The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest and the Jasenovac Memorial Museum in Croatia – both permanent exhibitions opened in 2006 – show striking similarities. Both feature dark exhibition spaces and a strong focus on the victims’ individuality: the stories of individual victims, survivors’ testimonies, and victims’ belongings in display cases dominate the permanent exhibitions and the names of the victims are presented on a black background. While there are no direct links between the two institutions both explicitly reference the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. (USHMM) as their role model. These are two of the five memorial museums in Hungary and the former Yugoslavia I will discuss in this article. All of them refer to the USHMM and Yad Vashem in Jerusalem as their role models or cooperate with them directly.

As I will show, the "universalization of the Holocaust" (Eckel and Moisel...
2008) has rendered the “memorial museum” the dominant paradigm for institutions dealing with twentieth-century atrocities, especially in post-communist countries striving to become EU member states. The Israeli Holocaust Memorial Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and the USHMM in Washington were the first institutions to be designated “memorial museums” in order to distinguish them from their in situ counterparts located where the crimes were committed. They have emerged as the two principal role models. This trend combines textual and aesthetic elements. They include, first, a universal moral orientation and imperative (Alexander 2002), based on the "lessons" of the Holocaust, to respect human rights and prevent new atrocities and "human suffering"; second, a strong focus on individual victims, their personal stories, testimonies, and photographs from their "lives before" the atrocity, as well as auratic objects; and, third, aesthetic musealization standards pioneered in the US and Israel. These include darkened rooms, victims' auratic objects, and the presentation of the names of the victims, generally inscribed in white letters on a dark background.

This trend has also come to influence those museums located at the sites of World War II atrocities in Croatia and Hungary. These in situ museums tend to tap into the "global" language of forms without much regard to the actual presence or suitability of relevant material traces at the respective location. At the Jasenovac Memorial Museum in Croatia, for example, the site of the former concentration camp and the mass graves around it have not been integrated into the exhibit. Since it hardly references the material aspects of the site or the daily routine in the camp, and identifies the camp commanders only on the computer working stations and the museum’s website, the exhibit could just as well have been installed anywhere else in the country.

Focusing on examples from Hungary and Croatia, I will begin by showing how the concept of the "memorial museum" was imported at three very different in situ sites dedicated to the memory of crimes committed in the World War II era: two antithetical Budapest museums, the House of Terror and the Holocaust Memorial Center, and the Jasenovac Memorial Museum at the site of the former Ustaša concentration camp in Croatia where Serbs, Roma, Jews and political prisoners were imprisoned and killed. The majority of Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest is located at the site of what was a minor "internment camp" in 1944/45 (HDKHE 2018). At first glance it therefore hardly seems comparable to the site of the Croatian death camp where, only 100 kilometers from the capital Zagreb, the Ustaša killed up to 100,000 people. Yet it is precisely the similar appearance of these two museums in spite of their very different locations that tells the story. The House of Terror, on the other hand, seems, at first glance, to be a different case altogether. Located at a historical site where people were detained, interrogated, tortured and killed, first under the regime of the Arrow Cross Party (1944/45) and subsequently under the communist regime, it devotes only two and a half out of more than twenty rooms to the Nazi occupation and focuses primarily on Hungarian suffering.

3 The number of victims killed at Jasenovac has been a constant battlefield for decades. In Tito’s Yugoslavia the official number was 700,000, Serb nationalists claimed one million victims, Croatian historical revisionists until today come up with only a few thousands (Radonić 2010). The Jasenovac Memorial Museum has so far identified 83,145 victims by name (Jasenovac Memorial Site 2018a).
under communist rule. Yet, it too has identified the USHMM as its role model. It has, for example, adopted the model of the "Tower of faces" in Washington by exhibiting portraits of the victims on a wall that ranges from the ground floor up to the roof. The "Hall of Tears" in the basement is also strongly reminiscent of the Children’s Memorial at Yad Vashem. Importantly, however, in this case the specific aesthetics born of the turn towards the individual victim in western Holocaust memorial museums are utilized to create a narrative of collective (Hungarian) suffering, primarily under communism.

Another case in point when it comes to various victim groups enlisting modes of Holocaust memorialization to claim that they too have suffered "just like the Jews" is the memorialization and musealization of the recent mass atrocities of the 1990s in former Yugoslavia. In the last and most innovative part of this article I will analyze if and how the "memorial museum" concept has travelled to the private Museum of Crimes against Humanity and Genocide in Sarajevo and the public Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide. It might seem at first glance that the case of Srebrenica does not belong to the comparison. Yet, the Srebrenica-Potočari memorial developed its new permanent exhibition from 2017 in cooperation with experts from the Westerbork concentration camp memorial (Memorijalni Centar Srebrenica-Potočari 2018) – comparable to the Kigali Memorial Museum in Rwanda which invited a UK-based NGO that specializes on Holocaust exhibitions to curate its permanent exhibition (Brandstetter 2010; Ibreck 2013). And the Genocide museum in Sarajevo begins its exhibition with an equalization of Bosniaks and Jewish Holocaust victims. I argue that it is these museums themselves that apply Holocaust memorialization and musealization as a kind of template for their exhibitions – albeit it in very different ways as I will show. This calls for a critical analysis of how this "Holocaust template" is applied also in the case of museums dealing with the recent mass atrocities.

The article draws from five years of research for my postdoctoral thesis on the World War II in post-communist memorial museums. Methodologically I combine discourse analysis, visual history and site analysis. The site where an exhibition is realized influences the construction of the leading narrative and the storyline. The specific site of a museum indicates how important the topic is to society. The inscribed meaning is obviously shaped by those in charge of the museum and the content they choose to prioritize. Relevant secondary literature apart, the site analysis focuses on the materiality of the site, exhibition catalogues, publications by museum staff, museum websites and news coverage of the museums. The main source for analyzing the core narrative and the storyline are the exhibits themselves (which were photographed in great detail for subsequent in-depth analysis). The entrance and first objects encountered often function as routing points, which build up the storyline with the introductory texts. The end of the exhibition determines if the storyline is self-contained or open. In the name of which collective does the exhibit speak and which sub- and counter-narratives are excluded (but may nevertheless still be discernible)? Are historical photographs used as huge installations evoking emotions, as room dividers, portrayals of famous victims, depictions of a ‘typical image’ of one group or as historical documents that are displayed in real size? (Brink and Wegerer 2012) Discourse analysis will allow to decode the
exhibitions’ texts as well as catalogues by examining which causes, responsibilities, needs for action, and values, as well as self- and other-positioning, are addressed in the texts and how this is done (Keller 2011: 59).

