


**ŠTO PODRAZUMIJEVA
„POSREDOVANJE UMJETNOSTI“?
POKUŠAJ PREVOĐENJA¹**



ALEXANDER
HENSCHEL

**THE TERM ‘MEDIATION’
IN THE CONTEXT OF ART.
AN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLATION¹**

Na međunarodnim skupovima traže se prevoditeljske usluge – a prijevodi uvijek kriju sretna rješenja, kao i rizike. Rizike poput, primjerice, pokušaja da se pojam njemačke složenice *Kunst-Vermittlung* (posredovanje umjetnosti) doslovno prevede na engleski kao *Art-Mediation* (medijacija umjetnosti) i tako stvori zbrka umjesto da se ponudi objašnjenje.

U ovome članku pojam „posredovanje“ ipak želim prevesti kao „medijacija“ i takav prijevod pokušavam smjestiti u umjetnički kontekst. No neću proučavati jezične implikacije, nego ću se posvetiti različitim konceptima značenja koji se u njemačkom kriju iza izraza „posredovanje“. Pritom ću povezati aktualne diskurse posredovanja *umjetnosti* s diskusijom o pojmu posredovanja u njemačkom filozofskom diskursu 19. stoljeća. Ipak, moramo imati na umu da ni u filozofiji pojam „posredovanje“ nije čvrsto definiran, nego se poziva na najrazličitije koncepte, a svima njima zajedničko je jedno: sadržavaju *pretpostavke o relacijama*. Kao što su i u općem jezičnom smislu – recimo, prilikom medijacije među dvjema suprotstavljenim stranama – uvijek u igri relacije kad je riječ o „posredovanju“.

1.

Ako izraz *medijacija* označava relaciju, prvo se postavlja pitanje: što su relati na koje se posredovanje odnosi? Među

kim ili čim se posreduje? Carmen Mörsch piše da je za nju *medijacija umjetnosti/Art-Mediation*² praksa pozivanja trećih osoba da koriste umjetnost i njezine institucije za obrazovanje (Mörsch 2009., 9). Izreka „pozivati treće osobe“ ukazuje na to da postoji prostor koji ima dimenziju *unutra* i dimenziju *vani*. Baš kao i Niklas Luhmann, i ja taj prostor nazivam „sustavom umjetnosti“ (Kunstsystem) (usp. Luhmann 1997.) i umjetnost, dakle, shvaćam kao operativni sklop komunikacija umjetnošću i o njoj, ali i kao sklop raznih aktera/ica. „Pozvane treće osobe“ ne bi, dakle, bile akteri/ice samoga sustava umjetnosti. „Pozvane treće osobe“ ne bi bile ni potpuno *izdvojene* osobe – za razliku od ne-pozvanih osoba koje želim nazvati „ne-publikom“ – nego su one upravo publika i time istodobno i unutra i vani.

Kod posredovanja u kontekstu umjetnosti riječ je stoga u najširem smislu o tom polju interakcije, o relacijama među akterima, publikom i ne-publikom. To se može prikazati na različite načine, odnosno, relacije se mogu uspostaviti različitim interesima, to jest posredovanje umjetnosti može se prakticirati različitim *stavovima*. Mörsch pritom razlikuje četiri diskursa (usp. Mörsch 2009., 9 ff.).

Posredovanje umjetnosti u *afirmativnom* diskursu treba jamčiti evolucijski razvoj sustava umjetnosti. Za to je potrebna uspješna komunikacija prema unutra i prema van.

Translation services are in demand at international conferences, and all translations bear both opportunities and risks. One example of this is the risk that more confusion than clarity is created by the literal translation into English of the German word composition *Kunst-Vermittlung* as ‘Art Mediation’. In what follows, I should nevertheless like to attempt to translate *Vermittlung* as ‘mediation’, while positioning it in the context of art. I shall not, however, examine the linguistic implications, but rather take up various concepts of meaning that underpin the German term *Vermittlung*. In order to do so, I shall link current discourses of *Kunst-Vermittlung* with a discussion of the term ‘*Vermittlung*’/‘mediation’ in the German-language discourse of nineteenth-century philosophy. It should be noted, however, that mediation is not a well-defined term in philosophy, either. It refers to a number of concepts that differ from one another considerably, except for the fact that they all contain *assumptions about relations*. In non-specialist, general usage, too, mediation always refers to relationships, for example when it refers to mediation between two conflicting parties.

1.

If the term ‘mediation’ describes a relationship, this raises the question: what are the referents of art mediation?

Between who or what does the mediation take place?

Carmen Mörsch writes that, for her, art mediation means the practice of ‘inviting the public to use art and its institutions to further educational processes’ (Mörsch 2009, 9). The expression ‘inviting third parties’ indicates that this is a space that consists of an inside and an outside. Like Niklas Luhmann, I call this space ‘art system’ (cf. Luhmann 1997). In other words, I understand art as an operative structure of communications through and about works of art, and of various actors. The ‘third parties’ who are ‘invited’ are then not the actors inside the art system. They are not completely *excluded*, either, though, in contrast to the uninvited, whom I would like to refer to as ‘not-audience’. They constitute the audience, and are therefore at once both inside and outside. At its most inclusive, mediation in the context of art deals with this area of tension, the relationships between actors, audience and ‘not-audience’. This can now be designed in a variety of ways, meaning that the relationships can be created with various interests, meaning that art mediation can be conducted with various *attitudes*. Mörsch differentiates four discourses in this respect (cf. Mörsch 2009, 9 ff.).

