EU GLOBAL STRATEGY – AN UPGRADE OR NEW OS?

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Sažetak

Abstract

This article examines European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in regard to European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. Its main focus is to answer the question: is the EUGS just the upgrade of the EES or is it a standalone document. Although both documents are named strategies, it has been argued that the ESS doesn't meet the criteria to justify its title. Concentrating on a mode of discourse of the strategies, article looks at theirs similarities and differences, as well as examines how their structures fall within given definition for the strategy. This article argues that the ESS is a document in contradiction with its name, and that the European Union received its real security strategy just with the EUGS.

Keywords: EU Global Strategy, European Security Strategy, CSDP

1. Introduction

The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) was a long awaited document in Brussels hallways, and not only among stakeholders of foreign and security affairs in the EU but beyond. EUGS comes as a first com-

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pact and unifying document when the EU needs unity and consolidation after the vote for Brexit. EUGS is not unique document. It is just a sequel to an existing document – the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. EUGS seems a long overdue sequel– but is it really?

This paper will analyse both documents concerned, and will try to answer the title question. Is the new document just one of many documents which the bureaucratic milieu of the Union produces in abundance that shines brightly on the Brussels' sky for a fortnight before it disappears into the vastness of Schuman's drawers? Is it an upgrade of the ESS, a 2003 document that is awfully outdated in a changed global-security landscape? Or is it really a new EU 'operating system', as Brussels key actors assure us?

To answer these questions, this paper will compare the old document, the ESS from 2003, and the new EUGS. It will analyse their structures and core ideas by placing both in their contextual surroundings.

2. European Security Strategy 2003

The first step towards developing a unified EU security strategy came during the writing process of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, when, in the text about foreign policy instruments at the EU's disposal, the syntagm "common strategies" was first introduced (Missirolli, 2015:9). The Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999, and rapidly thereafter three EU "common strategies" on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean were realised. In a series of public speeches in 2000, the European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, said: "Foreign policy remains primly a matter for democratically elected Member State governments… But it is equally necessary that all Member States should acknowledge what those actually doing the work of CFSP have long understood: that mere inter-governmentalism is recipe for weakness and mediocrity: for a European foreign policy of the lowest common denominator" (Missirolli, 2001:43). In the same speech, the Commissioner stated how EU foreign policy must have a global reach, but should focus its efforts. He offered three overall goals:

- "to manage more effectively our relationships with our nearest neighbors
- to apply our experience of multilateral cooperation to a wider stage

- to become a serious counterpart to the United States" (Missirolli, 2001:44)

After Patten's repeated interventions in 2000, discussion evolved on both institutional and political levels, and culminated with the EU Council stressing "the importance of common strategies for the coordination, coherence and effectiveness of external action" (Europa.eu, accessed on 29.8.2016). The Council called on newly appointed High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, to write an evaluation report on the adopted common strategies. In an Evaluation Report published on the 21st December 2000, the HR noted how "common strategies" didn't bring any added value to EU policy, how the strategies lacked any formalised guidelines, how procedures were improvised and ended with no clear priorities, and how the strategies were closer to classical declaratory texts than to useful internally-applicable modes of operation (Missirolli, 2015:10). Despite lively discussion, researchers agree that only after *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in 2003 came any active input towards writing a comprehensive European strategy (Toje, 2005; Becher, 2004; Duke, 2004; Missiroli, 2015). The need emerged from the rift between the EU Member States (MS) and candidate countries over the support for US policy towards Iraq. The ESS, therefore, got its tail wind not from the constant calls for the reform of the ESDP policy, but by the external influence of US foreign policy, which caused discord among European countries (Toje, 2004:120). After several months of consultations with all relevant stakeholders, and after gathering contributions from the Member States (although Antonio Missiroli notes how "the pen was kept firmly in the hands of Solana's own cabinet" (Missirolli, 2015:14)) the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy of the European Union ("A secure Europe in a Better World") on the 12th December 2003.

Looking solely at the layout of content, the Strategy document was a short text of 14 pages with a clear framework, which consisted of the following headers:

- Introduction,
- Security environment: global challenges and key threats,
- Strategic objectives,
- Policy implications for Europe, and
- Conclusions.

Introduction began with a note on how "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (ESS, 2003:1) in opposition to its violent past in the first half of the 20th century. It notes Member States' commitment to the peaceful solution of conflicts, and to cooperation. It praises the rule of law and democracy as instruments of change, moving authoritarian regimes to stable democracies; and it states how the policy of enlargement fulfils the vision of a continent united. It observes how, although the United States played important role in European integration and security through NATO and as dominant military actor after the end of Cold War, the international security landscape has changed, and is more complex. With the change in security landscape came a change in the nature of the threats against the security of the EU. As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people, and as foremost leader in the world economy, the EU is a global actor and, as such, needs "to share the responsibilities for global security and in building a better world" (ESS, 2003:1).

