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On Foucault’s Stoicism and Hegel’s Critique of the Stoic Point of View in Relation to the Problem of Freedom

Abstract
I argue that to understand Hegel’s critique of Stoicism in relation to the problem of freedom it is important to appreciate some Foucault’s ideas and those of the Foucauldian circle influenced by his thought. I will begin by discussing Foucault’s reference to Greco-Roman Philosophy in his lectures at Collège de France. In those lectures, by using Hadot’s concept of spiritual exercises, he tries to constitute ethics of the self based on a conception of subjective freedom. Afterwards, I will deal with Hegel’s critique of Stoicism on the ground of the Stoic theory of oikeîôsis. Hegel’s interpretation of this theory is the basis of his critical attitude towards Stoicism. There is a connection between Stoicism and Foucault’s late period in respect to the conception of freedom, which is entirely based on subjectivity. At the end of this paper, I hope to show that Hegel’s critique of Stoic ethics, beginning with an examination of the theory of oikeîôsis, can provide us with an opportunity to criticise the subjective point of view in the problem of freedom.

Keywords
Michel Foucault, care of self, Stoicism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, oikeîôsis, freedom, subjectivity

1. Foucault’s Stoic Mood

A Foucauldian approach to the problem of freedom presents us with a perspective of subjective freedom1 in which the concept of “the care of the self” (epimeleia heautou / souci de soi) is dominant. In his lectures at Collège de France in the 1980s, Foucault appeals to Greco-Roman Philosophy in order to attain a new conception of the self (or, so to speak, of the subject) and to strive for withdrawal from external things in order to be able to make progress in accordance with the knowledge of what should be desired and avoided. He wants freedom, but this freedom is entirely subjective rather than, for instance, to be social or political in respect of the intersubjective relationships. Similarly, Foucault’s idea of the practice of freedom that can be regarded as a form of an intellectual freedom is grounded in an ethical perspective of the individual and the subject. It means a self-determined action of the subject instead of being determined by any external power or power relations.

1 The phrases of “subjective freedom” or “subjective point of view” refer to a subjectivity to be a form of inwardness which is abstracted from all external demands or requirements. If Hegelian terminology is borrowed in order to make clear this point, it can be said that subjectivity reflected into itself is “the absolute inward certainty of itself” (Hegel, 1991: 163). It goes without saying that in this context the concept of the self becomes more significant than any other one. The focus of philosophical striving at the subjective level is an immanent relationship of the self to itself. For example, Epictetus points out that any man eagerly must
call attention to the possibility of the practice of freedom in a situation in which power-relationships and the dispositifs determine life, and the “self” is only a construction from power-relations. To understand the background of Foucault’s ideas here, it is useful to understand Hadot’s concept of exercices spirituels (spiritual exercises). In 1977, Hadot wrote an article entitled Exercices spirituels; it can be claimed that this article is more decisive in the alteration or transformation of Foucault’s thought concerning the subject-truth relationship, and in his turning towards ancient philosophy than other things with which Foucault dealt in this period. In his article, Hadot claims that “[s]piritual exercises can be best observed in the context of Hellenistic and Roman schools of philosophy. The Stoics, for instance, declared explicitly that philosophy, for them, was an ‘exercise’” (Hadot, 1987:15; 1995b: 82–83). By taking this context as a starting point, Hadot emphasises that we should consider these spiritual exercises in relation to art of life. In the Hellenistic and Roman schools of philosophy, those spiritual exercises are realised in accordance with the art of life that is also philosophy itself. Moreover, it goes without saying that for those schools, philosophy, as an art of life, is not an abstract theory, but a concrete attitude (Hadot, 1987: 16), and that it has a therapeutic function.

Hadot’s ideas about ancient philosophy are based on his general thesis according to which this philosophy can be seen as a struggle for attaining a transcendent point of view about everything that philosophy is interested in. Still, to attain such a transcendent point, Hadot claims that one should start at an individual level or, strictly speaking, a subject should care for itself during their entire life at a philosophical, that means, therapeutic level. According to him, from Socrates to the Hellenistic and Roman philosophers, all ancient philosophy can be evaluated in the light of the dealing of the subject with itself. It seems that Hadot’s thoughts concerning ancient philosophy must have been very on the analysis of the relationship between power and subject in Foucault’s late period. Hadot underlines the influence of his article on Foucault’s “the culture of the self” (Hadot, 1995a: 24). Foucault too pointed out Hadot’s effect on his thought in the second volume of his The History of Sexuality. He says that he has “benefited greatly” from the works of Pierre Hadot (Foucault, 1990: 8). But there are some crucial differences between them. Foucault, unlike Hadot, stresses the idea of the culture of the self in Greco-Roman philosophy which involves an inevitable duty to make resistance to power. To be able to make resistance to power, Foucault endeavours to constitute ethics of the self, and he claims “there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself” (Foucault, 2005: 252). It might be said that he appeals to the Greco-Roman Philosophy to constitute an ethic of the self, or, strictly speaking, pointing out the possibility of a culture of the self. Nevertheless, as he clearly showed us, the Greco-Roman Philosophy is not composed of a complete, identical corpus of ideas, and it is necessary to make some distinctions in it. For this reason, Foucault takes philosophy in the first and second centuries A.D. as a reference point, and distinguishes it from Plato’s perspective: In Plato’s texts, “care of the self is (…) instrumental with regard to the care of others” (Foucault, 2005: 175).

