

GRAD KAO LOGOR, LOGOR KAO GRAD

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MERVE
BEDIR

THE CITY AS THE CAMP,
THE CAMP AS THE CITY

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PRETHODNO PRIOPĆENJE

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SAŽETAK: U radu se predstavlja i tematizira transformacija suvremenog grada i logora u kontekstu izvanrednog stanja. O gradu se raspravlja u kontekstu rizika od potresa kao izvanrednog stanja i s time povezanih procesa urbanih transformacija kao mehanizama pritvaranja, budući da oni dovode do izmještanja stanovništva, restrukturiranja gradskih četvrti i brisanja urbaniteta. O logoru se pak govori kao o neformalnoj gradskoj četvrti i samoorganiziranom migrantskom kampu, koji se ovdje vrednuju na osnovi njihove potencijalne urbanosti. Glavno pitanje koje postavlja autorica je sljedeće: dok procesi potaknuti izvanrednim stanjem i s njima povezani mehanizmi (pritvaranja) radikalno mijenjaju gradski prostor današnjice, reproduciraju li ljudi (prekogranične) prostore za sebe, i kako?

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: izvanredno stanje, urbana transformacija, migracija, susjedstvo, grad, logor

Agamben¹ piše kako zanimanje za odnos golog ljudskog života i politike nije nužno specifično za suvremenost, već upravo obrnuto: goli život trajno je i primarno u žarištu politike, no na način da je iz nje isključen. Ova isključenost golog života iz politike upravo je ono što politiku i društveni život čini mogućima. Goli život uključen je u politiku samom svojom isključenošću, i ta isključenost određuje granice grada, društvenog života i politike, omogućavajući njihovo uspostavljanje. Budući da su tim mehanizmima ljudi zatočeni u neizvjesnosti između društvenog i političkog života, granica između golog života i politike postaje protočnom i te dvije domene počinju se preklapati.

Mehanizmi pritvaranja javljaju se u izvanrednim stanjima. Suverena vlast zadržava povlasticu donošenja svih odluka, uključujući odluku proglašavanja izvanrednog stanja.² Izvanredno stanje omogućava privremeno dokidanje zakona, odnosno dokidanje postojećeg pravnog poretka. U tom slučaju zakon se ne ukida sasvim, nego se neko vrijeme ne primjenjuje. S druge strane, još uvijek postoji pravni poredak, budući da je preduvjet za neprimjenjivanje zakona stvoren u postojećem pravnom poretku; na taj način opravdavaju se i izvanredno stanje i privremeno dokidanje zakona.³ Suverena vlast, iako je i sama dio pravnog poretka, može sama sebe izuzeti iz odgovornosti i ograničenja nametnutih zakonom tako što će proglasiti izvanredno stanje; ustvari, posjedovanje te ovlasti u samoj je biti suverene vlasti. Moć suverene vlasti ukorijenjena

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ABSTRACT: This paper presents and discusses the transformation of the contemporary city, and the camp in the context of emergency. The former is presented and discussed based on earthquake risk as emergency, and processes of risk-connected urban transformation as confinement mechanisms, leading to the displacement of inhabitants, redevelopment of neighborhoods, and erasure of urbanity. For the latter, it is the informal neighborhood and the self-organized camp of migrants, evaluated based on their potential of urbanity. The main question of this paper is the following: As processes of emergencies, and related (confinement) mechanisms transform the urban space radically today, (how) do people re-produce their spaces for themselves (across borders)?

KEYWORDS: emergency, urban transformation, migration, neighbourhood, city, camp

Agamben¹ argues that a concern of the relationship between the bare life of human and politics is not necessarily specific to modernity; on the contrary, bare life is continuous and primary in politics, but by being excluded from it. This exclusion of bare life from politics is precisely what makes politics and social life possible. Bare life is included in politics through its exclusion, and this exclusion draws the boundaries of the city, social life, and politics, and allows the establishment of them. As the mechanisms that confine humans in an uncertainty between their social and political life, the boundary between bare life and politics blurs, and the two start to overlap.

The mechanisms of confinement are created under emergencies: The sovereign always keeps the privilege to make all decisions, including the decision to declare the state of emergency.² The state of emergency allows the suspension of the law, i.e. the suspension of the existing legal order. In this case, the law is not cancelled, but not applied for a while. On the other hand, there is still a legal order, because the condition of not implementing the law is created in the existing legal order; hence the state of emergency and the suspension of law is justified.³ The sovereign, although itself is in the legal order, can keep itself exempt from the responsibilities and boundaries of the law through the state of emergency; in fact, having this power holds the essence of sovereignty. The sovereign roots their power in a legal order, which is both inside and outside

je u pravnom poretku, koji je i unutar i izvan nje. Također, proglašavanjem izvanrednog stanja i privremenim dokidanjem zakona suverena vlast može uključiti bilo kakav nepredvidivi uvjet u svoje vladarske ovlasti. Odnos suverene vlasti i zakona uspostavlja se neprimjenjivanjem zakona, baš kao što se i odnos politike i golog života uspostavlja ne-odnosom potonjega i politike.⁴ Tu se razotkriva veza između logora (kao metafore) i izvanrednog stanja. Logor je metafora i također prostorna reprezentacija nesigurnog graničnog stanja između političkog i društvenog života s jedne strane te golog života s druge, kao i između suverene vlasti i zakona. Agamben⁵ definira logor kao prostor u kojemu se goli život javlja kao rezultat dokinutog prostora, vremena i zakona u određenom političkom poretku. Ljudsko je biće u svome obliku golog života protiv zakona (u privremenoj dokinutosti) lišeno svake zaštite naspram suverene vlasti. U logoru zakon(i) društvenog i političkog ne štite čovjeka. U povijesti se 'ne-građane' ili 'nesavršene' građane (izbjeglice, homoseksualce, invalide, političke protivnike) izoliralo u logore iz razloga sigurnosti i zaštite 'savršenih' građana države, i to nije bio zločin, budući da je postojeći zakon bio privremeno dokinut. Logor stvara neizvjestan prostor koji nije niti unutar zakona niti izvan njega, a ljudi su ondje smješteni sa svrhom da ih se svode na stanje golog života u izolaciji od njihova društvenog i političkog bića. To nas uvjerava (ili nastoji uvjeriti) da ne postoji bolji oblik

bivanja čovjekom od toga da se bude građaninom. Ljudi su u logoru gotovo životinje i ako je potrebno, s njima se može postupiti kao sa životinjama.⁶

U nastavku teksta predstaviti ću dva slučaja proizvodnje prostora povezana s izvanrednim stanjima. Prvi je potres kao katastrofa i s time povezano izvanredno stanje, proglašeno u Turskoj radi urbane transformacije, dok je drugi migracija kao izvanredno stanje za suvremenu (nacionalnu) državu i s njome povezana politika s prikazanim primjerima u Grčkoj i Francuskoj.

