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Criminalistics and operative aspects of the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles in the Republic of Macedonia

Abstract:

Cash in transit is a term used to describe the banknotes in the process of transfer from one location to another. During this process, a whole array of risks, threats, dangers and vulnerabilities arise. As much as the value of the assets is greater, the more the transport is the tempting target of attack by criminal, primarily, bandit groups. Cash in transit vehicles attacks are criminal activities that are carried out for the purpose of acquiring illegal property and they contain elements of violence, brutality and aggression. From a criminal and legal point of view, cash in transit vehicles attacks are classified as crimes against property, or rather as criminal offenses of robbery. Studying the circumstances of the crime through the chronological and logical connection of the discovered facts provides an opportunity for understanding the crime, i.e. to create a criminalistics version of the events, on the basis of which the further operational procedures of criminal prosecution authorities will be based. The general goal of this paper is a criminal and operational analysis of the cash in transit vehicles attacks, which should contribute to recognizing the shortcomings, deficiencies and weaknesses in the manner of securing, as well as the ways of their detection, clarification and proving by the criminal prosecution authorities.

The paper will present the results of the researched criminological, victimological and criminal-operational aspects of the cash in transit vehicles attacks in the Republic of Macedonia in the period from 2005 to 2016. In this regard, in order to review the criminal-operational acting after detection of the committed attack on a cash in transit vehicle, an analysis of a specific individual case will be made by describing the situation that had previously passed, the criminal situation, the measures and activities undertaken for its clarification and the consequences that arose from it. Through the security analysis applied in the paper, the basis for improvement and the creation of more efficient and effective ways of planning and performing of the cash in transit and other valuable goods should be created.

Key words: *cash in transit, vehicles, attacks, criminalistics aspects, Republic of Macedonia*

Introduction

The provision of transport and transfer of money and other valuable goods¹ is, in fact, physical security of the transport and transfer of money, gold, precious stones, works of art, securities and other valuable parcels with private security workers and special vehicles. This is applied when moving along a certain path and it has a task to protect and secure the transport and transfer along the whole route from the starting moment or from the starting point to the end destination. But, if the value of the money or the consignment is high then their transport becomes attractive for attack by the criminal groups or the terroristic organizations.² This confirms the claim that the money are especially sensitive for transport. As any kind of security, the security of the cash in transit has many risks, threats and dangers that the participants of this process are facing with. The managing with the risks³ is an important process in securing the transfer of money and other valuable items, since it enables the necessary degree of protection to be determined. If this process is well managed, the set goal can be successfully performed, which is a safe transfer of money and other values, without any harmful consequences of transport and the entities that implement it.

¹ Art. 7, Par. 9, Law on Private Security (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 166/2012, 164/2013, 55/2016)

² Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for the security of persons and property: A Manual for Setting Up and Passing an Expert Examination for Performing the Issues of Security of Persons and Property, Skopje, 2008, p. 21

³ Roper, A., C.: Risk Management for Security Professionals, Butterworth-Heinemann, Elsevier Inc, 1999, стр. 4

The transport and the transfer of money and other valuable items cannot be excluded or avoided because they are necessary social need in the functioning of the modern living. It is logical to assume that it is easier to carry out an attack and assign the goods or other valuable items during their transportation, than when they are stored in an object with an organized security system.

The attacks on the cash in transit, criminally and legally determined as robberies⁴, are essentially brutal acts of violence of self-interest. The robbers decide to attack at a time when the presence of the citizens at the intended attack site is the lowest and at the same time endeavor to make the most of the surprise factor. In many cases, the attack is preceded by a prolonged planning process and detailed preparations, as robbers do not want to leave the course of a coincidence event. This is especially characteristic of professional, specialized and quite experienced robbers and banditry groups.⁵ Very often robbers use masking to remove the ability to be recognized by attackers. When carrying out the robbery attacks on money transport, the perpetrators mostly use guns and automatic rifles in order to intimidate persons involved in transportation and to easily seize spoils. As a rule, the attacked persons - employees in the transportation company or the security agency report the attack to the Police. At the time of the robbery, the victims are exposed to severe stress or direct physical attack, and they can also get injuries, so they are not always able to provide all the necessary answers to the questions about the exact time, place and method on which the attack was carried out, the appearance of the attackers, the damage done, etc. It is therefore particularly important for such persons to relax and reconcile before taking a statement from them. Once information about the robbery is obtained, it is necessary to quickly react by the internal affairs authorities in order to secure the scene of the criminal event and to fix the authentic factual situation during the inspection. If the police receive information that contains sufficient information about the executor and the direction in which it was directed, it would be right to simultaneously take chase after it, blockade and traffic control in order to find, capture and lead to a criminal sanction.

