Migration and Integration in German Cities

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Since 1945 Germany has been integrating economic migrants (from Southern Europe in the 1960s), as well as political refugees (as a result of the Balkan wars in the 1990s). Nevertheless, immigration policy has been relatively strict. In 2015 and 2016, there was a temporary policy shift and attracted by the German government, around 1.2 million people applied for asylum in Germany. These were predominately refugees from Syria. The article analyses who represents the interests of these refugees and the interests of other migrants in Germany. Since the 1990s, in some German cities they have been politically represented by advisory boards for cities. In this article, 14 representative cities are analysed and a representative sample of citizens and all councillors are interviewed in each city. In general, these boards are evaluated positively by citizens and by councillors alike, although acceptance is slightly lower in Eastern Germany.

Keywords: migration, refugees, integration, Germany, political representation, deliberative democracy, democratic innovation

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1. Introduction

The year 2015 may be regarded as a watershed in migration policies in Germany and most other European countries. Due to the Syrian war, political instability in the Near East, and policy change in Germany, the push and pull factors for migration were strengthened. On the one hand, in all the regions of the Near East, the political and economic crises and even war had an important impetus for the push factors for migration. On the other hand, the pull factors for migration in form of the political context, and symbolic and immigration policies in European countries and especially in Germany became manifest as the reasons for a “big wave” of migrants following different routes to Germany and other European countries.

International migration is not solely a European phenomenon and Europe is not the main and only target region for migrants. South Africa has also been confronted with a huge number of international migrants. Similarly, in Lebanon, nearly 25 per cent of the population is composed of migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries, especially from Syria (UNCHR 2017).

In most of these countries, metropolitan cities have had to accommodate many of the migrants because rural areas are less attractive to migrating people. Additionally, there is a strong trend towards urbanisation and an influx of the local rural population into the cities. As a result, this generates a high demand for employment, housing, and other social services in the cities.

The research question focuses on the social structure and political representation of migrants in Germany. Most political refugees have no representation in the country they are migrating to. Nevertheless, there may be an advocacy interest representation from political representatives within the parliament and at the local level within the council. Furthermore, special interest committees, such as advisory boards for migrants, may play an important role in the representation of all interest groups related to migration. The definition of different subgroups with a migration background seems to be crucial. This analysis focuses on the attitudes of the German citizenry, as well as of German local politicians, on “advisory boards for foreigners”, a democratic innovation which was implemented in some provinces (Länder) in the 1990s (Kersting, 2013; 2017).

In this paper reasons for migration will not be analysed in detail, but will be briefly presented. Human rights violations in dictatorial regimes and
in countries with raging civil wars have led to an enormous movement of political refugees (e.g. countries such as Jordan and Turkey have seen vast numbers of refugees settle in their refugee camps). In addition, in less authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes, where human rights are partly respected, religious and ethnic groups leave their home countries due to political reasons (see for example Nigeria). Other important reasons for migration, which often overlap, may be found in economic crises, extreme poverty, unemployment, and difficulties in meeting basic needs in the migrants’ home countries.

In the following section, immigration policies and policies of diversity management and affirmative action in Germany will be analysed. Additionally, this research focuses on the concept of interculturalism in order to overcome the negative tendencies of fragmentation and segregation and the development of parallel societies in purely multicultural settings. Following 1945, migration policies in Germany followed a specific administrative and political culture. Because of German history and the experience of the Nazi regime, the German constitution (Grundgesetz) highlights, in article 16a, the human right to asylum. During the Nazi regime, thousands of political refugees and members of ethnic and religious groups such as the Sinti, Roma, and Jews, had to leave their homes and received asylum in countries all over the world. For this reason, human rights related to the issue of asylum are regarded as very important in Germany and thus legal action and proof of the right to asylum and political reasons for migration were included in a detailed, long-term judicial investigation.

