RENAISSANCE OF HERBERT MARCUSE: A STUDY ON PRESENT INTEREST IN MARCUSE’S INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITICAL THEORY*

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ABSTRACT

Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in Marcuse’s critical theory. This can be partly ascribed to Marcuse’s interdisciplinary approach to humanities and social sciences. Many of Marcuse’s ideas and concepts are tacitly present in contemporary social and ecological movements. Contemporary literature on Marcuse is positively inclined to his theory while the critique of Marcuse dates back to the ‘70s, and remains largely unimpaired. This fact poses significant challenges to the revival of Marcuse’s critical theory. This study sets out to report on current interest in Marcuse’s critical theory trying to correct “past injustices” by responding to negative criticism. The main flaw of such criticism – as we see it – is in failing to perceive interdisciplinary character of Marcuse’s critical theory. Marcuse’s renaissance cannot be complete without, to use dialectical term, sublating the history of negative criticism.

KEY WORDS
Marcuse, interdisciplinary critical theory, Frankfurt School, social movements, critique

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INTRODUCTION

Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse were among prominent representatives of the Institute for Social Research (commonly known as the Frankfurt School). They pioneered interdisciplinary approach to humanities and social sciences. Their distinctive project (the critical theory) draws arguments and empirical data from various disciplines such as philosophy, economy, sociology, psychology, literature and arts. Hence, the interdisciplinary character of the critical theory. The critical theory became a platform to various social movements that demanded radical social and economic change. It goes without saying that the trio enjoyed a celebrity status (although Adorno became the target of students’ attacks and negative criticism). Until recently there was a significant discrepancy in contemporary reception of Marcuse’s and Adorno’s ideas. As Zill observes in the newspaper article: “Everyone talks about Adorno (...) Teddy has won the day ...” [1]. However, recent years have witnessed the renewal of interest in Marcuse’s critical theory. This study aims at exploring Marcuse’s renaissance. Contemporary literature on Marcuse is positively inclined to his theory, while the critique from the ‘70s remains largely unimpaired. Still today a systematic response to negative criticism is missing. Hence, in this article I respond to the main critical arguments and thus attempt to extricate some of Marcuse’s most progressive ideas from misinterpretations. This misconception is largely caused by critics’ unfamiliarity with the complete body of Marcuse’s works characterized by an interdisciplinary approach to the critical theory. Introducing psychoanalysis into Marxism (to give one example of Marcuse’s interdisciplinary approach) is not, as critics would have it, a deviation from Marxist theory but rather a response to the crisis of Marxism. Marcuse’s renaissance cannot be complete if the history of (flawed) criticism is about to repeat itself.

A distinctive trait of Marcuse’s oeuvre is the continuity of thought and philosophical imagination for the purpose of liberation of individual(s) and for the creation of a more humane world. Hence Marcuse’s later works are nothing more than an elaboration of ideas already presents in his early writings. An individual in his concrete historical existence has taken a central place in Marcuse’s theory right from the beginning. Marcuse’s critical theory of society is oriented towards overcoming of capitalism and its outputs. Thus, critical theory has an open dialectical structure. The sublating of capitalism is carried on by the praxis defined as the self-negation of the principle of historical materialism. Marcuse’s thought is dialectical. He attempts to pinpoint and demonstrate negative and destructive elements that are detrimental to human being and at the same time to indicate the praxis of sublating: negation of the established reality. This negation should be understood in terms of the “radical act” praxis. Marcuse’s critical theory and radical praxis formulates a politics of refusing that which negates human being. Critical theory as a theoretical position and revolutionary-directed thought continues on Marcuse’s previously conceptualized “concrete philosophy”. In the concrete philosophy Marcuse attempted to attain theory of historicity for the purpose of grasping the concrete historical situation. On the ontological level Marcuse attains the concept of historicity, as the origin and foundation of being(s), through interdisciplinary synthesis of Hegel’s, Marx’s and Heidegger’s thought. Marcuse, thus, conceives labor as the source of historical sustainability of everything that exists. Thus, labor is the permanent process of cultivation, appropriation and abolishment. The discrepancy of the given world and human being induces process of mediation. For Marcuse this concept of historicity can be identified with Hegel’s ontology which introduces the process of mediation and motility of being. Marcuse’s interdisciplinary approach is evident as early as in his complementing of the ontology of labor with Heidegger’s thoughts from Being and Time1. Heidegger’s temporality, because it is authentic, constitutes necessary supplement to the
historical materialism. Heidegger’s temporality cannot reconcile itself with the inauthentic social situation. Hence, Heidegger’s temporality points at the same direction as Marx’s vision of history. However, Heidegger’s temporality must be situated into the concrete material production of life and historicity, but in doing so the authenticity of Dasein functions as the regulative principle. On the question how concretely is authentic existence possible? Marcuse seeks the answer in the analysis of a basic situation in which there is an awareness about possibility of radical act directed toward realization of true, authentic, human existence. The human historical situation is in the foreground but the transcendental-ontological level of Heidegger’s temporality is consciously used as a corrective to bad practice.

An insight into the autonomy of technological development poses a problem to Marcuse’s concept of historicity. Marcuse perceived that the new subject of historical faring is technology and technological development which subdues human being by technological rationality. It cannot fit into Marcuse’s decisive understanding of historicity, in which self-realization is possible only through labor. The criteria of happiness which directs revolutionary praxis becomes incompatible with the technological development. Hence, Marcuse’s insistence on the tension between essence and appearance becomes obsolete: technological reality is in itself realization of reason. This, however, deprives philosophy of its second dimension. Nonetheless, Marcuse does not completely abandon the notion of labor and concept of historicity or for that matter any previously attained ideas and positions. He uses historicity to differentiate between different historical epochs in relation to labor. Yet, it should be pointed out, however, that Marcuse circumvents re-thinking of the concept of historicity and, rather orients himself to the critique of the developed industrial society. Marcuse’s critique, and concrete guidance for the revolutionary change, is directed: 1) at the existing order of things under the “performance principle”; 2) interdisciplinary supplementation of Marx’s theory on revolutionary subjects and 3) to the critique of the values of mass society. Nevertheless, Marcuse attempts to regain philosophy’s second dimension. This is evident in his decisive stance about qualitative differentiation between mass society and the society of aesthetic ethos. This is only possible by a radical change in relation to nature. Such a change can be expressed by the term “pacification of existence”.

In the end, as Kellner [2] notes, Marcuse’s work started as a reaction to the crisis of Marxism (bureaucratization of Soviet state and integration of working classes into capitalism) and Marcuse’s response consisted in the attempt of restoring Marx’s dialectic and focusing on the subjective factors as the basis of radical social change. Farr writes: “Indeed, Marcuse’s entire project can be viewed as a quest for a new subjectivity” [3; p.8]. It is in this context that Marcuse’s investigation into Freud’s theory should be understood.

Hence, Marcuse’s complete oeuvre is defined by the consistency of dialectical thinking (through negation, preservation and elevation), refuting of any positivism favorable to reality, by the care for an individual and by the overcoming of reified relations and creation of a more humane world in which human being (re)discovers oneself and sees the world as one’s own doing, as a stage in which one, in a peaceful and libidinal coexistence with others, can develop one’s all-around being. This qualitatively different world would be imbued with happiness as a universal and not subjective condition and labor would become free and creative activity of liberated individuals. The possibility of the new world is not mere utopian vision, because the contours of the new are already present in the existing. Especially interesting for contemporaneity is Marcuse’s later thought, where he opposes enclosing of multidimensionality by insisting on negative thinking. The remaining one-dimension is a consequence of the labor that is no longer burdensome, of the abundant society that is able to produce goods for massive consumption and of the technological breakthrough. The abundant society created the image of security, happiness and abundance. But in this state in which

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rationality has the character of technological rationality all alternative modes of organization and life are absorbed. Marcuse could not reconcile with this state as the permanent one. He remained dedicated to the traditional notion of logos and insisted on the reality of reason. This led Marcuse on the interdisciplinary quest for liberation and hence to search for a liberating potential in the character of labor, technology, instinctual structure and dynamics, art and aesthetics and to critical reassessment of democratic principles such as tolerance. However, the liberation for Marcuse presupposes the praxis expressed through the "radical act" and, later, the "great refusal". Marcuse directs praxis towards creation of the "new sensibility" and the "new rationality" that would oppose any aggression towards humans, nature and other living beings. An alternative dimension opens by cooperation of art and technology towards creation of the society as the work of art.

Marcuse remained dedicated to finding paths to concrete liberation. As Kellner notes: “The quest for the concrete would eventually lead him towards inquiry into the nature of labour, needs, sexuality, consciousness, art and especially into the nature and dynamics of contemporary social organization” [2; p.64]. Hence, Marcuse’s interdisciplinary search for ranges from the analysis of authentic art, the concept of tolerance, the tension between essence and appearance, and technology. However, even though these topics could be addressed as separate subjects, they should be understood and treated in a much broader, interdisciplinary context that characterizes Marcuse’s philosophy. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost is to avoid the trap of de-contextualization and abstraction to which negative criticism fell when it treated Marcuse’s ideas without reference to his early essays. Second reason is to extricate Marcuse’s ideas from almost half a century old misconceptions. Third reason is to offer meticulous reconstruction of how those ideas had been developed and to show persistence in Marcuse’s thought.