My discussion is organized around three principal pitfalls. I begin by discussing the first pitfall and argue that the Hungarian and Croatian in situ sites, by importing the concept of a “memorial museum”, have sidelined the specificity of their respective location and its history. This is particularly striking in the case of Jasenovac where the museum is located in the middle of a former death camp. Second, I discuss the limits of the “individualization of the victim”. I show that the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest and the Jasenovac Memorial Museum both share this focus in principle, yet do not apply it to the case of the Roma whom they represent in a stereotypical, anonymizing and, in part, humiliating way. In addition, the concentration on the victims brings with it the risk of losing sight of the perpetrators. In this regard, the differences between the Hungarian and Croatian museums are considerable. The third pitfall I discuss is the way in which the aesthetics and techniques pioneered by Holocaust museums are utilized elsewhere to portray one’s own group as a collective victim or “victim people”. The House of Terror in Budapest is an obvious case in point. Finally, a comparison of two very different Bosnian museums – one of which presents Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) as the “new Jews” while the other avoids this sort of simplistic equation and relies on the best practice of Holocaust musealization – demonstrates how this pitfall can be avoided.

Theoretical Approach

Three international developments are crucial if one wants to understand the aforementioned trends: the universalization of the Holocaust, the Europeanization of the Holocaust, and the competing narratives of suffering under Nazism and communism. The memory-boom in the post-Cold War West has established the Holocaust as a “negative icon” (Diner 2007: 7) of the twentieth century. This “universalization of the Holocaust” (Eckel and Moisel 2008; Assmann and Conrad 2010) implies that the Holocaust has created a universal imperative to respect human rights (Alexander et al. 2009) while also becoming a “container” (Levy and Sznaider 2005: 195) for the memorialization of various victims and victim groups. This development has brought about a change in the focus of memorialization: the figure of the hero and/or martyr formerly associated with those who resisted the Nazis has been replaced by that of the victim (Rouss 2011: 32). Yet the concept of the “victim” can have different meanings. It can refer to the individual and his/her “ordinary life before” the traumatic experience (Köhr 2007). Alternatively, the victim can be represented as part of a collective, as an emotionalizing symbol of national suffering (Rouss 2004: 374). The latter tends to go hand in hand with the externalization of responsibility, creating a “Europe of victims” (Jureit 2009: 203).

In the European Union, this universalization incorporates an additional dimension: the Holocaust has become a “negative European founding myth” (Leggewie and Lang 2011: 15). Tony Judt has argued that “the recovered memory of Europe’s dead Jews has become the very definition and guarantee of the continent’s restored humanity” (2005: 804) since it “seemed so important to build a certain sort of Europe out of the crematoria of Auschwitz” (831f.). Judt understands post-war Europe as a collective that developed shared structures
to avoid a recurrence of the catastrophe of the Holocaust. In its search for an identity that goes beyond economic and monetary union, this founding myth provides a compelling common narrative that is otherwise lacking. This is one of the reasons why the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research attracted so much interest and today (renamed into IHRA) encompasses 31 countries, most of them European. The suggestion that – especially post-communist – countries join the Task Force and implement Holocaust Memorial Day was the first step towards the creation of some kind of European standard. While no official political pressure was applied during the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004, the future member countries seem to have internalized a set of conventions about depicting the past in a similar vein to western policies and in our particular case western museums. The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest is a case in point: opened a few weeks before Hungary joined the EU (though it took a further two years to finalize the permanent exhibition), its concept was "based on museum techniques from Western Europe", as the director, Szabolcs Szita, explicitly stated (Molnár 2012).

Finally, alongside the Europeanization of the Holocaust, the post-communist countries have tended to re-narrate their national history, in particular by inventing a pre-communist golden age. Along with the communist regimes they have also delegitimized the narrative of the heroic anti-fascist struggle and placed the traumatic experience of communist crimes at the heart of their memorialization strategies. The resulting memory conflicts prompted representatives of post-communist EU member states to demand that communist crimes be condemned to the same extent as the Holocaust. Thus the European parliament declared 23 August, the day of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939, a memorial day for the victims of Nazism and Stalinism (Sierp 2017). In this context, narratives of Nazi occupation were (and are) often used to frame an anti-communist interpretation of history that ultimately depicts communism as the greater evil. This is clearly the case, for example, in the House of Terror in Budapest (Rév 2008).

Memorial museums spell an inherent contradiction. While memorials are seen to be safe in the refuge of history, it is assumed that historical museums are concerned with interpretation, contextualization, and critique. "The coalescing of the two suggests that there is an increasing desire to add both a moral framework to the narration of terrible historical events and more in-depth contextual explanations to commemorative acts" (Williams 2007: 8). That so many recent memorial museums find themselves instantly politicized reflects the uneasy conceptual coexistence of reverent remembrance and critical interpretation. Museums are key producers of knowledge about history; they showcase how a society interprets its past and are definitely not neutral spaces of knowledge transfer simply depicting "what actually happened". They are, rather, manifestations of cultural patterns and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that govern the relations between social, ethnic, and religious in- and outgroups – and therefore contested spaces (Sommer-Sieghart 2010; Simon 2010). Memorial museums tend to be sites used for the representation of identity, the canonization of official memory, and the presentation of the dominant historical narrative designed to serve as the foundation of the present. Then again, museums can also challenge the hegemonic national narrative.
In both cases, decisions concerning the objects and images that should be used, the way in which they are organized, and the character of the space in which they are displayed involve a range of highly charged aesthetic, ethical, and political issues. The relationship between the provenance and materiality of the evidence, on the one hand, and the desire to create an emotive and gripping visitor experience, on the other, is rarely straightforward. Apor and Sarkisova argue that physical objects play a significant role in the relationship of the present to the recent past, which is why the "touch of the real" makes historical exhibitions so attractive for many variants of the politics of history and memory” (Apor and Sarkisova 2008: 5).