Nevertheless, since World War II German governments have never regarded Germany as an immigration country. This is because there was no strong colonial history apart from certain African countries such as Namibia or Tanzania, and all these colonies were abandoned in the early 20th century, during World War I. This implies that when it comes to integration, language often becomes a burden to immigrants. Following an increase in immigration in the 1990s, it was as early as in 1993 that this right to political asylum was reduced on the basis of international treaties. New immigration policies, such as the Dublin convention, allowed for rejections of political asylum and the re-transport of asylum-seekers to safe neighbouring countries on the border of the European Union and the Schengen Area. This meant that migrants could be sent back to the country where they had entered the European Union. In a basically landlocked country such as Germany there was no direct access from outside the European Union. This led to the situation that migrants could only come to Germany indirectly, via different quotas in the European Union.
Furthermore, German integration policies were based on old nationalistic reasoning. According to German law, people who were born in Germany are not automatically granted citizenship. On the other hand, individuals who can prove that their ancestors came from Germany can acquire citizenship more easily. This “ius sanguinis” has often been criticised and discussed in German politics. With the demographic change and the decline in German population, a paradigm and policy shift in migration policy occurred and a new migration law was discussed, which would allow foreigners to acquire German citizenship with greater ease. In the early 2000s a green card programme was implemented to attract well-educated immigrants, but this strategy was not very successful. In 1998 dual citizenship was discussed and highly criticised. Later on, however, dual citizenship became partly allowed or tolerated in the case of some countries (Kersting, 2008).

Firstly, a brief overview and statistics on migration in Germany will be presented. Who has been migrating to Germany since 1945? Secondly, based on the theory of migration, a brief description of the social structure of migrants and migration behaviour, as well as their needs, will be provided. What are the main problems of migrants?

In the following section the focus lies on migration policies and the political representation of migrants. Here the status quo is analysed in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. As refugees, they can often rely only on a kind of advocative, indirect representation, which may lead to a situation where even well-minded policies fail to meet their goals. What kind of representation is there for groups with different migration backgrounds? Here a comparative study of 14 cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants will be analysed in depth. These cities differ in terms of region (Eastern and Western Germany), size (metropolitan areas and cities), wealth (debt rate), social situation (citizen receiving social welfare grants according to the law (Sozial-Gesetzbuch, SGB), regulations on introducing advisory boards for foreigners, as well as in the number of migrants in each city (Kersting, 2016).

In the cities of various German Länder the existing political structures and migration policies, as well as the representative bodies within these cities, follow varying strategies. With regard to this, the paper presents survey data (from 1998) of migrants in German cities and a more detailed evaluation of the attitudes held by both citizens and politicians towards migrant representational bodies in the form of “advisory boards for foreigners” (Ausländerbeiräte, Integrationsräte) in different German cities.

Existing programmes to integrate migrants into German cities will not be analysed here (see the analysis of the Kommunale Integrationzentren
in NRW, Ulusoy et al., 2016). It is obvious that in the German federal system, with around 10,000 strong multipurpose and multifunctional cities, coordination in the cities is extremely important and there seems to be a need for inter-municipal corporation (Kersting et al., 2009). Here, political representation and citizen feedback can be crucial for efficient and effective policies. But who represents the refugees and their interests, and how is their feedback included? Advisory boards for migrants are regarded as important actors in this regard. How are they accepted by the citizenry and in the city councils? How are they elected? What are their structures and competences? Political reality differs among the various German Länder, as it does at the municipal level.

2. Definition of Migrant Population and Migration Trends

Citizens with a migration background or migrants are not a homogeneous group, and can be characterised by three main factors. First, migrants derive from different countries and have different cultural and religious backgrounds, which leads to different needs and expectations. Secondly, the length of the migrants’ stay is an important aspect not only in terms of economic but also cultural accommodation. Thirdly, from a political point of view, their status within the German legal system differs. Here political refugees constitute a special group. By definition, these asylum-seekers can be divided into informal (illegal) migrants and those who have applied for asylum but are still uncertain about their application on the one hand, and those who are guaranteed and accepted asylum-seekers on the other. In general, the latter group have a three-year right to stay in Germany before a new application has to be initiated.

