Republicanism as a critical idiom: whose, whom against, and what for?¹*

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Summary

The aim of the paper is to draw briefly the discourse-theoretical foundations to the republican political theory (section 1), with the issue of slave/slavery as a pivotal concern of social and political life (section 2), and then to chart the most interesting consequences for the contemporary versions of the theory as proposed by the key authors (closing paragraphs of section 2, and section 3). The overarching message of the paper reads that republicanism is founded on a specific view of human nature as ens loquens, or zoon logon echon, that has important implications both empirically and normatively. The third, and final, section of the paper enlists six proposals, or suggestions, to contemporary republicans for the purpose of elucidating, first, the limits of republican theory/practice, and second, its intellectual origins as well as its opposition. Summarily, the paper lays emphasis as well on the status of republican language as a critical idiom with its pluralist, highly contextualized, and often programmatic/engaged voices.

Keywords: republicanism; slavery; discourse-ethics; discursive dignity; critical idiom; classical Greece and Rome

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¹ I have been fortunate to have received an inspiring and largely sympathetic comment on the paper, mostly on the third, and the final paragraphs of the second, section, from some key authors of contemporary republicanism: John Braithwaite, Philip Pettit, and Quentin Skinner. For this I thank them wholeheartedly. I decided to add some of their comment, mostly verbatim, to the final draft of the paper because I view this essay as a product of collective effort. However, for any misinterpretation, or perhaps a wrongly placed emphasis, generally as well as in relation to the comment, responsibility lies solely on me.
1 Discourse-theoretical (and -ethical) foundations

Language can be theorized as a collective body maker without too many obstacles. If I pass on to one information concerning an event from a distant past to which I bore witness, I thereby serve to one as an additional pair of eyes, or as "auxiliary eyes." I enable her or him, simply by the words I utter, to 'see' (at first in the sense of 'visualize') some events that s/he would not have 'seen,' or visualized, otherwise.

Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1988, 99) starts one of his essays by stating that, "If I blindfold you and take you into your kitchen, there is a reasonable chance that you will be able to find your way around without bumping into things. But if I have rearranged the furniture, then you will be in trouble. I can warn you: 'Watch out – I have moved the table into the middle of the room,' and once again you should be able to avoid colliding with it." Johnson-Laird presents this situation simply to pose a number of questions concerning the mental maps by which we construct meaning and discourse generally. However, he does not draw a very simple inference that I think should be drawn. Again, obviously, the purpose of the language use is to increase one's perceptual capacity and thus create a collective body in the sense of a structure made by mutual borrowings between the individual bodies – the blindfolded person (call him John) cannot see the differently arranged items in his kitchen, but if he speaks English, the fellow language-user (call her Ana) can guide him by uttering some words. Ana thus serves to John as his eyes, or as a 'prosthetic device' for his eyes, and does so simply through the power of her words.

Imagine now a bit more complicated situation. Granddad told Ted to bring him some water from a nearby water-spring. Ted understood the message since he learned the English language. He then went to the spring and returned to tell the following story: "Here is the water for you; it seems fresh and clean today, even cooler than yesterday. Along the way I met John. He inquired about you, your mood and health. He added that he would like to come for a visit. I invited him, and told him also that you are now fully recovered after the flu."

This super-simple example tells us that the granddad benefits considerably from Ted's discourse: Ted acts as his granddad's hands, but also as his eyes (he met John, but the granddad also saw the meeting through Ted's words), his ears (he passed on John's message to his granddad), and also his 'voice' (he told John what he believed his granddad would tell if he himself met John); finally, we should bear in mind that Ted acts in the same fashion on behalf of John, too (to whom he described his granddad's health-condition and from whom he received a message he then passed on to his granddad). Bear in mind that, every day, there are hundreds of
situations in which the roles of ‘Tad’, ‘graddad’, and ‘John,’ are played and replayed – we constantly rely on the others for the passage of indirect messages, the description of persons and events, and for mutual help with works generally.

In other words, language does not help one only in the sphere of perception; it does so also in the sphere of acting as it enables one to do some things on behalf of another, or help another, or make an arrangement for a mutual help; all you need is a polite request, or a mutual agreement, or a promise – the verbal stuff. Have also in mind that such ‘giving of hands,’ or creation of ‘extended hands,’ mediated by the use of language, is initially enabled by the mothers’ instruction to their infants to “bring the toy” or “give the toy to daddy,” and similar, which is a part of the daily language learning routine: as a part of such a routine, the child is trained as well to cooperate and assist his or her elders on the basis of a verbal pattern.

As Fiona Cowie (in Dessalles 2010, 887) put it, “Two heads are really better than one, and the only way you can reliably link those heads is via language.” Or, as Quine and Ullian (1978, 50) put it: “Two basic ways in which language serves us are these: as a means of getting others to do what we want them to, and as a means of learning from others what we want to know. In the one way it affords us, vicariously, more hands to work with; in the other, more eyes to see with.”

An attentive reader must have noticed that this view of language (let’s abbreviate it as LCBM – ‘language as a collective body maker’) depends on things going rather well in the ethical sense. Hence, the notion of LCBM enables us to explain why some discursive-moral values are, and have to be, cherished and promoted in the society of the language-using beings. Such beings cannot make the collective body in the form of, and via, language without also supporting a number of values, or standards, that we normally relate to the use of language: truths, meanings, reasons, and promises (all those taken emphatically as moral values, hence, as guidelines to an actual both verbal and non-verbal conduct). For instance, I will successfully pass the meanings of some propositions uttered by A to a third party, B, only if and when I don’t impute some additional meanings, or connotations, to A, which implies a standard of objective correctness and stability meaning-wise. Perhaps needless to add, in some contexts such imputation takes place frequently, with detrimental effects on all the parties concerned (e.g. heated political debates; for one interesting case of political imputation in a sensitive context, see Pehar 2016d). Or, via my language I serve to my

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2 Sources for such a perspective on language are too numerous to be all enlisted here; they include Roman Jakobson, Donald Davidson, Marco Iacoboni, Jean-Louis Dessalles, and Michael Tomasello, among many others; for further references, see Pehar (2016b) and (2016c).
fellow-humans indeed as ‘auxiliary pair of eyes’ only if I pass on to them true, i.e. accurate and sincere, descriptions of the environment. Or, once I receive a promise from someone that s/he would help me do so-and-so, s/he would actually serve as my “extended, or auxiliary, hands” only if s/he makes good on her, or his, promise; otherwise, she will betray my expectations, mislead me, and waste my time. This does not mean that exceptions, i.e. deliberate ad hoc or temporary violations, are impossible, or forbidden in all contexts, but it means that one needs to have a special, and plausible, reason to justify the exception (for more detail, see Pehar 2016c). Summarily, communication rests on a common ethos to which every human being is gradually, but securely, introduced from the first days of life to the years of full intellectual maturity.

