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# **New approaches to the challenge of mass migrations**

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**SUMMARY:** Migrations have been inevitable from the earliest history up to the modern times and they have constituted one of the foundations on which today's world has been built. Mostly developed countries encouraged the arrival of migrants who positively impacted the labour market. In last few decades developed countries have reduced the possibilities of legal immigration, while on the other hand crisis focal points all over the world have caused refugee and migration crises; desire to live in richer and more developed societies has been growing. Occasionally, due to events such as the migration crisis in Europe in 2015 and 2016, migrations became the most current issue for numerous subjects – from individuals, states and international organizations – to deal with. Today there are several political parties in the EU member states with very negative attitudes regarding migrants and further immigration in their program, and in some states, they are the ruling parties. Depending on the time, space and context, migrations are perceived, analysed and understood differently. The large migration crisis in Europe in 2015 and 2016 has shown that the European Union is unprepared for major migrations and that many countries, including Croatia, have no official migration policies. It exposed some of the weaknesses other than the lack of official policies and pointed out the advanced radicalization of the social and political scene in some countries, poor implementation of integration policies, misunderstanding of challenges and lack of understanding for the needs of others and “different”. It “shifted” the migration issues almost completely to security policies. This paper offers an analysis of these challenges related to the phases of handling them during the crisis, decisions of main actors and suggestions for improving the existing policies and better understanding of migrations challenges.

**KEY WORDS:**

**migrations,  
migration policies,  
the European  
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## Introduction

**S**ince the beginning of the massive migration/refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, written papers on this phenomenon generally reflect attitudes, narration, discourse analysis and considerations of their authors. The general common denominator and the conclusion of most of such papers include considerations that massive and uncontrolled migrations, seen from the positions of transit and destination countries, represent insurmountable challenge that many actors observe in very different ways, thus creating an incomplete picture of the phenomenon itself. Today it is caused by mixed *push* and *pull* factors – from combination of war destructions, ethnic intolerance, lack of public security, climate changes and indigence to the search of everything opposite to migrants' existing situation and environment. Although the EU member states need large number of immigrants due to demographic renewal (European Commission, 2006), lack of workforce and upholding the economic development, these states, as well as the Union as a whole, have no effective and enforceable strategic plans, developed capabilities and capacities to accept large number of migrants when huge uncontrolled pressures can make established rules to collapse, as was witnessed during 2015 and early 2016 (European Migration Programme; Mikac and Dragović, 2017: 131). On the other hand, large demographic growth in poorer and more unstable parts of the world and the substantial increase of the young population create a potential basis for destabilizing influences both for these countries and for their environment (Huntington, 1996). Furthermore, while some countries express fear from migration of their expert staff, in the countries of destination there is fear that social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their society is changing, especially in the long run (Castles, et al, 2014).

Many debates, as well as practices of public institutions, show that transition from humanitarian to security aspects of migration happens to quickly, which presents a challenge itself and we consider it to be inappropriate and inadequate approach to the phenomenon of contemporary migrations. Also, very quickly attitudes at various levels were established that associated mass migrations with increased threat of terrorism, as well as with great danger of infiltration of extremists and terrorists into the migratory wave (Europol, 2016). Concerning the above, it should be noted that several attackers who committed terrorist attacks in Europe (the most obvious example is the attack in Paris in 2016) came to Europe within a massive migration wave, but experiences so far show that the abuse of the migration wave to enter the territory of Europe was individual, not the systematic way of infiltration of extremists and terrorists (Mamić, et al, 2016: 71). We consider that part of the reasons for prevailing se-

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curity approach over humanitarian or comprehensive one with clear migration policies lies in lack of clear indicators of the totality of the mass migrations phenomenon that Europe, the European Union and states are facing, as well as in lack of necessary long-term progressive policies. It leads to the situation in which many of the most significant actors just respond bearing in mind primarily their own position. In earlier days Europe has inhabited the world; millions of migrants went to the United States. And now it is facing the migratory wave that will surely be the future of the Euro-Asian-African space for a long time. To reduce emigration, the so-called “Marshall Plan for Africa” was proposed – the stronger European Union’s aid to African countries, where the population is growing rapidly – at the last EU-Africa summit in December 2017 (The Parliament Magazine, 2017).

