Democracy as a Turning Point: A Treatise on the Democratic Limits of Democracy

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Abstract

Nowadays, in the era of accelerated globalization, we are challenged to re-examine some basic postulates of democracy. The notions of individualism, human rights, freedoms and equality of chances must undergo serious changes because democracy is threatened from at least three sides. First, the global trend of empowerment of the far right makes us think about the efficiency of democracy's defense mechanisms. Second, the dystopia of the world as a global village, when combined with the hyperreality of mass media, has transformed democracy into Beck's risk society. And third, democracy is threatened by its inner paradoxes. Furthermore, our aim will be to show theoretically that democracy can only exist as a promise to come. Its fatal attraction lies in this deceptive nature. In the mist of mainstream interpretations, our opinion is that only a radical critique of democracy can help us deal with its self-destructive nature.

Keywords

democracy, populism, aporia, autoimmunity, demos

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Philosophical Prelude to the Notions of Democracy and the Turning Point

Will you allow as a certainty that we are at a turning point? If it is a certainty it is not a turning point. The fact of our belonging to this moment at which a change of epoch, if there is one, is being accomplished also takes hold of the certain knowledge that would want to determine it, making both certainty and uncertainty inappropriate. Never are we less able to get around ourselves than at such a moment and the discrete force of the turning point lies first in this.

(Blanchot, 1993:264)

Whether we assume that we are at a turning point or not, it would be simplistic to start by neglecting *the discrete force of the turning point* itself. Indeed, for this very reason, it would be useful to begin by deferring the beginning and asking the *first* question, a question to be asked before any other, which *anyway* comes before, be it by surprise or *expectedly* by surprise: *what* is democracy and at *what* is its turning point?

This problem can clearly be expressed even in positive terms: it is the haunting possibility that our democracy and our turning point do not coincide with each other, and that renders democracy a fearless and not a privatisable turning point. For instance, to state that democracy is at a turning point can easily amount to the *rogue*isation (Derrida, 2005: 78–79)[*] of its alternatives, which are nothing more than the effects of democracy itself. In such circumstances, "democracy at a turning point" amounts to playing by the rules, by the *rails*[**], moving in a straight line without bending neither the rules nor the rails. But, without this possibility of transgression, a rule, a rail, a turning point itself would actually be for nothing. It is the singular plurality of the turning point which always-already undermines its unity: without the possibility of turning from the turning point, no turning point would really be *a* turning point.

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[*] Derrida notes that "[…] in the French idiom, someone can do something that is 'voyou' [rogue] without being *a* rogue. As such, it announces, prepares, and begins to justify some sanction".

[**] Words "rule" and "rail" have the same etymology: *regula* (lat.) meaning "straight stick, bar, ruler". See for instance https://www.etymonline.com/word/rule and https://www.etymonline.com/word/rail.

Paradoxically then, rather than accepting and embracing the plastic *Otherness* through playing by the rules, it is actually affirming democracy *as* a turning point that we necessarily and inevitably do *both* a great deal and very little. The epoch of the sole benefaction being epistemologically behind us and structurally always-already there, it is long overdue that we recognize that by negating democracy one actually upholds it, and that by affirming it, the final product of democracy results immediately deferred. Democracy as a turning point is, before all, a deictic phenomenon.

In order to stay strictly on the argument: we do not need to challenge democracy because it is always-already challenged by its very existence. Many issues are evident, especially nowadays – in times of accelerated globalization. In this work we will tackle three of them: first, the global empowerment of the far right which forces us to re-examine the notion of democratic defense mechanisms in the fight with disloyal competitors; second, the ambiguous influence of mass media whose enlightenment role has become a cruel method of surveillance and punishment. Third, the inner paradoxes of democracy, backed by the experience of different thinkers, such as Kant with his notion that obeying the rules is crucial and above any kind of freedom. Rancière's critique of democracy is also quite fruitful, especially when he says that democracy is the rule of no one because *demos* does not have an *arkhê** to govern. We will *try* to propose some solutions to these difficult challenges. We will talk about the expansion of the signified field of democracy, about democracy-to-come and, finally, about our own private crucial ex-centrism.