The research of the phenomenological characteristics of attacks on cash in transit enables the description of such criminal phenomena through their scope, dynamics, appearance forms, structure and structural modes, spatial and temporal distribution, etc.

⁴ The robbery is a criminal offence incriminated in Article 237, under Chapter XXIII entitled Criminal offences against property in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 37/1996, 80/1999, 04/2002, 43 / 2003, 19/2004, 81/2005, 60/2006, 73/2006, 07/2008, 139/2008, 114/2009, 51/2011 - two amendments, 135/2011, 185/2011, 142/2012 , 166/2012, 55/2013, 82/2013, 14/2014, 27/2014, 28/2014, 115/2014, 132/2014, 160/2014, 199/2014, 196/2015, 226/2015, and Decisions of the CCRM No. 220/2000, 210/2001, 206/2003, 228/2005)

⁵ Gill, M.: The Craft of Robbers of Cash-in-transit Vans: Crime Facilitators and the Entrepreneurial Approach. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Volume 29, Issue 3, September 2001, 277-291

The phenomenological characteristics of such attacks, in addition to identifying as a phenomenon and their movement in the space of a particular state, will allow them to develop as deep as possible in the phenomena and to perceive certain relations and states that move in the direction to explain their etiology. The criminal-criminological analysis enables the initiation of the application of more appropriate criminal measures (operational-tactical and technical measures and activities and investigative actions) for successful detection of criminal activities on money transportation, providing evidence and finding perpetrators, as well as appropriate preventive measures for prevention of future such harmful events.⁶ This would mean that the prosecution authorities – in particular the Police – must act in accordance with the principle of speed and surprise, and implement them as soon as possible after hearing about an assault on cash in transit vehicles, all the necessary operational-tactical measures and investigative actions.

Criminalistics-criminological features of the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles in the Republic of Macedonia

The attacks on the cash in transit can be differentiated in two forms: attacks on the cash in transit vehicles and attacks on the people who are transferring the money from the vehicle to the end destination. About the attacks on the cash in transit in the Republic of Macedonia in the period from 2005 to 2016⁷ the number of attacks is relatively small – 11 attacks. By years the scope of the attacks is from 1 to 6 which is relatively small number according the total number of robberies in this period. Given the harmfulness, danger, seriousness, complexity and consequences that these attacks on the process of money transportation leave, they merit scientific attention, as well as special research and analysis.

The attacks on the cash in transit vehicles are specific, unusual, characteristic, leaving more serious consequences compared to the other ways of committing the criminal act of robbery. In general, the way of their implementation asks more organized approach, special planning, involving more people, association, reconnaissance, over-sight, gathering of information, etc. Such attacks have advantages and disadvantages compared to other types of robberies.

⁶ Murgoski, B., Babanoski, K.: Preventive measures of the security of cash in transit, Yearbook, Faculty of Security, Skopje, 2011, pp. 246-257

⁷ Some of the data are listed according to the research conducted for the needs of the MA thesis entitled Security of the cash in transit in the Republic of Macedonia – preventive-operational aspects by Kire Babanoski, defended at the Faculty of Security - Skopje on 03.06.2011. It examines the criminal-legal, criminological-victimial and criminal-operational characteristics of the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles in the Republic of Macedonia in the period from 2005 to 2010. The characteristics examined for each of the attacks are individually: date, day, time, place, number of perpetrators, detected perpetrators and helpers, used firearms, damage (in millions of euros), insurance of funds, the owner of the means, the transport operator, the number of persons who were conducting the transport, the victims (injured, killed) and the phase of the procedure in which the cases were at the moment of the researching.

