

## Introduction

*This is the 50<sup>th</sup> issue of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy. The Journal, published since its first day by Kruno Zakarija, the best analytic publisher in Croatia, has been combining the best of the local work on analytic philosophy, done in Croatia and neighboring countries, Slovenia, Serbia and Hungary, and the cutting edge international work in the same area. The main cooperation has been, officially with the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb, and not formally but very intensely with IUC Dubrovnik and the Department of philosophy in Rijeka. The high quality international conferences from IUC, dedicated to philosophy of language, philosophy of science and mathematics, philosophy of mind, ethics and metaphysics have been, for decade and a half, providing the precious framework of dialogue and cooperation, well documented in the thematic issues published throughout seventeen years.*

*The present issue primarily belongs to the philosophy of language and linguistics series, supported by the homonymous IUC course. The preoccupation with philosophy of language has been a lasting feature of the local philosophy group, initially strongly inspired by the efforts of Georges Rey and Michael Devitt, beginning more than three decades ago, during their longer stay in Croatia. Other colleagues have then joined in, all the way to the present guest course directors, Barry Smith, Frances Egan, Michael Glanzberg and Jeff King. The present issue reflects the interests of a large part of the last year IUC meeting (the second part is coming out soon), with a focus on philosophy of pejoratives.*

*In her paper, "Loaded Words and Expressive Words: Assessing Two Semantic Frameworks for Slurs", Robin Jeshion assesses the relative merits of two semantic frameworks for slurring terms. Each aims to distinguish slurs from their neutral counterparts via their semantics. On one, recently developed by Kent Bach, that which differentiates the slurring term from its neutral counterpart is encoded as a 'loaded' descriptive content. Whereas the neutral counterpart 'NC' references a group, the slur has as its content "NC, and therefore contemptible". On the other, a version of hybrid expressivism, the semantically encoded aspect of a slurring term that distinguishes it from its neutral counterpart is, rather, expressed. On this view, while the speaker's attitude may be evaluated for appropriateness, the expressivist component of slurring terms is truth-conditionally irrelevant. Jeshion argues that hybrid expressivism offers a more parsimonious analysis of slurs' projective behavior than loaded descriptivism and that its truth conditional semantics is not inferior to the possible accounts available for loaded descriptivism. She also meets*

*Bach's important objection that hybrid expressivism cannot account for uses of slurring terms in indirect quotation and attitude attributions.*

*The book A Word Which Bears a Sword (published in Zagreb by Kru-Zak) came out in 2016 and was discussed at the Philosophy of Linguistics and Language conference the same year in Dubrovnik. In the "Precis of the theoretical part of the book A Word Which Bears a Sword" Nenad Mišćević presents his own view of pejoratives as negative terms for alleged social kinds: ethnic, gender, racial, and other. He argues that they manage to refer the way kind-terms do, relatively independently of false elements contained in their senses. This proposal, as presented in the book, is called Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term theory, or NHSKT theory, for short. The theory treats the content of pejoratives as unitary, in analogy with unitary thick concepts: both neutral-cum-negative properties (vices) ascribed and negative prescriptions voiced are part of the semantics preferably with some truth-conditional impact, and even the expression of attitudes is part of the semantic potential, although not necessarily the truth conditional one. Pejoratives are thus directly analogue to laudatives, and in matters of reference close to non-evaluative, e.g. superstitious social kind terms (names of zodiacal signs, or terms like "magician"). A pejorative sentence typically expresses more than one proposition and pragmatic context selects the relevant one. Some propositions expressed can be non-offensive and true, other, more typical, are offensive and false. Pejoratives are typically face attacking devices, although they might have other relevant uses. The NHSKT proposal thus fits quite well with leading theories of (im-)politeness, which can offer a fine account of their typical pragmatics.*

