How Do Language and Thought Influence Each Other?

A Reconsideration of Their Relationship with Parallel References to the History of Philosophy and Cognitive Linguistics

Abstract

The paper explores the relationship of language and thought with respect to their mutual determination or influence. Two questions are considered crucial: how do we learn the meanings of conventional linguistic signs, including those for abstract concepts, and how do we express our original insights, thoughts and feelings through not-yet-conventional linguistic means. These are followed by succinct answers and extensive elaborations referring to opposite views and linguistic examples from the history of philosophy and cognitive linguistics. It is argued that linguistic expressions, including metaphors, mostly incorporate how people represent (or once represented) the world to themselves through imagination and present (or once presented) the world to others through language. Hence language neither directly shows how we conceive and understand the world nor how we construct it in our thoughts. On the other hand, symbolization through metaphor and metonymy, as well as innovative verbalization, enable our cognition to communicate novel as well as abstract and philosophically demanding meanings.

Keywords

language, thought, cognition, conceptual metaphor, verbalization, symbolic cognition, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, philosophy of cognitive linguistics, George Lakoff, Marc Johnson

Introduction

In social couple dances it is very important to know which dance partner leads and which follows, lest the harmonious dance be reduced from order to chaos. In the theory of language and the everyday practice of using a language it is equally important to know whether thoughts and intentions or linguistic signs and social norms of communication have a leading role in conversations and other verbal expressions. Do I speak and communicate my

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1 This paper has grown out of a conference paper held at the 25th Days of Fran Petrić in Cres, the annual topic being “Language and Cognition”. Since the time at my disposal was very limited, I had chosen the shortest way to make my point, and that was in form of questions, problems, and possible approaches to solving them. The basic structure of presentation has also been kept in this paper, although vastly extended and elaborated. Thoughts conveyed in this paper are, however, a condensed product of several years of exploration and pondering on the subject, especially during my parallel university studies of philosophy and linguistics. I am very grateful both to the participants of the conference and to the two anonymous reviewers of this paper for their helpful remarks.
thoughts to others through language or does our common language “speak with itself”2 through us?

Speaking more commonly in terms of modern Western philosophy, it is of basic importance to know whether and to what extent our language determines our thoughts, and vice versa. Is there any determination between the two? And if there is one, is it a strict determination or only a loose and partial determination (more naturally termed “influence”)? Moreover, is it a one-way determination (unidirectional, either as linguistic determinism3 or as decisive linguistic indeterminism), or a two-way determination (bidirectional, either as loose interdetermination or as strict parallelism)?

This paper is not the place to explore all the conceptual possibilities of this divisional schema, but rather to clarify some decisive points of the topic. The most commonly and reasonably held view is probably that there is a loose form of bidirectional determination between language and thought.4 This formulation, however, still needs clarification and precise explanation.

In this paper I will restrict myself to a consideration of some central features of the relationship between language and thought and language and cognition. This consideration will follow in two steps, each in the opposite direction: one from language as a socially normed system of signs that we learn (appropriate) through mental effort, and the other from our thought verbally expressing original insights and concepts through the potencies of a previously mastered language. This will be done through formulation of two corresponding sets of specific questions, and their succinct answers with ensuing elaborative references both to the history of Western philosophy and to the theoretical work of two of the leading members of cognitive linguistics. By reconsidering and differentiating the views they give on this issue I hope to shed some light on this important and intriguing subject.

Two overall questions that I find crucial in this respect may be formulated thus: Does language enable us to convey meaning to others, both habitual or conventional and new or non-conventional, or does it not? Does language construct the meaning we communicate to others, or do we signify the meaning we want to express by using linguistic signs as means of expression?

First question: learning conventional signs and designating abstract meanings

How do we learn which conventional linguistic expressions of a particular language community are ascribed to specific meanings?5

For the sake of simplicity and clarity of the argument, I will abstract here from the distinction between first and second language acquisition, and say that we learn which conventional linguistic expressions of a particular language community are ascribed to specific meanings by observing how a particular language community speaks about a representative variety of topics and by appropriating this use of linguistic signs into our own speech. Speaking in Kantian terms,6 we will thereby find some of the meanings ascribed to these expressions in our external or spatial intuitions, e.g. “near” and “far”, “front” and “back”, and some in our internal or temporal intuitions, e.g. “earlier” and “later”, or in our internal flow of thoughts and feelings, e.g. “sad” or “happy”. This, however, does not suffice to explain – from a Kantian perspective – how can we associate certain linguistic expressions with abstract concepts not representable in our intuitions.
The answer to this question is closely related to or even dependent on the question concerning the origin of our cognition. I will therefore first briefly outline two possible answers with the aid of both Kantian philosophy and cognitive linguistics.

Since there is no cognition (and hence no meaning) for us in any intuition taken alone, a concept must come to our aid to let us see what is given in the manifold (multiplicity) of external or internal intuitions. The concept will order the material given in sense impressions or pure intuitions and make it cognizable. This raises the question as to where these basic structuring concepts come from. Two basic answers were given in philosophy: from within our mind or reason (as “innate ideas” in the continental rationalist tradition) and from without our mind, in external sense impressions which provide us with experience (as in the English-speaking empiricist tradition). Both positions were brought to a higher synthesis by Kant. According to his position, sense impressions are necessary triggers of pure concepts (i.e. non-empirically derived concepts) which enable our understanding to form experience out of the material given to the senses (as affected either from within or without).

I will go further and dare to say that this position may also be a viable explanatory basis for an answer to the starting question as to how we ascribe specific meanings to specific linguistic expressions in a particular language community. Namely, we associate certain expressions we see or hear other speakers use with the ways they present or communicate certain things, states of affairs, thoughts or feelings, either to us, or among themselves. In this case their use of language enables us to make connections between certain expressions and i.e. a list of names for things and events, but only to state the problem for the present purpose as clear and simple as possible. I do not constrain meaning to (extralinguistic) reference (in Frege’s distinction of Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference); Frege’s famous example is that the morning star and the evening star have different senses but the same meaning/reference, namely the planet Venus. See: Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Verlag von C. E. M. Pfeffer, Leipzig 1892, pp. 25–50. Meaning can be found in various fields of our experience, not to exclude those stemming from inward intuition, abstract reasoning, meditation or contemplative speculation. Moreover, meanings are not conveyed by isolated words, but through sentences, themselves dependent on some context. Linguistic expressions may acquire different meanings in different contexts.

2 As paradoxical as the latter claim may seem, it is nevertheless boldly elaborated even in this same journal issue through an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Grammar (Josip Oslić, Verstehen und Nichtverstehen in der praxisbezogenen Hermeneutik Ludwig Wittgensteins).


4 A fictitious and general but already mature answer could be posited as follows: “Yes, to some extent, my thoughts are directed and shaped through the language I speak. And yes, to some extent, the language I use was and is being cultivated and developed through the communicative, cognitive and poetic efforts of previous generations of its actual speakers and even speakers of languages it has come into contact with.”

5 By formulating the question thus, I do not intend to reduce language to nomenclature, but on some context. Linguistic expressions may acquire different meanings in different contexts.

