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Igor Wysocki
Walter E. Block

OBRANA ROTHBARDOVOG STAJALIŠTA O KRIVULJI POTRAŽNJE NASPRAM HUDIKOVE KRITIKE

A DEFENSE OF ROTHBARD ON THE DEMAND CURVE AGAINST HUDIK'S CRITIQUE

SAŽETAK: Prema Rothbardovom (1962.) stajalištu, krivulje potražnje kreću se uvijek, bez iznimke i nužno prema dolje. Hudik (2014.) to negira. Ovaj rad pokušaj je obrane Rothbardove analize naspram Hudikove kritike.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: granično zadovoljstvo, krivulja potražnje, Giffenovo dobro

JEL kategorija: A10

ABSTRACT: In Rothbard's (1962) view, demand curves always and ever and necessarily slope in a downward direction. Hudik (2014) demurs. The present paper is an attempt to defend Rothbard's analysis against Hudik's critique.

KEY WORDS: marginal utility, demand curve, Giffen good

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Igor Wysocki, *Independent Scholar* **e-mail:** igorwysocki82@wp.pl

Walter E. Block, *Ph. D., Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics* **address:** Loyola University New Orleans, 6363 St. Charles Avenue, Box 15, Miller Hall 318, New Orleans, LA 70118 **phone:** (504) 864 7934 **e-mail:** wblock@loyno.edu

UVOD

Rothbard (1962.) tvrdi da se krivulja potražnje, temeljena na zakonu graničnog zadovoljstva, uvijek kreće prema dolje. Hudikovo (2014) stajalište jest da Giffenovo dobro predstavlja tome protuprimjer. Autori ovog rada na strani su prvog autora te pokušavaju ukazati na pogreške drugoga. Rad je uglavnom strukturiran kao i Hudikov doprinos; zaista, pružamo, ako ne red po red, onda odlomak po odlomak kritiku na njegov rad. Drugi dio posvećujemo Hudikovim komentarima o redoslijedu preferencija, ordinalnoj naspram kardinalnoj korisnosti, zakonu opadanja graničnog zadovoljstva i pretpostavljenoj sličnosti neoklasične i austrijske škole ekonomije o ovim pitanjima. Treći dio rada posvećen je kritičkoj analizi zakona graničnog zadovoljstva. U četvrtom dijelu dajemo kritički osvrt na Hudikov tretman zakona o graničnom zadovoljstvu i krivulje potražnje, dok u petom dijelu dolazimo do zaključka vrlo različitog od Hudikova o usporedbi austrijske i neoklasične škole spram krivulje potražnje. Zaključak donosimo u šestom dijelu.

NEKOLIKO KOMENTARA

Prema Hudikovom stajalištu[1] ne postoji razlika između neoklasičara i Austrijanaca kad je posrijedi teorija potražnje. To nije točno. Većina ekonomista prihvaća Giffenovo dobro, koje podrazumijeva rastuću krivulju potražnje, dok prakseolozi to izričito poriču. Zašto? Zbog činjenice da kada se krećemo krivuljom potražnje, sve ostalo mora nužno biti konstantno osim cijene i količine,[2] barem prema austrijskoj tradiciji.[3] No Giffenovo dobro presudno ovisi također i o promjeni dohotka,[4] nečemu što je strogo zabranjeno kod poslušne krivulje potražnje.

Naš autor smatra da zakon graničnog zadovoljstva nije bitan u određivanju individualne potražnje, što može biti u skladu s mišljenjem modernih ekonomista no ne s onim Austrijanaca.[5] U svakom

INTRODUCTION

Rothbard (1962) maintains that the demand curve, based upon the law of marginal utility, is downward sloping. Hudik (2014) takes the view that the Giffen good provides a counter-example. The present authors take the side of the former, and attempt in this paper to focus on the errors of the latter. It is organized in much the same manner as is Hudik's contribution; indeed, we provide if not a line by line critique of it, then one that flows from paragraph to paragraph. In section II we take issue with several of Hudik's comments concerning preference orderings, ordinal versus cardinal utility, the law of diminishing marginal utility and the supposed similarity between the neo-classical and Austrian Schools of economics on these matters. Section III is devoted to a critical analysis of the law of marginal utility (LMU). In section IV we comment critically on Hudik's treatment of the law of marginal utility and the demand curve. In section V we reach a very different conclusion than does Hudik on the comparison of the Austrian and neoclassical schools on the demand curve. We conclude in section VI.

SEVERAL COMMENTS

In the view of Hudik[1] there is no difference between the neoclassicals and the Austrians "as far as … demand theory is concerned." This is not true. Mainstream economists embrace the Giffen good, which implies an upward sloping demand curve, while praxeologists reject this out of hand. Why? This is due to the fact that when we move along the demand curve, everything else must necessarily be held constant except price and quantity,[2] at least in the Austrian tradition.[3] But the Giffen good depends, crucially, upon income altering as well,[4] something strictly forbidden in a well behaved demand curve.

Our author opines that the law of marginal utility "is irrelevant for deriving individual demand." This may well be the case for traditional economists, but slučaju, Hudik ne nudi nikakav dokaz kojim bi potkrijepio svoju tvrdnju, pri čemu sam navodi citat Hoppeovog (2007[1995], str. 14) briljantnog uvida: "kad god ponuda nekog dobra poraste za jednu dodatnu jedinicu, s time da se na svaku jedinicu gleda kao da potrošaču nudi jednaku uporabnu vrijednost, vrijednost te jedinice mora se smanjiti, jer se ta dodatna jedinica može upotrijebiti samo kao sredstvo postizanja cilja koji se smatra manje vrijednim od najmanje vrijednog cilja koji zadovoljava jedinica takvog dobra ako bi ponuda bila manja za jednu jedinicu".

Ovaj autor tvrdi da je "presudna pretpostavka obiju škola, neoklasične i austrijske, postojanje redoslijeda preferencija". Opet, ne. Ne može se poreći da i Austrijanci i neoklasičari dopuštaju redoslijed prema preferencijama, odnosno ordinalnu korisnost, no neoklasičari također prihvaćaju kardinalnu korisnost, koju Austrijanci snažno, pa čak i silovito odbijaju.[6]

GRANIČNO ZADOVOLJSTVO

U ovom nam dijelu gurman Hudik poslužuje paletu salata i kolača od kojih svi trebaju četiri rajčice i velik broj jaja. Što mu je svrha u ovome dijelu? Navodno da prikaže da je Rothbardova tvorba krivulje potražnje na temelju potrošačkih preferencija neispravna. Naš autor ovdje započinje dubljim razmatranjem koncepata "relevantne jedinice" i "jednake uporabne vrijednosti". No tu zastranjuje.