Populism – The Ambiguous Threat to Democracy

Nowadays, we can read a number of news about growing right-wing populism in Europe which is, in most cases, written in the manner of premonition or in fear of resident evil. After the recent political developments, fear has become a clear and present danger. The specter of populism is spreading around Europe. In their article *How Far is Europe Swinging to the* Right the *New York Times* reports with no lack of critical sharpness: "Amid a migrant crisis, economic inequality, growing disillusionment with the European Union and

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*   *Arkhê* is both the first cause, the beginning, the origin (*arkhê*) and the entitlement to govern (*arkhêin*). Accordingly, to be bereft of the *arkhê* stands for the lack of the origin of the entitlement to govern as a proof for its legitimate exercise.

a sense of lost national identity, right-wing parties in a growing number of European countries have made electoral gains" (NYTimes, 2016). It is obvious that right-wing populism could not rise in a political climate which is suitable to everyone. Rightists are constantly emphasizing, rightfully to some extent, that the burden of guilt is in the garden of their ideological adversaries. Costas Douzinas said: "Left is either incapable of winning power, or has no idea what to do with it" (Douzinas, 2013: 210). We must add that it is not just a matter of power. Namely, the Left is deprived of ideology and the Right knows how to (ab)use that fact. That is why we can claim that democracy does not have effective defensive mechanisms against practices which are found to be non-democratic, which are in turn characteristics of right-wing populism. The issue is in the incapability of democracy to survive its full realization. Since populism is a threat to democracy, it can have dire consequences or can, at least, potentially put democracy in serious danger. In order to detect the democratic deficit, we must briefly examine the discourse on populism.

Greven says: "Populism's central and permanent narrative is the juxtaposition of a (corrupt) »political class,« »elite,« or »establishment,« and »the people,« as whose sole authentic voice the populist party bills itself" (Greven, 2016: 1). But in the very moment we identify the essence of populism in judging the corrupt political class, we become populists ourselves. Even if this claim is true, we cannot constitute the meaning of populism basing it solely on negative premises. It is precisely the opposite, the Left today is being built on the denial of right-wing populism. To be blatantly simple, we can compare two statements. The first one is from Victor Orban and is a prime example of a right-wing politician: "Hungary does not need a single migrant for the economy to work, or the population to sustain itself, or for the country to have a future" (TheGuardian, 2016). Certainly, it is a controversial statement but written in the self-confident manner of the Right which has a clear idea for the future. On the other hand, there is Emanuel Macron, a centrist politician: "Nationalism is war. I know it. I come from a region that is full of graveyards" (Reuters, 2017). So, the centrist position is that a future with the Right is not viable. And that is the crucial issue – it shows us all the impotence of democracy to defend itself.

In our opinion, in the choice of Macron and Le Pen, the voters of Le Pen are not the problematic ones. Those who voted for Macron simply in order not to vote for Le Pen are much more troublesome.

They did not vote for, but against. The main idea of these paragraphs is to show that they did not have anything to vote for in Macron's political campaign.* The right-wing policy included discriminating, disturbing, violent and racist ideas, but at least they were precise. The Left and the Center offered nothing else than the bare negation of the Right. That is why we can say that nowadays the (radical) Left and the (radical) Right are similar to some extent. Right-wing populism is the only political and ideological orientation that gives pragmatic solutions for social phenomena. It is important to note that subversion has been pertinent to the left side of the ideological scale. But, populism is the agent which has made the two overlap.

Martin Schultz said: "To combat right-wing extremism in Europe we need to be conscious of specific basic values – values that have to be regarded as inviolable across the spectrum from right to left! If these basic values are challenged, they have to be communally defended" (Schultz, 2011: 27). This approach is completely wrong. Namely, we should not fight against populism, but for democratic values and for a society based on those values. We cannot reduce the democratic deficit by fighting against a common enemy, since it will always result in the deficit being exactly the same. The only right way is to redefine the notion of democracy and to make it function in modern societies. In other words, to give it a breath of fresh ideas. When it comes to treating populism, we must quote Slavoj Žižek: "For the enlightened liberal-technocratic elite, populism is inherently "proto-Fascist," the demise of political reason, a revolt in the guise of the outburst of blind utopian passions. The easiest reply to this distrust would have been to claim that populism is inherently neutral: a kind of transcendental-formal political dispositive that can be incorporated into different political engagements" (Lacan. com, 2006). What Žižek suggests is to treat populism as any other idea that can be defeated by being put into practice. Basically, confronting populism with the possibility of being the only option would be the final defeat for it. We know it from the Freudian theory of dreams: if you want to destroy a dream, just make it real. However, the problem is that the defensive mechanisms of democracy will not function because there is no more populism. There will always be another threat, maybe even more appealing and dangerous. To make the mechanism function means to reshape the common sense of what democracy should mean.