On the one hand, they are attractive because robbers can acquire huge amounts of money without complying with the threat of being trapped inside the bank or another commercial company. On the other hand, they are caused because the robbers have to face directly the armed guards or overtake a strong bulletproof vehicle⁸. Having examined these challenges, it follows that the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles are attractive to criminals with greater experience and skills.

Also, a tempting target for the robbers may be the situations of providing money supply to ATMs by the private security personnel and bank employees. Given their fixed location, which is often in open and public places, the risk of being attacked is greater.

In the past period, in the Republic of Macedonia, were detected several attacks on the cash in transit vehicles of private security agencies, banks, post offices, etc. For illustration, brief descriptions of the criminal situation of some of them follow:

- 16.12.2005 – by four robbers armed with automatic weapons was robbed a vehicle of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Posts that was transferring € 600.000 to the Post Office in Shuto Orizari in Skopje;
- 18.04.2006 – a vehicle of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Posts secured by police vehicle with two police officers in Mala Recica, Tetovo, was blocked by two cars. Several robbers entered the vehicle and took away seven bags with € 160.000;
- 18.08.2007 – near the Mall Mavrovka in Skopje was caused a planned car crash with the vehicle of Commercial Bank – Skopje by a car full of masked and armed people. By threat to life were taken the bags with money which value was € 140.000;
- 16.11.2007 – at 7 o'clock in the morning toward the people securing the transfer of money while waiting at the traffic lights was started a fire. One person was killed and his two colleagues were injured. The robbers knew that in the vehicle were € 200.000;
- 13.03.2008 – a gang of robbers armed with automatic weapons on the street in Chair in Skopje, greeted the vehicle of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Post which was transporting € 650.000. There were wounded persons who carried out the transport, and the robbers have escaped with the money;
- 07.05.2008 – five armed people at the first pay toll at the highway Kumanovo-Skopje have robbed a vehicle of Macedonian Post and stole € 100.000;
- 01.07.2009 – at the highway Veles-Skopje near Kadino three bags with money ended up in the car of several masked robbers armed with guns who have forcefully stopped the vehicle of Ohrid Bank.

⁸ Murgoski, B., Babanoski, K.: Special transport vehicles as a preventive measure for the security of cash in transit, Horizons II, year VII, number 7, University "St. Clement of Ohrid" – Bitola, Bitola, December 2011, pp. 497-507

The Bank didn't say publically how much money was stolen;

- 08.01.2010 – by armed robbers the vehicle of Stopanska Banka – Bitola was greeted at the exit from Prilep to Bitola and left without € 450.000. One of the persons who carried out the transportation of money was injured;
- 07.05.2010 – a masked bandit with a pointed pistol and pepper spray took away a bag of money from one of the employees of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Post, and then expelled the two others from the vehicle. He stole the money that was intended for pensions;
- 25.05.2010 – two armed robbers failed to seize the money from the toll ramps of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Roads. The event ended with one killed and one seriously injured person who was transporting, car robbery and a cannon from bullets along Veles-Skopje highway;
- 08.02.2016 – two armed robbers at a pedestrian crossing in front of the Pensioners' Association in Veles attacked a vehicle of a private security agency carrying cash boxes for ATMs. In a short time, the police found the perpetrators and boxes of money in the vehicle of the robbers that left the crime scene.

Of the eleven cases shown, it can be ascertained that as many as ten were concentrated in the first six years of the analysis, ie in the period from 2005 to 2010. In the next five years, that is, the period from 2011 to 2015, no attack on a cash in transit vehicle occurred, which means that a peaceful period has occurred for the employees who perform this type of security job. The latest attack is registered in 2016. What are the reasons for this situation? It cannot be said with certainty, but there are a number of factors that contribute to the disappearance of the cash in transit attacks. The managers of the private security agencies have become aware of the danger that the transport and transfer of money and other valuable goods carry with them, and have undertaken a series of preventive measures for its successful performing. The introduction of the new precise legal regulation through the Law on Private Security⁹ and the detailed elaborated practical solutions in the Rulebook on the manner of performing the transport and transfer of money and other valuable goods¹⁰ largely influence the modernization and professionalization of this activity and its professional implementation. For these reasons, criminals gradually lost their desire and willingness to attack a well-relieved money transfer knowing that the chances of being discovered and captured are tremendous. So, at that time, they reoriented to commit classical robberies to banks, post offices and other financial corporations. However, the last attack in 2016, recalls that despite raising the level of performing of money transportation, however, there are criminals who decide to commit an attack and to seize the money that is being transferred.