Rizik od potresa kao izvanredno stanje: urbana transformacija kao mehanizam pritvaranja

Urbana transformacija glavni je čimbenik u pozadini 'procvata' izgradnje kao pokretača privrednog rasta u Turskoj nakon 2002. godine.⁷ Pozicioniranje Turske u globalnim financijskim mrežama, pojačana urbana transformacija, odnosno rušenje postojećih dijelova grada te izgradnja novih zdanja i infrastrukture predstavljaju se kao manifestacija suvremenosti i suvremenog grada. U početku su u središtu pozornosti bili veći gradovi s potencijalom na tržištu nekretnina, poput Ankare i Istanbula, no kasnije su i određeni dijelovi drugih gradova, osobito neformalne četvrti na rubovima grada, četvrti u kojima su stanovali 'nesavršeni građani', marginalizirani, manjine i tako dalje, dospjeli na metu intervencija.

PROCES URbane TRANSFORMACIJE U ČETVRTI HASANPA A. ZGRADE NA DESNOJ ŠTRANI BILE SU ISPRAŽNJENE RADI RUŠENJA, NO POČELI SU IH KORISTITI MIGRANTI IZ SIRIJE. U DALJINI SE NAZIRE NOVI TRGOVINSKO-UREDSKI CENTAR, KOJI PREDSTAVLJA ONO U ŠTO ĆE SE HASANPA A PRETVORITI. ISTANBUL, 2014. FOTO: ÜLKÜ OKTAY

URBAN TRANSFORMATION PROCESS IN HASANPA A. THE BUILDINGS ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE ARE EVACUATED TO BE PULLED DOWN, BUT THEN USED BY THE MIGRANTS FROM SYRIA. IN THE DISTANCE, THERE IS A NEW SHOPPING MALL/OFFICE COMPLEX, REPRESENTING WHAT HASANPA A IS TO BECOME. ISTANBUL, 2014. PHOTO: ÜLKÜ OKTAY

itself. Also, by declaring an emergency, and suspending the law, the sovereign includes any unpredictable condition in its governing power. The relationship of the sovereign with the law is established by not implementing the law, just like the relationship of politics with bare life being established by its non-relationship with politics.⁴ The connection between the camp (as metaphor) and the state of emergency is revealed here.

The camp is the metaphor as well as the spatial representation of the uncertain boundary condition between political and social life, and bare life; as well as the one between the sovereign and the law. Agamben⁵ defines the camp as the space that bare life emerges, as a result of the suspended space, time, and law in a given political order. The human being is in its form of bare life against the law (in-suspension), with no protection against the sovereign. In the camp, the law(s) of the social and political do not protect the human. Historically, the 'non-citizens' or 'not perfect' citizens (refugees, homosexuals, the disabled, the political opposition) were isolated in camps for reasons of safety and security of the 'perfect' citizens or the state, and this has not been a crime, because the existing law was in suspension.

The camp creates an uncertain space that is neither inside the law nor outside of it, and the humans located in them are supposed to be reduced to their condition of bare life, isolated from their social and political being. This (tries to) persuade us that there is no better

form of being a human, other than a citizen. Humans are almost animals in the camp, and if necessary, one could do what they do to animals, to humans.⁶

Following, I will present two cases on the production of space in relation to emergency. First, earthquake as disaster risk and the related emergency declared for the sake of urban transformation in Turkey, and second, migration as emergency for the modern (nation) state and the related politics of emergency in exemplified in Greece and France.

Earthquake risk as emergency; urban transformation as confinement mechanism

Urban transformation is the major factor behind the construction 'boom,' which has been the driver of economic growth in Turkey since 2002⁷. Establishing Turkey in the global financial networks, more urban transformation, i.e. more clearing of existing parts of cities, and construction of buildings and infrastructure were introduced as manifestation of modernity, and of modern cities. In the beginning, larger cities with real estate potential, like Ankara and Istanbul, attracted the attention, but later on, particular areas in every city, especially informal neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the cities, neighbourhoods of the 'not-perfect-citizens,' the marginalised, the minorities, and so on, have become the focus of intervention, as well.

U ovom slučaju država je predstavila rizik od potresa kao izvanredno stanje, a urbana transformacija prikazana je kao mehanizam za njegovo rješavanje, pri čemu je privremeno dokinut postojeći zakon⁸ prema kojemu je bila potrebna potpuna suglasnost stanovnika s određenog područja (zgrade, bloka, četvrti) kako bi se ispunili uvjeti za ponovnu gradnju. Budući da je zakon dokinut, pojedinačni projekti urbane transformacije realizirani su u skladu s posebnim dodatnim zakonima koji su se odnosili na pojedinačne stambene četvrti ili okrug podložan intervenciji. Te su intervencije pokrenute i omogućene zahvaljujući proglašenju izvanrednog stanja na određenom području, što je suverenoj vlasti omogućilo da privremeno dokine aktualni zakon i primijeni dodatne zakone koje

je sama definirala. U nekim je slučajevima sama država odredila granice suverene vlasti, u drugima je pak ta povlastica uključivala i developera/investitora.

Uz opravdanje rizika od potresa na širim područjima Turske uveden je zakon o transformaciji područja ugroženih prirodnim katastrofama,⁹ a uslijedilo je i nekoliko drugih zakona sa sličnom ideologijom intervencije i rušenja, očuvanja prirode i biološke raznolikosti, prodaje javnog zemljišta privatnim osobama, izuzeća od propisa o procjeni utjecaja na okoliš, postupaka javne nabave i tako dalje. Ovi su zakoni omogućili rušenja i razvojne odluke o gradovima, kao i postupke koji su se protivili ranijim zakonima i nadzornim institucijama, kao i uvođenje izvanrednih mjera kojima su



In this case, earthquake disaster risk was introduced as an emergency by the state, and urban transformation was proposed as a mechanism to deal with the emergency, suspending the existing law⁸, which asked for the full agreement of the inhabitants of a certain area (building, block, neighbourhood) in negotiating the conditions of rebuilding. The law being in suspension, the singular urban transformation projects were realized with special by-laws, focusing on residential districts, each particular to the neighbourhood or the district under intervention. These interventions were initiated, and made possible by the declaration of an emergency in a special territory, allowing the sovereign

authority to suspend the functioning law, and to apply the by-laws defined by itself. In some cases, the boundaries of sovereignty were defined by the state itself, in other cases the privilege was extended to the developer/investor.

Justified with earthquake threat in most parts of the country, the law on the transformation of areas at risk of natural disaster⁹ was introduced, followed by several other laws with similar ideology of intervention and erasure, on the conservation of nature and biological diversity, on the sale of public land to private bodies, on the exemptions to the environmental impact assessment regulation, on the public procurement procedures, and more.

sve odluke o rušenjima i izgradnji stavljene u ruke suverene vlasti. Taj je zakon smanjio zahtjev za potpunom suglasnošću stanovnika kod projekata urbane transformacije na samo 51%.

