozornost branitelja manevrima brodova, ispaljivanjem projektila, davanjem besmislenih trubačkih znakova, a vjerojatno i razmjenom psovki. Polibije nam kaže da je došlo i do bliske borbe, što govori da je Emilije bio spreman žrtvovati nešto ljudi kako bi održao uvjerljivost svoje glume.

Nakon što je konzul procijenio da je na obalu ispred njega pristigla sva vojska koju su protivnici bili spremni poslati iz grada,⁸⁰ ugovorenim signalom (možda onako filmski, zapaljenom strelicom, ili radije u rimskom stilu: puhačkim instrumentima koje su Rimljani redovito koristili za prenošenje zapovijedi) signalizirao je pješastvu iskrcanom prethodne noći da krene u nastupanje. S druge strane grebena koji se proteže uzduž Kabla, na oko kilometar od poprišta, nalazila se glavnina rimske vojske, barem 6500 legionara⁸¹ i svi saveznici, dakle sila koja je vjerojatno

After passing the Pelješac line, the consul turned into the Neretva Channel and, adhering to the coastline, passed by Brač through the Brač Channel; after the Split Gate, he turned into the spacious Milna Cove, where the Zaglav Peninsula shielded him from observation from Hvar. After waiting for nightfall in this cove and making his final preparations, he traversed the final 13 nautical miles to the north-western shore of the island of Hvar. He required several hours to cover this distance, precisely the time he took to reach the external side of the Kabal Peninsula in the dead of night.

While still far south, the consul immediately moved to the middle of the Adriatic and sailed to Vis on the open sea. There he took shelter behind the island or in the Issaeon harbour and then, after nightfall, he set off and passed by the island of Hvar at a greater distance, keeping time to make sure that he reached the eastern side of the Kabal Peninsula in the middle of the night. In this way, Cassius Dio would have been at least partially correct for involving Vis in the entire narrative, and this would explain his confusion between the two islands.

Most of the foot soldiers disembarked on the seashore on the eastern side of Kabal, at a place, or rather more likely several places, in the coves near Cape Žukova and Cape Ploče. After this, the fleet probably moved from the landing point and sailed to the northern site of the Kabal Peninsula so that it would not be noticed from the observation post at daybreak and so that it could assume a position to halt any retreat of the enemy's ships from Stari Grad Bay. Then the consul set off with 20 ships selected in advance for this purpose and sailed into Stari Grad Bay at the break of dawn.

The sight of Roman warships which appeared in Stari Grad Bay heading for Tiha Harbour provoked the expected response from the other side. Based on the direction of their enemy's movement, the defenders quickly realized that Romans were not intended naval breakthrough towards Pharos, but landing forces on Kabal. In and of itself, this landing within reach of enemy forces did not seem like a very shrewd move by their enemy; in fact, it appeared to be an opportunity to exploit the latter's poor judgement and vanquish its troops and at least a part of its fleet. At that point, everything hinged on the speed of the response: they had to reach the landing point before the enemy landed its infantry or at least before they managed to assemble and assume a battle formation, in order to sever the Roman ranks and then liquidate the then separated groups. The defenders of Pharos did indeed respond quickly - or Consul Aemilius, with his “bumbling,” allowed them to believe that. Ultimately, they did not have much of a choice; their sole alternative would have been to remain where they were and allow the

78 Polyb., 3.19.1.

79 Polyb., 2.10.2-4.

80 Polyb., 3.19.1 kaže da su svi branitelji izašli iz grada. Osim što takvo što nije vjerojatno, ne postoji ni način na koji je to rimski konzul mogao znati u tom trenutku. On je mogao vidjeti samo da novi branitelji već neko vrijeme ne pristižu i zaključiti da je ispred njega došla sva sila koja će uopće doći.

81 Upravo za to razdoblje nije nam poznata standardna veličina rimske legije. Klasična, “polibijevska” legija formacijski je brojila 4200 pješaka (Polyb., 2.24.13;

prilično nadmašivala broj branitelja na suprotnoj obali. Njihovo kretanje branitelji nisu mogli uočiti zbog uzvisine koja im je bila iza leđa. Ovi su sada izašli na zapadni rub platoa grebena i svrstali se u bojevi poredak, točno za leđima braniteljima na obali ispod sebe i odsijecajući im pristup Vratima od Kabla. Plato jest mjestimično vrlo širok, ali ipak ne dovoljno da bi Rimljani na njemu razvili standardni troosovinski bojni poredak (*triplex acies*) - taj poredak, u ovom slučaju, nije ni najbolje odgovarao situaciji; ovdje su Rimljani vjerojatno odustali od dijela dubine da bi dobili gušću i dužu frontu, rastegnuvši se linijom od oko 1,5 km.⁸²

Čim su ugledali Rimljane iznad sebe, branitelji su shvatili da se pojavila puno veća prijetnja i da su dovedeni u vrlo nepovoljan položaj. Na ovome mjestu Polibije braniteljima Fara i njihovom vođi Demetriju odaje veliko priznanje kao moralno čvrstoj i discipliniranoj vojsci. Po njegovim riječima, nisu se uspaničili, već su odustali od suprotstavljanja konzulovu iskrcavanju, vjerojatno se odmaknuvši od obale izvan dometa projektila s brodova; Demetrije je čak održao inspirativni govor svojim postrojbama, a zatim su sredili svoje redove, svrstavši se u bojni poredak i vrlo odlučno krenuli na Rimljane iznad sebe, kako bi pokušajem proboja izborili mogućnost povratka natrag u grad.⁸³ Pri tome su Rimljani imali još jednog saveznika na svojoj strani: s obzirom da se okršaj odvijao u jutarnjim satima, a Demetrije sada jurišao prema istoku, pri sudaru s rimskim snagama na platou izlazeće je sunce braniteljima tuklo ravno u oči - što

6.20.9), ali je u nekom vremenu prije bitke kod Kane taj broj povećan na 5300 (Polyb. 6.21.9-10). U ovom je proračunu korišten niži broj.

82 Standardna širina fronte klasične republikanske manipularne legije (4200 pješaka i 500 konjanika) s centurijama standardne dubine od 6 redova, svrstane u *triplex acies* je oko 300 m. Svih 30 manipula u jednom redu pokrivalo bi trostruko dužu frontu. Što ovdje to konkretno znači u minimalnim brojkama kojima su Rimljani raspolagali: ako je polovina legije bila na 20 brodova s konzulom, preostala legija i po, ojačana odgovarajućim kontingentom saveznika, imala bi dovoljno ljudstva da pokrije tu dužinu fronte, pa čak i da trećinu ljudstva (manipule trijarija) postavi u drugi red kako bi zaštitila razmake između formacija i parirala eventualnom neprijateljevom proboju. Standardni razvoj manipularne legije vidi kod Fields 2010, str. 40-43, Gary Bruggeman, *Legion Formations* na http://www.romanarmy.info/legion_formation/legion_formation.html ili http://www.garyb.0catch.com/legion_formation/legion_formation.html (posljednja izmjena 2013.), Goldsworthy 2003, str. 26-27.

83 Polyb., 3.19.4.

Romans to land, consolidate their forces and march toward the settlement from an unexpected direction; that is why the defenders deployed all of their available forces to this action.