Foucault, especially taking Plato’s dialogue Alcibiades I as a starting point, says that in this thought the government of others is dependent on the government of the self, but the basic aim of the relationship one has to oneself is to govern the others in a city-state (polis). In other words, the question is how to conduct ourselves to live with others in a just society. In contrast, in the
first and second centuries A.D., “the self one takes care of is no longer one element among others”, and the self is the sole aim of the care of the self, that means, “it is no longer a transitional element leading to something else, to the city-state or others” (Foucault, 2005: 177). That is to say, in that period the aim is not to govern others; on the contrary, the basic aim of a philosopher is nothing more than dealing with himself at the level of therapeutic exercises. Another distinction that Foucault made is that the Stoic conception of the self is apart from the other perspectives of the Hellenistic and Roman philosophical schools such as Platonism or early Christian thought in that era. If we especially consider his lectures entitled “L’Herméneutique du Sujet”, it can be said that, for Foucault, in “the Golden Age of self-cultivation” (i.e. in the first and second centuries A.D.) the late Stoic conception of the self plays a more significant role than that of other philosophical schools. That which is made the Stoic perspective more important than any other philosophical movement is that in Stoicism the self is the sole aim (telos) of the therapeutic work on the self, whereas, for example, in the Platonic tradition “the care of the self” is entirely a part of a cathartic endeavour. As for Christianity, we can easily see a sudden change of the point of view in it: taking this change into account, Foucault indicates that the Christian concept metanoia, i.e. conversion, is a “sudden, dramatic, historical-metahistorical upheaval of the subject” (Foucault, 2005: 211). Thus, in early Christianity, which is “a confessional religion” (Foucault, 1997a: 242), the care of the self is transformed into a renunciation of oneself or dying to oneself as a result of this conversion. The subject takes care of itself, but merely with an intention that it must attain a renouncing of the self at the end of this act to reunite with eternity that refers to God.5 As a result of Foucault’s estimation of Stoic thought, I would like to argue that his view must be distinguished from Hadot’s thought about ancient phi-

2 In De finibus, Cicero already said in relation to Stoic philosophy that “[a]ll the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the [Art of Life]” (“Quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est; ars est enim philosophia vitae”) (Cicero, 1931: III, 4).

3 For a detailed investigation of the connection between Foucault and Pierre Hadot, see (Davidson, 2005: 123–148). Davidson claims that “Foucault was engaged in intense, if sometimes submerged, intellectual exchange” with Paul Veyne, Georges Dumézil, and especially Pierre Hadot (Davidson: 2005: 124).

4 In contrast to Foucault’s distinction between Plato and the Greco-Roman Philosophy, it might be claimed that “the figure of Socrates” (especially, the Platonic Socrates) is a paradigm of this period, and the role of Socrates especially in the Stoic tradition is dominant. For example, Epictetus says that the life of Socrates is “an example (paradeigma) before us” (Epictetus, 1928: 4.5.1–2). As A. A. Long rightly said, for the Stoics Socrates’ life is “a virtual paradigm of Stoic wisdom’s practical realisation”, or “best actual paradigm of their own ideals” (Long, 2002: 68; 2006: 26). It is very clear that there is a close relationship between the Socratic way of life and the Stoic conception of the self in respect to the art of life. However, Foucault’s distinction here is not based on such a claim that the figure of Socrates is not decisive or significant in this period but it is based on a thought that there is a shift in the point of view from Plato’s political conception of the care for self to the Stoic understanding of the self.

5 For a comparison of the Platonic, Christian and Stoic positions in the framework of the concept of metanoia, see (Weiss, 2014: 220–221): “Platonic epistrophē is transformed into Christian metanoia. Metanoia occurs when one is abruptly transformed into a completely different person, one who is suddenly able to see truth. This would seem to give Foucault a clue with respect to the difference between Stoicism and Christianity. For Stoicism does not seem to require the kind of total and absolute self-renunciation that is always a pre-condition for metanoia, since the self cannot be reborn without the casting off an old self—all at once.”
losophy. First of all, in consequence of his theory of history, Foucault does not see any continuous movement in history; on the contrary, he thinks that there are some breaking points, ruptures in the succession of events which show a discontinuity in history, instead of continuity. The same is at stake in our context. Foucault, by examining the concept of the care of the self, indicates that the using of this concept shows us a shifting point of view in different historical eras, although from beginning to end, i.e. from the Socratic interrogation to the Christian way of thinking and living, the care of the self is more important than any other concept including the famous Delphic maxim “know thyself”. Thus, for Foucault, there is even a discontinuity in the history of this particular concept. However, Pierre Hadot has a unifying image for all ancient philosophy based on spirituality. According to him, spiritual exercises and endeavours are characteristic in all ancient philosophy from the early Socratic tradition including Plato to the Hellenistic period, and the “Socrates figure” became an increasingly dominant one in this tradition.