CONTEMPORARY MARCUSE

As an introductory sentence on Marcuse’s works from the contemporary perspective and in the light of contemporary social movements and struggles, a line from the movie Shortbus will serve: “just like the sixties only with less hope” [7; p.161]. Reflecting on Marcuse’s works from today’s perspective, Thompson writes: “Many of the ideas that Marcuse put forward as cautionary tales in One-Dimensional Man had become the profane features of everyday life by the time Jameson published his groundbreaking book on postmodernism [Postmodernism]. Indeed, it is impossible to read many of Marcuse’s observations without being struck by the feeling that they are prescient first drafts, thematic sketches destined to find their way to center stage a generation later” [7; p.163].

During global justice movements in 2005 Kellner reminded (one more time) on the continued importance of Marcuse for understanding the strategy and sociopolitical horizons of contemporary struggle: “Yet I would argue that in the present conjuncture of global economic crisis, terrorism and a resurgence of U.S. militarism, and growing global movements against corporate capitalism and war, Marcuse’s political and activist version of critical theory is highly relevant to the challenges of the contemporary moment. Marcuse is especially useful for developing global perspectives on domination and resistance, radically criticizing the existing system of domination, valorizing movements of resistance, and projecting radical alternatives to the current organization of society and mode of life” [8; p.3].

In recent years, we have witnessed radical movements that stand up against what denies „us“, and as such they reflect a renewed interest in Marcuse’s philosophy. Marcuse’s thought proves to be of a crucial significance to the renewal of contemporary radical praxis and politics of (great) refusal: “Acts of refusal can be observed in groups of workers going on
strike to oppose austerity measures, resisting a demanded speed-up in productivity aimed at restoring the rate of profit, or refusing to accept cuts in order to ‘pay off the deficit’ from massive state intervention to rescue capitalist enterprises, which are themselves the victims of a crisis of profitability, of capital’s valorization. Other examples include the 2010 United Kingdom’s mass student protests refusing the burden of debt from education, which is becoming an unaffordable privilege even as it is being restructured into an instrumental production line for the social factory; the 2011-2012 spread of protest occupations across the Americas, Europe, and elsewhere, which for all their inchoate uncertainty were authentic expressions of protest and resistance; and the 2016 Nuit Debout mobilizations against, among other things, neoliberal labor law reforms in France. Indeed, the feeling-in-the-dark nature of such spontaneous movements may be seen as a mark of their authenticity. As with earlier resistant antagonistic subjectivities in Marcuse’s time (e.g., in France in May 1968; in Italy in the ‘Hot Autumn’ of the following year, no less than the movement of autonomia operaismo, which reached its high point in 1977; and in the United States, the anti-Vietnam War protests and campus protests of the 1960s and 1970s), it is possible to see the attempt at becoming, at self-creation in and against the objective world of capital and instrumental reason” [9; p.59].

Reitz who aims to develop a theory of revolutionary ecological liberation by drawing on Marcuse’s thoughts on ecology points out: “Since the 1970s, the time of Marcuse’s initial prominence, the world has become ever more aware and rightfully disturbed about multiple forms of environmental disaster on the horizon. These include extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, and wild fires, chiefly in terms of global warming due to the burning of fossil fuels, and also resource waste, mismanaged plastic waste streaming into the oceans, soil contamination, degraded water and air quality, depleted ozone, ocean acidification, habitat and biodiversity loss. Each of these is also profoundly enmeshed within a world-wide system of economic inequality and conflict. Marcuse’s work has the strategic radicalism and optimism that are needed more than ever today” [6; p.2].

Feenberg (correctly) stresses that in the contemporary social criticism Marcuse’s key ideas are unduly unacknowledged14: “His relevance is proven by the fact that his key ideas appear unacknowledged in the writings of many contemporary social critics” [10; p.229].

Is there some special insight into democracy as such that could be linked to Marcuse’s theory15 in connection to the Paris street movements of the 1968? It was an insight about democracy as an excess. “Excess” usually means an unexpected and unwanted event that most often ends in violence. However, the word excess has another meaning as well: excess as the surplus that surpasses the norm or standard. Hence, it is possible to live a life without this surplus. On the other hand, the enjoyment of surplus makes qualitative difference in the enjoyment of life. In the same way democracy appears as an excess that (always) carries those who do not fit into the establishment, those who are repressed (slaves, proletariat, minorities, migrants, etc.)16. Democracy would be useless, as Rancière asserts, without this excess. In conclusion of the Hatred of Democracy Rancière writes: “It is because democratic man is a being of excesses, an insatiable devourer of commodities, human rights and televisional spectacles, that the capitalist law of profit rules the planet (...) Not only are the vices of the system the vices of the individuals whose lives it governs. But the people most guilty, the exemplary representatives of this vice, are those who want to change the system, those who spread the illusion that it can be transformed so they can further indulge in their vices (...) With politics forgotten, the word democracy thereby becomes both a euphemism designating a system that one no longer wants to call by its name, and the name of the diabolical subject that appears in place of that effaced word: a composite subject where the individual subjected to this system of domination and the one that denounces it are amalgamated. To paint a robotic portrait of democratic man, the best thing to do is to combine
these characteristics: the young, idiotic consumer of popcorn, reality TV, safe sex, social security, the right to difference, and anticapitalist or ‘alterglobalist’ illusions” [12; pp.88-89]. One could easily note the silent presence of Marcuse’s ideas.

Contrary to Rancière, Marcuse assumed that the true, human content (or for that matter democratic content), could be attained only through abolition of surplus (excess). In accordance with that assumption Marcuse in *Eros and Civilization* made the distinction between repression as biologically conditioned and surplus repression as socially conditioned. The act of “great refusal” could be then interpreted as an act against this democratic excess that continually carries some form of inequality and repression. Furthermore, Rancière description (and criticism) of the democratic man is similar to Marcuse’s one-dimensional man: “We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to increase and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and destruction into construction (...) The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced” [13; p.11]. Rancière criticized the vices of democratic man but so did Marcuse who argued that the un-freedom is not in satisfaction but already in the need and want. However, while Rancière posits “composite subjectivity”, the one who at the same time in an amalgamated way reconciles the acceptance and denouncement, Marcuse posits “rebellious subjectivity” who on instinctual level opposes (and refuses) any surplus repression (excess). As Garland notes: “Resistant subjectivity can be seen in the negation of identity-thinking and the spurious naturalization of fixed social roles, such as gender divisions and the reduction of sexuality to genital sex-as-procreation. Put another way, there is sexual desire, or the erotic – Marcuse’s pleasure principle – a uniquely rich process of life lived for its own sake, as an end in itself, which does not fulfill any functional instrumentality; thus, this desire can be viewed as a significant and inherently subversive activity, making noticeable the system’s cracks” [9; p.67]. Building on Marcuse’s understanding of subjectivity, Katsiaficas [14] aims to develop a theory of the “eros effect”. Marcuse’s “great refusal” as negation of identity thinking and radical practice could be explained in Holloway’s terms of power-over and anti-power: “Anti-power, (...) is not counter-power, but something much more radical: it is the dissolution of power-over, the emancipation of power-to (...) Anti-power is fundamentally opposed to power-over not only in the sense of being a radically different project but also in the fact that it exists in constant conflict with power-over (..) To find anti-power, we do not need to look outside the movement of domination: anti-power, anti-fetishisation is present against-in-and-beyond the movement of domination itself, not as economic forces or objective contradictions or future, but as now, as us” [15; pp.24-60]. Thus, “anti-power” as radical practice challenges and questions in the same vein as the “great refusal” repressive “power over” human beings.

Marcuse’s theoretical framework could be observed as latently existing in. These movements share some striking characteristics with the New Left although capitalism underwent radical transformations since Marcuse’s time. According to Funke, Lamas and Wolfson [16], these characteristics include: “an embrace of a diversity of actors and fronts of struggles, a commitment to leaderless and prefigurative forms of organizing, and a participatory governance process based in grassroots democracy and consensus decision making. Moreover, much of today’s activism displays a distrust of existing institutions, a critique of elite financial power, the physical and virtual occupation of space, and a strategy of change, grounded in voluntarism and spontaneous uprisings rather than resilient movement building. Analysis of the wave of protest of the 1960s and 1970s, reveals critical similarities to today’s
movement politics, along the lines just mentioned, and thus calls for a revisiting of Marcuse’s engaged critical theory, in order to carefully tease out insights from the struggles he witnessed, participated in, and reflected on. Moreover, this excavation of Marcuse’s frameworks may help scholars and activists identify the strengths and shortcomings of contemporary theory and practice of resistance” [16; p.4].