The source clearly indicates that all of the defenders did not arrive at the same time, rather their number increased with time,⁷⁸ and it is likely that some of them boarded their *lembi* in order to arrive at Tiha Harbour more rapidly, while the rest departed from the settlement on foot. Demetrius certainly had a plan in place in case of attempts at an incursion by the Roman fleet in Stari Grad Bay, and it is possible that, in compliance with this plan, a part of the Illyrians remained on their *lembi* attempt to block the exit to Roman ships. In order to confront these much heavier combat vessels, it is possible that they were tied together by chains as they did at Paxos.⁷⁹

Tiha Harbour has a shoreline very indented by numerous inlets. Its northern and eastern parts alone (from the cove called Srednja lokva to Uza Cove) account for over 4,000 meters of coastline. This is far more space than the defenders could have covered at the same time, so they had to extend themselves over it and then assemble in groups at those points at which the Roman ships were apparently making their landing attempts. This allowed the Romans to 'walk' them up and down the shore, "abandoning" their landing at any place where the defenders had gathered and then moving to a neighbouring inlet. Here they attempted to draw the attention of the defenders to the manoeuvres of their ships by launching projectiles, playing senseless trumpet signals, and probably exchanging shouted curses. Polybius said that close-range hostilities even broke out, which indicates that Aemilius was prepared to sacrifice a few men to maintain the credibility of his subterfuge.

After the consul had assessed that all of the troops that his opponents were willing to send from the settlement had arrived on the shore,⁸⁰ a pre-arranged signal (perhaps, as in cinematic depictions, a flaming arrow, or more likely something in the Roman style: a blare from the wind instruments which the Romans normally used to convey commands) was sent to the infantry that had landed the previous night to begin their advance. The bulk of the Roman army, a

78 Polyb., 3.19.1.

79 Polyb., 2.10.2-4.

80 Polyb., 3.19.1 said that all defenders left the city. Besides this being unlikely, there would have been no way for the Roman consul to know that in that moment. He could only see that no new defenders were arriving for a time and concluded that all forces that would be deployed had in fact arrived.

je, po svojoj prilici, konzul Emilije već ranije pomno proračunao.⁸⁴

S palube svoga broda konzul je imao jako dobar pregled situacije. Čim su se Demetrijevi ljudi odmaknuli od obale kako bi se okrenuli novoj prijatnijoj platonu, konzul je približio svoje brodove obali i počeo s njih iskrcavati pješake. Vidjevši da branitelji ulaze u sukob s rimskim snagama na platonu u urednom bojnom poretku i s visokim moralom, brzo je svrstao pješake na obali i uputio ih da neprijatelja napadnu s leđa. Iako su ovi predstavljali tek kojih 10 % od ukupne rimske sile, udarom u leđa branitelja donijeli su odlučnu prevagu na bojištu. Pritisnut u sendviču, dio braniteljskih snaga se raspao. Samo dio, jer Polibije jasno kaže da se dio branitelja uspio vratiti u Far,⁸⁵ a među njima i sam Demetrije, za kojega nam je izriječom rečeno da je bio na ovome mjestu. To ne mora nužno značiti da su se branitelji uspjeli oružjem probiti kroz rimske redove. Naime, dio branitelja bio je vjerojatno još na lembima kojima su pokušavali blokirati izlaz rimskim brodovima iz Starogradske zaljeva, pa su se neki vjerojatno vratili u grad, a neki procijenili da to više nije mudro i raspršili se po otoku. Dio Demetrijevih pješaka na Kablu se, nakon što im se raspao bojni poredak i započelo bježanje, vjerojatno uspio ukrcati na one lembe kojima su došli, a koji su bili ostavljeni na onom dijelu obale koji Rimljani nisu trenutno ugrožavali. Dapače, sam podatak da se Demetrije uspio izvući, sugerirao bi da se dobar dio njegovih snaga nije raspao u bezglavi bijeg, već da je došlo do relativno organiziranog povlačenja i odstupanja prema dijelu obale na kojemu se mogu ukrcati u brodove i morem "zaobići" rimsku blokadu. Pri tome ih onih 20 rimskih brodova u Starogradske zaljevu nije moglo previše ugroziti jer na njima više nije bilo marinaca, pa vjerojatno to nisu ni pokušavali.

I tu staje priča o bitci koju nam donosi Polibije. Što se dalje događalo, Polibija previše ne zanima jer, kako rekospo, on nastoji prikazati biološkog djeda svoga prijatelja i mecena kao kvalitetnog i lukavog vojnog zapovjednika. Nakon što je tu sliku naslikao,

minimum of 6,500 legionnaires,⁸¹ and all of their allies (a force that therefore probably considerably surpassed the number of defenders on the opposite shore), were on the other side of the ridge and extended the length of Kabal, roughly a kilometre from the scene of battle. Their movement could not be observed by the defenders because of the heights behind their backs. The former then came out on the western edge of the ridge's plateau and mustered into a combat formation, directly behind the backs of the defenders on the shore below them, cutting off their access to Vrata od Kabla. The plateau is in fact rather wide at places, but not enough to allow the Romans to assume the standard triple battle order (*triplex acies*) - in this case, that formation did not best suit the situation; the Romans probably relinquished some of their depth to obtain a denser and longer front, extending over a line of roughly 1.5 km.⁸²

As soon as they saw the Romans above them, the defenders realized that a far greater threat had appeared and that they had been put into a precarious position. Here Polybius accorded considerable recognition to the defenders of Pharos and their leader Demetrius as a morally firm and disciplined army. According to him, they did not panic, rather they abandoned the blockade of the consul's landing, probably moving from the beaches out of the range of projectiles from the ships; Demetrius even delivered an inspiring speech to his troops, and then they organized their ranks, assuming a battle formation and very

84 Naravno da nama danas ne može biti poznato je li dan bitke bio sunčan ili nije. No kako helenistički vojni priručnici odreda savjetuju korištenje sunca za leđima kao prednost koja se može ostvariti nad neprijateljem, to nešto govori o kvaliteti plana konzula Emilija, tj. da je on i taj element uzeo u obzir. Također, tempiranje vremena ulaska u Starogradske zaljev nakon svitanja govori o odabiru vremena u kojemu će njegovim brodovima u blizini obale najmanje smetati struje koje nastaju plimom i osekom – za koje se u ranijim okršajima pokazalo da mogu ozbiljno osujetiti manevarsku sposobnost ratnih brodova (primjerice: Liv., 28.30).

85 Polyb., 3.19.7.

81 The size of Roman legions is not known for precisely this period. The classical, "Polybian" legion formationally consisted of 4,200 foot soldiers (Polyb., 2.24.13; 6.20.9), but at some point prior to the Battle of Cannae, this number had increased to 5,300 (Polyb. 6.21.9-10). The lower figure was used in this estimate.

