Conceptual Analysis and Normative Inquiry in Sport
A Cautionary Note

Abstract
Bernard Suits’s classic definitions of games and sport have been widely credited as important philosophical achievements. I share that laudable view of his definitional work. But in this essay I warn against a growing tendency in the philosophy of sport literature to gloss Suits’s definition of these key concepts as metaphysical achievements as well, as discoveries of the true essences of games and sport. I focus my critical attention on the most recent example of such metaphysical overreach, Colin McGinn’s account of games featured in his recent book, *Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy*. I argue that McGinn’s metaphysical interpretation of Suits’s conceptual analysis of games and sport is ill-conceived and examine the normative fallout of interpreting Suits in this way.

Keywords
conceptual analysis, normative inquiry, metaphysics, essence, social features

The effort to get a conceptual handle on sport, to define its necessary and sufficient conditions, has been a central topic in the philosophy of sport literature. It is widely agreed that Bernard Suits’s definition of sport, spelt out in his classic essay, “The Elements of Sport”, in which he defines sport as a type of game primarily distinguished by the accent it places on physical skill, comes closest, if not succeeds, in accomplishing this impressive conceptual feat. I am an ardent admirer of his philosophical achievement in this regard, and have, therefore, no quibbles with his definition as such. Rather, what concerns me, and what I want to target in the present essay, is the misuse of Suits’s definition of sport by philosophers who gloss it as an important metaphysical discovery of the true essence of sport. The most recent, but only the latest, example of such metaphysical overreach and abuse is Colin McGinn’s analysis of games (and by implication sport) featured in his recent book *Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy*, which claims Suits’s definition is not only a conceptual tour de force but a metaphysical one as well.¹ I will argue that McGinn’s metaphysical claim on behalf of Suits’s definition is ill-founded, and focus on the normative fallout of interpreting Suits in this dubious way.

¹ For another prominent exponent of glossing Suits’s definition of sport in this metaphysical way, see John Russell (2018).
Before I proceed with my criticism of McGinn, I first need to present Suits’s definition of sport that served as McGinn’s point of departure. Since Suits held, however, as noted above, that sport is a type of game, any adequate definition of sport must begin with a definition of games.

According to Suits, games have four necessary elements. The first element is what he calls their pre-lusory goal, which he characterises as the specific state of affairs that game-players aim to achieve. So the pre-lusory goal of chess is to arrange the pieces on the board in a way that immobilises the opponent’s king, in a footrace to cross the finish line first. The second element of games he identifies as how one attempts to achieve the pre-lusory goal. In this regard, one can avail oneself of the means prescribed by the rules, which Suits calls the lusory means, or of the means proscribed by the rules, which he calls the illusory means. Of course, one can win a game only by following its permissible lusory means. The third element of games is their constitutive rules, which for Suits is the main element that distinguishes games from the legion of means-ends activities that human agents typically engage in. For unlike these non-game means and ends activities in which human agents save in rare occasions seek the most efficient means to achieve their goals, in games the rules expressly prohibit the use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means for achieving their pre-lusory goals. It is, for example, useful but forbidden in chess to immobilise the opponent’s king by glueing it to the board; it is similarly useful but prohibited in a footrace to trip one’s opponent. Game-rules by design place unnecessary obstacles in the path of game-players’ attempt to achieve pre-lusory goals. The point of doing so is precisely to create artificial challenges that make games the alluring affairs that so many people find them to be. The fourth and final element of games differs from the other three in that it concerns the attitude we must have in playing them, what Suits calls the lusory attitude. He characterises the latter as the knowing acceptance of the rules just because the activity made possible by such acceptance can occur (2014, ch. 3).