The second part of the Strategy is a short and concise, if not generalised, analysis of global changes, and lists key threats. The Strategy cites *globalisation* as the first **global change,** and states that it is perceived as a good and bad change depending on the part of the world. Globalisation opened the doors to *non-state groups*, which became a constant fixture of the "international infrastructure" (ESS, 2003:2). After globalisation, the Strategy notes that *poverty and diseases* in developing countries amplify security issues, and how any *new disease* can spread quickly and can become global threat. It continues by stating that "security is a precondition of development" (ESS, 2003:2). As a future problem, it correctly notes that *changes in global warming* will add to *competition for natural resources*, highlighting the problem of scarcity of water in some parts of the world, and the likelihood of future *great migrations* (ESS, 2003:3). As a special problem for Europe, the document highlights *energy dependence* (ESS, 2003:3). The Strategy notes **five key threats** for the EU, following a first sentence which explains that "large-scale aggression against any Member States is now improbable" (ESS, 2003:3). *Terrorism* is the first listed threat. Its motive is noted as "religious extremism", stemmed from: "pressure of modernisation, cultural, social and political crisis, and the alienation of the young people living in foreign societies" (ESS, 2003:3). The *proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* (WMD) is named as "potentially the greatest threat to our society" (ESS,

2003:3). The paper warns about the possibilities of a WMD arms race, and of the spread of biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. It also expresses concerns about the development of missile technology occurring alongside advancements in science. It warns and about the grave potential implicit in the possible co-mingling of terrorism and the proliferation of the WMD. The third key threat is *regional conflicts*, which can impact the EU directly or indirectly, as they lead to "extremism, terrorism, and state failure" (ESS, 2003:4). The fourth key threat is *state failure,* which is characterised as "an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability" (ESS, 2003:4), while the fifth is given as *organised crime* (cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants, and weapons), for which Europe is the main target.

Third part of the Strategy indicates three strategic objectives, which the EU should endeavour to achieve while keeping the maxim "to think globally and act locally" in mind:

- Addressing the Threats,
- Building Security in our Neighborhood, and
- An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism.

Concerning the first strategic objective, the ESS states that the EU has been active in **addressing the threats**, listing measures used as: the adoption of the European Arrest warrant, the tackling of terrorist financing, the signing of the agreement on mutual legal assistance with the US, the exertion of policies against the proliferation of WMDs, the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the tightening of export controls, the attainment of a universal commitment towards and strengthening of multilateral treaties, the supportive intervention into regional conflicts and the restoration of good government in failed countries (ESS, 2003:6). Continuing, it states that in the era of globalisation there are no distant threats, and that all key threats should be tackled through conflict-prevention before crisis occurs. The document notes how the new threats with which EU is confronted are hybrid threats, and as such require hybrid responses involving a "mixture of instruments" (ESS, 2003:7). Listed instruments are: political, economical, intelligence, police, judicial, military, humanitarian, and 'other'. The second strategic objective confirms that "even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important" (ESS, 2003:7). An **insecure neighbourhood,**

it establishes, can produce new threats. Thus, the EU needs to advance towards establishing an integration of states in processes of accession, as well as promoting good governance and offering political cooperation in neighbouring states. The third strategic objective, the **development of a stronger international order based on effective multilateralism,** is a direct answer to problems and threats which arise from globalisation. This objective should be based on upholding and developing International Law as set out under the United Nations Charter. It should aim to strengthen the United Nations, and extend membership of the WTO and other international financial institutions. Under this objective falls the strengthening of transatlantic relations, putting forward NATO as successful example. It also emphasises increased international investment in regional organisations close to the EU, such as OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union. As "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states" (ESS, 2003:10), the EU should aim to spread the understanding of the processes of good governance and social and political reforms, to establish the rule of law and protect of human rights, and to fight against corruption and the abuse of power. These goals should be achieved by trade and development policies, especially through assistance programmes and targeted trade measures.

The last part of the Strategy is made up of general recommendations given under the header of policy implications for Europe. It states that EU already has instruments in place for the achievement of proposed strategic objectives and for combating key threats, but to "make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable" (ESS, 2003:11). Union should be **more active** by employing active policies, and developing a strategic culture for fostering "early, rapid, and when necessary, robust interventions" (ESS, 2003:11). The document states that the EU should be able to maintain a number of simultaneous operations, involving both civilian and military capabilities. It should, we are told, be able to support the UN during its response to threats to international society, as well as in providing assistance to states in which there is emerging conflict. Preventive engagement should be one of the aims to ensure the avoidance of problems in the future. In its second point, the Strategy emphasises that a **more capable** EU is within reach, as is showed by the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EU should, however, transform its

militaries to enable more flexibility in addressing the new threats, with more resources given over to defence. It should also reduce duplication, and increase capabilities in defence policy with use of pooling and sharing. It might devote special attention to post crisis management, and work on the strengthening of diplomatic capabilities through employing a combination of MS and EU institutional resources. Common actions should commence after a common threat assessment, which calls for better sharing of intelligence data among MS and partners, and should be extended with joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, security sector reform, and broader institution-building. The paper stresses that EU-NATO arraignments enhance the operational capabilities of the EU. Bringing together different, pre-established instruments and capabilities through common policies, better coordination, and through external activities, is the way to make the EU **more coherent**: "in crisis there is no substitute for unity of command" (ESS, 2003:13). As a last recommendation, the Strategy states that **working with partners, which includes** establishing partnerships with key actors and multilateral co-operation in international organisations, is a necessity, since all threats described are common threats. Specifically, it states that although the EU has links to every part of the world, partnership with the USA is indispensable, closer relations with Russia through respect for common values are necessary, and the development of strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India are needed.