⁹Law on Private Security (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 166/2012, 164/2013, 55/2016)

¹⁰ Rulebook on the manner of performing transport and transfer of money and other valuable goods (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 89/2013)

They choose a target and only wait for the right moment when a security procedure is omitted or when security workers will make a mistake or omission in one of the steps within the security process. Therefore, if all the safety rules are not respected in securing the transportation of money and other valuable goods¹¹, it is very likely that in the future there would be such other attacks.

In the Republic of Macedonia, in the research period, the treasuries of the post offices and the banks remained without more than € 2 millions. In addition, nine persons suffered with injuries, and two people lost their lives. The police record the black statistics, and so far a significant part of the money has not yet been found, nor was found out how the robbers knew about the transfer values, which means that the logistic of the robbers, the way of planning and carrying out the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles remain mystery.

In the Republic of Macedonia, the armed attacks on cash in transit vehicles are always carried out by blocking the vehicle while in motion or by attack while the vehicle is waiting for a traffic light. So far no attacks have been noticed on the transportation of money when the vehicle is parked and money is delivered or taken. The robbers in the Republic of Macedonia do not recognize the advantages in this way, given the increased frequency of people, the higher degree of secured facilities, and the difficulties of moving away from the scene and so on.

In addition to the manner of carrying out the robbery attacks on the cash in transit vehicles, it is important to study the means by which such attacks are carried out in the Republic of Macedonia. With this it can be seen some personal characteristics of the perpetrators. Although at first the means of execution are directly related to the manner of execution, it is, however, more closely related to the personal attributes of the transaction. In the Republic of Macedonia the robbers of the cash in transit vehicles use firearms – pistols and automatic rifles to fulfill the threat and cars for faster escape from the crime scene.

The profitability of the load in cash in transit vehicles makes them an attractive target for attack. Certainly, in this case, the robbers are at high risk: the vehicles are mobile, there is a direct confrontation with the security personnel, because the guards must be obstructed directly and in the vehicles there is a higher level of security than in other potential targets. Consequently, in troubled attacks on cash in transit vehicles, people who are capable, committed and trained to cope with that risk are usually engaged.

If the robbery is successful that at least means obtaining the expected prey, escape from the crime scene and escape arrest and prosecution. This also means that the various types of risks have been carefully and well managed throughout the event by the robbers.

¹¹ For the safety rules and procedures for providing this type of transport in more detail at: Babanoski, K., Ilijevski, I., Dimovski, Z.: Handbook for security of the transportation and transfer of money and other valuable goods, Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for private security, Skopje, 2016

As victims or damaged in the belligerent attacks on cash in transit vehicles, the legal entities for which the money is transferred are the primary ones. This is primarily meant for banks, post offices, exchange offices, betting houses and other financial institutions, organizations and companies that need cash transportation. Also, immediate victims of such attacks are the persons who perform the cash transportation. Most often, they are employed in private security agencies, but also the police officers in cases when the cash in transit is done by the Police.

The owners of the funds that were subject of transport, when the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles in the Republic of Macedonia were carried out, were in six cases public enterprises, most often the Public Enterprise Macedonian Post, but also the Public Enterprise Macedonian Roads in one case and in the remaining five cases were banks. The robbers, most often, choose to attack the vehicles of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Post, in the period when the money intended for paying pensions is transferred. Each month, at the same time, these funds are transferred to the units in the postal network, so the robbers do not have to work hard to reach such information (they should not recruit or bribe a person to tell them when the money will be transferred so they have one trouble less, so they focus on other details when planning the attack).