To play a game then, involves trying to accomplish a specific state of affairs (the pre-lusory goal), using means permitted by the rules (lusory means), in which the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less efficient means (constitutive rules), and in which the rules are accepted just because they make the activity possible (lusory attitude). Since Suits’s main thesis is that all sports are games, the very same four elements that mark an activity as a game also mark an activity as a sport. But only partially, because sport is defined further by several other elements. To begin with, sport is a game of skill, which distinguishes it from games of chance (dice games, show-down, etc.). Further, and notably, sport is a game of physical skill, which distinguishes it from board games (chess, checkers) and card games (bridge, poker). These latter two kinds of games are, of course, games of skill as well, but in which, unlike sport, the skills called on do not depend on, and are not assessed in terms of, how players physically move or manipulate game tokens (chess pieces, playing cards). Suits also appended two further elements that he identified as necessary conditions for something being a sport. They are that it must have a wide-following, which distinguishes sport from personal, private idiosyncratic activities, and that it must have some measure of institutional stability, by which he means the development of ancillary social roles such as teachers, coaches, researchers, critics, etc., which distinguishes sport from fads like Hula-Hoop.2
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With Suits’s definition of games and sport accounted for, I can now take up McGinn’s metaphysical rendering of it. As McGinn sees it, Suits is to be credited not only for having defined games and sport, for explicating their necessary and sufficient conditions, but as well for having discovered their very essences, those essential features that make them the special kinds of human endeavour they at bottom are. This is the bold metaphysical thesis Colin McGinn unveils in *Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy*. It is in this work that he salutes Suits for having restored his faith in the classical conceptual analysis as the go-to method for grasping not only the objective reality of games but of most of the furniture of the universe to boot. In this same vein, McGinn further praises Suits for having shown the way to reverse the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy, to discredit the idea that philosophy is preeminent “about concepts” rather than about the mind-independent world. I argue contrarily, however, that Suits’s conceptual analysis of games and sport is hardly the *cause celebre* for the brand of metaphysical realism that philosophers like McGinn take it to be, and that far from showing the way to dispense with the linguistic turn Suits’s conceptual work, in fact, merely confirms how the way we use concepts like games and sport and talk about them is indispensable to what we take them to be and what meanings we ascribe to them.

The allure of Suits’s conceptual analysis of games to metaphysical realists like McGinn is easy to understand. After all, it was Suits who took Wittgenstein to task for asking the wrong question about games, “whether all things called games have something in common”, rather than the right question, “whether all things that are games have something in common” (2014, 199). Wittgenstein’s cardinal mistake, then, was to focus only on the things called games, since, obviously enough, things called games are often so-called “metaphorically or carelessly or arbitrarily or stupidly”. Following this linguistic script is a surefire way to torpedo any attempt to define games, to discover their essential features. Asking after only those things that are games, however, Suits insists, is the only fruitful way we have to determine if there is anything common that lies behind the concept of games, that explains why the things we lump under this concept belong there, why they should be so classified. Being called a game cannot be the common feature we are after, “because that is not a feature of the thing but of our language about things, and one of the chief purposes of definition is to make our referential language more exact” (2014, 202). Determining those features of the thing referred to by, but not reducible to, our concept of a game is also, it hardly needs saying, the aim of metaphysical inquiries into the nature of sport that interested McGinn and that prompted his interest in and appreciation of Suits’s conceptual analysis of games.

According to Suits, and after him McGinn, the other cardinal mistake that Wittgenstein made that prevented him from grasping what features games have in common is that he trained his sights on the surface resemblances of games, on their perceptible, observable features. That this is indeed an important mistake, Suits remarked, is easy enough to spot, since at the level of sensible appearance a cop chasing a thief on the street looks an awful lot like

However, it should be noted most admirers and critics of Suits’s definition have routinely ignored these latter two social and historical elements. For an account that treats this omission as a critical mistake see my forthcoming essay “Games and Sport”.

