CENTRAL EUROPE IN MICKIEWICZ’S THOUGHT AND DEED DURING THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION (1848-1849). THE CROATIAN TROPES.

Abstract

In the 40s of the 19th century Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) was considered one of the greatest writers of Polish Romanticism. On top of that, he was one of the most recognizable Poles in Europe with strong political involvement, known for opposing any forms of political despotism. In the era of the European Revolution of 1848-1849 he entered the realm of politics with significant impetus and among all else was counting on the Balkans to become one of the main stages of an anti-Austrian campaign, being convinced that especially among the Croatians there is a strong potential and willingness to rebel. His ideas on this area collided with Austro-Slavism and several other views and were finally defeated with Jelačić’s policy. The collapse of the liberation movements in Central Europe for him was due to the consequence of the lack of profound cooperation between the enslaved nations and he saw it as a triumph of destructive egoism over solidarity.

Key words: Adam Mickiewicz, anti-Austrian movement, Revolution 1848, Balkan, Slavic nations
Introduction

In the 40s of the 19th century Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) was considered one of the greatest writers of Polish Romanticism. On top of that, he was one of the most recognizable Poles in Europe. Being politically involved from a young age, in the 20s he was exiled to Russia for five years. He was known for opposing any forms of political despotism. In the era of the European Revolution of 1848-1849 he once again entered the realm of politics with significant impetus. In 1848 in Rome, observing the outbreak of the revolution and the proliferation of national movements from Paris, through Italy, German countries, Vienna, Prague up to Greater Poland (Wielkopolska region) he came to a conclusion that the time for long-awaited change of order in Europe established back in 1815 during the Congress of Vienna had arrived. According to his vision, Central Europe was to become the main center of changes, as Mickiewicz perceived Austria as the weakest link among the European empires which had executed the partition of Poland. The destruction of Austria was supposed to be the starting point of the big change. He expected the war with Austria initiated by Charles Albert, the king of Sardinia, and rebellious regions from northern Italy including Lombardy and Tuscany, the background of which was constituted by revolutionary proclamations in Vienna and Prague, will receive support from the French republican government as well as the moral protectorate of the new pope Pius IX. This was supposed to eventually lead to the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. Therefore, Mickiewicz started organizing a Polish legion in Rome, which he assumed could soon become a Slavic legion, a significant Central European military force. He hoped that the legion together with the Italian and French armies would reach Kraków within months or even weeks, resulting in the possibility of establishing Polish Piemont, the beginning of an independent state. Mickiewicz’s another expectation was that the revolutionary wave would weaken Prussia and send ripples inside the Russian empire, bringing about a change in the character of the country’s policy, especially that Bakunin had assured Mickiewicz and other Polish emigrants that it was a realistic option as Russia was teeming with internal conspiracies (Weintraub, 1998: 140-162).

Discussion

Such a combination of events could indeed lead to Poland’s full restitution, fulfilling the poet’s dreams. He prepared an ideological document for the legion called *The collection of rules*, which in the future was to become the basis for
a constitution. The revolutionary document, postulating openness of all posts
to the public, equal rights irrespective of one’s gender, ethnic origin or social
background (including full political rights for, among others, Jews and women),
the abolishing of censorship, an agrarian reform and, finally, full solidarity
between free Slavic nations. In 1848, it was Slavic nations, especially the Poles,
the Czechs and the inhabitants of the Balkans who played the pivotal role for
Mickiewicz. Therefore, it is what I would like to concentrate on, leaving aside the
details concerning the history of the aforementioned legion, as it is well-known
and has been thoroughly investigated (Kieniewicz, 1998: 254-271).