Historically, socially, politically, and philosophically, the idea of LCBM, together with the idea of ‘discursive-moral’ values/standards, has several extremely interesting consequences. First, obviously, here we have a clear case of discourse-ethics in vivo. We have an unequivocal and straightforward explanation why we tend to attribute some moral values to the use of discourse. However, let us also immediately note that this is discourse-ethics in a limited, narrow sense of the word: ethics that pertains only to discourse, ethics to which we are committed narrowly, as long as we figure, and view and present ourselves, as language-using beings (it obviously pertains also to our general agency, but only to the extent the latter depends on, and reflects, our use of language).

Second, LCBM gives us a pretty sound basis on which we can, I think unobjectionably, describe the cases of violation of the moral-discursive values in terms of harm inflicted on our both individual and collective bodies: for instance, lying may be presented as a case of external exploitation of an internalized collective body of language to achieve some purposes that in the victims’ individual bodies produce some effects that the victims cannot want to be produced there: hence, we say that lies are ‘misleading,’ or that lies ‘cloud’ or ‘blind’ our judgment, or ‘throw dust’ in our eyes, and similar (all the metaphors implying rightfully a direct bodily

3 ‘Reasons’ are devices for dealing with the cases of temporary disagreement, or suspicion, for instance, when I need to check one’s sincerity or to remove a doubt about a string of one’s discourse; the primary aim of the seeking and giving of reasons is to restore trust and reestablish agreement in views, that is, to find out the truths in a more indirect, discourse-mediated, than a direct, or perception- or experiment-based, fashion. Of course, the capacity of the narrative-making is a hugely important part of the ability to construct and supply reasons. And, in such a sense, the capacity of argumentation must have occurred pretty early in the evolutionary history of the speaking mankind, as Jean-Louis Dessalles pointed out.

4 In this I think I disagree with the versions of discourse-ethics as proposed by Habermas and Apel; in contrast to the two, I prefer empirically and practically weightier versions: for more detail, see Appendix to Pehar (2016b).
harm). The notion of LCBM, therefore, makes it easy to understand why, in an overwhelming majority of cases, the victim of a lie, together with all the discourse-supporting discourse-users, views the lie as a humiliating and degrading experience comparable to the animal’s being ensnared or entrapped.\footnote{To remind, the English noun ‘deception’ is rooted in the Latin ‘decapio’ (‘to ensnare’).} Also, as Sissela Bok (1999, 26–7, 30–1) eloquently emphasized, lying has as well a negative effect on the factor of ‘social trust’, which supplies a foundation to any kind of civilized society, and thus involves some harm in the sense of stalling and preventing our continued creation of the collective and discourse-based body more generally (see also Williams 2002).

Third, once a person reached the stage of satisfactory verbal and intellectual maturity, s/he must have already internalized a big bag of tradition involving many individual bodies other than her, or his, own. This implies that, as we become competent users of language, we necessarily also become much more than ‘this’ individual body with ‘this’ individual history – we become a cluster of many individual voices and “seeings-as,” a cluster into which many persons have, primarily linguistically, invested their own eyes, ears, hands, and their own experiences, visions, propositions, and schemes. Thus, each and every mature human being is a ‘Hobbesian Leviathan’ (for the meaning and origins of the book frontispiece that include ‘Hercules/Ogmios’ by Lucian, see Skinner 2008a, 170–3, 190–198) built by many months and years of ‘mutual contracting’ that ensured his or her own peace, safety, and stability as a language-user. Hence, the distinction between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ in the realm of the discourse-using beings can have only a very limited applicability, if at all – in the world of discourse, everyone is both an individual and a voice of a collective, both a partly idiosyncratic and a partly conformist agent.

Socially, and politically in particular, two further ideas can be derived from the theory of the LCBM with its discourse-ethical underpinning. First, it is by means of language that we considerably increase the power of both collective associations and individuals in the sense of the capacity to do and grasp things. This means that, perhaps contrary to the established ways of thinking, ethics of a kind (discourse-ethics) correlate positively with ‘(social and political) power’. Have in mind, for instance, that, as in the old fable, after the boy shouted ‘wolf’ when there was none, the villagers’ vigilance declined exposing them to the external dangers to a much higher degree; this means that the power of the village decreases by the work or empowerment of untruthful individuals, and thus, obviously, when reverse conditions hold, its power increases.\footnote{And here is how Geoffrey Miller (2001, 342) imagines the last thought of a dying Pleistocene mammoth killed by a hunting group of our human ancestors: “I am extinguished by...”}
The second idea is equally relevant to our social and political existence and networking. Imagine any two persons caught in a serious conflict on an important social or political matter calling for an urgent resolution. We may think of all kinds of the non-verbal resolving of the conflict: fist-fight, or bribery, or retreat due to some unexpected development. However, we normally think of verbal and negotiation-mediated kinds of resolution as more stable ones, as those that human beings should normally prefer to the others due to a number of factors: for instance, compared to a fist-fight, they save a lot of energy and, in normal conditions, do not involve the degrading of any of the relevant parties, or severe risks to them. Then you can think of the following three kinds as the most prominent, the clearest, and also the most stable cases: binding arbitration or judicial decision, a mutual agreement, or compromise, preceded by negotiations, and, third, a resolution upon a non-binding advice, or consultancy, by a third, external and neutral party.

Now, for all such types of resolution to hold, endure, and remain effective, a number of criteria must be satisfied to the highest degree possible: the final discourse (arbitration, agreement, or resolution) must be supported by sufficiently strong reasons that cannot be opposed by the competing ones (the requirement of reason-support); second, evidence on which the final discourse is founded must be fairly gathered and constructed, which involves, among other things, true and honest witness-statements (the requirement of fairness in evidence-gathering); third, the final discourse needs to cohere well with the rules or laws, or conventions, that are already accepted in the society (the requirement of external coherence); fourth, the inner parts of the final discourse must not be mutually contradictory (the requirement of internal coherence) nor open to interpretive conflicts and queries of the extent and nature that could jeopardize the process of the discourse implementation (the requirement of the ability to avoid, or minimize, harm produced by ambiguities).