Migration is not a recent phenomenon. Over the centuries there has been large-scale movement between different regions of the world. In Germany after World War II, many Germans and refugees from Eastern Europe came to German cities and rural areas and had to be accommodated. Polish- and German-speaking individuals were able to integrate relatively easily in the post-war period, when political–economic development brought a range of employment opportunities, especially in the steel industry in the Ruhr region. In the subsequent phase of the economic boom (1955), workers from Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, and later Turkey) were drawn to Germany and warmly welcomed until the economic reces-
sion of the 1970s. Nevertheless, integration was not easily accomplished and especially the Turkish group (with 3 million individuals) developed a kind of parallel society. This group consists of the first generation, which mostly grew up in the poorer rural areas of their country of origin, and nowadays of the second generation, which was fully socialised in the German context.

The third important wave came after the collapse of the divide between the Eastern and Western Blocs in 1989 and the disintegration of the USSR. Since 1990 the so-called “late immigrants” (Spätaussiedler) have been immigrating from the former USSR or Russian republics to Germany. This group could easily get citizenship in accordance with the legal background of “ius sanguinis”.

The breakdown of former Yugoslavia created a new crisis in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. With the Balkan wars, a large group of refugees came to Germany in the mid-1990s. This particular immigration wave was a reason for greater xenophobic tendencies, especially in Eastern Germany, and triggered new, stricter migration policies. This ended in the Dublin Regulation and a new migration policy (Asylkompromiss) in the 1990s. With the end of the Balkan wars, 75 per cent of these refugees went back to the new states of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia (Haug, 2017).

The enlargement of the European Union led to new forms of economic integration, whereby the free movement of people included new opportunities for workers. With the accession of Eastern European countries to the European Union, there was an interim phase where work opportunities and rights were restricted for migrants from these countries. Nevertheless, with the end of this phase a broad group of legal immigrants tried to find work opportunities in the richer countries of Western Europe, as well as in German cities.

There is a special form of citizenship granted to immigrants from within the European Union. They have special rights and can easily obtain work permits. Furthermore, politically these immigrants have full enfranchisement in local elections, as long as they are formally registered.

Migration in 2015–2016 was the heaviest in the new millennium and was a reminder of the situation after World War II. Half of the Syrian refugees in Europe applied for asylum in Germany in the period 2015–2016. In these two years, around 1 million asylum-seekers and migrants arrived from Syria, as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries, via the Balkan Route. Some were political refugees according to the Geneva Convention, while others were seen as temporary refugees. Due to the revi-
talisation of the restrictive Dublin Regulation, as well as a stricter policies in Eastern European countries and in Turkey, migration into Germany nearly ceased altogether by the end of 2016 (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: Asylum Application 1985–2017 in Germany

In some cases, the status was due to a legal process which was very cumber-
some and often took over a year, because it was based on individual con-
texts. In 2016 the list of countries which were regarded as safe countries of origin included the Maghreb states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It is worth noting that the status of Afghanistan was changed to unsafe in 2017.

Administrative and registration processes were centralised nationally to a certain extent, in coordination with provincial and local administration, but they remained very long and cumbersome. Following their entry into the country asylum-seekers were forbidden to work, but had to attend German language courses and fulfil similar requirements. In 2016 the German government forbade family reunification for temporarily accepted Syrian refugees (under subsidiary protection) because another 200,000 family members were expected to come to Germany in that case.
3. Migration Statistics

Statistics on immigration are problematic. In Germany, all citizens have to register according to the law, but there is a large number of informal immigrants in the country. It is important to note that Germany – in contrast to the US, the UK, and some other countries – has never defined itself as a country of immigration. Furthermore, despite central registration for citizens, in German federalism the autonomous cities and municipalities actually implement the registration process.

