

The Last Hundred Years: Some Observations on Historiography of Austria-Hungary

The paper discusses the developments of historiography on Austria-Hungary in Austria, Germany and the English-speaking countries in the century after its downfall. Two main periods are identified. First, the pre-war period, dominated by political history, national antagonisms, and the discussion on the question, who was to blame for the collapse of the monarchy. Second, the post-war period, marked with the rising dominance of the Anglo-American historiography, and the gradual inclusion of social and cultural history, and, recently, the imperial and post-colonial paradigms. The main issue discussed are the causes of the gradual rehabilitation of the monarchy and its popularity among Western scholars.

The debates on Austria-Hungary in historiography developed like no other one, as I shall demonstrate, because the monarchy eventually had no successor in terms of political continuity. Certainly, during the first three decades after its dissolution, the discussion was the most heated in Austria proper and Germany, where the Habsburg history was considered as constituting an important chapter in the German national history. In the other so-called successor states of the monarchy, Austria-Hungary attracted little attention from their respective national historians for the reasons I hope to explain below. There were but a few Western scholars competent about the realities and languages of the region at that time, and hence the voice of the émigré authors was already preponderant.

One of the key aspects of the historical debate on the monarchy in the inter-war years was that virtually all members of the discussion – including these who deplored and those who praised the monarchy – agreed that it was irrevocably gone.¹ Austria-Hungary belonged to the past exclusively because it was anachronistic. This simple dictum was being constantly repeated and implied by all participants in the debate. Astonishingly, perhaps, those who emphasized it most openly were the ones whose attitude towards the Monarchy ranged from sympathy to enthusiasm. For example, two economic historians, Gusztáv Gratz and Richard Schüller stressed in the introduction to their *Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary during*

¹ For a more detailed analysis of the inter-war historiography on Austria-Hungary, see: KOŻUCHOWSKI 2013.

the War in Its External Relations: “We may regret its fall; for it is possible still to hold, with Palmerston, that if an ‘Austria’ did not exist, it would be necessary to create one ... Yet the Monarchy, whatever its uses, was an anachronism.”² Alfred Pribřam, a political historian from Vienna, concluded his *Austrian Foreign Policy* with a similar formula: “Regrets, however, are of no avail. History has pronounced its verdict. Austria-Hungary is no more.”³

The Habsburg monarchy, despite being five to seven hundred years younger than the majority of European states, was supposed to be doddering with age, to be an antediluvian concept for which there was no room in the modern world. Accordingly, Viktor Bibl, the author of a three-volume analysis of the monarchy’s decay, claimed that one should not be surprised that the monarchy fell in 1918 but rather that it survived till 1918 – which he called “the miracle of the House of Habsburg”.⁴

The idea partly originated from the Austro-Hungarian state propaganda that proudly stressed its hoary age. The most talented advocates of the monarchy, such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal, praised it as an essentially anti-modern political idea. It was not of secondary importance, he claimed in his *Austrian Idea*, that the history of Austria as a *Mark* of the Holy Roman Empire had lasted a thousand years, and as a Roman colony claiming the legacy of Charlemagne it had lasted two thousand years. Duration, Hofmannsthal argued, recalling Machiavelli, is the real aim of all governments, surpassing all other qualities.⁵ In his speech at the Munich University in 1927 he juxtaposed the values allegedly represented by the monarchy, that were supposed to be rooted in the natural order, blessed by God and protected by tradition, and the “superficial modernity.”⁶ Other conservative admirers of the monarchy, such as the authors of the volume *Österreich und die Reichsidee*, published in 1937, also eagerly stressed that it represented the most ancient traditions, like the “supranational, federalist state idea,” which originated in Ancient Rome and flourished under Charlemagne.⁷

Ancient analogies were popular among authors who were sentimental about Austria-Hungary, such as Franz Werfel, who noted: “There may have been, in the days when Rome fell and new states sprang up on her soil, generations like ours.”⁸ Accordingly, Heinrich Benedikt insisted that the downfall of the monarchy

² GRATZ, SCHÜLLER 1928: 23.