Finally, the discourse implementation may be successful only if it takes place against the background of the full upholding of all the moral-discursive values – for instance, such implementation needs to proceed on the premise of the stability of shared meaning including also a reasoned, implicit or explicit, agreement on the interpretable, or vague, provisions; moreover, the fundamental reasons for which discourse was accepted, or issued or passed, must be preserved, or remain valid, throughout the process of its implementation. (Also, perhaps needless to say, when discourse is amendable, some space needs to be left open to the process.

a bunch of little bodies that weave themselves, through that odd squeaking [language], into one great body with dozens of eyes, dozens of arms, and one lethal will.” This point, too, can serve well to emphasize the specificity of republican school of thought in political theory.
of amending, and public revision and contestation in part or completely/fundamentally.) In other words, the moral-discursive values, i.e. the discourse-ethical standards, are an inevitable prerequisite to every kind of stable, discourse-mediated, conflict-resolution procedure.

2 INTRODUCING ‘THE SLAVE’ AND THE REPUBLICAN THOUGHT

Now, let us propose a metaphor related to the discourse-ethics, and LCBM, as presented sketchily above. Imagine that, between any two human beings, there is a web or net of discourse that is placed or removed in accordance with some human actions or performances, or practices, of a primarily verbal, but to an extent also non-verbal kind. As the next step, imagine that one individual started violating to a more significant degree the discourse-ethical structure of the web that here serves as a primary medium of interaction. Then the web will be removed and the human interaction between the former language-users will cease to be mediated by language. Silence will descend over the two. Also, have in mind that, in the middle period, when language is both used and violated in terms of discourse-ethics, of the two participants to the discourse at least one, and possibly both, used “words as weapons,” that is, spoke language that is not a real language, but only a chimera of it.

Hence, summarily, for the process of removal of the web of discourse to take place, the two agents need to pass through three stages as follows: 1. A normal flow of discourse; 2. ‘Crooked language’, or language-violation in the sense of ‘promise-breaking’ or ‘meaning imputation,’ or ‘violation of a deductive form of inference’, or ‘sophistry,’ or ‘lying,’ or any other form of discourse-unfriendly act and practice; 3. The decision to relate to the other without any support by the web of discourse, or without the discourse-ethical backing or the LCBM. The last part obviously entails the view of the other as less-than-human, as a creature deprived of one of the essential attributes of humanity. Let us call this figure “a dediscoursified human”, or a discursively ‘barren’ human.

Politically, in both theory and practice, we have now arrived at a very interesting point. Because, the figure I have just depicted is easily identifiable as one of ‘the slave.’ Since the social relation that defines the figure is primarily of a discursive character, the figure is not limited only to the very ancient periods of ‘cave-based’ human history, and definitely is not limited

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7 Of course, the process can be considerably accelerated by some kind of cultural stipulations and stereotypes: “we lose in the periods of peace what we gain in the periods of war,” or, “We are born to wage a crusade, God decides about who is right”, and similar; for more on this, see Galtung (1965, 358–360) and Pehar (2016b, 56–8).
either to the manifest forms of slavery, or servitude, in which human beings suffer physically and mentally at the hands of other human beings, work their guts out, are killed or whipped, or mutilated, for no reason, or given very small food portions to barely survive.

Slavery goes much deeper than that and is more widespread, often in hardly visible formats. This means that you may have a constitution and the branching of governmental powers, and a bill of fundamental human rights in place, without those preventing one from enslaving another human being, or making slavery an important feature of the entire social edifice or network. As already suggested, all you need is a specific relation of a discursive kind that is also relevant to the entire polity, or a major part of it.  

For example, imagine that you have a constitutional court in your own country. Imagine further that you have a case on an important matter before the court. The court then passed in the case an obviously unjust and, depending on interpretation, either constitutionally dubious or straightforwardly unconstitutional decision resulting in a violation of some rights of a half of the population. An external power, an informal ‘boss’ to the court, then buys a major portion of the political class of the society to prevent them from opposing the decision even though the latter do not support, or sincerely believe in, it. Furthermore, imposing a cluster of amendments, the power soon changes the constitutional structure of the polity along the guidelines of the unjust decision, making it thus appear permanent. In the process, the super-strong reasons opposing the decision are simply ignored. Therefore, in violation of the original constitutional principles, a half of the population is forced to live under the yoke of an unfair structure created by an unfair decision, contrary to the soundest public, political and legal, reasons.

Of course, we can imagine a different outcome, for instance, a rebellion, or a violent protest by the part of the population to remove the unfair structure. However, if you pose seriously the question of what key means were used to enslave and subjugate the people, the answer lies, strictly speaking, in the fact of the discursive harm or injury: against the soundest possible reasons, and in clear violation of a given constitutional

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8 Importantly, the way I and many others theorize it, one can as well make oneself a slave by denying oneself as a moral-discursive being for some short-term gain; but, the condition may be, contrary to one’s real interest, prolonged indefinitely – interestingly, and importantly, the pictorial metaphor for endorsement of such a position is “bowing down of one’s head” or “kneeling” with one’s eyes and head turned downwardly – showing and signaling bodily the act of submission, and symbolizing beheading after, for instance, a military defeat; this relates directly to the idea of LCBM.

9 This is my own account of the process of the Dayton peace treaty implementation in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina as offered in Pehar (2019a).
structure, one is subjugated to the condition of ‘asking no questions’, ‘posing no whys’, ‘being prevented from offering counter-reasons, or from offering the reasons not to revise the constitution as it was in force not long ago’; one’s lips had been violently, and in the above scenario institutionally, shut, and if one decides to ‘speak to the power’, to complain or protest loudly, one is swiftly, and publicly, characterized as a ‘fascist’, or a ‘nationalist’, or ‘right-wing populist’, even a perpetrator of ‘hate-speech’; that is, one party has signaled to the other that the latter needs to close its lips and silently, and humbly, submit to the decision the former has imposed. The “boss” may then assume a more passive stance in the belief that the physical (or material, or financial, or organizational....) weaknesses of the disadvantaged party will discourage them from opposing the unfair decision more resolutely; or, the “boss”, i.e. the ‘slave-holding’ party, may opt for a more active policy by remaining silent formally and officially, while undermining, perhaps secretly, by massive ‘sticks and carrots’ every effort to modify the state of affairs in accordance with a more just blueprint.¹⁰