The massive migration wave to Europe was triggered by the move of refugees from Syria to Europe in 2015, and many other refugees and migrants from more than hundred world countries joined them. Arab Spring also influenced the massive displacement and escape of the population from war-affected areas. It is important to know that at the beginning of 2015 most of the 4.3 million Syrian refugees (even 95 percent of them) were located in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, even Iraq, while the Arab countries Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar did not receive refugees from Syria at all. As a result, the camps in mentioned countries were overburdened and poorly supplied with basic necessities for the normal life of refugees. As they had lived for years in such conditions without much progress (though some states like Turkey made significant efforts in their integration into society), after the invitation of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2015 (saying that Germany would take all Syrian refugees) many of them decided to take that uncertain road to Europe. In that moment we recognised that the European Union has invested two billion Euros from 2007 to 2014 into building security systems, high technology and protection of borders, and very little in refugee reception; consequently it was poorly prepared for their massive arrival. The greatest pressure was on countries with external border of the European Union (Kurzgesagt, 2015).

The goal of this research is threefold: first, to present the phases of the occurrence, development and current completion of the massive migration crisis that Europe has faced (focus on events); secondly, to analyse the conduct of the most important political actors in the mentioned phases and processes (which is significant because everyone adjusts to the previous actors); thirdly, to propose examples of successful models of integration and coexistence of various nations and cultures in the Republic of Croatia, with special emphasis on relation between Christian majority and Muslim minority as a positi-

ve example for the rest of the European Union. The analysis will be accessed from several different discourses – humanitarian, security, institutional, political, theological. The results of the research will be important for understanding the extent of the challenges we are currently facing, and will be meeting. Conclusions of the research will have its application in the scientific part as well as in the promotion of migration policies, primarily those of the Republic of Croatia.

## Phases of migration crisis development

Efforts of migrants and refugees to enter Europe, especially the most developed (and therefore the most desirable) countries of the European Union, had lasted many years before the full development of the crisis in mid-2015. Therefore, the recent migration/refugee crisis can be divided into three phases: first, prior to mass migration movement that exposed to migrations primarily southern European countries (illegal border crossings, deciding on asylum applications, rescue operations at sea); second, since mid-2015, when massive migration movement from Turkey to Western Europe was initiated; third, since March 2016 and the agreement between the European Union and Turkey; it has (currently) halted the massive arrival of refugees and migrants, but smaller groups and individuals still succeed in their efforts that means that the crisis has not been resolved.

**The first phase** is characterised by several interacting activities that have been happening for years. Namely, the European Union and the member states have developed unified policies regarding migrations and asylum: the states at the “outer edge of the Union” mostly dealt with activities in which refugees, migrants and asylum seekers were required to seek protection or asylum. The above-mentioned policies, procedures and processes put primarily Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece under great pressure. At the same time, the instability in bordering area did not diminish but on the contrary. The wars and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, spreading of the Arab Spring and the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Tunisia and Libya, and especially the war in Syria and conflicts with ISIL, led to even more powerful migration movements as a result of multi-year transition processes (Tadić, et al, 2016).

Also, when we talk about illicit migration issues, the aforementioned states, being the countries closest to the crisis focal points and the traditional routes of illegal migrations, should hold them back, but there is a question of how to prevent mass ship arrivals when you are obliged to save lives. In addition, it is important to point out that, due to the almost completely blocked legal entry of refugees and migrants into the European Union, many of them decide or are even forced to

use the services of organized groups of people smugglers, what puts extra pressure on external states. According to Europol's assessment, smuggling of migrants has become one of the most profitable and widespread criminal activities of organized crime in the European Union. Smuggling of migrants is today large, profitable and sophisticated criminal market, comparable to the European drug market (Europol, 2017). Throughout all these years, most of the mentioned countries, but also those which are not members of the European Union (and are on the migration route to the most desirable countries of the Union), were left to face the mentioned challenges alone, without necessary co-operation and common response. These situations led to the political controversies at the highest level between Italy and France regarding the border crossing and for some time reinstated full border control by France. That made the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to warn that the Union's response to migration issues was no good in (The Guardian, 2015). Also, the institutions of the European Union had throughout all that period been working to establish mechanisms and measures aiming to deal with a balanced approach towards migrants, asylum seekers and illegal border crossings, but it is important to note that they had not developed procedures for mass entry of migrants. One of the latest documents is the *EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling*, which identified activities in four main areas: enhanced police and judicial response, improved information gathering and information exchange, intensifying smuggling prevention and assisting vulnerable migrants, and stronger co-operation with the third countries (European Commission, 2015a). Regardless of the huge effort by many actors, that entire period was characterized by vertical and horizontal inconsistent and uneven policies and procedures of states in addressing the growing challenges of migrations.