At this moment, it can be said that Foucault is much closer to Hegel’s view about ancient philosophy than Hadot’s one. Because, Hegel, too, thinks that in Greek philosophy polis was more important than any single individual in it; that is why it is impossible to see them apart from society in an isolated manner. For that reason, Hegel states, in Politeia Plato insists on the idea that “justice is not only in the individual, but also in the state, and the state is greater than the individual” (Hegel, 1995a: 91). On the other hand, for Hellenistic philosophy the criterion is the subject itself, that is, “the pure relation of self-consciousness to itself” (Hegel, 1995a: 233). This is the principle of all philosophising, Epicurean or the Stoic, during that period, “because the principle of this philosophy is not objective but dogmatic, and rests on the impulse of self-consciousness towards self-satisfaction” (Hegel, 1995a: 234). Another difference between Foucault and Hadot has its origins in their different views about “the care of the self” that is the main concern of any philosopher in that period. As is put forward above, Hadot claims that the sole aim of this effort is to attain a transcendent point of view. Foucault, however, thinks that the goal of all spiritual exercises and, to be sure, of the care of the self is an immanent relationship of the self to itself. The sole aim of the culture of the self, he thinks, is nothing but the self itself.

Foucault’s evaluation of Stoicism is related to his conception of freedom or, properly speaking, to his idea of the “practice of freedom”. In this context, it should be noted that Foucault distinguished the practice of freedom from the practice of liberation. He sees “liberation” as a “suspicious” notion that must always be thought within the certain limits of power-relations which are everywhere. “In such a state, it is certain”, Foucault argues, “that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or extremely constrained and limited” (Foucault, 1997b: 283). Hence, we should necessarily seek the possibility of freedom beyond the limits of power-relations and, for that reason, Bernauer and Mahon allege that “Foucault’s ethics is the practice of an intellectual freedom that is transgressive of modern knowledge-power-subjectivity relations”, and that it is “the need to escape those prisons of thought and action that shape our politics, our ethics, our relations to the self” (Bernauer; Mahon, 2005: 160). However, to say that the exercises or practices of freedom involve somehow transcending the “political” limits, or overcoming power-relations, is in tension with Foucault’s general belief that power is everywhere and there is not an “other side” of power relations. For this reason, those exercises of freedom can only be regarded as “counter-conduct”.
“Counter-conduct, then, is the struggle against the procedures and institutions implemented for conducting, from within conduct itself.” (Depew, 2016: 30)

Foucault tries to put forward the possibility of this counter-conduct from an ethical perspective in which the Stoic philosopher is a champion of individual freedom. In an interview in 1984, he says:

“Individual freedom was very important for the Greeks – contrary to the commonplace derived more or less from Hegel that sees it as being of no importance when placed against the imposing totality of the city.” (Foucault, 1997b: 285)

When he said that, no doubt, Foucault had especially considered the Stoics, because he, like Hegel, sees the difference between ancient philosophers, but, at this moment, we should ask: How to understand this “individual freedom” in the framework of his thought which is not only “political”, but also an “ethical” matter. I propose that this individual freedom is one of the forms of self-determination based on his conception of ethos. It requires a self-determined action, or counter-conduct movement from an ethical perspective, instead of being determined by an external power. It can be said that the need to escape the present power-relations from an ethical perspective also points to a striving towards the determination of the self without appealing to anything else.

As is pointed out above, Foucault seems to have adopted the Hegelian claim that there is a difference between Greek spirituality and the Roman conception of the subject. But, in the context of this distinction, while Hegel prefers Greek spirituality, and sees Hellenistic philosophy, according to his dialectical understanding of history, as a decline in comparison to, especially, Aristotelian philosophy,7 Foucault takes sides with “the Golden Age of the culture of the self” that refers specifically to late Stoic philosophy. Of course, Foucault can by no means appreciate this transformation of Greek spirituality as a decline or flourish in a dialectical manner. But, as a matter of his thought about the technologies of the self, for Foucault, the Stoic art of life becomes more important than any other thing. Michael Ure, in his writing about Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s relations with Stoicism, argues that “[a]ccording to Foucault, the Stoics of the imperial age significantly modified the classical Greek arts of existence” (Ure, 2007: 26).

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6 For the general explanation of his concept of discontinuité, especially see (Foucault, 1969: 9–28).

7 In his doctoral thesis on Democritus and Epicurus, Marx criticized Hegel’s deprecation of Hellenistic philosophy: “But in the admirable great and bold plan of [Hegel’s] history of philosophy, from which alone the history of philosophy can in general be dated, it was impossible, on the one hand, to go into detail, and on the other hand, the giant thinker was hindered by his view of what he called speculative thought par excellence from recognising in these systems their great importance for the history of Greek philosophy.” (Marx, 2010: 29–30) Still, for Marx, “these systems are key to the true history of Greek philosophy” (Marx, 2010: 30). When Marx emphasised the importance of these philosophical schools for the history of Greek philosophy, he especially had in mind the Epicurean materialism that gives him an opportunity to set out his conception of freedom, and of emancipation from religious fanaticism, on the basis of a materialist ontology.