Moreover, traces of “great refusal” and “post-technological rationality” could be observed in practice, as Vieta [20] points out, in the alternative community economies, radical education initiatives and recuperated spaces of production. All those “excess” strata of democracy such as: precariously employed, chronically unemployed, those unemployable, those whose services and skills are no longer required, marginalized and indigenous groups, etc. practice “great refusal” by reorganizing their life and economy on the very margins. As Vieta notes: “In their praxis, such experiments immanently critique capitalism’s ‘sacrosanct’ pillars of private property, profit, self-interest, and competition by replacing them with common ownership, mutual aid, and cooperation” [20; p.271]. Alternative educational institutions could be explained as Marcuse’s “areas of withdrawal” from the established reality. Finally, the “great refusal” could be observed in workers management that is taking place in Latin America’s workers recuperated enterprises. Even though alternatively organized communities, educational institutions and workers movement may lack fully formulated (political) programs or projects for the total transformation of society that Marcuse envisions, they nevertheless provide the evidence that Marcuse’s completion of transcendent project is possible. Thompson suggests that the acts of violence that accompany contemporary social movements could be explained and interpreted by drawing on Marcuse’s observations about “repressive desublimation”: “Reviewing Marcuse’s comments makes clear that, whatever his misgivings about “aggressiveness” as an outgrowth of repressive desublimation, he was open to considering violence a productive social force. Indeed, he maintained that this force needed to be protected from bourgeois ethics and representational politics. In the hands of constituted power, violence becomes the means by which the status quo is endlessly reproduced. By seizing hold of violence in a moment of Great Refusal, insurgent forces signal the possibility that another production is possible. Society is repolarized, and one-dimensionality dissolves” [7; p.175].

**MARCUSE’S RENAISSANCE: A REPORT**

Herbert Marcuse’s works have been highly influential during the sixties not only within academic circles but among wider public as well. His best known works *Eros and Civilization, One-Dimensional Man, An Essay on Liberation, Repressive Tolerance*, just to list a few, were not only highly critical of everything that comes out of capitalism and soviet’s socialism, but also contained concrete, practical, guidance for liberation and emancipation. Hence, Marcuse’s works provided manifesto for the New Left and other movements in the sixties. As is with every living philosophy, Marcuse’s opus was provocative. It was provocative by its concrete historical orientation, by its criticism and overcoming of any dogmatism. However, since the sixties the presence of Marcuse’s works worldwide has steadily faded. The exception is the US where the International Herbert Marcuse Society organizes bi-annual conferences that attempt to revalorize Marcuse’s thought in the light of contemporary discussions and problems. The journal *Radical Philosophy Review* published four issues (2013, 2016 and 2017) devoted to Marcuse studies. There is a wide body of literature written on Marcuse’s critical theory. To list them all and to provide an outline of each book would go beyond the scope of the topic. Large part of the literature is dated in the 60s, 70’s and 80’s and in the 90’s there is a slow decline in literature. This, of course could be explained in terms of Marcuse’s popularity gained first with *Eros*.
and Civilization published in 1955 and then with One-Dimensional Man. Social movements of the '68 also contributed to the fast growth of literature about Marcuse. However, it was not until 2000s that Marcuse’s ideas came again into focus through various books and articles. This sudden wake of the interest is explicable again in terms of the rise of new social movements and protests. It should be noted that recent books published about Marcuse are sympathetic towards his critical theory. In a sense authors of those books use some of Marcuse’s key notions and attempt to build upon them new criticism of capitalist mode of production and everything that comes out of it. However, works that are critical to Marcuse’s theory were published as well. Most of those works were published while Marcuse’s fame was at its pinnacle. Current literature completely omits this fact and hence leaves critique of the 70s and 80s completely untouched and undealt with. It is easy to overlook the fact that past mistakes made by critics, if left undealt with, could once again do injustice not only to the rediscovery of some of Marcuse’s most progressive ideas but to the authors who continue to work under Marcuse’s critical theory. Past can repeat itself: in the past MacIntyre’s, Schoolman’s and Vivas’ criticism easily mislead those who were unfamiliar with Marcuse’s complete opus and this may reoccur today since the sudden “rediscovery” of Marcuse could prompt up “rediscovery” of criticism. Moreover, Schoolman and Vivas published their books after Marcuse’s death in 1979 and thus Marcuse was denied a chance to respond to their criticism. Hence, I proceed to examine criticism and try to respond to it in an attempt to extricate Marcuse’s ideas from misconceptions that are even today associated with some of Marcuse’s ideas. One could assume that this attempt undertaken in the Main Flaws of the Critique of Marcuse, if successful would be beneficial to those contemporary authors who are interested in Marcuse’s critical theory.

For the purpose of this Report only those books published in recent years and by the authors whose bibliography demonstrates familiarity with Marcuse’s works, will be listed.

Reitz’s book Ecology and Revolution (E&C), published in 2018, “is grounded in the Frankfurt School critical theory of Herbert Marcuse. Its task is to understand the economic architecture of wealth extraction that undergirds today’s intensifying inequalities of class, race, and gender, within a revolutionary ecological frame. Relying on newly discovered texts from the Frankfurt Marcuse Archive, this book builds theory and practice for an alternate world system. Ecology and radical political economy, as critical forms of systems analysis, show that an alternative world system is essential – both possible and feasible – despite political forces against it. Our rights to a commonwealth economy, politics, and culture reside in our common works as we express ourselves as artisans of the common good. It is in this context, that Charles Reitz develops a Green-CommonWealth Counter-Offensive, a strategy for revolutionary ecological liberation with core features of racial equality, women’s equality, liberation of labor, restoration of nature, leisure, abundance, and peace” [9; p.iii].

Miles’ [25] book is not recent but it should be mentioned since it provides a detailed account of Marcuse’s aesthetic theory and its relation to liberation.

Any Report on Marcuse would be incomplete without mentioning Kellner’s [2] book Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism published in 1984. Kellner’s book can serve as an excellent introduction to Marcuse’s critical theory since it covers almost all of Marcuse’s works and essays. The book also has significance since in it Kellner meticulously demonstrates Marcuse’s lifelong commitment to Marxist project. Kellner’s successful intention refutes those critics who questioned Marcuse’s Marxist orientation and who failed to grasp that even though Marcuse abandoned Marxist orthodoxy (Marcuse belonged to the Western Marxism current) he nevertheless remained committed to saving Marxist project.
Editorial book by Lamas, Funke and Wolfson [16] *The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements* published in 2017 offers an analysis of contemporary social movements in reference to Marcuse’s concept of “great refusal”. The book chapters analyze “... different elements and locations of the contemporary wave of struggle, drawing on the work and vision of Marcuse in order to reveal, with a historical perspective, the present moment of resistance. Essays seek to understand recent uprisings – such as the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Arab Spring, and the Occupy movement – in the context of Marcuse’s powerful conceptual apparatus. The Great Refusal also charts contemporary social movements against global warming, mass incarceration, police brutality, white supremacy, militarization, technological development, and more, to provide insights that advance our understanding of resistance today” [26].


*Crisis and Commonwealth* a book edited by Reitz in 2013 engages Marx’s and Marcuse’s theories in relation to future freedoms, justice and liberties. Contributing authors attempt to link Marcuse’s ideas to the creation of intercultural commonwealth: “The collection extends the critical theories of Marcuse and Marx to an analysis of the intensifying inequalities symptomatic of our current economic distress (...) a labor theory of ethics and commonwealth, and the collection breaks new ground by constructing a critical theory of wealth and work. A central focus is building a new critical vision for labor, including academic labor. Lessons are drawn to inform transformative political action, as well as the practice of a critical, multicultural pedagogy, supporting a new manifesto for radical educators ...” [26].


Besides the books on Marcuse and editorial books with various contributors to Marcuse’s legacy, recent years have witnessed publication of Marcuse’s previously unpublished essays. The publication of these previously unknown essays marks an epochal brake in studies of Marcuse. These essays are essential for they hold the key for understanding some of Marcuse’s most prominent ideas. The origin of Marcuse’s ideas lies precisely in his early writings. Thus, publishing these essays contributes to studies of Marcuse in a sense that one can easily trace genealogy and development of his ideas, how they changed in accordance to historical situation and how they permeated his whole thought. They shed a new light on “old concepts and ideas”. In this respect these essays are unavoidable for any serious study of Marcuse’s critical theory. An example of this is *Transvaluation of Values and Radical Social Change: Five New Lectures, 1966-1976* edited by Jansen, Reitz and Surak. This edition contains Marcuse’s essays on art, radical social change, protest and rationality of philosophy. In a word they offer an insight into ideas of “new sensibility” and “transvaluation of values”. *Paris Lectures at Vincennes University, 1974: Global Capitalism and Radical Opposition* edited by Jansen and Reitz in 2015 “advances Marcuse scholarship by presenting seven newly discovered, hitherto unpublished, lectures to students at Vincennes University, a branch of the Sorbonne. Marcuse’s critical analysis focuses on core features of American
society, its political economy, its culture, and the potential attainability of a free socialist future” [26]. However, the most comprehensive project in this respect was the publishing of Marcuse’s collected papers in six volumes: vol. I: Technology, War and Fascism, vol. II: Towards a Critical Theory of Society, vol. III: The New Left and the 1960s, vol. IV: Art and Liberation, vol. V: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation and vol. VI: Marxism, Revolution and Utopia. Publications of these volumes that contain previously unpublished and unknown Marcuse writings mark an attempt to reintroduce Marcuse to contemporary discourses [30]. The essays assembled in these volumes provide fresh into Marcuse’s works and further advances studies of Marcuse’s critical philosophy. As has been mentioned earlier, these volumes should not be read as an (extra) addition to Marcuse’s main works but as an accompanying texts that offer a deeper insight into some of Marcuse’s ideas. For better understanding of Marcuse’s ideas and theory these texts sometimes prove to be more relevant than some of his more famous writings.