Hence, to repeat, ‘enslavement’ is a process that begins with a specific discursive attitude: reasons are blocked and truths are ignored, the dialogue is discontinued and discouraged, no talk on the relevant topic is allowed, and no room is left for the exchange of potentially plausible reasons, i.e. for negotiations and compromise. The situation in the US in the aftermath of the US Supreme Court 1857 ‘Dred Scott’ decision, and also one that Blackmon (2008) named as ‘neo-slavery’ or ‘slavery by another name’, may be as well offered as one of the most graphic examples of such discourse-dependent nature of slavery (for more detail, see Pehar 2016a and 2016c). Consequently, as I emphasized in my work on ‘dediscoursification,’ the treatment of one as a slave in the discourse-related sense is very likely to act as a cause of war (casus belli), which is also reflected in Cicero’s

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¹⁰ Interestingly, some of the first thoughts on slavery that we find in classical Greece, for example in Thucydides (Book I. 139–143) and Euripides’ Phoenician Women (lines 390–400), do frame the notion of slavery primarily in discourse-based terms. Also, to remind, Aristotle in Book I of the Politics defines the concept of the slave in terms of a being that can sense (aisthanesthai) Logos, but does not possess (me echein) it, which is again a discourse-theoretical approach. After having pondered many years on this issue, I came to the conclusion that the ‘dediscoursified’ character of the slave should be considered as primarily deriving from the fact that, legally, and then politically, ‘slave’ is a body owned by another body, with the proviso that the latter also functions as a ‘head’ to the former – such a relationship is, of course, stable only if the slave accepts voluntarily his or her position as a slave, and signals such an acceptance by the silence before injustice (which, again, is a discourse-theoretical notion). Also, closely related to this, such a notion of slavery is adequately reflected in the words by Saint-Just I quote in point v of section 3: “Servitude consists in being controlled by unjust laws.”
memorable words from the *Philippics*: “Servitutem pacem vocas?... Quae causa justior est belli gerendi, quam servitutis depulsio?”

Revival of the republican political tradition over the last two decades has inspired us to face again the figure of the slave, and discuss how and why, in terms of political theory, the figure seems unlikely to leave the stage of the modern or civilized, or ‘developed,’ world. Drawing on Quentin Skinner (1978, 1983, 1984) and John Pocock (1975), among others, Philip Pettit (1997) has assembled key ideas of the tradition, and presented them in a neat, readable, and widely cited format. His book was soon followed by Skinner’s own book *Liberty before Liberalism* (1998)12 and Viroli’s *Republicanism* (1999/2002). In the early 2000s, a number of further important books of the same outlook were published including the monographs by Iseult Honohan (2002) and John Maynor (2003), and two collections of essays edited by Weinstock and Nadeau (2004) and by Laborde and Maynor (2008) (importantly, see also Skinner 2002, and Skinner 2008b). However, it is not only historically relevant that one key precursor to the more recent books on republicanism was a book in criminology, a republican theory of criminal justice, jointly authored by John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit (1990).

Pettit was developing his ideas over a long period of time: when you compare the 1990 chapter on republican theory (in Braithwaite, Pettit 1990) with the 1997 version, you see that, understandably, in the former some important parts of the model are missing, and even the issues pertaining to nomenclature are not settled yet: for instance, ‘domination’ (the key term!) is in 1990 version named ‘dominion’;13 that was, of course, to be expected as theories and models are like the living creatures − they develop, branch,

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11 “You will call the relationship of slavery/servitude a peace? What cause for the waging of war is more just than the abolishment of slavery?” (Latin quote in Skinner 2002, 10–11, slightly amended)

12 See especially pages 24–35 for the description of how, in early English republicanism, the theory of ‘body politic’ is employed, which historically binds one key idea of the republican thought directly to the notion of LCBM.

13 The issues of nomenclature seem to remain unsettled to this day: in his comment Skinner appears even hesitant to use the term ‘republican freedom’ and explains his position as follows: “I don’t think it’s helpful to talk about ‘republican’ freedom. It’s true that there is a distinctive understanding of civil liberty that many early-modern anti-monarchists espoused, for example, in the English and American revolutions. They espoused, that is, the jurists’ view that the right way to grasp the concept of freedom is to consider what it means to be a slave, and that what it means to be a slave is to be subject (subiectum in the legal texts) to the will of a dominus. But many people who fully accepted this analysis, certainly in the Anglophone tradition, would have been horrified to be called republicans − most obviously, John Locke.” In his comment, Pettit seems to concede an important part of Skinner’s objection: “On ‘republican freedom’, however, there is something perhaps to add. I tried to replace the word ‘republican’ by a neologism, ‘civicist’, in a number of writings from about 2005 on. But no one else took it up, so I too dropped it. I’ve reconciled myself to ‘republican freedom’
grow, change, and mature. Importantly, one encompassing philosophical skeleton of the model was proposed in Pettit (2004) to which Pettit's book on the theory of freedom (Pettit 2001) was a necessary preparatory work. In the two publications one can, I think, recognize clearly that slavery is deemed a discursive, or discourse-based, condition, and that this has to be so simply because Pettit couches the notion of freedom in terms of ‘discursive control’ on which the idea of the capacity, or fitness, to be held responsible crucially depends (Pettit 2001). In other words, we are free to the extent that we are fit to be held responsible, i.e. to the extent that we can give a reasoned account of our behavior, or respond reasonably to the call by the others to give such an account, and revise, or clarify, our reasons in light of valid counter-reasons, or questions on some further topics, or evidence. Hence, the key message of Pettit’s book on freedom reads that we are free to the extent that we can control our behavior by such, and similar, accounts.

Here I will not in more detail explain why I view my above presentation of the notion of slavery as reflecting adequately Pettit/Skinner’s, and generally republican, basic frame of thought, as I explained it already in Pehar (2016a). In this outline my aim is different: I think that republicanism of the contemporary kind calls for some, perhaps only mild and minor, interventions. As boiled down to the fundamental building blocks reproduced in the above pages, the current republican theory can, and should, be improved, or made more persuasive and appealing, by some moderate readjustments and reallocation of its emphases.

on the grounds that it was a conception of freedom that those who are more or less properly described as republicans certainly embraced, even if it was embraced by others as well.”

But, see also my point ii of the next section: to be as clear as possible, in the way I present republican perspective in this paper, discourse as a collective body-maker precedes moral-discursive values that precede the concept of slave(ry) (‘one that can be harmed freely as a non-discursive human being’), on the one hand, and the concept of law (‘the definition, based on a reasonable discourse, of punishable and preventable forms of a humanly caused harm to discursive human agents’), on the other; it is only then that the notion of freedom, which is socially and legally constituted, can be properly elucidated. However, for the most part, as I put it in the first half of this section and in point ii of the next, the most interesting part of republican perspective will be played out in the point of contact, or clash, between the practice of slavery and the understanding of law; ‘republican freedom’ (but see again footnote 13) is secured only to the extent that we manage to secure a proper, full and just, application of law. Also, I do not place as much emphasis as Pettit on the division (or branching) of governmental powers (the executive, legislative, and judiciary).