6 I make my point in terms of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) for two reasons. The first is that one finds here many basic and crucial conceptual distinctions that were previously and again today blurred, and the second is that they, as well as Kant’s philosophy in general, are still very present in today’s debates and supposed to be well known to a student of Western philosophy.
certain meanings. Maybe we can figure out what is the motivation behind a particular coupling of expressions and meanings, but in general we accept (tacitly in accordance with the Saussurean principle of the “arbitrariness of the linguistic sign”) that any possible meaning could be ascribed to any possible linguistic expression. Basically, this should be the way how we master conventional signs or the conventional usage of certain linguistic expressions in a particular language community.

However, there is another possible and maybe even wide-spread answer among today’s Western scholars that is boldly presented in cognitive linguistics, at least by their renowned representatives George Lakoff and Marc Johnson. These two scholars have invested much effort in formulating a sort of philosophical basis for the cognitive linguistic enterprise. Not all of their colleagues would openly give full consent to their theoretical underpinnings which hold an unmistakable and strong naturalistic and evolutionistic worldview. However, most of them seem to share and implement the view of these two scholars when it comes to the operative level of linguistic analysis. Lakoff and Johnson hold that the abstract concepts we have called Kantian pure concepts of understanding are not just occasioned by impressions and intuitions but moreover emerge directly from our interactive experience with the world. In *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) they called this position experientialism, strictly distinguishing it not only from rationalism but also from empiricism, i.e. from two positions which, according to these authors, both err in their common myth of objectivism and their claim to absolute knowledge. Later, as in *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenges to Western Thought* (1999), they put even more stress on bodily grounding and the all-pervasiveness of what they call conceptual metaphors. The cognitivist hypothesis of the *embodied mind* now explicitly supposes our meaning to be “grounded in” or originating from the evolutionary past of our bodies, from our bodily (sensory-motor) experience and from our interaction with our physical and social environment. According to these two linguists, even principles and basic concepts of mathematics and physics are grounded or emerge from our bodily experience via metaphorical mappings, e.g. the counting, addition, and subtraction of numbers emerge from a child’s experience of the counting, addition, and subtraction of objects in external object collections (e.g. piles of different fruits), while causality and force emerge from a child’s experience of manipulating objects in its environment. What in the Kantian view were *occasions* to activate concepts inherent in our mind are here understood as *causes or origins* of these concepts themselves. I consider it important to notice this difference between the two, and the major role metaphor here plays.

To better understand the presuppositions and scope of this influential cognitivist view, a look should be taken at the place of metaphors in their famous groundwork.

Already in their classical work of cognitive linguistics – *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) – Lakoff and Johnson claimed 1) to have discovered that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life”, and 2) to be able to reveal how “our ordinary conceptual system” is metaphorically founded by taking a closer look at (the English) language of ordinary communication. The presupposition of this approach is clearly stated thus:

“Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like.”
What is hinted at here soon became the norm in cognitive linguistics, namely that language is not investigated so much for its own sake, i.e. to understand and describe language and its structures, as for the sake of discovering and describing structures of human-specific cognitive (perceptual, conceptual, etc.) processes reflected in language.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{7} “Le lien unissant le signifiant au signifié est arbitraire, (…) le signe linguistique est arbitraire. (…) Le mot arbitraire appelle aussi une remarque. Il ne doit pas donner l’idée que le signifiant dépend du libre choix du sujet parlant: (…) nous voulons dire qu’il est inmotivé, c’est-à-dire arbitraire par rapport au signifié, avec lequel il n’a aucune attache naturelle dans la réalité.” See: Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, Éditions Payot & Rivages, Paris 1967, pp. 100–101. English translation (tr. Wade Baskin, ed. Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy, Columbia University Press, New York 1959, pp. 67–69): “The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, (…) the linguistic sign is arbitrary. (…) The word arbitrary also calls for comment. The term should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker; (…) I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified.”

\textsuperscript{8} That there is no official “philosophical position of Cognitive Linguistics” is stressed by Peter Harder: “No consensus has been achieved, either inside or outside Cognitive Linguistics, on the precise status and properties of mental entities, including their relation both to the human body that generates them and to the outside cultural and physical environment.” See: Peter Harder, “Cognitive Linguistics and Philosophy”, in: Dirk Geeraerts, Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p. 1242. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.001.0001. Interestingly enough, even in a cognitivist statement as reserved as this one, it is still the human body which “generates mental entities”. Let us also take two illustrations of Lakoff and Johnson’s rather crude evolutionism: [1] “Categorization is therefore a consequence of how we are embodied. We have evolved to categorize; if we hadn’t, we would not have survived. Categorization is, for the most part, not a product of conscious reasoning. We categorize as we do because we have the brains and bodies we have and because we interact with the world the way we do.” [2] “We have evolved within these limitations to have the color systems we have, and they allow us to function well in the world. Plant life has been important to our evolution, and so the ability to place in one category the things that are green has apparent value for survival and flourishing. The same goes for blood and the color red, water and the sky and the color blue, and the sun and the moon and the color yellow. We have the color concepts we do because the physical limitations constraining evolution gave evolutionary advantages to beings with a color system that enabled them to function well in crucial respects.” See: George Lakoff, Marc Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, New York 1999, p. 18, 25.

\textsuperscript{9} “The myth of objectivism has dominated Western culture, and in particular Western philosophy, from the Presocratics to the present day. The view that we have access to absolute and unconditional truths about the world is the cornerstone of the Western philosophical tradition. The myth of objectivity has flourished in both the rationalist and empiricist tradition, which in this respect differ only in their accounts of how we arrive at such absolute truths. For the rationalists, only our innate capacity to reason can give us knowledge of things as they really are. For the empiricists, all our knowledge of the world arises from sense perceptions (either directly or indirectly) and is constructed out of the elements of sensation.” See: George Lakoff, Marc Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1980, p. 195.


\textsuperscript{12} G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{13} “… an important reason behind why cognitive linguists study language stems from the
As it is clear from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, the reason why even ancient rhetoric encouraged using metaphors in public speeches was the awareness that people ordinarily converse in metaphors as much as in direct or proper terms for things. By appropriating such characteristics of conversational language the orator will sound natural and achieve a good oratorical style. That “metaphors are pervasive in everyday speech” is no discovery of the late 20th-century discipline of cognitive linguistics. On the other hand, that distinguished poets and rhetoricians and not communication on the streets and marketplaces were traditionally regarded as sources of clear and exemplary use of metaphors, is only understandable. To assume the contrary would be to expect that even scholars before us had to follow the enterprise of cognitive linguistics as if its views were universally self-evident and its methods and goals self-supporting, and not moreover arising from very specific historical and cultural circumstances coupled with technological development and scientific trends.

The serious divergent point of cognitive linguistics, however, is the embodiment hypothesis. In cognitive science, whose constituent discipline is cognitive linguistics, it has various more-or-less congruent formulations and applications, but the one used in Lakoff and Johnson’s groundwork is of special interest for our topic. According to Tim Rohrer, it could be described as “a strong directionality constraint on metaphorical mappings”:

“… they claim that we normally project image-schematic patterns of knowledge unidirectionally from a more embodied source domain to understand a less well understood target domain.” [emphasis Lj. F. Ježić].