The legion was conceived of as an international undertaking, yet Slavic in
its core. It was to gather not only the Polish emigrants and teenagers fleeing
the annexed territories, but also Slavic prisoners of war from the Austrian army
(there were several thousands of them there), as well as volunteers from Czech
and Dalmatia (the poet used this ethnic name most frequently). For this reason,
he kept appealing in Rome for permission to conscript these prisoners of war
into the legion and attempted at propagating this idea among Austrian soldiers
fighting in Italy, among which there were many Croatians and Czechs. However,
he never managed to receive such permission from the government in Milan or
the leaders of Piemont because they were solely interested in unifying Italy, but
had no interest in the total destruction of the Habsburg monarchy. For similar
reasons, the poet never received support for his idea in Paris, as the French
Republic did not intend to export its revolution. In Paris the vision of French
forces being sent to the Balkans which purportedly were about to rebel against
Austria was treated as wishful thinking.

It is confirmed that in the spring of 1848 Mickiewicz really counted on the
Balkans to become one of the main stages of an anti-Austrian campaign and
was thoroughly convinced that especially among the Croatians there is a strong
potential and willingness to rebel. There are numerous testimonies to it, some
of which are worth quoting. On 17 April 1848, Mickiewicz wrote a letter to
Giuseppe Malmusi, the president of the government in Modena the following
words: “The Polish military host unified in Rome around the national flag blessed
by Pius IX is on its way to Poland, crossing Lombardy and the Slavic states. Our
mission is to create a union of the Polish legion, which would, in turn, create a
union of Slavic Legions. (...) We go to Milan where we shall wait for our Polish
brothers who head there through Switzerland. From there, we shall appeal to
the Poles conscripted to the Austrian army as well as all the other Slavs, our
brothers: Dalmatians, Ilirians, Croatians, Czechs and Slovaks. They are all led
by the same Spirit. Soon you will hear the calling of this Spirit. You will see that
the Spirit will become flesh. The whole Slavic fleet stationed in Livorno gave
us a promise of help” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 511). Let me add that the last part
of the message was largely exaggerated; the word concerning the legions was
propagated among Slavo-Balkan seamen but it brought rather meager results.
Five days later, Mickiewicz wrote to Jules Bastide, the Foreign Affairs Minister of
the republican government in Paris, as follows: “It is clear that countries which
have no nations lack the vital element and will soon fall apart [the poet had in
mind the Habsburg state] (…) It logically follows that the Austrian empire will
cease to exist. The appropriate action for France is to acknowledge it, announce
it and take relevant action. The French should reach out to the Slavic peoples,
especially to Poland which is the centre of action for the sake of liberation.
France was never effective in its actions undertaken in the north and will never
be acting differently than through (the agency of) Poland. The area that should
attract France’s attention first is the Slavic coast of the Adriatic Sea, especially
Triest, Zadar, Dubrovnik and Split. This is where the Slavic movement will break
out, if it had not happened already. The peoples can be divided into two groups:
one advocate a union with Venice which they vaguely recollect; others attempt at
conceiving the Slavic nationality. It is paramount for France to act in this spirit.
(…) It is pertinent to make use of the independence movement of Dubrovnik or
any other coastal city and support it. Poles should be put on ships heading in
that direction” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 523).

Another quotation comes from the letter to a temporary government of
Lombardy, sent on 3 May 1848: “The rebirth of national movements, especially
the fights Italians wage against Austria have shown the Polish emigrants that
the time to take action has come. Acting arm in arm with Italians, Poles are
coming closer to liberating their own country. They cooperate in attempts to
dismantle the Austrian empire, which will liberate 5 million Poles subordinate
to this empire. Additionally, they give the Slavic provinces of Iliria, Dalmatia
and Croatia, all bordering Italy, the incentive to start acting towards their
national interests. The movement of these provinces is politically linked to the
movements of the Czech kingdom and those Slavic peoples who constitute the
majority in the kingdom of Hungary. The direct aim of the Poles acting in Italy,
however, should be tearing the Slavic element away from the Austrian army. (…) But in order to influence soldiers, one needs to have a flag under which one will
fight. The Poles who were convinced about the gravity of the Slavic case for Italy
and that the time is right gathered in the capital of Lombardy. (…) This is how
the Polish legion (of Dąbrowski) was once created. Initially comprising around a hundred soldiers and officers, after a few months it amounted to twelve thousand and the number was still counting, as Poles, Ilirians and Czechs flocked and joined them. And that was even before the era in which we live has arrived and bolstered the national feelings” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 537).