In the following I ignore Pettit (2014) which contains a theory of freedom that, as I view it, supersedes the language of his earlier work on the subject; importantly, in the more recent work, the ‘slave’ perspective seems to be suppressed, or considerably softened or perhaps ignored, or simply kept more in hiding. Additionally, here I cannot resist quoting a part of Pettit’s response to my explicit question if he continues to adhere to discourse-theoretical foundations of republicanism: “I do think that the status that is assumed by anyone in
3 Drawing further, and finer, contours

This section, composed of six points, is organized in the following way: points i-iii deal with more foundational issues – what themes, with what expectations, and in which mode, should republican political theory be brought to tackle more specifically, given the framework I outlined in previous two sections. Points iv-vi address the issues related to the social membership of the intellectual movement, the issues of inclusion and exclusion. Specifically, point iv is about Pettit’s idea of a key or arch-opponent, or -competitor. In its stead I argue for the idea of a pluralist opposition, or competition, and also of a pluralist membership, emphasizing the latter especially in point v. In point vi I make a plea to remove the adjective “neo-Roman” and treat many classical Greek voices as equally valuable sources of the republican political tradition. Point vi is a special, but highly important and illustrative part of my general call to republican theorists and writers to be open widely to a multitude of voices as long as those endorse the broad, but recognizable, guidelines presented in sections 1 and 2, and points i-iii of this section. To refer back to my title, the first three points of this section center on What for; the last three on Whose and Whom against. Point i most directly explains the reasons for my putting in the title the characterization of republicanism as primarily a critical idiom. Points ii and iii emphasize, as is more widely known, republican commitment to the practice of education as well as to the processes of human civilizing, virtuous or civic character-building, and conflict-resolving, but I interpret their function as being, foremost, supportive of, hence auxiliary to, the ‘critical idiom’-function, or point i.

i. Recently, I often posed to myself the following question: granted the relatively high number of influential republican theorists and practitioners, how come that republicanism is not more widespread or popular? Secondly, why is our contemporary political world not at least close to being in accordance with the preferences of the republican school of thought, or to a higher degree representative of the republican values? I think the answer to both questions must come in two parts.

One has to do with the idea of ‘discursive dignity.’ When I think of myself as a ‘republican’ (apart from the principles, arguments, and ideas internalized in the course of reading the sources), I reason approximately along the following lines: I imagine there is a field of discourse between non-hierarchical discourse, and the status with which they are credited, is best given political recognition under a system of law where people enjoy freedom as non-domination and pass the eyeball test. To that extent, I think that the views defended by figures as different as Habermas and Darwall provide a sort of philosophical foundation for seeking such a system. But the writers in the tradition do not themselves seek any such foundation; on the whole, they are not deeply philosophical.”
me and a figure, or institution or body, of some political, and often legal, prominence; and then I simply ask myself “how can I protect my own discursive dignity, if I need to, in relation to the figure by drawing on the parts of the field?”. Sometimes I will think of the field of law as a resource I need to rely on to demonstrate the figure’s arbitrary interference with my choices, but sometimes, equally importantly, I will think simply of a more general, perhaps culture-related political argument – for instance, when appropriate, I may oppose the aforementioned figure by emphasizing his or her adherence to cultural biases (perhaps neo-colonialist, or pseudo-religious), or political sophistry or over-generalization, that cannot survive a closer theoretical, or simply logical/epistemological, scrutiny. Regardless of the outcome of my ‘discursive defense,’ one thing is pretty clear: to launch the discourse in the first place, I need to feel pretty confident about my discursive abilities, that is, my capacity to preserve and protect my discursive dignity, and do so in the form of publicly presented reasons for everyone to hear, understand, and, preferably, to respond publicly.

However, I also think that a majority of people do not yet sufficiently think of themselves as ‘the discursively dignified’ beings to whom one cannot, and should not try to, sell whichever idea, or proposition, one likes. And, sometimes, of course, objectively the protection of discursive dignity is unlikely to be an easy undertaking simply due to the sheer complexity of issues one needs to tackle: think, for instance, of moral dilemmas that frequently characterize the legal-political field (Cicero deals with a number of those pertaining to the practice of promising in De Officiis; think also of the similar contemporary issues pertaining to ‘euthanasia’ or ‘abortion,’ or ‘hate speech’), or complexity inherent in every act of ‘compromise’ that necessarily involves a fine-grained politico-ethical balance of ideas and interests (see also Sherry 1995, 137–8). This, more than anything else, explains why the republican theory, the republican thinking and tradition, is not, and is unlikely to be, more fashionable. For a majority of people, who are busy with all kinds of issues and troubles, it is much easier to rationalize than oppose, or problematize or head-on challenge, the fact of their submission that they always claim is “only temporary” (as emphasized very early by Euripides, Thucydides, Seneca, and later by Milton and La Boetie), and hope that ‘the arbitrary interference,’ or a similar kind of discourse-based harm, will be dealt with by appropriate authority, or “when conditions are ripe”.

As to the second part of my answer, simply due to the fact that specific discursive arbitrariness is more quickly spotted, and more pronounced,

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16 One statement repeatedly made by the former US State Secretary, Madeleine Albright, is among my favorite examples: “We [USA] stand tall and see further than other countries into the future” (retrieved from https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/98o219a.html)
than the background of the regular, rule-following, and non-arbitrary discourse, and is more harmful to, and more intensely felt by, some specific individuals or groups than the others, republican language will often assume the shape of a critical idiom targeting some specific issues at a not too general level of political theorizing. However, also importantly, it is impossible to criticize something without criticizing, and thereby often publicly exposing and thus annoying, someone. Apart from the fact that too many people still respond to the political or social kinds of critique in discourse-unfriendly ways – for instance, by reducing the argument to the *ad hominem* form, – that ‘someone’ will often protect and promote some factions that stand for some extremely powerful financial, or other, interests, not for the interests of the majority or for the public interest and good.

Furthermore, as an expected effect or response, the ‘someone’ will do everything, either directly or indirectly, to silence your opposition on the one hand, and on the other support those political agents and theorists whose key idiom is not of the republican kind, and who view their work exclusively in terms of an accommodation of narrow, short-term interests, not in terms of a just society, or promulgation of a common, enlightened, more long-term interest. The ‘someone’ will support those who do not care about the sharing of a common language, but about a small niche in which they can talk to themselves, and their loyal followers, in their own language. I contend that this, too, supplies a part of the answer to the question of why republicanism is not more widespread or popular, or why the contemporary political world is far from being representative of the republican ideals; and, more sadly, why it is far from being in a peaceful, or at least more positively conflict-transforming, condition.