Na primjer, pogledajmo ovaj redoslijed preferencija:

1. Kolač A, koji se može napraviti od samo 2 jaja.

2. Kolač B, koji se može napraviti od samo 3 jaja.

Pod pretpostavkom *ceteris paribus*, a ne navodi nas se da pretpostavimo išta drugo, teško je razumjeti ovaj redoslijed. Jedini način na koji bismo to mogli jest da se radi o slučaju "previše babica, kilavo dijete": treće jaje nije ekonomsko dobro, iako se, fizički, ne razlikuje od ostala dva. Odnosno, nije

not at all so for Austrians.[5] In any case, Hudik offers no evidence to buttress this claim of his. In any case, this claim of his is put paid by his own quote of Hoppe's (2007[1995], p. 14) brilliant insight: "whenever the supply of a good increases by one additional unit, provided each unit is regarded as of equal serviceability by a person, the value attached to this unit must decrease. For this additional unit can only be employed as a means for the attainment of a goal that is considered less valuable than the least valued goal satisfied by a unit of such good if the supply were one unit shorter."

This scholar avers that "the crucial assumption of both, the Austrian and the neoclassical theory is that of an existence of preference ordering." Again, no. It cannot be denied that both Austrians and neoclassicals do allow for preference ordering, or ordinal utility. But the mainstream also accepts cardinal utility, something strongly and even vehemently rejected by Austrians.[6]

MARGINAL UTILITY

In this section, the gourmet Hudik introduces us to a plethora of salads and cakes, all of which require four tomatoes, and various numbers of eggs. What is his purpose in this section? It is, presumably, to demonstrate that Rothbard's generation of the demand curve on the basis of consumer preferences, is invalid. Our scholar sets the stage here by delving into the concepts of the "relevant unit" and "equal serviceability." But here he goes astray.

For example, let us take a peek at this preference ordering:

1. A cake A, which can be produced only with 2 eggs.

2. A cake B, which can be produced only with 3 eggs.

Assuming ceteris paribus, and we are not led to presume anything else, it is difficult to understand this ranking. The only way to do so is to posit that this is a case of "too many cooks spoiling the broth": the third egg is not an economic good, even though, pokvareno jaje. Zaboravite na kolač i fokusirajte se samo na jaja. Ako netko preferira dva, umjesto tri, teško je izbjeći zaključak da postoji višak jaja.

Hudik ustraje da ovakav poredak *ne* pretpostavlja da se preferiraju 2 jaja umjesto 3 jaja, odnosno da se preferira manja količina. No teško je dokučiti što time želi reći. Ako potrošač preferira dva jaja umjesto tri, ili kolač A koji ima dva jaja umjesto kolača B koji ima tri, a drugih razlika između dvaju kolača nema, misteriozno je zašto također ne preferira dva jaja umjesto tri.

Što se tiče koncepta "relevantne jedinice", možda bi nam bilo bolje u ovom slučaju konzultirati Rothbarda. Iz njegove perspektive:

Rothbard (2004, str. 73-74) definira ono što vrijedi kao *jedinica jednog dobra*. On tvrdi: "Na primjer, pogrešno je tvrditi sljedeće: Jaja su dobro o kojem je riječ. Moguće je da osoba treba četiri jaja da ispeče kolač. U tom slučaju, drugo jaje može se upotrijebiti za manje hitniju svrhu nego prvo jaje, te treće jaje za manje hitniju svrhu nego drugo jaje. Međutim, zbog toga što četvrto jaje omogućuje da se napravi kolač koji se u protivnom ne bi mogao napraviti, granično zadovoljstvo zbog četvrtog jaja veće je od onog zbog trećeg jaja. Ovaj argument zanemaruje činjenicu da 'dobro' nije fizički materijal već bilo koji materijal čije će jedinice sačinjavati jednaku uporabno vrijednu opskrbu. Kako četvrto jaje nije jednako uporabno vrijedno ni zamjenjivo prvim jajetom, ta dva jaja nisu jedinice iste opskrbe te se u ovom slučaju ne može uopće primijeniti zakon graničnog zadovoljstva. Kada bismo jaja u ovome slučaju smatrali homogenim jedinicama jednog dobra, tada bi bilo potrebno razmatrati svaki set od četiri jaja kao jednu jedinicu."

Drugo područje u kojem se razilazimo u stajalištu s Hudikom jest ono u kojem piše: "Općenito, u slučajevima gdje raznoliki ciljevi zahtijevaju različite količine dobara, izabiremo cilj koji zahtijeva maksimalnu količinu jednog dobra te tu količinu definiramo kao relevantnu jedinicu." Ne. S prakseološkog stajališta, relevantna jedinica jest ona koja je logično dosljedna zakonu graničnog

physically, it is indistinguishable from the other two. That is, it is not a rotten egg. Forget about the cake. Focus, only, on the eggs. If someone prefers two of them to three of them, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is a surfeit of eggs.

Hudik as adamant that "This ranking *does not* imply that 2 eggs are preferred to 3 eggs, i.e. that less is preferred to more!" But it is difficult to see his point here. If the consumer prefers two eggs to three, or cake A which has two eggs to cake B, which has three, and there are no other differences between the two cakes, why, ever, does he not prefer two eggs to three? A mystery.

As for the concept of "relevant unit" we would do far better to consult Rothbard on this matter. In his perspective:

Rothbard (2004, p. 73-74) defines what counts as a *unit of a good*. He avers: "For example, it is erroneous to argue as follows: Eggs are the good in question. It is possible that a man needs four eggs to bake a cake. In that case, the second egg may be used for a less urgent use than the first egg, and the third egg for a less urgent use than the second. However, since the fourth egg allows a cake to be produced that would not otherwise be available, the marginal utility of the fourth egg is greater than that of the third egg. This argument neglects the fact that a 'good' is not the physical material, but any material whatever of which the units will constitute an equally serviceable supply. Since the fourth egg is not equally serviceable and interchangeable with the first egg, the two eggs are not units of the same supply, and therefore the law of marginal utility does not apply to this case at all. To treat eggs in this case as homogeneous units of one good, it would be necessary to consider each set of four eggs as a unit."