82 The standard width of the front of the classical republican-era manipular legion (4,200 foot soldiers and 500 mounted soldiers) with centuries at a standard depth of 6 lines deployed in the *triplex acies* was approximately 300 m. All 30 maniples in a single line could cover a front three times as long. What this specifically meant in the minimum numbers which the Romans had at their disposal: if half of a legion was on the 20 ships with the consul, the remaining legion and a half, reinforced by the corresponding contingent of allies, would have had sufficient men to cover this front length, even if a third of them (maniples of triarii) were stationed in the second line to guard the intervals between formations and confront any potential enemy breach. On the standard development of the manipular legions, see Fields 2010, pp. 40-43, Gary Bruggeman, *Legion Formations* at http://www.romanarmy.info/legion_formation/legion_formation.html or http://www.garyb.0catch.com/legion_formation/legion_formation.html (last updated 2013.), Goldsworthy 2003, pp. 26-27.

spominje samo još Demetrijev bijeg, jer je Demetrije previše poznata osoba da bi taj podatak mogao prešutjeti, a javljat će se i kasnije u njegovu djelu. Spominje da je Emilije osvojio Far i razorio ga, te prije nego se vratio u Rim, sredio ostale poslove u Iliriji, što se od rimskog ratnog pobjednika očekuje, iako se o tim "poslovima", tj. novom rimskom uređenju nametnutom lokalnim zajednicama, ovdje ne donosi nikakav podatak - priča odmah prelazi na vijesti o padu Sagunta u Hispaniji i početku rata s Hanibalom.⁸⁶

Konzul Emilije je iskrcavanjem na Kablu stvarno poduzeo lukav potez i to mu se isplatilo. Iskrcao se gdje nije bio očekivan, uspio iznenaditi i manevrom nadvladati protivnike te eliminirati dobar dio njihovih snaga. I, vjerojatno još važnije: svom cilju, gradu Faru, uspio se približiti iz pravca na kojemu nije bio očekivan, na kojemu zacijelo nisu bile organizirane veće obrambene zapreke njegovu nastupanju. Sam grad je pao: Polibije nam kaže da ga je Emilije osvojio na juriš,⁸⁷ a Dion Kasije da je pao izdajom.⁸⁸ Oba rješenja govore da rimski uspjeh na Kablu nije bio potpun, tj. da je u gradu još uvijek preostalo dovoljno branitelja koji su Rimljanima pružili otpor. Ali ne možemo ni pokušati procijeniti koliko je taj otpor trajao.

Jasno je što se dogodilo nakon toga. Grad i njegova bliža okolina temeljito su popljačkani, svi stanovnici i branitelji koje su Rimljani uspjeli dohvatiti zarobljeni su i bit će prodani na tržnicama. Grad je potom srušen sa zemljom i zasigurno je na ruševinama bačena kakva ritualna kletva. Zarobljeni lembi na mjestu su popaljeni. Konzul se vjerojatno nije previše zamarao progonom branitelja i stanovnika koji su se uspjeli raspršiti po Hvaru - otok je previše velik i šumovit da bi taj progon bio od velikog učinka, a grad je bio srušen i nije mogao u skorije vrijeme ponovo biti zaposjednut. Rimljani ovdje nisu imali ni volje ni potrebe ostavljati trajnu posadu, pa je, nakon što od grada više nije preostao kamen na kamenu, konzul ukrao svoj plijen i svoje vojnike te otplovio.

Sukob povijesti i arheologije (ili što je Demetrije uopće mislio?)

Najveći problem, na koji nisam u stanju naći dobre odgovore, proizlazi iz našeg trenutnog poznavanje Fara kao urbane aglomeracije.

Potpuno je jasno da je ono što je ovdje učinio Emilije Paulo bilo nešto što branitelji nisu očekivali. Ali, što su onda očekivali da će Emilije učiniti? Jedino što pouzdano znamo o obrani Fara jest da su Rimljani

resolutely marched toward the Romans above them, in order to attempt a breach and secure the possibility of returning to the settlement.⁸³ The Romans also had another ally in this: since the clash took place in the morning hours, and Demetrius was forced to march eastward, the rising sun hit the defenders right in their eyes - something Aemilius had already very likely taken into account.⁸⁴

From the deck of his ship, the consul had a very good view of the situation. As soon as Demetrius' troops moved away from the shore to face the new threat on the plateau, the consul moved his vessels closer to the shore and began landing his foot soldiers. Seeing that the defenders were engaging the Roman forces on the plateau in a standard combat formation and with high morale, he rapidly mustered his infantry on the beach and sent them to attack the enemy from behind. Even though they only accounted for about 10% of the total Roman force, hitting the defenders from behind proved pivotal on the battlefield. Sandwiched between their opponents, a part of the defending force fell apart. But only a part, as Polybius clearly stated that some of the defenders had managed to return to Pharos,⁸⁵ among them Demetrius himself, who had explicitly been identified as being on the scene. This need not mean that the defenders managed to pierce through the Roman ranks by force of arms. Some of the defenders were probably still on the *lembi* that were attempting to block the departure of Roman ships from Stari Grad Bay, so some probably returned to the settlement, while others may have decided that this was no longer advisable and scattered over the island. Some of the foot soldiers on Kabal, after their combat formation collapsed and they began to flee, probably managed to board the *lembi* on which they had arrived and which were on that part of the shore that the Romans were not threatening at the moment. Certainly the very fact that Demetrius managed to withdraw suggests that a goodly portion of his forces did not frantically break into flight, but rather managed to stage a relatively organized withdrawal

86 Polyb., 3.19.12 - 3.20.1.

87 Polyb., 3.19.12.

88 Dio, 12, fr. 53.

83 Polyb., 3.19.4.

84 Naturally, there is no way of knowing today whether it was sunny on the day of the battle. But since Hellenistic military manuals regularly advise the use of the sun at one's back as an advantage over one's enemy, that says something about the quality of the plan by Consul Aemilius, i.e., that he had taken this element into account. Also, timing the entry into Stari Grad Bay after daybreak indicates a deliberate choice of the time in which his ships would have been least hindered by the currents created by high and low tides - which in earlier clashes had been shown to seriously frustrate the manoeuvring capability of warships (e.g.: Liv., 28.30).

85 Polyb., 3.19.7.

imali informacije kako je ona jaka i dobro organizirana, te se u konzulovu stožeru zbog toga procjenjivalo kako će njezino slamanje biti dugotrajno.

S druge strane, arheolozi nam govore da je farski *asty* bio prostorom malen gradić, dapače, jedna od najmanjih grčkih kolonija općenito,⁸⁹ s fortifikacijom manjom od 100 x 120 m.⁹⁰ Ta dva podatka, Polibijev o snazi obrane i ovaj arheološki, nije baš lako pomiriti: tako male utvrde nisu uobičajena poprišta velikih bitaka. Kako organizirati obranu romantične tvrđavice u ravnici uz obalu od bijesa cijele rimske države?