Grad kao logor

Mnogi projekti gradnje realizirani su pomoću mehanizma izvanrednog stanja proglašenog zbog potresa i s njime povezane urbane transformacije, osobito u neformalnim četvrtima na gradskoj periferiji i u onim dijelovima središta gdje su cijene nekretnina visoke. Time su uništene brojne stambene četvrti i njihova svakodnevnica, što je radikalno promijenilo urbani prostor i doživljaj gradskog života u Turskoj.

U Istanbulu su neformalne četvrti izgrađene preko noći na zemljištu u državnom vlasništvu na rubovima grada, a nastanili su ih ljudi koji su doselili iz raznih dijelova zemlje u različitim razdobljima i iz raznih razloga: dva razloga bile su novonastala potražnja za radnom snagom u gradovima 80-ih godina prošlog stoljeća¹⁰, i destruktivne državne intervencije u kurdskim gradovima 90-ih, koje su te gradove učinile nenastanljivima.¹¹ Neformalne četvrti, koje su kasnije postale popularnim dijelovima brzorastućeg Istanbula, pogođene su intervencijama i procesima urbane transformacije. Drugi su slučaj četvrti u središtu Istanbula, gdje su ne-muslimani iseljavani iz svojih kuća u raznim razdobljima nakon Drugog

svjetskog rata.¹² Ti dijelovi grada, gdje su nekada živjeli Armenci, Grci i drugi, zjape prazni zbog kompliciranih vlasničkih odnosa. Iz sličnih razloga kao što su oni ranije spomenuti te su zgrade zaposjeli migranti iz drugih dijelova zemlje, kao i iz drugih zemalja, koji sele zbog međunarodnih politika, ratnih sukoba i tome slično. Veliki dijelovi četvrti i okruga srušeni su, a 'nesavršeni građani' ili 'ne-građani' izmješteni su u procesu urbane transformacije. Taj proces nije značio samo uništenje fizičkog prostora, nego i uništenje urbanog prostora koji su proizveli njegovi stanovnici, pravila gostoljubivosti, društvenih zakona četvrti koji su življeni, usvajani i uspostavljeni zahvaljujući dugogodišnjim iskustvima, društvenih odnosa među susjedima, ideje odgovornosti pojedinca za sebe sama i svoju okolinu i tako dalje. Ograđena stambena naselja zamijenila su takve četvrti, pretvarajući njihov niski stupanj gustoće, slabu infrastrukturu i samoorganizirani model urbanosti u model visokog stupnja urbane zatvorenosti uz omeđenost ogradama ili zidovima, stražarske kućice, nadzorne kamere i arbitrarno projektirane prostore na otvorenom. Ti su projekti realizirani kao intervencije odozgo, od strane državne agencije, odnosno Turska uprava za masovno stanovanje (TOKİ), i privatnih developera.

Prema Agambenu,¹³ moderne vlade mogle bi privremeno učiniti trajnim, odnosno mogle bi pretvoriti izvanredno stanje, ograničeno

ULAZ U NOVI STAMBENI KOMPLEKS TOK : STRAŽARINICA, ZID S OGRADOM OD BODLJKAVE ŽICE, NADZORNE KAMERE. KAR IYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. FOTO: MERVE BEDİR

ZID S OGRADOM OD BODLJKAVE ŽICE U NOVOM STAMBENOM KOMPLEKSU TOK. KAR IYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. FOTO: MERVE BEDİR

OGRAĐENO DJEČJE IGRALIŠTE OPREMLJENO ČITAČEM PRISTUPNIH KARTIČA. KAR IYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. FOTO: MERVE BEDİR

NEW TOK HOUSING ENTRANCE: SECURITY KIOSK, BARBED-WIRE FENCED WALL, SECURITY CAMERAS. KAR IYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. PHOTO: MERVE BEDİR

NEW TOK HOUSING BARBED-WIRE FENCED WALL. KAR IYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. PHOTO: MERVE BEDİR

FENCED AND ENTRANCE CARD CONTROLLED CHILDREN'S PLAYGROUND. KAR IYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. PHOTO: MERVE BEDİR

These laws made it possible to realize demolition and development decisions about cities, and to run counter to pre-existing legislation and supervisory institutions; as well as to introduce emergency procedures that leave all decisions about demolition and construction activities in the hands of the sovereign power. This law reduced the requirement of the full agreement of the inhabitants for the urban transformation project down to 51%.

The city as the camp

Through the mechanism of emergency declared with earthquake threat and urban transformation, many housing projects have been implemented, especially on the informal neighbourhoods at the periphery of the cities and the inner-city districts with high real estate value, destroying neighbourhoods and the daily life within them, radically changing the urban space and experience, in Turkey.

In Istanbul, informal neighbourhoods built-over-night on the land owned by the state on the outskirts of the city, was created by the people who migrated from different parts of the country in different periods of time, for different reasons; two of them being the new labour demand in the city in the 80s¹⁰, and a destructive state intervention in Kurdish cities in the 90s, leaving these cities uninhabitable¹¹. The informal neighbourhoods, which later became popular parts of the fast-growing city of Istanbul, have been

intervened with the urban transformation processes. Another case was the inner-city districts of Istanbul, where the non-Muslims had been displaced from their houses in different periods since WWI¹². These areas, once neighbourhoods of Armenians, Greeks, and others had remained vacant, with complicated ownership issues. Similar to the reasons mentioned before, these buildings had been occupied by migrants from the other parts of the country, as well as from other countries connected to international politics, conflicts, and so on.

Major neighbourhoods, districts were erased, and the 'non-perfect-citizens' or 'non-citizens' were displaced with urban transformation. The process was not only a destruction of the physical space, but also a destruction of the urban space that was produced by the inhabitants, the rules of hospitality, the social laws of the neighbourhood that had been lived, learned and established by experience in time, the social relationship that was produced by neighbours, the idea of responsibility for the individual to its self and surroundings, and so on. Gated settlements have replaced these neighbourhoods, transforming their low density, low infrastructure, self-organized urban pattern into a pattern of high rise-urban confinement with border fences/walls, security kiosks and cameras, randomly designed open spaces. These projects were realized as top down interventions by the state agency, i.e. Mass Housing Administration of Turkey (TOKİ), and by private developers.