Art mediation in the *affirmative* discourse aims to secure the evolutionary development of the art system. This requires successful communication both towards the inside and

It's not about making an "artistic enquiry" into social injustice. The aim is rather to occupy a constructive position and to use a variety of means to discover the potential for emancipation through learning together and listening to each other; the aim is to understand and to transform the environment in which we live. By working in the social arena, the artist becomes a political activist and is responsible for the consequences of her/his actions.



At the bus terminal in Zagreb on the day of departure after the conference, 15.5.2010.

BiroBeograd// Rädle&Jeremić

<http://modukit.com/raedle-jeremic>

<http://birobeograd.info>

Socially engaged art grew out of, and continues to grow out of, social struggles. It enters the realms of political action, and develops various techniques in order to do so: taking a stand and arguing one's point in public; agitation, education, provocation, collective forms of organisation and communication; acting in solidarity with others; direct intervention.

As part of their commitment to activism, Biro Beograd/ Rena Rädle and Vladan Jeremić have taken part for many years in the struggles of Roma/ Gypsy communities against everyday antiziganism, class racism and the stigmatisation, displacement and deportation of Roma in Europe.



Protesting in front of the French Embassy in Belgrade on 4th September 2010 against the deportation of Roma from France. romasolidaritymovement.wordpress.com

Ivan Basso, digital print from the series: Self-Positions, Paris 2009

Ivan Basso developed these photographs with young people who live and work on the street in Paris. He did so in cooperation with "Hors la rue", an organisation that works with homeless minors. A project by Biro Beograd.

Prema unutra da bi se ostvarila razmjena među pojedinim stručnjacima. Prema van da bi se promicala društvena važnost diskursa. Praksa posredovanja tada bi, primjerice, uključivala pisanje tekstova za kataloge ili držanje stručnih izlaganja. Publika bi se sastojala uglavnom od onih koji na drugim mjestima sustava umjetnosti i sami u nekom obliku nastupaju kao akteri/ice. *Unutar* ovoga okvira pozicije među akterima i publikom donekle su fleksibilne.

Reproduktivni se diskurs, za razliku od afirmativnoga, obraća onima koji se *ne* definiraju *per se* kao stručna umjetnička publika ili čak nastupaju kao ne-publika. Posredovanje umjetnosti ovdje ima zadatak, piše Mörsch, da „obrazuje buduću publiku“ (ibid., 10) i da umjetnost doživi kao kulturno dobro koje treba biti dostupno „svima“.

Ovdje može biti riječ i o identificiranju i suzbijanju straha od novog i nepoznatog (Schwellenängste). Što se tiče određenih ciljnih skupina za koje se smatra da su u podređenome položaju, to mogu biti i programi koji su posebno osmišljeni da se prilagođavaju njihovim potrebama.

I *dekonstrukcijski* diskurs može uključivati izradu programa za određene skupine ljudi. No za njega je ipak karakteristično da propituje etablirane definicije i o njima raspravlja sa samom publikom. Propituje se, primjerice, tko i zašto doista smije ili mora nastupati kao akter/ica, kao publika ili kao ne-publika.

Kad se, dakle, u okviru dekonstrukcijskoga diskursa govori o relacijama, onda se konstatira da se te navodne razlike ne mogu smatrati prirodnima nego samo iskonstruiranima – to su *razlikovanja*.

Četvrti – *transformativni* – diskurs dokida jednoznačno pozivanje na umjetnost kao na kontekstualni okvir. Ovdje, primjerice, bit može biti u korištenju umjetnosti i njezinih institucija kao ishodišne točke kako bi se prakticirala suradnja s akterima i publikom iz drugih društvenih polja, recimo iz područja politike. Umjetnost u tom diskursu može biti ishodišna točka za propitivanje društvenih odnosa, ali ne mora biti i krajnja točka. Za početak ću se zaustaviti na ovom sažetom pregledu, no vratit ću se na njega, a sad ću skočiti na kratku filozofsku povijest pojma posredovanja.

2.

U svojem *Općem rječniku filozofskih znanosti* W.T. Krug natuknici „posredovanje“ prije svega dodjeljuje značenje „mirenja“ dviju sukobljenih strana. (usp. Krug 1829., 249). Posredovanje tu ima funkciju sinteze dvaju ekstrema, preciznije rečeno, posredovanje prema Krugu ima funkciju *izbjegavanja* ekstrema.

Taj moment, dokidanje dvaju ekstrema u posredujućoj sintezi, J.G. Fichte sustavno obezvrjeđuje. Tako kao primjer navodi

towards the outside. Towards the inside in order to establish exchanges among individual experts. Towards the outside in order to advertise the social relevance of the discourse. The practice of mediation would then consist, for example, of writing catalogue texts or giving expert talks. The audience is then usually comprised of those who themselves appear as actors in some form or other in other parts of the art system. *Within* this framework, the positions between actors and audience are comparatively flexible.

The *reproductive* discourse, on the other hand, addresses itself to those who do not define themselves as specialist art audiences *per se*, or who even appear as ‘not-audiences’. In these cases, art mediation is tasked with, as Mörsch writes, “educating the public of tomorrow” (ibid., 10), and with conceiving of art as a cultural asset that should be accessible to ‘all’. This may also involve identifying fears that prevent people from accessing what is on offer, and attempting to break these barriers down. With regard to particular target groups identified as being disadvantaged, this can be done with programmes developed specially for their needs.