Raspolažući podacima kojima raspoložem, naprosto mi ne ide u glavu zašto bi Demetrije, sposoban i iskusen vojnik, mudar taktičar, čovjek koji posjeduje barem polovinu ilirske države, koji raspolaze ekonomskim resursima i sa sobom može povesti na tisuće ilirskih vojnika, odabrao braniti se baš u Faru? U malom gradu koji ima prilično loš strateški smještaj i koji, prema današnjim arheološkim interpretacijama, ima fortificiranu površinu koja dugotrajno može primiti možda stotinu vojnika? Pri tome situacija nije takva da su ga Rimljani prisilili da se baš ovdje brani. Iz izvora jasno proizlazi da je to njegova odluka, da je rimski napad na Far bio očekivan i da je grad aktivno pripreman za obranu. I da to nije jedina Demetrijeva tvrđava koja je pripremana za obranu od rimskog napada. No, nikakva količina na brzu ruku načinjenih palisada ne može kompenzirati nedostatak pravih, tvrdih bedema; niti to mogu velika pojačanja u ljudstvu za koje ne možete unutar sigurnosti bedema uskladištiti namirnice ni za desetak dana opsade. Kako je Demetrije uopće zamislio braniti tvrđavicu

and retreat toward a part of the island on which they could board their boats and bypass the Roman blockade by sea. Those 20 Roman ships in Stari Grad Bay could not threaten them too much, because they no longer had marines on them, so they probably did not even try.

This is where the story about the battle conveyed by Polybius ends. What happened there after did not greatly interest Polybius, because, as stated previously, he was attempting to portray the biological grandfather of his friend and benefactor as a skilled and shrewd military commander. After painting this picture, he only mentioned the flight of Demetrius, because Demetrius was far too well known a figure for him to have passed this fact over, and he would appear later in his work. He mentioned that Aemilius seized Pharos and destroyed it, and prior to his return to Rome, he settled all other affairs in Illyria, which was to be expected from a Roman military victor, even though no information on these "affairs," i.e., the new Roman order imposed on local communities, was provided - the story immediately moves to news of the fall of Saguntum in Hispania and the beginning of the war with Hannibal.⁸⁶

By landing on Kabal, Consul Aemilius truly made a clever move and it paid off for him. He landed where he was not expected, managed to surprise and overcome his enemies with this manoeuvre, and then eliminated a considerable portion of their forces. And, probably most importantly: he succeeded in approaching his aim, the town of Pharos, from an unexpected direction, along which there were certainly no organized, sizeable defensive obstacles to his advance. The settlement itself fell: Polybius wrote that Aemilius seized it in a charge,⁸⁷ while Cassius Dio asserted that it fell due to betrayal.⁸⁸ Both solutions indicate that the Roman success at Kabal was not complete, i.e., that a sufficient number of defenders still remained in the settlement to mount a resistance to the Romans. But there is no way to even attempt to estimate how long that resistance lasted.

What happened thereafter is clear. The settlement and its immediate vicinity were thoroughly looted, all residents and defenders whom the Romans captured became slaves and were sold on markets. The settlement was then razed to the ground and some sort of ritual curse was certainly placed on the ruins. The captured *lembi* were set ablaze on the spot. The consul probably did not concern himself greatly with chasing down the defenders and residents who managed to scatter over Hvar - the island was too large

89 Po riječima Branka Kirigina na predavanju *Faros: amfore i proizvodnja vina*, održanom u Arheološkome muzeju u Zagrebu, 8. prosinca 2016.

90 Kirigin 1991 i Kirigin 2004, str. 276, T. XVI A. Ranije Duboković-Nadalini 1965: oko 150 x 100 m; Gabričević 1973: 250 x 250 m (nakon obnove 219.), Barbir 1980: oko 200 x 300 m. Osobno nisam sudjelovao u arheološkim istraživanjima ostataka arhitekture u Starom Gradu ali, s tom rezervom, moram naglasiti da imam jednu nedoumicu oko interpretacija nekih koji to jesu radili. Naime, prihvatimo li (što svi odreda čine) da je konzul Emilije Far *potpuno uništio* ili *srvanio sa zemljom*, ili koji god prijevod Polibijeva Φάρων ... κατέσκαψε uzmemo kao valjan, to nedvosmisleno znači da su farske fortifikacije tada bile porušene. Kako se onda nađeni ostaci bedema i trakti bedema vidljivi po nekim konobama i oni uništeni gradnjom ceste redovito vezuju za grad *Pharos* prije 219. pr. Kr.? Oni bedemi koje je ovdje konzul Emilije zatekao nisu više postojali nakon što je on otišao. I ako su neki dijelovi gradskih bedema još i danas vidljivi, to su, čini mi se, bedemi koji su morali nastati nakon godine 219. A oni nisu morali zatvarati isti opseg kao raniji.

86 Polyb., 3.19.12 - 3.20.1.

87 Polyb., 3.19.12.

88 Dio, 12, fr. 53.

od kojih 12.000 m² protiv sile od koje sam nije uspio obraniti Krf? Dobro, to s Krfom možda nije imalo toliko veze s vojnom situacijom koliko je bilo izraz čistog političkog oportunitizma. Ali ovaj put nema mogućnosti takve trgovine s Rimom: on je sada glavni neprijatelj kojemu je objavljen rat. Za njega je pitanje biti ili ne biti, ali ipak svjesno odabire odlučni otpor pružiti baš ovdje. I to nije učinio isključivo iz nekih sentimentalnih razloga prema Faru, jer je ovdje mogao postaviti obranu koja je zabrinula samog rimskog konzula. Kako?

Zato se čini da treba krenuti korak dalje od raspoloživih podataka i pogledati što je u poznatim okolnostima moguće i što je logično. Znam da nije metodološki odveć prihvatljivo stvarati maštovite interpretacije bez čvrstih dokaza u izvorima i arheološkim nalazima - iako u ovom slučaju i u jednim i u drugima postoji nešto nagovještaja. Ali to je jedino čemu se mogu trenutačno domisliti što bi pomirilo historiografsku i arheološku interpretaciju. A mislim da ovaj rad ne mogu zaokružiti bez pokušaja odgovora na to, ipak ključno pitanje.

Sve bi moglo funkcionirati samo ako je Demetrije sklopio obranu u kojoj prostor oko samog Fara ne bi uopće došao pod neposrednu ugrozu. Tj. ukoliko nije mislio neposredno braniti sam Far, nego ga braniti u pretpolju i onemogućiti protivniku da se približi gradu. Ako, pak, razmišljamo u tom smjeru, tada se otvara jedna mogućnost ...

Naime, ne bi bilo nelogično pretpostaviti da je Demetrije smatrao kako je prisutnost kombinirane ilirske i farske flote dovoljna prijatna zbog koje se Rimljani neće usuditi uploviti u Starogradski zaljev. Zaljev nije dovoljno širok da bi se u njemu razvila velika flota i iskoristile prednosti koje joj daju njezini gabariti. Velika flota tu ne može manevrirati po volji i osjetljivija je na napade manjih brodova koji se zbog plićeg gaza mogu više približiti obali. Sve u svemu, prilično slično situaciji kod Salamine 480. pr. Kr. Forsiranjem pomorske bitke unutar Starogradskog zaljeva Rimljani bi se odrekli ključnih prednosti i izložili mogućnosti blokiranja cijele flote zatvaranjem 1200 m širokog izlaza. Zato je napad iz ovog smjera izgledao kao recept za katastrofu.

Eliminiramo li rimski ulazak u Starogradski zaljev i pokušaj pomorskog proboja prema gradu kao procjenjivo nevjerojatan i relativno samoubilački, u tom slučaju veliki rimski napad može doći isključivo s istoka, iz pravca Starogradskog polja. Za to se Rimljani trebaju iskrcati u Jelsi (teško da postoji neko pogodno mjesto istočnije na otoku)⁹¹ i započeti

and forested for such a manhunt to yield any significant results, while the settlement had been demolished and could not be reoccupied in the near future. The Romans had neither the desire nor the need to post a permanent contingent here, so after not even a single wall was left standing in the settlement, the consul loaded his plunder and soldiers and set sail.