**Pitfall 1: Importing the Memorial Museum in situ**

If the orientation towards "western" role models in the course of EU accession talks leads to the import of the memorial museum concept developed in the US and in Israel, this brings about the danger of de-contextualizing the exhibition located at an in situ site where the historical crimes happened.

The Jasenovac Memorial was established in the 1960s at the site of a former Ustaša concentration camp, which operated between 1941 and 1945. In the wake of the "Homeland war" 1991-1995 there were no more visitors to the memorial once Croatian Serbs started building barricades in other parts of Croatia in 1990. The institution was open until September 1991, when first Croatian armed forces used the site and then it was occupied by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Serb paramilitary unit "Wolves of Vučjak". The museum collection was already packed for the official evacuation, but finally one of the curators, Sime Brdar, evacuated most of the exhibits to his flat in Bosanska Dubica in the Serb part of Bosnia-Herzegovina 17 kilometers from the memorial. Thus, the collection was not destroyed, but the Bosnian Serb and Serbian authorities subsequently used it for exhibitions in Banja Luka and Belgrade (Benyovsky 2007: 53) in an attempt to create a narrative of Jasenovac which exaggerated the number of victims killed there and referred to the camp as the "Auschwitz of the Balkans". The USHMM was able to reach an agreement with Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb prime minister of the Republika Srpska (Walasek 2016: 84), that the items would be brought from Banja Luka to Washington D.C. for digitalization and then returned to Croatia in 2001. The Jasenovac Memorial is a state-financed institution whose director is appointed by the Ministry of Culture. The first permanent exhibition after the war opened there in 2006. At the time, Croatia's EU accession talks were stagnating and the conservative government of Ivo Sanader, who had led the party of the "founder of the nation" Franjo Tudman back to power in 2003, was trying to strike a balance between an EU-friendly course, on the one hand, and the expectations of his nationalist war veteran voters, on the other.5

---

4 The question who devastated the site is a highly politicized one. Helen Walasek for example claims that only the Croatian authorities "occupied" and vandalized the site (Walasek 2016: 84) while Blanka Matković calls this a "lie" and blames exclusively the Serb Četnik occupiers (Matković 2017) The former head of the memorial Nataša Mataušić comes to the conclusion that it could not be established to what degree units of the Croatian army (HV), the JNA or the Serb Republic of Krajina which Jasenovac was a part of until 1995 contributed to the devastation by using the facilities for accommodation and war needs. (Mataušić 2003: 156) I thank Ivo Pejaković, director of the Jasenovac Memorial for information on this topic.

5 At the time, the EU suspected Croatia of not cooperating fully with the Tribunal in...
In the preface to the museum’s official publication, the Croatian Minister of Culture stresses that the Jasenovac Memorial is “part of the European cultural heritage and symbolizes a place which requires remembering and encourages learning about the history of a nation”, which – as the Croatian version but not its English translation goes on to explain – had “actually always communicated with the world and Europe” (Benčić-Rimay 2006: 5). As Nataša Jovičić, the long-time director, has emphasized: “we want to be part of the modern European education and museum system and comply with the framework given by institutions dealing with these topics” (Vjesnik, July 24, 2004). The exhibition had been conceptualized with the help of experts from abroad in order to be “recognized internationally and follow international standards,” as the former director put it (Vjesnik, February 14, 2004). Yet Jasenovac is by no means a site where only Jewish victims were killed – and these international experts all came from institutions not located at the sites of former concentration camps, especially the USHMM, but also Yad Vashem and the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam. It seems remarkable that the Croatian curators did not seek to learn from memorial museums at the sites of former concentration and death camps in Nazi Germany or occupied Poland, which try to show the complex character and daily routine of a concentration camp. Consequently, at Jasenovac the site itself in no way shapes the way in which the exhibition tells its story.

What is usually referred to simply as "Jasenovac" is actually a camp complex. It comprised four campsites around the village of Jasenovac itself (Jasenovac I–IV) and a location in Stara Gradiška (Jasenovac V), 30 kilometers away, where the "Kula" (Tower) – the camp for women and children – and a prison primarily for political prisoners were situated. The Kula has been an unmarked ruin since the war of the 1990s. The museum itself is located at the former main camp site – Jasenovac III – which used to be a brick factory. Although the exhibition displays a map of nine Jasenovac execution sites in the larger area, not even the historical site of the main concentration camp around it is actively referenced. Only if visitors seek out additional information at the computer terminals provided will they find some very basic and limited information on each of the camp sites.

The locations of the barracks, offices and mass graves are explained only outside the museum building on a metal plaque from the 1960s situated on the way to the famous flower monument designed by Bogdan Bogdanović. This last point is the only one to draw implicit criticism from one of the frequently cited "international experts". The director of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, Diane Saltzman, stated that, given the destruction of the camp site in 1945, it would be important that the planned "memorial path" through the former camp include not only written descriptions but also photographs of the buildings and sites (Vjesnik, 2 December, 2006). To this day, this advice has not been heeded. It is little wonder that one foreign critic has called this very limited import of the memorial museum concept "post-modern rubbish", while a Croatian journalist rumbled the exhibition, against the backdrop of Croatia’s stagnating EU accession talks at the time of its conception, as a "dray-horse towards Europe" (Novi list, May 15, 2005).
Despite these shortcomings of the permanent exhibition when it comes to including the materialities and spatialities of its location, the Jasenovac site has remained a thorn in the side of Croatian historical revisionists. The memorial plaque with the “Za dom spremni” (ready for the home/land) slogan established by the Ustaša put up in the town of Jasenovac in November 2016 and relocated a few months later (Večernji list, September 2, 2017) is a case in point. The plaque was formally placed to commemorate Croatian soldiers of an unofficial unit who have been using that slogan in 1991, but right wing groups have been using the fallen soldiers from the 1990s war to rehabilitate the Ustaša symbols and idea in general. Representatives of the victim groups have therefore boycotted the official annual commemoration at the memorial site for the fourth time in a row (Jutarnji list, April 15, 2018).

