

Ivo Goldstein, *Jasenovac* (Zaprešić; Jasenovac: Fraktura; Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac, 2018) 958 pp., [32 pp.] with tables: illus., geographical maps; 24 cm

According to many, the Jasenovac camp is still the most controversial issue of contemporary Croatian history. Despite the existence of extensive historiographical and other literature on Ustasha crimes in the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) and the Jasenovac camp, it has remained one of the most complicated historiographical topics to be further questioned and updated. Therefore, any new scientific effort and approach is welcome.

Ivo Goldstein's latest book *Jasenovac*, according to the back cover copy, is "the first scientific monograph" on the Jasenovac camp, "written acribically", which means (from Greek ἀκριβεία, acribia) particularly carefully, accurately, precisely, scrupulously, and "responsibly, without ideological prejudices, hidden agenda and politicked motives". Therefore, it is obviously a "masterpiece" of Croatian historiography. As Goldstein explains in his preface, he has been researching the Ustasha crimes committed at the time of NDH, as well as the scope of crimes committed in the Jasenovac camp, "for over twenty years" (p. 21). Thus, the book *Jasenovac* is a result of his scientific efforts to date.

Goldstein writes that his book on Jasenovac is a book about "the hell of the 20th century". He confides in the reader that, while reading the most important memories of former inmates (Berger, Ciliga, Jakovljević, Miller, Miliša, Nikolić, Riffer) about the Jasenovac camp, he increasingly felt like none other than Dante, whom "his Vergils (plural, not singular!) lead through purgatory and hell and carefully described people and their torments, lives and reasons why they were in that hell" (p. 34). Goldstein, who had previously also expressed poetic tendencies, feels like Dante, which is a bit worrying for a scientist who should write without poetic passions...

According to Goldstein, the "main and most comprehensive" published sources for the history of the Jasenovac camp are three collections of documents edited by Antun Miletić¹ (p. 30). Three collections? Well, I have to give a hint to Goldstein and the reviewers of his book: four collections, four (number 4)! As Goldstein does not even list Miletić's fourth collection of documents

¹ Antun Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945: Dokumenta*, Bk. I-II (Belgrade; Jasenovac: Narodna knjiga; Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1986); Antun Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945: Dokumenta*, Bk. III (Belgrade; Jasenovac: Narodna knjiga; Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1987).

on the Jasenovac Camp published in Jagodina in 2007² in the bibliography (p. 811), he obviously does not know that it exists.

In his book Goldstein actually uses the literature in which the aforementioned fourth Miletić's collection of documents was used, i.e. cited.³ However, for Goldstein to notice the aforementioned and perhaps be inspired to purchase and use the said book - well - we should not expect such coherence and persistence from a man who, at least sometimes, feels like Dante.

On page 781 of his book, depicting the atmosphere in Yugoslavia, when the greatly exaggerated numbers of 700,000 or more victims of the Jasenovac camp were systematically presented, Goldstein states that even then "scrupulous researchers" such as Antun Miletić knew how to "keep their distance", even when it was "impossible to express an opinion more freely". Thus, in the mid-1980s, "scrupulous" Miletić stated and published that there were no reliable sources that could determine how many inmates lost their lives in Jasenovac and that this number could only be estimated on the basis of partially preserved sources. In relation to that, Goldstein further explains, Miletić cited sources which, according to Goldstein, "should show to every well-meaning reader" that the number of 700,000 Jasenovac victims was exaggerated.⁴ Despite that, Goldstein continues, "scrupulous" Miletić, poor man, was "an object of manipulation" since Vladimir Dedijer thanked Miletić in the preface to his book [*Vatikan i Jasenovac (Vatican City and Jasenovac)*] from 1987,⁵ stating that through the aforementioned Miletić's first book of documents on Jasenovac, "the suffering of hundreds of thousands killed was articulated" (p. 781).

But who is actually manipulating? Dedijer was not the one who manipulated when he was thanking Miletić, but the true manipulator is - Goldstein, who while being acribical and scrupulous, "is forgetting" to mention what Miletić wrote on page 38 of his first collection of documents *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945*. [*Concentration Camp Jasenovac 1941-1945*] - "Therefore the total number of those killed on the territory of the so-called NDH according to various sources can for now be estimated only at several hundreds of thousands", and what he later clearly repeated on page 42 - "At the Ustasha

² Antun Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac [1941-1945. Dokumenta]*, Bk. IV (Jagodina: Gambit, 2007).

³ For example: Vladimir Geiger, "Brojdbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac, 1941.-1945. (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 45 (2013), no. 2: 211-242; Nikica Barić, "Kozara 1942. - sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece", *Pilar: Časopis za društvene i humanističke studije* XI (2016), no. 22 (2): 53-111; Željko Krušelj, *Zarobljenici paralelnih povijesti: Hrvatsko-srpska fronta na prijelazu stoljeća* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2018).

⁴ Antun Miletić, "Prilog proučavanju koncentracionog logora Jasenovac - Stara Gradiška (1941-1942)", in: *Okrugli stol 21. travnja 1984.: Materijali s rasprave*, ed. Dobrila Borović (Jasenovac: Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1985), pp. 18-22.

⁵ Vladimir Dedijer, *Vatikan i Jasenovac: Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Rad, 1987).

concentration camp Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška from August 1941 to May 1945 according to estimates several hundreds of thousands men, women and children were killed”.

Goldstein either intentionally ignores that or he does not know enough, and he should know much more since he has been dealing with the Jasenovac camp “for over twenty years” and he wrote “the first scientific monograph” on that camp. This is unusual, because when stating that Dedijer manipulated with Miletić (p. 781), in his footnote no. 171 (p. 929), referring to that statement of his, Goldstein refers to the aforementioned book by Željko Krušelj *Zarobljenici paralelnih povijesti* [*Prisoners of parallel histories*], pages 40–42, who there put forward explanations which were in complete opposition to those put forward by Goldstein. So, either Goldstein is extremely rash and has misunderstood, misinterpreted, or incorrectly written everything, or he scrupulously writes in his own favour.