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* Macron is just an example of a paradigmatic figure; it is not the intention of the authors to go deeper into considerations about him.

Is Mass Media a Guest or a Parasite of Democracy?

Similar to the notion of populism, the relation between mass media and democracy can be read in two ways. Namely, it is very hard to find a better platform for the exchange of opinions, wide social inclusion and accessibility of information for the population. Among numerous functions of mass media, we can find the following ones: to inform, to be a watchdog, to serve the political system, to set an agenda, to entertain, to be a place for voices to be heard, to hold society together (Bittner, 1996: 11). All of these functions are indirectly under the legal norm of what is necessary in a democratic society. However, if used deliberately in the wrong manner, mass media can become by far the biggest threat for democratic system. By becoming a judge instead of a mediator, it can create and destroy lives. It can create events that did not happen at all and it is embodied in Boorstin's term "pseudo-event". It is a kind of media creating events which include alternating reality or a planting of a completely new one. As Boorstin says: "The modern American tourist now fills his experience with pseudo-events. He has come to believe that he can have a lifetime of adventure in two weeks and all the thrills of risking his life without any real risk at all" (Boorstin, 1961: 93). The "increase" in reality and the transformation to realities was noticed by Jean Baudrillard when he created the term "hyperreality". So, we are not living our everyday reality anymore, but the media created one which is more real than reality itself. In his words: "Reality is jealous of picture" (Baudrillard, 2002: 28). Only the hyperreal era could bring the "ingenious" saying that, if it was not in the news, it did not happen. For the sake of power or economic interest, the mass media can overshadow the whole democratic system and even democracy as an idea(l). We will show this on the paradigmatic example of terrorism.

The reasons why the mass media has been a fertile ground for terrorism and the other way around are pretty simple. The mass media is ubiquitous and easy-to-reach while terrorists need to spread their message to as many recipients as possible. Therein lies a very old dilemma – if the mass media just gives visibility to terrorists, or if it actively participates in their revealing and extermination. Without going into that discussion, we can quote Baudrillard again with: "The spectacle of terrorism forces the terrorism of spectacle upon us" (Baudrillard, 2002:30). The mega-capitalistic demands of the mass media for a bigger profit and a bigger audience dictate the agenda of what is attractive. Human suffering has always been appreciated and since death is the king of all suffering, terrorists

succeeded in transforming their deaths into a weapon against a system that operates on basis of the exclusion of death. Terrorists accept to kill themselves in sacrifice for some unclear ideals: "Terrorism has no meaning, no objective, and cannot be measured by its real political and historical consequences" (Baudrillard, 2002: 57). Certainly, it means that the mass media distorted the appearance of terrorism and accommodated it to its own needs. This can be best seen in how mass media presented the September 11 attacks. It was interesting that we did not have a chance to see any blood, any death or even any frightening scene in any of the reports from the biggest media networks. On the other hand, we remember all the reports of Islamic State or Boko Haram where absence of blood is a pertinent miracle: we look at live decapitations and ritual killings. Žižek says: "The real horror happens there, not here" (Žižek, 2002: 13). The guilty ones are always the others, not us. This one-sided approach may be considered as good in societies where it is needed to "make real violence to get to surface, as an opposition to the invisible violence of security" (Baudrillard, 1994: 40).

We can conclude that the media-constructed reality poses a great threat for democracy, which once again does not have an appropriate answer. The only cure for this is to prevent confusion between reality and the virtual world and to show critical sharpness when it comes to considering whether media content should be accepted as true. One golden rule should always be kept in mind: let the media serve you, do not ever serve the media. The intimate space in the broader setting of the world must be preserved. We base this claim on the micro-contribution that democracy can defend itself against the intrusion. The next chapter will in a roundabout manner look into the problematic question of whether democracy wants to be saved at all.

Democracy: a Notion, a Concept or *at least* both?