određenim prostorom i vremenom, u trajnu paradigmu vladanja. Kada izuzetak postane pravilo, postoji sve više mogućnosti za privremeno dokidanje zakona, pri čemu se povećava broj i raznovrsnost mehanizama koji stvaraju goli život. Na taj se način goli život, smješten na rubovima društvenog i političkog poretka, širi gradom. Naposljetku logor, kao prostor trajnog izuzetka, zamjenjuje grad kao prostor politike i socijalizacije. Logor nije ograničen na povijesne primjere poput nacističkih logora, gulaga i slično. Logor je općenito prostor trajnog izuzetka u odnosu na pravni poredak, gdje se vrijeme i zakon dokidaju, a goli život i politika miješaju. Logor je mjesto gdje grad nestaje, čovjek kao društveno i političko biće pada u drugi plan, a ostaje samo goli život. U logoru se čovjek ne definira prema svojoj političkoj i društvenoj ulozi, identitetu ili biću, nego prema svojim biološkim karakteristikama.¹⁴

U našem slučaju moglo bi se ustvrditi da unatoč postojanju pravnog poretka – zakona o vlasničkim odnosima i zakona o

urbanoj transformaciji mjesnih općina – stanovnici neformalnih zgrada žive u trajnom stanju izuzetka. U nekim se četvrtima ‘nesavršeni građani’ koji se ne slažu s procesima urbane transformacije radikaliziraju i dodatno kriminaliziraju, što opet pridonosi ‘opravdanosti’ njihova uklanjanja iz tih četvrti.

Migracija kao izvanredno stanje, izbjeglički logori kao mehanizam nadzora

U vrijeme kad su ratni sukobi u Siriji počeli jačati, Turska je mijenjala zakon o migracijama i državljanstvu, pri čemu je uzela zakon Europske Unije o međunarodnoj zaštiti kao uzor za vlastiti zakon iz 2013.¹⁵ Pripreme za usvajanje tog zakona u parlamentu ustvari su bile jedna od stvari koje je EU pozdravila kao znak demokratizacije Turske tijekom prvog razdoblja vladavine AKP-a. Međutim, novi zakon razlikuje se od europskoga u jednom pogledu: samo tražitelji azila koji dolaze iz Europske Unije smiju zatražiti status izbjeglice, dok drugi, koji dolaze iz Azije, Bliskog



According to Agamben¹³, the modern governments could make the temporary into the permanent, i.e. they could transform the state of emergency, which is defined for a certain space and time, into a continuous governing paradigm. When the exception becomes the rule, there are more conditions for the suspension of law, hence the mechanisms that create bare life forms increase and vary. This way, the bare life that is located at the border of the social and political order spreads over the city. Consequently, the camp, as the space of continuous exception, replaces the city as the space of politics and socialising. The camp is not limited to the examples of its history, such as Nazi camps, gulags, etc. The camp, in general, is a space of continuous exception inside the legal order, where the time and the law is suspended, and the bare life and politics is mixed. The camp is where the city is dissolved, the human as a social and political being retreats, and the bare life remains. In the camp, the human is not defined with its political and societal role/identity/being, but with its biological characteristics.¹⁴

In our case, it could be claimed that under the existence of the legal order, i.e. the property ownership law and the urban transformation law under local municipalities, the inhabitants of informal houses live in a continuous state of exception. In some neighbourhoods, the ‘not-perfect-citizens,’ who do not agree with the processes of urban transformation, are radicalized and criminalized, which further ‘justify’ the displacement of them from their neighbourhoods.

Migration as emergency, refugee camps as control mechanism

Around the time that the conflict in Syria started to accelerate, Turkey was changing its law on migration and citizenship, where it took the European Union (EU) law on international protection as an example in making its own law¹⁵. The preparations of this law in the parliament was actually one of the things that the EU appreciated towards ‘democratization and modernization’ in Turkey. However, the new law is different than the EU law on one point: only the

Istoka ili Afrike i dalje potpadaju pod jednu od ostalih kategorija i ne stječu izbjeglički status. Prema tom zakonu, tražitelji azila iz Sirije dobivaju samo status 'osobe pod privremenom zaštitom', bez ikakvog izgleda za stjecanje izbjegličkog statusa, kao ni za stjecanje trajne dozvole boravka ili državljanstva. Tražitelji azila iz Sirije koji su pod privremenom zaštitom ne smiju napuštati grad u kojem su registrirani bez dopuštenja Državnog ureda za migracije. Na taj način 'privremena zaštita' kao takva ustvari sadrži dobru dozu nejasnoće i nesigurnosti.

Prema Konvenciji UN-a o izbjeglicama,¹⁶ tražitelj/ica azila može biti prihvaćen/a kao izbjeglica samo ako je pojedinačan slučaj koji bježi od smrtne opasnosti u vlastitoj zemlji. Tako definicija u konvenciji ustvari ne obuhvaća golem broj osoba koje bježe od rata. Ovu odluku usvojio je niz zemalja. Kao drugo, različite države koriste različite kategorizacije tražitelja azila. Uspjela sam ih pronaći 11 u raznim dokumentima: izbjeglica, tražitelj azila, osoba pod privremenom zaštitom, osoba bez državljanstva, osoba sa statusom sličnom izbjegličkom, neredoviti migrant, neregistrirani migrant, uvjetni izbjeglica, stranac pod supsidijarnom zaštitom, humanitarno ugrožena osoba, žrtva trgovine ljudima.

Neprestanu 'migrantsku krizu' duž europskih granica valja promatrati u odnosu na pooštrene granice koje stvaraju takve izrazito hijerarhizirane nacionalne i međunarodne definicije i zakoni gostoljubivosti, kao i inherentno neprijateljstvo koje je u

njih ugrađeno. Ovaj detaljno razrađeni sustav također pokazuje kako je migracija u suštini izvanredno stanje za suvremenu (nacionalnu) državu, budući da omogućuje ulazak 'nesavršenog građanina' ili 'ne-građanina'. Stoga ga suvremena država nastoji staviti pod nadzor koliko god je to moguće, a to čini klasificirajući migranta (ekonomski migrant, tražitelj azila, imigrant i sl.), gradeći infrastrukture za smještaj (prihvatni centri, deportacijski centri, logori) i primjenjujući učinkovit program učenja o tome kako biti dobar građanin.