After everything mentioned perhaps we shall even forgive Goldstein, who acerbically and scrupulously deals with important subjects, for simultaneously not taking care of some basic things like properly citing the literature he uses. In the very aforementioned footnote 171 (p. 929) he cites “Bulajić, *Vatikan i Jasenovac, dokumenti*” [Bulajić, “*Vatican City and Jasenovac, documents*”]. The same “work” is wrongly cited in his bibliography on page 810, too. The author of the book must be Vladimir Dedijer, and not [Milan] Bulajić? Besides, Miletić’s article that he refers to Goldstein cites “by heart”, incorrectly: “Prilog proučavanju koncentracionog logora Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-1945)” [Contribution to the study of the concentration camp Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-1945)], in: *Okrugli stol, 21. travnja 1984. godine*, Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1985. [*Round table discussion, 21 April 1984, Jasenovac Memorial Site, 1985*], pp. 18-22. In the bibliography this article is listed on page 823. It would be accurate as follows: “Prilog proučavanju koncentracionog logora Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-1942)” [Contribution to the study of the concentration camp Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-1942)] etc.

Anyone even slightly better informed clearly understands that the important place in the systematic spread of the “Jasenovac myth” is assumed exactly by the works of Antun Miletić, a colonel in the former Yugoslav People’s Army, a persistent long-time advocate of the thesis that at least several hundred thousand, perhaps even 700,000 people lost their lives in the Jasenovac camp. To Goldstein, however, Miletić is a “scrupulous researcher” (pages 211, 781), which means (lat. *scrupulosus*) overly accurate, extremely cautious, and conscientious. To Goldstein is obviously scrupulous anyone who confirms his approach.

When, at the very beginning of the book, Goldstein writes hastily and confusedly that in Yugoslavia there was an exaggerated number of 700,000 Jasenovac victims, he goes on and utterly inconsistently explains to us that “such narratives and the general situation” in the places suffered in the “Ustasha and Chetnik genocide actions” created an impression that these crimes were being ignored, intentionally forgotten, and that they “should not be talked and written about” because the authorities at the time wanted to portray the Nazis and fascists as “the main criminals” and “domestic quislings as secondary actors” (p. 28). So, according to Goldstein, on one hand, the 700,000 victims of the Jasenovac camp were greatly exaggerated and lied about, while on the other, the Ustasha crimes were not to be talked about? If 700,000 people were killed in Jasenovac alone, how can “domestic quislings” be “secondary actors”?

It is enough to merely flip through the book by the best Serbian expert on the numerous and almost incomprehensible literature on the Jasenovac camp Jovan Mirković *Objavljeni izvori i literatura o jasenovačkim logorima* [*Published Sources and Literature on the Jasenovac camps*] ⁶, which Goldstein listed in his bibliography (p. 823), to realize what and how much was written and published about Ustasha crimes in NDH and about the Jasenovac camp, and whether the Ustashas during Yugoslavia were portrayed as “secondary actors”. As for the list of casualties of World War II and the manipulation of figures on these casualties in Yugoslavia, Goldstein should have consulted, which of course he did not, relevant and inevitable papers, such as articles by Srđan Bogosavljević⁷, Mate Rupić⁸ and Nenad Lajbenšperger⁹, and perhaps some things would become clearer to him.

Goldstein would occasionally also assume the rhetoric of a Croatian nationalist to attack the “Belgrade downtown” (čaršija), which in the 1980s spread the thesis that the partisans deliberately did not want to liberate Jasenovac (p. 644). But elsewhere Goldstein alone would take on the same “arguments”. For example, he cited Jovanka, the wife of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, that “the entire leadership” after the war “set aside” the Jasenovac

⁶ Jovan Mirković, *Objavljeni izvori i literatura o jasenovačkim logorima* (Laktaši; Banja Luka; Belgrade: GrafoMark; Besjeda; Muzej žrtava genocida, 2000).

⁷ Srđan Bogosavljević, “Nerasvetljeni genocid”, in: *Srpska strana rata: Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju*, ed. Nebojša Popov (Belgrade: Republika, 1996), 159-170 or Srđan Bogosavljević, “Drugi svetski rat – žrtve Jugoslavija”, in: *Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara*, Vol. 4, eds. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2001), pp. 487-507.

⁸ Mate Rupić, “Popis žrtava Drugoga svjetskog rata u Hrvatskoj iz 1950. godine”, in: *Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara*, Vol. 4, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2001), 539-552 or Mate Rupić, “Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu prema popisu iz 1950. godine”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 33 (2001), br. 1: 7-18.

⁹ Nenad Lajbenšperger, “Presenting and Establishing the Number of Yugoslav Casualties of World War II from Liberation until 1951”, *Tokovi istorije* (2017), no. 3: 143-166.

issue, and so the issue of Jasenovac and its victims “was taken lightly” (p. 799). Indeed, in communist Yugoslavia this issue was “taken lightly” - only the death toll of the Jasenovac camp was pushed to more than half a million. Too bad Goldstein did not read the book by Heike Karge *Steinerne Erinnerung – versteinerte Erinnerung? Kriegsgedenken in Jugoslawien (1947-1970)*¹⁰ more carefully, in which case his conclusion might have been somewhat different.

To present systematically and seriously how the number of 700,000 Jasenovac casualties arose in Yugoslavia, what in that regime was generally the attitude towards the victims of World War II – that, unfortunately, truly does require scrupulousness, it requires work, it requires effort. Goldstein, who considers colonel Miletić “scrupulous”, quotes instead writer Miljenko Jergović, who on one occasion said that Auschwitz was “a terrible and final place”, so on the basis of that Goldstein concluded that Jasenovac and Auschwitz “differed in a few elements” (page 23). However, when Goldstein paraphrases Jergović in his book, it is of equal weight as if in my historiographical works I paraphrased the opinion of the winner of the renowned Croatian literary award *Kiklop* Nives Zeljković Celzijus. Namely, Jergović is not known to be an authority on Nazi crimes and the Holocaust, nor on relevant judgements on Auschwitz. Aren’t there historians and scholars of related professions who are nonetheless more relevant?