In conclusions, Strategy notes that the world is full of new dangers but and new opportunities, and, if more active and capable, the EU would make an impact on a global scale, and "contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world" (ESS, 2003:14).

In the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) publication "Towards an EU Global Strategy" from 2015, writers compared draft texts of the first strategy from June 2003 and its end result from December 2003, stating how, after discussions with stakeholders, the end text of ESS made a few distinct changes. While in the draft text only three key threats were recognised (there called "new threats"), the final Strategy included the identification of five key threats. The final Strategy also put stronger emphasis on effective multilateralism as a foreign policy in opposition to US' unilateralism, and made an important linguistic change, alter-

ing the call for "pre-emptive engagement" in the draft text to a call for "preventive engagement" in the final (Missirolli, 2015:15). Discussions leading to the final compromise resulted in a weakened document. A number of papers rightly pointed out that the European Security Strategy from December of 2003 was not a real strategy (Toje, 2004; Posen, 2004). Toje argues that it does in fact fulfil all criteria necessary for it to be called a strategic *concept*, that is "a guide to be used while perusing an agenda" (Toje, 2004:120), as it shows purpose and tasks, identifies a security landscape, and describes the EU's approaches towards the desirable security outcome (Toje, 2004:120). But, he continues, "traditionally, the term 'strategy' refers to the use of military means to reach political ends" (Toje, 2004:120) and "defines actual goals and set up priorities to achieve policy objectives" (Toje, 2004:121), which the ESS doesn't. What the ESS is, at least according to Toje, is a "testimony of the need to develop an EU strategic culture" (Toje, 2004:122), a culture that will have agreed aims. Following same line of thought, Becher notes that the ESS serves important functions: it is educational for the public, attempts to explain world events, offers stimulation for public debates and guidance for the EU officials, and provides encouragement for the future (Becher, 2004:354).

The main problem of the institutionalisation, or the 'culturization', of the EU security policy is the difference in the security views of the Member States. Ideally, then, the ESS 2003 was an instrument for establishing EU strategic culture – as it is, however, it shows desire but delivers nothing. Ultimately, through the ESS we received a backpack packed with supplies and could begin to understand the inclination for beginning the journey ahead, but we were left short of an agreed-upon path, and a detailed map.

To keep the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) afloat, in 2008 the European Council produced the 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy' (RI-ESS), named "Providing Security in a Changing World". At the outset, the new document was meant to be an updated version of the ESS, but the idea fell through as Britain and Germany opposed any new strategy (Toje, 2010:174). It therefore became an implementation report, although Toje notes that it "does not evaluate the progress made[...], it does not offer concrete recommendations for the future, nor is any follow-up mechanism provided" (Toje, 2010:175-176).

Challenges and key threats, we come to understand, remain more or less the same: "some have become more significant, and all more complex" (Missiroli, 2015:45). Of the five key threats from the ESS, the Review re-affirms the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD, and merges terrorism and organised crime in a connected threat. It replaces threats posed by failed states and regional conflicts with those offered by cyber, energy security, and climate change. It also concurs with the ESS in finding the main means for upholding security as multilateralism under UN authority, together with friends and allies. Unlike the ESS, which tried to position the EU as a more powerful actor which will provide a soft balance against the US, the Review abandons that aim. As Toje notes, the Review can be understood as the EU hedging its bets; it "seeks to offset risk by pursuing multiple policy options that increase the likelihood of a beneficial result from a range of different outcomes" (Toje, 2010:185). In its third part, *Europe in changing World,* the Review gives its most important recommendations. These recommendations were not as prominent in the ESS, and are: to tighten coordination inside EU; to do a "comprehensive EU policy on information sharing" (Missiroli, 2015:46); to work against terrorist financing; and to do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment. The only really new concept introduced in the Review is the idea of 'human security', which argues that the referent for security should be the wellbeing of the individual but of the state (Toje, 2010:180).

3. Change of global security landscape 2003 – 2016

There is a vast difference between the state of affairs and global security landscape from the end of 2003, when the ESS was published, and the middle of 2016, when the EUGS came to light.

The EU is now the Union of 28 states, pending 27 after the UK's referendum on leaving the EU. The EU contains 50 million more people, and is economically more efficient than ever. It is also a remodelled Union after the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, which amended the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, and is very important for the CSDP and our analysis of the difference between the ESS and the EUGS. The Lisbon Treaty introduced important defence-related changes, almost all recommended in the ESS and the RI-ESS. These