The conflict between history and archaeology (or what was Demetrius even thinking?)

The greatest problem, for which I have been unable to find any answers, arises from our current knowledge of Pharos as an urban agglomeration.

It is entirely clear that what Aemilius Paullus had done here was something the defenders had not expected. But what, then, were they expecting Aemilius to do? The only thing known for certain about the defence of Pharos is that the Romans had information that it was strong and well organized, and that because of this the consul's command staff assessed that breaking it would take considerable time.

On the other hand, archaeologists tell us that the Pharos *asty* was a spatially small town; indeed, it was one of the smallest Greek colonies in general,⁸⁹ with fortifications smaller than 100x120 m.⁹⁰ The report by Polybius on the strength of settlement's defence and the archaeological data are not easily reconciled: such small fortifications are not normally the scene of great battles. How could one organize the defence of a

89 According to Branko Kirigin in the lecture *Faros: amfore i proizvodnja vina*, delivered in the Archaeological Museum in Zagreb, 8 December 2016.

90 Kirigin 1991 and Kirigin 2004, p. 276, Pl. XVI A. Earlier, Duboković-Nadalini 1965: ca. 150 x 100 m; Gabričević 1973: 250 x 250 m (after restoration in 219), Barbir 1980: ca. 200 x 300 m. I did not personally participate in archaeological research of the architectural remains in Stari Grad but, with this caveat, I must stress that I have one qualm about the interpretations of some who had done so. For if we accept (which all without exception do) that Consul Aemilius "entirely destroyed" Pharos or "razed it to the ground," or whichever translation of Φάρον ...κατέσκαψε is taken as authoritative, to undoubtedly mean that the fortifications of Pharos were demolished at the time. How then are the remains of fortified walls and wall tracts visible in some huts and those destroyed by road construction tied to Pharos prior to 219 BC? Those walls that Consul Aemilius found there no longer existed after he left. And if some parts of the town walls are still visible today, those are, it seems to me, walls that had to have been built after 219 BC. And these did not necessarily enclose the same surface area as the earlier ones.

91 Vrboska ne izgleda privlačno kao mjesto za iskrcavanje veće vojske jer ima dugačak, uzak, krivudav zaljev,

prodor prema Faru preko Starogradskeg polja, gdje će se najvjerojatnije ulogirati. Samo Polje ne može se braniti od rimske vojske, kojoj odgovara otvorena bitka na ravnom, pa, iako jest najvažniji ekonomski resurs Fara, u ovom slučaju mora biti žrtvovano. Na kraju, uništene poljoprivredne kulture mogu se obnoviti za nekoliko godina. Starogradske polje jest široka i ravna površina, ali na oba kraja, i na zapad prema Starom Gradu i na istok prema Jelsi, moru prilazi kroz vrlo sužen lijevak, kroz brda koja ga nadvisuju preko 100 metara. Taj se lijevak kod Jelse sužava na ispod 200 m širine, a onaj prema Starom Gradu širok je oko 1 km, ali po sredini izbija ravno na položaj kolonije i njezine fortifikacije (kakve god one bile). E sada, iz toga izlazi mogućnost da se Demetrije namjeravao braniti na tim suženjima i na liniji uzvišenja koja zatvaraju polje.⁹² Time bi rimsku vojsku zaustavio prije linije s koje može neposredno ugroziti grad i zatvoriti cirkumvalaciju, a ukoliko bi se previše približila samom gradu, riskirala bi udar u leđa osloncem na neko od uzvišenja na sjeveru i jugu; pa čak i s varijantom da se Rimljane pusti u prostor Starogradskeg polja i zatim im se za leđima zatvori "lijevak" koji vodi u Jelsu i time presiječe logistika. S druge strane, zaustavljanje Rimljana na prostoru Starogradskeg polja značilo bi da Demetriju i dalje ostaje otvorena komunikacija s južnom obalom otoka Hvara preko brda Vitrenica, tj. prostora današnjih sela V. Grablje i Brusje, pa ga pomorska blokada izlaza iz Starogradskeg zaljeva nije morala zabrinjavati. Rimljani nisu mogli mornaricom blokirati cijeli izduženi otok - zahvaljujući čemu je Demetrije na kraju i uspio umaknuti. Tako bi Demetrijeva mogućnost evakuacije i dotura ostala netaknuta.

Ako se takva obrana mogla organizirati, to bi za Rimljane značilo nužnost likvidiranja desetak ili petnaestak gradinskih uporišta prije nego bi se uopće mogli približiti gradu, uz istodobno rasipanje snaga na trajno zaposjedanje šest ili sedam od njih kako bi držali otvorenom komunikaciju s Jelsom. Tako

koji se sve više sužava, a uz najveći dio obale zaljeva su visoke stijene.

92 Približno linijom (ili dijelom linije): tt. 145 Planik - tt. 155 Gračišće - tt. 207 Hum - tt. 276 Purkin kuk - tt. 108 Mali Starač - Gobaško brdo - tt. 66 Maslinovik - tt. 75 Skujivac - tt. 125 Vetežnji hum. Pri tome je obrana oslonjena na dio položaja za koje znamo da su bili fortifikacijski uređeni. Ovakva obrana zahtijeva isturanje niza relativno manjih posada, a, uz njih, još i centralno smještene jake interventne snage spremne na upućivanje na ugrožena mjesta i pripravne za preuzimanje inicijative te poduzimanje iznenadnih napada na neprijatelja. Iz izvora znamo da su upravo takve elitne snage bile smještene u samom Faru.

romantic small fortress on a plain next to the seashore against the wrath of the entire Roman state?

Having at my disposal the data that I have, I am at a loss to explain why Demetrius, a capable and experienced soldier, a shrewd tactician, a man who possessed at least half of the Illyrian state, who had at his disposal economic resources and who could mobilize thousands of Illyrian soldiers to follow him, would chose to defend himself precisely in Pharos. In a small town which had a rather poor strategic position and which, according to current archaeological interpretations, had a fortified surface that could accommodate perhaps one hundred soldiers on a long-term basis. And the circumstances were not such that the Romans had forced him to mount his defence there and nowhere else. The sources clearly indicate that this was his choice, that the Roman attack on Pharos was expected and that the town was actively prepared for defence. And this was not the only fortress held by Demetrius that was prepared for defence against a Roman attack. But no amount of hastily erected palisades can compensate the lack of a genuine, sturdy fortified walls, nor can this be accomplished by major reinforcements in manpower, as not even roughly ten days of supplies for these men can be stored within its walls. How could Demetrius even conceive of defending a small fortress with an area of roughly 12,000 m² against a force he could not repel at Corfu? Granted, circumstance at Corfu may not have had been due so much to the military situation as to political opportunism. But this time there was no possibility of such horse-trading with Rome: he was now the main enemy, against whom war had been declared. For him it was a question of whether to be or not to be, but he nonetheless consciously chose to mount his resolute defence right here. And he did not do so exclusively for reasons of sentimentality toward Pharos, for here he could have mounted a defence that would have concerned the Roman consul himself. How?