Deconstructive discourse, too, can deal with the development of programmes for particular groups. What defines this discourse, however, is that established definitions are called into question and negotiated with the audiences themselves.

For example, questions are raised about who may or must take on the role of actor, audience or ‘not-audience’, and why this is the case. When, within the framework of deconstructive discourse, one speaks of relationships, one does not position putative differences as natural but as constructed: they are *distinctions*.

The fourth of these discourses, the *transformative* discourse, invalidates the unequivocal reference to art as contextual framework. This can involve, for example, taking art and art institutions as a point of departure for co-operations with actors and audiences in other social fields, such as politics. Here, art can be a point of departure for social questions, but need not constitute the end point.

I shall leave this sketch to one side for the moment, but will return to it later. First, however, it is time for a little philosophical history of the term ‘*mediation*’.

2.

In his *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (General Dictionary of Philosophical Sciences), W. T. Krug assigns to the lemma *Vermittlung*, ‘mediation’, the primary meaning of arbitrating between two conflicting parties (cf. Krug 1829, 249). Here, mediation functions as the creation of a synthesis between two

relaciju između svjetla i tame. Među tim dvama ekstremima prividno posreduje sumrak. „Prividno“ iz toga razloga što se daljnjim promišljanjem može zaključiti da „svjetlost i tama uopće nisu suprotni pojmovi, nego se razlikuju samo u stupnju. Mrak je jednostavno vrlo malena količina svjetla“ (Fichte 1965., 301). Sumrak, dakle, ne posreduje, on je samo sastavni dio cjeline svjetla i tame. Fichteu je, prema tome, bitno svladavanje puta od suprotnosti do istovjetnosti. Pritom se postupak posredovanja pokazuje manjkavim jer, doduše, uspostavlja sredinu, ali krajnje polove ekstrema ne uspijeva stopiti u istovjetnost. No Fichte ide i puno dalje; on uvodi protupojam posredovanju – pojam „neposrednosti“ (usp. Arndt 2004., 13). U trenutku kad se spozna da su dva prividno suprotna elementa dijelovi jedne cjeline, tada je moguća neposredna (immediate) spoznaja. Neposredno bi onda bilo ono što „neposredno postaje jasno, razumljivo“ najviši princip, ničim uvjetovan, ničim posredovan, koji nije potrebno objašnjavati.

G.W.F. Hegel u svojoj filozofiji primjenjuje oba koncepta, i onaj neposrednosti i onaj posredovanja, ali ne prihvaća ni *univerzalnost* posredovanja, ni neposrednost (usp. *ibid.*, 23 f.). Pritom je njegova skepsa usmjerena ponajprije prema svim *neposrednostima* prosvjetiteljske tradicije. Tko navodi da je nešto „neposredno jasno, razumljivo“ – dakle, nije

posredovano, odnosno, nije moguće biti posredovano – izmiče svakoj kritici, tvrdi Hegel. Ako je u Hegelovoj filozofiji riječ o posredovanju između dvaju *različitih* elemenata, onda u prvome planu nisu ni sami elementi koje se razlikuje, ni potencijalni rezultat njihove sinteze. Međutim, Hegelu je važnije misaono djelovanje *samoga* razlikovanja, promišljanje razlikovanja ili, točnije rečeno, za Hegela je *posredovanje promišljanje razlikovanja* (usp. Hegel, 1968., 16). U takvim momentima posredovanja lako je spoznati da su suprotnosti, odnosno navodne razlike, uvijek rezultat *mišljenih* razlikovanja. U toj koncepciji posredovanje ima dvostruko značenje: s jedne strane podrazumijeva moment odvajanja, i to razlikovanjem, ali u trenutku kad se napravi razlika između dvaju elemenata, oni se počnu *misliti* zajedno i tako tvore spoj, cjelinu.³

Hegel taj koncept istodobnosti odvajanja i spajanja primjenjuje, primjerice, na razvoj ljudske svijesti. Početak čini prva negacija, razlikovanje između sebe samoga i nečega neodređenoga. Od tuda se uslijed promišljanja, odnosno posredovanja izgrađuje sve kompleksniji duh, sve dok on, nagada Hegel, ne spozna sve povezanosti (usp. Hegel 1992., 88). To je trenutak koji Hegel naziva „apsolutnim“. „Apsolutnim“ jer uz sebe nema ništa pa je, prema tome, izložen *neposrednom*.

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extremes. More precisely, according to Krug, mediation has the function of *avoiding* extremes.

This moment, the dissolution of two extremes in a mediating synthesis, is systematically devalued by J. G. Fichte. Fichte cites the relationship between light and darkness as an example. It appears that twilight mediates between these two extremes. The caveat 'it appears' is necessary because further consideration shows that "light and darkness are not actually opposites; they can only be differentiated by degrees. Darkness is simply a very low quality of light" (Fichte 1965, 301). Therefore twilight does not mediate; it is rather a component of the whole formed by light and darkness. Fichte is therefore concerned with the transcendence of opposites to form identities. In this respect, the process of mediation is lacking because it creates a middle, but is not able to bring the furthest extremes to an identity. Instead, Fichte introduces the counter-term of mediation, namely 'immediacy' (*Unmittelbarkeit*), into the discussion (cf. Arndt 2004, 13). When one realises that two seemingly opposite elements are part of a whole, immediate realisation becomes possible. The immediate is, then, that which 'becomes clear immediately': a basic principle that is unconditional, unmediated and does not require clarification.