From the Report presented here one could note that the Marcuse renaissance began in the English speaking part of the world. Books about Marcuse are predominately being published in the US. Besides the obvious reawakening of the interests for Marcuse’s ideas this could be ascribed to the fact that some of Marcuse’s students became university professors and continued to safeguard the (revolutionary) legacy of their professor Marcuse [31]. However, there are indications, judging by the published books, that academicians from other part of the globe are interested in reintroducing Marcuse’s legacy. Italian author Renata Bascelli published Per una filosofia concreta: Alle radici del pensiero di Marcus in 2018: “The need for a ‘concrete philosophy’ is the reason that constantly inspires the reflection of Marcuse, from the first writings (...) up to the later works (...) The thought of Marcuse, from its origins, in virtue of the lucid vision that characterizes it, can still constitute a lesson for the contemporary world and (...) perhaps try to solve, the total crisis that is gripping humanity today” [26]. Similar attempt was made by the author of this study in the book Critique and Resistance: Foundations of Herbert Marcuse’s Critical Philosophy (In Croatian) published in 2017. Reviewing the book Buzar writes: “It is a work that (...) is apparently written with the intent of encouraging new-old views of the socio-political and economic reality of modern man (...) The primary focus is Marcuse’s thought and his concept of revolution. Therefore, it is, of course, not an invitation for a revolution, but an invitation for ‘breakthrough of thought’, about how the notions of ‘revolution’ and ‘freedom’ should be thought of” [31; pp.193-194]. Portuguese Luis Gustavo Guadalupe Silveira published in 2011 a book on Marcuse’s aesthetics Alienação artística: Marcuse e a ambivalência política da arte. In Germany Tim B. Müller published in 2010 a book Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg. The book explores Marcuse’s (among others) engagement during Cold War with US secret services arguing that Marcuse’s critique of Western modernism may come from the period of his involvement with intelligence agencies.

The existing body of literature written about Marcuse is by no means exhausted in this Report. For the Report only established and prominent Marcuse scholars have been chosen, who, unlike critics, are familiar with Marcuse’s life work. However, Marcuse’s critics have also (un)contributed to the literature and hence the next section will assess and revalorize their share.

**MAIN FLAWS OF THE CRITIQUE OF MARCUSE**

During its heyday in the sixties Marcuse’s works provoked significant criticism. However, it should be said that Marcuse gained fame with his later works, namely Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man originally written in English language and during his living in the US. Before this “sudden” burst of fame, Marcuse was largely unknown figure in the
academia. Hence, his pre-war works written and published in Germany remained largely unknown and due to the language barrier, unviable to the wider public. It is only after he gained popularity that his complete works were translated into English language and hence available to his critics and sympathizers. Unfortunately, this delay in translations will prove to be fatal for almost all of Marcuse’s critics. Negative criticism, as was to be expected, focused largely on Marcuse’s latter works, completely omitting his early works (or mentioning them only marginally) which are in fact crucial for understanding Marcuse’s complete critical theory. Thus, flaws in criticism results from the unfamiliarity with Marcuse’s pre-war (or pre-emigration) writings. It is curious to note that while one can still find some recent articles and books on Marcuse (mostly affirmative), there is a complete lack of articles and books critical to Marcuse’s ideas.

Marcuse’s most prominent critics worth mentioning are MacIntyre, Schoolman and Vivas. The reason why they are worth engaging with is that all of them assert that they are (“allegedly”) familiar with Marcuse’s complete works. The problem with negative criticism is on two levels: at the level of content and at the level of form. Apart from the objections that could be raised on the content of the criticisms and disputability of critic’s interpretations, the problem lies in the very form in which criticism is presented. MacIntyre proceeds thorough criticizing Marcuse’s and commits himself to “exceptional obligation to portray what Marcuse says faithfully” [34; p.7]. Even though he acknowledges the importance of Marcuse’s early writings, it is interesting that MacIntyre starts his critique completely omitting important essays such as: Philosophy and Critical Theory, On the Concept of Essence, On Concrete Philosophy, On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labor, etc. [29]. This “thorough” critique of Marcuse’s positions MacIntyre carries out on the 92 pages. It is practically impossible to deliver a thorough critique on 92 pages, especially on Marcuse whose complete opus is quantitatively impressive and qualitatively complex [29]. MacIntyre himself admits this: “The criticism of Marcuse’s positions encounters two kinds of difficulty; those posed by particular theses which he asserts and those posed rather by his whole manner of thought and style of presentation. Marcuse’s manner is both literary and academic; he is allusive and seems to presuppose in his readers not only a high level of general culture, but a wide area of presumed agreement on academic matters (such as the interpretation of Descartes – to give one example)” [34; p.17]. Hence, one could argue that it is impossible to deliver a thorough critique on 92 pages that MacIntyare announces. Without reflecting on Heidegger’s, Marx’s and Hegel’s influence on Marcuse it is possible to deliver a general, reductionist and seriously flawed critique. Schoolman’s intention is also to conduct a systematic and comprehensive critique and exposition of Marcuse’s complete works: “in the sense that it attempts to discover the conceptual limits of his theoretical framework, to account for the origins of these limits, and to demonstrate how his arguments are shaped within and by this framework (...) The account that I offer for what I contend to be his errors implicitly serves to extricate Marcuse from the harsh indictments that have been leveled in the past” [35; p.xiii]. Schoolman, whose criticism is also flawed, is aware of the existing misconceptions about Marcuse’s positions: “Marcuse was constantly on the defensive against his accusers and supporters, who both frequently attributed views to him that he did not hold. Seldom was criticism forthcoming” [35; p.xi]. However, Schoolman’s initial intention failed to realize and to deliver on its promise to extricate Marcuse. The problem with Schoolman’s criticism (at the level of form) is that throughout the entire book, Schoolman (usually wrongly) presents Marcuse’s thesis and ideas by paraphrasing them without quoting or referencing to the original texts [29]. Moreover, Schoolman recounts and summarizes the ideas of Heidegger, Freud and Lukács again without indicating where these ideas could be found in the original texts [29]. Finally, Schoolman mentions Marx passingly
without giving any deep significance to Marx’s ideas that shaped and influenced Marcuse’s critical philosophy. Hence, from Schoolman’s un-academic approach to the subject it is not possible to see clearly whose ideas influenced Marcuse and how [29]. On the opposite pole of negative criticism stands Vivas whose criticism contains a dose of non-justified and non-grounded “enmity” towards Marcuse’s ideas. In his “savage” (to use his own term) criticism of Marcuse, the conservative professor of philosophy Vivas announces the tone of his criticism as well as his contribution to the existing body of literature: “This is a polemical essay, directed at Marcuse’s savage indictment of our society. It is not offered as an academic contribution. It has not been couched in the third person language that is loved by academics (…) it often uses the first personal pronoun, and when it does not call a spade a spade, it refers to it as a manure shovel. It does not quite get down to the level of the academic New Left; it uses euphemism like ‘manure’ instead of the four-letter words that are frequently found in the writings of the new nihilists, both among academics and among students. I refrain from such language not because I’m ignorant of four-letter words, but because that kind of language (…) ought not to be allowed to lose its value by everyday usage” [33; p.9]. From the quoted passage it is possible to assume the extent to which Vivas’ criticism is appropriate, written with objective distance and finally how it contributes critical examination of Marcuse’s theory. Moreover, the quoted passage testifies to its intention and purpose. Unlike MacIntyre and Schoolman who at least recognized erudition and complexity that imbues all Marcuse works, Vivas assumes that it is possible to give comprehensive critique by superficial reading of his works: “One does not have to read him extensively to learn that from his pages arises an asphyxiating vapor, corrosive in its animosity” [33; p.22]. Assuming that this enterprise is possible Vivas acknowledges the ignorance and superficiality of his own criticism: “In the book I have not done more than assert in general terms that some of his criticism is without foundation…” [33; p.10]. Lacking in depth knowledge, Vivas’ critique of Marcus dismantles itself from the inside.