Hence, my message based on the first reflection in this section is as follows: have a full confidence that republican critique, based on human discursive dignity, will in some form live forever, but, as regards actual social and political impact of the critique, or its capacity to attract and motivate a more cohesive group of followers or sympathetic supporters in the daily politics, we should not set our expectations too high.

ii. Republican theorists should move the idea of discourse, and discursive dignity with its social and political ramifications, much more determinedly, and assertively, to the center of their interest. Republican theory is primarily about an idea of human nature (as *ens loquens*, or *zoon politikon* kai *logon eikon*). This also implies that the notions of law (a kind of discourse) and of the law-following polity should play a much more prominent role in theorizations along the republican terms.¹⁷ From what I can

¹⁷ Skinner agreed very much with this point; actually, he seems to me to lay a great emphasis on the role of jurists in what we nowadays call ‘republican tradition;’ here is what he stated
gather, the failure to add, or emphasize, those two views may perpetuate some of the shortcomings, lacunae or ambiguities, or even inconsistencies that can be found in today’s versions of republican theory.

Hence, I propose that we should not agree with Pettit’s thesis that “non-arbitrary laws...make people non-free [in contrast to unfree]” simply because “obeying laws...constrain the range of our choice” (Pettit 1997, 302). Furthermore, the notion of ‘arbitrary influence,’ on which the idea of ‘domination’ most critically depends, cannot be disentangled from the notion of discourse. However, also importantly, I think that the notion of arbitrary influence, except in the most straightforward, but also incomplete and not self-enforced, sense of “a law-violating, or law-opposing, influence”, cannot be at all couched exhaustively in general terms, and especially not in terms of procedures. In the conditions of real life, the ‘arbitrary influence’ is normally shown to be arbitrary post-facto, through an interpretive critique of a flawed or unfair ad hoc application, or enforcement, of (specific) laws, or some constitutional provisions, in specific, publicly visible conditions, or through a critique of logical or epistemological aspects of one’s discourse.

This has important implications also for the understanding of the ‘civic virtue’–related aspects of the republican theory in the following sense: institutional and procedural blueprints, and guidelines, do not suffice to create a good, and well-functioning, polity. The institutions of govern-

in his comment: “I completely agree with you that legal language should figure much more prominently in so-called republican discourse. I now think the alleged influence of classical Roman and Renaissance republican texts has been greatly exaggerated (certainly by me). The whole vocabulary of the so-called republican theory of freedom in early-modern Europe stems from the jurists, and in c17/c18 England and America the discussion is largely framed in the terminology of common law (in turn largely taken from Roman law, especially as reformulated by the Medieval Glossators, among whom Azo seems to me probably the most crucial source for later common law writers).”

18 In Pehar (2014b) I proposed an analysis of the notion of law in terms of ‘collective promise.’ In contrast to Pettit, I would say that we fulfill the laws in the way we fulfill our promises, and that this makes us generally free. Now, if one violates the law, then one is not free from the standpoint of the collective personality; also, one risks being apprehended and indicted, of course. In other words, the laws are imposed only on the crime perpetrators, not on everyone; but they apply to everyone because we assume that, if we lack a reasonable argument to the contrary, everyone supports the laws. I think that my conception of law can be non-problematically reconciled with the language of ‘vinculum iuris’ ("the binder, or rope or chain, of law"); e.g. in the Institutes by Justinian, 3, 13), which is envisaged as being invisible and self-imposed: the idea of 'promise' makes again a useful model to present the idea of 'invisible binder', and anyway is the topic through which the classical Roman jurists introduced the idea of 'legal obligation as a vinculum iuris' ('vinculum iuris' is probably a Latin reflection of the Greek 'desmoi ton poleon' – originally, 'justice' and 'shame' as the inner binders of the city from Plato's dialogue Protagoras; for more detail on the concept of 'vinculum iuris' see Gaudemet 2000).

19 Lovett has a different view on this; see Lovett (2010, esp. 85-123).
ment must be filled with the ‘human stuff’ (or ‘human natures’) of the right kind to ensure the proper service to the state and a just administration of law;20 such ‘stuff’ is brought about discursively and gradually, by education and by a character-rooted habit-formation, through training and practice, enabling them to keep their eye on the discourse-based values that are critically important to the collective body. However, this does not mean that institutions or procedures are unimportant; it means only that they are insufficient and need to be supported/supplemented with the relevant virtues. (Sherry 1995)

iii. Another view looms large behind the classical forms and traditions of republicanism: the idea of peaceful conflict resolution, and the concomitant idea of a civilized, non-violent, and negotiated settlement of political differences and disputes. In some key thinkers of the ancient republicanism, and I don’t mean only the classical Roman figures, this idea is prominent.

The narrative runs approximately as follows: at the times when they were not endowed with key political virtues, humans lived in scattered communities, feared each other, and were an easy prey to all kinds of misfortune; to build a polity, they need both logos, as a precondition to the rule of law, and some specific virtues that enable them to found and preserve the polis and tame the violence inherited from the darker stages of human (pre)history.21 As emphasized above, classical republicanism views slavery either as a straightforward ‘casus belli’ or as a relation that cannot be distinguished conceptually from ‘the state of war;’ hence, building a viable polis and removing the conditions of slavery, or the state of war/emergency, are hugely overlapping, perhaps even identical, processes. My third suggestion is thus as follows: the enrichment of republican model in direction of the ‘peace, conflict, and war’-related thinking is likely to bind its core, discourse-related parts more tightly to the realms of the International Relations and global politics (only to a very small degree overlapping with Slaughter 2018; but compare also Braithwaite 2003).

20 In a context like this I like quoting a 1930 statement by Herman Müller, then Chancellor of the Weimar Republic: “Democracy without democrats is an internal and external danger” (cited in Mazower 1998, 22); have also in mind that Thomas Jefferson, later followed in this by Tocqueville, laid a critical emphasis on the role of education in the preservation of the republic and the law-abiding citizenry, for which see Peterson (1970, 145–52) and Tessitore (2003).