In other words, they claim that we unconsciously structure and hence understand the conceptually more abstract in terms of the conceptually (i.e. perceptually) more concrete or embodied. In the way we understand things and affairs there is therefore an asymmetric mapping or unidirectional determination of experiential domains, e.g. the emotional or the abstract in terms of the physical or the spatial. They make their claim with recurrent recourse to the ordinary use of (the English) language. Their own linguistic examples will thus best serve to elucidate their claim.

For Lakoff and Johnson, the concept IN directly emerges from our spatial experience, e.g. “Harry is in the kitchen”. The use of this concept in other domains of our experience, e.g. social and emotional, is however metaphorical, as when one says “Harry is in the Elks (a basketball team)”, or “Harry is in love”. This does not mean that physical (spatial), social and emotional experiences are not equally basic, only that the latter two are – for speakers of English at least – structured through two metaphorical concepts in terms of the former: Social Groups Are Containers and Emotional States Are Containers, respectively.

“The word ‘in’ and the concept IN are the same in all three examples; we do not have three different concepts of IN or three homophonous words ‘in’. We have one emergent concept IN, one word for it, and two metaphorical concepts that partially define social groups and emotional states. What these cases show is that it is possible to have equally basic kinds of experience while having conceptualizations of them that are not equally basic.”

As we see, the “conceptualization” of someone’s membership in a social group and of someone’s emotional state is grounded in a human-specific concept emerging from a human-specific perception of someone’s presence in a bounded space (e.g. a room). The reason is that the latter has a clear boundary or image schema (in-out) the former two lack. This conclusion concerning the direction of human understanding (metaphorical mapping) is drawn from
(an interpretation of) linguistic data, i.e. the way we think from the way we speak. Since metaphors are pervasive in our everyday speech, they also, according to this account, determine the way we think.

This affects not only ordinary people in everyday conversations, but also the most distinguished thinkers in their abstract reasoning. In the second part of *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999) Lakoff and Johnson were eager to show how and which metaphors directed or even predetermined the scope and limits of the philosophical views of the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Enlightenment thinkers, Kant’s ethics, modern analytic thinkers, and Noam Chomsky – without any of these being aware of the metaphors at work! For Lakoff and Johnson, this is so because metaphors are not a matter of how we speak, but a matter of how our unconscious conceptual system functions. They hold it evident that prior to empirical investigations into the cognitive unconscious based on the embodied-mind hypothesis no thinker could have had an insight into that system. Both the cognitivist hypothesis and methodology, and the corresponding empirical investigations, were lacking.

“Traditional methods of philosophical analysis alone, even phenomenological introspection, cannot come close to allowing us to know our own minds.”

assumption that language reflects patterns of thought. Therefore, to study language from this perspective is to study patterns of conceptualisation. Language offers a window into cognitive function, providing insights into the nature, structure and organisation of thoughts and ideas.” See: Vyvyan Evans, Melanie Green, *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2006, p. 5. Also: “We view language as providing data that can lead to general principles of understanding. The general principles involve whole systems of concepts rather than individual words or individual concepts. We have found that such principles are often metaphoric in nature and involve understanding one kind of experience in terms of another kind of experience.” See: G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, p. 116.

The supporting citation (Rhet. 1405a) is provided later in this paper, in the standard translation under the editorship of David Ross.

The statement is elaborated on the two following pages: “The cognitive unconscious is vast and intricately structured. It includes not only our automatic cognitive operations, but also all our implicit knowledge. All of our knowledge and beliefs are framed in terms of a conceptual system that resides mostly in the cognitive unconscious. Our unconscious conceptual system functions like a ‘hidden hand’ that shapes how we conceptualize all aspects of our experience. This hidden hand gives form to the metaphysics that is built into our ordinary conceptual systems. (…) It constitutes our unreflective common sense. What is startling is that, even for most these basic of concepts, the hidden hand of the unconscious mind uses metaphor to define our unconscious metaphysics – the metaphysics used not just by ordinary people, but also by philosophers to make sense of these concepts.
As a consequence, “philosophical theories are largely the product of the hidden hand of the cognitive unconscious”.

One and, if only it were true, far-reaching example may suffice for illustration. For Lakoff and Johnson, Aristotle gave a classical formulation of “container logic” which forms the basis of all subsequent formal logic, but which is itself simply a consequence of the misleading hidden metaphor Categories Are Containers (for their members):

“… Aristotle accepted the metaphor Essence Is Form. As a result, his syllogistic logic is a formal logic. It is a logic of spatial containment that is metaphorically applied, via the metaphor that Categories Are Containers, to all categories, regardless of their specific content. It is the form of the syllogism that makes it valid, regardless of its content. This idea, that logic is universal and formal and independent of all content, has come down to us in contemporary formal logic.”

Their claim is that Aristotle thought of predication (i.e. categorization in the Aristotelian sense) in terms of spatial containment via image schemas he was unaware of. One may perhaps argue that it was already Aristotle who gave the basis for the set theory developed 22 centuries later. This claim seems to be supported not only by the place from Aristotle that Lakoff and Johnson cite, but also by the last books of *Metaphysics*. However, that there is an image schema called container, and that Aristotle used it unaware of what he was doing, is highly questionable.

Independently of the interpretative outcome, the issue amounts to whether we differentiate between logical forms and their (intuitive/graphical) representations, e.g. in Venn diagrams, or not, confounding them so that one of the two may be reduced to the other. In Lakoff and Johnson’s case: The Aristotelian logical relations between terms in universal propositions is reduced to relations of spatial containment between objects in space. With the aid of the evolutionistic explanations Lakoff and Johnson are fond of, the reduction would go all the way down to sensory-motor “inferences” we imagine to be present in “lower” animals.

If Lakoff and Johnson’s position were put in terms from the beginning of our paper, we may say that the language we speak partially determines how we think and act on the level of conscious intention, and is mostly determined by or reflects how our conceptual system works on the unconscious level. On the other hand, a better understanding of this unconscious level coming from the cognitivist exploration of, inter alia, language and its metaphorical expressions, could perhaps enable us to better manipulate others with its “hidden hand”, or, stated more positively, to intentionally improve (partially determine) how we and others think of or “conceptualize” certain physical, social, political, economic or mental phenomena.

The second question: creating non-conventional meanings and expressions as cases of metaphorization and verbalization

We may now move on to the second question which falls into two subquestions: a) How do we ascribe new or non-conventional meanings to conventional expressions, and b) how do we use non-conventional (i.e. not-yet-conventional) expressions to express our own original insights, thoughts and feelings?