8 At this moment, it can be claimed that Foucault considers primarily Plato’s Alcibiades I, and does not take the Apology into ac-
theory of *oikeiōsis* in the context of Hegel’s critique of Stoic ethics. Because of the fact that subjectively the Stoics lay stress on the transformation of the self in respect of an art of life, and that, in their view, the care of the self is not instrumental in relation to the care of others, that is, with regard to the government of others, Foucault seems to have a point of view rooted in the Stoic conception of the self with which the constitution of the subjects, and, at the same time, a practise of freedom would be possible aesthetically and ethically. This idea conforms with the Nietzschean tradition, which includes Heidegger’s analysis of care (*Sorge*) in *Sein und Zeit*. It seems to me that Foucault especially pursues a typically Nietzschean thought about “how one becomes what one is”. Nehamas, by quoting Nietzsche’s famous paragraph which is entitled as “One thing is needful”, and begins with the phrase “To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art!” in *The Gay Science* (Nietzsche, 1974: 232), points out that the capacity for responsibility for oneself is what Nietzsche’s calls “freedom” (Nehamas, 2001: 274). Of course, responsibility for oneself requires “the care of the self” in the framework of an art of life. In this sense, Nietzsche sees this art as “to give style to one’s character”.

This returning to Stoic philosophy also points out a requirement that is confessedly expressed by Paul Veyne in his book about Seneca. According to Veyne, the Foucauldian circle considers Stoicism as providing an *immune* system for the individual given that in Stoic philosophy “the individual can rely only on the self for support in defence against a world (…) not made for him” (Veyne, 2003: xi). I think that this individualistic and subjective view that turns in on the self can be criticized by referring to Hegel’s critique of Stoicism in relation to the abstract concept of freedom. At this moment, to put forward this subjectivity with a critical approach, I suppose that we should pay regard to Hegel’s critique of Stoic ethics which becomes more significant than anything else in this context.

### 2. Hegel’s Critique of Stoic Philosophy
**Based on the Theory of *Oikeiōsis***

Hegel’s examination of Stoicism, along with Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness, in the chapter titled “Freedom of Self-Consciousness” in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel, 1977: 119–138) is well known, and by some Hegel scholars the view of abstract freedom that he ascribes to Stoicism in this chapter is associated with the Kantian theory of freedom. In this chapter, Hegel argues that Stoicism introduces a pure abstraction of the outer reality in terms of the independence of self-consciousness (*Das selbststän- dige Selbstbewusstsein*), and freedom of self-consciousness which is caught only at the level of pure thinking:

“In thinking, I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in communion with myself [bei mir selbst].” (Hegel, 1977: 120; 1996: 156)

At this moment, Stoic thought, as a shape of self-consciousness in the history of spirit, can be seen as a struggle to achieve an abstract identity with itself through withdrawing from the outer reality into an “inner citadel” of pure thinking. In this sense, as Hegel put it, “the freedom of self-consciousness is indifferent to natural existence” (*gleichgültig gegen das natürliche Dasein*), and “freedom in thought” lacks the fullness of life (Hegel, 1977: 122; 1996: 158). As a result, as Alan Wood rightly remarks, in the Stoic point of view, “moral reflection must turn inward and seek there for what outer social reality has lost” (Wood, 1990: 218). In this inwardness, however, the concrete life of an individual is lost.
Hegel puts the basic characteristics of Stoic thought in five paragraphs in an essential way, and, to be sure, this chapter is very important to understand the journey of spirit from consciousness and self-consciousness to absolute spirit. But, in this paper, I will focus on the chapter about Stoicism in his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie to establish a connection with the current “Stoic” conception of freedom, which is articulated from the Foucauldian perspective. First of all, I would state that Hegel departs, first and foremost, from the text of Diogenes Laërtius, when he criticizes the basic assumptions of Stoic ethics, and that his critique of Stoic ethics is throughout based on his reading of the oikeiōsis theory of the Stoics. Furthermore, I would also try to indicate that Hegel’s consideration of the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis depends entirely on the concept of sustasis (constitutio in Seneca’s translation), which is translated into German as Zusammensetzung by Hegel.

There is a huge amount of literature about the theory of oikeiōsis following Pohlenz’s article in 1940 (Pohlenz, 1940: 1–81). In those studies, many scholars including Pohlenz insist that the oikeiōsis is the fundamental concept of Stoic ethics, and that the Stoic ethics is by no means completely understood unless this concept is taken into consideration. For example, Pemproke claims that “if there had been no oikeiosis, there would have been no Stoa” (Pemproke, 1971: 114–115). On the other hand, some scholars such as Striker have doubted that it is a fundament for Stoic ethics. Striker claims that “it should be obvious that oikeiōsis did have an important part to play, though it was probably not the foundation of Stoic ethics”. According to her, “the central thesis of Stoic ethics is that happiness for man consists in a life of virtue” (Striker, 1996: 295). However, in contrast to Striker’s view, Hegel regards the theory of oikeiōsis as a foundation of Stoic ethics because he begins his critique of Stoicism with a translation of Diogenes Laërtius’ famous paragraph, which is related to oikeiōsis and the first impulse of a living being in Stoicism. Laërtius explains:

“An animal’s first impulse [prōtē hormē], say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself [oikeiousēs hautō tēs phuseōs ap’ arkhēs], as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, ‘The dearest thing [proton oikeion] to every animal is its constitution [sustasis] and its consciousness [sun eidesis] thereof’; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution [oute poiēsasan auto, mēt’ allotriōsai mēt’ oikeiōsai]. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin [oikeion] to it.” (Diogenes Laërtius, 1931: VII/85)

count, which would be significant for understanding the Socratic art of living according to which the care of the self is required at an individual level. In his lectures entitled The Government of Self and Others Foucault examined the Apology in the framework of the paradox of the political non-involvement of Socrates. As is well known, in these lectures the main issue is parrhēsia (truth-telling), or parrhēsiaistic attitude against power. By considering Plato’s Apology, Foucault states that, at first sight, philosophical parrhēsia, strictly speaking, Socratic parrhēsia is personal rather than a direct political activity. Accordingly, he argues that “it involves renouncing any political ascendency and power over others”. Yet, this renouncing means, in Socrates’ case, to avoid being the agent of injustice. The question is how a life based on justice can be realised by acting as a citizen, or as a subject. As a result, while he points to the paradoxal aspect of the relationship between politics and philosophy, Foucault indicates the political importance of the Socratic parrhēsia, and says that “philosophy’s question is not the question of politics; it is the question of the subject in politics” (Foucault, 2010: 319).