In the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, both of these concepts

are in currency: the concept of immediacy as well as that of mediation. However, Hegel dismisses the *universality* of both mediation and immediacy (cf. *ibid.*, 23 ff.). And this process feeds his scepticism towards all the immediacies of an Enlightenment tradition. Furthermore, whoever claims that something is 'immediately apparent' – and therefore not mediated or capable of being mediated – withdraws from all possible criticism. When Hegel considers the mediation between two *different* elements, neither the differentiated elements themselves nor a possible synthetic result are in the foreground. Hegel is instead concerned with the action of thinking involved in making this differentiation, with the reflection. More specifically, according to Hegel, *mediation is the reflection of differentiation* (cf. Hegel 1968, 16). In such mediations, it is possible to realise that opposites or putative differences are always the result of differentiations that take place in *thought*.

In this conception, 'mediation' has a twofold meaning: it refers, on the one hand, to the moment of separation through differentiation. On the other hand, as soon as two elements are differentiated, they are *thought* together and therefore form a connection, a whole.³ Hegel applies this concept of the simultaneity of separating and connecting to the development of human consciousness, for example.

Hegelova spekulativna pretpostavka o postojanju *Apsolutnoga* u kojem se stapaju sva posredovanja znači i da je svakome posredovanju već dodijeljen *cilj*, veća cjelina koje je ono dio. Svaka relacija koju se može misliti jest samorazlikovanje neke veće cjeline koja predstavlja cilj svih posredovanja. Ako bismo to *apsolutno* promatrali kao sustav, mogli bismo ga pojmiti samo kao sustav koji se odnosi na samoga sebe. Posredovanje koje se unutar njega odvija, prema tome, ne posreduje *nešto*, konstitutivno drugo, nego samo sebe. Takvo je posredovanje samoreprezentacija (usp. Arndt 2004., 29). Hegelov pojam posredovanja imao je enorman utjecaj na buduće generacije filozofa i u jednakoj je mjeri mobilizirao protivnike kao i kritičke zagovornike. Red protivnika sezao je sve do Gillesa Deleuzea koji je Hegelov pojam posredovanja identificirao kao instrument vlasti (Herrschaftsinstrument), jer ako se posredovanje odnosi na veću cjelinu, sve razlike prisiljava na istovjetnost (usp. *ibid.*, 36). Razlike bi u tom slučaju bile samo „prividne razlike“ jer bi ionako bile dio veće cjeline. S druge strane, kritička teorija prihvaća Hegelov pojam posredovanja, no uz presudan zaokret – tvrdi, naime, da posredovanja *nisu* reprezentanti neke buduće apsolutne cjeline, nego upravo permanentno negiraju prividne cjeline. Theodor W. Adorno o tome piše sljedeće: „Posredovanje nipošto ne kazuje da se u

njemu sve stapa, nego postulira ono što se njime posreduje, ono što se *ne* stapa.“ (Adorno 1966., 174). Moglo bi se zaključiti: onda kad prijeti da će nešto neposredno postati jasno i razumljivo, čin posredovanja postiže negaciju, drugu mogućnost postizanja razumljivosti. Utoliko je posredovanje za Adorna stalna negativnost. Čin posredovanja mijenja ono što je prividno već etablirano. Takav koncept posredovanja *konstitutivno* nema ni početak ni cilj.

Na ovome mjestu želio bih iskristalizirati dva pojma posredovanja. Razlikujem između *apsolutnoga* i *negativnoga pojma posredovanja*.

Za apsolutan je pojam posredovanja karakteristično da se ono konstantno odnosi na veću cjelinu. Ona može podrazumijevati ili praktičnu zaokruženu cjelinu (kao kod Kruga) ili spekulativnu cjelinu (kao kod Hegela). U prvome su slučaju ciljevi posredovanja očigledni, a u drugome prikriveni, pa je moguće da ih se ni ne spozna kao takve. Apsolutno posredovanje je samoreprezentacija cjeline.

Negativni pojam posredovanja, s druge strane, ne proizlazi ni iz kakvoga prvobitnog principa ili neposredno definiranoga predmeta posredovanja, niti je usmjereno nekakvome cilju, koliko god on bio spekulativno postavljen. Štoviše, ovdje je funkcija posredovanja negacija sama, ona, dakle, mijenja postojeće relacije. U ovome konceptu posredovanja ono gubi

A first negation, the differentiation between the self and something unspecified, forms the starting point. From there, in the course of reflection (i.e. mediation), an increasingly complex spirit establishes itself until this, according to Hegel's speculation, grasps how everything fits together (cf. Hegel 1992, 88). This is the moment that Hegel refers to as the 'absolute': the absolute that exists separately from all else and which is correspondingly determined as immediate. Hegel's speculative assumption of an absolute in which all mediation is sublated also means that all mediation already contains a *goal*, a larger whole of which it is a part. Every relationship thinkable is the self-differentiation of a larger whole, which represents the goal of all mediation. If we were to understand such an absolute as a system, then this system could only be understood as one that is entirely self-referential. Therefore, any mediation that occurs within this system does not mediate *something*, something that is constitutively different, but *itself*. Such mediation is self-representation (cf. Arndt 2004, 29).