Then the demographic changes and the need for a labour force triggered a policy change. As noted before, there were big changes and waves when it comes to immigration. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs reported a high demand for immigration, and it is here that statistics differ significantly. According to the projected demographic change, by 2021 a number of 300,000 immigrants could stop the decline in labour force. But it has been calculated that by 2021 between 100,000 and 200,000 people will migrate to Germany. Another report concludes that 270,000 well-trained immigrants per annum are needed to meet the demand for workers within the German economic system. According to Haug (2017), a net immigration of 400,000 and 530,000 people is regarded to be necessary to stabilise the German working population. In Germany in 2011, 15.96 million migrants accounted for 19.6% of the population, with 6.9 million of these being non-citizens with migration experience and 6.1 million German citizens with a migration background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012; see Haug, 2017). These citizens are predominantly late settlers from the former USSR, who were covered by the ius sanguinis regulation (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015f; Haug, 2017). Another 4.6 million are German citizens without a migration background, which means these are second-generation immigrants or the children of the late settlers (Spätaussiedler). There is also a substantial group (1.9 million) of non-citizens without migration experience. These are non-citizens who were born and have lived in Germany all their lives.

Statistics on people with a migration background differ by definition (first-generation, second-generation, and so on). The following are statistics on people with a migration background in German cities: Berlin has around 18%, Nuremberg 20%, and Essen 15%. Some cities like Münster have a migrant population of less than 10%, and in Eastern Germany, the number stands around 7% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015).

According to Krummacher (2017), 95% of migrants live in Western Germany and only 5% in the new Länder in Eastern Germany. Also, 44% of
migrants live in metropolitan areas, 30% in medium-sized municipalities, and 26% in smaller towns (Krummacher, 2017).

Until 1973, a brain drain from the poorer European countries towards the rich ones could be clearly observed. In this period of immigration Germany had around 500,000 immigrants per year more than emigrants. The next wave of immigration started in 1989, with a peak of 1.5 million immigrants to Germany in 1992.

By this time, emigration from Germany had grown to 750,000 and peaked in 2013, with nearly 1 million people leaving the country. From 2009 onwards, immigration grew again from around 1 million people to 1.5 million people in 2014.

In most years, there was a very small surplus of immigration, but in 2008 there was a negative balance, with more people leaving Germany than immigrating. One reason lies in re-migration, which is often ignored in German cities, because citizens do not de-register (see Graph 2). For example, first-generation Turkish immigrants, but also those from Mediterranean countries, often went back to their home countries after retirement. In Turkey, some of them faced problems with reintegration. Since 2006 it has been possible to observe this for younger age groups of Turkish immigrants. In 2015 statistics showed that circular migration was relatively high regarding the exchange between Poland and Germany (BMI & BAMF, 2015).

Graph 2: Migrants in German Cities

Source: Author; for further data see also Kersting (2016).
In the 1980s the number of asylum applications stood below 100,000 (see Graph 1). Beginning in 1985, this number rose to more than 400,000 in the early 1990s with the Balkan wars, but it dropped again in 1994 and the subsequent years to below 100,000. In the 2000s it stabilised at below 50,000.

The number of asylum-seekers (accepted and applying) rose with the crisis and the civil war in Syria, with around 500,000 new applications (see Graph 1); hence the number of asylum-seekers has gone up by 150% since 2014.

The city statistics for asylum-seekers are quite unreliable\(^1\). Administration staff at all levels face problems with registration, census, and the central register. In some “central camps”, for instance in Bavaria, there were twice as many people accommodated in 2017 than were identified as asylum-seekers in the whole of Bavaria. Municipalities such as Münster or Duisburg with around 300,000 inhabitants had to accommodate around 4,000 refugees.\(^2\) Nevertheless, it may be observed that in 2017 the number of applications declined sharply to around 100,000 (see graph 1).