The two substantial state memorial museums in Budapest could not differ more in their approach to World War II, even though the Orbán government initiated both of them. Years before the House of Terror opened, its director, Mária Schmidt, formulated her clear position on the Holocaust: World War II was not about Jews or genocide. "We are sorry, but the Holocaust, the extermination or rescue of the Jews, was a side show, as it were, a marginal aspect, it was not the object of any of the belligerent powers’ war aims.” (Schmidt 1999). Yet, during the EU integration process Fidesz – the ruling party from 1998 to 2002 and again since 2010 – changed its approach to this issue. The Orbán government introduced Holocaust Memorial Day in 2000, modernized the country’s old communist-era exhibition in Auschwitz-Birkenau, and set up a foundation for the creation of the Holocaust Memorial Center. In 2002, Hun-
gary joined the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. All these highly symbolic steps were designed primarily for the gratification of the outside world, however. On the domestic political stage, the victims of the communist era continued to compete with those of the Holocaust. Hence, 2000 saw not only the introduction of Holocaust Memorial Day in Hungary, but also the inauguration of an "equivalent" memorial day for the victims of the communist regime on 25 February (Ungváry 2011: 300).

Fidesz inaugurated the House of Terror, which represents the core of Orbán’s politics of the past, as a state-funded museum during the election campaign in 2002. It is located at a historic site where people were detained, interrogated, tortured or killed, first during the short-lived regime of the Arrow Cross Party (1944/45) and then under the post-World War II communist regime (Ungváry 2010). While all exhibitions invariably stage the history they present to some extent, this in situ museum has transformed its traumatic location into a colorful, loud, and overwhelming theater of horrors. The basement, which displays various kinds of torture cells includes, also features gallows although prisoners were not in fact hanged in this location. The curators pay very little attention to the materiality of the site or the reconstruction of its actual history. In this sense, for all that it references the USHMM in its aesthetics, it has "imported" the concept of the memorial museum in the most idiosyncratic of ways. The manner in which it relates to its own location apart, we will have ample opportunity to return to the manner in which this institution constructs its narrative later.

As opposed to that of the House of Terror, the location of the – also state-funded – Holocaust Memorial Center was highly contested. The initial plans from the early 2000s focused on a more prominently located synagogue within the former ghetto of Budapest, but its purchase fell through. So the Ferencváros synagogue at Páva Street was chosen instead and renovated. Initially, the museum was severely criticized for being too far from the center of Budapest, for being surrounded by high walls, which was seen as a form of ghettoization, and for being situated next to, under and in a synagogue, which gave the impression that the Shoah in Hungary was above all a Jewish problem – or indeed a matter of Jewish religion, as Imre Kertész put it. Yet once the exhibition opened in 2006, these criticisms largely receded and those interested in the memorialization of the Holocaust generally appreciated it for its extensive coverage of Hungarian antisemitism and domestic responsibility for the deportations (Radonić 2014).

István Mányi, the architect responsible for the renovation of the synagogue, the architectural design of the yard and the underground exhibition room (built before the plans for the exhibition were developed) has pointed out that this is an "authentic site". An internment camp was located there during the persecution of the Jews of Budapest (Mányi 2006: 35; Seewann and Kovács 2006b). The Center’s website also mentions this fact: "It was functioning as a facility for worship until 1944. In 1944–45 it was used as an internment camp and following 1945 it hosted occasionally religious ceremonies." (HDKE 2018). What we do not learn here is that it was used already in 1941 as a detention center for Jews of "unclear citizenship", i.e., Jewish refugees from Poland, Germany, Slovakia, and elsewhere interned there on the orders of the Hungarian minister of the

6 See the debates in the Hungarian journals Elet és írdaalom and Mált és Jövő and, for an overview: Holocaust Dokumentációs Központ: "Emlékeztető" (Magyar Narancs, February 19, 2004).
interior (Frojimovics et al. 1999: 138). Yet despite these references to the fact that the location was significant, at least during the deportations of 1944/45, the dark exhibition space is devoted to the Holocaust in Hungary in general and neither the exhibition texts nor the guidebook provide any specific information as to what exactly transpired on this site during World War II.

This sort of failure to translate the mere statement of a particular site’s historical significance into a meaningful engagement of the materialities and spatialities of that site, then, is the first pitfall that arises when the concept of the memorial museum is imported to in situ locations.

**Pitfall 2: Individualization of the Victims**

Exhibiting traumatic pasts with the help of victim written or oral testimonies, private photographs of the victims’ lives before the persecution instead of or in addition to the humiliating shots taken by perpetrators is the strongest means of evoking empathy with the individual victims. Yet this technique can also be applied in problematic ways – by individualizing “our” victims while depicting “their” victims in a stereotypical way and/or as an anonymous mass (Radonić 2015); and by focusing exclusively on the victim’s perspective and thus avoiding the difficult issues of complicity and perpetratorship.

**Individualization – But not for Roma Victims**

Following the paradigm set by Raul Hilberg’s pioneering work, Holocaust research initially focused strongly on the perspective of the perpetrators. Subsequently, the emphasis shifted more and more towards the construction of the narrative from the survivors’ perspective and the victims’ agency. Exhibitions dedicated to the atrocities have followed suit. The first five guidebooks from Jasenovac, for instance, published between 1966 and 1985, do not feature individual victims. The first private photographs and portraits of individual victims appeared in 1986, but they principally showed “national heroes killed in the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška camps” (Lukić 1986: 46). Discussions about the merits of showing piles of anonymous victims’ corpses followed and resulted in the overriding trend to focus on individual victims instead.