Even though only 12 volunteers set off from Rome to Milan with Mickiewicz, knowing that in France emigrants were being conscripted he expected that the armed forces he was preparing would exceed in terms of both number and multinational character the 18th century legions of Jan Henryk Dąbrowski, which had eventually become a significant part of Napoleon's army. In fact, his expectations were never fulfilled for a number of reasons. France did not get involved in the Italian-Austrian war and Radetzky’s soldiers started dominating, Milan fell and Charles Albert, the leader of Piemont made truce with the Austrians even before Mickiewicz’s legion was fully formed. The uprising in Greater Poland targeted at Prussia collapsed and rebellions in Vienna, Prague and Lvov were throttled. Mickiewicz’s initiative did not receive full support among the Polish emigration, either. The left-wing emigrants gathered around The Polish Democratic Association as well as Prince Czartoryski’s supporters opposed the idea. In turn, the youth from the annexed lands, having experienced the defeat of uprisings in Greater Poland and Galicja chose Hungary and General Bem’s army. Finally, funds were too scarce to equip and send volunteers willing to become a part of Mickiewicz’s legion. As a consequence, the number did not exceed 300 soldiers.

Moreover, the poet was wrong about the possibility of an outbreak of an anti-Austrian and pro-independence movement in the Balkans, where count Josip Jelačić enjoyed a strong position. As the main Croatian politician, the ban and the commander-in-chief of the army, he advocated close relations with the Austrian dynasty. He took part in throttling the rebellion in Vienna and in a campaign in Hungary where, paradoxically, he fought against General Bem's army. 1848 was the pinnacle of his political and military career. He was in charge of the regions of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, propelling the idea of great Croatia and initiating the process of integration of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. Having put up strong resistance to the attempts of imposing on them Hungarian hegemony, he severed ties with Buda and led Croatian forces against the Hungarian government. This won him widespread support in Croatia, although there did exist opposition defying his policies and strong position in relation with the imperial court. He hoped for gaining broad autonomy within
the Habsburg monarchy without being at all dependent on Buda and with huge autonomy from Vienna. The last goal was not achieved. Once the Hungarian uprising was thwarted Vienna imposed a centralist system conceived of by Bach on all the provinces, including the South Slavs. Croatia had no other option than to accept a wave of Austrian civil servants. Jelačić kept the ban’s title until the rest of his life, however, after the collapse of the European Revolution of 1848-49 his position strongly diminished.