include the permanent structured cooperation mechanism (PESCO) in Art 42(6) and 46 TEU; the mutual assistance/defence clause in Art 42(7) TEU; the solidarity clause in Art 222 TFEU; the enhanced co-operation in Art 20 TEU; and the expansion of the Petersburg tasks in Art 43 TEU. Up to the writing of this paper, the sole CSDP instrument introduced in the Lisbon Treaty which has been used is the *defence clause*, which stipulates that "if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007:326/39). This was invoked in November 2015 by France. The *PESCO mechanism*, aimed towards "Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007:326/39), should be next introduced if we hold onto the German/French pledge given this summer. The *enhanced cooperation mechanism* is a mechanism of last resort, which could be put in action only when a desirable objective cannot be reached by the whole Union in the field of the Union's non-exclusive competence, while the *solidarity clause* is the instrument of joint-action if one Member State is the object of terrorist attack, or natural or man-made disaster. The Lisbon Treaty also extends the scope and range of the Petersburg tasks to include "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007:306/35). This is a clear response to the recommendation of a more capable Europe in the ESS. The treaty was a cornerstone for the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, who, from the Lisbon Treaty onwards, became Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). It also gave new impetus to the EDA, and a project of Battlegroups that reached full operational capacity on the 1st January 2007. In between 2003 and 2016, the EU gave life to a bundle of new policies in the foreign policy and security fields, the most important of which were

the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP), Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (renewed Barcelona process). It created the European Security and Defence College, and set new targets for further development of EU civilian and military capability under "Headline Goal 2010".

Not all changes went in the direction of progress. The EU and its Member States are still alert after the financial crisis of 2008, which had direct consequences for defence budgets. Moreover, money intended for the investment in further development of the EU's military capabilities had to be diverted elsewhere. The most significant and visible example is the non-fulfilment of four collective benchmarks for investment, as approved by the Ministerial Steering Board of EDA in November 2007. It wasn't merely that the benchmarks – on equipment procurement, including R&D/R&T, (20% of total defence spending), European collaborative equipment procurement (35% of total equipment spending), defence Research & Technology (2% of total defence spending) and European collaborative defence R&T (20% of total defence R&T spending) – were not met, but investment actually *decreased (EDA,2016)*.

While the EU slowly constructed and interconnected its internal institutions, capacities, and capabilities (with greater or lesser success), the world changed. The security landscape of 2016 is more turbulent and insecure for the EU than it was in 2003. Most of the conflicts and wars raging in 2003 are still being fought in some turbulent areas of the world, or else have been replaced by new ones in the same or a near locality. Although these conflicts do infringe on the EU's sense of security, real risks come from the new conflicts that emerged on the EU's borders (the aftermath of the Arab Spring; those in Ukraine and Turkey). Other new factors which should worry the EU are the rise of the new powers around the world, climate change, and the increasing lack of resources which slowly but steadily becomes the number one peril of the 21st century. Both the ESS and the RI-ESS correctly identified great future problems for international society: the merging of terrorism and organised crime, the proliferation of WMD, increasing global warming, threats posed by energy and cyber security, and increasing competition for resources. At the centre of all these negative global changes was globalisation. One of the great examples of how globalisation affects the whole world was the financial crisis of 2008. While the crisis had a negative impact on the Western markets and especially on states with

fragile political systems, it was a wind in the sails for some "emerging" and "developing" economies. Accordingly, after 2008, EU countries saw a period of relative political and financial decline, while strong developing countries progressed. This reshaped the world's security landscape. In the same way that globalisation influences the world and security landscape negatively, it can and has influenced at them positively. Globalisation facilitates the sharing and using of technological and scientific advances, an increased understanding of ideas and lifestyles, the fostering of global growth and wealth, and, as a result, prolongs and improves the quality of human life around the world.

If the EU wants to use the positive aspects of globalisation for normative multilateralism, it must protect itself from globalisation's negative aspects. In 2015 all EU Member States finally agreed "that the security environment had so radically changed – and not for the better – that a strategic rethinking had become imperative" (Tocci, 2015:120).

4. European Union Global Strategy

The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), presented on the 28th of June 2016, has 56 pages and is comprised of:

- Executive Summary
- A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens' Interests
- The Principles Guiding our External Action
- The Priorities of our External Action
- From Vision to Action

"We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects." (EUGS, 2016:7). These are the opening words of the EUGS, and are followed by an injunction to remember that: "We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy is being questioned." (EUGS, 2016:7).

If one judges a book by its cover, or in this case by its opening remarks, one could feel that the EUGS is a more urgent appeal, with its main task to alarm and compel targets to act, as opposed to straightforwardly offering plain strategy on security, as in the ESS. The EGSS resumes its dire premonition when depicting the current security situa-

tion around the EU. It notes that the EU's security in the East "has been violated" (EUGS, 2016:7). "Terrorism and violence plague" the South we are told, and are spreading across the Mediterranean and the Middle East (EUGS, 2016:7). Development in Africa is slow, unlike growth of its population, and "security tensions in Asia are mounting" (EUGS, 2016:7). Above all, we're warned, climate change is advancing. The report does spend two sentences describing how those changes could be opportunities, and acknowledges the good that was brought to the world through globalisation. It ends the short introduction to the Executive Summary with determined declarations to overcome troubles "by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world." (EUGS, 2016:7). *Our Shared Interests and Principles* outlines established EU mantras: the promotion of peace and rules-based international order; guaranteeing the security and prosperity of its citizens and territory; adhering to its values and principles as guided by responsibility; the need to stand united and the desire to engage with others. *The Priorities of our External Action* summarises five priorities: the security of the Union; offering state and societal resilience from East to South; maintaining an integrated approach to conflicts; instituting regional cooperation; and encouraging good global governance. Lastly, *From Vision to Action* sketches how the EU will exert its priorities to achieve its goals, and thereby become "a credible, responsive and joined-up Union" (EGSS, 2016:10).