At the Jasenovac Memorial Museum, Nataša Jovičić, the director responsible for the permanent exhibition that opened in 2006, referred directly to the "world museology" and explained that she did not want to show anonymous corpses and the weapons that killed them, as the communist-era exhibitions in Yugoslavia had done. Instead, she was keen to create a "positive message of hope" by turning Jasenovac into a "site of life". The criticism of the shock aesthetics used in numerous exhibitions on World War II in previous decades was certainly valid but Jovičić was clearly veering into redemptive territory by trying to make sense of mass murder by "sending a message of light to the site of crime" (Vjesnik, March 7, 2004). Jovičić thus carried the idea of human rights education at the memorial sites to the extreme of portraying genocide in general and the Holocaust in particular as a means of teaching young people the value of life and providing hope for the future. Since she understood the memorial primarily as a "modern and dynamic human rights center" (Vjesnik, February 27, 2004), the educational center presents "topics such as the Holocaust" (Jovičić 2006: 10) as moral lessons. The import of moral universals had led to
a dehistoricized understanding of the learning of lessons from the past.

The exhibition focuses to a considerable degree on individual victim stories, video testimonies of survivors, objects produced by the inmates, and the names of the victims inscribed on glass plates hovering above the heads of the visitors. Its guidebook contains 221 reproductions of photographs, most of them portraits of victims, many of them private pictures showing them before the war. In step with the "universalization of the Holocaust" Jasenovac also includes Roma victims in the exhibition and the guidebook – a victim group whose memory was marginalized for decades all over Europe. However, while the guidebook contains numerous portraits and other private photographs of Jewish and non-Jewish Serb and Croat victims, both pre-war and post-war, it presents only four pictures of Roma, all of them taken by perpetrators inside the camp. Even if one assumes that pictures of the Roma from before their imprisonment may be hard to find, it would surely have been possible to obtain post-war images of those Roma survivors whose names are known. The chapter on the Roma also differs significantly from the others in that it addresses topics like Romany grammar or the origin of the name Roma. The chapters on the other victim groups provide no such exoticizing background information. We learn from the author that "their women are still known for their colorful style of dressing" (Lengel-Krizman 2006: 158), and that, as a "people of freedom and unlimited travel" (170), they must have found their imprisonment more difficult to endure than the other prisoners (158).

Furthermore, while the texts on Serb and Jewish victims include plenty of testimonies, there are none from Roma here, since "the testimonies of the few survivors are so drastic that we might or might not accept them as truthful and authentic" (170) – so the author decides to err on the side of caution and simply refuses to include them altogether. Hence, in the Jasenovac guidebook, the Roma are the only victim group not allowed to speak for themselves. The aforementioned map in the exhibition includes a site called "Uštica", but its significance is not explained – that it was a "Gypsy camp" within the Jasenovac complex is not even mentioned.

The exhibition at the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest is dedicated to the Jewish and Roma victims. Yet the sections focusing on Roma were developed not by the main curatorial team but by another group led by Péter Szuhay from the Museum of Ethnography in Budapest. Coverage of the Roma victims was not initially envisaged and only subsequently included following the intervention of Roma activists (Kovács et al. 2014). The individualizing element is pronounced at the Holocaust Memorial Center. It shows, for example, next to Anne Frank, a Hungarian girl, Lilla Ecséri, who also wrote a diary during the Holocaust. Another case in point for the individualization of the victims are the stories of five families, four Jewish and one Roma, from Nagybicsér in Baranya county. Alongside those of the Jewish families, the story of István Kolompár’s family accompanies the visitors from room to room. This is the one individualizing Roma story that features in the exhibition. We learn that his daughter Aranka survived while many others, including her eighteen-month-old sister Ilona, did not.

The first room introduces Hungarian Jews and Roma and shows Roma...
at work, thus countering the common prejudice that Roma are work-shy or criminal (Meyer 2014: 185). Yet, while the locations where all the photographs of Jews were taken is indicated, giving even the name of the street or the square, three of the six photographs of Roma are situated in an unknown place “somewhere in Hungary”. The caption does not say "the location where the photograph was taken is unknown", but "Gypsy women wandering and begging somewhere in Hungary", thus reproducing the depiction of Roma as standing outside of villages, market town, cities and thus the civil society as a whole (Holzer 2008: 48). Here too we are confronted with a stereotypical description of Roma who "clung to their nomadic way of life and permanently lived in tribal, clannish circumstances". "It was these people that the authorities kept trying to settle or drive to the territory of neighboring countries." A distanced and even derogatory phrase like “these people”, or the statement that "the job of the authorities was not made easier by the fact that the law never defined who was to be regarded as a Gypsy", would presumably be inconceivable in the representation of Jewish victims.

While the photos of Roma feature prominently in the first, introductory room, they are scarce in the rest of the exhibition and in the guidebook. The latter includes more than 50 photographs of Jewish victims, but only two of Roma and one of a Dutch Sinti girl. Furthermore, the artifacts in the introductory room can be associated with “Jewish” professions and Judaism, whereas there are no objects associated with Roma. When it comes to the video testimonies on the multimedia stations, while the names of the interviewed Jewish survivors are provided, the testimonies of four Roma women are labeled simply "Persecution of Roma".

The "universalization of the Holocaust" has brought with it a strong focus on individual victims, then, but the case of these two museums demonstrates that this focus in not applied universally. The Roma clearly do not belong and neither museum actually has a viable strategy as to how Roma might sensibly be positioned vis-à-vis the other victim groups.

What about the Perpetrators?

According to Saul Friedländer’s concept of "integrated history", it is crucial to combine the voices of the victims with information about the perpetrators. In this respect, the Jasenovac Memorial Museum and the Holocaust Memorial...
Center represent two very different degrees of integration of the perpetrator perspective.