**The second phase** is characterised by the invitation of German Chancellor Angela Merkel who announced that Germany would receive all Syrian refugees regardless of the European Union country they entered first (Independent, 2015). That unilateral move – although it was extremely humane because all the initiatives that had been made up to then to advance, improve and resolve the situation (especially of the Syrian refugees) had not produced the necessary results – was additionally of double importance. First, it suspended already achieved policies and mechanisms of the Union and the member states related to the control of persons crossing the borders, because most migrants had no documents and therefore could not be properly recorded. Secondly, all countries on the potential route of mass movement of migrants were in the situation to, without any prior announcement or preparation, face the challenge they had never encountered before and had no appropriate response mechanisms. Those countries were: Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia

and Austria. The largest migration wave occurred in those countries during 2015. Because of dealing with problems of large number of migrants in their countries, who primarily tried to go further, and due to the lack of coordination with neighbouring states – there were serious political and security misunderstandings, accusations and border blockings. According to the UNHCR data, more than a million refugees and migrants came to the European Union in 2015; more than 80 percent of them first came by the sea and then continued their travel by land. In recent years, the Mediterranean has been the main migration route to the European Union, but also the place of suffering of large number of migrants, where almost 16,000 people died in last four years. The largest number of migrants come from African countries and it makes it difficult to determine the type and motive of migration – whether they are refugees or economic migrants.

#### Entrants to the EU via the Mediterranean

Year	Number of migrants	People who died
2017	172,301	3,139
2016	362,753	5,096
2015	1,015,078	3,771
2014	216,054	3,538

Source: UNHCR, 2018

These numbers were too high for transit countries, but also became more and more so for countries such as Germany and Sweden that received most migrants and refugees. Germany realized that at that pace it cannot receive, register and take care for people arriving, the crisis reached its maximum, so at the highest level of the European Union a potential solution started to be considered. Here we have several paradoxes of the modern world. First, many actors from different parts of the world (USA, Russia, certain Gulf Arab states, Iran, some EU member states) are involved in a conflict in Syria that has caused mass departure of people. But the European Union that is not a participant in a conflict, was expected to resolve the issue of taking care of Syrian refugees. Secondly, most refugees were situated in the surrounding countries for years, while only a small part went toward the Union, what caused tectonic disturbances in the relations between individual member states and member states with institutions of the Union. Third, the Union today represents an area of great development, opportunities and human rights, but closes its doors to the people who need help. Fourth, dealing with this primarily humanita-

rian crisis is a world problem, but the world has generally remained “deaf and blind” to the aforementioned. As the crisis became too large for any individual country, an institutional solution was required at the level of the European Union but however was not found.

**The third phase** is the result of the increasing tightening of relations in Europe and a pragmatic search for ways to stop the mass entry of migrants and refugees to the Western Europe. The event that brought the turning point was the signing of the Agreement between the European Union and Turkey in March 2016. It was agreed that all illegal migrants arriving to Greece via Turkey would be returned to Turkey (European Parliament, 2016). Although this Agreement stopped the mass entry of migrants, it opened major concerns such as doubts about the feasibility of agreed co-operation, which the heads of states and governments of several Union members expressed. The idea was for Turkey to take migrants who illicitly came on Greek islands from Turkey, and in return the European Union agreed to take for every refugee returned from Greece legally one Syrian refugee, who has found shelter in one of the refugee centres in Turkey. This should have ended people smuggling, but raised the question of the legality of such an agreement. The massive return of refugees, without examining each individual case, is not allowed under the *Geneva Convention* and European regulations, as well as returning refugees to countries where they would be persecuted is not allowed either. Turkey planed to non-Syrian refugees to their countries of origin (Hasselbach, 2016). The mentioned also opened new humanitarian and ethical issues related to migrations, especially illicit migrations – by reinforcing the state border control as well as other preventive and repressive measures within the country, people trying to reach countries of developed democracies with an aim to achieve better living conditions are generally prevented to reach that goal and by returning them to their home country or the country they have come from are to some extent left to smugglers. The question is how to return people to war-torn countries, to countries that do not have developed standards of human rights protection or do not have financial resources for help? Also, in the last migration wave, one part of Syrian and other refugees crossed the border and entered the European Union based on political decision, and larger part remained in Turkey. Is that correct? Why to receive some and others not? According to group of authors, the intensified border control certainly has some positive effects, but it cannot survive without effective migration control and the European Union needs to adopt a new asylum system and agree on distribution of migratory load on a permanent and long-term basis, about what the member states currently have diametrically different attitudes (Crone, et al, 2017).