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runners in a footrace chasing a lead runner. It is only if we drill down deeper into games, if we abstract from surface resemblances and the contingencies of time and place, that we will be able, pace Suits, to discover the structural features that games share in common. Only employing such abstraction, therefore, will be able to sort out the objective properties that distinguish the very different activity of a cop chasing a crook from runners chasing one another in a footrace. The same goes, again, for metaphysical investigations of the game and the like, which is why McGinn insists that philosophic analysis qua conceptual analysis is a wholly abstract, a priori rather than an empirical matter.³

However, I don’t think Suits’s conceptual analysis of games can be credited either for showing how we can simply shove aside language or how we can make do in a purely a priori way in our analysis of games without taking into account the contingencies of time and place. To be clear, my criticism is not again that there is something wrong with Suits’s definition of a game, that he shouldn’t be genuinely praised for having discovered commonalities in things that are games and sport whether called such or not. Rather, what I want to dispute is McGinn’s claim that his definition doubles as a metaphysical achievement as well. I want to take issue, therefore, with the idea that conceptual analysis is the way to get at the essence of games and sport, to discover those objective, mind-independent and linguistic-independent properties that mark them as the things that they are. More specifically, I dispute that the properties of games and sport that Suits’s uncovers belong exclusively on the object side rather than on the linguistic side of conceptual inquiry, that they capture what games and sport are in themselves rather than our concept or idea of games and sport. In my view, the features picked out by our concepts of games and sport, our talk about them and the vocabularies we use to evaluate them, cannot somehow be detached from our concepts of games and sport such that they bear no trace of the descriptive and normative markers laid down by them.

My counter-thesis that there is no way sport is apart from our descriptions of what we purport it is, to include what we take to be its main purpose and central properties, derives from Rorty’s important claim that “we can only inquire about things under a description” (Rorty, 1991, 99).⁴ That means any conceptual investigation of sport, of its main properties, cannot help but take its point of departure from the different ways we describe it and in terms of the different human interests that inform these descriptions. So trying to inquire what sport is or should be when we try to rid, to parrot William James, all traces of the human serpent over it is a non-starter. For what sport is or should be under no description at all, is simply unknowable, if not unimaginable.

A closer look at Suits’s conceptual analysis of sport, contra McGinn, suggests as much. For the data Suits relied on to come up with his definition were derived from what he termed “hardcore” games, hardcore in the sense that if the things that fall into this class are not games then nothing is. He thus included in this class such noncontroversial instances of games as “bridge, baseball, golf, hockey, [and] chess” (2014, 164). Now what he claimed next about these can’t miss examples of games is often overlooked, but crucial to his entire account, namely, that “all [these] things [are] called games” (Ibid.). What is important about Suits’s remark should be obvious, since it shows that the starting point of his conceptual inquiry was nothing other than a particular description of sport that depicts it as some sort of attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles just so we can be about meeting the challenges they pose.
This description, of course, chimes with our familiar interest in sport as a contrived affair meant to test a wide array of skills that were it not for these social practices themselves would otherwise have no utility to speak of. Further, his interest in this particular description and idea of games and sport explains his decided lack of interest in another familiar description and concept of a game expressed in utterances like “don’t play games with me”. This common description of games reflects our interest in games as con activities that give human agents and opportunity to indulge their fancy for cunning and deception in their interpersonal relationships with one another. Suits’s description of games and sport has very little in common with the latter description of them. In fact, he makes no bones about his disinterest in games as deceptive con activities, going out of his way in his magisterial book *The Grasshopper* to make clear to his readers that the concept of a game he was working with was not the same concept Eric Berne of *Games People Play* fame was working with – which was entirely dedicated to examining how people in their social interactions slyly try to get under one another’s skins.

*Contra* McGinn then, Suits’s definition of sport was indeed a description of sport, as he noted in his account of the hardcore games he drew his definition from, and not, as he insinuated in other passages of *The Grasshopper* that McGinn seized on, an analysis of its unadulterated, worldly essence. So Suits’s claim to have uncovered those features that belong exclusively to games and sport themselves rather than to our language about them doesn’t hold up. What goes for Suits’s here goes as well, of course, for McGinn’s claim that Suits had indeed scored a metaphysical coup by having conceptually wrung out the essential features of games. But, to reiterate, Suits has done no such thing, since the features of games he laid out were one and all descriptive-dependent ones, and, therefore, inseparable from the vocabularies we use to talk about them. The central point I’m trying to get across here, then, is that there is no way sport is under no description at all, since things in the world like sport can’t, as it were, speak for themselves, can’t mandate they be described in certain terms, their very own. To put the same point in Putnam’s words, the “elements of what we call ‘language’ or ‘mind’ penetrate so deeply into what we call ‘reality’ that the very project of representing ourselves as being mappers of something ‘language-independent’ is fatally compromised from the start” (Putnam, 1990, 20).