See especially (Wood, 1990: 44–45); (Houlgate, 2005: 82). However, Hegel already established a connection of the form of abstract thought in the Stoic point of view with Kant’s principle of duty. See (Hegel, 1995a: 273).

I refer to Hadot’s book The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.
In this paragraph, starting from Chrysippus’ thought, Diogenes Laërtius presents the Stoic concept of *oikeiōsis* in terms of the self-preservation and constitution of an animal. Cicero, too, thinks *oikeiōsis* to be related with “self-preservation” (*ad se conservandum*) and “constitution”, and translates it into Latin as *sibi conciliari* and *commendari*:

“…immediately upon birth (…) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and those things which appear to threaten destruction.” [*simul atque natum sit animal (…) ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum videantur afferre*] (Cicero, 1931: III, 16)

In this context, it can be asked whether in Stoic thought self-preservation, constitution and its consciousness (or awareness) must be regarded on an ontological level, or if it points merely to a psychological presupposition with regard to living beings. Hegel thinks that those expositions of practical ethics are psychological in character, and they are based on Chrysippus’ idea of formal harmony (*Übereinstimmung*) with himself (Hegel, 1995a: 258; 1986a: 277). Hegel, then, claims that Chrysippus interprets *oikeiōsis* in a psychological sense which indicates only one aspect of *oikeiōsis*. It might be asserted that, for Hegel, what an animal’s first impulse is, that is to say, self-preservation according to its constitution determined by nature, refers also to a process which occurs in accordance with the *hégemonikon* of a living being, i.e., with its leading faculty. At the same time, one can say that from a psychological perspective the Stoics think that nature initially determines an animal as belonging to itself. Besides, *oikeiōsis* is always regarded as opposed to *allotriosis* (estrangement, alienation). Accordingly, by no means it can be said that nature is able to estrange (or, alienate) an animal from itself, because, as Seneca emphasized, “in no animal can you observe any low esteem, or even any carelessness, of self” (*in nullo deprendes vilitatem sui, ne neglegentiam quidem*) (Seneca, 1925: CXXI / 24). In this sense, according to the Stoic conception of *oikeiōsis*, nature can never estrange any living being from itself and that means that it belongs to, or endears to, itself by nature. Hegel, like several scholars of Stoic philosophy, states that the principle of Stoic morality is the concordance of spirit with itself (*das Zusammenstimmen des Geistes mit sich selbst*) (Hegel, 1986a: 284). However, Hegel argues that this concordance of spirit with itself is formal and abstract in Stoic thought.

At this moment, it must be confessed that it is very difficult for a translator to translate *Zusammenstimmen* or *Zusammenstimmung*. Hegel, first of all, considers here the etymology of *sustasis*. As is known, *sustasis* is derived from *sun­istēmi*, that means, “putting together” (*con-stitutio* in Latin). But, it seems he also wants to refer with the word *Zusammen-stimmung* to another meaning, that is, *sun­phōnē* that means both, literally, “consonance” (*con-sonantia*), and “in a symphonious manner”, or “harmony”. By considering these meanings, E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson translated it into English as *harmony* (Hegel, 1995a: 258); to be sure, this translation is not wrong, but insufficient. It seems to me that we can regard *harmony* as the equivalence of *Übereinstimmung*, another concept, which is used by Hegel in relation to Stoic ethics. Wenceslao Roces translates it as *la consonancia* into Spanish, by taking into account *sunphōnē* (Hegel, 1995b: 359). I would prefer to use the word “concordance”, similar to the way in which Pierre Garnion, a French translator of Hegel’s *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, prefers to translate a phrase as *la concordance de l’animal avec lui-même* (Hegel, 1975: 665) because of the fact
that the German word *Stimmung* is the equivalence of “accord”. On the other hand, I would like to claim that Hegel was well aware of the untranslatability of *oikeiōsis*. The untranslatability of *oikeiōsis* has been frequently underlined. As Julia Annas rightly said, “there is no good single English equivalent” for the Greek word (Annas, 1993: 262). Annas uses “familiarisation”. It has been proposed as equivalent “appropriation”, or “appropriateness” (Long-Sedley 1987: 346). Further, “making akin to”, “endearmment”, “affinity”, “affiliation” can also be thought as to be equivalent for *oikeiōsis*. Kerferd, making a detailed etymological analysis of *oikeiōsis*, describes the three meanings of the verb *oikeiō* from which *oikeiōsis* is derived:

“(1) to appropriate, acquire, make one’s own (of things), to win over, bring over to one’s side, bring into one’s household or family (of people); (2) to endear or make friendly, to feel endearment for; (3) to admit, accept or claim as belonging to, to claim or assert kinship with.” (Kerferd, 1972: 180)

It seems to me that, considering the difficulties in the translation of *oikeiōsis*, Hegel tried to give the meaning of it by translating two Greek words, that is, the words *oikeiōsis* and *sustasis*, with a single phrase *Zusammenstimmung mit sich selbst* into German, except he used the German word *einheimisch* as the equivalence of the adjective *oikeion*. For this reason, it can be easily said that when Hegel arranged Laërtius phrase about the nature of an animal as “the nature of an animal that seeks itself through itself, receives into itself that which is in conformity [concordance] with itself” (*seiner Zusammenstimmung mit sich gemaess*) (Hegel, 1995a: 258; 1986a: 277), he regarded throughout the theory of *oikeiōsis*, and saw it as the foundation of Stoic ethics.

Additionally, Hegel considers the Stoic conception of human virtue and establishes a connection between this conception and the principle of self-preservation at the psychological level. Virtue (*aretē*) is based on a rational nature or living in accordance with nature that is also *logos* itself. The realisation of the aim of virtue is happiness (*Glückseligkeit*). In this context, the question is how to harmonize virtue with happiness, and *vice versa*. Because, on the one hand, a Stoic philosopher should overcome his passions, that is to say, his living instincts or individual happiness in his life, in order to attain a condition of virtue in a general perspective, and on the other hand, he must care for himself on an individual or personal level. Virtue is to follow a general law that means to live in accordance with nature, but it also requires the satisfaction of the subject in his particularity (*in seiner Besonderheit*):

“I, as the will that fulfils law, am only the formal character which has to carry out the universal (*Allgemeine*); and thus, as willing the universal, I am in accord with myself as thinking. The two

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11 In a current article, Jacop Klein similarly supposes that “[an animal’s impulse to self-preservation] should be identified with an impulse to preserve (téreim) its leading faculty or *hégemonikon* in a condition of conformity to nature” (Klein, 2016: 160). Klein’s comment of *oikeiōsis* would be appropriate for Hegel’s assertion about this matter.

12 See (Striker, 1993: 262); Besides, according to Forschner, *allotrios* as a contradictory concept of the adjective *oikos* refers to “what belongs to another and, in the broader sense, what belongs to a stranger” (Forschner, 2008: 169).

13 Needless to say, Hegel is well aware that the word *oikeiōn* as well as *oikos* (home or household; *Heim* in the word *einheimisch* used by Hegel) is derived from the Greek root *oik-,* which means, generally, “belonging to”.

14 For the Stoic texts about the principle of “living according to nature” (*homologoumenos tē phusei zēn*), or “living in accordance with nature”, see (Van Arnim, *SVF*: III: 1–19). In Cicero’s *De finibus* “living according to nature” is put forward in respect of *oikeiōsis* and *kathēkon* (officio: appropriate act, or duty): “Prima est enim conciliatio humanis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam.” (Cicero, 1931: III, 21)
now come into collision, and because I seek the one satisfaction or the other, I am in collision with myself, because I am also individual.” (Hegel, 1995a: 262–63; 1986a: 282)

According to Hegel, Stoic philosophy cannot overcome this collision, it cannot achieve a concrete unity of the universal and the individual. There is, on the one hand, the universal ideal of the virtuous wise man (sophos) liberated from his passions or desires, and for this reason, the Stoics eagerly advise to be indifferent to the existence of the individual; on the other hand, the Stoic philosopher must march forward to this ideal in his personality, or through his exercises. Consequently, a Stoic philosopher, being indifferent to the individuality of existence, encounters a dilemma: “he must be indifferent to the individuality of his existence, and to the harmony with the individual [Zusammenstimmung zu dem Einzelnen] as much as to the want of harmony [Nichtzusammenstimmung]” (Hegel, 1995a: 269; 1986a: 288). However, due to their general theory of oikeiōsis, he must, in one way or another, be in concordance with himself, and cannot be indifferent to that. Thus, to escape from this dilemma, he must be in concordance with himself on a universal ground. By this way, negative conception of freedom appears in Stoic thought. According to Hegel, “Stoic self-consciousness has not here to deal with its individuality as such, but solely with the freedom in which it is conscious of itself only as the universal” and, Hegel continues, “in that freedom the individual has the sense of his universality rather only” (Hegel, 1995a: 269). In such a way, he becomes the pure thought that annihilates all manner of existence in it, and he isolates himself from everything, which he is capable of giving up in his individual life. “This negative moment of abstraction from existence” (Hegel, 1995a: 270) represents, as is pointed out above, the conception of formal and abstract freedom, which is caught only at the level of pure thought. But, for Hegel, the formal firmness (Die formelle Festigkeit) of spirit, which isolates itself from everything, “sets up for us no development of objective principles, but a subject which maintains itself in this constancy” (Hegel, 1995a: 273). Thus, it can be said that that which is at stake here is subjective freedom, which means a continuous withdrawal of consciousness into itself.