Nowadays, democracy is too often seen as a form of consensus: to decide democratically translates into reaching a consensus on a question. This assumption has been contested by postmodernist thinkers. For instance, Jacques Rancière inverts this logic by showing methodologically that there is not just one logic, just one logos (Rancière, 2010: 45–62). He gives a straightforward account of democracy's internal self-destructiveness. That is what he, clearly enough, calls the "democratic paradox" (Rancière, 2010: 45). Very simply: "[...] democracy as a form of government is threatened by

democracy as a form of social and political life and so the former must repress the latter" (Rancière, 2010: 47). How is it possible that, when talking about democracy, we actually have at least two democracies, as underlined by the French philosopher? How come that we have democracy and *democracies* at the same time – what determines the disclosure of the sense(s) of this word? Rancière seems to have the answer once again: "Democracy is the specific situation in which it is the absence of entitlement that entitles one to exercise the arkhê. It is the commencement without commencement, a form of rule (*commandement*) that does not command [...] Democracy is not a political regime. It is the very regime of politics itself as a form of relationship that defines a specific subject [...] democracy is not a political regime in the sense that it forms one of the possible constitutions which define the ways in which people assemble under a common authority" (Rancière, 2010: 31).

So, what is the first element of such a statement? I would say "the absence of entitlement which entitles", which traduces into what Agamben calls "the state of exception". There is a state of exception, the absence of entitlement, which is not, however, an exceptional state of exception. Nor a temporary exceptional state of exception. On the contrary, for the absence of entitlement to entitle, we need it as a permanent state of exception, as a permanent confusing turning point, as a permanent temporary exceptional state of exception. Democracy thus becomes the form of government of those who have no form of government, an exceptional state for those in the state of exception and an entitlement for those with no entitlement. Only as such can democracy withstand its governmental and liberal version. Were there no democracy in the form of *democracies*, these lines would have no sense because their sense(s) would be fully accomplished. Their *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, their sense(s) and reference(s), would be superposed. It would amount to putting democratic institutions literally *in* the book: an utterly violent and unnecessary scenario of supplementing what *is* and detains a self-sufficient meaningfulness.

The second important element in Rancière's statement is "commencement without commencement", that is the *first cause* without the *first cause*. The *first cause* which is at the same time its own opposite, as well as its own negator; a union of Kant's affirmative, negative and infinite judgment. And when it comes to the third point by Rancière, namely "[democracy] as a form of relationship that defines a specific subject" (Rancière, 2010: 31), it highlights all the vainness of exporting democracy, which then equals to

nothing more than mango or arms export, to just another political calculus. And who better to describe it than one of the fathers of present-day Enlightenment: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (Smith, 2007: 16). So, it is not us who have democracy at our disposal, but exactly the other way around. Any dissent just confirms this, and any agreement becomes a disapproval. Reinterpretation is all about that: "Repetition thus appears as a difference, but a difference absolutely without concept; in this sense, an indifferent difference" (Deleuze, 1994: 15).

If democracy is not a political regime, if it is the entitlement of those with no *arkhê*, then democracy belongs to the people (*demos*) who "exists only as a rupture with the logic of arkhê, a rupture with the logic of commencement/commandement" (Rancière, 2010: 33). "People" is here used just as a translation of the Greek word *demos*, but this does not mean that it is necessarily plural. It can perfectly be singular even if it, as we saw, does not mean that this singularity possesses democracy. This matter, however, seems to be the point where Rancière disagrees with Derrida who writes about a *Messianic* dimension of democracy-to-come (Derrida, 2005:88). Still, if "people" is not necessarily plural, then "Messiah" is not necessarily singular. The former is a matter of the translation from the Greek language, while the latter is just a metaphor, which, in spite of and on account of its im-possibility (of its *to-comeness*), denotes exactly the undenotable, that which rejects every denotation which is not the denotation of its undenotability. This is why democracy is autoimmune: it entitles the unentitled to be such, because it is threatened by its very logic which at the same time protects it and destructs it, which is at the same time in and out, metaphysical and non-metaphysical. Just as *différance*, which, in spite of its transcendence of metaphysics, remains a metaphysical name as well as all the names it receives in our language which are, as names, metaphysical (Derrida, 1997: 56).