My main concern with this metaphysical reading of Suits, however, is on the normative front, in which McGinn’s interpretation of Suits as having discovered the essence of games naturally lends itself to the thesis that normative disputes about how sport should be conducted can all be neatly and effectively settled by appealing to its essence. The basic idea here is that the essence of sport gives us an objective fact of the matter that we can use as our criterion for adjudicating disputes over what is and should be the aim of sport rightly understood. I have already argued, however, that McGinn is mistaken in this regard, that he has instead given us a description of a game that cannot be hived off from the vocabulary in which that description is rooted, not, that

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3 McGinn here once again praises Suits’s conceptual analysis of games for further showing that philosophy is not the naturalistic enterprise that Quine would have us believe that it is when he insisted it is “continuous with science” (VIII).

4 For ease of exposition, I will when feasible from this point on restrict my attention to the concept of sport. Of course, since all sports are games, what I have to say in the ensuing analysis about sport applies equally to games.
is, without distortion. But McGinn’s misreading of Suits’s description as a discovery of the essence of sport is compounded when we venture into normative territory, since it takes no notice of the fact that the reason why Suit’s description was pitched at such a high abstract level, why it abstracted from all the social and historical contingencies of game-playing, was that it was keyed to a single definitional purpose, namely, to account for the properties that all games and sport share in common. And I, like many others, think Suits admirably succeeded in accomplishing this definitional purpose.

But in giving a metaphysical gloss of Suits’s description, the effect of which was to jack up the abstract character of the descriptive properties Suits identified to yet a higher level, McGinn paid no mind to the fact that such an abstract description of sport is not useful in the least when we are presented with normative conflicts over whether, for instance, sport should be played and valued primarily as end-in-itself or as mere means to achieve extra-athletic ends. It’s of no normative use at all in such cases because it is too abstract, because what is in dispute in such cases is not whether participants in sport should be about trying to overcome artificial obstacles to exhibit their athletic excellence, but rather about how they should go about trying to prove their athletic excellence, what skills and mix of skills are crucial in this respect, and what attitudes and other human qualities are required to play a well-played game ethically and aesthetically speaking.

In the space I have remaining I can only briefly sketch out my main worry here. That worry is that in misreading Suits in this metaphysical way, McGinn not only elides the fact that these so-called essential properties of sport are descriptive ones, but further, and crucially, that they are social/institutional ones, and that they make up only a small subset of the different social properties we ascribe to sport at different times and places depending on our varying human interests in sport. This is important because institutional properties, as Searle tells us, possess two distinguishing features: (1) institutional properties qualify as such only under a description, and (2) only under a description agreed to and accepted by a community (Searle, 2010, 116). This distinguishes institutional properties both from what Searle calls natural, “brute” properties, for, example, the basic, physical movements featured in different sports, which are what they are independent of how we describe them and of the historical contexts in which they are instantiated, and what McGinn calls essential metaphysical features of sports, which likewise are what they are supposedly independently of how we describe them and of the social and historical contexts in which they are instantiated. On both this naturalistic and metaphysical account of sport, then, the idea that a particular athletic community’s description of sport and its acceptance of that description has anything to do with what sport is and how it should be played is too far-fetched to be entertained let alone seriously pursued.