Original thoughts, feelings and insights often require original linguistic expressions or the original use of conventional linguistic expressions. Because speakers of a language are unequally conscious of its nature and structure (how it is built and how can it be further developed), and because they, moreover, do not have the cognitive and aesthetic needs that go beyond the array
of conventional linguistic expressions and phrases, only some of them will use it creatively and thereby enhance the potential to express a wider range of meanings in the common language. This is thus an issue of special importance for creative poets, philosophers, mystics and scientists, who try to verbalize experiences, thoughts or insights which are present in their consciousness, but are not straightforwardly communicable by available linguistic means. Since all conventional signs were non-conventional once, answering the second subquestion can give us some idea of what it may have originally looked like to give the first names to things.

A straightforward answer to the first subquestion (2a) would be: this happens mostly through the conscious and constructive use of metaphor, metonymy, and, more generally speaking, symbols. It therefore raises the question as to the nature of metaphorization and its use in symbolic cognition.

The case denoted by the second subquestion (2b) is perhaps best exemplified by the innovative use of language in philosophy, which I will call verbalization. That the latter was regarded by Johnson and Lakoff in *Philosophy in the Flesh* must remove from the syllogisms that what may be called matter, preserving only its form. This was done by Aristotle, who introduced letters instead of concrete subjects and predicates.” See: Jan Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, Clarendon press, Oxford 1957, p. 2.

“Reason is evolutionary, in that abstract reason builds on and makes use of forms of perceptual and motor inference present in ‘lower’ animals. The result is a Darwinism of reason, a rational Darwinism: Reason, even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature.” See: G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, p. 4.

Could constrains posed on our language use through, e.g., the policy of political correctness affect our society’s views on related affairs and corresponding inherited values? An example of a new metaphor Lakoff and Johnson give in *Metaphors We Live By* (1980, p. 139) is Love Is a Collaborative Work Of Art. The explanation of this phenomenon runs as follows (p. 145): “New metaphors have the power to create a new reality. This can begin to happen when we start to comprehend our experience in terms of a metaphor, and it becomes a deeper reality when we begin to act in terms of it. If a new metaphor enters our conceptual system that we base our actions on, it will alter that conceptual system and the perceptions and actions that the system gives rise to. Much of cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old ones. For example, the Westernization of cultures throughout the world is partly a matter of introducing the TIME IS MONEY metaphor into those cultures.”
the Flesh (1999) as a product of the subconscious metaphorical mind, i.e. as another instance of metaphorization, was introduced earlier in this paper. In the following only my differing account will be sketched.

In order to give an answer to the second question in both of its parts, I think we need to make a distinction which is today often overlooked. Its simplest linguistic expression lies in the difference between concepts and (intuitive and imaginative) representations. The order we find incorporated into conventional linguistic expressions is primarily the order of human intuitive and imaginative representation. Language and linguistic expressions show us, for the most part, how we as humans represent (or once represented) the world to ourselves through our imagination and how we present (or once presented) our experiences with the world through linguistic signs to others. However, it neither directly shows how we conceive the world nor how we construct it in our thoughts. This statement holds for us both as individuals and as a language community.

As an example of how a linguistic expression of an abstract religious or philosophical concept may clearly point to the original representational mode of thought through which the concept was gradually reached and linguistically presented, we may take the noun spirit. Although its originally meaning in Latin was “breathing” and “breath” (Latin spiritus from a possibly onomatopoeic verb spirare “to blow”,27 analogous to the Old Greek πνεύμα “wind, breathed air, spirit” from πνεύμα “to breathe, blow”, and analogous to the Croatian duh “spirit” related to duhati “to blow (of mouth and of wind)” and dah “breath”), it has taken early on, under the influence of Stoic philosophy, the meaning of an aerial but intelligent and divine all-pervading active principle, and later on, under the influence of Jewish and Christian Sacred Scriptures and theology, the meaning of the third divine hypostasis of the Trinity (“Holy Ghost” or “Holy Spirit” as Spiritus Sanctus). Despite the linguistic formation of their expression, neither the philosophical concept of spirit, as in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Geist in German), nor the theological concept of the Holy Spirit, are conceived of as metaphors or metaphoric concepts. And we do not, hopefully, take recourse to the concept of physical breathing in order to rightly conceptualize them. Just as how in Christian iconography the depiction of the Holy Spirit as dove does not suggest we ought to conceptualize the Holy Spirit as a member of this bird species, but serves as a handy symbolic representation (an icon) of an otherwise non-depictable concept, so does the linguistic expression “Holy Spirit” symbolically point to a non-representable concept of a spiritual being via an original representation of breath or breeze. That this concept has been symbolically represented by the breath and the dove rather than, say, by body odour and a vulture, shows that some motivation lies behind a specific coupling of linguistic or iconic expressions with concepts. They are not automatically or randomly coupled by our cognitive unconscious, but chosen with awareness and forethought.

We could also question whether etymologically related terms, such as artistic inspiration or expiry date, are in today’s usage conceived of as metaphors or metaphoric concepts, although their formation supposes a metaphoric extension from their original meanings “breathing in” and “breathing out”, respectively.

The term concept(ion) itself, as well as its conceptual brethren perception, comprehension, and apprehension, apparently all once passed a metaphorical extension from some meaning of physical collecting or grasping to one of mental grasping. As far as we know, they were not served by our “cognitive
unconscious" (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphor concept Understanding Is Grasping), but by ancient Greek philosophy, at least since the Stoics. Cicero even reports how Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, used to describe what comprehension is by a gesture of a closed fist, and that the name was in fact chosen by resemblance to this non-verbal demonstration of a closed fist. An unconsciously working metaphor? It does not seem to be one originally, and even today only well-educated speakers are aware of the Latin etymology and exact meaning of these four terms. Their origin in his-

In Greek (approximately): ἐννοια in Latin: conceptus and visum (Cicero) or reprezentatio (later); in German: Begriff and anschauliche or eingebildete Vorstellung (viz. Anschauung or Einbildung).


If anything is metaphorical about them, it is the representational shift still discernible behind their linguistic formation. Under the representation of breath and air a fitting symbol was found for a spiritual being. In case the word spirit was in fact formed by onomatopoeic imitation of the sound of breeze or breathing, it could honourably stand for a success story a linguistic sign may only hope to acquire: from its humble beginnings of imitating natural sounds to the peak of its career in denoting the highest concepts of philosophy and theology. Interestingly, a parallel “success” in Indian culture and philosophy was achieved by the Sanskrit term ātmā. Originally meaning “breath” (cognate to, e.g., German atem “breath”), it acquired the venerable meaning “Self” in the philosophical system of Advaita Vedanta (the Self which is also Brahman or God, either in full non-dualism of Sāṅkara, or in “qualified non-dualism” of Rāmānuja). The intermediate meaning was “soul”, which could also be used as a reflexive pronoun (“self”).

Lakoff and Johnson consider this iconographic symbol, as well as all other “cultural and religious symbolism”, as a special case of metonymy because the dove’s natural habitat is the sky, and the sky metonymically stands for heaven, the natural habitat of the Holy Spirit. See: G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By; p. 40.