At the beginning of the book, Goldstein mentioned that during communist Yugoslavia, “suggestive metaphors” were used in connection with Jasenovac about “bloodthirsty slayers” and “crazed criminals” (p. 28). Besides, perhaps we should have waited until 1991 for the Belgrade media to start talking about the “bloodthirsty” Ustasas, that is, Tuđman’s slayers. And what are Goldstein’s metaphors like? He writes about “shameless deceits” (p. 48), “deeply immoral tasks” (p. 49), “the depth of hell” (p. 432), “the bottom of hell” (p. 567), etc. ...

The fact actually is that Goldstein “scrupulously” uses a plethora of suggestive metaphors. A good example is his chapter “Koljači na terenu” [“Slayers in the field”] (pp. 414-475), about Ustasha perpetrators of crimes in Jasenovac. Thus, in the statements they gave in communism and in the shadow of more than half a million Jasenovac victims, Goldstein would leave witnesses to “evaluate” the slaughterers, and he would only “scrupulously” quote them: “intelligent sadists” (p. 422), “pagan bastard” (p. 423), “executioner” (p. 426), “executioner” (p. 427), “ripper” (p. 428), “criminal priest” (p. 429), “Ustasha villain” (p. 430), “the most dangerous slayer” (p. 432), “the greatest villain” (p. 434),

¹⁰ Heike Karge, *Steinerne Erinnerung – versteinerte Erinnerung? Kriegsgedenken in Jugoslawien (1947-1970)*, Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts an der Freien Universität Berlin, Band 49 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010).

“humans – beasts” (p. 434), “the main brute” (p. 438), “the greatest villain” (p. 438), “beast” (p. 438), “executioner” (p. 440), “the most bloodthirsty killer” (p. 440), “brute” and “executioner” (p. 442), “chief brute” (p. 444), “severe slayer” (p. 446), “chief brute” (p. 446), “the toughest villain” (p. 447), “the most famous executioner” (p. 447), “the most vicious and bloodthirsty criminal” (p. 447), “the greatest villain” (p. 448), “butcher” (p. 448), “the chief brute” (p. 448), “the chief brute” (p. 449), “the Satan himself” (p. 452), “human beasts” (p. 453), “the toughest villain” (p. 453), “butchers” (p. 455), “snake” (p. 455), “leader of bloodsuckers” (p. 455), “she drank and whored only with the Ustasas” (p. 456), “true criminal” (p. 458), “woman-beast” (p. 460), “the greatest executioner/brute” (p. 461), “the greatest executioner” (p. 461), “the Jasenovac executioners” (p. 466), “famous executioner and slayer” (p. 467), “slayer” (p. 469), “senile sadist” (p. 471), “the chief of slayers”, “the best slayer” (p. 472), “covert torture”, “slayer”, “boss of the slayers” (p. 474), “greater torturer” (p. 475), “brut” (p. 475).

It would be wise for Goldstein to use, and to quote, the same or similar means of expression, both when writing about communist crimes, and when mentioning Josip Broz Tito in that context. However, contrary to the epithets mentioned above, Goldstein would call the communist systematic and ruthless confrontation with the enemy in Croatia, and elsewhere in Yugoslavia, at the end of and after the Second World War merely an “aberration”¹¹ [from lat. *aberratio*, deviation from the course, system defect].

Even if we ignore that such Goldstein’s writing is tedious and boring, the bigger problem is that behind such assessments, there is actually a lack of a better explanation, some kind of response regarding the violence and its perpetrators in Jasenovac based on better quality methodology. Instead, we got a poorly written biographical lexicon of “Ustasha slayers”. Everyone is there, on the number. Petar Brzica and other Ustasas were betting who would kill more Serbs, so in one day he “allegedly” managed to kill 1360 of them, which was a “record” (p. 428). It certainly is a real record. One day has 24 hours, or 1440 minutes, so fast Brzica killed an average of one Serb almost every minute, without any break or rest. There is also a certain Maričić, whose exact first name Goldstein did not even identify, but he did mention that the said gentleman wore a moustache “à la Menjou” (p. 432), and Goldstein, the master of important details, then explained to us that this refers to the kind of moustache worn by American actor Adolphe Menjou (p. 884). There is also some Ustasha scented with “the elegant and famous perfume chypre” (p. 431). Goldstein does not forget Ustasha Mujo Jusić, who had made for himself a “Damascus

¹¹ “Ivo Goldstein: Istinu o Jasenovcu zna svatko tko želi”, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ivo-goldstein-jasenovac-logor-/29198835.html>, accessed on November 20, 2018.

sabre weighing 5 kg, which had to be held with both hands” (p. 443), and in the whole story the key information is that of Ustasha Stjepan Bosak, who had big feet, so - believe it or not - he wore shoes size 52 (p. 443).

In the book, Goldstein describes Jasenovac (and Stara Gradiška) as an example of “the hell of the 20th century”, as an “apocalypse”, etc. But, in fact, his incessant desire to depict this hell eventually made him contradictory and sometimes even grotesque. By listing horrors, Goldstein eventually creates an impression contrary to that he intended. The more alert reader does not know how to believe what Goldstein writes, among other things, because Goldstein contradicts himself.

So, for example, we can firstly find out that regular drinking water was available to detainees in minimal quantities (p. 257), but then we learn that a doctor ordered one sick inmate to drink tea, but he wanted water, so another detainee gave him “a litre or two of water” (p. 344). So, first there is no water, then it is supplied plentifully, and even tea can be drunk... Regarding the typhoid epidemic in Jasenovac at the end of 1942, Goldstein concludes that the camp administration sought to “cover up the epidemic before the authorities in Zagreb” (p. 269). Since Goldstein himself stated a few pages before (p. 266) that the Ustasha Defence at the end of November 1942 requested disinfectants from the authorities in Zagreb to suppress the typhoid epidemic at the camp,¹² it remains unclear how this epidemic was intended to be “covered up”? There is no logic here, except for Goldstein’s “logic” that the Ustashas, apart from slaughtering, were also lying and covering things up... Likewise Goldstein will do his best to explain to us that the life conditions of inmates in terms of diet, personal hygiene and all other existential issues were inhuman, below the level of survival. And then Goldstein would blurt out that mothers who were in the camp with their children bathed these children every day, washed their diapers and prepared food (p. 299). So how is that possible when there was no food, no water, no conditions for maintaining personal hygiene?