This outlines the complexity of the issues dealing with multilateral challenges of migration policies and different approaches to this area. Along with understanding and experience we have come to realize that every case is unique and every person trying to enter Europe has its own vision and need, but the mechanisms and procedures within Europe, the European Union and member states during all previous period were developed with intention of being as standardized as possible. The aforementioned approach is justified from the point of view of standardization of the procedures for all countries and of saving both human and material resources dealing with this area, but also shows unwillingness of dealing with the mass influx of refugees and migrants considering their individual needs.

It is evident that the European Union and its member states, as well as countries surrounding the EU located at the migration routes, must get ready for the long-term pressure of migrants from different social, cultural, religious and civilization reasons and establish effective and sustainable migration policies as well as an asylum system that will fulfil the purpose recognized by the United Nations Conventions.

### **Actions of the most important political actors during the crisis**

The previous section presents the most important events relevant to the current migration/refugee crisis. It is necessary to emphasize that it has been going on for years and is not over yet. Only the largest event within the current crisis is completed and that concerned the mass movement of migrants and refugees by land route from Greece to Western Europe from mid-2015 to March 2016. The crisis is still ongoing because migrants and refugees constantly try to come to Europe individually and in small groups; they finally make large total number. We are currently in a situation rather similar to the one in mid-2015, as predominantly southern states of the European Union still individually deal with migration issues, although with some stronger help from the EU, cooperation with other states and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontex. Frontex statistical data on the number of persons illicitly crossing the external border do not coincide with the above mentioned UNHCR data, so it is not possible to create a real picture of the number of migrants entering the European Union territory, but it indicate the main migration route to the European Union (Frontex, 2018).

To deal in a crisis it is important to consider the activities and conduct of the most important political actors that determine the direction and dynamics of managing the crisis, while many others have just a reactive ability to monitor the development of the situation and

adjust to new conditions. The activities of the most important political actors within the first phase of the crisis were characterized by very slow accommodation to potentially larger arrivals of migrants and refugees.

The specialty of this migration crisis was that political actors acted on multiple levels: through intensifying of the legal and strategic framework, through practices of state agencies and through statements of politicians at the European level. Common to all actions was that they were approached partially, individually, without synergistic effect of everyone involved in the process, generally from the aspect of security where there was no involvement of other actors.

It has already been mentioned that the south states of the European Union (Spain, Italy, Greece) for many years have endured the greatest burden of crisis with insufficient level of understanding and cooperation by other EU member states. The situation in Southeast Europe states was also mentioned – there was a belief among the highest levels of some governments that no crisis, no, mass entry of migrants and refugees trying to go further would occur to them, so they were not well prepared for it at any level. Because of such attitudes political parties with anti-immigrant attitudes strengthened, as well as radicalization of the large number of citizens in these countries.

After the invitation and open welcome of German Chancellor Merkel to all Syrian refugees, many realized that a new phase in current crisis begun. In August 2015 the European Commission approved € 2.4 billion aid designed to provide emergency aid package over the next six years (from that € 560 million for Italy to € 473 million for Greece) for dealing with migrations issues. However, many believe that these funds are too small compared to the size of the crisis (Park, 2015).

A new challenge for the whole Europe, especially for individual member states (such as Hungary, Germany, Scandinavian countries), was the strengthening of anti-immigrant attitudes and extremism in some social groups and layers, especially based on the religious difference between the majority of domicile non-Islamic population and the potential arrival of persons predominantly of Islamic religion. “One of the phenomena which affect the strengthening of extremism in whole Europe is the huge entry of migrants and refugees from most Muslim societies to European countries. In the Republic of Croatia no significant anti-immigrant or anti-Islamic extremism was recorded. Further complication of the refugee and migrant crisis increases the risk of the growing extremism, especially as expansion of this kind of extremism in other European countries” (Security Intelligence Agency, 2017: 14). In addition to mentioned, Charles Kupchan considers that one of the main reasons for the migrant crisis lies in the fact that

it happens in so far unresolved situation in many European countries that have difficulties integrating Muslim groups that have been in those countries for years, some even for generations. The arrival of new migrants from the Muslim countries has only complicated the situation (Park, 2015). It is precisely why Croatian experience on co-existence of different religious groups is an example that could and should be used by others in Europe that are facing difficulties in creating public policies and approaches to this topic. These will be processed in continuation of this paper.