³ PRIBŘAM 1923: 11, 28.

⁴ BIBL:1937: 13.

⁵ HUGO von HOFMANNSTHAL 1956: 105-106.

⁶ See: GREIFFENHAGEN 1971: 169.

⁷ WOLF, HELIG, GÖRGEN 1937: 1-34.

⁸ Werfel 1937: 4

could be compared solely to the fall of Rome.”⁹ Alfred Missong argued that “the Austrian man ... racially is a synthesis of the Germans and the Slavs, spiritually of the Romans and the Byzantines...”¹⁰ Still in the 1960s an Austrian essayist, Herbert Eisenreich, explained to his readers that “the uniqueness and the greatness of Austria arises from the fact that it was – as Athens had been – a great market place and melting pot of ideas.”¹¹

Still, the uniformity of opinions emphasizing that Austria-Hungary had been doomed for destruction may seem somewhat schizophrenic, since in the inter-war debates on the monarchy much attention was focused on the question of what could have been done to save the monarchy and who was to blame for its final breakdown. The following issues were hotly debated: what could have been done to satisfy the nationalities, whether the Compromise of 1867 had been a fatal mistake, or how the war of 1914 could have been avoided.¹² Liberals blamed Conservatives, and vice-versa, and everyone in Austria accused the Magyars of having been terribly stubborn. These discussions evidently mirrored the pre-1914 debates on the necessity of political reforms. Thus, they notoriously focused on the person of Francis Joseph,¹³ and the hopes inspired by the prospects of Franz Ferdinand’s rise to power.

And yet, an aura of fatality overshadowed this debate that was perhaps best expressed by Bibl in his discussion of plans to reform the monarchy by the unfortunate archduke Franz Ferdinand. Having hesitated between federalization and the so-called trialism, Bibl argued, the archduke realized that the contradictory claims of the Monarchy’s nations were unsolvable, and that all his plans were doomed because of the contrarious nature of their object (*die Tücke des Objekts*) – that is Austria-Hungary itself.¹⁴ What was generally considered as most problematic about the monarchy, and what apparently made it “anachronistic” was its non-national character, resulting in the lack of an “animating idea” (as Heinrich von Srbik put it).¹⁵ In the early 20th century national identity was regarded as the only one solid and reliable source of political legitimacy, and the fact that Austria-Hungary lacked one made it an outdated political concept.

Analogies to Athens, Rome, and Byzantium evoked images of the splendid but remote and decadent past. Symbols of old age were venerable but provoked

⁹ Benedikt: 1968: 8.

¹⁰ WINTER (ed.) 1927: 111.

¹¹ Leser: 1981: 103.

¹² For more on the counterfactual scenarios about Austria-Hungary and World War I see: KOŻUCHOWSKI 2012: 243-252.

¹³ See: CORTI, SOKOL 1928; BAGGER 1928; TSCHUPPIK 1928; REDLICH 1929; SCHNEIDER (ed.) 1919.

¹⁴ BIBL 1922: 402-30.

¹⁵ SRBIK 1949: 132-33.

natural associations with dotage and agony. However, it was also highly demobilizing for the monarchy's critics. What happened to Austria-Hungary appeared to have been expected and those who disliked it saw no sense in explaining the process. All they needed to do was to congratulate themselves and forget about the Habsburgs as quickly as possible.

Indeed, it seems that it had been a typical strategy of national historiographies of the so-called successor states to ignore the Habsburgs before the Great War, and that 1918 did not mark a profound change in their attitude. For example, it took Josef Pekař, a leading Czech historian and Masaryk's intellectually most gifted opponent, little effort to rework his "History of Our Monarchy", which appeared in 1914, so that he could publish it after 1918 as the "History of Czechoslovakia". In both versions, the essential subject was Czech national history, and the role of Austria (and, to be sure, Slovakia) was marginal. Neither was it central for Jan Opočenský's "The Downfall of Austria and the Birth of Czechoslovakia" (in German as "Der Untergang Österreichs und die Entstehung des Tschechoslowakischen Staates", published in 1928).