Let us summarize the problem of Marcuse’s criticism at the level of the form. All mentioned critics are aware of the importance of Marcuse’s early essays and they clearly state that fact. However, this very fact proved not to be useful in their critical endeavour. It is evident that even though mentioned critics claim familiarity with early writings, they either completely skip the early phase (MacIntyre), or poorly and wrongly summarize main ideas (Schoolman), or finally, completely ignore pre-war writings (Vivas). However, this omission at the formal level will have serious consequences at the level of content of criticism. Instead of opening space for improvement, the criticism has done injustice to some of Marcuse’s most prominent and advanced ideas. Marcuse’s views and ideas were largely influenced by Schiller, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Heidegger and (early) Lukács. Thus, for understanding Marcuse’s position (even in his later works) it is of utmost importance that one should be familiar with those authors in order to comprehend what Marcuse took from them and further developed. From the form in which criticism is presented it is evident that the mentioned critics lack familiarity with some fundamental ideas of the authors that influenced Marcuse. The problem is that nobody seriously dealt with criticism and this in turn has led to the accumulation in the body of criticism by repeating what has already been (wrongly) said about Marcuse’s critical theory. In the next passages I will attempt to respond to criticism.

Vivas apologetically and without any imagination glorifies the established “reality principle” and “performance principle” arguing that the model of Western societies should be implemented to other less developed societies: “We live in a better world, we fortunate ones, that man has probably ever lived in before. The majority of our citizens, and a large number of members of Western society outside the borders of US, enjoy opportunities that only a small minority ever enjoyed before. And we are earnestly seeking to expand the number of
people who can enjoy this opportunities, in and out of the US” [33; p.19]. If Vivas had any imagination in Marcusean sense of the word, he would be able to imagine a qualitatively different world that can arise on the basis of the existing one. Vivas then proceeds to argue that Marcuse is advocating total annihilation of the society: “… his call for the destruction of our society, for direct action, for the shooting and murdering and repression of those who do not see the world with the hate filled eyes he sees it with ...” [33; p.9]. Had Vivas thoroughly read Marcuse he would have realized that there is no mentioning of destruction of established society (as that would be inappropriate to Marcuse’s Marxist understanding of history) but only of dialectical overcoming which is something completely different.

MacIntyre is uncertain about Marcuse’s criteria of truth (which is significant in Marcuse’s theory as an assessment of that what it is in terms of that what could be): “Marcuse at various points both in these early writings and later on refers to criteria of truth which he rejects. But he does not make it clear what criteria of truth he accepts or to what criteria of truth he is appealing in inviting us to accept his assertions” [34; pp.17-18]. For Marcuse the only criterion of truth is the reality of reason from the perspective of concrete historical possibilities [29]. To answer MacIntyre it is not necessary to reference all positions from which Marcuse’s lifelong preoccupation with reality of reason is evident. As an answer to MacIntyre, a summary of Marcuse’s criterion of truth will suffice: “(1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real possibilities open at the attained level of the material and intellectual culture. (2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the established totality, must demonstrate its own higher rationality in the threefold sense that (a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the productive achievements of civilization; (b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic tendencies, and relations; (c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of existence, within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance for the free development of human needs and faculties. Obviously, this notion of rationality contains, especially in the last statement, a value judgment, and I reiterate what I stated before: I believe that the very concept of Reason originates in this value judgment and that the concept of truth cannot be divorced from the value of Reason” [13; pp.224-225]. Another correction that needs to be done relates to MacIntyre’s classification of Marcuse as a “pre-Marxist” thinker [29]. MacIntyre bases this classification on two observations: 1) “He sometimes speaks not of Marxist materialism but of ‘the critical theory of society’ ” and 2) “Marcuse is endlessly willing to talk of ‘man’ rather than of men, of what ‘man’ desires or does or suffers” [34; p.21]. Moreover, MacIntyre assumes that Marcuse pertains to young Hegelians rather than to Marxism: “The hypothesis that it is with the Left or Young Hegelians that Marcuse has to be classified is reinforced by the way in which he treats Hegelian theory and even its Marxist version as providing us with standard of rationality against which the actual world must be judged” [34; p.40]. Marcuse’s Marxism was marked by constant search for revolutionary subject that is capable of transforming given reality. It is correct that Marcuse gave up proletariat once he noticed that proletariat has become integrated into mass society, or in other words, subordinated to the “technological rationality”. However, it is utterly inappropriate (and incorrect) to call Marcuse “pre-Marxist” or “non-Marxist” since Marcuse’s complete approach is carried by Marxist open dialectic which essentially contains the notion of necessity and demonstrates that laws of capitalist mode of production contain internal antagonisms whose overcoming has the character of necessity [29]. For Marcuse, capitalism abolishes itself in the dynamics of internal antagonisms. This abolishment is not carried out by inherent necessity but by “spontaneity of reason” (and here we can see the openness of Marxian dialectic), and by achieved level of material, technological and intellectual development. Subsequently, at the center of Marcuse’s concept of liberation lies the notion of labor in its Marxist meaning. Marcuse assumed that due to the technological development it
is possible to reduce time spent at labor and increase the time in which human being can comprehensively develop his being. Finally, what makes Marcuse distinctive to other Marxist is that for him the beginning and the goal was liberated individual and not class.

Schoolman argues that Marcuse’s concept of radical social change is more directed to the level of cognizance: “Marcuse, it must be emphasized, is not speaking in these very important passages of the actual destruction or abolition of alienation, reification, and the social relations from which this condition arises. On the contrary, Marcuse is speaking of a cognitive act, of an act of understanding, of the impulse upon which the act of abolition, of social revolution, is eventually to be based” [35; p.25]. However, Schoolman’s claim is utterly dubious. First and foremost, Marcuse understood repression to be socially conditioned and hence the process of overcoming could not be conceived as cognitive act. Quite contrary, Marcuse clearly expressed that these conditions could not be overcome by cognition: “... not as subjective properties that could be overcome by understanding concern but rather as the effects of the intervention of social necessities into the personal sphere” [38; p.123]. It is precisely in the early works where Marcuse conceived radical act as an act that aimed to appropriate reality that seems foreign to human being. Following this, Marcuse will later define “great refusal” as the protest against “surplus repression”, against dominant norms, as a struggle for final form of freedom. Therefore it is not clear on what arguments Schoolman bases his claim equating radical act with cognitive act. Moreover, freedom for Marcuse is the freedom from the “kingdom of necessity”.

Problematic as well is Schoolman’s interpretation of Marcuse’s concept of critical theory. Schoolman argues: “What this means is that critical theory becomes emphatically ‘theory’; that is it articulates its goals, its truth, without reference or direct appeal to a practical agent of historical change for that agency is no longer a conscious revolutionary subject (...) Critical theory especially retains its theoretical allegiance to political economy because materialism is the basis of its concept of essence and identifies structural tendencies in the social system that can lead to radical change (...) Claimed to exist independently of any subject’s failure to comprehend them, transcendent possibilities become, as Marcuse says, critical theory’s utopian element” [35; pp.72-73]. Suffice is to outline some problematic points in Schoolman’s interpretation. The “practical agent” (or the subject) of Marcuse’s critical theory that is missing according to Schoolman, is always ordinary, everyday individual in his concrete historical situation and in his concrete world. Hence, the critical theory (as well as “concrete philosophy”) appeals to an individual by indicating to him possibilities for better life and for self-confirmation in the world that he has created and to which he belongs. Schoolman asserts that critical theory owes its allegiance to political economy. However, Schoolman is wrong since Marcuse defined critical theory in clear distinction to philosophy, sociology and political economy [29]. In addition Marcuse demonstrated how critical theory surpasses political economy: “The difference lies in the decisive factor, precisely the one that makes the society rational – the subordination of the economy to the individuals’ needs” [36; p.106]. Final disputable point in Schoolman’s interpretation relates to the element of utopia. Marcuse did not consider the possibilities of critical theory to be utopian. Instead, he asserted that critical theory along with philosophy opposes any type of positivism. What differentiates critical theory from philosophy is its insistence on qualitative change which is always derived from social tendencies and not by confrontation of some utopian vision: “Like philosophy, it opposes making reality into a criterion in the manner of complacent positivism. But unlike philosophy, it always derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social process. Therefore it has no fear of the utopia that the new order is denounced as being. When truth cannot be realized within the established social order, it always appears to the latter as mere utopia. This transcendence
speaks not against, but for, its truth. The utopian element was long the only progressive element in philosophy, as in the constructions of the best state and the highest pleasure, of perfect happiness and perpetual peace (...) Critical theory preserves obstinacy as a genuine quality of philosophical thought" [36; pp.105-106].