This is why it would appear to be necessary to move a step beyond the available data and consider what was possible and logical under the known circumstances. I know that it is not methodologically very acceptable to formulate speculative interpretations without firm evidence in the sources and archaeological finds - even though in this case, one and the other provide some indications. But this is the only thing that may currently be devised that would reconcile the historiographic and archaeological interpretations. And I believe that I cannot complete this work without an attempt to answer this rather crucial question.

All of this could function only if Demetrius had set up a defence in which the area around Pharos itself would not have been directly threatened. That is, insofar as he did not intend to directly defend Pharos itself, but rather organize the defence in depth and

zamišljena obrana imala bi logike i zasigurno bi pred Rimljane stavila velike operativno-taktičke probleme, a njezino razbijanje tražilo bi i velike snage i puno vremena.

Kada je rimsko brodovlje iznenada osvanulo u Starogradskom zaljevu, branitelji Fara očividno su u početku mislili kako je neprijatelj učinio nepromišljen potez ušavši izravno u osinjak i da to valja iskoristiti, spriječiti ga da odatle izađe i kazniti ga.

Ako je bilo tako, ratna varka Emilija Paula bila je i u tome što se iskrcao na potpuno neočekivanome mjestu i time anulirao najveći dio Demetrijevih obrambenih priprema te ga istodobno prisilio na otvorenu bitku (kakva Rimljanima više odgovara) na prostoru koji je udaljen od uređenih obrambenih položaja. Dapače, dio Demetrijevih snaga nije se ni mogao uključiti jer su zaposjedali kilometrima udaljene visove i bili nevoljni napustiti ih da ih ne bi prazne zauzeli Rimljani: izvor izričito kaže da su se protiv Emilijeva “fingiranog iskrcavanja” uključile sve one braniteljske snage koje su bile u samom gradu, pri čemu one ne moraju biti sve snage kojima je Demetrije raspolagao.

Naravno, još uvijek postoji mogućnost da će neka buduća istraživanja pokazati kako je ova tvrđavica tek ono što su Farani svojom oslabljenom ekonomskom snagom mogli izgraditi nakon godine 219. pr. Kr., a da je izvorna farska ili Demetrijeva utvrda bila puno prostranija i moćnija. Time će ovo moje domišljanje većim dijelom moći otići u arhivu. Iskreno navijam za takav rasplet. Na kraju, Kirigin je sigurno u pravu kada tvrdi da do sada predložena rješenja nemaju čvrstu arheološku potvrdu.⁹³

Epilog

Far je ovom rimskom intervencijom definitivno izvučen iz okrilja ilirske države.⁹⁴ Oslabljena ovim

93 Kirigin 2004, str. 66-72, 74-75. Za najnovije objave rezultata arheološkog istraživanja Fara vidi Jeličić-Radočić, Katić 2015, ali uz to i Kiriginov osvrt na ovo djelo: Kirigin, 2017, str. 305-311.

94 Nije mi jasno zbog čega Wilkes (1969, str. 23) drži da je Far kasnije bio Gencijev posjed. Za to ne nalazim nikakva dokaza. Što se eventualno na Faru kuju novi ilirskih vladara, ne mora nužno označavati politički porednost. To što se u Anicijevu proglasu (Liv., 45.26) Far uopće ne spominje, ne mora značiti da je bio ostavljen kao ilirsko uporište: to samo znači da njegov status nije tom prilikom promijenjen. Isa se ovdje spominje zato što je aktivno sudjelovala na rimskoj strani u Trećem ilirskom ratu, za što biva nagrađena. Far vjerojatno nije sudjelovao u tim zbivanjima; naposljetku, kako to uopće očekivati od grada koji je bio potpuno razoren nepunih 50 godina ranije? Farska psefizma jasno kaže da je u međuvremenu stavljen pod zaštitu Rima. A to

thus prevent the enemy from even approaching the settlement. If, however, we focus our thinking in this direction, then that opens a certain possibility...

Namely, it would not be illogical to assume that Demetrius believed that the presence of a combined Illyrian/Pharos fleet was a sufficient threat and that the Romans would therefore not dare to sail into Stari Grad Bay. The bay is not wide enough for a fleet to assume a formation that would exploit the advantages of its dimensions. A large fleet cannot freely manoeuvre here and it would be sensitive to attacks from smaller ships that can come closer to the shore because of their shallower draught. All in all, rather similar to the situation at Salamis in 480 BC. Had they insisted on a maritime battle inside Stari Grad Bay, the Romans would have forsaken a key advantage and exposed themselves to the possibility of a blockade of their entire fleet once the 1,200 m wide passage was closed. This is why an attack from this direction seemed like a recipe for disaster.

If we eliminate the Roman entry into Stari Grad Bay and the attempt at a maritime incursion toward the settlement as realistically inconceivable and relatively suicidal, in this case a major Roman attack can come exclusively from the east, from the direction of Stari Grad plain. For this, the Romans would have had to disembark at Jelsa (there is scarcely any suitable site farther east on the island)⁹¹ and begin their incursion toward Pharos across Stari Grad plain, where they would most likely set up camp. The plain itself could not be defended from the Roman army, which would have preferred an open battle on a flatland, so even if it was the most important economic resource for Pharos, in this case it would have to have been sacrificed. After all, destroyed agricultural produce could be restored in several years. The Stari Grad plain is a wide and flat surface, but at both ends, in the west toward Stari Grad and in the east toward Jelsa, the sea is accessed through very narrow “funnels”, through hills over 100 meters high. The width of the funnel at Jelsa narrows to less than 200 m, while the one toward Stari Grad is roughly 1 km wide, but in the middle it leads straight to the site of the colony and its fortifications (whatever their type). So herein one may see the possibility that Demetrius intended to defend himself at these narrow points and along the line of the heights which enclose the plain.⁹² He would have

91 Vrboska does not appear attractive as a site for landing a larger army, because the inlet is long, narrow and winding, and the narrowness increases, while most of its shores are high rocks.

92 Roughly along the line (or partly so): tp. 145 Planik - tp. 155 Gračišće - tp. 207 Hum - tp. 276 Purkin kuk - tp. 108 Mali Starač - Gobaško brdo - tp. 66

ratom, ona više nije mogla učinkovito držati pod kontrolom toliko udaljeni položaj, pogotovo bez mogućnosti oslonca na snažnog lokalnog vođu poput Demetrija. Uz to je izgubila i ofenzivnu snagu potrebnu za održavanje daljnje agresije prema sjevernom i srednjem Jadranu pa joj ovakva isturena baza, barem trenutno, više nije bila od koristi. Ali Far time nije samo prestao biti pomorska baza iz koje se poduzima agresija na područje sjevernog i srednjeg Jadrana - ostao je sam bez moćne ilirske zaštite, izložen svim susjedima kojima je do jučer bio prijatelj, a i svim bivšim saveznicima. Preživjeli Farani su se ipak vratili da bi obnovili grad, i njihova pšefizma, u kamen uklesana odluka narodne skupštine,⁹⁵ jasno ukazuje kamo su se okrenuli u toj gospodarskoj i sigurnosnoj krizi. Ovim spomenikom trajno su obilježili svoju zahvalnost matičnom otoku Parosu za pomoć koju su odande dobili. S druge strane, sam početak teksta spominje naklonost rimskog Senata i naroda prema Faru te obnovu savezništva, što bi sugeriralo da se obnovljeni Far priklonio rimskoj političkoj sferi i zaštitu potražio pod krilima apeninskog orla. Arheologija nam jasno pokazuje da je grad s vremenom uspio ponovo stati na noge, nastavio živjeti kao grčka zajednica te obnovio trgovinu sa širim susjedstvom.⁹⁶ Ali više nikada neće steći toliko prominentno političko i strateško značenje kakvo je imao za kratkog razdoblja Demetrijeve tiranije - vjerojatno na svoju sreću.