Cicero not only translated Plato’s Timaeus, but also coined philosophical terms in Latin after the Greek model. He thus consequently used the Latin comprehensio to stand for a very prominent Stoic epistemological term καταλήψις, both of them having verbs denoting some act(s) of grasping in their roots (com-prehendere and κατα-λαμβάνω). “… concepīō (= σοληψιμένον): contenir, recueillir; spécialement concipere sēmita, Cic., Dnu. 2, 10, 26, etc., d’où “concevoir” (sens physique et moral, concipere animō, Cic., Leg. 1, 59); conceptīōs (depuis Cic. technique) = σολήψις, M. L. 2115 (…) La plupart de ces verbes sont accompagnés de noms ou adjectifs dérives en -tus, -tō, -tīr (-tīrs), -tīcius, -tīus, formés vraisemblablement sur les modèles grecs en -ηψις, -ηπτός, -ηπτικός, qui appartiennent presque tous à des langues techniques (droit, grammaire ou rhétorique, philosophie) et n’apparaissent guère avant Cicéron.” See: A. Ermout, A. Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latin, p. 96. The Latin apprehensio seems to be modelled after Greek ἀντίληψις.

“… Yes, but you deny that anyone knows anything, except the wise person. Zeno used to demonstrate this with gestures [gestu conficiet]. When he had put his hand out flat in front him with his fingers straight, he would say: ‘An impression is like this [visum huissus modi est].’ Next, after contracting his fingers a bit: ‘Assent is like this [adensus huissus modi].’ Then, when he had bunched his hand up to make a fist [Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat], he would say that that was an ‘apprehension’ or ‘grasp’ [comprehensio/comprehensio]. (This image also suggested the name he gave to it, katalēpsis [lit. ‘grasp’], which hadn’t been used before.) [qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, qua ante non fuerat, καταληψις impusit?] Finally, when he had put his left hand on top, squeezing his fist tight with some force, he would say that scientific knowledge [scientia] was like that: a state none but the wise enjoyed (…)”. See: Cicer, On Academic Scepticism, translated by Charles Brittain, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Cambridge 2006, p. 84 (II.145). For the (inserted) Latin text s. Anthony A. Long, David N. Sedley, The Hel lenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, Greek and Latin Texts With Notes and Bibliography, Cambridge University Press 1987, p. 254 (41A).
tory of philosophy is present in the minds of even fewer scholars. Of course, one could still hear a sentence like “I couldn’t grasp his argument.” And this expression may be connected to the four mentioned above. Nevertheless, for today’s ordinary speakers of English the expression could hardly be “transferred” (i.e. metaphorical) from the original meaning in the physical domain of our experience, as it presumably might have been for those who introduced it to the array of meanings expressible by conventional linguistic signs. It now functions as (if it were always) a handy literal expression for two meanings: physical grasping and mental grasping (comprehension), depending on the intention of the speaker, and the context of the utterance. Since both experiences of grasping are immediate and basic, one can hardly give priority to one over the other. To do this would require some interpretation, and this interpretation would depend on an explicit or implicit philosophical position or world-view. A naturalist and an evolutionist could claim, as Lakoff and Johnson regularly do, that physical grasping is the source domain and mental grasping is the target domain, the first enabling naturally evolved beings called humans to structure and conceptualize the second. An idealist could claim exactly the opposite. He or she could even grant that in this or some other analogous case the denotation in the physical and empirical domain preceded that in the purely mental or abstract domain (according to the development of our understanding in the temporal order), and still claim that the logical or conceptual order goes the other way around. An undeveloped but verbalized representation of an external object (e.g. a pyramid) could both logically presuppose and by development be resolved into purely intuitive and conceptual structures (e.g. geometrical and logical). Moreover, our consciousness has precedence over any possible object of consciousness. How will it determine the directionality of metaphorical extensions or even mappings? By the principle of common sense? Technical utility? Profitable trends in the scientific community? Or by the truthfulness and best insight reached so far? There is also a third possibility in this directionality question, and it was hinted at by some critics of cognitive linguistics:

“… it is just as plausible to suppose that space, time, and other concepts are organized by a common set of abstract principles that are simply more transparent in spatial language than in other linguistic domains (…).”

The characterization “transparent” should also remind us that spatial determinations are more directly representable in our intuition and imagination than temporal determinations, let alone those which are purely conceptual (only intelligible). As such, spatial determinations could naturally serve to represent not only their own but also some more abstract mental structures (common to two or more domains). This would have an immense effect on our language if, according to the above hypothesis, linguistic expressions directly (viz. from their formal side) show how we (once) represent(ed) the world to ourselves through imagination, and not how we (now) think of it or conceptualize it. Therefore, even though “a common set of abstract principles” may be represented in language in terms of spatial determinations, it is not necessarily derived from the latter. It could consist of conceptual structures common to heterogeneous domains.

This possibility was excellently (clearly and shortly) explained in the early 1790s by the early Post-Kantian Humean sceptic Salomon Maimon in a discussion with the Berlin scholar and academic Johann Georg Sulzer. Linguistic expressions which are apt for denoting heterogeneous domains, and designate transcendental concepts, were termed by him transcendental expressions.
(German *transcendentale Ausdrücke*). Since Sulzer’s opinion about the pervasiveness of tropes (metaphors) in language is not without similarity to the position of cognitive linguistics, both Maimon’s critique and his own solution sound very relevant and up-to-date for our topic. The bulk of the argument is worth citing in full:

“In every language there are transcendental expressions, i.e. expressions that are common to both material and immaterial things, as for example, the *movement* of the body and of the mind [*Bewegung des Körpers und des Gemüts*], grasping [*fassen*] a body and grasping a thought and the like. Further, we know from the history of human development that sensible representations and concepts (with respect to our consciousness) precede intellectual ones. From this we infer that these transcendental expressions are originally and properly intended [*bestimmt*] for the designation of sensible objects, but subsequently diverted [*or: derived, German: abgeleitet*] from this application to designate the super-sensible; this notion is the source of the opinion about the tropes that I mentioned above. By contrast, I claim that, even assuming this were correct with respect to the history of our cognition and of its designation (language), it still does not follow from this assumption that these transcendental expressions should not be just properly used for the transcendental concept common to heterogeneous things (however I will never accept this assumption [as correct with respect to the history of our cognition], since the cognition of particular matters [*Materiellen*] presupposes the cognition of universal forms [*Formellen*], under which they are subsumed, and through which their cognition is effected).

32 “Take, for example, a metaphor like ‘UNKNOWN IS UP; KNOWN IS DOWN. Ex-samples are ‘That’s up in the air’ and ‘The matter is settled.’ This metaphor has an expe- riential basis very much like that of UNDER-STANDING IS GRASPING, as in ‘I couldn’t grasp his argument.’ With physical objects, if you can grasp something and hold it in your hands, you can look it over carefully and get a reasonably good understanding of it. It’s easier to grasp something and look at it care- fully if it’s on the ground in a fixed location than if it’s floating through the air (like a leaf or a piece of paper).” – This may be a clever explanation on their presuppositions. How- ever, if their presuppositions are arbitrary or downright false, this collective explanation of tree linguistic utterances via a common expe- riential basis is as arbitrary and artificial as any ad-hoc explanation, which does not take the diachronic perspective into account: the etymology and history of usage of such ex- pressions.