Historians, especially authors of synthetic analyses of the region’s history differ in their evaluations of his policy in the period of revolution. Dragutin Pavlicević defended the strategy taken by Jelačić: “Croatia began its fight for a country and a nation being put between Scylla from Vienna and Charybdis from Buda. So, if a historian is supposed to use a ‘what if’ clause, the answer would be: if it had not been for Jelačić and the Croatian army in 1848, Croatia would have become a Hungarian district and would never have received the status it did receive when Hungarians signed the Croatian-Hungarian settlement in 1868” (Pavlicević, 2004: 251). Pavlicevic portrays ban Jelačić in a fashion typical of a protagonist of an ancient tragedy who, lacking a simple and easy choice, was still able to create facts and propel processes beneficial to his community in the long run. Barbara Jelavich saw positive aspects of the European Revolution of 1848-49 for Croatia in different areas: “Nevertheless, the period was not totally lost. An agrarian reform was carried out and Zagreb became a seat of a bishop” (Jelavich, 2005: 311). She did not evaluate Jelačić’s policy directly, but underscoring the debacle of Croatia’s hopes for autonomy she indirectly pointed at his failure. Polish historians, including Wacław Felczak and Tadeusz Wasilewski were more critical in their assessments, commenting on appointing Jelacić as the ban in the following fashion: “The new Croatian ban was supposed to be a military tool of reaction against the Hungarian revolution and simultaneously be the catalyst for the Croatian revolution. The hasty nomination of Jelačić for the ban and the commander-in-chief of the army stationed in Croatia and its borderlands significantly influenced the course of and the fate of the Croatian revolution. As a loyal servant of the Habsburg dynasty Jelačić understood the Croatian policy as being an anti-Hungarian demonstration by which he complied with the interests of the whole monarchy as well as his fellowmen from Iliria who maintained the anti-Hungarian program from the pre-revolution period” (Felczak, Wasilewski, 1985: 324). Both historians considered the lifting of serfdom to be the biggest social achievement of the time, in which they agreed with Jelavich. Jerzy Skowronek, less directly than his predecessors put forward a thesis that Jelačić
had been used by Austrian reactionary politicians. He underscored, however, that the Hungarian side did not leave the Slavs, especially the South ones, including the Croatians, much room for maneuver. On top of that, Skowronek focused on the final consequences of the collapse of the European Revolution: “Vienna did not intend to respect the Slavic strive for independence. Instead, it strengthened the centralist policy, failing to comply with the rules delineated by the March constitution. Croatians gained their confirmation of independence from Hungary and the rights to use their national language as the official one, but did not get Vienna’s permission to merge Dalmatia with Croatia” (Skowronek, Tanty, Wasilewski, 2005: 278). These incomplete gains were the legacy of the ban of Croatia.

Around the year 1848, among Croatians, especially the supporters of Jelačić’s policy, as well as in the circles of Czech elites the idea of Austro-Slavism started gaining popularity. It was a concept standing in opposition to the Russian concept of Pan-Slavism. The concept of Austro-Slavism was conceived of by the representatives of the Czech national movement, especially Francisek Palacky and a number of Mickiewicz’s acquaintances, including a writer Vaclav Hanka. It was presented during a famous Slavic Convention in Prague in 1848 and it was rather coolly received by the Poles present there (Mickiewicz was absent). The proponents of Austro-Slavism were opposed to the idea of dismantling the empire; they strove to reshape the Austrian Empire into a federation of nations enjoying equal rights under the reign of the Habsburgs. Obviously, Mickiewicz’s project ran counter to this idea. It assumed Austria’s defeat and collapse followed by the creation of a range of independent countries on the stretch of land between the Baltic and the Adriatic. These countries, most of which were to be Slavic, would be tied by solidarity and cooperation but would not form any kind of federation. Mickiewicz wanted to convince among others Vaclav Hanka to his idea, but it did not catch on with the Czechs and the conscription to the legion as far as Czech volunteers were concerned was very poor. The similar case was with Croatians and Mickiewicz himself admitted there were no representatives of this nation in the legion. Still, the Polish Romantic truly expected solidarity between the Slavs in the fight against the invaders. The last, 15th point of an ethical-political manifesto of the legion penned by Mickiewicz under the title *The composition of rules* dealt with this issue: “Our brother Czech and its peoples, our brother Rus and its peoples deserve our political help, our familial help” (Mickiewicz, 1997: 11). Although the stress was put here on the
cooperation of the nations closest to the Poles in terms of geography (Czechs and Russians) for the sake of freedom, the overall overtone of the proclamation clearly encompasses a wider specter of nations.

It remains unclear where Mickiewicz’s certainty that the uprising of the South Slavs against the Austrians was imminent came from. Researchers Henryk Batowski and Stefan Kieniewicz attempted to find the answer to this question but it is still uncertain. Mickiewicz was well-informed about the Balkan culture, politics, as well as national differences and dissimilarities. However, the information he was privy to might have been incomplete, the traces of which can be found in Paris lectures and the aforementioned letters in which he seems to treat Dalmatia and Croatia as entities related to each other, yet separate. Besides, he couldn’t have had the knowledge about the Balkan situation comparable to that of Prince Czartoryski who had his agents in Belgrade and carefully analyzed the political processes in the region in cooperation with the French government. As a matter of fact, Czartoryski even made endeavors to instigate certain actions in the region, among others trying to facilitate the communication between the Hungarians and the South Slavs during the European Revolution of 1848-49. Mickiewicz became seriously conflicted with the members of Czartoryski’s faction in Rome in 1848 and, therefore, it is highly unlikely that he was informed about the actions they were taking at that time in the Balkans.