In opposition to the ESS, the EUGS chooses a different way of presenting the Strategy. It does not lay out global challenges and key threats, but reveals common interests, principles, and priorities for the achievement of its objectives. In other words, the EGSS speaks from inside out – what the EU wants, needs, and can do to achieve goals – while the ESS observed from outside in – what are the threats and problems surrounding the EU, and how should the EU position itself towards them? So here we should once again quote Toje's definition of strategy: "a strategy paper is expected to define actual goals and set up priorities to achieve policy objectives" (Toje, 2004:121), and: "a strategic concept is a guide to be used while pursuing an agenda. It expresses its purpose, nature, and the fundamental security tasks of the organisation. It also identifies the central features of the security environment while specifying the

elements of the organisation's approach to security" (Toje, 2004:120). Just by outlining the document's construction, it becomes evident that the EUGS is in fact everything the ESS longed to be, but never was. In the light of the EUGS, we can argue that the ESS was in fact a draft of aspiration that indicated a need for EU strategy, while the EUGS is the strategy itself.

To demonstrate that the EUGS is in fact long awaited EU's strategy, we will follow Toje's definition and analyse the document by its segments.

The purpose of the EU's security tasks is "to Promote our Citizens' Interests" (EUGS, 2016:13) through promoting its values. These values, it explains, are "embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order" (EUGS, 2016:13). Peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order are all elements of the EU's approach to security, and they identify the central features of the security environment as it stands. To promote *peace and security*, the EU needs to collaborate with partners, have capabilities to defend itself, hold onto its Treaties' commitments and acknowledge that "internal and external security are ever more intertwined" (EUGS, 2016:14). This latter quote implies that the promotion of peace and security outside the EU's borders can lead to maintaining peace and security inside the EU. The *prosperity* of EU citizens is a goal as important as ensuring prosperity is shared worldwide. The document notes that the EU needs to follow growth, the bulk of which will happen outside the EU, as the Union has strong interest in "fair and open markets, in shaping global economic and environment rules, and in sustainable access to the global commons through open sea, land, air and space routes" (EUGS, 2016:15), as well as establishing free and secure internet. *Democracy* needs to be fostered, with the values upon which it was built cherished, heeded, and promoted with each internal and external action, without exception. To maintain peace and security, prosperity and democracy, *a rules-based global order* is of particular interest to the EU, "with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core" (EUGS, 2016:15).

Central features of the proposed security environment, which are identified throughout this segment of the document, are: rapid globalisation that blurs borders, maintaining free access to markets and commons, the promotion of the EU's values and democracies, and

adherence to a rules-based order. During the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016, the Member States felt on their own skin how closely inter-connected is the Union's security with their own policies in the Middle East, the North Africa and the Western Balkans. Prosperity should be observed and through the prism of social inequality that is growing in today's world, both inside and outside the European Union. A social inequality is especially visible between the metropolitan regions and the periphery of the Member States. With a wave of populist support in the Member States, it is precisely a democracy that is being threatened in the EU. The populist parties (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance in Hungary and Law and Justice Party in Poland) who came to the power by means of democracy, detect that same democracy and its values as a main obstacle for the reforms they want to pursue in their countries.

The Principles guiding the EU's external actions are de facto nature and fundamentals of security tasks. As a user-friendly and earnest document, the EUGS acknowledges how its principles emerge from realistic observation and idealistic ambitions, but notes that the EU's actions should be guided by principled pragmatism. The *principle of unity* is not just propellant, throwaway premise, but one that needs to be defended; when united in diversity the EU is more powerful and able to promote its citizens interests. The *principle of engagement* brings opportunities and impediments equally, as "environment degradation and resource scarcity knows no borders, neither do transnational crime and terrorism" (EUGS, 2016:17). To deal with "causes of conflicts and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights" (EUGS, 2016:18), the EU will heed to its *principle of responsibility* and *principle of partnership*, as "responsibilities must be shared" (EUGS, 2016:18) with international organisations, regional bodies, states, civil society, and the private sector.

It is noteworthy to remark that these principles are not of the same value. The principle of unity, listed first in the EUGS is the umbrella principle, as the EU cannot utilise the three other principles without unity. The Member States are not equal in their economic, military, and even democratic strength. Only united, acting as one, can they meaningfully utilise the principle of engagement, just as it is the EU as whole that needs to bare a responsibility and promote partnerships.