For Derrida, thus, there is a "Messianicity without Messianism" (Derrida, 2005: 88) and it is not a coincidence that he uses two different words here. On the one hand, "Messianicity" makes us think about something which is under (de)construction, which is in progress, which does not end. In a nutshell, it is the chiliastic dimension of what *is* never and remains always to-come as the structural possibility of what actually is: the reason why it is not just another –*ism* lies precisely in the fact that it supervenes and surprises by nature and is thus not projectable in the form of an ideology. On

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the other hand, "Messianism" is exactly the ideologocentric form of Messianicity, the programmable and expectable arrival of the Attended Messia *in person*. In Messianicity, every waiting is in vain and every arrival im-possible. Messianism, instead, is what Rancière means by Police: "Two ways of counting the parts of the community exist. The first counts real parts only – actual groups defined by differences in birth and by different functions, places and interests that make up the social body to the exclusion of every supplement. The second 'in addition' to this counts a part of those without part. I call the first police and the second politics" (Rancière, 2010:36). Police is thus that which legalizes without taking into account justice as a 'supplement'; police is politics without democracy, politics without politicizing, Rortian construction without deconstruction. But the latter is just another construction, contrary to what is often said and written about it: imagining deconstruction as De(con)struction is just another Kantian enlightened mechanism of construction and consensus. "The essence of politics, [on the contrary], is dissensus" (Rancière, 2010: 38), as a supplement which protects politics from being reduced to The Police.

This is why "[p]olitics will always fail to deliver on promises to implement freedom and equality integrally" (Rancière, 2010: 80). This is why Derrida challenges Law with justice and democracy with democracy-to-come. The Law of Justice is democracy-to-come.

Demo(n)cracies: a Multidisciplinary Account

In his book "How the World Works" (2011), Noam Chomsky opens a chapter entitled *War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength* in the following way: "According to the common-sense meaning, a society is democratic to the extent that people can participate in a meaningful way in managing their affairs. But the doctrinal meaning of democracy is different – it refers to a system in which decisions are made by sectors of the business community and related elites" (Chomsky, 2011:64). What we can define problematic here, after our long mental excursus, is that "people" is a rather ambiguous and equivocal term, if "term" is the proper word at all. Similarly, Chomsky takes for granted that a meaningful participation means something per se; rather, it is precisely the semantic rupture within the homogenized concept of "people" that defines the meaningfulness itself. Accordingly, it would be quite difficult to envisage in "people" an accomplished sense subverted from an outside, the latter being actually nothing more than what

engenders the inside itself.

Yet, Chomsky does not stop here: "If segments of the public depart from their apathy and begin to organize and enter the public arena, that's not democracy [...] it's a *crisis of democracy*" (Chomsky, 2011:64). We can now see that he does not miss the opportunity to problematize the very nature of people, of "the public", in this case Chomsky seems to be saying that democracy actually both attacks itself and defends itself from itself.

Naomi Klein comes close to this reasoning when she says the following: "As Latin Americans had just learned, authoritarian regimes have a habit of embracing democracy at the precise moment when their economic projects are about to implode" (Klein, 2008: 175). We would like to highlight an interesting word choice here: it explains by itself why Chomsky's and Klein's positions might be considered strictly connected.

The word we should draw our attention to is "(to) implode": why not to explode? Why has Klein chosen the inverted explosion, the explosion towards inside in mentioning democracy? To implode, that is to collapse inward, to (be) self-destruct(ed). We claim that only a "wider" democracy can withstand suicidal economic projects and survive its own implosion. Where you cut a head, a couple of new ones grow in its place.

But Klein does not end here, either: an ambiguous chapter title speaks about *Surviving Democracy: Bombs Made of Laws*. Things get far more complicated: Klein clearly states that the survival of democracy has to be survived, which cannot but make us think about the aforementioned concepts of evil democracy and the state of exception. And we claim that this is the very framework with no frames which enables her to say that "[t]his book is a challenge to the central and most cherished claim in the official story – that the triumph of deregulated capitalism has been born out of freedom, that unfettered free markets go in hand with democracy" (Klein, 2008: 18). The only *Invisible Hand* that the Canadian journalist sees is that of disruptive meanings.

Such is the situation in which "September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of "free trade and democracy" and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force" (Klein, 2008: 18). And such is the situation in which Tariq Ali, in *Letter to a Young Muslim* declares as follows: "[...] democracy means the right

to think differently, and [...] [f]or the West, [it] means believing exactly the same things that they believe. Is that really democracy?" (Ali, 2003:306). We see that Ali first introduces an apparently irreconcilable dichotomy, but then asks a question without asking for an answer, by asking an affirmative question (actually an always-already non-affirmative one). Ali proves *ipso facto* that democracy is precisely that because it is not. For, what would *the right to* be if you did not have to ask for it, if it could not be abolished?

Susan George shows no less anxiousness about what she calls "illegitimate authority" (Abc.net.au, 2013), namely that of multinational corporations and supranational entities where Leviathan seems to be unleashed, as a clear rupture in the democratic authorization can be identified.