Polibije nam izričito kaže da je Demetrije osobno sudjelovao i zapovijedao u ovom događaju. S obzirom na krajnju namjeru s kojom je Polibijev tekst pisan, ako se Demetrije to jutro zaputio u nadzor radova na neki udaljeniji položaj, ili se iz nekog drugog razloga nije mogao osobno angažirati, očekivati je da to Polibije prešuti, ostavljajući kod čitatelja dojam da je neprijateljev vrhovni zapovjednik osobno predvodio svoje snage, jer bi njegova odsutnost umanjila herojsku sliku o Emiliju Paulu koju Polibije ovdje izgrađuje. Bilo kako bilo, Demetrije nije podijelio sudbinu svoga grada. Trojansko rješenje, koje se danas može naći samo u lošim akcijskim filmovima, očito je dobro funkcioniralo u antici: u nekoj uvali nalazili su se skriveni brodovi predviđeni za upravo ovakvu situaciju. Gdje je to mjesto, danas je nemoguće reći, ali s obzirom na pretpostavljeni i stvarni pravac dolaska neprijatelja, po svoj se prilici nalazilo negdje na

thereby halted the Roman army prior to the point at which they could directly threaten the settlement and enclose a circumvallation, and if they moved too close to the settlement itself, they would risk an assault from the rear, making use of some of the elevated positions in the north and south; there was even the variation of allowing the Romans into the area of Stari Grad plain and then, behind their backs, closing the "funnel" leading to Jelsa and thus cutting off their logistics. On the other hand, halting the Romans in Stari Grad plain would have meant that Demetrius had continued to remain open to communication with the southern side of the island across Vitrenica Hill, i.e., the areas of today's villages of Velo Grablje and Brusje, so the maritime blockade of the exit from Stari Grad Bay would not have to concern him. The Romans could not set up a naval blockade of the entire oblong - which is why Demetrius ultimately managed to slip from their grasp. The possibility for evacuation and rapid transport by Demetrius remained intact.

If such a defence could have been organized, for the Romans this would have entailed the necessity of liquidating anywhere from a dozen to about fifteen hillfort strongholds before they could even approach the settlement, while simultaneously having to parcel out their forces to permanently seize six or seven of them in order to maintain open communications with Jelsa. A defence conceived in this fashion would have been logical and certainly would have posed considerable operational and tactical problems for the Romans, and breaking it would have required immense forces and a great deal of time.

When the Roman navy unexpectedly appeared in Stari Grad Bay, the defenders of Hvar obviously thought that their enemy had made an imprudent move by entering directly into a hornet's nest and that this had to be exploited, preventing their departure from the bay and punishing them.

If that had been the situation, the military ruse set up by Aemilius Paullus in fact hinged on the fact that he landed at an entirely unexpected site and thereby voided the majority of the defensive preparations made by Demetrius and simultaneously forced the later to engage in open combat (which better suited the Romans) in an area far from orderly defensive

potvrđuje i ugovor između Filipa V. i Hanibala iz 215. g. pr. Kr. (Polyb., 7.9.13), po kojemu Rim ima prestati biti gospodarom (između ostalih) i Fara.

95 Raspravu o dataciji ovog spomenika vidi u: Kirigin 2004, str. 205-209. Ranija mišljena vidi kod Eckstein 1999, str. 395-418; Derow 1991, str. 261-270, gdje je pobrojana i starija literatura.

96 Kirigin 2004, str. 202 i d.

Maslinovik - tp. 75 Skujivac - tp. 125 Vetežnji hum. Herein the defence depended on a part of the positions that are known to have been fortified. Such a defence required extending relatively small crews forward and, additionally, the stationing of strong intervention forces prepared to take threatened positions and capable of taking the initiative to stage surprise attacks against the enemy. The sources indicate that such elite forces had been stationed in Pharos itself.

južnoj obali otoka, u relativnoj blizini komunikacije preko brda Vitrenica. Odatle se Demetrije, s ljudstvom koje mu je preostalo, a Dion Kasije kaže i s priličnom količinom blaga,⁹⁷ otisnuo prema Makedoniji i svom novom životu savjetnika mladog, ambicioznog i moćnog kralja Filipa V.

Očekivati je da je rasplet situacije na Kablu i kasniji pad grada rezultirao zarobljavanjem većeg broja Demetrijevih ljudi. Pri tome bi možda moglo biti da oni Iliri koji su bili među njima ipak nisu završili na tržnicama robova, nego su pušteni na slobodu. Naime, Apijan opis ovog rata završava podatkom da su Rimljani pošteđjeli Ilire na zamolbu kralja Pinesa.⁹⁸ Kako ardijska država nije sudjelovala u ovom ratu, niti se svrstala protiv Rimljana, teško je uvidjeti na što bi se drugo ova molba mogla odnositi. Lako je moguće da je među Ilirima zarobljenima na Hvaru i u Dimalama bilo i nešto članova visoke aristokracije, a još lakše da je Pines bio u bliskim odnosima s nekim ljudima svoga očuha, pa je pokušao za njih intervenirati. Konzuli su toj molbi udovoljili, očito računajući da će to pridonijeti ojačavanju odnosa s Pinesom, ali su time nesvjesno ojačali i optužnicu po kojoj će im kasnije suditi.

Jer, na kraju, rat protiv Demetrija ipak nije završio slavno za pobjednike. Istina, oba su konzula za svoje uspjehe dobila trijumf, ali ih je, nakon toga, plebejski tribun izveo na sud pod optužbom da su posve maleni dio plijena podijelili vojsci te time oštetili plebs. Emilije Paulo, koji je bio patricij, jedva se od te optužbe izvukao, a plebejac Livije Salinator proglašen je krivim i osuđen na veliku globu. Čini se da je to suđenje obojici nanijelo priličnu sramotu, te se povlače iz javnog života na više godina, da bi se vratili u rimsku politiku i na vojna zapovjedna mjesta tek na nagovor prijatelja, u vremenu kada je Rimu trebalo iskusnih zapovjednika za rat protiv Hanibala: Emilije da bi rimsku vojsku poveo u klaonicu kod Kane, a Livije Salinator da bi konačno preokrenuo ratni kotač na korist Rima u bitci kod Metaura.