Especially astonishing is Schoolman’s assertion that after early works and due to the experience of fascism Marcuse completely abandoned his concern for an individual41. “Fascism was that political event (...) that eventually led to Marcuse’s abandonment of the individual” [35; p.37]. This astonishing assertion will completely mislead Schoolman to conclude that the subject of critical theory is imaginary “Critical theory, its knowledge of the society and of its alternatives, becomes the property of an imaginary witness, of an individual who no longer exists. The imaginary witness, however, is the mournful and melancholy legacy of a critical spirit born from the horrors of fascism” [35; pp.350-351]. It is not clearly evident what made Schoolman to arrive to this (wrong) conclusion; especially since Marcuse’s complete work could be described from its preoccupation with an individual and for creation of a more humane world. Furthermore it was precisely the experience of fascism that led Marcuse to believe that a new anthropology of human being is necessary prerequisite for a new society which he expressed through notions “new rationality” and “new sensibility”42 [29]. Contrary to Marcuse’s conscious subject who lives in harmony with reason and eros, Schoolman posits an “ambivalent individual” as the subject of critical theory: “Only a theory that recognizes the effects of reification and realizes that the structure concealed by ideology generates insights that transcend appearances can be a radical theory. Such a theory is radical because it recognizes that the individual is necessary ambivalent” [35; p.352]. However, Schoolman’s “ambivalent subject” is not capable for taking radical act precisely because of this ambivalence that is immanent to him. His ambivalence bonds him to the same “principle of reality” and “pleasure principle” against which Marcuse directed his criticism. It is important to emphasize that Marcuse’ subject is the result of a dialogue with Freud (interplay of two life instincts: eros and thanatos), Marx (human beings as a species beings; labor as a free human activity that leads to all-around self-realization), Schiller (homo ludens, aesthetic education) and Heidegger (Dasien’s throwness into the world, radical act, authenticity)43.

Schoolman completely misunderstood Marcuse’s appropriation of Freud’s ideas as on the example of the two basic instincts eros and thanatos [29]. This is mostly evident in Schoolman’s reductionist and banal account of Marcuse’s approach to art: “Libidinal rationality is still socialism’s guiding principle. But Eros is no longer entrusted to the vicissitudes of political practice, no longer vested in the erstwhile politics of the New Left’s new sensibility. Eros finds a new and sublimated refuge in art” [35; p.326]. However, few points will be sketched here as well. Marcuse accepts the thesis of the “permanence of art” and thus sees the activity of eros and art immanent to human beings as a species in its struggle against “surplus repression” regardless of the historical situation. Schoolman’s account that for Marcuse the modern art is conformist is erroneous due to his ignorance: “Modern art is conformist. It sacrifices the truth of the aesthetic dimension by transforming art into a language and experience that affirms and supports the established social order. Form, modern art contends, is a deadly obstacle to the artist’s search for an aesthetic presentation of modern civilization that will display its horrors and spiritual poverty (...) As form disappears from art, art’s critical disposition and the aesthetic dimension recede in proportion. Art is assimilated into the fabric of one-dimensional society” [35; p.344]. However, for Marcuse the conformist art is only mass art that Marcuse terms as “anti-art” meaning the art that has been commodified44. As an answer to Schoolman it is suffice to quote Marcuse from his essay Art as Form of Reality in which he clearly demonstrates an advanced moment of modern art : “I believe that the authentic avant-garde of today are not
those who try desperately to produce the absence of Form and the union with real life, but rather those who do not recoil from the exigencies of Form, who find the new word, image, and sound which are capable of ‘comprehending’ reality as only Art can comprehend—and negate it. This authentic new Form has emerged in the work (already ‘classic’) of Schönberg, Berg, and Webern; of Kafka and Joyce; of Picasso; it continues today in such achievements as Stockhausen’s Spirale, and Samuel Beckett’s novels. They invalidate the notion of the ‘end of art’ ” [41; p.146].

What is perhaps most misunderstood by critics is Marcuse’s approach to technology as the new subject of social change. The extent to which MacIntyre misunderstood how technology fosters integration of individuals into society is evident from the following passage: “It is clear that technological advance and investment in such advance are the mainspring of the continuous expansion which underpins the real if precarious stability of advanced industrial society. This expansion affects to some degree every sector of the social order. But the degrees to which different sectors are affected, the rates at which they expand and the directions in which they expand are quite different. The result is not the highly integrated and well-coordinated system portrayed by Marcuse, but rather a situation in which there is less and less coordination between different sectors” [34; p.70]. Schoolman, on the other hand, confuses concepts. He interchangeably and confusingly uses concepts of “technological rationality” and “technological domination”. It should be emphasized that within Marcuse’s critical theory there is no such concept as “technological domination”. Furthermore, Schoolman never defined how “technological domination” could be related to Marcuse’s theory and besides that he wrongly interprets the “technological rationality”: “Simply stated, whenever Marcuse speaks of technological rationality he is referring to the modus operandi of the process of material production. He appears to construe production in the broadest possible sense: all sectors of industrial enterprise – the whole military-industrial complex, as well as the entire distributive network of goods and services – are included” [35; p.140]. However, this is not “technological rationality” as used by Marcuse. Marcuse defines “technological rationality” in distinction to individual rationality; arguing that under the influence of technological apparatus the latter is transformed into former. Hence, for Marcuse “technological rationality” determines not only the way in which individuals think but the forms of protests and revolts. Thus, technological rationality, the way Marcuse uses it, describes the prevailing mode of thinking and acting – of being-in-the-(technological)-world. Schoolman, also, fails to notice that “technological rationality” holds subversive potential on which Marcuse based his argument about cooperation of technology and art in creating the new society: “The technological rationality also contains an element of playfulness which is constrained and distorted by the repressive usage of technology: playing with (the possibilities of) things, with their combination, order, form, and so forth. If no longer under the pressure of necessity, this activity would have no other aim than growth in the consciousness and enjoyment of freedom. Indeed, technical productivity might then be the very opposite of specialization and pertain to the emergence of that ‘all-round individual’ who looms so large in Marxist theory” [43; p.257]. Another criticism comes from Kołakowski according to whom: “Marcuse’s thought is a curious mixture of feudal contempt for technology, the exact sciences, and democratic values, plus a nebulous revolutionism devoid of positive content (...) The destructive effects of science are inherent in its content and are not simply due to its social misapplication (...) Marcuse’s attacks on science and logic go hand in hand with attacks on democratic institutions and ‘repressive tolerance’ (the opposite of ‘true’ tolerance, i.e. of repressive tolerance” [44; pp.416-417]. Quite contrary to Kołakowski’s argument, Marcuse did not assume that destructive relation to humans and to nature is immanent to technology. Marcuse was not a technophobe as Schoolman and Kołakowski try to portray his views on technology. Transcendence of existing society is
possible only by rearrangement in technological base. Hence, “feudal contempt for technology” does not quite capture Marcuse’s position or views.

With this criticism is, to a certain extent and in its main points, exhausted. As has been argued, the problem of the critique of Marcuse is twofold: at the level of form and at the level of content. Marcuse became widely known with his later works (E&C and ODM) which alongside acclamation produced negative criticism as well. Criticism in this sense focused mainly on Marcuse’s later works while completely omitting (or only passingly mentioning) his early works. In a way, Marcuse’s later works are just an elaboration and further development of his main ideas laid down in his early writings (and to a certain extent, an accommodation of those ideas to a wider public that was in a sense unfamiliar with continental philosophy) laid down in his early writings. Thus in order to understand what Marcuse is saying it is absolutely necessary to study his early works as they hold the key for comprehending his later works and ideas in general. Critics may be partially excused since Marcuse’s pre-war writings were translated later. However, the damage has been done and until now there has not been any serious attempt to extricate Marcuse’s ideas from various misreadings. Hence, these lapses in criticism became commonly accepted and the future critique of Marcuse’s works continued to build on this widely but wrongly shared opinions. Marcuse’s texts represent but a genuine commitment to the historical possibility of a better world. Critique has pointed to some flaws in Marcuse’s theory, but an in-depth insights and substantiality is lacking. Most of Marcuse’s ideas are de-contextualized which renders such critique of Marcuse flawed. Among critics there is insufficient understanding of interdisciplinary of Marcuse’s critical theory and especially of the influences that Heidegger, Hegel, Schiller, Marx, Freud and Lukács had on Marcuse.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Let us end with a couple of concluding remarks. It is our belief that recent social struggles and political upheavals point to the potential of Marcuse’s critical theory to offer guide to the contemporary praxis. Re-emerging academic interest in Marcuse testifies to the relevance of Marcuse for contemporaneity. Although recently published books are positively inclined towards Marcuse, there is no systematic attempt to respond to negative criticism. That leaves Marcuse’s most progressive ideas vulnerable to the same flaws that could be identified in the critique already done in the past. In this study we have done our best to amend this fact. To conclude on Marcuse’s renaissance only one word written on Marcuse’s gravestone comes to mind: “weitermachen!”

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REMARKS

1Marcuse’s deeper and more substantial closeness to Heidegger can be seen in the Heideggerian Marxism collection of essays. This is most evident in the essays Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism and On Concrete Philosophy.
2Marcuse introduces the notion of “historical project” in an attempt to substitute the foundation of historicity in the ontology of labor.
3Marcuse articulated this criterion in the essay Philosophy and Critical Theory.
4Namely two epochs: first, pre-technological in which one needed to constantly struggle with nature to secure existence and thus labor had burdensome character. And second,
technological epoch in which technological development could render labor obsolete or at least reduce it to the minimum.