21 The sources include Cicero’s De Inventione, and Aelius Aristides, Pros Platonis, who draw on the classical Greek sources such as Plato’s Protagoras or To Nicocles by Isocrates; I think we should assume that both Plato and Isocrates draw on earlier sources, as evidenced, for instance, in Sophocles’ Antigone (lines 354–5). Aristotle’s locus classicus on zoon politikon logon ehon (Politics Book I, 1253a-b) draws as well implicitly on Plato’s Protagoras; importantly, in this regard Thomas Hobbes, with his notion of ‘peace-making virtues’, and the description of the state of nature, is part of the same tradition.
iv. There is some degree of shyness (or, should I say ‘civility’) in Pettit’s presentation of republicanism as a political theory interpreted in terms of social and political influence. In terms of historical interpretation, he presents the picture of republican ‘eclipse’ and of ‘liberalism,’ the arch-enemy of republicanism, as the leading political view of today in the sense of ‘being socially/politically dominant,’ or ‘being most influential and most taught about.’ I am not sure if this is historically accurate.

Today, for sure, we are witness to an ‘ideological’ dominance of a shallow talk about ‘liberalism, pluralism, and human rights,’ which clearly serves as a support to the global corporations and US-led neoliberal, often non-democratic, domination of the Trans-Atlantic political-military, very pronouncedly elitist, network (NATO and EU). In other words, you will hear people often saying that ‘they are free to choose,’ or ‘think as they like,’ or ‘associate with others as they like,’ or that ‘the pluralism of opinions and parties is the key to democracy and our way of life,’ and similar. However, perhaps what one does not hear frequently enough is a simple, yet undeniable fact of which all mature adults, in their optimal and fully sober condition, are aware: there is no society or political order, characterized by some modicum of civilized conduct, which does not encompass both rights and duties standing approximately in balance (see also Sherry 1995).

Yes, one can think as one prefers, but one also owes an argument, or evidential support, to whomever one talks to. Yes, one can associate with others as one decides, but ‘associations’ need to respect the constitutional principles. Yes, one can do whatever one likes, except that one has the duty not to harm another human being, and one cannot, and should not, harm the being without a legal sanction. In other words, if we decide to picture our intellectual arch-enemy in pretty simplistic terms, as a theory claiming that “one is free to the extent one is not interfered with,” I am afraid that there will not be enough of weight and relevance in our republican projects or ideas.

v. Hence, let us try to picture republicans as an internally diverse and colorful club that encompasses both ‘grand’ theorists and, perhaps more important, theorists at a mid-level of theorizing, including also practitioners i.e. those writing pamphlets, or manifestos, or ‘party programs,’ and acting along such guidelines in their daily political battles. While adopting such a view, I think we may as well realize the strength, a very enduring, or perennial, character of ‘republican principles,’ and also their enduring social and political influence. In such a sense, I would advise against a quick dismissal of some versions of republican thought that are alleged

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22 Of course, this is acknowledged in many key provisions of many constitutions, and international conventions, world-wide: think, for instance, of the German Grundgesetz (articles 1–19), or of the European Human Rights Convention.
not to coincide with the ‘orthodoxy’, such as Kant or Rousseau. If one calls oneself ‘a republican,’ and then offers a reason for which s/he thinks that s/he belongs to the tradition of republican theory, we owe her or him a charitable and patient hearing as much as s/he owes it to us too.

For instance, I think that, in some aspects, Hobbes is a republican (at least, he is not a republican any less than Cicero; have also in mind that Hobbes named one of his *Leviathan* chapters, in Latin, ‘De Civitate sive Republica’

[23]; also *De La Boetie* (‘On voluntary servitude’) should be counted as a major figure of the republican tradition, and many *Levelers* such as Overton, and some voices of critical, post-Marxist theory, and Louis (Antoine) Leon de Saint-Just, too, who presents the notions of liberty and law in the following terms (Saint-Just 1791, 27): “Servitude consists in being controlled by unjust laws; liberty in being controlled by reasonable ones; and license in being controlled by oneself...The spirit of equality does not consist in the fact that one human being can say to another ‘I am as powerful as you.’ There is no such a thing as lawful power. Neither laws nor God itself are powers, but only a theory of the good. The essence of equality consists in each individual being an equal part of sovereignty, that is, of the totality.” To those countless others should be added, including many voices from the Weimar Republic and many 19th century advocates of republicanism in France, including Maurice Jolly.

Having in mind the diversity of political motivations and issues, we should not be caught by surprise with the multitude of opponents of republicanism, either theory- or practice-wise. Hence, addressing again the issue touched upon in point iv, the nature of the opponent will be normally determined by the specific issues a republican theorist, or practitioner, deals with, and also by the parts of the theory on which this or that republican places his or her current emphasis. For instance, in some cases, legal positivism can be an arch-opponent, and in some other cases it will be legal realism of the kind sketched by Thrasymachus in Book I of Plato’s *Republic*. In some others, a republican theorist will have to confront a different kind of opponent: for instance, a postmodernist theorizing of government, or perhaps a postmodernist, or radically relativist, take on ethics; and in a third set of cases, the role of the arch-opponent may be

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23 In his comment Skinner, expectedly as he authored Skinner 2008a, disagreed with my, perhaps preposterous, call to add at least some aspects of Hobbes to the republican tradition; still, I reckon that the exegesis of Hobbes is not an easy or straightforward matter, for which see Pehar 2014a.

24 One reviewer for this journal suggested that I should add Hannah Arendt to the list of important republican thinkers, which is more than welcome suggestion in the context of this point; in that regard, her *Crises of the Republic*, at least to me, seems more straightforwardly republican than her other publications; and, of course, like many others I find her leanings towards Martin Heidegger’s language, or jargon, somewhat problematic and puzzling.
enacted by ‘Leninism’ or ‘Nazism’ taken as clusters of ethical, legal, and political attitudes (as in Pehar 2014b).

We should also note that this move is very likely to affect one’s choice of intellectual alliance. In my own case, Donald Davidson and natural law-theorists often figure as key allies in general discourse-related and legal fields respectively; but this applies predominantly to the most abstract, or general, level of theorizing. Put less abstractly, the number of republican-minded practitioners of politics must be definitely higher, but still not too high due to the considerations from my point i above.

vi. With the notable exception of Iseult Honohan, a majority of today’s republican theorists present the school as ‘neo-Roman.’ The motivation for their doing so lies probably in the fact that the English-speaking world learned about the tradition primarily through Machiavelli and the Italian Renaissance and European humanism in which the Latin was the lingua franca of teaching, while reliance on Roman classics, such as Cicero, Seneca, Sallust, and Livy, was a compulsory part of higher education. Additionally, the Roman code of law, which critically influenced the development of the legal codes throughout Europe, with the Digest by Justinian, must have influenced as well the choice of the adjective ‘neo-Roman’ to characterize the modern-day republican perspective.