Hegel's term 'mediation' had a great influence on later generations of philosophy, and mobilised both opponents and critical supporters. The line of opponents reaches as far as Gilles Deleuze, who identified Hegel's 'mediation' as an instrument of domination. After all, inasmuch as mediation

refers to a larger whole, it enforces identity on all differences (cf. *ibid.*, 36). Differences are, then, nothing but 'pseudo-differences' because they are, in fact, part of a bigger whole. Critical theory, in contrast, uses Hegel's term 'mediation', but asserts that mediations are *not* the representatives of a later absolute unity; mediations are posited as *permanently* negating the putative existence of unities. In this respect, Theodor W. Adorno writes that "mediation by no means asserts that everything is sublated in it. Mediation postulates what is mediated through it, that which is not sublated" (Adorno 1966, 174). One could say that, when the threat of something becoming immediately clear arises, the act of mediation creates a negation, another possibility of becoming clear. In this respect, for Adorno, mediation is negativity in permanence. Mediation causes a shift in what appears to have been established. *Constitutively*, a concept of mediation such as this has neither a source nor a goal.

I should now like to distil two definitions of mediation. I differentiate between an *absolute definition of mediation* and a *negative definition of mediation*. An absolute definition of mediation is defined by the fact that mediation always refers to a larger whole. This can be a practically self-contained whole (Krug) or a speculative whole (Hegel). In the former case, the aims of mediation are obvious; in the latter case, they

What is your level of education? Where did you study? Was it a public or private institution? For how long did you study? In case it was longer than expected, what was the reason? Did you have a scholarship? If not, who paid for your studies? Did you work as a student? Where did you work? What kind of work did you do? (Manual labor / »creative industries« / volunteer work / work within the university (assistant)... / internships / other?) How many hours a day/week did you work? How much did you earn? Did you get health benefits/paid holidays? Were you able to cover all of your expenses by yourself? If not, who supported you? Did you attend to any alternative courses/education? If so, what kind and where? How long did it take you to find a job after finishing your studies? Was it related to your studies? Have you worked as an intern? In case you have, where and for how long? Which were your responsibilities? Was it a paid internship? If not, did they give you any kind of benefits? How many hours a day/week did you work? After finishing the internship period did you have the opportunity to apply for a position in the same place? Were you offered a contract? If not, what was the reason? Are you still involved with any academic institution? If you are, what is the nature of this link? Do you consider your work as culture related? In which field of culture do you work? What is your job in the Museum? How long have you been working here? Before working here, did you work in the same field? What do you produce in your work? Are the results of your work shared with others in any way? How? What kind of contract do you have in the museum? Government employee / Freelance / fixed-term contract / short-term contract / service contract? In case your position is temporary, how does this condition your life? Would you prefer to have a permanent position? Why? Have you ever applied for a government opposition? How much do you earn? 800€ / 800€ - 1500€ / + 1500€? Do you consider your work as well paid? Is it enough for your living expenses? How many hours do you work per day? Do you have a Health Insurance? Is it Social Security or a Private Insurance? Is it covered by your employer? Are your social security contributions taken into account for your unemployment insurance? How many days of vacation do you have? Are they paid? Are you granted sick leave? Do you have maternity leave? Do you have any opportunity to be promoted? Which are your possibilities? Do you have another job different from this one? Why? What kind of job is it? Do you spend your free time in any other kind of occupation?

RADICAL EDUCATION COLLECTIVE:
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<http://radical.temp.si>

Workers' Inquiry is a research process that includes individual and collective "translations" of Marx Workers' Inquiry, which aims not only to provide answers but also to formulate relevant questions and possible alliances. Our quest is not a search for collective identity nor the categorization and classification of different types of precarious workers (from seasonal migrant workers to self-employed project-dependent freelancers) but to re-elaborate both precariousness and precarious labour as conceptual and organisational tools from within, for the emerging subjectivity on the horizon of struggles and for the reappropriation of common knowledge and creativity.

Recently we have been involved in a joint research project with the Workers' Inquiry Group at the Centro de Estudios del MNCARS, Madrid and in an investigation within the particular context of contemporary "academic" capitalism in Slovenia.

kontrolu uslijed nemogućnosti uzdizanja u više stanje. Čini se da se cijela ova rasprava može svesti na zaključak da su oba pojma posredovanja, doduše, idejnopovijesno izrasla na istome tlu, no da se u svojoj *konzekventnosti* fundamentalno razlikuju.

3.

Sada ću oba pojma posredovanja primijeniti na područje u kojemu sam razmatrao diskurse posredovanja umjetnosti. U kontekstu afirmativnoga diskursa, diskursa posredovanja među stručnjacima, može se govoriti o apsolutnom pojmu posredovanja. Naime, ovdje je riječ o većoj cjelini sustava umjetnosti i trebalo bi jamčiti njezin razvoj. U tom smislu posredovanje nastupa kao samoreprezentacija sustava umjetnosti. To svrstavanje postaje upitno ako se razvoj same umjetnosti promatra kao permanentno prekoračenje granica, kako se dosad gledalo na umjetnost. Ukoliko posredovanje omogućava i komunicira takvo prekoračenje granica, moglo bi se itekako govoriti o negativnom poimanju posredovanja. Jedino: dugoročno gledano, takva prekoračenja granica nikada dosad još nisu rezultirala destabilizacijom sustava umjetnosti, nego su ga, štoviše, u njegovoj samosvijesti trajno učvršćivala. Negacija na koncu služi *apsolutnom*. I u *reproduktivnom* bi se diskursu, onom koji se obraća ne-

stručnjacima, mogao možda prepoznati negativni pojam posredovanja, i to onda kad se (eksternu) publiku doživljava kao permanentnu negaciju sustava umjetnosti. No to ne mora biti slučaj ako se unaprijed – primjerice prethodnim definiranjem ciljeva učenja ili formuliranjem retoričkih pitanja – naznače ciljevi posredovanja umjetnosti. U tom pogledu posredovanje ne reprezentira one kojima je kao publici dopušteno ući u sustav umjetnosti, nego sam sustav i njegovu prikupljeno znanje. Posredovanje umjetnosti i ovdje bi bila samoreprezentacija umjetnosti koja se referira na apsolutni pojam posredovanja.