Regarding countries of origin in 2016, around 12,000 asylum-seekers came from Syria, around 5,000 from Iraq, and another 2,000 from Iran. The distribution of these asylum-seekers followed the Königsteiner-Schlüssel (distribution formula). More than 16,000 went to the biggest province of North Rhine-Westphalia, which makes up 20% of the German population; 6,000 asylum-seekers went to medium-sized Länder, and fewer than 2,000 to smaller Länder.

According to Haug (2017), a report on refugees from 2015 showed that more than half (55%) were under the age of 25 – mostly male – and more than half of these (53%) did not have any education or work experience.

Social groups with a migration background have a higher fertility rate. In 2014 around 35% of children below five years of age were of a migration background. In the 35–44 age group, 25% of the general population has a migration background. In bigger cities, this group is represented by a

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\(^1\) Cities were not calculating immigration into the cities correctly. This could be observed during the census in 2013, where municipalities had to readjust the population size because they had overestimated the number of people with a migration background living within the city boundaries.

\(^2\) In 2015 and 2016, in addition to this group, in cities like Duisburg another 4,000 Romanian and Bulgarian EU-immigrants exerted pressure on the labour market.
higher percentage than it is in smaller municipalities and it is predicted that this percentage will continue to grow. For example, in the case of Bavaria every fifth Bavarian has a migration background and by 2024 this will have risen to one quarter of the Bavarian population. It is also obvious that the fertility gap is growing.

Although the percentage of migrants with a high education background is rising, on average migrants still have a relatively low level of education. In addition, in the group of refugees around a third have a university or a high-school degree. This is slightly higher in the subgroup consisting of refugees from Syria, at around 55% (Haug, 2017).

Nowadays migration is highly influenced by new information and communication technologies. Individual decisions to migrate and the structural context of migration come together with broader experiences of migration, which could be easily transmitted via new digital media. In this regard, migration has a self-strengthening effect (Haug, 2017).

In 2015 in Germany, refugees were given free accommodation (in town halls, sports arenas, and schools), designated towns, and a small amount of money, which covered their basic needs. There was no freedom to settle close to existing social networks or family networks. According to the theory of social networks, refugees try to stay together with family members or people from the same countries (Haug, 2008).

Following a heated discussion in 2016, the German national government changed its migration policy. It forbade family reunification, although this is required under international law, so male refugees were often unable to bring their families to Germany easily.

In Germany, there are regional disparities when it comes to housing and employment. In some cities the housing situation is highly problematic and the cost of living is very high. Nevertheless, these areas enjoy the highest rates of employment. In most rural areas the cost of living is cheaper but employment opportunities are much less frequent. Notably, immigration policies have often forced migrants to live in rural areas, smaller towns, or villages.

Due to demographic changes in Germany, some cities and towns are shrinking; meanwhile in other areas there is a strong influx of people which leads to extremely high rent and accommodation costs (for example in Munich, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and recently Berlin).
Table 1: Cities: Migration, Wealth, Poverty, Local Elections, and Representation

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<td>Bonn (NRW)</td>
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<td>782</td>
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Source: Author, based on Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, own data base. (Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, North Rhine-Westfalia (NRW), former West Germany; Brandenburg, Sachsen Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen, Sachsen, former East Germany). The city states of Hamburg and Berlin and their submunicipal districts have no regulations.

SGB 2: Citizens with welfare grants (Sozialgesetzbuch 2), Foreigner (excluding migrational background citizens with German citizenship), Cities debt rate; Voter turnout at local election, Obligatory “Advisory Board for Migrants”.

In the cities analysed here it may be observed that there is very large number of people with a migration background, especially in metropolitan areas such as Hamburg and Berlin. These cities have different forms of representation when it comes to foreigners. Here, around one third of the population has a migration background, not including migrants with German citizenship. In most other cities it may be observed that the number of migrants is much lower (20%); for instance, in cities such as Münster or Koblenz it is below 10%. In general it can be seen that the smaller the city, the lower the number of people with a migration background. It is
lower overall in Eastern Germany, where less than 6% of the population has a migration background.