Another area in which we part company from Hudik is when he writes this: "In general, in the cases where various ends require different amount of goods, we take the end which requires the maximum amount of a good and we define this amount of good as the relevant unit." No. From a praxeological point of view, the relevant unit is the zadovoljstva. Zašto je to tako? Hoppe (2007) je po tom pitanju izrazito jasan. Drugim riječima, pretpostavimo da imate tri boce vode. Rangirate ih kako slijedi: prva je za piće, druga je za pranje, treća je za zalijevanje cvijeća. Sada vam oduzmemo jednu od tih boca. Koje zadovoljstvo ste si uskratili? Ako ste odgovorili da ćete se riješiti cvijeća, sjednite, odličan (5). To nije ni pitanje empirijske vjerojatnosti. Radije, zaključujemo prema čistoj logici stvari. Ako se vodimo prakseologijom po ovom pitanju te zadržimo prethodno spomenuti preferencijalni redoslijed boca vode, bilo koji drugi zaključak smatra se logičnom proturječnošću.

Naš autor piše sljedeće: Rothbard (op. cit., str. 6) piše: "Sudionika možemo interpretirati kao nekoga tko rangira svoje alternativne ciljeve prema tome koliko su mu vrijedni. On nikada ne smatra da bi ta pretpostavka mogla biti prekršena. Usp. također Mises (op. cit., str. 94)." Postoji dobar i dovoljan razlog zašto Rothbard "nikada ne smatra da bi ta pretspostavka mogla biti prekršena". To je zbog toga što je ona *prakseološka* izjava. Njen prekršaj značio bi logičnu proturječnost. Možda riskirajući ponavljanje,[7] još jednom spominjemo Hoppeov pronicljiv komentar: "kad god ponuda jednog dobra poraste za jednu dodatnu jedinicu, s time da se na svaku jedinicu gleda kao da potrošaču nudi jednaku uporabnu vrijednost, vrijednost te jedinice mora se smanjiti, jer ta dodatna jedinica može se upotrijebiti samo kao sredstvo postizanja cilja koji se smatra manje vrijednim od najmanje vrijednog cilja koji zadovoljava jedinica takvog dobra ako bi ponuda bila manja za jednu jedinicu". *To* je razlog zašto Rothbard ne smatra da bi se ta pretpostavka mogla prekršiti. Zakon graničnog zadovoljstva ne postaje suvišan, premda Hudik tvrdi suprotno.

GRANIČNO ZADOVOLJSTVO I KRIVULJA POTRAŽNJE

U ovome dijelu Hudiku smeta Rothbardova skala vrijednosti koja uključuje usporedbe između apsolutnih količina zlata i dodatnih jedinica

one that is logically consistent with the LMU. Why is this? Hoppe (2007) was pellucidly clear on this matter. Let us put it in other words. Posit you have 3 bottles of water. You rank them as follows: the first is used for drinking, the second for washing, the third for keeping your flowers moist. Now, we take one of these bottles of water away from you. Which benefit do you now deprive yourself of? If you answered the plants must go, move to the head of the class. Nor is this a matter of empirical likelihood. This conclusion stems, rather, from the pure logic of the matter. If we adhere to the praxeology of the matter, and retain the preference order of the water previously mentioned, any other conclusion amounts to a logical contradiction.

Our author writes the following: "Rothbard (op. cit., p. 6) writes: "The actor may be interpreted as ranking his alternative ends in accordance with their value to him." He never considers that this assumption may be violated. Cf. also Mises (op. cit., p. 94)." There is good and sufficient reason why Rothbard "never considers that this assumption may be violated." That is because it is a *praxeological* statement. A violation of it amounts to a logical contradiction. At the risk of being repetitive,[7] we once again resort to mentioning Hoppe's insightful comment: "whenever the supply of a good increases by one additional unit, provided each unit is regarded as of equal serviceability by a person, the value attached to this unit must decrease. For this additional unit can only be employed as a means for the attainment of a goal that is considered less valuable than the least valued goal satisfied by a unit of such good if the supply were one unit shorter." *This* is why Rothbard "never considers that this assumption may be violated. LMU thus does not turn "out to be superfluous," Hudik to the contrary notwithstanding.

MARGINAL UTILITY AND THE DEMAND CURVE

In this section Hudik takes issue with Rothbard's "value scale involving comparisons between absolute maslaca. On to najprije smatra "pomalo bizarnim – nije jasno koja je potrošačeva nagrada u svakoj od situacija; prije bi se očekivala skala vrijednosti koja uspoređuje raznolike kombinacije zlata i maslaca". Ovaj Rothbardov kritičar nastavlja: "Na primjer, pri kupnji drugog kilograma maslaca, je li potrošač već kupio prvi? Ako jest, po kojoj cijeni?"

Evo skale vrijednosti s kojom Hudik ima problem:

1. 7 zrna zlata
2. Prvi kilogram maslaca
3. 6 zrna zlata
4. 5 zrna zlata
5. Drugi kilogram maslaca
6. 4 zrna zlata
7. 3 zrna zlata
8. Treći kilogram maslaca
9. 2 zrna zlata

Ovdje postoji više pogrešaka nego što je moguće ukazati.

Našem se kritičaru ne sviđa Rothbardova "skala vrijednosti koja uključuje apsolutne količine zlata i dodatne jedinice maslaca". No zašto bi ona bila razlog prigovora? Čemu uopće prigovor? Je li Hudik htio da Rothbard promijeni prvi kilogram maslaca, drugi kilogram maslaca i treći kilogram maslaca u jedan kilogram maslaca, dva kilograma maslaca i tri kilograma maslaca? No to ne bi bilo dovoljno, jer bi se tri kilograma maslaca moglo rangirati više od 7 zrna zlata i gdje bismo onda bili u pogledu izvođenja krivulje potražnje?

Prema Hudiku, "...nije jasno što je potrošačeva nagrada u svakoj od situacija". Naravno da je jasna. Da još jednom ponovimo: kada se krećemo uz krivulju potražnje, mijenjaju se samo i jedino dvije stvari: cijena i količina. Sve ostalo neophodno mora ostati isto, uključujući i nagradu u svakoj situaciji. Ako postoji bilo kakva promjena u bilo kojoj od stavki, osim cijene i količine, uključujući i nagradu u svakoj

amounts of gold and additional units of butter." He sees this "at first sight (to be) rather bizarre – it is not clear what the consumer's endowment at each situation is; one would rather expect a value scale comparing various combinations of gold and butter." Continues this critic of Rothbard's: "For instance, when buying the second pound of butter, did the consumer buy already the first one? If so, for what price?"