Goldstein states that some Ustashas killed prisoners in Jasenovac with explanations which were “monstrous”, for instance because of escape attempts or escape of some other prisoners (p. 323). Well then, if Ustashas in Jasenovac anyhow killed mercilessly, why would then be so “monstrous” if they killed a prisoner for an attempt to escape or because other prisoners escaped? This is a good example of how Goldstein increasingly overuses “heavy” epithets, and eventually becomes counter-productive in relation to his mission to depict hell. Eh, Dante, Dante! Instead of being shocked by the brutality of Ustasha butchers, the reader in the end scoffs at Goldstein’s pathetic phrasing...

¹² HR-HDA-226, Ministarstvo zdravstva i udružbe NDH, Glavno ravnateljstvo za zdravstvo, No: 74.970/1942.

In the flood of Goldstein's quotes, everyone will find something for themselves. Thus, he first estimates that for the inmates it was "the most difficult" to get used to "the proximity of death" (p. 301), but then he contradicts himself quoting the memories of Jasenovac survivors who say that "everyone" sent to Jasenovac "felt" it was the "final stop of their lives", that is, the closeness of death in the camp made them allegedly "feel toughness instead of fear" (p. 338). On the other hand, Goldstein is drowning in contradictions regarding the killings of prisoners. As he explains to us, the Ustashas in Jasenovac could have beaten up or killed "any detainee without any reason or cause". But just a few lines later, Goldstein states that some did ask why someone had been killed, so the excuse was that it was a detainee trying to escape. In other words, even when one killed for no reason, there had to be some, even "meaningless reason" (p. 322). So, first, the Ustashas needed neither reason nor cause, and then there had to be some reason, even "meaningless"?

Elsewhere, writing about an Ustasha Mirko Runjaš "Gipsy", Goldstein stated, among other things, that he "had full authority to satisfy his sadistic demands on detainees as much and in the manner he wanted" (p. 447). But it sounds pointless if, as mentioned, Goldstein had previously stated that Ustashas in the camp could kill "any detainee without having either reason or cause for that". So why did Runjaš need some "full authority"?

It is even more ridiculous when Goldstein, describing another "field butcher", Ustasha officer Ille, states it was a "public secret" that this butcher – "blackmailed detainees". In fact, if Ille noticed better shoes on some inmate, he approached him "without shame" and said that those shoes should be handed over to him, and if the detainee complained to someone about it, Ille threatened to kill him (p. 449). The Ustashas, first we learned from Goldstein, could kill any detainee with impunity, but then Ille "shamelessly" asked the detainees their shoes, and the detainees could even "complain" to someone? So why didn't Ustasha Ille simply slaughter them and take their shoes? I repeat: Goldstein's terror lab is eventually transformed into a random pile of claims in which he denies himself.

After all, one really has to laugh when Goldstein quotes Đorđe Miliša,¹³ who states that Ustasha Jakov Džal was a "known executioner", but even here Goldstein intervenes, and estimates that this could be a "vague impression", which Miliša anyway "attributed to anyone" (p. 455). Unlike Miliša, Goldstein chooses words carefully, he never uses "suggestive metaphors" ... After everything written Goldstein teaches us that all "participants in the genocide and crimes against humanity in Jasenovac" were nonetheless "people" and not

¹³ Đorđe Miliša, *U mučilištu – paklu Jasenovac* (Zagreb: Self-published, 1945).

“one-dimensional monsters” (p. 488). It would not be possible to conclude that from his earlier descriptions...

It was, in fact, German historian Alexander Korb who, in connection with the writing of Western historians on NDH and its, i.e. Ustasha crimes, noticed exactly the “discourse of pathologization” (*Pathologisierungsdiskurs*), whereby the Balkans are perceived as a distant and foreign place where the Ustashes commit picturesquely-exotic bloody crimes. Korb also writes about Western historians who uncritically cite certain sources for the description of the situation in NDH, in particular the “apologetic memoirs” of German General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau¹⁴, who becomes a “crown witness” with his work instead of it being critically analysed and contextualized. All of the aforementioned Korb sees as a flawed approach that we should detach from.¹⁵ However, as Goldstein is not a historian from the West, but from our regions, he often succumbs to *Pathologisierungsdiskurs*, and he simply cannot do without the memoirs of Glaise von Horstenau. At the very beginning of the book, he regrets that his memoirs were not cited more often during Yugoslavia (p. 28).

Already at the beginning of the book, when Goldstein, in order to describe “a monstrous torturer”, Ustasha officer Viktor Tomić, uses the opinion of Vladimir Židovec that there was some “special kind of mystique and insanity” in Tomić (p. 596), it is obvious that things will not end well, and Goldstein, in a Dante-like fashion, will continue using similar poetic images, for instance “the entire Jasenovac madness” (p. 596).

Goldstein will commit to explanations as if he were a trained psychologist or psychiatrist. Thus, the motives of the Ustasha hatred of the Serbs were “multiple and layered”, so Goldstein refers to Sigmund Freud and “the narcissism of minor differences” (p. 52). Killing with a sledgehammer or a knife was, Goldstein concludes, a testimony of “individual pathology” (p. 336). Afterwards, Goldstein estimates that Miroslav Filipović Majstorović displayed “bipolarity”, which is the case for persons with “severe psychopathological problems” (p. 409). And then, after the “narcissism of minor differences” and bipolar disorders, there is also a typical Goldstein-like neologism about “a typical self-hatred syndrome” with Filipović Majstorović since his mother was reportedly Serbian (p. 401). [The self-taught parapsychological labelling of “self-hatred” has already been patented by Goldstein(s) earlier, for example, to classify Ernest Bauer, who was a member of the NDH government and whose mother

¹⁴ *Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau*, vol. 3: *Deutscher Bevollmächtigter General in Kroatien und Zeuge des Untergangs des “Tausendjährigen Reiches”*, ed. von Peter Broucek (Wien; Köln; Graz: Böhlau, 1988) – Croatian edition: Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, *Zapisi iz NDH* (Zagreb: Disput, 2013).