33 Cf. the quote from Hegel below in this article where representations are said to be “metaphors for concepts”.


35 Sulzer’s views were much more moderate than Lakoff and Johnson’s, but his follow- ing claim was still provocative enough for Maimon to respond: “It can easily be shown that the greatest part of every language con- sist of tropes, although most of them have lost their tropical force [*tropische Kraft*], and are regarded as proper expressions. (…) What all tropes have in common is that the concept or representation which one wants to evoke is not being evoked immediately, but through another concept or representation. This replacement happens either out of neces- sity, because one does not have a word which would be the direct expression of the matter, or intentionally. Out of necessity one denotes invisible things using names of visible things. However, as soon as one gets somewhat used to these tropes, they lose their force and func- tion as proper expressions. With regard to expressions grasp [*fassen*], see [sehen], compre- hend [*begreifen*, represent to oneself [*sich vorstellen*, deliberate [*erwägen*], it comes very rarely to our mind that these are tropes.” See: Johann Georg Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theo- rie der schönen Künste*, vol. 2, Weidmann & Reich, Leipzig 1772, p. 811. Lakoff and Johnson also claim that metaphors pervade our ordinary language, but they do not agree that conventionalized metaphors lose their metaphoric virtue and become equal to proper terms. “The fact that they are conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive.” See: G. Lakoff, M. John- son, *Metaphors We Live By*, p. 55. Namely, wasting time, attacking positions (in an argu- ment), and going our separate ways (out of a love relationship) are respective conventional expressions of the allegedly live metaphorical concepts Time Is Money, Argument Is War, and Love Is a Journey.
For example, we cannot say that if in paradise Adam first saw a red cherry and called it red, and then a red apple and called that red as well, it follows that he first used a prosaic expression, and then a poetic [expression], and that the expression red is proper with respect to cherry, but improper (and hence a trope) with respect to apple; in fact the expression red does not mean cherry any more than it means apple; instead it signifies what is common to both. It is just the same in the following case. Movement means change of determinations in time, but with the difference that in physical movement both the determination itself and its change are outer spatial determinations; whereas in mental movements they are inner relations (of identity or difference).\textsuperscript{36}

What in Maimon’s time was being distinguished (in the Aristotellean tradition) as proper and improper expressions or terms, were, in other words, literal and tropic (viz. metaphoric or metonymic) expressions. One and the same expression was literal for one meaning and tropic for another. Maimon was fond of systematically resolving cross-domain or metaphoric expressions into transcendental concepts, and metonymic expressions into what he called “rhetorical figures”, where one expression originally and properly belongs to one of two meanings, and is diverted or derived (German abgeleitet) from there to the other.

His first example of what is the only real type of trope concerning singular expressions can also serve as an illustration of how a new meaning can be given to an expression via metonymy. In German Abend signifies both the time of the day when the sun sets (“evening”), and the direction or region (“the West”, more commonly termed Abendländ) in which the sun is to be found before it sets. Since the two do not have something common to both (similarity or tertium comparationis),\textsuperscript{37} but only “refer to one another and reciprocally provide distinguishing marks for one another”, one meaning is the original and proper and the other derived and improper. In Maimon’s clever account, in this case the temporal determination gives its expression to the spatial (directional or geographical) determination.\textsuperscript{38}

It is noteworthy that in Maimon’s view languages do not lack expressions for abstract concepts, since transcendental expressions are the most abstract (being identical for different domains), but often lack expressions for concrete concepts (more determined than transcendental concepts, and hence confined to one domain). We have, e.g., an expression for movement in general, but not for physical or mental movement!\textsuperscript{39} Applied to Lakoff and Johnson’s example of the concept IN mentioned above, we have a common English expression for spatial containment, group membership, and the presence of an emotional state (“to be in love”), but not for each of these separately. Spatial containment may be the intuitively (sensibly) most perspicuous or transparent of the three and hence the first to be verbalized (linguistically represented). But are the other two, to which the expression is being metaphorically extended (“transferred”), therefore improperly denoted or conceptually dependent on the first one?

In passing, we should point out that Maimon’s concern with proper understanding and distinguishing between tropes and transcendental expressions lies not within linguistic investigations per se, but in demonstrating in the “interests of reason and true morality” that expressions for immaterial and purely intelligible objects are not improper or tropical expressions dependent on those for material and sensible objects, and that therefore “imagination does not triumph over reason”.\textsuperscript{40} We could say that, in principle, imagination has always served the purposes of reason in philosophy, occasional errors and abuses notwithstanding. In the Age of Enlightenment, which was on its wane in Maimon’s time, this still seemed to be obvious.
More typical examples from cognitive linguistics can also clarify how new metaphors may bring new meanings to linguistic utterances. The article of Panther & Thornburg in this same journal issue cites a nice example of how suggestive metaphors may have an emotional and imaginative impact on people’s approach to solving a social issue. Namely, the article of Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) which describes a psychological experiment in which the metaphor Crime Is a Virus was systematically used to describe the increased crime rate in one group of participants and the metaphor Crime Is a Wild Beast was systematically used for the same purpose in another group. The question of how to reduce crime in the city was answered by participants in the first group by pointing to the need of better education, reduction of poverty, and social reform, and in the second group by demanding law enforcement, a police force, and prison sentences. Such was the suggestive force of two imaginative and emotionally saturated representations evoked through systematically recurring metaphoric expressions! Were the problem of crime in the city conceptualized in the exact philosophical meaning of the term, i.e. elevated to or resolved/formd into a concept (“a full mental grasp”, i.e. a clear and distinct notion), as a virus problem in the first group and as a wild-beast problem in the second group, participants would probably ask for help from virologists, and from zoo keepers, hunters or animal liberationists, respectively. They themselves would perhaps be considered by people outside the two groups as in need of linguistic or even medical assistance for thinking that crime is a sort of virus or a species of wild beasts just because it was


The similarity (ουμοστης) between the meanings of the literal and the “transferred” (metaphorical) expression is, even in Aristotle’s view, characteristic of metaphors because it is in a way, the connecting link between these two meanings. “… a metaphor makes the signified somehow [more] known through the similarity, for those who metaphorize [use metaphors/transfer expressions to new meanings] always do so according to some similarity.” 36 η μπν γν μεταφορθ πει πως γνωρίμων τμ σημανόμενον δι τη ύμουσης πάντες γνω οι μεταφέροντες κατ’ τιν η ύμουση μεταφέροντον Τόπικα 140a10–12 (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Topica, translated by E. S. Forster (modified), Harvard University Press, London 1960.


Ibid., p. 157.