Substantial security strategy needs to define actual goals and set up priorities; the third part of the document goes about doing this, indi-

cating five priorities that the EU's external action will pursue. The *security of the Union* is the first priority, as "the EU Global Strategy starts at home" (EUGS, 2016:18). Threats that imperil security of the EU are terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility, energy insecurity, the politics of fear, and the EU will engage them through five lines of action: security and defence, counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security, and strategic communications. *State and societal resilience to East and South* is second priority. If 'multilateralism' was main buzzword in the ESS, 'resilience' is the one for the EUGS: "A resilient state is a secure state" (EUGS, 2016:23). By building resilience, the EU plans to strengthen weak states and avoid state failure, but as "resilience is broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole society" (EUGS, 2016:24), the true goal will be to build a resilient society. Instruments with which the EU will construct a resilient societies are enlargement policy, more effective migration policy, association agreements, the deepening of partnerships, the creation of economic area, the building of physical and digital connections, the strengthening of societal links, and "work through development, diplomacy and CSDP" (EUGS, 2016:26). While building and strengthening the resilience of society is long-term pre-emptive method for forestalling state failure, their *integrated approach to conflicts and crisis* is an ad hoc measure. This priority includes pre-emptive peace, which is to be implemented by monitoring root causes of crisis; providing security and stabilisation when crisis erupts; conflict settlement; and promoting an 'political economy of peace', which means to "foster the space in which the legitimate economy can take root and consolidate" (EUGS, 2016:31). The fourth priority is *cooperative regional order*, which seems to imply discussion of the current European security order: "the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of boarders and the peaceful settlement of disputes" (EUGS, 2016:33). The document promotes the idea of closer trans-Atlantic relationships, a connected Asia and co-operation in the Arctic, and a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa. The document raises concerns about specific European interests like the "climate, the Arctic, maritime security, education, research and cross-border cooperation" (EUGS, 2016:33). As it was mentioned in the beginning of the EUGS, it is a document which lists and realistic and idealistic goals. At present uncertain global security situation, the picture of a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean,

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Middle East and Africa is not very realistic. It is an idealistic goal to which the EU should aspire. The idea of a closer trans-Atlantic relationship was a realistic goal at the time when the EUGS was written, but today it feels closer to idealism with the Donald Trump in the office of President of the United States of America.

Global governance for the 21st century is the fifth priority, with "a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order" (EUGS, 2016:39). This will be achieved by reforming and increasing investment in the UN, the Security Council and the international financial institutions. Also, "the EU will lead by example by implementing its commitments on sustainable development and climate change" (EUGS, 2016:40) by seeking for the clarification and extension of the rules of the global trade and investment area; by aiming for widening the reach of international norms, regimes, and institutions; and by bidding for the development of new rules in cyber, space, energy and health policies and in new scientific fields. To do all of the above, the EU will work in partnership with other non-EU countries, organisations, the private sector, and with civil society.

The EUGS concludes with From Vision to Action, calling for a credible, responsive, and joined-up union. A more responsive union would be one in position to act rapidly and flexibly as a credible union. This may mean developing something more than soft-power capabilities by engaging all of its political, economic and military capacities joined-up across internal and external policies. In the end, the EUGS states how it is just the beginning, a vision, and that real work starts after the Strategy is translated into action.

5. Analysis of strategies

As this paper has already observed, there were many possible causes for the writing of the ESS, but perhaps the primary trigger for doing so was the embittered division that occurred in light of the Iraq war in 2003. Nathalie Tocci poetically notes that then-HR Javier Solana "sought to heal the internal European wounds" (Tocci, 2015:116) – the aim of the 2003 Strategy was, in the first place, internal. As was shown in the previous section, the state of affairs in the global security landscape changed immensely from 2003 to the present. During that time, there were myriad reasons to call for a new Strategy, and as many triggers. Notable

numbers of EU Member States lobbied for it, but still no significant progress was made before 2014. Tocci notes that Catharine Ashton, at one point HR and after the Lisbon Treaty HR/VP, wasn't keen to ask for the mandate for the new Strategy, but, after the European elections in 2014, newly-elected EU leadership (headed by Jean-Claude Juncker) was (Tocci, 2015:116). HR/VP Federica Mogherini released the new Strategy on the 28th of June 2016.

Unlike the ESS, a document published with the intention to bind the EU Member States after another fiasco in the field of CFSP, the EUGS acts like a warning. Where the ESS opens with reminders about the pristine idea behind EU project ("The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented un European history" (ESS, 2003:1)), and reminds Member States and citizens alike about all good the EU and CFSP have done ("Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (ESS, 2003:1)), the EUGS warns Member States about the insecurity of and dangers towards the EU: "We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union." (EUGS, 2016:7). It impels them to act before it is too late: "We need a stronger Europe" (EUGS, 2016:1). Whereas the ESS starts with awe-inspiring words about the proficient and salutary changes the EU has made in and for Europe, compelling joyous and grateful emotions, the EUGS turns the tide by vocalising admonitions: "Our Union is under threat" (EUGS, 2016:7); and appeals for exigency in response: "Our European project which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy is being questioned" (EUGS, 2016:7). The ESS progresses with description of threats and insecurity, and the EUGS resumes with a short reminder about progress made and opportunities ahead.

If 'multilateralism' was main buzzword in the ESS, 'resilience' is the one for the EUGS. The theme that divides the two mantras is the way in which the EU exercises its strategy. While multilateralism is a method describing how the EU wants to conduct its foreign and security policy – a desirable path, an aspiration, which depends on other partakers – resilience is pragmatic goal that depends on pre-existing EU instruments. Both documents state that the EU needs to take responsibility for the international security landscape, but while the ESS states modus operandi, how to do something, the EUGS reveals an end goal, and describes the methods of implementing the instruments to achieve it.