Here is the value scale to which Hudik takes umbrage:

1. 7 grains of gold
2. The first pound of butter
3. 6 grains of gold
4. 5 grains of gold
5. The second pound of butter
6. 4 grains of gold
7. 3 grains of gold
8. The third pound of butter
9. 2 grains of gold

There is more wrong here than you can shake a stick at.

Our critic does not much like Rothbard's "value scale involving comparisons between absolute amounts of gold and additional units of butter." But why should this be so objectionable? Objectionable at all? Would Hudik have Rothbard change from "The first pound of butter, the second pound of butter, the third pound of butter" to "One pound of butter, two pounds of butter, three pounds of butter?" But that would hardly suffice, since three pounds of butter might possibly rank higher than 7 grains of gold, and then where would we be, in terms of deriving a demand curve?

In Hudik's view, "… it is not clear what the consumer's endowment at each situation is?" Of course it is clear. To repeat, once again. When we move along a demand curve, there are two and only two things that can change: price and quantity. All else must necessarily remain the same, the "endowment at each situation" certainly included.

od situacija, onda dolazi do pomaka u krivulji potražnje, a ne do kretanja uz nju.

Ovaj učenjak pita: pri kupnji drugog kilograma maslaca, je li potrošač već kupio prvi? Odgovor je poprilično jednostavan. Bilo da se radi o Rothbardovoj ili neoklasičnoj ili čak Hudikovoj krivulji potražnje, ona je hipotetski model. Ona kaže, na primjer, da će se prodati Y jedinica po cijeni X. Dakle, ne, pri kupnji drugog kilograma maslaca, potrošač nije već kupio prvi kilogram, već je kupio obje jedinice u isto vrijeme u jednoj velikoj nabavci.

Onda se pita: ako jest, po kojoj cijeni? Postavljeno na ovaj način, pitanje je neispravno. Hajdemo se vratiti na osnove ekonomije. Prisjetite se da je u pitanju krivulja *potražnje*. Krivulja potražnje sastoji se od linije točaka, koja prikazuje cijene i količine koje potrošač kupuje. Sve osim jedne od tih točaka su potpuno hipotetske. Odnosno, sve govore nešto slično sljedećem: *ako* je cijena takva i takva, potrošač će kupiti X količinu proizvoda; *ako* je cijena tako i tako drugačija, onda će potrošač kupiti Y količinu proizvoda. U trenutku kupnje može, naravno, biti samo jedna cijena. Sve su druge točke hipotetske. No recimo da interpretiramo ovo pitanje/izazov na vrlo, vrlo suosjećajan način. Tada bismo odgovorili da nam Rothbardov aparat ne dopušta precizan odgovor na to pitanje. Međutim, možemo dati grube procjene. Na primjer, prvi kilogram maslaca kupio bi se za manje od 7 zrna zlata, možda po cijeni od negdje 6,99 zrna zlata.

Hudik prikazuje gore spomenuto tablicom (Tablica 1).

Ova je tablica točna te precizno ilustrira Rothbardovu skalu vrijednosti u odnosu na zrna zlata i kilograme maslaca. Stoji Hudikova tvrdnja da Rothbard ne *derivira* potražnju koja se kreće prema dolje od skale vrijednosti: njegova skala već *jest* raspored potražnje i on već *pretpostavlja* da se kreće prema dolje. Međutim upravo ta tvrdnja ide nama u prilog. Poslušna krivulja potražnje je *odnos* između cijene artikla i njegove količine, sve ostalo ostaje jednako. Ako uistinu pretpostavimo

TABLICA 1 / TABLE 1

CIJENA (zrna zlata) PRICE (grains of gold)	**KOLIČINA (kilogram maslaca)** QUANTITY (pounds of butter)
p=8	0
p=7	0
p=6	1
p=5	1
p=4	2
p=3	2
p=2	3
p=1	3

If there is any alteration in any of these things other than price and quantity, up to and including the "endowment at each situation," then we have a shift in the demand curve, not a movement along it.

This scholar asks: "when buying the second pound of butter, did the consumer buy already the first one?" The answer is rather simple. A demand curve, whether Rothbardian or neo-classical, or Hudikian for that matter, is a hypothetical model. It says for instance, that at a price of X, Y units will change hands. So, no, when buying the second pound of butter, the consumer did not already buy the first one. Rather, he makes the purchase of both units at the same time, in one fell swoop.

He then inquires, "If so, for what price?" When put in this manner, this is an invalid question. Let us return to basic economics. Remember, we are dealing with a *demand* curve, here. A demand curve consists of a locus of points, depicting prices and quantities at which the consumer would make purchases. All but one of these points is entirely hypothetical. That is, they all say something of the following sort: *if* the price is thus and such, the consumer will buy amount X of the product; *if* the price is a different thus and such, the consumer will buy amount Y of the product. At the time of the acquisition there can of course by only one single *ceteris paribus*, ono što bi se trebalo izjednačiti jest uporabna vrijednost jedinica predstavljenih na horizontalnoj skali. Ipak, ne želimo na jednu os naslagati jedinice *različitih dobara*. Razmotrimo potražnju za prijevozom. U ovu nejasno definiranu kategoriju spadaju svakakve vrste dobara: automobili, skuteri, jet avioni, bicikli, koturaljke itd. Kada nekom sudioniku definiramo cilj općenito – želi putovati od A do B – tada bi, u neku ruku, sve od navedenog bile jedinice istog dobra. No očito je da ne zadovoljavaju (niti to mogu) *isti niz ciljeva*[8]. Stoga ne čudi da uz tako široku i nejasnu definiciju nekog dobra krivulja potražnje može imati kakav god oblik želimo. Na primjer, bili bismo spremni platiti 200 $ za jedan skuter i oko 1.000.000 $ za dva Mercedesa. Znači li to da se krivulja potražnje kreće prema gore? Naravno da ne, već se logički pretpostavlja da su dva dobra o kojima je riječ vrlo različita. Stoga relevantna jedinica treba biti konstantna, u protivnom bismo u odnos stavljali količine različitih ekonomskih dobara i njihovih cijena, što bi uistinu bila uzaludna vježba.[9]

Razmotrimo Hudikovo (str. 4) naizgled kritično rangiranje ciljeva:

1. Kolač *A*, koji se može napraviti od samo 2 jaja.
2. Salata *X*, koja se može napraviti od samo 4 rajčice.
3. Kolač *B*, koji se može napraviti od samo 3 jaja.
4. Salata *Y*, koja se može napraviti od samo 4 rajčice.
5. Kolač *C*, koji se može napraviti od samo 1 jaja.
6. Salata *Z*, koja se može napraviti od samo 4 rajčice.