As subjects that carried out the transport, when the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles in the Republic of Macedonia were committed, in most cases, even seven, were the employees who carried out the transport, without any associated (escort) security. In three of these cases, they were private security agencies that provided transportation of money for banks with special bulletproof vehicles, and only in one case the transport was carried out by the Police.

Nearly always, in the analyzed period, two or three persons were hired for securing and conducting the cash in transit. The number of persons involved in transport should depend on the amount of the value of the funds being transferred. But even in cases when money shipments worth € 450.000 and € 600.000 were transferred, they were carried by only two people. In the case in which five employees of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Post were attacked, financial assets worth € 650.000 were transferred.

The most common, and the only way of finding out about the committed criminal act of robbery on a cash in transit vehicle is the report by the attacked persons who performed the transfer, who can be employed in the entity for which the money is transferred, in a private security agency or, in the Ministry of Interior, the Police, if transport is provided by the police officers and they are attacked. The success of the police authorities in the discovery of the perpetrator depends on the speed of reporting by the victims in the particular case. In cases when the attacks are carried out in an urban area, a citizen (witness) who happened to be in the place and saw the event can be the one who reports.

When it comes to the sources of information about the preparation of a criminal act of robbery, or rather, a robbery attack on the cash in transit vehicles, it should be especially pointed out that in the process, it is very difficult to obtain initial information, actions with a high degree of conspiracy and discretion in their preparation. To this end, the law enforcement agencies should direct their activity to obtain information about various activities by which the robbers prepare their execution, such as supply of weapons, vehicles, organizing and dividing tasks and so on. The knowledge obtained from various sources is therefore necessary to undergo an in-depth control and analysis, based on a more organized approach, for the purpose of fully determining the truthfulness and accuracy of their claims. An important source for obtaining knowledge about the preparation of a certain robbery on the cash in transit vehicles is the operational activity of the authorized officials. Bodies of criminal prosecution by operational route can come up with original information about preparatory actions for this type of attacks. As a special way of getting information of the preparation is the informative activity of the police. The informer and the contributor can provide meaningful information if they are treated correctly and tactfully.

Criminal-operational activity after finding out about an attack on a cash in transit vehicle – case study

In order to better understand the circumstances, the manner of execution and the manner of detecting the attacks on the cash in transit vehicles, it is important to analyze the characteristic individual case, which has undergone all stages of detection and proofing. An interesting case for analysis is the attack on a vehicle of Stopanska Banka AD Bitola, at the exit from Prilep to Bitola, dated 08.01.2010, which was committed by a total of seven perpetrators and helpers, with large damage and international elements in it, and the money has not yet been found. Because of these specificities, for the needs of the research undertaking in this paper, that's why this case will be subject to analysis.

The data on the case were obtained from the verdict¹² issued by the actual and locally competent Basic Court in Prilep. The event occurred on 08.01.2010, and the convicted court verdict was passed on 01.10.2010. Information on the course of events after the court verdict was obtained from internet sources. For a comprehensive and full consideration of the particular case, it is necessary to consider the situation that preceded the case, the chronology of the case – the criminal situation (time, place, manner and means of execution), the participants in the case – the perpetrators and the victims, the criminal-operative acting to clarify the case and the consequences arising from it.

¹² Court verdict K. No. 91/10, Basic Court - Prilep, passed on 01.10.2010

Situation that preceded the case

On the basis of previously obtained information from a person from Bitola, the two executors realized that for the needs of Stopanska Banka AD – Bitola, the money is taken from the treasury of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in Prilep and transported to the bank in Bitola with a vehicle owned by the bank. Then they agreed and made a plan to steal the money from the vehicle.

On 08.01.2010, around 10:00 am, the two perpetrators walked out of the home of one of them with their vehicle and rushed to the branch office of Stopanska Banka AD – Bitola in Prilep, where they got together with the vehicle that carried the money and which the perpetrators recognized. Then they rushed to the exit of the city after the gas station and the hotel Salida, near the interchange in front of the exit from Prilep for Bitola. Here they agreed on what to do when the vehicle came from the bank. They decided to put a big stone on the road and with their vehicle to hinder the way of the transport vehicle. Here they waited for the vehicle from the bank about 40 minutes. At about 12 o'clock when the vehicle of the bank approached the scene, the perpetrators opened the hood of their vehicle and one of them stood in front of it pretending to repair it and the other on the driver's seat. At the moment when the bank vehicle approached the parked vehicle, the perpetrators moved their vehicle by placing it in a sloped position on the road and completely blocked the road so that it could not pass and was forced to stand still.