Kojoj god kategoriji pripadao, migrant¹⁷/ne-građanin treba pristupiti nacionalnoj državi pod odgovarajućim uvjetima. Ako to ne učini, mogao bi zapeti na neodređeno vrijeme na njezinim granicama, bilo to na otocima poput Lesbosa, gdje bi se potpuna izolacija mogla učiniti lakše podnošljivom zbog mora kao prirodne fizičke granice, bilo u logorima poput onih u Calaisu i Dunkirku, gdje se isključenost iz države može postići i unutar njezina teritorija zahvaljujući visokim, čvrstim ogradama i nadzornom sustavu. U ovom slučaju (nacionalne) granice i logori sadrže ekstra-teritorijalne prostore, gdje mehanizmi nadzora suverene države u odnosu na izvanredno stanje migracije proizvode pustopoljine, ne-mjesta. Arhitektura logora svodi migrantov svakodnevi život na minimum kako bi preživio u zatočeništvu, na ono što je Agamben nazvao golim životom. Ne samo da su granice tog teritorija opremljene raznim sustavima sigurnosti,

LOGOR KOJI SU ORGANIZIRALI TRAZITELJI AZILA I
DOBROVOLJCI. LESBOS, 2016. FOTO: MERVE BEDIR

CAMP ORGANISED BY ASYLUM SEEKERS AND VOLUNTEERS.
LESBOS, 2016. PHOTO: MERVE BEDIR

asylum seekers coming from the EU are allowed to apply for a refugee status, the others coming from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa remain under one of the other categories and do not get a refugee status in Turkey. Under this law, asylum seekers from Syria get only 'temporary protection' status, which does not provide any prospect for a refugee status, but no prospect for a proper residence permit, or a citizenship status either. Asylum seekers from Syria under temporary protection cannot leave the city they are registered in, without permission from the State Department of Migration. The procedure of 'temporary protection,' hence the law, inherently includes a level of ambiguity and uncertainty in itself. According to the UN refugee convention¹⁶, for an asylum seeker to be accepted as a refugee, she/he needs to be an individual case escaping from a fatal situation in his/her own country. So, the definition in the convention actually does not cover mass number of people escaping from war. This decision belongs to the different states. Besides, different states use different categorizations for asylum seekers. At least 11 of them are mentioned in different documents in European states' laws: refugee, asylum seeker, temporary protection, stateless person, refugee-like-person, irregular migrant, undocumented migrant, conditional refugee, subsidiary refugee, humanitarian resident, victim of human trafficking resident.

The re-current 'migrant crisis' along the borders of Europe needs to

be confronted through the perspective of the heightened borders created by these highly hierarchical national and international definitions and laws of hospitality, and the inherent hostility embedded in them. This intricately detailed system also shows that migration, in essence, is an emergency to the modern (nation) state, because it allows the 'not perfect-citizen' or 'non-citizen' to come in. Therefore, the modern state tries to manage it as much as possible; by classifying the migrant (economical, asylum seeker, expat, ...), by building infrastructures of hospitality (reception centres, detention centres, camps, ...), and by applying an effective program on learning how to be a good citizen.

Whichever category it falls into, the migrant¹⁷/the non-citizen has to approach the nation state under proper conditions. If it does not, it might get stuck at its borders indefinitely, be it islands like Lesbos, where a total isolation might seem easier to sustain due to the sea holding a natural physical boundary, or camps like the ones in Calais and Dunkirk, where an exclusion from the state borders might also be achieved within its territory thanks to high and strong fences and surveillance. The (national) borders and camps in this case hold extra-territorial spaces, where the control mechanisms of the sovereign state in relation to the emergency of migration produce wastelands, non-places. Through the architecture of the camp, the migrant's daily life is planned as its minimum to survive in confinement, what Agamben describes as bare life. Not


nego i ćelije-kontejneri te nepostojanje bilo kakvog prostora za okupljanje, učenje ili rad stvaraju situaciju zatočeništva. Po svojim stupnjevima zatočeništva i izolacije logori su savršena mjesta izuzeća, gdje se migrant radikalizira i ilegalizira baš kao i u neformalnim četvrtima.

Logor kao grad

Razlika između nesavršenih građana i ne-građana sastoji se u osobnoj iskaznici koju nesavršeni građani posjeduju. To znači da oni snose još više odgovornosti za svoje uključivanje u savršeni identitet nacionalne države. Međutim, suvremeni grad nije najbolja konstrukcija za ostvarivanje savršenog odnosa države i ne-građana, odnosno nesavršenog građana... (i)migrant dovodi jezik grada u stanje kaosa, osvaja ga i uništava, ruši sve definicije metropole. Iako se grad odupire (i)migrantima okrutnim finansijskim mjerama, (i)migranti mijenjaju sliku metropole. No (i)migrant skupo plaća tu promjenu, budući da mora trpjeti bijedne

uvjete koje metropola stvara. Nepripadanje (i)migranta stvara napetost koja okružuje njegov/njezin život".¹⁸

Neke od četvrti Istanbula – Tarlaabaşı, Kurtuluş, Küçükpazar, Fatih – odražavaju tu infrastrukturu (i)migracije, kvare savršen identitet i sliku nacionalne države. Tarlaabaşı, nekoć jedna od ne-muslimanskih četvrti Istanbula, doživio je radikalnu transformaciju nakon pogroma 1955. godine, što je uzrokovalo ubrzano iseljavanje znatnog dijela ne-muslimanskih građana pa su zgrade ostale prazne. Kasnije, uslijed internog izmještanja Kurda u Turskoj tijekom 90-ih godina, dio četvrti nastanilo je kurdsko stanovništvo, što se poklopilo s velikim projektom urbane transformacije usredotočenim na aveniju Tarlaabaşı. Negdje u isto vrijeme u četvrt su doseljavali i migranti iz Somalije, Sudana i drugih afričkih zemalja.¹⁹ Tarlaabaşı bi se mogao smatrati četvrti 'neformalnog' karaktera, budući da u zgradama stanuju migranti koji nisu ovlašteni živjeti ondje kao vlasnici ili stanari. U tom smislu je Tarlaabaşı također prostor izuzeća u onom smislu koji smo ranije naveli. Stanovnici te četvrti dijele susjedstvo



only the borders of the territory is equipped with various security apparatus, but also the cell-containers, the non-existence of any space for gathering, for learning, for working create the condition of confinement as well. With degrees of confinement and isolation, camps are perfect spaces of exception, where the migrant is radicalised and illegalised, as in the informal neighbourhoods.

The camp as the city

The difference between the not-perfect-citizen and the migrant/non-citizen is the identity card that the not-perfect-citizens hold. This means that they have even more responsibility to get included in the perfect identity of the nation state. However, the contemporary city is not the best construct for this perfect relationship between the state and the non-citizen, or the not-perfect-citizen, to be achieved. "The (im)migrant puts the language of the city in disorder, conquers and destroys it; s/he disrupts all definitions of the metropolis. While the city resists the migrants

through its vicious political processes, the image of the metropolis is altered by the migrants. The migrant forfeits from this alteration of image, by enduring the wretched living and working conditions created by the metropolis. The non-belonging of the migrant begets this tension that surrounds her/his life"¹⁸.

Some of the neighbourhoods of Istanbul, Tarlaabaşı, Kurtuluş, Küçükpazar, Fatih, which historically harbour migrants, disrupt the perfect identity and its image of the nation state. Tarlaabaşı, which used to be one of the non-Muslim neighbourhoods of Istanbul, was radically transformed starting with the pogrom of 1955 causing the acceleration of emigration of an important part of the non-Muslim citizens of Istanbul, leaving their buildings empty. Afterwards, once more through the 1990's internal displacement of Kurdish people, part of the neighbourhood was inhabited by the Kurdish people, which overlapped with a major urban transformation project focusing on Tarlaabaşı boulevard. Around this time, migrants from Somalia, Sudan, and other countries from Africa¹⁹ were also

i svakodnevni život s određenim stupnjem samoorganizacije, a u drugačijim uvjetima i solidarnosti. Slično tome, logori na Lezbosu i u Calaisu, iako samoorganizirani po svome karakteru, pokazuju značajke zajedničkog života i života u gradskoj četvrti.