¹⁵ Alexander Korb, *Im Schatten des Weltkriegs: Massengewalt der Ustaša gegen Serben, Juden und Roma in Kroatien 1941–1945* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013), pp. 27-28.

was of Jewish descent.]¹⁶ Thus, Goldstein concludes – a bipolar disorder with the syndrome of self-hatred. After that diagnosis, Goldstein will treat us with one of his more meaningless and sadder conclusions and inspiringly write: “However, the Serbian descent of Miroslav Filipović-Majstorović’s mother is just the most drastic example of the contradiction, tragedy and theatre of the absurd that pervades the history of the Jasenovac camp” (p. 401). As we are not inspired like Goldstein, we will have to conclude the opposite, that is, that the alleged Serbian origin of Filipović Majstorović’s mother is a completely irrelevant detail for the overall assessment of Jasenovac. At the same time, the most drastic example of Goldstein’s superficial scribbling is when he notices the “theatre of the absurd” in Jasenovac (p. 401). What is the “theatre of the absurd” in Jasenovac?

Goldstein will not, intriguingly, forget to mention that “some facts”, although he did not specify which, suggest that Vjekoslav Luburić was homosexual, although there is no “mention” of it in the “memoirs or official documentation” (p. 397). Franciscan and Ustasha Dionizije Juričev was, however, “among the Ustashes most active in sleeping with nuns” (p. 678). It was not Goldstein’s claim, but those were the rumours, and he, being so scrupulous and acritical, had to convey this crucial information. After these key details, elsewhere the profundity of Goldstein’s psychological-sociological-historiographical analysis is breath-taking. Thus, he explains that the illiteracy of a particular person (an Ustasha villain) does not imply that the person was immediately violent and cruel, and there were also intelligent and educated persons who were “merciless criminals” (p. 422).

It seems that Goldstein’s “explanations” are arbitrary and randomly poured. I repeat, there is too much *Pathologisierungsdiskurs* at Goldstein. There is no broader quality pattern nor methodology that would facilitate in understanding Jasenovac.

“Brutality was manifested not only in the killing with a sledgehammer and a curved knife, but also in the fact that killers and victims often looked into each other’s eyes in the last moments” (p. 334), Goldstein writes and further describes in detail the mallet and explains how it was used for killing... Goldstein will, in turn, interdisciplinary link the Ustasha killing with a sledgehammer in Jasenovac with the alleged ancient custom of killing old people in some of our parts, for example in Lika, Gorski Kotar, Dalmatian Hinterland, on some Adriatic islands, and in Herzegovina and Montenegro. Goldstein broadly and very picturesquely, with reference to details, conveys what the ethnological literature recorded on that subject (pp. 334 – 335). Goldstein writes that

¹⁶ Cf. Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu* (Zagreb: Novi Liber; Židovska općina Zagreb, 2001), pp. 51-52.

“in the depressed areas of Croatia and the wider region, there is a memory of the custom that the elderly who turn 60 years old (and even when they only turn fifty, but also eighty) are well fed, taken to the mountain and killed there by a family member by the stroke of a mallet or similar objects on their head [...]”. Goldstein also writes that in the Dinaric Alps there allegedly was a saying “ripe for the axe” [I am splitting hairs, but it is not “allegedly” because it still exists today]. Etc., etc.... And after that and such an inspired Goldstein’s description and “explanation”, inevitable for understanding the crimes committed in the Jasenovac camp, there remains a puny impression, since Goldstein himself, somewhat regretfully, explains that researchers still have not “undoubtedly confirmed” the existence of the “custom of killing old people”. However, Goldstein further explains that this is “partly probable also because families sought to suppress them from the collective memory, but everything could not be erased”. I will allow the possibility! I also regret that my relatives from Bisko did not get their hands on me and bludgeon me to death on Mosor, so at least I would not have to read the aforementioned nonsense.

In the light of the foregoing, the attempt at a more layered explanation in the chapter “Banalnost jasenovačkog zla” [“The Banality of Jasenovac Evil”] (pp. 476-490) has yielded poor results. As the title itself suggests, Goldstein will first recount Hannah Arendt and what she wrote about Eichmann.¹⁷ But the impression remains that Goldstein came up with the first book he remembered. What about studies on direct perpetrators of crimes in Nazi camps, or on members of German troops who carried out mass killings of Jews? Could using such studies and other relevant literature, by means of comparative approach, make it easier to obtain some answers about the Ustashas from Jasenovac? Goldstein has better things to do than attentively reading articles in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, *Yad Vashem Studies* or reading various other globally relevant journals, collections of papers, and books. After all, in his book Goldstein makes no mention of any work of, for instance, Ian Kershaw. He even mentions Raul Hilberg¹⁸ several times in the notes, but he is not in the bibliography. I guess in a hurry he forgot. And who knows when all this was *copy-pasted*.

In his book, Goldstein did not consult the essential book by Jovan Ćulibrk *Istoriografija holokausta u Jugoslaviji* [*Historiography of the Holocaust in Yugoslavia*].¹⁹ Goldstein does not consult many other works either. For example,

¹⁷ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: The Viking Press, 1963).

¹⁸ Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961).