Ako se *dekonstrukcijski* diskurs odnosi na umjetnost kao kontekst, onda bi se i ovdje moglo govoriti o apsolutnom pojmu posredovanja. No istodobno umjetnost u svojoj institucionalnoj organiziranosti i samu sebe dovodi u pitanje. Posredovanje umjetnosti stoga uvijek stoji korak izvan sustava da bi odande moglo promišljati i negirati razlikovanje između umjetnosti i publike; bit je u tome da se donesene odluke istaknu kao moguće, ali ne i nužne. Polje interakcije između umjetnosti i publike ne treba ukloniti – i to u korist rješenja koje će tobože zadovoljiti svakoga – nego bi posredovanje umjetnosti trebalo izdvojiti iz toga odnosa i razvijati ga zasebno. Posredovanje bi tada bilo oblik permanentne negativnosti.

tend to operate covertly, and may not even be recognised as such. Absolute mediation is the self-representation of a whole. In contrast, a negative definition of mediation would not assume an original principle or immediately set object. Nor would it lead to a goal of any sort, no matter how speculative that goal might be. Instead, the function of mediation is to be found in the negation itself, and therefore leads to shifts in existing relations. According to this concept, mediation is defined by a loss of control because there is no possibility of sublation in a higher state.

It therefore appears that, although both of these concepts of mediation have grown, from the point of view of the history of ideas, out of the same soil, they are fundamentally different from one another when it comes to their consequences.

3.

I shall now apply these two concepts of mediation to the field sketched out above: the field of art-mediation discourses. With respect to the affirmative discourse, the mediation discourse of experts, one might at first gravitate towards the application of an absolute concept of mediation. The reason for this is that it is about the larger whole of the art system, and that its development is to be ensured. In this respect, mediation

takes the form of the self-representation of the art system. This classification is questionable, however, once one conceives of the development of art itself as a constant breaking down of the boundaries of that which was previously labelled art. Inasmuch as mediation allows and communicates this breaking down of boundaries, one could also use a negative concept of mediation. And yet, in the long term, this breaking down of boundaries has not yet led to a destabilisation of the art system. Instead, it has actually had the long-term effect of confirming the art system in its self-assurance. In the end, negation serves the absolute. In the *representative* discourse that addresses itself to non-experts, too, one could perhaps discern a negative concept of mediation. This could be seen to be the case when the (external) audience is understood to be the constant negation of the art system. This does not happen, however, if goals relating to art mediation (through the definition of educational goals or the formulation of rhetorical questions, for example) are mapped out in advance. When this is the case, mediation does not represent those who are admitted into the art system as an audience, but represents the art system itself and its accumulation of knowledge. Here, too, art mediation would be the self-representation of art, and would refer to an absolute concept of mediation.

Običaj „konstantnoga vraćanja na umjetnost“ dokida se tek u kontekstu transformativnoga diskursa. Odreći se zajamčenosti vlastite pozicije negacijom značilo bi možda u potpunosti izgubiti tlo na kojem stoji umjetnost. Apsolutni pojam posredovanja *umjetnosti* ovdje zasigurno nema smisla. Međutim, apsolutni pojam posredovanja mogao bi doći u obzir kad bi se umjetnost iskoristilo kao ishodišnu točku za postizanje potpuno drugačijih ciljeva, recimo onih političke ili društvene prirode. No tko je tu onda akter, a tko publika, potpuno je drugi par rukava. Zato se uvijek iznova mora postaviti pitanje o čijoj je (samo)reprezentaciji ovdje riječ.

4.

Na početku ovoga članka obećao sam da ću pokušati pronaći prijevod. Utoliko ukoliko je i prijevod vrsta posredovanja – posredovanje između dvaju jezika – suočeni smo s dilemom ovoga ili bilo kojeg drugog prijevoda: on s jedne strane obećava ispuniti zadani cilj nadjezičnoga razjašnjenja, ali s druge strane nikad ga nije moguće u potpunosti kontrolirati, upravo zato što je pojam moguće reći samo u jeziku. Utoliko je i svaki prijevod istodobno *apsolutno*, kao i *negativno* posredovanje.

Pojam posredovanja je, prema tome, ambivalentan. I baš ga iz toga razloga ima smisla primijeniti u kontekstu umjetnosti.

On je u stanju opisati relaciju između umjetnosti i publike kao interaktivan odnos koji se ne može raspustiti ni na koju stranu i na kojemu stalno treba raditi.⁴

¹ Ovaj članak sadrži neke preliminarne teze moga doktorskoga rada (radni naslov: „Što ovdje znači 'posredovanje'? Smještanje pojma posredovanja u područje interakcije između umjetnosti i njezine publike"/„Was heißt hier 'Vermittlung'? Eine Verortung des Vermittlungsbegriffs im Spannungsfeld zwischen Kunst und ihrem Publikum“) koji trenutno pišem na Sveučilištu Carl von Ossietzky u Oldenburgu pod mentorstvom Eve Sturm i Carmen Mörsch.