Chronology

The criminal event occurred with the use of a gas pistol and by using force and threat by the two persons that they would directly attack the life and body of the two officers from the security department of Stopanska Banka AD – Bitola and managed to seize four boxes with cash in amount of 27 million denars. The manner of execution was by obstructing the road of the bank vehicle – Volkswagen Golf 5 which transferred the money from the NBRM Treasury to Prilep for Stopanska Banka AD – Bitola with the help of the vehicle Renault 5 Campus. Due to the disruption of the road, the officers were forced to stand and one of the perpetrators holding a gas pistol in his hand fired one shot in the air and with a pointed gun to the officers came to the driver, summoned him to come out, hit him with the gun in his head and pulled him out the vehicle. Then he entered the vehicle and threatened with the gun of the other officer sitting on the co-driver's seat, driven him out of the vehicle. By driving the Golf 5 he has left the scene following the Renault 5 Campus driven by his partner.

They headed along the main road to Skopje and entered Prilep on one of the side streets, stopped in front of a house, took the four boxes with money from the seized vehicle, put them in their vehicle and parked it in a garage owned by one of the executors.

After the crime was committed in order not to be discovered, a third person helped with cover-up of the objects – two bags containing 27 million denars, which he again handed to a fourth person to hide them. He placed two travel bags with money in his cellar on the ground floor of the building. After that he took these money and took them to an unknown place. On 14.01.2010, he traveled to Skopje with a taxi and informed his parents that he was planning to leave for Switzerland. On 15.01.2010, from a railway station in Skopje, he left in an unknown direction and since then his trace has been lost.

The perpetrators, however, were sheltered by three of their friends who helped them not to be discovered after committing the act by hiding the traces.

With all these previously stated actions, several criminal acts were committed:

- Crime Robbery from Art. 237 Par. 3 in relation to Par. 1 and Art. 22 from the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia;
- Crime Coverage from Art. 261 Par. 3 in relation to Par. 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia; and
- Crime Assisting the perpetrator after committed crime from Art. 365 Par. 2 in relation to Par. 1 and Art. 45 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia.

Perpetrators

A total of seven people participated in the preparation, execution, assistance and concealment of the criminal work. Two people are direct perpetrators. They met each other for a long time after jointly serving prison sentences in the KPU – Idrizovo, Skopje. After serving the sentences they continued to contact.

The third and fourth persons were involved in concealing the crime by concealing the stolen money – illegally acquired property benefit. Other three people, however, helped the perpetrators not to be discovered, by sheltering them and hiding traces.

Criminal-operative treatment

For the purpose of clarifying and detecting the entire event, the police took the following operational and tactical measures and investigative actions:

- Crime scene investigation;
- By undertaking this investigation, all traces at the scene of the attack were fixed and picked up for the purpose of further investigation and determination of the source of their origin. In addition, a photo documentation was made and an on-site inspection report was compiled.
- Search of a home;

A search of the houses of the perpetrators was conducted.

- Temporary seizure of objects;

A certain amount of money (68.000 denars) was seized from the home of one of the perpetrators, mobile phones and many used telephone cards.

- Face recognition;

Recognition of the persons who took part in the event was performed.

- Identification of objects;

Recognition of the vehicle carrying the perpetrators was carried out.

- Announcing an international arrest warrant;

An international arrest warrant was issued for one of the perpetrators who left the country.

- Apprehension;

Six persons were arrested from a total of seven perpetrators. One person left the country and was unavailable to the prosecution authorities.

- Detention;

To all six suspects, a certain measure of detention was ordered.

- Taking statements from witnesses;

During the main hearing a statements of several witnesses were taken in order to provide arguments that would better determine the factual situation.

- Taking statements from defendants;

During the main hearing a statements were also taken from the defendants in order to provide arguments that would better determine the actual situation.