Most criticism, which the Monarchy posthumously provoked concerned the mental state of its elite, who were typically presented as incompetent. This criticism, however, was quite tempered and far from fierce attacks concerning moral standards and political principles. After 1918, even the Monarchy's old enemies preferred ridiculing rather than condemning it. Let me illustrate this with two reminiscences by politicians who were certainly no friends of "the old Austria." One was Ignacy Daszyński, a Polish socialist, and ex-deputy to the Viennese parliament:

The old emperor was succeeded by Charles, a weak man of an immature mind. Sometimes he made the impression of being simply harmlessly stupid. The two years of his rule were the time of the total decline of the entire and resulted with its breakdown . . . The government of Clam-Martinić fell because of the typically aristocratic incapability of the prime minister and his colleagues. He was replaced by a certain Dr. Seidler, an ex-teacher of the emperor Charles. He was the funniest prime minister I have ever seen (and I have seen a couple of dozen of them!). He was petty, sincere, relatively stupid, and so naïve, that once in my speech, causing laughter in the Chamber, I asked: "Have you ever seen, gentlemen, a child of this age?" And such a man could have served as the prime minister of the declining Austria for an entire year!¹⁶

The other one was Leo Trotsky, who had spent some time with the elite of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party in Vienna before 1914, and does not need to be introduced. He recollected:

¹⁶ DASZYŃSKI 1957: 99, 254, 270.

They were well-educated people whose knowledge of various subjects was superior to mine. I listened with intense and, one might almost say, respectful interest to their conversation in the ‘Central’ café. But very soon I grew puzzled. These people were not revolutionaries. Moreover, they represented the type which was farthest from that of the revolutionary. This expressed itself in everything—in their approach to subjects, in their political remarks and psychological appreciations, in their self-satisfaction—not self-assurance, but self-satisfaction. I even thought I sensed philistinism in the quality of their voices.¹⁷

The tone of these characteristic opinions varies from mockery in the former case to sarcasm in the latter. Daszyński’s reminiscences could be easily confused with any of the famous fictional satirical portraits of the pre-1918 Austrian elite, such as those by Jaroslav Hašek, Robert Musil or Fritz von Herzmanovsky-Orlando. “The old Austria” of these narratives, bitter as they are, was anything but a dangerous enemy. The reception of Hašek’s famous *Good Soldier Švejk* may seem particularly instructive in this respect: planned as a radical anti-Habsburg pamphlet, the book became known to millions of readers worldwide in an abbreviated version as a universal pacifist manifesto, eventually deprived of its actual political context.

No other group produced a critique of the Habsburgs comparably passionate and bitter as the one expressed by the pan-German authors.¹⁸ First, they regretted that Austria as such had been an obstacle for the unification of all Germans in one state. Second, they condemned the agreement of 1867 with Hungary as a “moral capitulation” and lamented the influence enjoyed by the Magyars and other non-Germans in the monarchy (and that at least some of them had not been Germanized). Third, they despised the fact that Austria had not crushed Serbia at some earlier time before 1914 and that Franz Ferdinand, the alleged strong man, had never ascended to the throne and taught the Magyars and other non-Germans the lesson they deserved. Finally, they blamed both Francis Joseph and Charles for their indecisiveness and lack of military vigour. To be sure, one needs to remember that the tradition of demonizing the Habsburgs as one of the most tragic factors in German history had been a long tradition among German nationalist authors, including a number of the most prominent 19th-century Protestant German historians, such as Johann Gustav Droysen or Ludwig Häusser.¹⁹ However, because it was Adolf Hitler who was to unite Austria with Germany, and the independence of the Austrian Republic has not been seriously questioned after World War II, this trend, powerful and passionate as it was in the inter-war time, died out with the

¹⁷ TROTSKY 1970: 207.