Thus, in the framework of the Stoic individualism or subjectivism, Hegel’s basic supposition in relation to Stoic ethics is that in Stoicism the determination of abstract freedom in thinking or, strictly speaking, the striving for an abstract independence from the external world must also go to a universal determination of morality, but this universality remains necessarily abstract and formal, that means, in this way, it cannot be actualised in a living and concrete process. The Stoic philosopher eagerly deals with their own self, and they only take care of themselves in their subjectivity but, starting from this einheimisch (oikeiōses) or subjective point, they want to attain universality and objectivity. In this context, there is no need to say that, according to Hegel, the Stoic philosophy can by no means satisfy the demand of concrete freedom, which is realised in history, although it is a necessary moment in the development of spirit towards the consciousness of freedom.

Additionally, Hegel established a connection of this subjective point of view with the Roman world. First of all, Hegel describes the Roman world with the phrase “despotic power”. In the Roman world:

“The development [spirit] consists in the purification of inwardness to abstract personality, which gives itself reality in the existence of private property; the mutually repellent social units can then be held together only by despotic power.” (Hegel, 2001: 300)

The question here is how an individual reconciles with that world of abstract universality. This question is significant because, as Hegel states,
“… in Rome, we find that free universality, that abstract Freedom, which on the one hand sets an abstract state, a political constitution and power, over concrete individuality.” (Hegel, 2001: 297)

Moreover, for Hegel, this reconciliation turns out to be a matter in the face of the keen difference between the:

“… political Universalities on the one hand and the abstract freedom of the individual on the other – appear, in the first instance, in the form of Subjectivity.” (Hegel, 2001: 297)

Thus, there would be only one choice for an individual in this world of abstract universality in which the concrete characteristics of the living spirit are suppressed through an abstract legal constitution: to withdraw into the self, or to take care the self, and to attain a subjective freedom in thought, not in an objective, real world:

“… the consciousness, where real universality is destroyed, must go back into its individuality and maintain itself in its thoughts.” (Hegel, 1995a: 274)

In this sense, the Stoic point of view related to freedom fits to the Roman world and spirituality, and “the philosophy of the Stoics has more especially found its home in the Roman world [in der römischen Welt ist daher besonders die stoische Philosophie zu Hause gewesen]” (Hegel, 1995a: 276; 1986a: 296).

Conclusion

Frederick Beiser says that

“Hegel’s analysis of freedom in the Philosophy of Right reflects his fundamental moral teaching that freedom has to be realized in the world, and cannot be attained by flight from it.” (Beiser, 2005: 199)

And, he continues:

“In Hegel’s view, Christianity, Stoicism and French radicalism were all failed strategies for achieving freedom. Since they attempted to escape the world, they did not struggle against it, and so ultimately succumbed to it.” (Beiser, 2005: 199)

We can conclude that the Stoic point of view does not satisfy the demand of concrete freedom, which can only become concrete in a society or in an intersubjective area, in so far as it remains only at the level of the subjective or individual approach to the problem of freedom. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is another perspective in Stoicism, or in the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis which is ruled out both by Hegel and Foucault. This perspective shows us that oikeiōsis should not be considered only at the level of personality, but it refers to the social relationships, and thereby, it opens up an opportunity, if we use Julia Annas’s phrase, for other-concern (Annas, 1993: 262).

15 In a negative manner, A. A. Long emphasizes Hegel’s thought about that this Greco-Roman period is a decline: “For Hegelian idealists post-Aristotelian philosophy represents a marked decline from the apogee reached by Aristotle and Plato.” (Long, 2006: 361) On the other hand, there is a close relationship between Plato’s Socrates and the Greco-Roman ethics. For example, according to Long, “Socrates gave Hellenistic ethics much of its flavour and its ideal of a life in control of itself” (Long, 2006: 20). It might be claimed that a continuity between these traditions rather than a contradiction is at stake. However, it should be noted that the Zeitgeist had been changed until Greco-Roman period.

16 For Annas’s distinction between personal and social oikeiōsis, see (Annas, 1993: 275): “So, personal oikeiōsis will get me to the impartial viewpoint, and social oikeiōsis will just be a matter of applying this to others.”
The famous concentric circles (kuklois) of Hierocles can be an example of this social oikeiôsis, and of the relationships with others. According to Hierocles, “… each of us, most generally is circumscribed as though by many circles, some smaller, some larger, some surrounding others, some surrounded, according to their different and unequal relations to one another.” (Hierocles, 2009: 91)

Yet, in this concentric construction, which begins with kin relationships, and goes to the entire race of humanity, “the first and closest circle is that which each person draws around his mind [dianoia], as the center” (Hierocles, 2009: 91). More precisely, each person is the centre of all relations with others. Besides, we can easily see an example of this so-called social oikeiôsis in Epictetus’ philosophy. He points to the importance of the association (koinonia) of the natural and the acquired relationships “those namely of a son, father, brother, citizen, wife, neighbour, fellow-traveller, ruler, and subject (arkhomenon)” (Epictetus, 1998: II. 14. 3). This social oikeiôsis, in addition to the personal one, could be thought in relation to the care of others which Foucault attributes to the Platonic tradition. However, the main focus of this so-called social oikeiôsis is to be the individual itself; that is, the Stoics attach importance to the private life of a wise man (sophos). Seneca points out this view in his Epistles:

“I beg you to consider those Stoics who, shut out from public life, have withdrawn into privacy for the purpose of improving men’s existence and framing laws for the human race without incurring the displeasure of those in power.” (Seneca, 1917: XIV–15)