Drugi je slučaj samoorganizirane četvrti izgrađene preko noći u Ankari, koja je gotovo u potpunosti uništena tijekom procesa urbane transformacije zbog rizika od potresa. Želimo li sagledati tu četvrt unutar metafore logora o kojoj govori Agamben, trebala bih objasniti mjeru u kojoj četvrt nije bila logor, nego pravi urbani prostor kakav današnjim gradovima nedostaje. Iako se ova analiza zasniva na mojim osobnim iskustvima i opservacijama, moje tvrdnje ne bi se trebale shvatiti kao izraz nostalgije prema nekadašnjem susjedstvu koje je zamijenila zatvorena zajednica, nego kao osnova za kritičku raspravu o tome što ne valja s našim gradovima danas, i što bi trebalo istražiti želimo li oživjeti/razviti odnos građana i javnog prostora. Osim toga, neka od ovih osobnih iskustava u mojoj četvrti poklapaju se s mojim opservacijama u

izbjegličkim logorima na Lesbosu i u Calaisu.

Jedna od glavnih karakteristika četvrti bio je zajednički vrt uz zgradu, koji je koristilo nekoliko domaćinstava, najviše tri. U svakoj je zgradi, po modelu koji je bio zastupljen u mnogim slučajevima, živio je još netko iz uže ili proširene obitelji. U nekolicini slučajeva jedna od stambenih jedinica bi se iznajmljivala. Četvrt je bila vrlo zelena, uskih ulica i bez ograda između vrtova i ulice, ili s niskim ogradama.

Nepisani zakoni četvrti definirali su se i razvijali dugi niz godina, među obiteljima koje su živjele na istom mjestu. Vrijednosti susjedstva također su dijelom proizlazile iz tih zakona (te vice versa): osjećaj odgovornosti, familijarnosti, sigurnosti, povjerenja u druge i tako dalje. Bilo je mnogo svađa među susjedima, no sukobi su se rješavali već prema tome što je tko očekivao ili mogao očekivati od drugoga, što je bilo dobro poznato i što je naposljetku činilo policijsku intervenciju izvana nepotrebnom.

Zakoni četvrti zahtijevali su poznavanje drugih, što je također



moving to this neighbourhood. Tarlaşaşı could be considered 'informal' in nature, because the houses are inhabited by the migrants who are not formally entitled to live there as owners or renters. In this sense, Tarlaşaşı, as discussed before is another space of exception. The inhabitants of this neighbourhood share the neighbourhood and daily life there, within a certain scale of self organisation, and in solidarity under different circumstances. Similarly, the camps that are in Lesbos and Calais, more self-organized in nature, display the clues of a life in common, and a neighbourhood.

Another case is a built-over-night, self-organised neighbourhood in Ankara, which was demolished almost completely during an urban transformation process under earthquake risk. If this neighbourhood is to be considered within the camp metaphor that Agamben refers to, the extent to which the neighbourhood was not a camp should be explained, as well as how it was actually the urban space that cities today lack. Although there is

a limitation that this analysis is based on my personal experience and observations, my claim and analysis should not be considered within an understanding of nostalgia, of a by-gone neighbourhood exchanged with a gated settlement, but as a basis to critically discuss what is wrong with our cities, today; and what could be explored as to revive/flourish the relationship among the citizens and the urban space. In addition, some of these personal experiences in my neighbourhood overlap with my observations in the camps in Lesbos and Calais.

Some of the main characteristics of the neighbourhood were 1-3 dwellings using a common garden per building. Each dwelling, using the same footprint in many cases, was inhabited by someone from the family, or the extended family. In a few cases, one of the dwellings would be rented. The neighbourhood was dominantly green, with narrow streets, and no borders or low height borders defining the edge of the garden to the street. The unwritten laws of the neighbourhood were negotiated and developed over

značilo odgovornost za njih. Svaki je pojedinac bio pripadnik sveopće volje i dio cjeline. Četvrt je funkcionirala negdje između „onoga što je Rousseau nazvao ‘društvenim ugovorom’ i ‘narativnog ugovora’, odnosno mogućnosti njegove prerade, kao poimanja društvenih spona i solidarnosti koje može potaknuti i potvrditi viziju svijeta kao prostora mogućnosti.“²⁰ Ono što je zanimljivo u kontekstu ovoga rada, to je da se slični nepisani zakoni, pravila i ugovori razvijaju i u samoorganiziranim logorima u Dunkirku, na Lesbosu i drugdje, i to je srž čovjekova postojanja kao društvenog i političkog bića. To dovodi raspravu na novu razinu: dok naši gradovi postaju logorima na način koji je opisao Agamben, ljudi u logoru, doslovce i metaforički, kolektivno proizvode i reproduciraju urbani prostor, urbani identitet, te drukčije razumijevanje toga što bi grad mogao biti. U ovom slučaju „logori se ne mogu smatrati kao prostori ilegaliziranih osoba pod policijskom kontrolom, nego kao prostori koje nasilje države sprečava da postanu ono što bi mogli postati.“²¹

Epilog

Prema Dikenu i Laustsenu,²² izbjeglički logori, baš kao i zatvorena, ograđena zajednica ili čak uredski kompleksi, trgovinski centri ili centri za mršavljenje i ljepotu, mogu se razmatrati unutar Agambenove metafore logora. Sva ta mjesta ponavljaju načelo primjenjivanja neprimjenjivanjem, odnošenja neodnošenjem. Oni

ostaju u gradu, no i izvan njega, zahvaljujući svojim mehanizmima nadzora i pritvaranja.

Nova ograđena naselja navodno imaju bolju infrastrukturu i nebudere otporne na potres, prostore na otvorenom s drvećem u teglama i granitnim pločnicima, ali i pogranične uvjete s bodljikavom žicom, ukrašenim kapijama sa stražarima i nadzornim kamerama, dječja igrališta s ogradama i čitačima pristupnih kartica – a sve to stvara logor unutar grada. Stanovnici ne prepoznaju jedni druge i ne znaju (ne žele znati) jedni za druge (ili o drugima), što ima veze i s nevoljkošću da se za njih preuzme odgovornost. U ovom novom svijetu vladaju drugi zakoni, koje je na različitim razinama uspostavio developer/investitor, no nijedan od njih nisu napravili stanovnici. Nijedno od pravila ne predstavlja njih same. Nova zatvorena naselja u gradovima postaju mjesta nepripadanja.