On the other hand, most of the bigger cities, especially cities like Berlin, have a very high debt rate. This reduces the possibilities of developing certain policy fields and infrastructure. In general, the debt rate of German cities can be very high. Cities in provinces like Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Saxony, have lower debt, while in municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Rhineland-Palatinate the debt rate is relatively high. The SG2 rate relates to the number of citizens who are under different welfare regimes. Social welfare programmes such as the SGB 2 focus predominantly on long-term unemployed citizens. German cities are multifunctional and historically provide services in all these areas.

4. Political Representation

According to the 2004 Charter of the Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union, refugees, like all human beings, have the right to political representation, which may be direct or indirect. The German Constitution includes the legal framework for representation, as do the regional constitutions of the provinces. Furthermore, regulations at local levels are formulated in local government acts by the regions and other laws at the regional level. At the local level, local charters and bylaws provide a full range of representation as an instrument of participation under regional local government acts (Kersting, 2008).

During a local financial crisis of the 1990s and the 2000s, there was a reduction of participatory instruments, especially in medium-sized cities. There seemed to be less interest in the political representation of foreigners. However, a few cities introduced the integration of an ombudsman, officers as well as special units, and local administrations for cultural questions. Furthermore, civil society organisations such as churches, NGOs, and other organisations became important actors in migration policies (Krummacher, 2017; Haug, 2017).

Local government associations in Germany have historically been more passive and even defensive on the subject of integration. This engagement and attitude changed slightly at the end of the 1990s (Krummacher, 2017). The new migration law of 2005 (Zuwanderungsgesetz) reduced the possibility of an internal integration policy compared to former legislation for foreigners of 1965 and 1990 (Schönwälder, 2012; Haug, 2008).
In local administration new concepts were developed in Berlin, Munich, and other cities. Nevertheless, an integrated regulation of integration policies as a local function is requested and implemented at the provincial level in some Länder (Kersting, 2004; Gesemann & Roth, 2009, 2016; Krummacher, 2017, p. 87). In 2015–16 a culture of open arms developed in most metropolitan areas, and civil society showed its activism through numerous voluntary organisations.

Until 2017 only three regions had had advisory boards to represent the rights of migrants. This was first implemented in the state of Hessen (Ausländerbeiräte) and in NRW (Integrationsräte), and subsequently in the local government act of Baden-Württemberg (see Kersting, 2016). There, advisory boards for foreigners or integration councils have been implemented in most cities. Nevertheless, some other bigger cities and municipalities in the other provinces also allow the implementation of advisory boards for foreigners. In Hesse and NRW, regulations within the Länder constitution and local government acts focus on the size of the cities; so advisory boards for migrants are implemented in cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. In some Länder it is an obligation for cities of a certain size, whilst in others it is a voluntary initiative (Kersting, 2017).

In Germany, foreigners from European Union countries were allowed to vote at local and EU elections because migrants from EU countries are full citizens and are allowed to vote. Non-EU citizens are disenfranchised, but they are represented on elected advisory boards for foreigners (Hessen) and integration councils (NRW). This enfranchisement includes European Union citizens, Eastern European citizens, and asylum-seekers. Migrants may be actively engaged in voting and run as candidates. In most cases members of these advisory boards are directly elected. NRW’s integration councils include directly elected migrants and ordinary council members. Additionally, in other cities, organised interest groups and citizen experts are included. Predominantly, the chair is held by an elected member of the council, and in some cities the mayor takes over the role of chair.

Advisory boards for migrants or integration councils have certain rights as do other communities within the local government, including the right to be heard at the council and the right to speak and address the council. In certain areas they can make proposals, often together with other committees. They also have their own small budget. Additional rights which have been requested are a higher budget and more binding decision rights, as well as the right to invite the mayor or other administrative employees to their council meetings.
4.1. Empirical data

Survey research and opinion polls in 2016 showed that advisory boards for migrants are highly respected within the citizenry (for details of a survey with 2,700 citizens and more than 600 councillors, see Gabriel & Kersting, 2014). Around 66% of the citizens think that advisory boards for migrants are a very important instrument of political participation at the local level.