I’m on record, of course, as thinking this is a big mistake, especially, again, in our normative inquiries into sport. But first I need to make clear the distinction Searle is making here and its importance for my present criticism of McGinn. Let us begin with his distinction between brute, natural facts, and social, institutional ones as it figures in a sport like baseball. Before the invention of this game, human beings had, of course, from time immemorial hurled and struck at objects in various ways and for various, but perhaps mainly, instrumental purposes. What they did they did naturally, so to speak, since neither their purposes nor their actions required or depended on some institution for their intelligibility or meaning. But what they never did nor could do was throw a runner out at first base, or pitch a one-hitter, or hit a homerun, or score more
runs than their opponent, all of which had to await the invention of baseball. Pitching a one-hitter, hitting a homerun, and the like, are institutional actions since they require and depend on an institution, and, as a consequence, require and depend on the assignment of a purpose to make their actions intelligible to players and to those who watch them. The assignment of an institutional purpose, in turn, introduces normative criteria of assessment, since to say something has a purpose is to say some ways of realising that purpose are better than others, and, therefore, that certain non-moral and moral properties of sport are crucial to the realisation of that designated purpose. As institutional facts about sport, therefore, none of them can be read off of or reduced to the natural physical actions of throwing or striking, or whatever natural, pre-institutional actions we might care to mention. That is why these institutional non-moral and moral facts about sport count as such only under a description and only if they are in concurrence with what the members of the relevant community believe about them.

When we bring back McGinn’s metaphysical picture of sport as constituted by essential properties, we can see that his effort to write off the properties of a game like baseball as ahistorical, asocial, timeless, a priori properties, similarly denies their social/institutional standing as well as that the aim of this or any other sport has anything to do with a historical community’s acceptance of a certain description of them. On this metaphysical rendering, the purpose of sport is as simple as it is forever fixed: to provide human agents with an opportunity, in Suitsian jargon, to exercise and display their physical skills in overcoming contrived obstacles. This supposed metaphysical fact regarding the point and purpose of sport becomes thereby, as previously noted, the normative criterion for what counts as a good, well-played game, the objective fact of the matter that we can rely on to guide our thinking of how sport should be done. However, this not only gives us a much too abstract conception of the purpose of sport to be of any real help in determining how we should do sport, but a false picture of sport as a static human practice not in any significant way affected by the contingencies of time and place. And in bracketing the social and historical contexts in which sport is practised, it brackets as well what role our community agreement as to what is the purpose of sport plays in our normative conflicts and responses to them. For just as the fact that the green piece of paper in my pocket is a five-dollar bill if and only if my peers and I agree that it is, or that the small blue-covered sheath of pages I take with me when I travel abroad is a passport, once again, if and only if my peers and I agree that it is, so too is the fact that the purpose of sport is what it is, yet once again, if and only if my peers and I agree that it is.

This sidelining of the social and historical features sport picks up at different times and places matters especially in hard normative cases in sport in which we disagree over what is the purpose of sport, which is the source of further disagreements over what counts as an athletic body, what substances or types of equipment are integral or alien to athletic perfection, and the like. We fail to give normative due to the social and historical contexts that give rise to these types of conflicts and to the social norms by which we understand and rationally respond to them when we insist they all answer to the same purpose.

In previous papers, I have made a point of highlighting the conflict between English gentleman-amateur conception of sport and the American professional conception of sport that so vexed the modern Olympic Games at the turn of the twentieth century. This has been my main example of the sort of normative conflict that gets lost sight of when we fly at too high a reflective altitude to even notice conflicts of this kind, let alone to deal with them. The
purpose of sport according to the amateur community’s acceptance of the description of sport as a gentlemanly undertaking is what accounted for its view of sport as an avocational pastime that should be pursued for the love of the game itself rather than for any instrumental benefits that might be obtained by engaging in it. By contrast, the purpose of sport according to the professional community’s acceptance of the description of sport as a career open to talent is what accounted for its serious, winning oriented, vocational take on athletic competition. Just then as feminists objected to the concepts of “lady” and “gentleman” because of the deontology it committed them to, which required they play a certain passive social role they wanted no part of it, so amateurs objected to the concept of the professional athlete because of the deontology it committed them to, which required they give their all to winning, and professionals objected to the concept of the gentleman athlete because of the deontology it committed them to, which required they play the role of the leisurely dilettante. The same is true of the clash between anti-doping proponents, who insist that natural talent is a necessary, indispensable element of athletic endeavour, and doping proponents who see it only as an inequalitarian scourge, or proponents of disability sports who think running on carbon blades is indeed running and should be treated as such and those who think of running on carbon blades as something other than running that might give dis-abled athletes an unfair advantage over able-bodied ones. These and countless other complex normative cases require we forsake abstract, metaphysical accounts of the purpose of sport that do not do justice to the social and historical contexts in which such conflicts get a grip on us and test our reflective mettle.