7It should be noted that in Marcuse’s later writings “world” is interchangeably used with “society”.

6As Marcuse writes in recently discovered *Paris Lectures*: “What is actually happening at this stage of capitalist development is not the emergence of a new working class but a vast extension of the working class, an extension of the working class to strata of the middle classes which at previous stages of capitalism have been independent” [4; p.46].

7As Aronowitz explains: “Although Eros and Civilization is written, in the main, in philosophical and theoretical terms, it is essential to place Marcuse’s work not only in the twentieth century outpouring of psychoanalytic thought, but also in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ philosophical intervention to put philosophy back into the world and in the realm of the concrete” [5; p.133].

8In this respect Marcuse could be included among founders of bioethics. As Reitz points out: “Marcuse regarded the environmental movement of his day as a critical intervention against institutional destructiveness and as the embodiment of a life-affirming energy directed towards the protection of Earth and the pacification of our human existence” [6; p.163].

9As Reitz comments: “Marcuse saw within the classical liberal arts philosophy critical impulses toward multiculturalism, social history, and critical social theory (...) He also (...) shares (...) the philosophical conviction that the most meaningful and beautiful works of art are also the soundest foundation for an education to political justice” [6; p.88].

10Which according to Reitz proves to be of utmost significance for present situation: “... if we all have a de jure right to express any opinion in public, the de facto condition is that left opinions are usually marginalized and often suppressed, while right-wing ones, which benefit the ruling class, are given free play” [6; p.18].

11See *Main Flaws of the Critique of Marcuse*.

12And in this respect Hegel’s, Freud’s, Schiller’s, Heidegger’s, Lukács’ and Marx’s influence on Marcuse will be evident.

13See *Marcuse’s Renaissance: A Report*.

14See Matuštík’s article *The Existential Dimension of the Great Refusal: Marcuse, Fanon, Habermas*. In the article Matuštík attempts to demonstrate theoretical closeness of Marcuse, Fanon and Habermas.

15E.g.: “If one refigures Marcuse’s refusals through Fanon’s existential inventions, leaps can serve to link transgressive singularities with personal and global agencies of liberation (...) A concrete critical theory of liberation today gathers refusing voices from multiple margins. This thought can deliver on an earlier promissory note that democracy-to-come must become morally and sociopolitically anticolonial and ethically postcolonial” [11; p.320]. Matuštík asserts: “Marcuse’s essays (1928-1932) serve the young Habermas to become more concrete in a twofold sense: to move away from abstract historicity and to move closer to historical and material analysis with practical intent (...) Habermas’s sociopolitical version of the either-or self-choice, influenced by his intense intellectual engagement with Marcuse’s works, thus retains its radical existential character...” [11; pp.323-326].

16Marcuse dedicated *An Essay on Liberation* to the protesters who took to the streets of Paris.

17In this respect it could be said that Marcuse identifies the “great refusal” with those who belong to this democratic excess, those who live on the outskirts of democracy: “They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions” [13; p.260].

18Matuštík who interprets Marcuse’s “great refusal” as an expression of concrete existential thought in either-or terms asserts: “If projects of liberation aim at radically multicultural
democracies with human faces, these must admit an existential dimension. This existentiality issues in a reconstructed historical materialism, not in the wasteland haunted by spiritual ghosts. Democracy concerns the entirety of human existence, or it is abstract. Revolution concerns the entirety of human existence, or it is abstract. Dissent and democracy concern the entirety of human existence, or they are abstract” [11; p.317].

18He was Marcuse’s student.

19Katsiaficas develops further Marcuse’s argument about instinctual drive and need for freedom. The “eros effect” is used to explain contemporary uprisings and social movements: “During moments of the eros effect, universal interests become generalized at the same time as dominant values of society (national chauvinism, hierarchy, and domination) are negated (...) Dimensions of the eros effect include the sudden and synchronous emergence of hundreds of thousands of people occupying public space; the simultaneous appearance of revolts in many places; the intuitive identification of hundreds of thousands of people with each other; their common belief in new values; and suspension of normal daily routines like competitive business practices, criminal behavior, and acquisitiveness (...) The eros effect is not simply a general strike, armed insurrection, or massive mobilization. Rather, it can be all of these and more. It is not an act of mind; nor can it be willed by a ‘conscious element’ (or revolutionary party). It involves popular movements emerging in their own right as ordinary people take history into their hands. The concept of the eros effect is a means of rescuing the revolutionary value of spontaneity, a way to stimulate a reevaluation of the unconscious” [14; p.85].

20See, e.g. [17-19].

21Vieta accurately poses a question: “Indeed, contrary to Marcuse’s ultimate vision, perhaps we must question whether such ‘total’ transformations of the system can ever be achieved lest we be reduced back into hegemonic and oppressive forms of vanguardist, etatist, or universalist thought and practice” [20; p.278].

22E.g. black block group of protesters and other alike groups.

23Unwillingly, Marcuse was proclaimed to be father and guru of the New Left, see e.g. [21-23]. However, Marcuse refused to be called “father” or “grandfather” of the New Left. Refusal to be associated with any type of father figure can be explained from Marcuse’s engagement with Freud’s theory. Marcuse’s investigation into Freud’s theory clearly revealed that father figure (whether in family (father-son conflict) or in “primordial horde” (rebellion of the sons against dominating father who monopolizes pleasure which eventually leads to parricide)) impersonates the reality principle – the very principle that imposes restrictions on instinctual structure and that is responsible for internalization of various repressive mechanisms. One can presume that this was the key reason why Marcuse refused to be associated as the father of the New Left. He would then be an embodiment of the principle that he vigorously criticized as the hindrance to truly human liberation.

24This is especially the case of Croatia where Branka Brujić [24] obtained her Ph.D. in 1973 with thesis Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse and Historical Thinking (In Croatian). However, thesis was never published as a book.

25Author of this study participated at the International Herbert Marcuse Society Sixth Biennial Conference at Salisbury University (USA) November 12-15, 2015 with written contribution Contemporary One-Dimensional Society – Is Marcuse’s Thought Still Valid? (published in the book of abstracts).

26Complete and exhaustive bibliography on Marcuse could be found on official webpage dedicated to the legacy of Herbert Marcuse. The page is curated by his grandson dr. Harold Marcuse. The page provides detailed and up to date (from 1940s nowadays) information on books, articles and reviews about Marcuse. Complete bibliography could be seen at: http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/booksabout.htm.
M. Višić

27Reitz asserts: “Recent years have witnessed a genuine Marcuse Renaissance. *New Political Science* devoted a special issue to *Marcuse in the Twenty-First Century: Radical Politics, Critical Theory, Revolutionary Practice* (2016). The *Radical Philosophy Review* dedicated four Special Issues to fresh considerations of Marcuse’s thought (2017 and 2016; twice in 2013). Two collections of commentary on Marcuse’s political perspective have also been published in 2017, *The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements*, edited by Andrew T. Lamas, Todd Wolfson, and Peter N. Funke, and *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On: The Struggle Continues*, edited by Terry Maley” [9; p.3].

28I.e. giving up of the proletariat.

29Most of those essays come from the Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt.

30Kellner describes general intention of the volumes: “For while there have been a large number of new translations of works by Benjamin, Adorno and Habermas during the past decade, little untranslated or uncollected material by Marcuse has appeared. In addition, while there has been great interest in recent years in the writings of French ‘postmodern,’ or ‘poststructuralist,’ theorists, such as Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard and others, Marcuse did not fit into the fashionable debates concerning modern and postmodern thought (...) The neglect of Marcuse may be altered through the publication of a wealth of material, much of it unpublished and unknown ...” [30; pp.xiv-xv].

31Or could it be perhaps that Marcuse’s project remained unfinished, or took an unappealing turn? (such as new form of dominance, in-development of technological rationality, new forms of repression and even more new forms of renunciation, occupations that are slowly dying since the humans can be replaced by the machines and thus creating a vast population that is “useless” in the new information and services society, new forms of alienated labor such as precarious labor, etc.).

32An example of misapprehension due to the unfamiliarity with Marcuse’s complete critical theory (and this applies to all critics) offers Nancy Chodrow [32] who completely misinterprets Marcuse’s appropriation of Freud’s ideas. Farr replies offering a valid reason: “Chodrow’s criticism of Marcuse is appropriate only if Marcuse’s interpretation of Freud is taken out of the context of his critical project. Marcuse’s work on Freud must be taken as only a moment within a larger more complex project” [3; p.63]. Therefore it can be said that every serious criticism of Marcuse must grasp and be familiar with his entire work.

33Both Vivas and Schoolman claim familiarity with Marcuse’s early writings as well as its significance for understanding his later works: “Not all essays in *Negations* are of equal value to the student of Marcuse’s nihilism; but those published in the Thirties are of interest because they show that Marcuse was then concerned with ideas that he was to develop later in his books (...) Professor Eric Voegelin told a mutual friend, who passed it on to me, that Marcuse has been saying very much the same thing for as long as Voegelin has known him. Some proof of the truth of the statement is to be found in these older essays” [33; p.7].