Mickiewicz’s conviction that the anti-Austrian uprising was imminent in the Adriatic Sea basin seems to stem from two facts. First of all, Mickiewicz firmly believed in the Slavs craving for freedom and he apparently wanted to see this tendency also among the South Slavs. Secondly, he might have been convinced into believing that by his Croatian acquaintances who were all young enthusiasts. One of them was Medo Pucić (born in 1821, also known under the name Pozzo Orsato), a poet from Dubrovnik writing in Croatian and Italian, who in 1848 sided with the Italian movements. Pucić, like Mickiewicz, believed that Risorgimento would open the door to freedom to all the Slavs. He met Mickiewicz several times in 1848 in Rome and Florence. Lubomir Durković-Jaksić pointed to the young Croatian poet as Mickiewicz’s main informant concerning the liberation movements in the area of Croatia and Slovenia: “Most likely he received information about the situation in Dalmatia and Istria from Pucić and some seamen from that area which he contacted” (Durković-Jaksić, 1984: 111). Undoubtedly, Mickiewicz pinned his hopes with him as far as propagating the idea among the Balkan nations. On 4 May 1848 the Polish Romantic tried to summon him to Milan in reference to this case and it is vital to quote his short yet very significant letter here:
“Dear Sir, during my stay in Florence it was physically impossible for me to take full advantage of our meeting, which was so auspicious for me. I would like to consult you about the matters of highest importance. It is about – as you may feel – the matter of Slavic and Polish freedom. Could you possibly come to Milan in a couple of days? If it is possible, please do not hesitate a moment. Meanwhile, please inform me whether you know any Dalmatian or Ilirian in Milan, a patriot capable of writing in his national language. Please respond at your earliest. Sincerely, Adam Mickiewicz” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 544).

It is unknown whether Pucić fulfilled Mickiewicz’s request, though it is clear that at that time he indeed supported the Italian and Polish liberation aspirations and hoped for an anti-Austrian uprising at the Adriatic. Durković-Jaksić proved that Jelačić’s service suspected Pucić of taking actions whose outcome was to connect the liberation initiatives in the Balkans with the Italian case and to instigate South Slavs against Austria. He kept close relations with Ljudevit Gaj, a prominent intellectual, the leader of The Croatian National Rebirth movement and a publisher of his poetry. He was willing to become actively involved in organizing an anti-Habsburg political action and was convinced that Croatians can be talked into the war with the Austrian monarchy for the sake of full independence. “There is evidence that Gaj was soliciting for money necessary to topple Jelačić and lead Croatians to a war with Austria. Colonel Ludwik Bystrzonowski, an emissary of Prince Czartoryski and French Minister Jules Bastide took measures to reconcile Yugoslavs with Hungarians and ally Yugoslavs with Italians in the fight against Austria. (…) He spoke to Gaj and other opponents of Jelačić who intended to fight with Austria. According to his first report, sent to the French minister Bastide from Sremskie Karłowce on 22.11.1848, he and Gaj considered overthrowing Jelačić” (Durković-Jaksić, 1984: 120). Therefore, it looks as if Gaj and his Croatian associates believed at the turn of 1848 in the possibility of reaching an agreement with Hungarians and instigating their society into a rebellion against Austria. However, one may doubt whether they stood realistic chances of executing such an action.