Dok se gradovi restrukturiraju u procesima urbane transformacije, „logor zamjenjuje grad“.²³ Dok se društveni, kulturni i ekonomski odnosi, kao ‘kultura susjedstva’ u gradovima, uništavaju mehanizmima pritvaranja nevladini logori na Lesbosu i u Dunkirku (a potencijalno i mnogi drugi) stvaraju vrstu urbanosti koja započinje živjeti poput stambene četvrti.

Četvrti Istanbula koje nisu bile podvrgnute urbanoj transformaciji no žive pod tom prijetnjom organiziraju se putem saveza i kooperativa kako bi spasile svoje domove, susjede i susjedstva te zadržale pravo na njih. Stanovnici četvrti žele zadržati upravo onakav urbani

SITUACIJA U STAMBENIM ČETVRTIMA PRIJE URBANE TRANSFORMACIJE.
KAR İYAKA, ANKARA, 2017. FOTO: MERVE BEDİR

HOUSING CONDITION BEFORE URBAN TRANSFORMATION. KAR İYAKA,
ANKARA, 2017. PHOTO: MERVE BEDİR

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years, by the families living in the same place. The values of the neighbourhood were also partially driven from these laws (and vice versa), such as the feeling of responsibility, feeling of familiarity, safety and security, trusting the other, and so on. There were lots of fights among the neighbours, but conflicts were solved based on what everyone would/could expect from each other, which was well known, and which eventually made the police unnecessary to intervene from outside.

The laws of the neighbourhood required knowing the others in the neighbourhood, which also meant being responsible for them. Each individual was a member of the general will, and a part of the whole. The neighbourhood functioned somewhere between “what Rousseau explained as the ‘social contract’ and the ‘narrative contract,’ which is the possibility of it being rewritten, as a way of imagining social bonds and solidarities that can help instigate and affirm a vision of the world as a space of potential.”²⁰ What is interesting in the context of this paper, is that similar unwritten laws, rules, contracts develop in the self-organised camps in Dunkirk, Lesbos, and elsewhere, and this is the core of the human existence, as a social and political being. This brings the discussion to another level in terms of how, while our cities are becoming camps in the way Agamben describes it, people in the camps both literally and metaphorically produce and re-produce of urban space

collectively, an urban identity, a different understanding of what a city could be. In this case, “camps should not be considered as spaces of the illegal (under police control), but spaces that are prevented from what they could become as neighbourhoods, due to the state violence.”²¹

Epilogue

According to Diken and Laustsen,²² refugee camps, but also gated settlements, and even office complexes, shopping malls, weight watcher and beauty centres could be considered within Agamben’s metaphor of camp. All these places repeat the principle of implementing by not implementing, relating by not relating. They remain in the city, but also outside of it, through their control and confinement mechanisms.

The new gated settlements with supposedly better infrastructure and earthquake-proof high rise blocks, open areas with potted trees and granite border stones, settlements border conditions with barbed-wires, ornamented gateways with security and cameras, children’s playgrounds with fences and entrance card systems create the camp in the city. Inhabitants do not recognize each other, they do not (want to) know (about) each other, which is also about the unwillingness to take responsibility for them. In this new world, there are other laws established on different levels of the

život kakav poznaju i na kakav su navikli. David Harvey²⁴ smatra kako svaki društveni odnos izgrađuje vlastitu prostornost, budući da prostor istovremeno određuje karakter i kvalitetu tog društvenog odnosa. Slično tome, dok urbana transformacija radikalno mijenja naše gradove, a migracijske politike stvaraju nove prostore izolacije i isključenja, kako onda prostorne strategije i politike u pozadini tih procesa mijenjaju njihove stanovnike? To je, naposljetku, u središtu mog zanimanja.

¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, prev. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford University Press, 1998.).

² Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, prev. George Schwab (MIT Press, 1985.).

³ Giorgio Agamben, *The State of Emergency*, <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpagambenschmitt.htm> (posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

⁴ G. Agamben, bilj. 1.

⁵ Isto.

⁶ Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (Harcourt Publishing, 1973.).

⁷ Izvješće gradbenog sektora 2016., http://intes.org.tr/content/insaasat_2016.pdf (na turskom jeziku, posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

⁸ Plan transformacije područja pod općinskim zakonom: https://www.csb.gov.tr/db/nevsehir/editordosya/5393%20say%C3%84%C2%B1%C3%84%C2%B1%20BELED%C3%84%C2%B0YE%20KANUNUN%2073_maddesi.pdf (na turskom jeziku, posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

⁹ Zakon o transformaciji područja ugroženih prirodnim katastrofama: <http://www.csb.gov.tr/gm/altyapi/index.php?Id=114&Sayfa=sayfa&Tur=banner>, 2012. (na turskom jeziku, posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

¹⁰ Fatma Bilge Cengiz, *Türkiyede Sendikaların Düzensiz Emek Göçüne Bakış: İstanbul Örneği*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Marmara University, 2013. (na turskom jeziku).

¹¹ Ayşe Betül Çelik, "I Miss My Village!": Forced Kurdish Migrants in İstanbul and Their Representation in Associations", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 32 (proljeće 2005.), 137–163.

¹² George A. Kourvetaris, "The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of İstanbul", *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 34/2 (zima 2006.), 375-387.

¹³ G. Agamben, bilj. 3.

¹⁴ G. Agamben, bilj. 1.

¹⁵ Zakon o strancima i međunarodnoj zaštiti: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/6458-sayili-yabancilar-ve-uluslararasi-koruma-kanunu-yururluge-girdi_350_361_607_icerik (na turskom jeziku, posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

¹⁶ Konvencija UN-a o izbjeglicama: <http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html> (posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

¹⁷ U ovom članku, nadovezujući se na Lorenza Pezzanija i Charlesa Hellera, koristim termin 'migrant' za sve one koji prelaze državne granice kako bi boravili u drugoj zemlji, neovisno o točnim motivima ili mogućem budućem priznanju statusa izbjeglice, dok termin 'imigrant' koristim za one koji u nekoj zemlji borave dovoljno dugo da steknu status stanovnika; termin 'tražitelj azila' naglašava da je nezakonitost migracije proizvod državnog zakona, a ne neko inherentno svojstvo migranata. Usp. Charles Heller i Lorenzo Pezzani, „Liquid Traces: Investigating the Deaths of Migrants at the Maritime Frontiers of the EU“, u: *Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth*, ur. Forensic Architecture (Sternberg Press, 2014.), 657–684.

¹⁸ Ian Chambers, „Migrancy, Culture, Identity“, u: *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (Routledge Publishing, 1994.); navod u: Artıkışler Collective, <http://artikisler.net/works-isler/stadyum-stadium/> (posjećeno 27. rujna 2017.).

developer/investor, but none was made by the inhabitants. None of the rules represent them. The new gated settlements in the cities become places of non-belonging.