Since the beginning of the migration crisis in its full profile (since mid-2015), Germany has been trying to accept as many Syrian refugees as possible and has encouraged other EU members to do more regarding reception of the refugees. But not all states reacted as expected. Already in August 2015 representatives of the Visegrad Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) expressed their views and fears of accepting migrants from Muslim countries. These attitudes were mainly related to the willingness to receive a certain number of persons who were not Muslims but Christians. The loudest voice was that of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who repeated many times that the arrival of large number of migrants meant a threat to Hungarian national security. By such views, the above-mentioned leaders had clearly and loudly violated the rules of the Union on the prohibition of people's discrimination based on religion. However, the citizens of Hungary in the 2018 elections gave support to that policy, and the Fidesz party won 133 out of 199 seats in the Parliament. In Austria, the right-oriented Freedom Party entered the Government and gained the interior, foreign and defence ministry, announcing the change of the Austrian immigration policies, while in Germany the right Alternative for Germany is the third strongest political party in the Parliament. As in many other European countries political parties with anti-immigration attitudes in their program (the Netherlands, France, Poland, Italy) have achieved significant results, it is evident that radicalization of the EU member states citizens regarding the EU migration policies is increasing.

During migration crisis states in Southeast Europe were heavily occupied with the operational implementation of temporary care of large number of migrants and refugees on their territory for which they did not have adequate resources and therefore only partially conducted the registration of migrants. This situation can be analysed from different perspectives. Summarizing the situation, it can be concluded that "a relatively small number of refugees and migrants requested assistance and/or asylum protection, as most of them intended to reach Western Europe as quickly as possible. Disproportion of number of migrants and refugees, uncertainty about how long would the route be opened for massive passage, limited transport and

accommodation capacities throughout all parts of the route, restricted humanitarian and security assumptions and different approaches to this challenge led to a distinctive political crisis between individual states. Paradoxically, though aware that refugees and migrants did not want to stay in their states, at the beginning of the crisis the states cooperated extremely poorly, even confronting each other in some areas. As the crisis grew longer, the co-operation between the states increased, even though by the end of the massive transition of people did not reach satisfactory level of collaboration needed between neighbouring states relying on each other and depending on mutual treatment. Assuming that the crisis between states was inevitable it should have been organizational – how to help refugees and migrants in transit at its best, with clear implementation of the necessary and available security measures that could be implemented – not of the political nature” (Mikac and Cesarec, 2017: 169-170).

During that time the European Union institutions were very active in various attempts to reduce the size and pressure of the crisis, but they mostly focused on its security aspects. In September 2015, the interior ministers of the Union member states decided to relocate 120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy and other EU states directly affected by the migration crisis into other states. The proposed relocation was part of a comprehensive effort in dealing with the migration crisis (European Commission, 2015b). This plan was adopted despite the clear opposition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania (Park, 2015), with the previously known Hungarian attitude. The European Commission has been trying all the time to coordinate the overall European response to the crisis and that plan, with certain difficulties and slowing down, is implemented even today. According to International Organization for Migration (2018: 2) “since the beginning of the EU relocation scheme, 33,154 beneficiaries have been relocated from Greece and Italy to 25 different countries in the European Economic Area.”

In that period the European Union also adopted several important strategic documents of the highest level in the field of security. One of them is *The European Agenda on Security* from April 2015, aiming to provide answers to new security challenges, which generally do not have source on the EU territory. The program is based on the agreement of all institutions and represents a coordinated response at the European level with an aim to protect the freedom and security of the EU citizens, respecting European values and including the rule of law and fundamental rights. The program identifies three priority actions: tackling terrorism and preventing radicalization, disrupting organised crime and fighting cybercrime. In area of defeating organized crime it is emphasized that criminal networks exploit the needs of refugees and migrants and that it is necessary to stop people smugg-

ling and human trafficking through intensified co-operation within the EU but also with the third countries through specific assistance to key transit and starting countries (European Commission, 2015c). *The European Agenda on Migration* from May 2015 indicates the need to strengthen the European approach to address migration issues according to the principles of solidarity and division of responsibility. It also highlights the need to involve all actors in order to talk about European migration policy: member states, EU institutions, international organizations, civil society, local authorities and the third countries. The program introduces measures for immediate actions related to the implementation of sea operations to rescue lives of migrants, joint operations to combat smuggling, partnering with the third countries and assistance to the most exposed member states. The program also identifies four pillars of better migration management; they are: a) Reducing the incentives for irregular migration (cooperation with the third countries, global development programs, fighting people smuggling and human trafficking, effective return of migrants); b) Border management – saving lives and securing external border (effective sea border control, the introduction of so-called smart borders, capacity building of North African countries, establishment of standards for border management); c) Strong common asylum policy (consistent implementation of the European Asylum System, prevention of abuse, consistent taking of fingerprints); d) New policy on legal migration (Blue Card, visa policy modernization, migrant integration, labour force mobility, linking of migration with development policies). In the annex of this program there is also the European Program of Resettlement (European Commission, 2015d). A *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* was adopted in 2016 and it connected challenges and activities in area of internal and external security. As priority actions are defined: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience, an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, cooperative regional orders and global governance for the 21st century. The strategy is also concerned with migration issues at multiple levels: migration flows management, influence on causes of migration, development of joint risk analysis, and adaptation of foreign policies and instruments to internal policies related to border management, homeland security, asylum, employment, culture and education. It requires efforts both in the countries of origin and transit, especially related to stronger humanitarian activities and overall development in the countries of origin in order to reduce the reasons for departure. All measures should be directed towards strengthening legal aspects of migration on one hand and towards repressing illegal migration and people smuggling on the other (European Council, 2016). With above mentioned strategic documents and approach the migration issue is even more defined as a question of security that