¹⁸ See, for example: RAPP 1936; KLEINWÄCHTER 1920; GLAISE-HORSTENAU 1929; KAUNER 1922.

¹⁹ For more see: IGGERS 1968; FAULENBACH 1980; LEHNARD-SCHRAMM 2014.

fall of the Third Reich, and the subsequent silencing of German nationalism. The most outspoken critics of the Habsburg legacy have been silenced.

It may also seem surprising how little criticism the monarchy provoked from democratic liberals.²⁰ One response to this may be that they also viewed Austria-Hungary as a closed chapter of respective national histories. The chapter concluded the volume that embraced feudalism, religious wars, and dynastic policies, and laid the groundwork for the next volume, titled “modernity and the nation state”. Another one was formulated by Ernest Gellner, who suggested that the “pariah-liberals” of Central Europe were so frightened by the rising nationalism and chauvinism – which he labels as “the village green” ideology – that, paradoxically and *contre coeur*, they acknowledged the Habsburgs as their only ally.²¹

The rickety structure, which was a survival of feudalism and baroque absolutism, somehow endeared itself to, and only to, the free-thinking liberal individualists (a strange metamorphosis indeed!) . . . An old and rigid dynasty, long linked with hierarchy, authoritarianism, and obscurantist dogmatism, did not exactly look like promising material for being the symbol of the Open Society. But, comic as it might be, the logic of the situation made it so.²²

After World War II Austria-Hungary made a spectacular career in the English-speaking countries, and particularly the US, which has gradually become a global centre for Habsburg studies. A major synthesis of Austrian history has appeared nearly every decade after 1945 (by A.J.P. Taylor, Arthur May, C.A. Macartney, Robert Kann, Alan Sked, Robin Okey, Pieter Judson).²³ Despite remarkable efforts by Central-European scholars, that may be symbolized by the monumental series *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848 – 1918*, edited by Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch,²⁴ most major methodological and ideological shifts in Habsburg studies were dictated by the American scholars.

The main tendencies in these studies may be summarized as follows. First, one may observe a gradual methodological shift from the traditional political history to social and cultural history oriented towards parties, groups, milieus, and local communities. A.J.P. Taylor’s history of Austria from 1809 till 1918 was still an

²⁰ One evident exception is the excellent, and partly nostalgic but still highly critical study by JÁSZI 1929; another one is: REDLICH 1929.

²¹ This attitude can, for example, be seen in: HERTZ 1937; KOLARZ 1946.

²² GELLNER 1998: 32-33.

²³ TAYLOR 1976; MAY 1951; MACARTNEY 1968; KANN 1974; SKED 1989; OKEY 2002; JUDSON 2016.

²⁴ WANDRUSZKA, URBANITSCH (eds.) 1973 – 2000.

exercise in political-diplomatic history, focused on the great decision-makers and central political structures. Robert A. Kann's *The Multinational Empire*²⁵ and *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526 – 1918* marked a radical shift towards viewing the monarchy as a conglomerate of nations rather than one of the traditional European great powers. National politics, culture, and interests became the true subject of the Habsburg history. Alan Sked's *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, and Robin Okey's *The Habsburg Monarchy c. 1765 – 1918* may be viewed as yet another shift: nationalities as political entities were now paralleled with mass parties, ideological and cultural currents, and other factors that were supposed to have determined the Habsburg history. Pieter Judson's recent synthesis crowns this trend in that it dismisses national antagonisms and nationalism as fundamental determinants of this history, stressing a variety of other loyalties and, most importantly, the idea of imperial unity.