¹⁹ Jovan Ćulibrk, *Istoriografija holokausta u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Institut za teološka istraživanja, Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu; Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Be-

when writing about the fate of the Kozara children, why didn't he consult the essential book of Ćiril Petešić *Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom* [*Children's Home Jastrebarsko*],²⁰ or [to avoid being one-sided] a book by Rade Milosavljević *Dečji ustaški koncentracioni logor Jastrebarsko* [*Children Ustasha Concentration Camp Jastrebarsko*]?²¹ When writing about the Serbs in NDH and the relation of the Usthas towards Orthodoxy, why does Goldstein not consult the essential book by Veljko Đ. Đurić *Ustaše i pravoslavlje* [*Ustasha and the Orthodox Religion*],²² or his other works, regardless of whether he agrees with him. He neither consulted a collection of documents *Srbi u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj* [*Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia*], edited by Nikola Živković and Petar Kačavenda.²³ I cannot believe it, but in his book Goldstein does not even mention the essential book - an extensive collection of documents *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941.-1945.* [*Crimes of the Independent State of Croatia 1941 [-1945]*], published in 1993 by Vojnoistorijski institut in Belgrade.²⁴ So, there is a long list of books, collections of documents, journals and papers that Goldstein, in his "scrupulous" approach, neither used nor consulted, and - in short - he should have because they are relevant to understanding the issues he was addressing... However, we should not be overcritical since Goldstein did use some important titles. For example, there is a column by Viktor Ivančić published in March 2017 in *Novosti* [*News*] of the Serbian National Council entitled "Govno na grobu" ["Shit on the Grave"] (p. 818).

After writing a few lines about Hanna Arendt, Goldstein introduces the category of "genetic criminals", defined by Italian physician Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909). Unfortunately, Goldstein then explains to us what a "Lombroso type" or a "born criminal" is. These are persons who have "low forehead, thick eyebrows, strong lower jaw, small eyes and strong extremities". However, Goldstein complained, for most Ustasha criminals in Jasenovac there are neither physical descriptions nor photographs, so unfortunately it is not possible to determine whether they were of a "Lombroso type" (p. 477). At the end of this magnificent multidisciplinary analysis, he concludes that on the basis of

ogradu, 2011) or Jovan Ćulibrk, *Historiography of the Holocaust in Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: The Institute for Theological Research of the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the University of Belgrade; Faculty of Security Studies of the University of Belgrade, 2014).

²⁰ Ćiril Petešić, *Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom: Dokumenti (1939-1947)* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1990).

²¹ Rade Milosavljević, *Dečji ustaški koncentracioni logor Jastrebarsko* (Jagodina: Gambit, 2009).

²² Veljko Đ. Đurić, *Ustaše i pravoslavlje: Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva* (Belgrade: Beletra, 1989).

²³ Nikola Živković, Petar Kačavenda, *Srbi u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj: Izabrana dokumenta* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998).

²⁴ *Zločini na jugoslovenskim prostorima u prvom i drugom svetskom ratu: Zbornik dokumenata*, Vol. I: *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941.-1945.*, Bk. 1: *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941.* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1993).

physical descriptions and photographs (of Ustasha butchers) that do exist, it is “clear” that Lombroso theory, or any similar, cannot be applied to the example of Jasenovac. - Good morning, Prof. Goldstein! Didn't Lombroso theory ultimately have an impact on the Nazis and their theories on “criminal types” and “inferior races”, and consequently on the Nazi practices of euthanasia and persecution of “lower race”?

After meddling with Lombroso and regretting that there were no photographs of the Ustashes from Jasenovac to look at their thick eyebrows, Goldstein goes into new “explanations”, so, for example, he mentions Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's famous book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (p. 481),²⁵ but, being scrupulous as he is, he writes his name inaccurately: Daniel Jonas. Goldstein did hear about Goldhagen, as he also heard about Arendt, Lombroso, and Madagascar, so he mentioned him, too. At the time, Goldhagen's book aroused great attention and debate in Germany, so I guess Goldstein too was able to hear about it. A number of serious German and other historians have warned of all the simplifications, misconceptions, and wrong conclusions of this book.²⁶ But, as he does not know other things, Goldstein probably does not know that either.

After that, Goldstein tries to give us additional explanations for the evil in Jasenovac because its proportions are “so terrible” that even the “most consistent advocate of a rational approach” must think that there is “some other explanation”. Again, that *Pathologisierungsdiskurs*! But Goldstein does not stop, so unfortunately he continues to “explain”. Thus, the Ustashes were uneducated, young and pliable, all in a society where the collective is more powerful than the individual and in which there is a “herd mentality”, much more so than in “richer, more developed and more advanced environments” (p. 482). Great, Prof. Goldstein, that is why the partisans were different, educated, of mature age and unpliant, and therefore, fortunately, Germany and German society, which were much richer, in every way more developed and advanced, and undeniably more civilized and cultured, managed to avoid Adolf Hitler, Nazism, racial laws, and Auschwitz. A colossal conclusion.

Afterwards, on page 483 of his latest book Goldstein treats us with this conception: “In the culture of Jasenovac killers, the contempt and hatred of the “other” and the “different” were strongly expressed. And that culture, in fact metaculture, did not disappear in the decades after World War II, it manifested itself in the wars of the nineties, in mass and revenge killings, robbery and

²⁵ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).

²⁶ Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, Fourth Edition (London: Arnold, 2000), pp. 253-262.

arson.” Ridiculous – which is that “metaculture”, what was everything that happened from 1945 to the 1990s, in the decades of life in the undemocratic communist system, what influenced people’s behaviour in the wars of the 1990s? What kind of an “explanation” is that, what is it based on?

I would be disappointed if Ivo Goldstein did not mention the “Ustasha plan of dealing in thirds”. Developing this theory without relying on reliable sources is almost a tradition in the Goldstein family. - Slavko Goldstein wrote that Ustasha Vlado Singer met communist Šime Balen in May 1941 and told him about the Ustasha “plan of dealing in thirds”. He then wrote that “it seems” that the above was a “frequently mentioned and popular” formulation in “some Ustasha circles”. However, Slavko Goldstein wisely concluded, this “platitude” about “the thirds” is not originally Ustashian, but originates from the senior adviser to the Russian emperor, who in the early 1880s, commenting on the pogroms of Jews, concluded that one third of Jews from Russia should emigrate, one third should convert to Orthodoxy and one third should be killed.²⁷

Therefore, Ivo Goldstein also writes that among the Ustashas “circulated the maxim” saying that the “Serbian question” should be resolved on the principle that “one third are to be killed, one third resettled and one third converted to Christianity”. This maxim - Goldstein writes - was never written down in Ustasha program files or recorded in the NDH press or legal provisions, but - Goldstein concludes - there is no doubt that the terror against the Serbs was aimed at its realization. Goldstein explains that various sources, even records of “well-informed contemporaries” “indirectly testify” about that. Goldstein mentions Hermann Neubacher, a special official of the German Reich Foreign Ministry for the Balkans based in Belgrade, and his book *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-45*,²⁸ which should, probably, be a relevant source for the theory of “the thirds” (pp. 51-52).