Part of the conclusion of Thibodeau and Boroditsky (ibid.) is worth citing here: “... despite the clear influence of the metaphor, we found that participants generally identified the crime statistics, which were the same for both groups, and not the metaphor, as the most influential aspect of the report. These findings suggest that metaphors can influence how people conceptualize and in turn approach solving an important social issue, even if people don’t explicitly perceive the metaphor as being especially influential.”
talked about figuratively as if it were a virus or a wild beast. This would be a case of conceptual confusion at the meeting point of literal and figurative language. What is at stake in this example are in fact not different conceptualizations, but rather different “imaginative emotionalizations”, i.e. different emotional engagements of our imagination in forming an attitude toward the problem of increased crime rate in the city.\(^{43}\)

Finally, I will point out some attested examples of a philosophically creative usage of available linguistic material, of which some authors give us abundant examples, e.g. Plato and Aristotle. When Plato needed an expression for the highest concepts which are conceived as archetypes of all phenomena in the word, he used the expression ἰδέα (ideá) or ἱλατος (eidos), meaning originally “sight” or the “visible external shape of something”, and afterwards “kind/species”, to express that new meaning. When Aristotle needed an expression signifying the material which receives its shape to form a concrete object, he generalized the meaning of the word ὑλη (hýle) “wood” to cover the meaning of material in general (an instance of synecdoche or pars pro toto). He even speaks of πρότειν ὑλη (protéi hýle) “primary matter” which can only be grasped by the intellect! Another example is the term οὐσία (ousía) derived from τὸ ὄν (tō ón) “being” and meaning “that by which some thing or person subsists”: it can be understood in the material sense as “property, possessions”, or in the conceptual sense as “essence”. Since philosophers try to find out the essence of things, ousia can be understood as denoting the answer to the question τι ἐστι (ti esti) “What is it?”, so this question was used by Aristotle metonymically in the nominalized form τὸ τι ἐστι (tò ti esti) in the same sense as ousia which is the answer to this question.

Aristotle famously coined many new terms, some of which were demanding both linguistically and philosophically, and are hence good examples of what I have called verbalization. One such is ἐντελέχεια (entelechéia), which could be paraphrased into its compound parts as τὸ ἐν τέλει ἐχεῖν “to be and persist in (the naturally purposeful completion)” (lit. “to hold oneself in oneself’s perfection”). Entelechy is the final or mature state a natural being by nature tends to attain, and brings it in a process (also called ἐντελέχεια) from potency (δύναμις, potentialia) to actuality (ἐνέργεια, actus). The term was so unusual and complex to the ancient Latin writers that no satisfactory Latin translation was found above that of action or actuality (actus), and the untranslated term entelechia was also used. Cicero even seemed to think that Aristotle gave this action the name ἐνδελέχεια “consistency” (quaund continua motio et perennis) as were it some previously unnamed “fifth nature” that the mind (mens) consists of.\(^{44}\) When Hermolaus Barbarus finally found a satisfying translation in perfectihabia in the 15th century, a rumour emerged that he asked the Devil himself “to remove the confusion” around the term and “provide him with the exact equivalent in Latin”.\(^{45}\) Such was the perception of the perplexity of the term coined by an extraordinary philosophical mind!

Aristotle was himself aware that metaphors pervade our everyday speech and he was aware of the need to create terminology and ways to achieve it by using metaphors (although this is, admittedly, not always evident from his extant written judgments concerning metaphor).

“In the language of prose, besides the regular [tò κτίσμαν] and proper [tò οἰκζίων] terms\(^{46}\) for things, metaphorical terms [μεταφορά] only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper or regular and the metaphorical – these and no others – are used by everybody in conversation [πάντως ἐπὶ μεταφοράς διαλέγομεν]. We can now see that a good writer can produce a style that is distinguishable without being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear, thus satisfying our definition of good oratorical prose.” (Rhetorica Γ II, 6.; 1404b32–36; emphasis and interventions Lj. F. Jezić)\(^{47}\)
“Further, in using metaphors to give names to nameless things [τὰ ἀνώνυμα], we must draw them not from remote but from kindred and similar things [ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοιῶν], so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said. (…) Good riddles do, in general, provide us with satisfactory metaphors: for metaphors imply riddles, and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor.” (Rhetorica Γ II, 12; 1405a33–35; emphasis and interventions Lj. F. Ježić)48

I hope that these examples have illustrated some ways of the creative use of conventional and new expressions to cover new, abstract and philosophically demanding meanings.

Interestingly, the view that the creation of philosophical terms in a language uses a metaphorization of accessible linguistic expressions and some new verbalizations, seems to be empirically confirmed by Plutarch’s description of Cicero’s way of creating Latin philosophical terminology:

“He made it his business also to compose and translate philosophical dialogues, and to render into Latin the several terms of dialectics and natural philosophy; for he it was, as they say, who first, or principally, provided Latin names for ‘phantasia,’ ‘synkatathesis,’ ‘epokhe,’ and ‘katalepsis,’ as well as for ‘atomon,’ ‘ameres,’ ‘kenon,’ and many others like these, contriving partly by metaphors and partly by new and fitting terms to make them intelligible and familiar.” [emphasis Lj. F. Ježić]50

To see, in addition, how far philosophers could understand metaphors in a different way than the one prevailing in linguistics, let us look at Hegel’s remark in § 3 of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences:

43 It may be worthy to note in passing that this shows that our relationship to a virus problem is much more benevolently and constructively rational than to a problem of wild beasts. Confronted with the first, we react, so to say, like a cultivated physician (how to cure), while the second still evokes a reaction of an attacked caveman (how to overcome by force).


49 “In Latin, respectively, visum (conception), assensio (assent), assensionis retentio (withholding of assent), comprehensio (perception), individuum (atom), vacuum (void); ‘ameres’ (indivisible), with its Latin equivalent, does not occur in the extant works of Cicero (Gudeman).”

“Since the determinacies of feeling, of intuition, of desire, of willing, etc., are generally called representations, insofar as they are known, it can be said in general that philosophy puts thoughts and categories, but more precisely concepts, in the place of representations. Representations in general can be regarded as metaphors of thoughts and concepts. But to have representations does not mean to know their significance for thinking, i.e., to have the thoughts and concepts of them. Conversely, it is one thing to have thoughts and concepts, and another to know what are the representations, intuitions, and feelings that correspond to them.”51

Here we find an explicit and – considering Hegel’s overall philosophy of the self-developing idea – very fitting example of the viewpoint mentioned above as giving the converse logical order of metaphorical extension: representations are metaphors for thoughts and concepts. Although this claim has a special meaning within Hegel’s system of philosophy, it also holds, in a sense, for most of Western philosophy. Imaginative representations and modes of thinking are interpreted or replaced by philosophers by a more purely conceptual way of dealing with subjects, as far as it goes. They are usually much more aware of the difference between the two than other people, and they make this transition with intent. As Hegel also pointed out in the quote, this includes an awareness of the need to know which representations can stand for or are fitting for which concepts. These are their symbols either by convention, or moreover by some natural motivation.