Imamo problem s 1. i 3. Ako se koncentriramo na sredstva umjesto ciljeva (što je opravdano, jer vrijednost sredstava proizlazi iz vrijednosti ciljeva koje sredstva pokušavaju zadovoljiti), dolazimo do apsurdnog zaključka da sudionik rangira na sljedeći način (fokusirajući se samo na prvi dio skale):

1. 2 jaja
2. 4 rajčice
3. 3 jaja

price. All of the other points are hypothetical. But, suppose we interpret this question/challenge very, very sympathetically. Then, we can respond that the Rothbardian apparatus does not allow us to answer this question precisely. However, we can give rough estimates. For example, the first pound of butter would be bought for less than 7 grains of gold; perhaps somewhere in the neighborhood of 6.99 grains.

Hudik illustrates the above with the table (Table 1).

This table is accurate and aptly illustrates the Rothbardian value scale related to the grains of gold and pounds of butter. Hudik's point that "Rothbard does not *derive* downward sloping demand from the value scale: his value scale *is* already a demand schedule and he already *assumes* it to be downward sloping." Yes, granted. However, it is precisely this point that works in our favor. The well-behaved demand curve is *a relation* between the price of an item and its quantity, everything else equal. If we take the assumption of *ceteris paribus* seriously, what should be equated is the serviceability of the units represented on the horizontal scale. After all, we would not like to stack on the same axis the units of *different goods*. Consider the demand for transport. What falls into this vaguely defined category are all sorts of goods: cars, scooters, jet planes, bicycles, skates, etc. When we define a given actor's end generically – he wants to travel from A to B – then, in a sense, all of the above would appear to be the units of the same good. Yet, obviously they do not (and cannot) satisfy *the same range of ends*[8]. Therefore, there is no wonder that with such a broad and murky definition of a good the demand curve can assume any shape desired. For example, we would be ready to pay $200 for one scooter and about $1,000,000 for two Mercedes. Does that mean that the demand curve slopes upward? Of course not. Rather, it logically implies that the goods in question are very different. So, the relevant unit should be kept constant; otherwise, we would be relating the quantities of different economic goods to their respective prices – a futile exercise indeed.[9]

Poteškoća proizlazi iz činjenice da ako sva ta jaja predstavljaju ekonomsko dobro, više jaja se ne preferira od manje jaja, koliko god uporno Hudik pokušava poreći tu pretpostavku. Jedini način da se ovakav redoslijed zadrži jest da se kaže da je treće jaje negativno granično zadovoljstvo (eng. *economic bad*) – činjenica koju Hudik ignorira.

Drugi problem je u tome što u gore navedenim skalama vrijednosti novčana roba (rajčice) dolazi samo u skupinama od 4 komada, dok su jaja dostupna u različitim količinama. Nije moguće da Hudik ne vidi da je s tri skupine po četiri rajčice prva vrednija od sljedeće, a ta vrednija od posljednje. Ako ekonomskog sudionika lišimo prve skupine od četiri rajčice, on bi odustao od 6. cilja – Salate Z. Stoga, prema zakonu opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva, moramo prihvatiti da cijena (izražena u rajčicama) pada kako se krećemo prema dolje skalom vrijednosti (kao što je navedeno u Hudikovim ciljevima). Ponovno ćemo napisati ovu tvrdnju u tablici sličnoj njegovoj:

1. 2 jaja
2. Najvredniji cilj koji zadovoljavaju prve četiri rajčice
3. 3 jaja
4. Manje vrijedan cilj koji zadovoljavaju sljedeće četiri rajčice
5. 1 jaje
6. Najmanje vrijedan cilj koji zadovoljava zadnja skupina od 4 rajčice

Postoji li ikakav dobrohotan način interpretacije ovakvog bizarnog redoslijeda? Ono što iz ovog rangiranja možemo iščitati jest da je sudionik spreman žrtvovati 4. razinu (njegov drugi najbolji cilj koji zadovoljava druga skupina rajčica) kako bi došao do 3 jaja, no može, jadan, žrtvovati svoj *najvredniji cilj* koji zadovoljava *prva skupina od 4 rajčice* kako bi došao do 2 jaja. Čini se da bi ovaj hipotetski sudionik žrtvovao više da bi dobio manje. No opet, o takvom slučaju možemo govoriti ako je treće jaje negativno granično zadovoljstvo (eng. *economic bad*). Ako nije, 3 jaja moraju vrijediti više (koliko god infinitezimalno)

Consider Hudik's (p. 4) apparently critical ranking of ends:

1. A cake *A*, which can be produced only with 2 eggs.
2. A salad *X*, which can be produced only with 4 tomatoes.
3. A cake *B*, which can be produced only with 3 eggs.
4. A salad *Y*, which can be produced only with 4 tomatoes.
5. A cake *C*, which can be produced only with 1 egg.
6. A salad *Z*, which can be produced only with 4 tomatoes.

We have difficulty with 1 and 3. If we concentrate on means rather than ends (which is valid because the value of means derive from the value of ends the means help to satisfy), we end up with an absurd conclusion that the actor has the following ranking (just zooming in on the first half of the scale):

1. 2 eggs
2. 4 tomatoes
3. 3 eggs

The difficulty stems from the fact that if all those eggs count as economic goods, more cannot be preferred to less, however strenuously Hudik tries to deny this implication. The only way to save this ranking is to say that the third egg is already an economic bad – a point ignored by Hudik.