- Expertise;

Many different types of expertises were carried out by the Ministry of Interior – Department of Criminalistics Technique of soil trails on vehicle floor mats, vehicle color, cigarette smoke and biological material for DNA analysis, as well as investigation and expert analysis of gas pistols.

Consequences

With the robbery on the cash in transit vehicle, two bags containing 27 million denars were seized. From a criminal-legal point of view, it is a matter of great value or damage. The two people, who carried out the transport, received minor injuries, fear and stress, because of the threats they were referred to.

As previously pointed out, one of the persons who helped the perpetrators and hid the money, soon after the event left the country, more precisely he went in Rijeka, Croatia. The Basic Court in Prilep had issued a warrant after him. There, with part of the stolen money from Macedonia, he bought an apartment and a BMW car. He was not found by the police, but by members of the criminal underworld. Three people from Prilep managed to locate him, left to Zagreb, where they first rented an apartment and where they traveled several times to Rijeka following his movement.

Soon they decided to snatch him to told them where he hid the money. So one evening at about 10 o'clock in the evening, in a small street near the Railway Station in Rijeka, as he drove his new BMW was blocked by their vehicle Volkswagen Golf 5. They pulled him out of his vehicle and sat in their car. However, at that moment police special forces appeared, and in a lightning action lasting fifteen minutes, they surrounded the two cars, broke the glasses and defeated the group.

Dismissing the case

From a criminal-legal point of view, the event is qualified as a crime robbery. The crime of robbery, according to art. 237, par. 3 in relation to par. 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, appears that, by using force or threatening to directly attack the life or body of another, it will take away another movable object with the intention of unlawfully appropriating it and if during the commission of the offense of a person with intent a serious bodily injury has been inflicted or if the act has been committed as part of a group of gangs or if a firearm or a dangerous weapon has been used. For the perpetrator of this crime, a prison sentence of at least 10 years is provided. An act of execution of this crime is the use of force or the threat of immediate attack by the person in whose possession the object is for the purpose of confiscation of it, with the intention of its unlawful appropriation. In terms of guilt, an intent is required in the consciousness that force or threat is used for theft and that a foreign movable object is taken away with the intention of its unlawful appropriation. In coexistence, the co-perpetrator needs to have a common intent with regard to the use of force and the purpose for which it is applied.

During the criminal procedure it was established that in the critical time and in the critical place, the two perpetrators using force and threatening to attack the life and body of the victims – the officers of the bank, using a gas pistol from the vehicle of the bank, took away the money assets, owned by the bank. In the course of the criminal procedure, through the evidence procedure, the court found that in the actions of two of the involved persons (the first and the second one) are contained the elements of the crime robbery referred to in art. 237 par. 3 in relation to par. 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, which they made as co-perpetrators, upon previous agreement and joint participation in the commission of the crime.

It was also established that four of the perpetrators during the critical time period helped the two main perpetrators after the executed crime not to be discovered, hiding and covering up the traces and objects from the committed crime, knowing all the time that they are helping the perpetrators who committed robbery.

In the actions of all the other defendants (third, fifth, sixth and seventh person), the elements of the crime assisting the perpetrator after committed crime from art. 365 par. 2 in relation to par. 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia. That crime is committed by the one who will hide a perpetrator of crime for whom a prison sentence of five years or more is prescribed, or by hiding the guns, traces, objects or otherwise helping him not to be detected, or if someone hides convicted person. For the perpetrator of this crime, a prison sentence of three months to five years is envisaged. Regarding the blame, an intent is required and it consists in the awareness that through certain specific actions he is hiding and helps the perpetrator not to be discovered. There is no need to know what the prescribed penalty is in the law for that crime or its legal qualification, but it is necessary for the enforcement agent to have awareness of the real marks of the committed crime by the person assisting him.