Towards the end of 1848, on his way back from Italy to Dubrovnik, Pucić made a longer stopover in Zagreb where he met Gaj. It is unknown whether they spoke about Mickiewicz’s actions and whether Pucić played any role in the secret negotiations that Gaj carried out with Czartoryski’s and the French government’s emissaries. A few months earlier, when he was in Italy, he could have been receiving information about anti-Austrian moods and conspiracies, possibly from Gaj’s circles in Zagreb, and passing them over to Mickiewicz. It
is also possible that Mickiewicz was not completely cut off from the knowledge that Czartoryski and his circle were privy to. After all, in the Slavic regions of the Balkans, including Croatia, there were numerous political circles which maintained a clear opposition to Vienna and the policy of Euro-Slavism. The poet could have learned about them prior to his departure to Rome from some people close to Czartoryski, whereas Medo Pucić might have elevated, if not even magnified Mickiewicz’s hopes.

Pucić himself seems to have significantly changed his views in 1849 and, given the prolonged Croatian-Hungarian conflict, he turned to Jelačić and his policy. In March 1849 he published an article entitled *Formiamo noi una nazione?* in “L’Avvenire”, a newspaper issued in Dubrovnik. As Durković-Jaksić wrote: “He advocated the need of unity among the Yugoslavs living within the borders of Austria in the fight for making their national rights recognized and respected, under the supervision of a constitutional national government and with the help from the Czechs and Poles, which, in practical measures, meant nothing but supporting the existence of Austria. He condemned his fellow countrymen fighting for the freedom of other nations, calling it a waste of effort. At the same time, he understood Polish aspirations. He referred to them in the article and claimed that only Poles knew how to protect the dignity of their country fighting for the freedom of their own country and whole Europe under their own banners, wearing their national confederate caps” (Durković-Jaksić, 1984: 120). This way he also paid homage to Mickiewicz’s actions concerning the formation of the legion and indirectly explained that as a Croatian, in the present circumstances, he could not get involved in actions targeted at Austria. Another sign attesting to the change of his views was Pucić’s renowned poem *Na slavu Jelacicia bana* published in March 1849.

Henryk Batowski (1980:51) aptly wrote: “Even if Mickiewicz’s action had been organized better and addressed to Croatians more appropriately, in that given moment it could not have succeeded”. The poet lost hope for a common Slavic rebellion against Austria in mid-1848 when ban Jelačić’s siding with Vienna started to indicate clearly the vectors of politics in the Balkans. On top of that, it was combined with a complete absence of signals pointing to the possibility of reaching a Slavic-Hungarian agreement and organizing a common crusade against the Austrian empire.

The following year, in 1849 Mickiewicz as an editor of “La Tribune des Peuples” in Paris published a number of articles in which he ceased to raise the topic of South Slavs’ uprising and generally mentioned Balkan issues very rarely,
which means that he also did not directly criticize Jelačić’s policy. It is assumed that it was an effect of Mickiewicz’s contacts with Andrija Brlić, ban Jelačić’s emissary to Paris who got in touch with the editor of “La Tribune des Peuples” and attempted to throw a pro-Slavic light on the actions taken by the leader of his country¹. Maybe Mickiewicz maintained some contact with Pucić and he took his point of view of that time into consideration? Even though Mickiewicz personally avoided this topic, other contributors to his newspaper wrote widely about the matters of South Slavs and their conflict with Hungarians. Some articles were directly reprinted from “Novine”, a newspaper edited by Gaj. Durković-Jaksić (1984: 135-151) analyzed them thoroughly. They point out that the editors of “La Tribune” had a positive attitude to the Hungarian uprising; all the main battles and conflicts between Kossuth’s army (in which Polish officers and soldiers played significant roles) and Serbo-Croatian military units were covered in articles. At the same time, the undertones clearly indicated that there were hopes for an agreement between Hungarians and the leaders of South Slavs, which could change the course of history and push it towards the scenario desired by Mickiewicz. There were even voices whereby Poles would act as mediators in this conflict. Czartoryski’s circle made efforts to promote such a solution but to no avail.