² Sama Mörsch „posredovanje umjetnosti“ prevodi s „umjetničkim obrazovanjem“ („Art-Education“). No ja ću u članku izraz „medijacija umjetnosti“ pokušati primijeniti na njezin tekst.

³ I utoliko se prijevod pojma „posredovanje“ pojmom „medijacija“ (mediation) pokazuje manjkavim. Ekvivalent složenice „dekonstrukcija“ (deconstruction) zapravo bi trebao biti „de-medijacija“ (de-mediation) (puno hvala Nori Sternfeld za ovaj ukaz), odnosno „medijacija“ se prema „neposrednosti“ (immediacy) i „de-medijaciji“ odnosi kao „konstrukcija“ (construction) prema „destrukciji“ (destruction) i „dekonstrukciji“ (deconstruction).

⁴ Referentna literatura: Adorno, Theodor W. (1966): *Negative Dialektik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp; Arndt, Andreas (2004): *Unmittelbarkeit*, Bielefeld: transcript; Fichte, Johann G. (1965 [1798]): *Grundlage der gesammelten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer*, Gesamtausgabe (GA), Abt. I, Bd. 2, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: frommann-holzboog, S. 173-461; Hegel, G. W. F. (1968 [1801]): *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie*, Jena: Seidler, Gesammelte Werke (GW) 4, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, S. 1-92; Hegel, G. W. F. (1992 [1830]): *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, GW 20, Hamburg: Felix Meiner; Krug, W. T. (1829):

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Inasmuch as the *deconstructive* discourse refers to the context of art, one would assume that this is also a case of an absolute concept of mediation. And yet, simultaneously, art here also calls itself into question in its institutional composition. Art mediation is therefore also always one step outside of the system, a position from which it reflects and negates the differentiation between art and audience. The aim is to expose established differentiations as possible but not necessary. The tension between art and audience is not then to be *dissolved* – for the benefit of a solution that putatively satisfies all parties – but art mediation should be developed out of this tension. Mediation would thus be a form of permanent negativity. It is only in *transformative* discourse that the movement of the 'always coming back to art' is dissolved. Forfeiting the secured nature of one's own position through negation then means possibly losing the very basis of art. An absolute concept of *art* mediation certainly does not make sense in this case. An absolute concept of mediation might become relevant if art were used as a point of departure, however, to pursue quite different goals, such as goals of a political or social nature. Who is actor and who is audience is another matter entirely. For this reason, the question whose (self-) representation it is must be raised again and again.

4.

At the beginning of this text, I promised to attempt a translation. As translation is also a mediation – the mediation between two languages – the dilemma of this and other translations rears its head: on the one hand, it promises the goal of supra-lingual clarification. On the other hand, it is never entirely controllable because a term is only expressible in language. In this respect, every translation, too, simultaneously constitutes both absolute and negative mediation. The concept of mediation is therefore ambivalent. And this is the very reason why it makes sense to use it in the context of art. It is capable of describing the relationship between art and audience that is the subject of tension, that cannot be dissolved on either side and that must be continuously worked on.⁴

¹ This essay contains some preliminary considerations from my dissertation (working title: “Was heißt hier 'Vermittlung'? Eine Verortung des Vermittlungsbegriffs im Spannungsfeld zwischen Kunst und ihrem Publikum”), which is currently being written at Carl-von-Ossietzky University in Oldenburg, Germany, under the supervision of Eva Sturm und Carmen Mörsch.

² Mörsch translates 'Kunstvermittlung' as 'Art Education'. In what follows, I shall however attempt to apply the term 'Art Mediation' to her text.

Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Bd. 5, Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus; Luhmann, Niklas (1997): *Die Kunst der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp; Mörsch, Carmen (2009): »Am Kreuzungspunkt von vier Diskursen: Die Documenta 12 Vermittlung zwischen Affirmation, Reproduktion, Dekonstruktion und Transformation«, in: dies. et al. (Hg.): *Kunstvermittlung 2. Zwischen kritischer Praxis und Dienstleistung auf der Documenta 12. Ergebniss eines Forschungsprojekts*, Zürich/Berlin: diaphanes, S. 9-33.

³ And in this respect, the translation of 'Vermittlung' as 'Mediation' is deficient. In parallel to the word composition 'deconstruction', 'de-mediation' would be more appropriate (many thanks to Nora Sternfeld for this observation), i.e. 'mediation' is to 'immediacy' and 'de-mediation' what 'construction' is to 'destruction' and 'deconstruction'.

⁴ References: Theodor W. Adorno (1966): *Negative Dialektik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp; Andreas Arndt (2004): *Unmittelbarkeit*, Bielefeld: transcript; Johann G. Fichte (1965 [1798]): *Grundlage der gesammelten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer*, Gesamtausgabe (GA), Abt. I, Bd. 2, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: fromman-holzboog, pp. 173-461; G. W. F. Hegel (1968 [1801]): "Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie", Jena: Seidler, *Gesammelte Werke* (GW) 4, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, pp. 1-92; G. W. F. Hegel (1992 [1830]): *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, GW 20, Hamburg: Felix Meiner; W. T. Krug (1829): *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, vol. 5, Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus; Niklas Luhmann (1997): *Die Kunst der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp; Carmen Mörsch (2009): "Am Kreuzungspunkt von vier Diskursen: Die Documenta 12 Vermittlung zwischen Affirmation, Reproduktion, Dekonstruktion und Transformation", in: Carmen Mörsch et al. (eds): *Kunstvermittlung 2. Zwischen kritischer Praxis und Dienstleistung auf der Documenta 12. Ergebniss eines Forschungsprojekts*, Zürich/Berlin: diaphanes, pp. 9-33.