The second problem is that in the above value scales, the money commodity (tomatoes) comes only in 4-piece clusters while the eggs are available in various quantities. Hudik cannot be unaware that with three bunches of four tomatoes, the first is more valuable than the next, and it more than the last. If the economic actor is deprived of the first bunch of four tomatoes, he would resign from end 6 – A salad Z. So, according to the law of diminishing marginal utility, we should recognize that the price (expressed in tomatoes) diminishes as we move down the value scale (as is indicated by Hudik's ends). Let us rewrite this point in a table similar to his:

od 2 jaja, zato što bi jedno dodatno jaje moglo zadovoljiti neki dodatni barem malo vrijedan cilj. Problem, naravno, leži u relevantnoj jedinici. Kada bi jedini način prodaje jaja bio u pakiranjima od 2 ili 3 jaja, tada bi bilo zamislivo da sudionik plati više za pakiranje od 2 jaja nego za pakiranje od 3 jaja samo zato što bi mu treće jaje predstavljalo teret. No to uopće ne krši zakon opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva. Taj zakon nalaže da bi sljedeće pakiranje od 3 jaja bilo manje vrijedno od prethodnog itd. Isto se može primijeniti na pakiranja od 2 jaja. Svaku sljedeću jedinicu tog dobra ekonomski će sudionik cijeniti sve manje.

Čak i ako zaboravimo problem očitog negativnog graničnog zadovoljstva trećeg jajeta, problem Hudikovog primjera jest da uspoređuje različite brojeve jaja s padajućom cijenom (sljedeća jedinica od 4 rajčice je poprilično dobra mjera padajuće cijene, stavljena na ordinatu bilo koje krivulje potražnje). Nažalost, ti različiti brojevi jaja mogu zadovoljiti različite nizove ciljeva. Stoga je naš izazov sljedeći: može li Hudik dati primjer bilo koje situacije u kojoj zadovoljstvo pada, a da se plaća sve veća cijena za sljedeće jedinice? Njegov primjer to ne uspijeva, jednostavno zbog toga što dva jaja i tri jaja (i jedno jaje, kad smo kod toga) mogu zadovoljiti različite nizove ciljeva. Ne bi nas trebalo iznenaditi da netko može tražiti više za veću cijenu (cijena 2 rajčice) pod jednim uvjetom – dobra o kojima je riječ su *dva različita dobra*. Ne samo što ne dokazuje da je zadovoljstvo nebitno za izvedbu krivulje potražnje, već Hudik naše stajalište uopće ne dovodi u pitanje. Kako bi potkopao naše stajalište, morao bi navesti primjer takvog dobra (i to istog dobra!) za koje vrijedi: što više jedinica dobra osoba kupuje, to je veću cijenu voljna platiti. Slažemo se da je to nemoguće, barem s prakseološkog stajališta.

S obzirom na sve rečeno, Hudikov prikaz (str. 6) jednostavno ne slijedi (Grafikon 1).

Dok s ordinatom ovdje nema problema, na apscisu su prokrijumčarena *različita ekonomska dobra* (možda je i pokoje negativno granično

1. 2 eggs
2. The most valuable end satisfied by first four tomatoes
3. 3 eggs
4. The less valuable end satisfied by the second four tomatoes
5. 1 egg
6. The least valuable end satisfied by the third four tomatoes

Is there any way to charitably interpret this bizarre ordering? What we can read from this ranking is that an actor is ready to sacrifice level 4 (his second best end satisfied by the second four tomatoes) to achieve 3 eggs; but he can, alas sacrifice his *most valuable* end satisfied by *the first four tomatoes* only to achieve 2 eggs. It seems that this hypothetical actor would sacrifice more to get less. Then again, it can be the case if the third egg is already an economic bad. If it is not, 3 eggs must be valued higher (however infinitesimally) than 2 eggs for an additional single egg could possibly satisfy some additional at least slightly valuable end. The problem is, of course, the relevant unit. If the only way to sell eggs would be to do so in 2- or 3-piece packages, then it is imaginable that the actor would be ready to pay more for the 2-piece package than for 3-piece one merely because he would find the last egg burdensome. But that does not violate the law of diminishing marginal utility at all. Rather, it says that these two comprise two distinct units. This law mandates that the next 3-egg package would be less valued than the previous one, etc. And the same applies to 2-egg packages. Each successive unit thereof is going to be valued less and less by an economic actor.

Even if we forget the problem with the apparent economic badness of the third egg, the problem with Hudik's example is that he is comparing different numbers of eggs with the diminishing price (the next units of 4 tomatoes is a rather good measure of the diminishing price, put on the vertical axis of any demand curve). Unfortunately, those different numbers of eggs can satisfy different ranges of ends. So our challenge is

GRAFIKON 1 / GRAPH 1



zadovoljstvo bačeno na tu hrpu), pod netočnom maskom jednakog fizičkog izgleda. Tranzicija od količine 2 na 3 na apscisi sačinjava tranziciju od jednog ekonomskog dobra na drugo te tako miješa dva različita ekonomska dobra na istoj skali, što Hudikov prikaz čini lažnim.

Hudikova odvažna izjava (str. 4) da je "lako prikazati potražnju koja se povećava (bez kršenja zakona graničnog zadovoljstva), kao što je prikazano na primjeru […]" ne drži vodu. Što je cijena jaja veća, to je potražnja za njima veća, no samo zato što jaja o kojima je riječ, iako su fizički jednaka, predstavljaju *različita* ekonomska dobra. Da, ne krši se zakon opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva (kako bi i mogao?) kada je riječ o različitim ekonomskim dobrima, zakon opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva nema ni šansu pokazati svoju valjanost. Naš izazov ostaje netaknut: ako je zakon opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva suvišan i nebitan za krivulju potražnje, od Hudika se traži da pruži jedan jedini primjer koji pokazuje da zadovoljstvo (*istim dobrom*) pada, a sudionik plaća sve više za

as follows: can Hudik give an example of any situation where utility diminishes and yet a higher and higher price is paid for the successive units? His example fails to do so simply because two eggs and three eggs (and one egg for that matter) can satisfy possiblye different ranges of ends. It should not surprise us that one can demand more for the higher price (2-tomato price) on one condition – the goods in question are *two different goods*. Far from proving that utility is irrelevant for the derivation of the demand curve, Hudik leaves our position unscathed. In order to undermine our position, he must offer an example of such a good (and the same good!) that the more units a person buys, the higher price he is willing to pay. This, we contend, is impossible, at least praxeologically.

Given all that, Hudik's (p. 6) simply does not follow (Graph 1).