Andrija Brlić (born 1826), a young intellectual and Banovina’s emissary, was an enthusiast of Poland. He learned Polish in the forties and achieved such command that he read Mickiewicz’s most significant works. In 1849 in Paris he befriended a prominent Polish emigrant, writer Edmund Chojecki, who contacted him with Prince Czartoryski and President Ludwig Napoleon (later Napoleon III). He met Mickiewicz for the first time in 1849. The effect of this meeting was an article penned by Brlić which was published on the front page of the third issue of “La Tribune”². The text fostered the idea of establishing a federation of South Slavs whose centers would be Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana. He substantiated the sense of Croatians and Serbs fight with Hungarians whom

¹ Batowski wrote: “We may assume that Brlić talked to Mickiewicz about Jelacić’s attitude to Vienna. Brlić tried to convince Mickiewicz and his other acquaintances in Paris that Jelacić was not so devoted to Austria as it might have seemed and that his policy would be purely Slavic. He also claimed Jelacić acted against the Hungarian revolution solely due to a provocation made by the Hungarian nobility. (...) The fact is that Brlić’s visit to Paris and coming into contact with Mickiewicz led to an absence of criticism towards Croatians and Jelacić’s actions in “La Tribune des Peuples”. It seems that Brlić managed to convince Mickiewicz that Croatia’s policy towards Austria was only temporary,” (Batowski, 1980: 58). As I will show in the remainder of the present analysis, not all of Batowski’s theses can be substantiated.

² A. T. Bertlich, Tentances des Slaves du Midi, „La Tribune des Peuples”, 22.03.1849
he accused of the desire to annex Slavs’ indigenous lands. The Hungarian leaders were described as unwilling to reconcile, which worked to Austria’s benefit. It meant that Jelačić was willing to act more independently towards Vienna were it not for the belligerent attitude of Hungarians. He spoke in a similar fashion during his private conversations with Mickiewicz who, according to him, had a friendly attitude to Jelačić and shared his opinion that a full reconciliation with Hungarians was unfeasible (this is what he wrote in his diary (Durković-Jaksić, 1984: 129-130), but it remains uncertain whether he depicted Mickiewicz’s opinions accurately).

Instead of describing the issues of South Slavs in “La Tribune”, Mickiewicz concentrated more on an insightful analysis of the European strategy of Tsar Nicholas I as well as the situation in Italy and Hungary where hopes for the Central European geopolitical change crumbled with the subsequent defeats of the uprisings. The name of Jelačić was mentioned in this respect once only, in an article entitled Russia which was published in the 9th issue of the newspaper on 23 March 1849. The ban was listed there among the leaders who acted in favor of repressing the European revolution of nations, by which, nolens volens, they support the realization of Russia’s strategy3. The strongest pronouncement about the Croatian-Hungarian conflict appeared in a text entitled An appeal to Hungarians whose authorship is attributed to Mickiewicz, though not confirmed. The appeal was published in the 38th issue on 22 April 1849 and was signed by “the editors of La Tribune”. It includes the following paragraph: “When our fellow Slavs, bearing an erroneous grudge against the past, with which you cannot feel solidarity, got led on to such an extent that they stood under the spiteful banner of tyranny in order to help in the fight against you, we warned them, bemoaned their error and never stopped to hope that one day, with clearer minds, they will unite with us to fight arm in arm for our common freedom” (Mickiewicz, 1997: 330). The meaning of this fragment is clear. The editors of “La Tribune” admit that in the past there was harm that the Slavs sustained from the Hungarians, but this past fact does not work to the detriment of the revolutionary government fighting with the Habsburg Empire which enslaves the Slavs. In such a situation, all the Slavs together with the Hungarians should unite under the banner of freedom and make a common effort to topple the despotic state. The truth