DISKUSIJSKA SKUPINA
„UMJETNOST I POSREDOVANJE
KULTURE U JAVNOM PROSTORU:
SUSJEDSTVA I RAZVOJ GRADA“;
SUDIONICI I SUDIONICE: NORA
STERNFELD, VESNA VUKOVIĆ,
SUSANNE BOSCH I OSTALI.

ALEXANDER
HENSCHEL

DISCUSSION GROUP "ART AND
CULTURE MEDIATION IN PUBLIC
SPACES: NEIGHBOURHOODS
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,"
PARTICIPANTS: NORA STERNFELD,
VESNA VUKOVIĆ, SUSANNE
BOSCH ET AL.

Diskusije o umjetnosti u javnom prostoru i projektima koji nastaju u kontekstu razvoja grada pokazuju da su svi urbani problemi vrlo slični i da su umjetničke strategije u gradovima s jako različitim prošlošću usporedive kad se radi o pitanjima gentrifikacije i sudjelovanja umjetnika/ca u procesima razvoja grada. To je evidentno i iz činjenice da mnogi umjetnici/e koji rade na realizaciji participacijskih projekata u urbanom kontekstu djeluju u međunarodnim okvirima, ali rade i kao predavači/ce na raznim visokim umjetničkim školama koje nude studijske programe na tu temu. Postupno se razvio i čitav jedan međunarodni jezik, kako u pogledu umjetničkih ideja, tako i u pogledu njihova opisa, pa se spoznajivanje čini jednostavnijim no što je to slučaj u području medijacije umjetnosti i kulturno-prosvjetnog rada, u kojemu su prisutne raznolike nacionalne ili regionalne tradicije, predrasude i antagonizmi. Radna skupina koja se bavila ovom temom diskutirala je o ulozi umjetničkih projekata

u razvoju grada, polazeći od prikaza *UrbanFestivala* Vesne Vuković, u organizaciji [BLOK] *Lokalna baza za osvježavanje kulture*¹. Pritom je bila riječ o mogućnostima da se državnim sredstvima, ali bez direktne ovisnosti o državi, pokrenu demokratski participacijski procesi, a razgovaralo se i o posljedicama sve veće privatizacije javnoga prostora. Raspravljalo se, nadalje, i o projektima koji javni urbani prostor shvaćaju kao prostor za koji se trebalo izboriti, prostor u kojemu su vidljivi sukobi oko ekonomske i političke hegemonije i koji – manje ili više subverzivnim strategijama – preispituju postojeće odnose moći. Proces medijacije na tome polju, participacijski projekti, procesi su u kojima se preklapaju politika i umjetnost, pokazala je diskusija. Tematizirano je i na koji način umjetnički festivali, kao što je primjerice i *Skulpturprojekte Münster*, s jedne strane pridonose afirmaciji participacijskih projekata u javnome prostoru i pomažu širenju diskusija o umjetnosti i politici u široj javno-

sti, ali s druge strane postaju sastavnicama gradskoga marketinga i na taj način instrumentaliziraju, a u konačnici i zatiru kritički potencijal umjetnosti. I u tom se kontekstu razvila debata o pojmovima i definicijama interakcije, suradnje i participacije, kao i o pitanju koje procese umjetnici/ce u gradu doista mogu pokrenuti kad je riječ o kratkotrajnim projektima i u kakvom su oni odnosu s postojećim konstelacijama moći.

¹[http://www.urbanfestival.hr/2010/en/blok-en/\(20.3.2011.\)](http://www.urbanfestival.hr/2010/en/blok-en/(20.3.2011.))

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The discussions about art in public spaces and projects that take place within the context of urban development show that there are great similarities regarding problems in urban contexts. Artistic strategies in cities with very different histories become comparable when looked at from the point of view of gentrification and the involvement of artists in urban-development processes. This can also be seen from the fact that a large number of artists who carry out participatory projects in urban contexts work internationally, and teach courses offered in this subject area at a variety of different universities. An international language is being developed, both in terms of ideas and in terms of the way in which these ideas are described. This means that communication in this field appears to be easier than in that of art mediation and cultural education, where national or regional traditions, prejudices and resentments are present in a variety of forms. The working group dealing with this subject used

Vesna Vuković's representation of the *UrbanFestival* organised by [BLOK] Local Base for culture refreshment as a starting point for a detailed discussion of the role of artistic projects in urban development. Points debated included the possibility of initiating democratic participatory processes using state funding but without direct dependencies, and the consequences of the increasing privatisation of public space. The group also examined projects that understand public space as a contested space in which conflicts about economic and political hegemony are visualised, and that question existing power relations (using more or less subversive strategies). It became clear during the discussion that mediation processes in this field, participatory projects, are processes in which politics and art are intertwined. Another question raised was the way in which art festivals, such as the *Sculpture Project Münster*, contribute to the establishment of participatory projects in public spaces and help to propa-

gate debates about art and politics among the public. At the same time they become part of the ways in which cities market themselves. In so doing, they instrumentalise the critical potential of art and, ultimately, arrest this potential. Here, too, a lively debate arose about terms and definitions of interaction, collaboration and participation, and about the question as to which processes can actually be put into practice for temporary projects in the urban environment, and what their position is with regard to existing power relations.