According to his natural and biological determination, even though a rational animal can by no means be regarded as an “unsocial” being, a man, as Epictetus said, should not neglect himself and his own interest (Epictetus, 1998: I. 19. 13). In this context, it can be stated that Stoic philosopher wants to attain summum bonum (the highest good) that means the harmony, concordance and unity of the soul with itself, and summum bonum, if we borrow Seneca’s words in De Vita Beata, “is the inflexibility of an unyielding mind, its foresight, its sublimity, its soundness, its freedom, its harmony, its beauty” (Seneca, 1932: VIII. 5). As a result of this conception of harmony or concordance, we can say that oikeiôsis for a rational being, first and above all, is individual and self-directed instead of being other-directed, because the goal of Stoic philosopher’s taking care for himself is the harmony and concordance of the individual with itself, and, that is, with nature in order to attain a happy or good life (eu zên). In this sense, as is pointed out above, for both Hegel and Foucault, Stoicism can be distinguished from the Platonic tradition in that it insists that caring is self-directed, but not other-directed on political ground. For Hegel, in the Hellenistic and Roman period, the subject is the one that should be cared for (Das Subjekt ist so dasjenige, wofür gesorgt warden soll) (Hegel, 1986a: 251), that is to say, the concept of Sorge (care) is regarded as a personal and subjective matter. As a result, if we consider the Stoic conception of oikeiôsis, even though Stoic thought lays emphasis on an “other-concern” in a certain degree, it could be said that this emphasis should remain limited, because the Stoic theory of ethics is based on a conception of wise man according to which only a sophos might attain freedom, and others are foolish men (stultus) and slaves, and a sophos cannot establish a friendship with them.

For this reason, as I have tried to show above, both Foucault’s and Hegel’s considerations about the position of Stoicism in the history of philosophy are right, but Foucault’s defence of this position in the framework of his own interests gives a hint about his point of view concerning the problem of freedom. To be sure, in this writing, it was not my intention to criticize Foucault’s
understanding of freedom in all aspects. But, his conception of the care of the self and his thought about transforming one’s life into a work of art which is, in fact, a form of self-determination would be a subject of a keen critique because of the fact that this point of view regards all real and social relationships only as power-relations against which we must seek a possibility of a counterculture, and, as Veyne said, he sees Stoicism as an immune system in order to save himself from “a world not made for him”. Against this point of view, a Hegelian perspective considers freedom to be always related to others. At this moment, if Hegel’s idea of freedom is regarded as a model to understand what the relationship with others means in a free society, one can say that freedom must become concrete, objectively, in a society and the scope of intersubjective relationships, though it, at the same time, is a form of self-determination. For Hegel, the self-determination of the subject always requires an other subject who is a non-eliminable partner in the process of mutual recognition. In this sense, when Hegel defines freedom as “Bei-sich-selbst-Sein in einem Andere”, that means, “to be with oneself in an other” or “to be at home in an other”, he is suggesting that freedom requires a mediation of others, and it cannot be actualized “by fleeing before the other” [durch die Flucht vor dem Anderen] (Hegel, 1986b: 26), on the contrary, it becomes concrete only on the ground of bei sich mediated through an other. However, it seems to me that Foucault’s ethos, as a striving for self-determination beyond the power-relationships, can be thought fleeing into the subjective freedom of an individual by withdrawal into the self, although this self-determination must be only a counter-conduct because of the fact that it is impossible to go beyond the power-relationships.

References


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O Foucaultovu stoicizmu i Hegelovoj kritici storičkog gledišta u odnosu spram problema slobode

Sažetak

Ključne riječi
Michel Foucault, briga o sebi, stoicizam, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, oikeiōsis, sloboda, subjektivnost
Über Foucaults Stoizismus und Hegels Kritik des stoischen Standpunkts in Bezug auf das Problem der Freiheit

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter
Michel Foucault, die Sorge um sich selbst, Stoizismus, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, oikeiōsis, Freiheit, Subjektivität

Çetin Türkyılmaz

Sur le stoïcisme de foucault et la critique de Hegel du point de vue stoïque par rapport au problème de la liberté

Résumé
Afin de comprendre la critique hégélienne du stoïcisme liée au problème de la liberté, je soutiens qu’il est important de reconnaitre la valeur des idées de Foucault, mais également les idées du cercle foucauldien. Je commencerais par discuter des références de Foucault à la philosophie gréco-romaine lors de ses cours au Collège de France. Dans ces cours, Foucault tente d’établir une éthique du soi basée sur la conception de la liberté subjective en se servant de la notion d’exercices spirituels de Hadot. Ensuite, j’aborderai la critique hégélienne du stoïcisme sur la base de la théorie stoïque de l’oikeiōsis. L’attitude critique de Hegel envers le stoïcisme se fonde sur sa propre interprétation de la théorie stoïque. Il existe un lien entre le stoïcisme et la période tardive de la pensée de Foucault eu égard au concept de la liberté, qui se fonde dans son ensemble sur la subjectivité. À la fin du présent article, j’espère être en mesure de montrer que la critique hégélienne de l’éthique stoïque nous présente une opportunité pour critiquer le point de vue subjectif eu égard au problème de la liberté.

Mots-clés
Michel Foucault, souci de soi, stoïcisme, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, oikeiōsis, liberté, subjectivité