3 The relevant quotation goes as follows: „Radetzky receives his pay from Petersburg; from there he most likely receives his orders. It is certain that in Petersburg they already know Radetzky’s future plans and speak about it openly. They say if Radetzky could not rival Piemont, he would retreat to Adiga. He would make effort to stay in touch with Frulia and Iliria and would wait at that position for a quick arrival of Windischgraetz and Jelacić’s armies (Mickiewicz, 1997: 56).
was, frankly speaking, more complex. Attempts to reconcile the opposing sides (that is Hungarian and Slavic, especially Croatian) taken by Prince Czartoryski failed, especially that Hungarians’ willingness to compromise was rather limited. Mickiewicz knew the situation was not easy and the choice the Croatians were to make could not be described in black and white colors, as Brlić himself confirmed. The appeal quoted above was a form of a manifesto supporting the Hungarians’ fight, as, at that moment, they had become the last resort, the final hope for changes in the political situation of Central Europe. For this reason, they were praised, agreed with and cheered to continue the fight. The poetics of the appeal determined the rules of discourse. Nevertheless, it is doubtless that among the editors of the newspaper Jelačić’s decision to get involved in the campaign on the Hungarian territory was perceived as a strategic error for which both the Hungarians and the Croatians would pay a very high price. The Polish emigration understood Jelačić’s policy of defending his nation’s rights and territory but a military action outside his country’s borders targeted against a neighboring state fighting for its full sovereignty could not find acceptance.

Conclusion

According to Mickiewicz the collapse of the liberation movements in Central Europe was the consequence of the lack of profound cooperation between the enslaved nations, inadequate understanding on the part of the countries’ elites that despotism, even if it treats certain of the enslaved nations more leniently, should still remain the enemy for all the nations, as the nature of this system rests in the attempts to treat the annexed countries as material which needs to be completely subdued and spiritually neutered. Once again in the history of the world destructive egoism triumphed over solidarity. Mickiewicz wrote in “La Tribune” in October 1849: “This is how countries perish in the decisive moments of history. Their own egoism brings them doom and history should not show mercy to them”. He reminded Hungarians their lack of support for the Polish issue in 1831. The Czechs were accused of indifference towards the just-throttled Hungarian movement and in this context the poet raised the question about the future of the Balkan Slavs. “Is this not the history of our times? When Poland was partitioned, the Hungarian regiments which were used by the Austrians to disarm the Polish army were ordered to give out the Polish arms to Russia. The time has now come for Hungary and this time Czechs remain indifferent, if not even hostile. The future of the Czechs is easily predictable. We shall see how Ilirians and Danube Slavs will react then” (Mickiewicz, 1997: 269).
“The solidarity of nations” which he wrote about many times in “La Tribune” did not stand the test of time; it proved too weak to destroy the empires. His project of the new order in Central Europe which was the motivation for establishing the legion remained a dream which was unfulfilled, but not abandoned for long. Five years later, motivated by similar premises, Mickiewicz got involved in the Crimean War, though now he was less hopeful for the cooperation of the Slavic nations. This time, he pinned his hopes with Emperor Napoleon III’s faithfulness to the Napoleonic idea.

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SREDIŠNJA EUROPA U MICKIEWICZEVOJ MISLI I DJELU TIJEKOM EUROSPE REVOLUCIJE (1848-1849). HRVATSKE TROPE.

Sažetak

U četrtdesetim godinama 19. stoljeća, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) smatran je jednim od najvećih pisaca poljskoga romantizma. Ne samo to, on je bio jedan od najpoznatijih Poljaka u Europi, sa snažnim političkim angažmanom, poznat po suprotstavljanju svim oblicima političkog despotizma. U dobu Europske revolucije 1848.-1849., ušao je u političku sferu sa značajnim impulsom i, među ostalim, računajući na Balkan da postane jedna od glavnih pozornica anti-austrijske kampanje, uvjeren da, posebice među Hrvatima, postoji snažan potencijal i volja za pobunom. Njegove ideje o tome sukobile su se s austro-slavizmom i nekoliko drugih pogleda i na kraju ih je porazila Jelačićeva politika. Urušavanje oslobodilačkih pokreta u Središnjoj Europi je, prema njegovu mišljenju, bilo posljedica manjka bitne suradnje između porobljenih nacija i on je to smatrao trijumfom destruktivnog egoizma nad solidarnošću.

Ključne riječi: Adam Mickiewicz, anti-austrijski pokret, revolucija 1848., Balkan, slavenske nacije