will certainly hamper migration movements and have negative affect on the increase of legal migrations.

In addition to this, the Union has also strengthened some of its own agencies, such as Frontex, with the task of greater involvement in issues of dealing with migrations and the control of the EU external borders. The EU external border control reform took place in 2016 when the “European Border and Coast Guard” was established, but not as a new agency but through the strengthening of the existing “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” – Frontex. Thus, the European Border and Coast Guard is composed of Frontex together with the competent authorities of member states responsible for border management; they continue to carry out daily management of external borders. Although the member states have taken responsibility for border management in some part, Frontex has been given the role of monitoring the implementation of EU measures, of evaluating and coordinating the work of member states. The key role of the new Agency is to ensure the effective application of solid common standards of integrated border management and, where necessary, operational support in personnel and technical equipment, as well as interventions in order to respond quickly to new crises on external borders.

As in many other areas of EU security policy, Europol as a European Union law enforcement agency has set itself as a powerful factor in some issues related to migrations too. Namely, after the signing of the agreement between the EU and Turkey in March 2016, Europol estimated that large number of migrants would try to use all available opportunities to access the Western European area. Assessing the danger of strengthening smuggling chains and organized crime groups that would make every effort to make significant profits by transferring illegal migrants to the EU territory, in February 2016 Europol established the European Migrant Smuggling Centre – EMSC. During the opening ceremony of the Centre Commissioner of EU for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos pointed out that the struggle against smuggling of migrants was a priority for the European Union in solving the migration crisis. The launch of this Centre should strengthen cooperation with member states, international organizations, national participants and European agencies and be responsible for battle against smuggling of migrants. On the same occasion Rob Wainwright, director of Europol, stressed that according to Europol research, about 90 percent of all migrants who came to the territory of the European Union used services of organized criminal groups to come to the EU. That is why the establishment of common institutional response to the problem of smuggling migrants has become the main answer of the European Union to mi-

gration crisis (Europol, 2016). In its first two-year report the European Migrant Smuggling Centre – EMSC recognized that “smuggling of migrants across EU borders as well within the EU was still one of the key threats of organized crime. The further development of this phenomenon would still be influenced by various factors, from legal and political once to the development of law enforcement bodies both in countries of origin, countries in transit and in destination countries. On the other hand, armed conflicts and economic and political pressures in the countries of origin would continue to be key factors for the mass phenomenon of illicit migrants travelling to the EU” (Europol, 2018). The key role of organized crime groups in smuggling migrants is found in the fact that organized crime groups are highly adaptable to new areas of the most profitable activities. In that context they exploit established criminal infrastructure to generate revenue. Analysing organized crime groups involved in smuggling migrants into EU territory, Europol concludes that 46 % of all organized crime groups involved in smuggling migrants are polyvalent (Europol, 2018: 13), that is, they deal primarily with other forms of organized crime, but given the possibility of earning income by smuggling migrants they however actively participate in smuggling. Such a phenomenon represents a major security challenge for law enforcement bodies in EU member states and calls for active involvement of all actors of EU security architecture in finding new mechanisms to prevent this phenomenon effectively.

### **Recommendations for improving access to the phenomenon of incoming migrations**

It is evident that over the past few years attempts to reduce migrations to the European Union have focused on strengthening security policies and halting migrants' arrival, but regardless of the measures taken, the Schengen area and freedom of movement have been endangered as never before. Some countries have re-established border control at the internal borders of the European Union, at some borders physical barriers have been raised and further strengthening models have been considered. Raising the level of security policies was not accompanied by adequate migration and employment policies. At the same time, despite the evident need for labour force in the European Union, there are no defined profiles of labour force and migrants generally abuse the existing protection mechanisms in order to avoid deportation due to illegal entry into the EU. The European Union, as well as member states, if they want to reduce illegal migrations, should beside the security policies try to create the profiles of migrants and labour force needed in individual member state. Howe-



ver, the incoming immigrant population mainly wants to join already existing community with which they share either origin, religion or blood relationship. It is therefore extremely important to work in cooperation with the existing migrant communities. Unfortunately, today's trends show that national politics and rhetoric of politicians in most EU member states place migrations mostly into negative context, influencing public attitude that becomes extremely unwilling in accepting new migrants.