While there are no problems with the vertical axis here, the horizontal one smuggles in *different economic goods* (maybe even one economic bad thrown to the mix) under the inaccurate guise of the same physical appearance thereof. The transition from quantity 2 to 3 on the horizontal axis comprises the transition from one economic good to another and therefore, it jumbles two distinct economic goods on the same scale, which renders Hudik's figure fallacious.

Hudik's (p. 4) bold statement that "It is easy to show that demand can be increasing (without violating LMU), as it is shown in the following example […]." is without substance. The higher the price of the eggs, the more of them are demanded but only because these eggs in question while physically the same represent *different* economic goods. Yes, it does not violate the law of diminishing marginal utility (how can it?) when different economic goods are at issue, the law of diminishing marginal utility is not given a chance to demonstrate its validity. Our challenge remains intact: if the law of diminishing marginal utility is superfluous and irrelevant to the demand curve, Hudik is requested to come up with a single svaku sljedeću jedinicu. Drugim riječima, neka naš kritičar prikaže slučaj gdje sudionik to čini za svaku sljedeću *jedinicu istog dobra*. To bi uistinu pokazalo neovisnost krivulje potražnje od zakona opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva.

Da sažmemo, naše rješenje uključuje ozbiljno poimanje krivulje potražnje, odnosno njeno shvaćanje kao *odnosa* između cijene i količine, dok je *sve drugo jednako*. Ako uvjet c*eteris paribus* stoji, jedinice na apscisi moraju se odnositi na isto ekonomsko dobro, odnosno na jedinice jednake uporabne vrijednosti. Samo se tada krivulja potražnje mora kretati prema dolje, kao i bilo koji prikaz koji predstavlja zakon opadajućeg graničnog zadovoljstva.

USPOREDBA AUSTRIJSKE I NEOKLASIČNE ŠKOLE

Što da zaključimo iz sljedećeg Hudikovog urlika: "Dosljednost je krucijalna pretpostavka neoklasičnog pristupa. Mises (1996 [1949], str. 103) je kritizirao tu pretpostavku ne shvaćajući da i njegov pristup leži upravo na toj pretpostavci: konstruiranje redoslijeda preferencija zahtijeva da odnosi među preferencijama budu prijelazni. Kako je ranije spomenuto, Austrijanci su jedva skrenuli pozornost na tu činjenicu."

Austrijancima je prijelaznost isto što i križ vampirima. Prema ovome stajalištu, ako se A preferira više od B, a B više od C, tada neizbježno slijedi da se A preferira više od C. Ovo je krivo na nekoliko razina. Prije svega, postaje logično pozitivistički tvrditi da bilo što, apsolutno bilo što "neizbježno" slijedi bilo što drugo. "Neizbježno" nije u skladu s ovim pogledom na svijet, ali ipak, Hudik, koji iz nekog čudnog razloga preferira logično pozitivističke moderne ekonomiste više od Austrijanaca, nalazi se u areni koja bi mu trebala pobuditi veliku intelektualnu nelagodu, samo kad bi bio svjestan te svoje jedinstvene nedosljednosti. Da, prijelaznost ponekad "funkcionira". Ako je A viši od B, a B viši od C, onda je svakako i neporecivo A

example in which the utility (of the *same good*) diminishes and yet an actor pays more and more for each successive unit. In other words, let our critic point to such a case where an actor does this for each successive *unit of the same good*. That would show the genuine independence of the demand curve of the law of diminishing marginal utility.

To summarize, our solution involves conceiving of the demand curve seriously, that is understanding it as a *relation* between price and quantity, *everything else equal*. If the *ceteris paribus* condition holds, the units on the horizontal axis must apply to the same economic good, that is to units of equal serviceability. Only then must the demand curve slope downward, just as any figure representing the law of diminishing marginal utility does.

COMPARISON OF THE AUSTRIAN AND NEOCLASSICAL SCHOOLS

What are we to make of this howler of Hudik's: "The crucial assumption of the neoclassical approach is that of consistency. Mises (1996 [1949], p. 103) criticized this assumption not realizing that his own approach rests on this very assumption too: constructing preference scale requires that preference relation be transitive. As was mentioned before Austrians have scarcely paid attention to this fact."

Transitivity is to Austrians as the cross is to the vampire. According to this view, if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then it ineluctably follows that A is preferred to C. This is wrong on several levels. First of all, it becomes a logical positivist to proclaim that anything, anything at all, "ineluctably" follows anything else. "Ineluctable" does not at all fit in with this world view, and, yet, Hudik, who for some strange reason likens the logical positivist mainstream economists to the Austrians, finds himself in an arena which should bring him great intellectual discomfort, were he but aware of this particular inconsistency of his. Yes, transitivity "works" sometimes. If A is taller than viši od C. No samo zato što nogometna momčad A uvijek ili gotovo uvijek pobijedi momčad B, a momčad B konstantno pobjeđuje momčad C, ne slijedi da će momčad A savladati momčad C. Tko zna, jake i slabe strane svake od momčadi mogle bi se razriješiti tako da momčad C pobijedi A.

Hajdemo se malo vratiti ekonomici blagostanja. Neki potrošač odabere A umjesto B i B umjesto C. Nalaže li sama logika da će ova osoba odabrati A umjesto C ako joj se ponude te dvije opcije?[10] Naravno da ne. Kada je A odabran umjesto B, to se dogodilo u vremenu T1. Kada je B odabran umjesto C, to se dogodilo u vremenu T2. Sada je vrijeme T3. Postoji mogućnost da se osoba predomislila. Protivno uvjetnoj činjenici, u vremenu T3, ova bi osoba mogla preferirati B umjesto A, a C umjesto B, stoga, čak i ako je prijelaznost, na neki način, i dalje održiva u T3, C bi ipak bio odabran umjesto A. No možemo ublažiti ovu pretpostavku. Čak i da nema (hipotetskog) predomišljanja, još uvijek nema logičnog razloga zbog kojeg bi osoba odabrala A umjesto C. Prijelaznost jednostavno nije prakseološka kategorija.

No Hudik ima odgovor i na tu dosjetku. On smatra, "ako dopustimo da se preferencije mijenjaju nasumično, individualna se potražnja ni ne može derivirati". Što znači ovo "dopuštanje"? Naravno da se preferencije mijenjaju, "nasumično"[11] ili ne, potpuno je svejedno. U stvarnom svijetu, ljudi se ponekad, čak i često, predomisle oko redoslijeda preferencija. Ako želimo da naša ekonomska teorija bude bar donekle blizu stvarnosti, ne možemo to bezbrižno odbijati uzeti u obzir.