It was further established that one of the defendants, covering the cases, specifically the seized money during the robbery, as well as the clothes that were carried on by the perpetrators during the execution of the crime, as well as the gas pistols, helped them not to be detected after the execution of the act. In its actions, the elements of the crime coverage from art. 261 par. 3 in relation to par. 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia. This crime costs the one who buys, accepts, or in some other way acquires, hides or explodes an object that he knows has been acquired by a crime or what has been obtained for him by selling or replacing, and the value of the object is substantial or the subject is good under temporary protection or cultural heritage. For the perpetrator of this crime, a prison sentence of three months to five years is envisaged. Regarding the subjective element of the existence of a crime coverage, it requires the existence of a direct intent, which consists in the awareness that the perpetrator hides an object for which he should know that it has been acquired with the crime, which should exist at the moment when he takes action, and in relation to the nature of the matter there may be negligence.

Conclusion

The violent attacks on money transport and other valuable goods in recent times in the Republic of Macedonia were frequent occurrences. By their consequences suffered several entities: the directly involved entities in the provision of transport (MOI and agencies for securing property and persons and their members), the legal entities for which the transfer is to be made (banks, post offices, exchange offices, etc.) and the insurance companies, which should compensate the damage.

The attack is the result of some violent, aggressive and brutal behavior of the individual. Earlier well-planned, aided by certain factors, reasons, conditions and instances, the attack is a dangerous act whose consequences (material damage, bodily harm, human loss) are particularly harmful and serious. Bearing this in mind, the attacks on cash in transit (like robberies) are placed within violent criminality (given the element of violence they contain in their actions, even though the intention is to gain financial assets).

The robbers consider the robbery to be successful if the financial gains meet or exceed their expectations, if they successfully escape the scene and feel satisfied with the work done and are sure that they have not left any evidence that could lead to their identification and prosecution. Success depends on their ability to take control of the situation at the scene, ie to deal effectively with all the risks that can (and do not) occur during the robbery. The robbers of the cash in transit vehicles pay more attention to it than the robbers of other types of objects.

The response of the security workers to an attack on the cash in transit vehicles should be the most severe and with all available means.

In case of an attack, the responsible person should immediately be informed of the implementation of the plan directly or through the workers in the security and surveillance center and the police in order to ask for assistance. If the person responsible for the immediate implementation of the security is temporarily or permanently disabled, it should be done by some of the remaining members of the team.

In the case of attacks on cash in transit, in addition to the fact that the security of the shipment and the vehicle is endangered, the lives of the members of the security personnel performing the security, the lives of the people responsible for the shipment by the user of the service, as well as the lives of people who accidentally found themselves at the site of the attack. Members of the security staff in such situations, in accordance with laws and by-laws, can use weapons in self-defense and protect the objects they are responsible for, but they must always be careful not to shoot at random passers-by. Therefore, attackers in such situations are in the lead because they want to achieve their goal, regardless of everything.

If any of the members of the team is injured, immediate help should be given to him, and this applies to all citizens who have found themselves in the place, as well as to the attackers.

Successful transportation of money and other values may exist if it is carried out fully professional, in a planned and organized manner and if the following rules are observed:• Developing a plan for the cash in transit (which includes the security assessment) that contains all aspects of transport from the starting point (departure point) to the end point (delivery point);

- Money and valuable goods should be transported with specially protected vehicles, with a precisely determined place where the bag will be placed. Vehicles must be fully technically sound, with a built-in alarm and a radio link for communication with the monitoring center for the monitoring of the transport;
- The vehicle must be driven at a constant speed and it should be 50-70 km/h in a populated area and 80-120 km/h on an open road, which is considered optimal and safe speed for this purpose;
- If more vehicles participate in the money transfer, they should be driven without allowing the entry of other vehicles between them. Vehicles should move in synchronized, at the same speed, and when stopped, they always be one behind the other;
- During the ride, the driver should be careful about some suspicious road activities and to check if someone is following the vehicle with the money, whether a vehicle or person is behind them for a long time, especially to look at intersections, bridges, tunnels, who are working on the road, etc., to which it is possible to come to some endangering;
- When taking or handing money and other valuables from and into the vehicle or from and in the facility, the security procedures must be respected depending on the number of persons involved, the formation that is applied, accessibility to the facility, etc.;
- In case of incidents and when the use of firearms is necessary, care should always be taken not to endanger the lives of other persons, especially if the attackers are fleeing to a crowd of people, and the weapon must not be used.

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