However, I find this deeply unsettling and unfair mainly for the following reason. After the famous line by Horace on ‘Graecia capta,’\(^\text{25}\) it is more or less widely known that the Greeks were much more versatile producers of culture, including philosophy, science, and arts, than the Romans; hence the Roman political philosophers basically learned stuff and borrowed from the classical Greek thinkers and writers: Cicero, for example, is widely known not to be an original thinker as he was predominantly paraphrasing, or applying, the Greek sources including Plato, Aristotle, and the Greek Stoics. Actually, Cicero viewed himself primarily as a proto-postmodernist of a skeptical outlook in accordance with the then prevalent, and today obviously strange, interpretation of Plato; hence, since he, as a Platonist in accordance with his own reading of Plato, was unable to adopt more firm, or positive, political and legal views, in his books De Civitate and De Legibus he borrows, with no excuses or afterthoughts, from the Stoic doctrines (for more detail, see Clayton, n.d.).

This does not mean that Cicero is not important; but it must mean that, without the Greek predecessors, especially in the realm of political theory, there would not have been any political thought in the classical Roman era from say 200 BCE to 100 AD, including the age of Republic,

\(^{25}\) “Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio.” Or: „Greece, the captive, made her savage victor captive, and brought the arts into rustic Latium“ (Horace, Epistles 2.1.156).
Caesar, and Augustus. Also, it is sufficiently known that the Romans, who received the higher education, thought it was their duty to learn the classical Greek (primarily the Attic dialect as written in 5th and 4th century BCE), as fluently as possible, in order to be able to read at least Plato, Aristotle, and key Greek historiographers and dramatists.

However, most importantly, there are so many republican ideas and propositions (I mean, ‘modern-day republican’) in the classical Greek works considered per se that the idea to limit the adjective to ‘neo-Roman’ (republicanism) seems to me historically very inadequate and very unfair regardless of the more specific issue of Greco-Roman interaction. For instance, Euripides puts into the lines spoken by his dramatis personae many ideas about Isonomia and Isegoria (equality before the law and the equal rights of public speech); and he also addresses many times the issue of slavery (which he, too, states is ‘para physin’ – contra naturam); have also in mind the importance of the Antigone by Sophocles not only for the classical tradition of the natural-law thinking, but also for the general topics of ‘a good ruler’ and of ‘the city-making sentiments/attitudes (astynomoi orgai in the Greek).’ Thucydides, too, has been an important source, especially if considered in terms of ‘discourse ethics’ (3.82), and in depiction of ‘the rights of the stronger’ (‘Melian Dialogue’) as well as in presentation of Pericles’ description of the character of the Athenian democracy, or in the paragraphs concerning the pseudo-debates between the proponents of democracy, on the one hand, and aristocracy on the other (again 3.82). Even in Hesiod and pre-Socratic philosophers one can find interesting precursors to the contemporary republican ideas; and then, following a very important experience, and period, of the Peloponnesian war (the end of 5th century BCE), at last we come to the really golden era of Athenian philosophy, political theory, law, ethics, and scholarship more generally, which includes Socrates, major sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle with their broadly ramified schools.

The claim that those thinkers, orators and dramatists, have not critically influenced the Roman political, and general philosophical thinking, cannot be reconciled with available historical evidence. Have in mind that this is not a minor issue of nomenclature or national branding or visibility. To put it simply and unmistakably, it is politically unfair, and thus ‘un-republican’, to exclude key Greek thinkers from the history of republicanism; it is also imprudent in the sense of signaling falsely that the corpus of classical Greek writings in politics has nothing to offer to the

26 Here the development of the culture of writing, and literacy in general, played an immensely important role: see, among others, Vernant (1990, 204–208) and Harris (1989); for well-organized presentations of the key sources of the classical Greek political thought, especially pre-Socratic, see Gagarin and Woodruff (1995), and Woodruff (2005).
modern-day republican. And, finally, returning to the theme with which I opened this self-reflective overview, if deprived of the Greek sources or Greek socio-political debates and experience, the LCBM in the area of the history of political ideas, not only data-wise but also in terms of the creativity of dialogue and the richness in political logic/epistemology and rhetoric, would make a very impoverished collective body.27

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27 While both Skinner and Pettit agreed with my point vi, thereby revoking the adjective ‘neo-Roman’ (republicanism), Braithwaite went one step further by emphasizing that the parts of republicanism lie in historically even more distant periods of the Persian Cyrus the Great; and also that, “Republican thought flowed along many different Silk Road paths. And it seems to me that the last great innovation in [Chinese] republican thought, the Control Yuan in Sun Yat Sen’s republican constitution, is something that would greatly benefit many western powers, notably the United States, at the moment. The Control Yuan became a fourth elected branch in Chinese history that oversees the impeachment of officers of the judiciary, legislature and executive, the anti-corruption commission, the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, the Electoral Commission, the Human Rights Commission etc.... Republican theory will better advance when its ‘diverse and colorful club’ stretches beyond the histories and philosophies of the NATO powers.” As one reviewer suggested, an argument similar to Braithwaite’s is presented in Springborg (1992).


**Sažetak**

**Republicanizam kao kritički idiom:**
**Čiji, protiv koga i zbog čega?**

Svrha se ovoga ogleda sastoji u kratkome prezentiranju diskurzivno-teorijskih zasada republikanske političke teorije (Dio 1), sa temom roba/ropstva kao sredinjim problemom društvenoga i političkoga života (Dio 2), kako bi se potom ocrtaše najzanimljivije konsekvence za suvremene verzije te teorije, kako su predložene od strane ključnih autora (završni paragrafi Dijela 2 i Dio 3). Obuhvatna poruka ogleda glasi da se republikanizam temelji na specifičnome poimanju ljudske prirode kao ens loquens, ili zoon logon echron, što sadrži važne implikacije u i empirijskome i normativnome smislu. Treći, završni dio ogleda navodi šest pripjedloga, ili sugestija, današnjim republikancima kako bi se, prvo, pojasnile granice republikanske teorije/prakse, i drugo, kako bi se pojasnili i njezini intelektualni izvori i njezina oporba. Sveukupno, ogled naglašava status republikanskoga jezika također kao kritičkoga idioma sa pluralističkim, izraženo kontekstualnim i često programatskim/angažiranim glasovima.

**Ključne riječi:** republikanizam, ropstvo, etika diskursa, diskurzivno dostojanstvo, kritički idiom, klasična Grčka i Rim.