Asle Toje's main objection toward the ESS was that it didn't offer "even roughest guide to the sort of situations in which coercive military and economic power might be used" (Toje, 2010:178). The EUGS does nothing but indicate this in its constant references to promotion and building of resilience, and by presenting its 'integrated approach to conflicts and crisis' that will be multi-dimensional, multi-phased, multi-level and multi-lateral. The EU, we're informed, was taught from experience that these conflicts have a 'protracted nature' (EUGS, 2016:28) – these, then, will be the most cogent responses. The EUGS has, in a way, an easier job in this segment, since the EU has already showed the significant way it can exercise its economic power in the case of Iran and in the on-going case in Russia.

Four core terms Toje extracted from the ESS were 'strategic culture', 'effective multilateralism', 'failed states', and 'preventive engagement'. (Toje, 2003:121). The EUGS never mentions any of the ESS' core terms, preferring to replace them with its own. 'Preventive engagement is replaced by 'building *resilience* in the EU' (and, perhaps most notably, also outside of the EU), while 'effective multilateralism' is replaced by '*rules-based global order*', with the future goal of global governance under the UN. Other core terms in the EUGS are '*shared interests*' that supplant 'strategic objectives', '*principled pragmatism*' that substitutes 'strategic culture', and its commitment towards '*regional politics*' as a strategic priority. According to Biscop, by sticking to principled pragmatism – emphasising "own security, the neighbourhood, and hard power, and by no longer emphasising democratisation" – the politics of the EU is slowly but steadily going back to Realpolitik (Biscop, 2016:2). If we regard authors of the ESS as true and not strategically duplicitous, it would seem that the ESS was not pragmatic at all, especially when we know it dubbed Russia as an important international partner that helped form stability in the region. It even went as far as to state that "the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict". Adhering to principled pragmatism, the EUGS treads more carefully before articulating such strong and assertive predictions.

The idea of 'principled pragmatism' accords with Buzan and Weaver's argument that "the global level of security at the outset of the twenty-first century can best be understood as one superpower plus four great powers." (Buzan & Weaver, 2003:30). As the US still is and, according to the data, will be for the foreseeable future the *only* superpower on Earth,

the EU needs to come to terms with its position as a global power. The New Strategy is just that, a pragmatic development in the understanding of the environment in which the EU finds itself, as well as the facts and circumstances of the global security landscape. This does not mean the EU needs to resign itself to the present situation, but merely to except momentary actuality. As HR/VP Mogherini says, "in challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together" (EUGS, 2016:3). It needs to think strategically, as it still hasn't yet realised its full potential. The EU is a global power as it has economic and political potential to bid for superpower status, but lacks a military one. What the EU needs is not to reinvent its foreign and security policy, but to use the instruments at its disposal. Although it is a global power, its security primarily depends on its neighbourhood, since territory still is elementary defining feature of security dynamics (Buzan & Weaver, 2003:30).

The overall flavour of the two strategies is much different, and it have as their roots differing situations on the ground. As was noted, the ESS was a response to Iraq war troubles. It was a call for unity, and a reminder of what happens when Member States go on divergent paths – it treaded carefully. The EUGS is a response to the emerging euro-scepticism that culminated with Brexit, but it takes unity as given. Although it discloses a mere vision of EU security strategy, it calls for and commits to action. The different characters of the two strategies show a basic difference in the attitudes of their creators. Whereas the ESS is more a panegyric on sixty years of European unity in diversity, the EUGS is a spur to action that the EU needs. Where the ESS is a fearful attempt of keeping communion, the EUGS is an act of defiance towards sceptics. Where the ESS goes on the defence to preserve unity, the EUGS goes on the offense to strengthen unity. Even their appeals at the end of papers have different flavours. The ESS calls for more active union, while the EUGS calls for more credible union. Both documents state that the EU was active in foreign and security policy, but what EUGS accurately observes is that activity without credibility isn't enough. To be a significant player in the international security landscape, the EU needs to be perceived as such – it needs to be taken seriously. Accordingly, developed capabilities are a necessity, but at some point one needs to use those capabilities to show one's pertinence. The last call in both strategies was for a more coherent (i.e. more joined-up) union. To achieve this end, however,

they use different means. The ESS spends most of it time in describing and detailing threats and challenges which lurk in the dark, forgetting that not all threats and challenges mean the same to all countries in the EU, and nor do different citizens perceive them as equally menacing. State failure as a key threat to the EU security sounds unimportant to many. When citizens are battling with unemployment and inner insecurity, the failures of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Liberia sound trivial. The threat of irregular immigration in Mediterranean sounded irrelevant to non-Mediterranean countries, just like the threat from revisionist Russia sounds exaggerated to the EU countries that weren't contained under the Iron Curtain. To avoid falling into seeming irrelevance, the EUGS mentions threats and challenges casually, as agencies that serve as an example of obstacles that lie before Member States on the path to achieve their shared interests, to their end goals. One of the shared interests of the EU Member States is 'peace and security'. Since internal and external securities are entwined, obstacles for achieving 'peace and security' are all key threats mentioned in the ESS: terrorism, regional conflicts, failure of neighbouring states, organised crime, and the threat of WMD. The EUGS does not mention these threats but explains that aspiration towards 'peace and security' "implies broader interests in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world." (EUGS, 2016:14).