To sum up then, my criticism of metaphysical treatments of sport of the kind McGinn went in for speaks to a larger point about normative inquiry in particular and philosophical inquiry in general. That point is that while Suits and McGinn were right to take Wittgenstein to task for only attending to the observable perceptible features of games, they were wrong to infer that philosophical/normative inquiry rightly understood is mostly, if not entirely, an a priori, abstract affair, as opposed to an importantly empirical one. Contrarily, I think philosophical inquiry in general and normative inquiry in particular are, rightly understood, in significant measure empirical affairs in the sense that the historical and social contingencies that mark and chart the different interests we take in, and value things like sport are crucial both to the salience and cogency of such investigations. I would like to close my essay then with a caveat Nietzsche penned in his Twilight of the Idols that makes my critical point much better and far more eloquently than I am capable:

“You ask me what all idiosyncrasy is in philosophers? (...) For instance, their lack of the historical sense (...) They imagine that they do honor to a thing by divorcing it from history sub specie aeterni – when they make a mummy of it. All the ideas that philosophers have treated (...) have been mummmified concepts; nothing real has ever come out of their hands alive. These idolaters of concepts (...) threaten the life of everything they adore.” (Nietzsche, 2007, 17)\(^5\)

**Literature**


William J. Morgan

**Konzeptuelle Analyse und normative Untersuchung im Sport**

**Ein Warnhinweis**


Bernard Williams provides a positive gloss on Nietzsche’s admonition: “The reflective understanding of our ideas and motivations, which I take to be (…) a philosophical aim, is going to involve historical understanding. Here history helps philosophical understanding, or is part of it. Philosophy has to learn the lesson that conceptual description (or, conceptual analysis) is not self-sufficient; and that such projects as deriving our concepts a priori from universal conditions of human life (…) are likely to leave unexplained many features that provoke philosophic enquiry.” (Williams, 2006, 192)
und Sport zu beschönigen. Ich konzentriere meine kritische Aufmerksamkeit auf das jüngste Bei-
spiel für eine solche metaphysische Überanstrengung, auf Colin McGinns Bericht über Spiele, 
der in seinem kürzlich erschienenen Buch, Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy, 
vorgestellt wurde. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, dass McGinns metaphysische Interpretation von
Suits’ konzeptueller Analyse der Spiele und des Sports schlecht konzipiert ist und untersuche 
den normativen Fallout einer auf diese Weise ausgeführten Auslegung Suits’.

Schlüsselwörter
konzeptuelle Analyse, normative Untersuchung, Metaphysik, Essenz, soziale Merkmale

William J. Morgan

Analyse conceptuelle et enquête normative dans le sport

Remarque

Résumé
Les définitions classiques des jeux et du sport de Bernard Suits ont été largement reconnues 
comme un acquis important en philosophie. Je partage ce point de vue louable mais dans cet
essai je mets en garde contre une tendance croissante dans la littérature philosophique du sport 
à masquer la définition suitienne de ces concepts clés par des concepts métaphysiques, et à les 
considérer comme la découverte de l’essence réelle des jeux et du sport. Je concentre toute mon 
attention critique sur le plus récent des exemples d’un tel abus métaphysique, sur les considéra-
tions de Colin McGinn sur les jeux dans son livre Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philo-
sophy, publié récemment. J’affirme que l’interprétation métaphysique de McGinn de l’analyse 
conceptuelle des jeux et du sport élaboré par Suits est malavisée et j’examine les conséquences 
normatives d’une telle interprétation.

Mots-clés
analyse conceptuelle, enquête normative, métaphysique, essence, propriétés sociales