Ipak, najveću cijenu ovoga rata nije platio razoreni Far, ni Demetrije, niti pobjednički konzuli. Platila ju je rimska država - i to najveću cijenu koju je ikada platila za ijedan lokalni obračun u koji se upustila. Sukob protiv Demetrija oduzeo joj je stratešku priliku da Hanibalski rat vodi u Hispaniji i dopustila je da se on premjesti na italsko tlo, što je dovelo do serije golemih poraza rimske vojske gotovo pred vratima Rima i 14 godina Hanibalova haranja Italijom. Koliko god to možda čudno zvučalo, ali razaranje Fara

positions. Indeed, a part of the forces of Demetrius could not join the fray because they were holding the heights several kilometres away and were unwilling to abandon them lest they be occupied by the Romans: the source clearly indicates that all of the defence forces that had been in the town itself had come out to meet the “feigned landing” by Aemilius, and these need not have been the totality of the forces which Demetrius had at his disposal.

Naturally, there is still the possibility that some future research will show that this small fortress is only what the people of Pharos could have built with their debilitated economic resources after 219 BC, and that the original fortress of Pharos or Demetrius was much more spacious and sturdier. This would render my speculation a mere footnote for the archives. I sincerely hope for such an outcome. In the end, Kirigin was certainly correct when he asserted that the solutions proposed thus far lack firm archaeological confirmation.⁹³

Epilogue

With this Roman intervention, Pharos was definitively removed from the aegis of the Illyrian state.⁹⁴ Weakened by this war, it could no longer effectively maintain control over such a distant position, particularly without the possibility of depending on a powerful local leader such as Demetrius. It had additionally lost the offensive force necessary to maintain further aggression against the northern and central Adriatic,

93 Kirigin 2004, pp. 66-72, 74-75. For the most recent publication of the results of archaeological research into Pharos, see Jeličić-Radonić, Katić 2015, but also Kirigin’s review of this work: Kirigin 2017, pp. 305-311.

94 I am uncertain as to why Wilkes (1969, p. 23) maintained that Pharos was later held by Gentius. I can find no evidence of this. The fact that the coins of Illyrian rulers may have been minted on Pharos does not necessarily signify political subjugation. The fact that the proclamation of Anicius (Liv., 45.26) does not even mention Pharos similarly need not mean that it had been left as an Illyrian stronghold: it only means that its status had not been changed at that juncture. Issa was mentioned there because it had actively participated on the Roman side in the Third Illyrian War, for which it was rewarded. Pharos probably did not participate in these events; finally, how could this have been expected from a town that had been entirely destroyed not quite 50 years prior? The Pharos psephism clearly states that in the meantime it had been placed under Roman protection. And this was additionally confirmed by the treaty between Phillip V and Hannibal in 215 BC (Polyb., 7.9.13), according to which Rome had to relinquish its suzerainty over (among others) Pharos.

97 Dio, 12, fr. 53.

98 App. *Illyr.*, 8.

zatvorilo je Rimljanima vrata Hispanije i Hanibalu otvorilo vrata Italije.

so such a forward base was at least at that moment no longer of use to it. This does mean that Pharos was no longer a maritime base for staging aggression against the northern and central Adriatic, but not only that, it was just left without its powerful Illyrian protection, exposed to all neighbours to which it had only recently been a threat, but also to all of its former allies. The surviving residents of Pharos nonetheless returned to restore their town, and their psephism, a decision of the community assembly carved in stone,⁹⁵ clearly shows to whom they turned in this economic and security crisis. With this document, they permanently marked their gratitude to their home island of Paros for the help they received there. On the other hand, the very beginning of the text mentions the favour of the Roman Senate and the people for Pharos and the renewal of their alliance, which would suggest that the restored Pharos put itself inside the Roman political sphere and sought protection under the wing of the Apennine eagle. Archaeology clearly shows that over time the town managed to stand on its feet again, continued to live as a Greek community and restored trade with the wider neighbourhood.⁹⁶ But it would never acquire the prominent political and strategic significance that it had during the brief period under the tyranny of Demetrius - probably to its good fortune.

Polybius explicitly stated that Demetrius personally participated and commanded in this event. Given the ultimate reason why Polybius wrote his text, if Demetrius had set off to oversee works at some distant position in the morning, or if he could not be personally involved due to other reasons, it is to be expected that Polybius would have left this out, leaving readers with the impression that the enemy's supreme commander personally led his forces, because his absence would have diminished the heroic image of Aemilius Paullus that Polybius wanted to create. Whatever the matter, Demetrius did not share the fate of his town. The Trojan solution, which can today only be found in action films of questionable quality, obviously functioned well in Antiquity: concealed ships anchored in some cove were foreseen for just such a situation. Today it is impossible to say where this was, but given the assumed and actual route of the enemy's arrival, it was probably somewhere on the island's southern coast, in the relative vicinity of communication over Vitrenica Hill. Thence Demetrius, with his remaining personnel and, according to

95 For the debate on the dating of this monument, see: Kirigin 2004, pp. 205-209. For earlier views see Eckstein 1999, pp. 395-418; Derow 1991, pp. 261-270, where the older literature is also listed.

96 Kirigin 2004, p. 202 ff.

Cassius Dio, a considerable quantity of treasure,⁹⁷ set off for Macedonia and his new life as an advisor to the youthful, ambitious and powerful King Philip V.

It is to be expected that the situation on Kabal and the later fall of the town resulted in the enslavement of most of the people loyal to Demetrius. However, it is possible that the Illyrians among them were not sent to the slave markets, but were rather set free. Appian concluded his description of the war with the note that the Romans spared the Illyrians at the request of King Pinnes.⁹⁸ Since the Ardiaean state did not participate in this war, nor side against the Romans, it is difficult to imagine anything else to which this request may have referred. It is quite possible that there were some members of the high aristocracy among the Illyrians captured on Hvar and in Dimallum, and it is even more possible that Pinnes had close relations with some of his step-father's men, so that he attempted to intervene on their behalf. The consuls granted this request, obviously counting on this to reinforce relations with Pinnes, although they also unintentionally bolstered the indictment under which they would later be tried.

And, finally, the war against Demetrius did not end in glory for the victors. To be sure, both consuls were awarded a triumph for their successes, but then afterward the plebeian tribune accuse them for malfeasance in the distribution of the spoils to their army, thereby depriving the plebs. Aemilius Paullus, who was a patrician, barely evaded a conviction, while the plebeian Livius Salinator was declared guilty and forced to pay an immense fine. It would appear that this trial considerably disgraced them both, and they withdrew from public life for several years, only returning to Roman politics and military command posts at the urging of friends, at a time when Rome needed experienced commanders in the war against Hannibal: Aemilius led the Roman army at the slaughter at Cannae, while Livius Salinator finally turned the wartime tide in Rome's favour at the Battle of the Metaurus.

Even so, the greatest cost of this war was not borne by the destroyed Pharos, nor Demetrius, nor the victorious consuls. The price was paid by the Roman state - the greatest it had ever paid for any local conflict in which it became entangled. The conflict against Demetrius deprived it of the strategic opportunity to wage war against Hannibal in Hispania, and thereby allowed him to advance to Italian soil, which led to a series of devastating defeats, almost at the gates of Rome, and 14 years of Hannibal's destruction in Italy. As odd as this may sound, the destruction of Pharos closed the door to Hispania for the Romans and opened the doors of Italy to Hannibal.

97 Dio, 12, fr. 53.

98 App. *Illyr.*, 8.

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