Following the wisdoms of his father Slavko, but without mentioning what Singer allegedly told Balen [probably the tape recording was lost], Ivo Goldstein educates us that the idea of “the thirds” is not the original brainchild of Ante Pavelić, or any of his associates, but taken over from an adviser to the Russian Emperor Alexander III, who proposed that idea (“resettle one third of the Jews, convert one third, and one third would starve to death”) as the solution of the Jewish question in Russia. As the icing on the cake, Ivo Goldstein scrupulously supplements his father Slavko and concludes that the Ustashas had “obviously” somewhere “read and simply taken over” that statement (p.

²⁷ Slavko Goldstein, 1941. *Godina koja se vraća* (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2007), pp. 113-114.

²⁸ Hermann Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-45: Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten* (Göttingen: Musters Schmidt Verlag, 1956), p. 18.

52). - So, in the absence of reliable sources, Goldstein refers to “indirect sources” and proclaims “obvious” what it is not - until proven by some serious and verifiable sources - that the Ustashas had taken over the notion of “the thirds” from the adviser to the Russian emperor.

Goldstein says in the book that NDH committed “genocide” against the Serbian people. Nowhere in the book has Goldstein made any theoretical account of what he regards as genocide, how the term should be explained, and what other authors have written about it. For him, the term genocide is self-explanatory.

But let us take a look at what some authors, more serious than Goldstein, write about that. In his research of mass killings in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1941 and 1942, so the issue here considers violent acts perpetrated by NDH, but also the Chetniks, Tomislav Dulić, in a methodological introduction, broadly explains and discusses the concepts of “genocide” as well as “intended genocide”, “ethnocide” and “massacre”, while elaborating on the complexity of the definition and use of the term “genocide”.²⁹ With regard to the mass violence of NDH against the Serbian population, in the conclusion of his work Dulić says: “Whether they wanted to physically annihilate a substantial part of the [Serbian] population, thus committing genocide as they did against the Jews and the Roma, whether they [NDH] failed to a point where their actions may best be described as ‘attempted genocide’, or whether they committed ethnocide cannot be properly established without more comparisons and case studies of regions where there was less military combat”.³⁰ The aforementioned German historian Korb has extensively dealt with the subject of mass violence of NDH against Serbian, Jewish and Roma people.³¹ He has also recently stated for the Croatian press that one should be careful when describing the violence of NDH against Serbs as “genocide”.³²

But what does Goldstein care about what Dulić and Korb write or think, or some other competent scientists, because to him, this is the Ustasha genocide against the Serbs and that is that. The problem is, and we experienced this well in the late 1980s with the Serbian campaign on Croatian “genocidity”, that

²⁹ Tomislav Dulić, *Utopias of Nation, Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-42*, *Studia Historica Upsaliensia* 218 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2005), pp. 11-24.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

³¹ Korb, *Im Schatten des Weltkriegs*.

³² Robert Bajruši, “Alexander Korb za Jutarnji: Njemački povjesničar i jedan od vodećih stručnjaka za povijest NDH: ‘Ovo je prava istina o broju ubijenih u Jasenovcu’” [“Alexander Korb for *Jutarnji*: German historian and one of the leading experts for the history of NDH: ‘This is the real truth about the number of people killed in Jasenovac’”] <https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/njemacki-povjesnicar-i-jedan-od-vodecih-strucnjaka-za-povijest-ndh-ovo-je-prava-istina-o-broju-ubijenih-u-jasenovcu/7373904/>, accessed on February 16, 2019.

qualifying NDH violence against Serbian population as “genocide” here does not only have the meaning of a historiographical debate but also has its current political function. [And it is a real shame that Goldstein did not consult French historian Xavier Bougarel’s article “Od krivičnog zakona do memoranduma. Upotrebe pojma ‘genocid’ u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji” [“From the Penal Law to Memorandum: The uses of the term ‘genocide’ in Communist Yugoslavia”³³] - So there are undoubtedly well-intentioned people who will undoubtedly agree with Goldstein that genocide was committed against Serbs in NDH, but that does not mean that such claims and conclusions have a foothold in the past reality.

In the book Goldstein writes about the “Jasenovac camp system”, which, from the end of August 1941 to April 1945, was “the central and by far the largest camp system on the territory of NDH”, and states that “the official name of the entire camp system was the Ustasha Defence - the Command of the Assembly camps of Jasenovac”. He further states that in the documents and literature the following names “were frequently used”: “Jasenovac Assembly Camp, Jasenovac Concentration Camp, Jasenovac Assembly and Labour Camp, and Jasenovac Labour Camp”, but also states: “Although the documents at that time referred to ‘Jasenovac’, it would be more appropriate to use the term ‘Jasenovac camp system’, since there were five separate camp units marked with Roman numerals I to V, as well as the camp farms surrounding those five camps, which were also part of the system” (p. 81). Throughout one entire chapter (“Jasenovac III”, pp. 80-120), Goldstein writes extensively about the “Jasenovac complex”, about “five camp units - Jasenovac from I to V”, that is about the “Jasenovac camp system”.