As Toje concludes in his critique, "The ESS confirmed the EU as a power concerned with maintaining the current international order" (Toje, 2010:184). After reviewing the EUGS, we could paraphrase Toje and conclude that the EUGS announced the EU as a global power concerned with upgrading the security of international security landscape by revising current international order and fostering its own strategic autonomy. Revisionism has a negative connotation as it is closely linked to Hitler's Germany and today to Russia's new militarism, but to understand how the EUGS changes the EU's overall direction of foreign policy we need to follow Buzan's differentiation between three types of revisionism. All three types of revisionism come from its oppositional nature towards status quo, but in three different qualities. Orthodox revisionism is about power and status, and about feelings of threat; revolutionary revisionism is about power and ideology, and a feeling of alienation; radical revisionism is a mixture of both. Radical revisionism is not just about self-promotion, and nor is it all for the alteration of the

status quo. It opposes the continuation of the status quo by striving to reform it, leaving structure as much as possible untouched, but changing operations. (Buzan, 2009:238-244) The point of this paper is to show that through the EUGS, the EU positioned itself as a radical revisionist force. This is not unfathomable. The EU has not been seen before. It is a unique project that has persisted for sixty years, despite the fact that every few years its destruction is declared and predicted. The current status of the security landscape is made by and for nation-states, not for the Union of 28 (pending 27) states. The Union has different objectives to those of a nation-state, regardless of its level of development. For a long time, the Union tried to operate under a status quo, and it proved difficult. Each Member State had different goals. What connects Member States is a shared vision, not particular short-term goals. To achieve this shared vision, the EU "will invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be zero-sum game" (EUGS, 2016:4.).

6. Conclusion

This paper proved that with the EUGS the EU positioned itself as effective strategic actor. To become such, it needed to define "policy goals and the means by which they are to be attained" (Toje, 2010:188). The EUGS has done precisely that, codifying the EU's shared interests and end goals, and formulating means in the form of priorities and principles by which it will fulfil its policy objectives. To achieve the shared interests of prosperity, democracy, peace and security, and a rules-based global order, the EU will work on implementing a more effective migration policy. They intend to continue "working on a more effective common European asylum system which upholds right to seek asylum by ensuring the safe, regulated and legal arrival of refugees" (EUGS, 2016:28); "through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation we will work with countries of origin" (EUGS, 2016:27), and they hope to "support transit countries by improving reception and asylum capacities, and by working on migrants' education, vocational training and livelihood opportunities." (EUGS, 2016:27).

One of the criticisms of the ESS and the RI-ESS was that both strategies attempted to conserve the ideology and importance of multilateralism, "rather than positioning the EU in relations to a unipolar or

multipolar strategic reality" (Toje, 2010:179). In this regard, the EUGS still holds fast. What the EUGS actually does, and what the ESS and the RI-ESS failed to do, is position itself contextually in its security strategic reality, its 'neighbourhood'. It also presents a concrete plan of the means by which it will achieve its interests. In lieu of developing a grand global strategy towards the power-shaped international system, it goes on an unpretentious and modest path still clinging to multilateralism with the UN as the main global actor; but conceiving, as that the EU is the wealthiest and most prosperous part of the Earth, that it should take some of the burden of 'global actorship' on itself.

After analysing three documents and taking into account profound changes that happened and are still happening in the global security landscape, we come to answer our initial question – the ESS is awfully outdated document in changed global security landscape, and the EUGS is completely new operational platform.

We can conclude that the framing of the EU foreign and security policy finished with this strategy. As this Strategy is alive, is open towards new imputations and changes and is inclined towards upgrades and renovation, it can stand for a long time as a cornerstone for the construction of new sub-policies in an ever-changing and increasingly challenging security landscape. Ultimately it might be best to understand the ESS and the RI-ESS as rehearsals before the main performance. Just as it was incertitude that preceded the creation of the ESS, incertitude preceded the creation of the EUGS. But while the ESS was born timid and bashful in the light of unpredictability, the EUGS came out strong, defying fear and distrust.

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Globalna strategija Europske unije – nadogradnja starog ili novi OS?

Sažetak

Članak nudi pregled Globalne strategije Europske unije (EUGS) iz 2016. godine, u odnosu na Europsku sigurnosnu strategiju (ESS) iz 2003. Glavni fokus je na pronalasku odgovora na pitanje: je li EUGS samo nadogradnja ESS-a ili samostalni dokument. Iako su oba dokumenta nazvana strategijama, prema nekim tvrdnjama ESS ne ispunjava uvjete za taj naziv. Usredotočujući se na diskurs strategija, članak razmatra njihove sličnosti i razlike te daje pregled njihovih struktura unutar definicije pojma strategije. Zaključak je članka da je ESS dokument u suprotnosti sa svojim imenom i da je svoju pravu sigurnosnu strategiju Europska unija dobila tek s EUGS-om.

Ključne riječi: EU globalna strategija; Europska sigurnosna strategija; CSDP