Hudik optužuje da prema Rothbardovom stajalištu pristup otkrivene preferencije mora koristiti pokazatelje. Kako? Autor nije dao nikakav citat toga.

ZAKLJUČAK

Hudik završava svoj esej u problematičnom tonu, izjavom: "Na metodološkoj razini, uloga zakona

B, and B is taller than C, then by gum and by golly, A is taller than C. But just because football team A always or almost always beats B, and B whups C as consistently, it does not at all follow that A will prevail over C. Who knows, the strengths and weaknesses of each time might work out in a manner such the C overcomes A.

Let us return to welfare economics for a moment. A consumer chooses A over B, and B over C. Does logic alone mandate that this person pick A and set aside C when confronted with these two?[10] Of course not. When A was chosen over B, this occurred at time T1. When B was chosen over C, this occurred at time T2. It is now time T3. One possibility is that such a person might have changed his mind. Contrary to fact conditional, at T3, this person would have favored B over A, and C over B, thus, even if transitivity, of a sort, is still maintained, at T3, still, C would be picked ahead of A. But we can relax this assumption. Even if there were no (hypothetical) change of mind, still, there is no logical reason compelling such a person to select A instead of C. Transitivity is simply not a praxeological category.

But Hudik is not without a response to this sally. He opines "If we let preferences change haphazardly, individual demand could not even be derived." What is this "letting" business? Of course preferences change, whether "haphazardly"[11] or not, it makes no never mind. In the real world, people sometimes, often, even, change their minds about rank ordering of preferences. If our economic theory is to be able to come within a million miles of reality, we cannot blithely refuse to acknowledge this.

Hudik charges that in Rothbard's view, "the revealed preference approach must make us of index numbers." Say what? No citation to this effect was provided by this author.

CONCLUSION

Hudik ends his essay on a problematic note. He states: "On the methodological level, the role of o graničnom zadovoljstvu mora se ponovno razmotriti. Status ovog zakona kao prakseološkog već je poljuljao Nozick (1977) izjavom da zahtijeva (neprakseološki) koncept indiferentnosti…" Ovdje Hudik jednostavno nije napravio domaću zadaću. Nozick (1977) je podvrgnut poraznim opovrgavanjima.[12] Autor koji takvo što tvrdi dužan je barem biti svjestan Nozickovih kritika te možda čak i registrirati zašto misli da ih doprinos harvardskog filozofa može izdržati. Hudik to jednostavno ne čini.

LMU requires reconsideration. Status of this law as praxeological has been already shaken by Nozick's (1977) remark that it requires (non-praxeological) concept of indifference…" Here, Hudik simply has not done his homework. Nozick (1977) has been subjected to withering refutations.[12] It is incumbent upon an author who makes any such claim to at least be aware of Nozick's critics, and perhaps, even, to register why he thinks that Harvard philosopher's contribution can withstand them. This Hudik simply does not do.

BILJEŠKE

[1] Sve reference na autora ticat će se iste njegove publikacije, osim ako se ne navede drugačije.

[2] Na primjer, okusi, cijene i kvantiteta drugih dobara kao što su supstituti ili komplementi, i da, također i dohodak!

[3] Ako što drugo varira, to podrazumijeva promjenu u krivulji potražnje, a ne kretanje uz nju.

[4] Učinak dohotka zbog inferiornih dobara nadmašuje učinke supstitucije, što neophodno podrazumijeva kretanje cijene i količine u suprotnom smjeru.

[5] Hudikov citat Hoppeove (2007) briljantne egzegeze vrlo je prikladan. Problem je u tome što se Hoppeova tvrdnja nalazi180 stupnjeva suprotno od Hudikove teze, no Hudik je čak ni ne komentira, a kamoli da je pokušava pobiti.

[6] Ovdje pogledati bilo koji suvremeni priručnik mikoroekonomije gdje se "korisnosti" nalaze na ordinati. Ako to ne predstavlja kardinalnu korisnost, onda je ništa ne predstavlja.

[7] Odnosno, svakako ga riskirajući. No u ovom trenutku je potrebno.

[8] Što je naša definicija istog dobra. Vidi: Wysocki, Block, neobjavljeno.

[9] Barem pri pokušaju izrade koherentne krivulje potražnje. Ne tvrdimo da je ovo iracionalno u svim slučajevima.

[10] Što ćemo napraviti: takvu osobu tužiti na sudu ako ne napravi ovakav izbor?

[11] Govorimo li ovdje o determinizmu naspram slobodne volje?

[12] Vidi, na primjer: Barnett, 2003; Block, 1980, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009A, 2009B; Block and Barnett, 2010; Callahan, 2003; Collingwood, 1945; Hoppe, 2005; Hulsmann, 1999; Machaj, 2007; O'Neill, 2010; Rothbard, 2004, str. 265, 267; Wysocki, 2016; Wysocki, and Block, neobjavljeno

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[1] All references to this author will concern this one publication of his, unless otherwise specified.

[2] For example, tastes, prices and quantities of other goods such as substitutes or complements, and, also, yes, income too!

[3] If something else varies, this implies a shift in the demand curve, not a movement along it.

[4] Income effects due to inferior goods outweighing substitution effects, which necessarily imply price and quantity moving in opposite directions.

[5] Hudik's quotation of Hoppe's (2007) brilliant exegeses is very apropos. The difficulty is that while that claim of Hoppe's runs 180 degrees counter to Hudik's thesis, the latter never so much as even comments on it, let alone attempts to refute it.

[6] See on this any mainstream microeconomic textbook where "utils" are placed on the vertical axis. If this is not the use of cardinal utility, then nothing is.

[7] Well, the certainty. But it is needed at this point.

[8] Which is our definition of the same good. See: Wysocki, Block unpublished.

[9] At least when trying to generate a coherent demand curve. We do not claim this is irrational for all purposes.

[10] What are we going to do, sue such a person in a court of law if he does not make this choice?

[11] Are we talking about determinism versus free will here?

[12] See for example Barnett, 2003; Block, 1980, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009A, 2009B; Block and Barnett, 2010; Callahan, 2003; Collingwood, 1945; Hoppe, 2005; Hulsmann, 1999; Machaj, 2007; O'Neill, 2010; Rothbard, 2004, pp. 265, 267; Wysocki, 2016; Wysocki, and Block, Unpublished

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