Additional efforts should be directed at combating people smuggling and human trafficking; the legal framework needs to be stricter, and the authority of border police increased to fight against cross-border crime. In addition to this, placing migrants in the context of the last terrorist crimes cannot be avoid, but the important fact is that most of the perpetrators of these acts were born or lived for longer period in the territory of the EU member states. It is necessary to determine why policies of including migrants into local society have failed, because without analysis of mistakes done during their integration, only the security aspect of migrations will be strengthened, and that will lead to further radicalization of both, the domiciled population and the old and new migrants. Migrants must respect the legal order and values of the society they came to, but they also deserve their religion and customs to be respected if they are in accordance with the legal framework of the country in which they stay. In order to achieve this approach, it is necessary to involve all actors interested in this process and create real and effective dialogue through education and understanding.

This approach has been recognized in Croatia. Involvement of the Islamic Community in the activities of accepting, assisting and integrating of refugees speaks of systematic concern and readiness to adequately respond to the demands and needs of time. The Islamic Community in Croatia has a special interest and desire to actively participate in all activities because it wants to retain the centennial institutional positive visibility in Croatian society, while simultaneously carrying out its mission of humanity to the needy. The purpose of various programs organized by the Islamic Community, by itself or in cooperation, is the prevention of any form of extremism and radicalism, which is the largest and the most complex task of the whole society. Only good cooperation of local community, religious communities (Islamic Community), state institutions responsible for this issue and non-governmental organizations can provide high-quality implementation of migration public policy. Everyone has the same goal, and that is integration that guarantees the safety of society. Healthy public approach to this issue of all these addresses will surely prevent xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Islamism. Multi-cultural and multi-confessional regions in Croatia and in Europe must do eve-



rything in the preservation of these values necessary for their own future.

Bearing in mind all of the above, Meshihat of Islamic Community in Croatia through its humanitarian organization Zirat and its organizational units (Majlis) carries out the following programs:

- a) Custody of one domestic family over one arriving family; namely, on daily basis the domestic family cares and helps the arriving family. For help it can address some of the institutions of the Islamic Community and the State. This is called "Fraternization with refugees (Muhajirs)". Similar practice is recorded in Medina after migration of Muslims from Makkah to Medina.
- b) Permanent spiritual care in refugee camps. Our imams are in constant contact through performing prayer and regular lectures of the religious content but are also connected to culture and specifics of the environment into which they came, all in goal of understanding the differences and quality adjustments. This program must be realized at least twice a week.
- c) Various programs in our communities and centres. It is very important that refugees feel the warmth of the community and gain confidence in the community, and through community in overall environment. Therefore we do not allow them to conduct weekly prayer on Friday (Jumu'ah) in refugee camps, but we insist on their arrival to the prayer areas of our community (mosques, masjid, centres) to avoid any form of their isolation or ghettoization. Our goal is positive integration.
- d) Educational programs are conducted during the week through the school catechism. On Saturdays and Sundays additional hours are organized for them together with others who attend religious classes in our community. Groups are divided by the school age and in this way the friendship between all the participants is developed.
- e) Workshops and social gatherings with parents who bring children to catechism. Namely, while they wait for 4-5 hours for their children to finish, their mothers and fathers have their own program. Sometimes it is a language lesson, sometimes a special lecture, sometimes they present certain works or culinary specialties. This is very useful because they use time rationally.
- f) Ramadan requires additional activities. To facilitate their fast, in cooperation with the Managing Board of premises they are located, special meals are organised (iftar and sehur), and in the evening a special prayer that accompanies the fast. This is only consumed by those who at the beginning of the month said that they would fast.
- g) Mediation in finding employment as well as their re-qualifica-

- tion for certain professions is done. We urge craftsmen to give them chance to make their stay easier and to make quality adjustments.
- h) Special programs are conducted with children without both parents. This kind of activity is the most complex but we succeed. We have created workshops for those children to learn the language, culture and religion and to prepare them for further education. Workshops take place in our premises. The best effect we have in Osijek.
  - i) We regularly include them in all activities of our youth, women's councils and other organizational units founded by the Islamic community. There are various excursions, social gatherings, specialized workshops etc.
  - j) Allocation of Eid's packages for school-age children during Eid al-Fitr, and Eid al-Adha meat and joint Eid celebration with active participation of their children and certain traditional customs that they carry from their countries. It is interesting to see the diversity of these customs.
  - k) Organizing joint iftars in our premises; addressing them Mufti honours them.