“... the early period is the most important in Marcuse’s life work” [35; p.3].

34The importance of these early papers does not lie only in the fact that they constitute a first statement of the thesis which informs the whole of his later work. For on certain points they are more explicit than anything in the later works” [34; p.16].

35In fact MacInytre (as well as other mentioned critics) omits all of the early essays that are collected in *Negations: Essays in critical Theory and Heideggerian Marxism*.

36Here are some examples that corroborate this “enmity”: “He does not deserve our courtesy, our charity, our tolerance (...) If he were to possess the power for a short while, he would out-Robespierre Robespierre, out-Saint-Just Saint-Just ...” [33; pp.9-10]. On one occasion Vivas implicitly calls Marcuse “a termite who gnaws civilization: He is a hero in France, Germany, Italy, and it goes without saying in Columbia University and points west, wherever in our world the social termites gnaw at the uprights of our civilization” [33; p.51].
He declared himself conservative: “I call myself conservative ...” [33; p.11].

In his early writings Marcuse indicated imagination (phantasy) as the key instrument of critical theory: “In order to retain what is not yet present as a goal in the present, phantasy is required (...) For it would determine what man is on the basis of what he really can be tomorrow. In replying to the question, ‘What may I hope?’, it would point less to eternal bliss and inner freedom than to the already possible unfolding and fulfillment of needs and wants. In a situation where such a future is a real possibility, phantasy is an important instrument in the task of continually holding the goal up to view (...) Without phantasy, all philosophical knowledge remains in the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future ...” [36; pp.113-114].

Later, in Eros and Civilization Marcuse again emphasizes the subversive potential of emancipation within psychoanalytic theory: “Freud singles out phantasy as one mental activity that retains a high degree of freedom from the reality principle even in the sphere of the developed consciousness (...) Phantasy plays a most decisive function in the total mental structure: it links the deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest products of consciousness (art), the dream with the reality; it preserves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom (...) imagination preserves the ‘memory’ of the subhistorical past when the life of the individual was the life of the genus, the image of the immediate unity between the universal and the particular under the rule of the pleasure principle (...) phantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its own - namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality. Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason” [37; pp.140-143].

Schoolman to a certain extent perceives Marcuse’s criterion of truth: “In fact, since Marcuse’s theory of historicity maintains that all meaning, including standard of truth and validity, are formed within a historical, social context, his theory excludes a transcendental foundation for criteria of rationality. By maintaining that conceptual meaning, in particular, criteria of rationality, that is concepts of truth and falsity or of right and wrong, is always defined within a social context, Marcuse has explicitly followed not only Hegel (...) and Marx but Wilhelm Dilthey as well” [35; p.31].

For Marcuse’s lifelong commitment to Marxist project see [2].

This is somehow present in MacIntyre and Vivas as well. MacIntyre utterly improperly and unfoundedly proposes the argument that Marcuse equated USA with Hitler’s Germany: “In his early writings of 1934 Marcuse argued that liberalism had as its natural successor totalitarianism. In 1960 he takes the prevailing social order of the advanced countries to embody just such totalitarianism. He is thus prepared to characterize in the same terms Hitler’s Germany and the United States of Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon – or at the least he is committed to hold that there are strong and growing tendencies in the United States which may be characterized in key respects as resembling Nazism (...) In assimilating Nazi Germany to such societies as those of North America and of Britain today Marcuse can only assist in obscuring the small but genuine threat from the neo-Fascist right that does exist in those societies” [34; pp.67-68].

Vivas of course follows MacIntyre: “Marcuse also suggests that our society is totalitarian in the sense that Nazi Germany was and that Russia and China are” [33; p.48].

MacIntyre is evidently unfamiliar with Marcuse early writings and the essay to which MacIntyre is referring is The struggle against liberalism in the totalitarian view of the state. However, MacIntyre (and Vivas) had not read carefully and thoroughly this essay. It should also be said that in the later works to which MacIntyre is referring, Marcuse never compared the US with Hitler’s Germany. Marcuse clearly speaks about key differences of the two: “This is not a fascist regime by any means. The courts still uphold the freedom of
the press; ‘underground’ papers are still being sold openly, and the media leave room for continual and strong criticism of the government and its policies. To be sure, freedom of expression hardly exists for the blacks, and is effectively limited even for the whites. But civil rights are still there, and their existence is not disproved by the (correct) argument that the system can still ‘afford’ this kind of protest (...) There is little need to stress the facts that in the United States the situation is different from Weimar Germany, that there is no strong Communist Party, that there are no paramilitary mass organizations, that there is no total economic crisis, no lack of ‘living space,’ no charismatic leaders, that the Constitution and government set up in its name are well functioning, and so on. History does not repeat itself exactly, and a higher stage of capitalist development in the United States would call for a higher stage of fascism” [39; pp.24-25].

Farr holds these Marcuse’s notions to be crucial for development of more democratic societies: “The notion of a new sensibility is one of Marcuse’s most radical and important insights. It is my position that without the development of a new sensibility full democracy is not possible (...) A pure democracy is one that has purged itself of the need from domination whether that domination is based on class, race, sex or gender, sexual orientation or nationalism. Such a democracy tends towards humanism wherein the dignity and the right to the necessary resources for self-determination and self-development of all human beings is affirmed. Such a democracy is put into action y more than an appeal to the so-called principles of democracy (...) Marcuse’s notion of the new sensibility introduces a care perspective. The care perspective moves us beyond the mere applications of principles. The care perspective invoked by Marcuse’s new sensibility must be made universal via humanism, that is, the cultivation of care toward all humanity” [3; pp.115-116].

Kellner correctly asserts that in contrast to the ideals philosophical models of subjectivity: “... Marcuse posits a bodily, erotic, gendered, social, and aestheticized subjectivity that overcomes mind-body dualism, avoids idealist and rationalist essentialism, and is constructed in a specific social milieu. Moreover, Marcusean subjectivity is challenged to reconstruct itself and emancipate itself from limited and oppressive forms and to pursue the project of cultivating a new sensibility” [40; pp.3-4].

e.g. Soviet realism or commercialization and mass production of art in the advanced technological civilization.

This is evident in Whitfield’s statement: “For example, Eros and Civilization envisions technology as a catalyst of emancipation, freeing humanity from drudgery and permitting a polymorphous sexuality to pervade utopia. The latter book [One-dimensional Man] repudiates technocratic bureaucracy, however, and condemns the exploitation of nature that scientific progress is supposed to achieve” [42; p.106].

To this confusion adds Schoolman’s misconception about Weber’s critical influence on Marcuse’s dealing with technology. It should be said that it was Heidegger’s essay Question Concerning Technology that influenced Marcuse.

Perhaps best explanation on this subject offers Mattick: The capital-labour relationship determines the unfolding of technological development as the accumulation of capital. Only within the frame of capital formation do science and technology expand the capacities of social production by increasing the productivity of labour. Under the social relations of capital production the given potentialities of socialized production cannot be fully realized, since their realization would destroy existing capitalist production relations. At a certain point in its development, capital becomes a hindrance to a further unfolding of the social forces of production, and, from the point of view of production, changes from a progressive into a regressive force. Only destruction of the capitalist system can now assure continued progressive social development. Marcuse himself points out that in Marxian theory ‘the social mode of production, not technics, is the basic historical factor.’ (...) For Marcuse, the
present technology is specific to, but not limited by, capitalism. It offers a way out for capitalism and is therefore the most important obstacle to its abolition. For Marx, too, science and technology are specific to capitalism, but only in the sense that their direction and development find their determination and limitations in capitalist relations of production. Should these relations be abolished, science and technology could take on an unhampered and different course, in accordance with the conscious and rational decisions of fully-socialized man. For Marx, it is neither science nor technology which constitutes a system of domination, but it is the domination of labour by capital which – with everything else – turns science and technology into instrumentalities of exploitation and class rule. In Marcuse’s view, however, it is no longer capitalism which determines the state and nature of technology; it is technology which determines the state and nature of capitalism (...) Yet, all that capitalism can accomplish in this way, even in Marcuse’s view, is its own maintenance by keeping technological progress within the boundaries of class domination. But as this technology finds – by and large – the support of all layers of society by satisfying their material needs, it can assure its domination over, and its growth within, class society” [45; pp.9-10].

i.e. One can notice that One-Dimensional Man is written under the influence of Hegelian and Marxian categories and dialectics. As Kellner points out: “In retrospect, One-Dimensional Man articulates precisely the Hegelian-Marxian philosophical project that Marcuse began developing in the 1930s in his work with the Frankfurt School” [46; p.xviii]. Another example: in Eros and Civilization in the part where Marcuse discusses the possibility of eros’ victory over thanatos, one can notice that Marcuse is closely following and building on Heidegger’s being-toward death.

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