Second, one may also observe a number of ideological trends determining the development of the Western discourse on Austria. The point of departure and arrival of one of them was summarized by George Kennan: "The Austro-Hungarian Empire still looks better as a solution to the tangled problems in that part of the world than anything that has succeeded it."²⁶ The main ideological reason for this conclusion was, evidently, the moral ruination of nationalism in result of World War II. Consequently, Austria-Hungary entered the picture in a new light, as presumably the most tolerant, liberal and indeed supra-national of the multinational empires – quite in contrast to its popular image when it still existed – and as a victim of the most dangerous modern political ideology. Pieter Judson's recent synthesis seems to be a radical culmination of this trend, as it denies the ability of nationalism to undermine the loyalty of the Habsburg citizens towards the monarchy until its last days. In terms of narrative strategies, the idea that it would have been better had the monarchy not broken down, is manifested by the continued tendency, also typical for the inter-war authors, for counterfactual discussions on what could have been done to save it when it might have been still possible.²⁷ Except for the fact that such discussions unavoidably lead to methodological dead-ends, their obvious defiance is that we are never informed for whom it would be better if the Monarchy had survived its actual dissolution.

Moreover, the Habsburg studies have been successfully integrated in the global trend of empire-studies. What seems the most characteristic in this approach is the juxtaposition of empire and nation-states as two fundamentally different ideal types (in the Weberian sense of the term) of statehood. Again, such a sharp distinction sheds a positive light on what had been considered as Austria-Hungary's

²⁵ KANN 1950.

²⁶ KENNAN 1979: 423.

²⁷ SKED 1989: 3.

most problematic feature: its multi-national character. In contrast to the time before World War II, Austria-Hungary, the Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Turkey, and occasionally also the Wilhelmine Germany are today typically considered as representing one political formation – contrasted both against the Western democracies and the nation-states that succeeded them. Remarkably, the imperial approach has successfully replaced, and indeed silenced, the idea of viewing the Monarchy predominantly as a great power (*Grossmacht*), which was typical for the inter-war period. The difference between the two approaches is essential. Empires, as viewed by the modern historians, are foremost composite states, embracing a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional population; even though not democratic by principle, they are still believed to have pursued relatively tolerant, or at least negotiable policies towards various ethnic and religious groups, and to have worked for the establishment of some supra-national political identity. The most characteristic feature of the great powers, in contrast, as they were perceived by the traditional historiography and political sciences (and their political elites), was their military strength and desire, or readiness, for expansion. Eventually, the two approaches do not deny each other, emphasizing different political aspects; their ideological implications, however, are clearly different.

Furthermore, a crucial aspect in the overwhelmingly positive image of Austria-Hungary in the post-World War II discourse has been a product of studies in cultural history, expanding vigorously since the 1960s. This expansion paralleled, or perhaps mirrored the discovery of originality and modernity of the Austrian or, more precisely, Viennese culture around 1900 in the West. The fundamental study in the respect was the spectacular synthesis *The Austrian Mind. An Intellectual and Social History 1848 – 1918* by William M. Johnston,²⁸ embracing virtually all aspects of the Austrian cultural legacy: from psychoanalysis to atonal music. In literary history the rising popularity of such post-Habsburg authors as Musil, Werfel, Roth, and Canetti was captured by Claudio Magris, who deconstructed Habsburg sentimentalism with his concept of the Habsburg myth as an essentially escapist idea.²⁹ Although his impact on studies in Austrian literature has been preponderant, the tendency prevailed to view Austria around 1900, and particularly Vienna, as a “laboratory of modernity,” where a number of dominant intellectual, cultural, and artistic trends of the 20th century were born, or even matured. To be sure, psychoanalysis as an answer to the fears and desires of bourgeoisie in the time of its most impressive economic and social rise, and as a metaphor for the ambiguities of the Victorian morality, attracted the most attention of scholars. However, there are more such originally Habsburg (or post-Habsburg) answers to general problems of the entire Western civilization: in literature (Kafka,

²⁸ JOHNSTON 1983.

²⁹ MAGRIS 1966.