While the Jasenovac exhibition clearly gives agency to the survivors by drawing on their video testimonies, it only identifies the perpetrators vaguely as "Ustaša authorities", the "Ustaša movement", "Ustaša in power" or "Pavelić and his collaborators". Even these references are few and far between, however, and predominantly feature not in the sections dealing with mass murder but in the context of the general characterization of the "Independent State of Croatia". The most prominent level of display comprises exactly two massively enlarged photographs that are on permanent display and merit particular interest. One of them shows the Ustaša leader Ante Pavelić during his visit to Hitler in 1941. The caption informs the visitor that during Pavelić’s first visit to Hitler’s Bavarian residence in June 1941, Hitler gave Pavelić full support for the policy of genocide against the Serb population. Had the caption stated that Hitler gave Pavelić full support for the annihilation of Croatian Jews and Roma, it would be factually correct. Yet the Nazis actually protested against the Ustaša persecution of Croatian Serbs, their first and foremost enemy image, since it significantly strengthened anti-Nazi and anti-Ustaša resistance (Schmider 2002: 161). The museum’s presentation thus amounts to an externalization of responsibility.

The second permanently installed photograph bears the caption, "At the entrance to the camp", and shows, in the foreground, an elderly man struggling to remove a ring from his finger. The photograph is cropped in a specific way. In the original cutout, we see at the left edge of the photograph a perpetrator pulling at an elderly victim’s coat (Mataušić 2008: 125). He is wearing a Ustaša uniform, but instead of the usu-

---
8 From the USHMM website we learn that the victim is Theodore Grunfeld, a Jew from Zagreb, who was murdered there (USHMM 2018).
al cap worn by his peers he is wearing a black Muslim fez with the usual Ustaša emblem on it. Thus the way in which the image is presented at Jasenovac is not only vague as far as the complex geographical context of "the camp" is concerned, it also offers a simplified account of the perpetrators by neither showing nor mentioning that there were also Muslim Ustaša (which is hardly surprising, given that the Independent State of Croatia was largely coextensive with the current Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). To obtain further information visitors again have to turn to the computer terminals provided and the museum’s website, where they can find short biographies of twelve Ustaša – seven of them linked directly to the camp (Jasenovac Memorial Site 2018b).

Nowhere does the exhibition deal with the fact that the Ustaša camps were actually – apart from the camps run by the Romanians in Transnistria – the only death camps in German-controlled Europe that were operated not by the Germans but by local collaborators in a Nazi satellite state.

The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest, by contrast, tackles the issue of the perpetrators with texts and photographs displayed at the highest level of visibility. It introduces visitors not only to the German personnel responsible for organizing the deportation, Eichmann and two of his SS staffers, but also to Andor Jaross, the minister of the interior in the Hungarian collaborationist government and the "deportation trio": junior ministers László Endre and László Baky and László Ferenczy, a lieutenant colonel in the Hungarian Gendarmerie who was in charge of the deportations on the ground. The exhibition also refers to gendarmes who systematically robbed Jews, prevented them from bringing food into the ghetto, and raped or tortured them in front of their relatives, supposedly while searching them for hidden valuables (Fritz 2010: 171). There are even three photographs of ordinary Hungarians looting a ghetto on display, clearly documenting not just the readiness with which the Jews' property was seized but also the participation of female perpetrators. The exhibition also offers an unsparing account of the "right-wing, antisemitic, nationalist and anticommunist" Horthy regime. No attempt is made to externalize and lay Hungarian responsibility at the feet of the Germans. The exhibition explicitly broaches the issue of antisemitism in Hungary prior to the 1930s and 1940s: "In the 1880s, 'modern', racially motivated antisemitism reared its head in Hungary, too, its proponents declaring that the Jewish 'race' intended to dominate the world, and to that end exploited and destroyed nations." Given that the exhibition does not focus on the fate of the Jews of Budapest or its own location, we do not learn anything about perpetrators active on site.

### Pitfall 3:
"Just like the Jews" – Holocaust memorialization as a Container for Various Victims’ Memories

Jeffrey Alexander (2002: 51) has argued that evoking "the Holocaust to measure the evil of a non-Holocaust event is nothing more, and nothing less, than to employ a powerful bridging metaphor to make sense of social life. The effort to qualify as the referent of this metaphor is bound to entail sharp social conflict, and in this sense social relativization, for successful metaphorical embodiment brings to a party legitimacy and resources." In the following I discuss the use of the "Holocaust template" on the example of the House of Terror when it comes to the musealization of communist crimes and on two very different examples from
Bosnia-Herzegovina with regard to the war of the 1990s.

The aforementioned trend to emulate the aesthetics of the USHMM and Yad Vashem can also be found at the House of Terror in Budapest. It has adopted the model of the "Tower of faces" from the USHMM, a three-story installation comprising private photographs shot between 1890 and 1941 of the members of the Jewish community of a particular village in what is now Lithuania who fell victim to a massacre there in 1941. The Hungarian exhibition also displays portraits of the victims on a wall that ranges from the ground floor up to the roof. In addition, the "Hall of Faces" in the basement is strongly reminiscent of the Children's Memorial at Yad Vashem. Yet these aesthetics, though reflecting the turn towards the individual victim in "western" museology, are utilized here to frame a narrative of collective (Hungarian) suffering at the hands of the communists and the Nazis (a few of them Hungarian but most of them German). The apparent similarity to the "Tower of Faces" notwithstanding, the photographs displayed here are not private in nature, but were taken for the records of the communist police, they are mug shots of humiliated victims taken by the perpetrators. Moreover, the installation comprises only victims of the communist era. Here the narrative of suffering under communism has not only been prioritized over the narrative of suffering under Nazism, the latter has been omitted entirely.