*Testimonial injustice is a hot topic in social epistemology. In her contribution Julija Perhat whose work is focused pejoratives (in particular, gender pejoratives for women) tries to connect them with injustice. Here she gives a precis of pejoratives and testimonial injustice and her present topic is testimonial injustice perpetrated by the serious use of pejoratives, in particular, gender pejoratives. Perhart combines two strands: on the one hand, the work on testimonial injustice where she relies on Miranda Fricker's work, and on the other hand, her own central area of interest, gender pejoratives.*

*Katherine Ritchie in her article "Social Identity, Indexicality, and the Appropriation of Slurs" stresses the point that slurs are expressions that can be used to demean and dehumanize targets based on their membership in racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or sexual orientation groups. Almost all treatments of slurs posit that they have derogatory content of some sort. Such views—which she calls content-based—must explain why in cases of appropriation slurs fail to express their standard derogatory contents. A popular strategy is to take appropriated slurs to be ambiguous; they have both a derogatory content and a positive appropriated content. However, if appropriated slurs are ambiguous, why can only members in the target group use them to express a non-offensive/posi-*

*tive meaning? Here, she develops and motivates an answer that could be adopted by any content-based theorist. She argues that appropriated contents of slurs include a plural first-person pronoun. She shows how the semantics of pronouns like ‘we’ can be put to use to explain why only some can use a slur to express its appropriated content. Moreover, she argues that the picture she develops is motivated by the process of appropriation and helps to explain how it achieves its aims of promoting group solidarity and positive group identity.*

Bianca Cepollaro in her “Let’s not worry about the reclamation worry” discusses the Reclamation Worry (RW), raised by Anderson and Lepore 2013 and addressed by Ritchie (this issue) concerning the appropriation of slurs. She argues that Ritchie’s way to solve the RW is not adequate and she tries to show why such an apparent worry is not actually problematic and should not lead us to postulate a rich complex semantics for reclaimed slurs. To this end, after illustrating the phenomenon of appropriation of slurs, she introduces the Reclamation Worry, and then argues that Ritchie’s complex proposal is not needed to explain the phenomenon. To show that, she compares the case of reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs to the case of polysemic personal pronouns featuring, among others, in many Romance languages. She introduces the notion of ‘authoritativeness’ that she takes to be crucial to account for reclamation and focuses on particular cases (the “outsider” cases) that support her claims and speak against the parsimony of the indexical account. She concludes with a methodological remark about the ways in which the debate on appropriation has developed in the literature.

Next three papers have a different theme. In her contribution “The Myth of Embodied Metaphor (the paper was also presented at the Philosophy of Linguistics and Language Conference in Dubrovnik 2016) Nikola Kompa is critical of the leading embodied metaphor approach. She points out that according to a traditionally influential idea metaphors have mostly ornamental value. However, current research stresses the cognitive purposes metaphors serve. According to the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor (CTM) expressions are commonly used metaphorically in order to conceptualize abstract and mental phenomena. More specifically, proponents of CTM claim that abstract terms are understood by means of metaphors and that metaphor comprehension, in turn, is embodied. In this paper, Nikola Kompa argues that CTM fails on both counts.

In contemporary epistemology, the view is that in order to have knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief. Guido Melchior in his paper under the title of “Baseless Knowledge” argues that baseless knowledge can then be defined as knowledge where the belief is acquired and sustained in a way that does not track the truth. He argues that rejecting this view leads to controversial consequences but he does not say which belief bases constitute a sufficient condition for knowledge. The point he is making is that assuming that appropriate bases constitute a necessary condition for knowledge has controversial consequences.

*And finally, Adelin Costin Dumitru in “On the Moral Irrelevance of a Global Basic Structure: Prospects for a Satisficing Sufficiency Theory of Global Justice” interrogates the Rawlsian concept of a basic structure in the context of global justice. His aim in this paper is twofold: to show that the existence of a global basic structure is irrelevant from the standpoint of justice; and to set the stage for a cosmopolitan theory of global justice that employs satisficing sufficientarianism as a distributive principle.*

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