Broch, Musil, Kraus), architecture (Loos), philosophy (Wittgenstein), or music (Schoenberg).³⁰

The cultural milieu of Vienna from the late nineteenth century up to 1938 has become the focus of numerous studies by the Anglo-American scholars, as well as in Austria, where they are centred around the research group established by Moritz Csáky. To sum up, seen from the perspective of cultural history Austria-Hungary evolved from being perceived as a backward periphery of European, and particularly German culture, into one of Europe's vibrant centres of modernity. The image of Austria-Hungary as a country of decadent aristocrats and sclerotic bureaucrats waltzing in Vienna, surrounded by illiterate peasants agitated by nationalist activists, has been replaced, or at least rivalled by that of visionary artists, intellectuals, and scholars. Clearly, the revisited and reevaluated context of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity plays a key role in this spectacular transformation. Moreover, and especially since the fall of communism, the same approach has prevailed in the studies on Habsburg peripheries: first Budapest, and then other multicultural centres of the monarchy.³¹

The idea of Austria-Hungary as one of the centres of Western culture before World War I was certainly a remarkable departure from its image as an anachronism, which prevailed in the inter-war period. And yet, I believe, it still owed much to a more general paradigm of decadence, present in the European history from the time of Polybius, who was the first to develop the theory of cyclical rise and decline of political organisms. The crucial element of this theory, reproduced and re-elaborated by numerous authors up to the Enlightenment, and still present in the popular image of history in modern times,³² is the idea that political decline is in part a consequence of cultural and artistic refinement, resulting with political escapism of the elites. The focus on the artistic and intellectual achievements of Austria-Hungary's last generations, overshadowing its political problems, perfectly suited this model, evoking images of the splendid declines of a number of empires, from Antiquity to the 20th century.

Importantly, however, the discovery of Austria-Hungary as one of the vibrant centres of the early 20th-century modernity, and the emphasis on social and cultural issues in Habsburg studies, also led to the reassessment of the Monarchy's political legacy. Shifting attention from the relations of the Monarchy with its neighbours, and then from those between the Monarchy as a whole and its nationalities, to various social groups and political organizations, the historians arrived at a number of ambiguous aspects of the Habsburg heritage. The fundamental study in this

³⁰ See for example: TIMMS! 1989; SCHICK 1965; WILLIAMS 1974; GREINER 1979; DOPPLER 1957; ASPETSBERGER (ed.) 1977; JANIK, TOULMIN 1973.

³¹ See: HÁNAK 1998; LUKACS 1988; CZAPLICKA (ed.) 2005; CSÁKY 2010.

³² See: DEMANDT 2002: 111-113.; WALBANK 1980: 41-58.; BURKE 1977: 87-102.

respect was *Fin-de-siècle Vienna. Politics and Culture* by Carl Schorske.³³ What Schorske emphasized was the tension between the post-feudal “village green” and petty bourgeoisie, and the invention of mass-politics, with its populism, aggression, and the new type of culture, based on the domination of mass-media. Seen from this perspective, the monarchy was a home not only for the sophisticated intellectuals and artists, but also for the demons of mass-politics: nationalism, and, no less-importantly, anti-Semitism. What he reinvigorated, moreover, was the idea of Austrian escapism, symbolized both by Freud and Arthur Schnitzler, as a reaction of the liberal elites incapable of exercising influence on the masses, and seeking refuge from the world of politics and the social activity in general in the exploration of their inner psyche. Hence, Schorske’s impact on studies on political movements and ideology in the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the last decades cannot be overestimated.

Finally, in the last decades the Habsburg studies have undergone a remarkable transformation under the influence of two more methodological trends. The first one came from the post-colonial studies that, in my view, should be regarded as a response to the imperial studies.³⁴ Naturally, it remains debatable whether Austria-Hungary was a colonial power in the proper sense of the term; however, as a matter of fact the same concerns the problem if it was an empire or, more precisely, if it was an empire comparable to the colonial powers of its time. Still, regardless if the colonial terminology is appropriate for Austria-Hungary, the post-colonial studies clearly challenge the idea of Central Europe as a hodge-podge of nationalities that had (or perhaps still should) be governed from above, by some supra-national political power imposing Western civilization on the region. To be sure, the discussion may be seen as the new version of an old debate between enthusiasts of the imperial power and the defenders of the national sovereignty, dressed in the new vocabulary of the centre-periphery relations. The main asset of this situation, in my view, is that for the first time it can eventually take shape of a scholarly debate employing methodology and concepts acceptable for the representatives of both positions, which was scarcely possible both in the inter-war period and before the collapse of communism because of the depth of the national and ideological resentments between the Austro-German, the Western, and the East-Central European authors, representing the so-called successor states of the Monarchy.