Prima facie, the museum seems to equate Nazi and communist persecution. The way in which the Arrow Cross and the red star are juxtaposed, both on the front of the building and in the entrance hall, would seem to reflect this equation. Yet of the more than twenty rooms in the museum only two and a half in fact deal with the period of the Arrow Cross regime installed following the Nazi occupation in 1944. The responsibility both for this regime and for its communist successor is externalized and placed squarely at the feet of foreign powers. Domestic Hungarian complicity is minimized. It went no further than the Arrow Cross Party and a small number of Hungarian communists who, for the most part, were supposedly either Jews or former Nazis. Generally speaking, Hungarians were only ever victims. Indeed, even those responsible for atrocities during World War II feature – in the guidebook – only in their subsequent capacity as "victims of communist dictatorship" (Schmidt 2008: 86). In the prison cells in the basement their photographs and short biographies are exhibited: here all anti-communist fighters are depicted as heroes "who sacrificed their lives or freedom in the fight against oppression" (84). The museum presents individual stories only insofar as they contribute to the narrative of the heroic struggle for the Hungarian cause.

Visual representations of the Holocaust, by contrast, are kept to an absolute minimum. They include a video projection of ice flowing down the Danube, an allusion to the practice of Arrow Cross party members of shooting Jews dead at the bank of the river in the winter of 1944/45. Horthy's government (1920–44) is presented as a democratic regime and no reference is made to its authoritarian and antisemitic character (Rév 2008: 60). In this respect the contrast to the Holocaust Memorial Center could not be more stark. No mention is made of the fact that most Hungarian Jews were deported immediately after the German invasion, most of them in May 1944 – while Horthy was still in power and before the Arrow Cross Party took control (Seewann and Kovács 2006b: 53). The decision to emulate the model of the "Tower of faces" yet omit the is-
sue of Hungarian responsibility for the Holocaust and refrain from the visual representation of individual Jewish victims suggests that that this exhibition is in fact designed to portray Hungary as a collective victim that has suffered just like the Jews.

In the former Yugoslavia, the memory of the Holocaust is universalized in another way: victims of the more recent conflicts feel the need to shore up the legitimacy of their victim status by referring to a new Holocaust. In the post-Yugoslav space, Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, when referring to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, often present themselves as the "new Jews" and their adversaries as the "new Fascists" or "new Nazis". In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the memory of the annihilation of the huge Jewish community during World War II has been displaced entirely by the "recent Holocaust" during the post-Yugoslav war (MacDonald 2002).

The private Museum of Crimes against Humanity and Genocide (Tolj 2016), which opened in July 2016 in Sarajevo, places the effort to depict Bosniaks as victims of a new holocaust center stage. The exhibition – presented in Bosnian, English, and Turkish – begins with a photograph of a boy in the Warsaw ghetto with a Star of David on his armband. An analogy is then drawn to the fact that Serbs forced Bosniaks to wear similar armbands in the Bosnian town of Prijedor in 1992: "This was the first day of a campaign of extermination that resulted in executions, concentration camps, mass rapes and the ultimate removal of more than 94% of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the territory of the Prijedor municipality. This was the first time since the 1939 Nazi decree for Polish Jews to wear white armbands with the blue Star of David that members of an ethnic or religious group were to be marked for extermination in this way". The curators could, of course, have drawn on the fact that, far closer to home, the Independent State of Croatia too forced its victims to wear such armbands, yet instead chose to use the universalizing example of the Jews in the Warsaw ghetto as their reference point.

Juxtaposed to this image, on the opposite wall, are horrifying photographs of exhumed bodies, among them that of a baby's not yet fully developed body in

**Figure 4. Museum of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, Sarajevo**
its mother’s womb. What follows in the next room are individual victims’ objects, drawings, and photographs, and the touching testimonies from survivors of the atrocities. Yet one can barely look at them since they too are surrounded by photographs of anonymous mutilated corpses, the bloody bodies of victims – including children killed by a grenade during the siege of Sarajevo or the skull of a 3-year-old. The section on mass graves includes a staged mass grave, presenting half-buried skulls, bones, dental plates, and victims’ belongings. The term “concentration camp” is used on almost every text board to denote prison camps run by Bosnian Serbs or Croats from Herzegovina. Naser Orić, the commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces in and around Srebrenica whom the ICTY initially sentenced to a two-year prison term but subsequently acquitted (ICTY 2018: 8), is presented as an undisputed hero. The foreign Islamists who fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina are mentioned once: "Members of El Mujahid – were foreign volunteers who fought during the 1992–1995 war. They arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of fighting for Islam and on behalf of Muslims. Some originally went as humanitarian workers, while some of them were considered criminals in their home countries for illegally traveling to Bosnia and becoming soldiers". The crimes they committed – both against non-Muslim and Muslim Bosnians (Kohlmann 2005) – are not mentioned. The overwhelming pedagogy of horror, the black-and-white delineation between "us" and "them", and the equation with the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto massively eclipse the empathy-evoking individual accounts.

The memorial room ("Spomen soba") opened at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide in 2007 is another

---

The memorial room was co-financed by Great Britain and the Netherlands and advised by the Imperial War Museum in London (Spomen soba 2018). The memorial cemetery dates back to the decision...
The new permanent exhibition called "Srebrenica Genocide – Failure of the International Community" opened in Srebrenica-Potočari in an adjoining building ten years later, in 2017, takes a different stand. It was created in large part by a team from Westerbork, the Dutch memorial museum at the site of the former Nazi transit camp for Jews and Roma. While the aforementioned poster equating the Srebrenica victims with the Jewish victims of the Holocaust features prominently in the memorial room (Hasanhodžić 2017: 145), the new permanent exhibition in the adjoining building, by contrast, places a strong focus on fourteen survivor stories, private photographs of the victims, and their individualization. The curators narrate the story of Srebrenica on three planes, of which one is the "personal storyline". In the words of the exhibit: "Here you follow the fate of one victim of the genocide: Rijad Fejzic, or 'Riki'. You'll learn about the life and death of an ordinary teenage boy in Srebrenica and about his mother's struggle to find his mortal remains."

It would seem that the curators intentionally sought to avoid allusions to Srebrenica as a new holocaust. This is demonstrated, for instance, by the use of the term "March of Death" to denote the heavily attacked march of Bosniak men and boys from Srebrenica through 100 kilometers of Serb-controlled territory – as opposed to the term "death march", which would be directly associated with the Nazi concentration camps. The exhibition avoids not only blunt equalization with the Holocaust, but also restrains from making some kind of sense out of the crimes transforming them into a heroic narrative. It broaches the issues of "the void" the crimes of July 1995 have left in the families: "They have to live without so many family members, deprived of normal living conditions, haunted by nightmares and in anguish over questions concerning why the genocide of Srebrenica was not prevented", as the exhibition text in room 22 says.