Graph 3: Citizen Attitudes: Advisory Boards for Migrants in Germany

The analysis shows that these instruments are less attractive in Eastern Germany, but they are highly attractive in Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, and Hesse. A multilevel analysis on advisory boards for migrants in Germany shows that they are much more important in Western Germany, especially in cities with a strong Social Democratic Party (SPD), where these boards are strongly supported. Other aspects such as city size, voter turnout, wealth, the level of other participatory opportunities, or the status of a diverse university town were not significantly relevant factors in the evaluation.

Among local councillors and administrators, advisory boards for migrants are regarded as quite important by three quarters of the respondents, while
10% of the councillors evaluate the advisory boards as not important at all. In the Eastern German city of Erfurt and in Bavarian cities the advisory boards achieve better results. In North Rhine-Westphalia councillors are more sceptical, although some serve on these boards. Nevertheless, in some cities such as Bonn the local councils are divided into two groups, one of which rejects the idea and another important group which supports them.

Graph 4: Councilors’ Attitudes: Advisory Boards for Migrants in Germany

Source: Author; for further data on empirical research see Kersting (2016); middle groups not shown.

5. Conclusions

Germany’s population is shrinking and there is a strong demand for immigration. Nevertheless, integration is not an easy task, particularly in Eastern Germany, where there are fewer immigrants and xenophobia is obvious. Therefore, immigration policies have to be administered well. Here, federalism and strong local authorities often lack the capacity to learn from neighbouring cities, and the federal level fails to learn from the experience of the provinces.

In 2015 civil war in Syria and symbolic policies at the national level in Germany triggered the refugee crisis. At the beginning, local administra-
tors struggled with the immense influx of people only to realise that this situation might have been handled with the help of civil society. In 2017 the situation regarding the status of refugees is unclear. Developments from August 2015 until the end of 2016 showed strong dedication to the rule of law when it comes to the individual rights of refugees on the one hand, but on the other hand, they demonstrated a lack of capacity within the German bureaucracy. The situation with refugees was mitigated by strong civil society engagement and an “open arms” culture with strong civic engagement, which made refugees feel welcome. Especially in Western Germany, many NGOs, churches, and other civic groups and organisations assumed many governmental responsibilities and state functions regarding the integration of refugees. This crisis was made more acute by the financial crisis, as well as a lack of coherent integration concepts at both the level of the provinces and the national level. Some provinces, such as North Rhine-Westphalia, developed special policies to coordinate the crucial field of education and other areas of relevance to refugees. These may – in the long run – end up as typical muddling-through policies regarding refugees in Germany. They may also lead to a new administrative culture showing the deficits of German bureaucracy. In certain regions, the positive effect of migration was highlighted and refugees were seen as a panacea for shrinking cities and regions. In this regard, councillors and administrations have often used these new statistics as an argument to demand more money from the provincial level. Local finance has always been problematic, and for several years politicians have had to reject economically important decisions to save money and to reduce functions. Now, after many years, for the first time cities are growing again. Councillors are able to plan for infrastructural projects such as schools.

There are three main problems. First, the shrinking regions and xenophobia are more prevalent in rural than in metropolitan areas. Secondly, the shrinking regions are not attractive to migrants because migrants have special requirements. Thirdly, most migrants do not fulfil all the requirements and do not have the relevant skills needed by the German economy, so lengthy training and socialisation seems to be necessary. Local integration policies appear to be focused on muddling through, which is why new strategies are needed. Some of these are:

- Substantial investment in education is necessary to ease integration. Education and wealth facilitates integration in German cities.
- To foster integration, it seems necessary to include the whole family as opposed to just the parents or just the children; hence it appears necessary to reunite families and allow family members to follow the refugees.
In the long run, it will be difficult to forbid the refugees the right to settle wherever they wish in Germany, and networks within the refugee population may lead to a kind of internal migration within the country. The majority of refugees want to remain in prosperous regions. Here, the policy of decentralisation has to create attractive employment opportunities and cultural possibilities in medium-sized cities, which will reduce regional disparities and prevent the shrinking of regions and cities. In the long run, the city lights of big metropolitan areas with strong cultural venues, job opportunities, and reasonable housing can enhance the pull effects of smaller and medium-sized cities within Germany.