The post-colonial studies go hand in hand with yet another methodological approach imported from a different cultural context: the memory studies. The flexible, universalist, and often equivocal concepts of *lieu de memoire* and cultures of memory has appeared successfully applicable to both national and international

³³ SCHORSKE 1981.

³⁴ See: MÜLLER-FUNK, PLENER, RUTHNER (ed.) 2002; FEICHTINGER, PRUTCH, CSÁKY (ed.) 2003; KAPS, SURMAN 2012.

historical studies, and seems to be enjoying a rising popularity in the post-Habsburg region.³⁵ Its main achievement – and probably also its most problematic aspect – is the combination of deconstruction, petrification, and perhaps reanimation of the Habsburg sentimentalism, incessantly expanding into all branches of popular culture, from cinema to cuisine, and into the most remote corners of the old Monarchy. Moreover, memory studies have greatly improved our awareness of the *longue durée* of the monarchy after its collapse: in institutions, mentalities, legal codifications, cultural patterns, and memories proper.

The Habsburg studies are an expanding, and increasingly international field, attracting the attention of historians from Central and Western Europe, as well as America. As I tried to demonstrate, despite its many methodological and ideological transformations, it still revolves around a number of questions that have been present in the discourse on Austria-Hungary since its dissolution – the most persistent of them concerning the causes and the inevitability of this dissolution.

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³⁵ See: CSÁKY 2002: 25-49; ROMSICS 2006; MOOS 2016; FEICHTINGER and UHL (ed.) 2016; NELL and KOŻUCHOWSKI 2015: 177-196.

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Posljednjih stotinu godina: Neka opažanja o historiografiji o Austro-Ugarskoj

Raspad Austro-Ugarske uzrokovao je žestoku raspravu među austro-njemačkim povjesničarima. Najčešće postavljana pitanja među simpatizerima Monarhije bila su ona o uzrocima pada i odgovornosti za njezin pad. Zanimanje za povijest Monarhije bilo je daleko manje u drugim zemljama nasljednicama, koje su je smatrale anakronizmom, mišljenjem koje su dijelili i s nostalgicarima. U konačnici, oni koji su s najviše entuzijazma pozdravili njezin pad bili su njemački nacionalisti. Ovo je gledište, međutim, bilo kompromitirano ishodom Drugog svjetskog rata. U narednom razdoblju austrijski su studiji procvjetali u anglo-američkoj znanstvenoj zajednici koja je proteklih desetljeća potaknula većinu inovativnih pristupa. Postupno, pozornost znanstvenika pomaknula se od diplomacije i visoke politike prema socijalnoj i kulturnoj povijesti.

Slika Monarhije dramatično se promijenila nakon što su različiti aspekti umjetničke, intelektualne i političke kulture ranog dvadesetog stoljeća došli u fokus, učinivši ju prije simbolom modernosti nego nazadnosti. Štoviše, ova je slika dodatno profitirala integracijom Habsburških studija u paradigme imperijalnih i postkolonijalnih studija. Konačno, uloga nacionalnih nezadovoljstava, tradicionalno smatrana kao najrevolucionarniji element u kasnoj habsburškoj povijesti, u posljednje je vrijeme dovedena u pitanje.

Keywords: Austria-Hungary, historiography, nationalism, anachronism, empire studies, post-colonial studies, memory studies.

Ključne riječi: Austro-Ugarska, historiografija, nacionalizam, anakronizam, imperijalni studiji, postkolonijalni studiji, studije sjećanja.

Adam Kożuchowski
The Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History
Polish Academy of Sciences
Rynek Starego Miasta 29/31, 00-272 Warszawa
akozuchowski@yahoo.com

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