How philosophers “put concepts in place of representations”, regarding the latter to be symbols for the former, is perhaps best illustrated by the work of Philo of Alexandria, the most famous and influential Jewish philosopher of classical antiquity. Philo is the first thinker known to us who systematically interpreted great portions of the Pentateuch as an allegory of “Moses’ philosophy”. To be sure, from our perspective, Philo’s Moses draws abundantly on (mostly) Platonic and (sometimes) Stoic philosophy. Nevertheless, Philo’s work excellently exemplifies how (Jewish religious) representations could be thought of as symbols for (Platonic and Stoic philosophical) concepts. Let us look at some examples in his Allegorical interpretation of Genesis II. and III.52

“‘And the heaven and the earth and all their world were completed.’ (Gen. ii. 1). (…) For using symbolical language he [i.e. Moses] calls (συμβολικὰς λαβὼν) the mind (τὸ νοῦς) heaven (οὐρανός), since heaven is the abode of natures discerned only by mind, but sense-perception (ἡ αἰσθησίς) he calls earth (ἡγῆ), because sense-perception possesses a composition of a more earthly and body-like sort. ‘World,’ in the case of mind (κόσμος νοῦς), means all incorporeal things, things discerned by mind alone (τὰ ἁπάντα καὶ νοητά ἀπόκειμενα): in the case of sense-perception (κόσμος αἰσθητικὸς) it denotes things in bodily form and generally whatever sense perceives (τὰ ἐνσώματα καὶ ὁσα συνδόλως αἰσθητή).” (Alleg. interpr. I. 1.)

“‘And God planted a pleasure [i.e. pleasure-garden] in Eden toward the sun-rising, and placed there the man whom He had formed.’ (Gen. ii. 8) (…) Virtue is figuratively called ‘pleasure,’ (παράδειγμα μὲν δὴ τροποίς εἴρηται ἡ ἀρετή) (…) For God, being good and training our race to virtue as the operation most proper to it, places the mind amid virtue, evidently to the end that as good gardener it may spend its care on nothing else but this.” (Alleg. interpr. I. 45–47.)

Another example. On Philo’s allegorical interpretation, God created Eve after Adam in the Mosaic account because it forms a logical sequence to create the actual sense-perception (ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθησις) after the mind (νοῦς), so the former may be the helper of the latter. And God made Eve when Adam was asleep because perception begins when the mind has fallen asleep (i.e. when full awareness, which prevents the inflow of impressions, starts to retreat).53 Philo assumes this symbolism of Adam and Eve to be further confirmed by the mind being an active faculty and the sense-perception a passive (receptive) faculty, analogous to man being symbolically imagined as the active part
and woman as its passive counterpart. In order to bring both of them together in the apprehension of sensible and intelligible objects, a third was needed, “a bond of love and desire, under the rule and dominion of pleasure (ἡ δονή), to which the prophet gave the figurative name of a serpent (συμβολικός ὄφιν ὁνύμασε; lit. ‘which /pleasure/ he symbolically named serpent’).”

Concluding remarks

Pain and pleasure or sorrow and thrill express themselves naturally through inarticulate sounds. The mind expresses itself through language. However, the mind’s articulation through language does not make it indistinguishable from its own means of expression. It may be influenced by language, but can also influence it, enhance it, or even transcend it through other verbal and non-verbal linguistic and symbolic means of communication. Mastering a language through knowledge and creative usage makes us more resistant to its possible subconscious influence on our thoughts and attitudes, and, in general, more conscious of the boundaries the language we use sets before us in communication and cognition.

A means to an end is not to be mistaken with the end itself. If the human language has evolved to serve the communicative function, it must be able to convey meanings. These are for most people’s needs and for most of the time expressible by conventional linguistic means. However, at other times, some people, especially poets, philosophers, scientists, and mystics, also need non-conventional linguistic means, either to convey a seemingly well-known but worn-out meaning afresh, or to render an original or completely new meaning expressible through their language. In this paper many examples have been as being capable of discourse. Well, there is another power or faculty in the soul, closely akin to these, namely that of receiving sense-impressions (ἡ ισθητική), and it is of this that the prophet is speaking [as of Eve]. For his immediate concern is just this, to indicate the origin of sense-perception. And logical sequence leads him to do so. For it was requisite that the creation of mind should be followed immediately by that of sense-perception, to be a helper and ally to it. (…) How is it, then, produced? As the prophet himself again says, it is when the mind has gone to sleep that perception begins, for conversely when the mind wakes up perception is quenched.” Philo, Al- leg. Interpr., II. 23–25


53 “We are rational beings, on the one hand as being partakers of mind, and on the other hand
presented of how philosophers found expression for their concepts, either through the “transference” (metaphoric extension) of conventional linguistic expressions to new meanings, or by coining new terms out of available linguistic material (“verbalization”).

As a new and progressive scientific discipline within cognitive science, cognitive linguistics has broadened our horizons in the last decades by new and exciting ways of understanding language and cognition, especially through the lens of meaning (cognitive semantics). However, when it makes pretensions to a full and only viable explanation of human cognition, downplaying and replacing philosophy, various errors may occur. Some errors on the conceptual level, with references to blurred philosophical distinctions, were discussed in this paper.

When not speaking metaphorically (pars pro toto), conceptualization cannot mean formation of any kind of mental representation, but the formation of a complete mental grasp, i.e. of a concept. Literal and metaphorical expressions of a language do not directly show us how their speakers conceive or conceptualize the world, but only – and through particular cases – how they (once)57 imaginatively represented the world through language in order to communicate their experience and cognition of it. However, these imaginative representations could serve and have served as symbols for concepts, which finally enabled people to structure and order all of their experiences and knowledge into coherent wholes, both in philosophy and in special sciences.

Ljudevit Fran Ježić

Kako jezik i mišljenje utječu jedno na drugo?

Razmatranje njihova odnosa uz uspoređno uključivanje povijesti filozofije i kognitivne lingvistike

Sažetak

U radu se istražuje odnos između jezika i mišljenja s obzirom na njihov mogući uzajamni utjecaj. Dva se pitanja uzimaju za ključna: kako učimo značenja konvencionalnih jezičnih znakova, uključno s onima za apstraktno značenje konvencionalnih jezičnih znakova, i kako izražavamo naše izravne uvide, misli i osjećaje još nekonvencionaliziranim jezičnim sredstvima. Na pitanja se sažeto odgovara, a potom se odgovori razrađuju pomoću suprotstavljenih gledišta te jezičnih primjera iz povijesti filozofije i kognitivne lingvistike. Zastupa se stav da jezični izrazi, uključno s metaforama, pretežno u sebe ugrađuju kako si ljudi predodavaju svijet (ili su nekoč predodavali svijet) svijet uobzirući i kako ga takva drugima jezično predstavljaju (ili su ga predstavljali). Jezik zato ne pokazuje izravno niti kako svijet poimamo i razumijevamo niti kako ga konstruiramo u svojem mišljenju. S druge strane, simbolizacija posredstvom metafore i metonimije te tvorba novih riječi i izraza (verbalizacija) omogućuju našoj spoznaji da priopći nova te apstraktna i filozofski zahtjevna značenja.

Ključne riječi

jezik, mišljenje, spoznaja, konceptualna metafora, verbalizacija, simbolička spoznaja, Aristotel, Immanuel Kant, filozofija kognitivne lingvistike, Georg Lakoff, Marc Johnson
A diachronic perspective in linguistics is necessary if we are to understand the original and hence also the present meanings of linguistic expressions, and in general to gain an insight into how language functions by looking at how it comes into existence and evolves.