To guarantee a broad range of citizen rights and to avoid mismanagement, refugees have to be included in the political process. Their integration into advisory boards could constitute the first step towards including them in the local political process. The differences between the needs of heterogeneous migrants have to be respected, while on the other hand, competitions between these social subgroups have to be avoided. Ultimately, some migrants and refugees will go back to their home countries, but all others should be given the opportunity for full inclusion into German society and full citizen rights. Parallel societies with cultural enclaves must be subsumed into a vibrant, intercultural German society. This means building up a new cultural context by profiting from the ideas and influences deriving from new cultures. Much more bridging between different groups is required. This strategy seems to be much more challenging and promising than a mere parallel multicultural strategy. Multicultural identities have to be preserved and bonding is strong in most of these groups anyway, but bridging between societal groups can generate a more advanced society.

References


MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN GERMAN CITIES

Summary

Germany has never regarded itself as a country of immigration. Nevertheless, after World War II a number of refugees settled in Germany and in the 1960s German industry attracted a large group of immigrants from Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey). Both of these groups predominantly integrated into German society. In the 1990s, during the Balkan wars, a large number of refugees came to Germany, but most of them returned home afterwards. In 2015 a new migration policy emerged. Due to the war in Syria, refugees tried to immigrate into Central Europe via the so-called Balkan Route. They were partly attracted by a symbolic but brief German “open arms” policy. In 2015 and 2016, around 1.2 million people applied for asylum in Germany. Due to the policy shift of the German government and new policies in Turkey and other countries in Eastern Europe, these numbers dropped dramatically in 2017. The paper tries to answer the question of who represents these refugees, as well as other migrants. Meanwhile, some groups with a migration background – such as citizens of the European Union – have full electoral rights at local and European Union elections. Since the 1990s most other foreigners have been represented on advisory boards for citizens in most of the larger cities. These advisory boards are also regarded as advocates for refugees without a long-term perspective of becoming German citizens. Nevertheless, there are only three provinces (Länder) with an appropriate legal framework for these boards. The advisory boards are accepted in all 14 analysed representative cities by both the citizens and the councillors, although acceptance is slightly lower in Eastern compared to Western Germany.

Keywords: migration, refugees, integration, Germany, political representation, deliberative democracy, democratic innovation
MIGRACIJA I INTEGRACIJA U NJEMAČKIM GRADOVIMA

Sažetak


U radu se pokušava odgovoriti na pitanje tko zastupa te izbjeglice i druge migrante. S druge strane, neke skupine migrantskog podrijetla kao što su primjerice građani Europske unije imaju sva izborna prava na lokalnim i EU izborima.

U većim gradovima još od 90-ih godina prošlog stoljeća većinu drugih stranaca zastupaju savjetodavni odbori građana. Te se savjetodavne odbore također smatra zagovornicima onih izbjeglica bez dugoročnih izgleda da postanu njemački državljanini. Samo tri pokrajine (Länder) posjeduju odgovarajući zakonski okvir unutar kojeg savjetodavni odbori mogu djelovati. Savjetodavne odbore prihvaćaju i građani i vijećnici u svih 14 analiziranih reprezentativnih gradova, no u istočnom je dijelu Njemačke prihvaćanje slabije izraženo nego u zapadnom dijelu zemlje.

Ključne riječi: migracija, izbjeglice, integracija, Njemačka, zastupanje u politici, deliberativna demokracija, demokratska inovacija