## Conclusion

An overview of occurrences and the analysis of related events have shown all the complexity of the current migrant/refugee crisis. The crisis had lasted for years and had its peak from mid-2015 to March 2016, when it revealed numerous weaknesses at all levels of EU member states and the Union itself as a political supranational community. Analysing the actions of the main actors in Europe, we found that great effort has been made to help a certain number of people who have tried to come to Europe, but we also found that the development of mechanisms was primarily directed to halting further arrivals of migrants and refugees and much less to efforts to help those people in their environments and thus reduce their arrival in Europe. We cannot get rid of the impression that decision-makers and political actors in the European Union are reluctant to accept warnings about the migration wave that will continue to come to the EU external borders and create constant challenges to all competent services. One of the most important migration issues should be how to integrate migrants into society where they need to make their contribution in order to feel full-fledged members. If they remain outside the legal framework, their mass can be the source of further instability and radicalization of "old and new residents" in certain area.

As migration issues since the beginning of the crisis have been unjustifiably defined as primary security issues, recommendations for the implementation of integration mechanisms necessarily imply the inclusion of security bodies in their construction. It is necessary to develop models of social inclusion based on acceptance of diversity in order to avoid the development of xenophobic and Islamophobic ideologies. Namely, alongside the migration crisis, anti-immigration ideologies have been strengthened, which has spread the ideas of so-called *Islamization of Europe*, trying to place migrants in the context of terrorist attacks in Europe and bring migrant issue into the relationship of the future change of Europe's contours. In the forthcoming period significant efforts should be made in the context of social integration of migrants on one hand, while on the other it is necessary to establish a campaign for educating public on accepting religious freedoms and migrant rights.

Europe in general, and in particular the European Union, needs to do much more in the crisis areas outside of Europe, with its political, economic and social influence, in cooperation with important international partners, in order to ensure the implementation of development policies, to work on conflict prevention and to invest in these environments and consequently reduce immigration pressure. The policy of closing borders cannot be viable in the long term; it is necessary to invest part of the abilities and capacities to give positive perspective to people in far areas to have the basic civilization minimum.

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# Novi pristupi izazovu masovnih migracija

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**SAŽETAK:** Migracije su neminovna pojava od najranije povijesti sve do suvremenog doba, te predstavljaju temelje na kojima je izgrađen današnji svijet. Uglavnom razvijene države poticale su dolazak migranata koji su pozitivno utjecali na tržište rada. U posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća razvijene zemlje smanjile su mogućnosti legalne imigracije, dok su s druge strane krizna žarišta diljem svijeta generirala migracijske i izbjegličke krize, a raste i želja za životom u bogatijim i razvijenijim društvima. Povremeno, zbog događanja poput migrantske krize u Europi 2015. i 2016. godine, postaju najaktualnije pitanje kojim se bave brojni subjekti od pojedinaca, preko država do međunarodnih organizacija. Danas postoji nekoliko političkih stranaka u državama članicama Europske unije koje u svojim programima proklamiraju vrlo negativan stav prema migrantima i daljnjoj imigraciji, a u nekim državama to su vladajuće stranke. U ovisnosti o vremenu, prostoru i kontekstu migracije se različito doživljavaju, analiziraju i shvaćaju. Velika migrantska kriza u Europi 2015. i 2016. godine pokazala je kako je Europska unija nespremna za velike migracije, te da mnoge države, uključujući Hrvatsku, nemaju službene migracijske politike. Spomenuta kriza razotkrila je i neke druge slabosti osim same odsutnosti službenih politika, te je ukazala je na uznapredovanu radikalizaciju društvene i političke scene u pojedinim državama, slabu primjenu integracijskih politika, nerazumijevanje izazova i neshvaćanje potreba drugih i "drugačijih" te "prebacivanje" bavljenja pitanjima migracija gotovo potpuno u okvire sigurnosne politike. Ovaj rad nudi analizu navedenih izazova vezano uz faze postupanja tijekom krize, odluke glavnih aktera i prijedloge unapređenja postojećih politika i shvaćanja izazova migracija.

**KLJUČNE RIJEČI:** migracije, migracijske politike, Europska unija, Republika Hrvatska, humanitaran pristup

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