Finally, Slavoj Žižek sums up perfectly not only that which is imposed by the power structures of a society, but also that which is more imposed, preferably imposed in the general framework of mere imposition: "In a classic line from a Hollywood screwball comedy, the girl asks her boyfriend: 'Do you want to marry me?' 'No!' 'Stop dodging the issue! Give me a straight answer!'' In a way, the underlying logic is correct: the only acceptable straight answer for the girl is 'Yes!', so anything else, including a straight 'No!', counts as evasion. This underlying logic, of course, is again that of the forced choice: you're free to decide, on condition that you make the right choice. [...] And is it not the same today with the choice 'democracy or fundamentalism'? Is it not that, within the terms of this choice, it is simply not possible to choose 'fundamentalism'?" (Žižek, 2002: 3). Žižek recognizes that *democracy* is far more problematic here: the democratic principle of no fixed principles simply cannot but undermine the logic of fundamentalism being the only alternative to *democracy*.

Autoimmunity and Aporia(s)

What other than such a democracy could withstand all these *democracies*? Derrida writes: "Plato already announces that "democracy" is, in the end, neither the name of a regime nor the name of a constitution. It is not a constitutional form among others. And yet there have in fact been, in addition to the monarchic, plutocratic, and tyrannical democracies of antiquity, so many so-called modern democratic regimes, regimes that at least *present themselves* as democratic, that is, under and in the name of democracy: democracy

at once monarchic (what is called constitutional monarchy) and parliamentary (found in a large number of European nation-states), popular democracy, direct or indirect democracy, parliamentary democracy (whether presidential or not), liberal democracy, Christian democracy, social democracy, military and authoritarian democracy, and so on" (Derrida, 2005:26–27). What is far more problematic here is that, apparently paradoxically, tyrannical, military and authoritarian democracy assume a much sincerer character. Other democracies which, conversely, hide and suppress their sufficitarian democratic deficit and vice versa, tend to be far more dictatorial than those whose every secret is perfectly public. In addition, the latter explodes in violence all at once, which makes us think that the cause is somewhere else, that we are assisting to a radical change in regime etc. But the truth is that democracy itself is violent. It inscribes us just as de Saussure's language engraves what was previously thought to be its patron: once again – it is us. For, what language (even assuming that only one existed) would make sense if it did not cruelly exercise its (counter)power on us, confounding in such a manner the very *raison d'être*, origin and sense of this relation? With democracy it is the same: the origin is continuously and simultaneously here and elsewhere. And so is (not) identity.

That is why democracy is *autoimmune*. As Derrida puts it: "Nothing in *common*, nothing immune, safe and sound, *heilig* and holy, nothing unscathed in the most autonomous living present without a risk of autoimmunity. As always, the risk charges itself twice, the same finite risk. Two times rather than one: with a menace and with a chance. In two words, it must take charge of – one could also say: take in trust – the *possibility* of that radical evil without which good would be for nothing" (Derrida, 2002: 82). Of course, the first thing that comes to mind when mentioning autoimmunity is medicine, clearly. Autoimmune is that which contemporarily defends and attacks by attacking the defended and defending the attacked. Autoimmunity is *aporetic*, which does not simply equal to imperviousness, a complete breakdown or to a paralysis, but rather to that which renders the impossible im-possible, that which fails at defining the calm realm(s) of safety and security in that the purpose of such realm(s) is always an externality which is both external and internal. An internal externality which moves from imperviousness without ever simply exceeding it.

Towards a Conclusion

The initial premise of this brief text was based upon the idea that the present-day democracy is under attack and in danger. However, two spontaneous questions arose from it: who or what is in charge of defending democracy? Is there any subject which could announce its crisis and does not this very announcement in form of a statement or of an affirmation actually transform into its opposite? Does not the very fact that we can doubt that announcement and question it amount to an affirmation of the negation by affirmation? We questioned it in at least two senses: in the sense of putting it in question and in the sense of asking a question to it. If a conclusion ideally should offer answers, the hybrid dimension of answers and affirmations cannot but put us in an aporetic situation.

Democracy is not the only game in town and it is certainly not a house on the hill. Democracy is an oath, a curse, a discourse which must be utterly transformed in order to avoid going in the trash can of history. The ultimate survival test of democracy will be its confrontation with the possibility of *status quo*. If it stays the very same, democracy will disappear in the routine of (non)democratic threats to itself.

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