Furthermore, in Srebrenica human remains play a crucial role in the memorialization process. The cemetery, the memorial room inaugurated in 2007 and the permanent exhibition opened in 2017 today form a single memorial complex – a Bosniak enclave in the Serb
part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the well-nigh autonomous Republika Srpska. While one plane of the permanent exhibition comprises the individual victims’ stories, a second dimension references the materiality of the building, which at the time of the massacre housed the Dutchbat commando. This “functional storyline”, as the exhibition calls it, “provides information about the function of the individual rooms at the time when UNPROFOR stayed here. This presentation has the unique feature that it is constructed at the actual historical site of the events”. Former offices, meeting rooms, and bedrooms have been re-constructed and the graffiti left behind by the Dutchbat soldiers during their missions in 1994 and 1995 preserved and contextualized. As the exhibition text explains, this has been done even though “many of the people visiting the former compound are shocked by some of the content of the graffiti that they perceive to be sexist or racist”. There are also graffiti created by staff working for the Bosnian Serb authorities who controlled the space after 1995. What the memorial does not encompass are the numerous sites at which the Bosnian Serbs actually carried out the mass murder and buried the victims. This would be difficult to achieve, though, since these locations are situated outside of the memorial enclave and there are so many of them. In some cases remains of one victim have been found in up to five hidden burial sites.

The aesthetics and modes of representation developed by Holocaust memorial museums have quite obviously “travelled” (Erll 2011) to the museum in Srebrenica and the Westerbork memorial has contributed to an exhibition that successfully avoids the pitfalls of the post-Yugoslav “war on memory” – in strong contrast to the depiction of Bosniaks as the new Jews in the private museum in Sarajevo.

**Conclusion**

I have encountered numerous intellectuals in Hungary and post-Yugoslav countries who consider Germany a role model when it comes to critically confronting the past, especially in terms of dealing self-critically with perpetrators

---

**Figure 6.** On the way from the Srebrenica-Potočari Cemetery to the new permanent exhibition at the former battery factory
and collaboration. And yet, Hungarian and Croatian curators do not emulate the practices of German in situ museums or pay attention to decades' worth of German debates about the "authenticity" of objects or the display of anonymous corpses etc. Instead, they strive to prove their European-ness by referencing primarily an American museum. The fact that even the House of Terror emulates the aesthetics of the USHMM and Yad Vashem to legitimize its narrative of Hungarian collective suffering proves how universalized Holocaust remembrance has become as a container for a variety of victim stories. Yet, as we saw, the "import" of the memorial museum concept to in situ sites tends to come at the price of erasing the specificity and materiality of the respective location. Often little more is offered than a simple reference to the fact that the location is of historical significance.

The individualization of the victim pioneered by the Holocaust memorial museums has been firmly established as best practice, yet this musealization technique falls short if it is applied only to certain victim groups while others are still depicted, potentially even in a stereotypical manner, as an anonymous collective. The representation of Roma at the Jasenovac Memorial Museum and the Holocaust Memorial Center are disturbing points in case. In their approach to the perpetrators, these two museums differ massively. The Croatian museum mentions "the Ustaša" in very general terms but does not confront the issue that these Nazi collaborators – in contrast to comparable cases – killed most of their victims in a domestic death camp. The Budapest museum, by contrast, deals extensively with Hungarian responsibility for the Holocaust and even displays photographs of "ordinary" Hungarians – men and women – as perpetrators.

The museums in Sarajevo and Srebrenica dedicated to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina also demonstrate how universalized Holocaust remembrance has become – albeit in rather different ways. The genocide museum in Sarajevo bluntly portrays Bosnian Muslims as "the new Jews" and relies on a pedagogy of horror, displaying numerous overwhelming photographs of bloody corpses. The new permanent exhibition at the Srebrenica-Potočari memorial, on the other hand, benefits from the experience of a "western" memorial museum. It has avoided equating the Holocaust and Srebrenica and "imported" the individualization of the victims as a central mode of musealization. It also draws on the crucial role of the materialities and spatialities of this site – the cemetery, the former battery factory in which people sought shelter, and the building, which housed the Dutchbat command. It stands for the "forensic turn" in the memorialization and musealization of atrocities. Although we can observe the impact of this turn on many Central European memorial sites, first of all the extermination camp sites Sobibor and Treblinka (Sturdy Colls 2015), it has not reached the site of the former Jasenovac death camp yet, where the generic memorial museum concept still prevails.
References


Predložak holokausta – memorijalni muzeji u Mađarskoj, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini

Sažetak U članku se razmatra kako memorijalni muzeji u Mađarskoj, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini odražavaju trendove koje su postavili Američki memorijalni muzej holokausta i Yad Vashem. Muzeji u državama koji su, ističući holokaust, nastojali pokazati svoju doraslost Europi tijekom pregovora o pristupanju Europskoj uniji, kao i muzeji koji su temu holokausta ostavili postrance kako bi izbjegli da se njegovo obilježavanje natječe sa sjećanjima na komunističke zločine, sadržavaju elemente ”zapadnjačkih” memorijalnih muzeja holokausta, što ukazuje na činjenicu da je sjećanje na holokaust univerzalizirano. Autorica tvrdi da su ti muzeološki trendovi ”doptovali” i do muzeja posvećenih postjugoslavenskim ratovima. U posljednjem dijelu teksta nudi analizu načina na koji su se trendovi potekli iz memorijalnih muzeja holokausta odrazili na Muzeju zločina protiv čovječnosti i genocida u Sarajevu i na Memorijalnom centru Srebrenica-Potočari.

Ključne riječi Memorijalni muzeji, Mađarska, Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina, Jasenovac, Srebrenica