As cities are re-built through urban transformation processes, "the camp replaces the city"²³. As the social, cultural, and economic relationships, the 'neighbourhood culture' in the cities are destroyed with mechanisms of confinement, the non-state-led camps in Lesbos and Dunkirk (and potentially many more), create the kind of urbanity that starts to live like a neighbourhood. The neighbourhoods that have not gone through urban transformation in İstanbul, but who live under such threat, organize themselves through associations and cooperatives to save and claim their homes, their neighbours, their neighbourhoods. They want to keep the very urban daily life that they know, and that they are used to. David Harvey²⁴ claims each social relation constructs its own spatiality as space simultaneously determines the respective social relation's character and quality. Similarly, as the urban transformation processes are radically changing our cities, and as the politics of migration are creating new spaces of isolation and exclusion, the spatial strategies and politics behind these processes are also transforming its inhabitants; and this eventually, is my main concern.

¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford University Press, 1998.

² Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, translated by George Schwab, MIT Press, 1985.

³ Giorgio Agamben, *The State of Emergency*, <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpagambenschmitt.htm> (last accessed on September 27, 2017).

⁴ G. Agamben (as in n. 1)

⁵ Ibidum.

⁶ Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt Publishing, 1973.

⁷ Construction Sector Report 2016, http://intes.org.tr/content/insaasat_2016.pdf (in Turkish, last accessed on September 27, 2017).

⁸ Regulation on transformation of areas under municipality law: https://www.csb.gov.tr/db/nevsehir/editordosya/5393%20say%C3%84%C2%B1%C3%84%C2%B1%20BELED%C3%84%C2%B0YE%20KANUNUN%2073_maddesi.pdf (in Turkish, last access: 27/09/2017).

⁹ Law on transformation of areas under disaster risk: <http://www.csb.gov.tr/gm/altyapi/index.php?Id=114&Sayfa=sayfa&Tur=banner>, 2012 (in Turkish, last accessed on September 27, 2017).

¹⁰ Fatma Bilge Cengiz, *Türkiyede Sendikaların Düzensiz Emek Göçüne Bakış: İstanbul Örneği*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Marmara University, 2013 (in Turkish).

¹¹ Ayşe Betül Çelik, "I Miss My Village!": Forced Kurdish Migrants in İstanbul and Their Representation in Associations" in *New Perspectives on Turkey* 32 (Spring 2005) 137–163.

¹² George A. Kourvetaris, "The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of İstanbul" in *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 34/2 (Winter 2006) 375–387.

¹³ G. Agamben (as in n. 3)

¹⁴ G. Agamben (as in n. 1)

¹⁹ Ricky D. Knight, *The Long Wait: African Migrant Communities and the Production of Local Identity in Istanbul, Turkey* Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University, 2011.

²⁰ „[n]arativna struktura ponekad pretendira na status ugovora; pripovijedanje priče direktno uvodi u igru pripovjedački sporazum koji priziva neku narativnu zajednicu. Obično se ona poklapa u svojim granicama s društvenim zajednicama određene vrste. Do neke mjere sve takve zajednice, od onih trajnih do onih u nastanku, koriste narative kao tehniku zajedničkog predstavljanja, zacrtavajući nove granice ili utvrđujući postojeće. Sudjelovanje u nekom pokretu podrazumijeva ili uključuje nešto poput prihvaćanja ugovorne obveze i pretpostavljam da se neki aspekti pripadnosti pojedinca pokretima koji su protuteža monadskom individualizmu ostvaruju putem narativnih ugovora.“ Usp. Sudipta Kaviraj, „The Imaginary Institution of India“, *Subaltern Studies 1*, ur. Partha Chatterjee i Gyanendra Pandey (1993.); Lawrence Liang, „Copyright, Cultural Production and Open-Content Licensing“, *The Indian Journal of Law and Technology 1* (2005.).

²¹ Prepiska s Léopoldom Lambertom putem elektronske pošte (28. srpnja 2017.).

²² Bülent Diken i Carsten Bagge Laustsen, *The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp* (Routledge Publishers, 2005.).

²³ G. Agamben, bilj. 1.

²⁴ David Harvey, „Contested Cities: Social Process and Spatial Form“, u: *Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions*, ur. Nick Jewson i Susanne MacGregor (Routledge Publishing, 1997.).

¹⁵ Law on foreigners and international protection: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/6458-sayili-yabancilar-ve-uluslararasi-koruma-kanunu-yururluge-girdi_350_361_607_icerik (in Turkish, last accessed on September 27, 2017).

¹⁶ UN refugee convention: <http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html> (last accessed on September 27, 2017).

¹⁷ In this paper, in reference to Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller, the term ‘migrant’ is used to describe all people who cross state borders to reside in another country, independently of their exact motives or their possible future recognition as refugees, ‘immigrant’ for the people who have stayed in a country long enough to be a resident, ‘asylum seeker’ for whom applied for a refugee status, and ‘illegalised migrant’ to highlight that illegality of migration is a product of state law rather than an intrinsic feature of migrants.

Source: Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, “Liquid traces: Investigating the deaths of migrants at the maritime frontiers of the EU” in *Forensic Architecture (ed.) Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth*. Sternberg Press, 2014, 657–684.

¹⁸ Ian Chambers, “Migrancy, Culture, Identity” in *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, Routledge Publishing, 1994; mentioned in Artkişler Collective, <http://artkisler.net/works-isler/stadyum-stadium/> (last access: 27/09/2017).

¹⁹ Ricky D. Knight, *The Long Wait: African Migrant Communities and the Production of Local Identity in Istanbul, Turkey* Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University, 2011.

²⁰ “[t]he narrative structure sometimes aspires to be a contract; the telling of a story brings into immediate play some story conventions invoking a narrative community. Ordinarily these are coincident in terms of their frontiers with social communities of some form. To some extent all such communities, from the stable to the emergent, use narratives as a technique of staging together, redrawing the boundaries or reinforcing them. Participating in a movement includes or involves something like accepting contractual obligations and I suspect some of the affiliation of the individual to movements counteracting a monadic individualism is

accomplished by narrative contracts.”

Source: Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Imaginary Institution of India” in *Subaltern Studies 1*, ed. Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey, 1993.

Source: Lawrence Liang, “Copyright, Cultural Production and Open-Content Licensing” in *The Indian Journal of Law and Technology*, Volume 1, 2005.

²¹ E-mail conversation with Léopold Lambert, July 28, 2017

²² Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, *The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp*, Routledge Publishers, 2005.

²³ G. Agamben (as in n. 1)

²⁴ David Harvey, “Contested Cities: Social Process and Spatial Form” in *Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions*, ed. Nick Jewson and Susanne MacGregor. Routledge Publishing, 1997.