However, at the end of August 1941 the first camp was founded near the village of Krapje, also called Camp I, and then at the beginning of September 1941 a camp near the village of Bročice was also founded, called Camp II. Because of difficult terrain and constant flooding in mid-October 1941 the central camp was founded near Jasenovac, called also Camp III and Ciglana (Brickworks), to which in the middle of November 1941 the inmates from Krapje and Bročice, the two camps that were then closed, were transferred. Additionally, at the end of 1941 Kožara (Tannery), also called Camp IV, was founded in the village of Jasenovac, and in the former Penitentiary in Stara Gradiška a camp was founded, which was marked as Camp V. Camp farms were established in the wider vicinity of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška, to

³³ Xavier Bougarel, “Od krivičnog zakona do memoranduma: Upotrebe pojma ‘genocid’ u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji”, *Političke perspektive* 1 (2011), no. 2: 7-24.

which detainees were sent to work.³⁴ “The Tannery camp was established in January 1942 in Jasenovac itself, as a smaller labour camp (the so-called Tannery). In fact, it was not a camp in the true sense of the word, but only a work detail IV or a tannery group, but it was nevertheless numbered as Jasenovac IV”, Goldstein states on page 83 of his book.

So, Krapje and Bročice, camps I and II founded at the end of August and the beginning of September 1941, ceased to exist in mid-November of the same year, and Tannery or Camp IV was not in fact a camp but a work detail, as Goldstein himself accurately concluded. Therefore, we can speak and write about two camps only – the Jasenovac camp (Assembly camp III) and the Stara Gradiška camp (Assembly camp V). Despite the fact that both camps were under joint command in Jasenovac, they operated almost independently, so from the middle of 1942 there were the “Command of the assembly camp in Jasenovac” and the “Command of the assembly camp in Stara Gradiška”, and from May 1943 the “Administration of the Assembly camp Jasenovac” and the “Administration of the Assembly camp Stara Gradiška”, and it remained so until 1945, as is undoubtedly confirmed by documents.³⁵

Goldstein only mentions the original name (“Command of the assembly camp in Jasenovac”), and the above mentioned changes in the camp titles, which were certainly connected with the camp organization in Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška, he doesn’t mention at all. And since it does not fit into the “more appropriate” terminology that he uses - by which he tries to exaggerate already difficult and dark picture about the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška camps - he also forgets the chronology, i.e. the moment when each Jasenovac camp was founded and ceased to exist. Using the term “system” in defining the Jasenovac camp (and Stara Gradiška) is characteristic of many Serbian historians and notably publicists, who count the victims of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška in hundreds of thousands... Adhering to such terminology and interpretations leads to the notion that the “Jasenovac camp system” really existed, in fact in the form of five camps at the same time, Camp I, Camp II, Camp III, Camp IV and Camp V. Thus exaggerating, Goldstein in fact manipulates and misleads those who are not familiar with the subject.

At some places, the question arises as to how much Goldstein’s writing corresponds with actual events, even if it is not the matter of his manipulation, but rather ignorance. For example, Goldstein claims that the Ustashas from

³⁴ Mario Kevo, “Počeci logora Jasenovac”, *Scrinia Slavonica* 3 (2003): 471-499 and Mario Kevo, “Počeci jasenovačkog logora i pojmovna (terminološka) problematika Sustava jasenovačkih logora”, in: *Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara*, Vol. 9, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2005), pp. 573-589.

³⁵ Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945. Dokumenta*, Bks. I-IV.

Jasenovac led by Vjekoslav Luburić at the beginning of 1942 arrived in the village of Jablanovac where Luburić explained to the villagers that because of the “partisan threat” they should be evacuated “to safety”. Then the Ustasas killed some villagers, and deported part of them to Jasenovac and part to Germany (pp. 544-545). However, in the daily report of the General Staff of the Croatian Home Guard, based on the data received on 8 April 1942, which Goldstein doesn’t mention, it states that: “People of Orthodox religion from the v.[illage] of Jablanac (13 km southwest of Okučani) were taken by rebels to the v.[illage] of Orahovo (1.5 km southwest of the v.[illage] of Jablanac). Catholic families moved to the v.[illage] of Mlaka (4 km southwest of the v.[illage] of Jablanac). The village of Jablanac is completely empty.”³⁶

Goldstein explains that the “story about the corpses floating in the Sava River” had gradually become one of the most frequently mentioned stories in the “variety of Jasenovac horrors”, it had spread by word of mouth and in time it “lost its historic credibility”. Goldstein was keen to restore “the story about corpses floating in Sava” its former glory. There are “numerous documents” (p. 364) about that, as Goldstein educates us. Which are they, I wonder?

Thus Goldstein writes that on “22 June 1942 the Command of the 3rd Home Guard Corps based in Sarajevo reported that ‘lately it has been receiving reports from the guards on the bridges that recently there have been corpses and carcasses floating in the Sava River (...) these bodies get stuck by the banks and decompose, tainting the environment’” (p. 364). However, Goldstein deceives.

This Goldstein’s statement immediately attracts attention, but his meagre knowledge of the subject and terminology facilitates our job. The Command of the 3rd Home Guard Corps in Sarajevo did not include the part of NDH through which the Sava River flew, which immediately directs us to refer back to the source that Goldstein cited. And there we will see his readiness to cite only those archival sources that suited him to corroborate his claims.

The fact is that the Command of the 3rd Home Guard Corps forwarded to subordinate commands a circular of the General Staff of the Ministry of the Croatian Home Guard labelled *Obći br. 10615/taj.* dated 17 June 1942, which stated that: “The Command of the 2nd Home Guard Military District has been receiving reports from the guards on the bridges that recently there have been carcasses and corpses floating in the Sava River, some among them also dressed in Home Guard uniforms. These bodies get stuck by the banks and decompose, tainting the environment. Such an inhuman and malicious act

³⁶ *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u naroda Jugoslavije*, Vol. IV, Bk. 4: *Borbe u Bosni i Hercegovini 1942 god.* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut Jugoslovenske narodne armije, 1952), doc. no. 122.

of mostly enemies of the state, which causes infections, must be disabled by banning the throw of dead bodies in rivers, controlling rivers and banks by administrative and military patrols, and imposing a regulation to catch and bury bodies on the spot.”³⁷

So, when the document is read in its entirety, it becomes clear how much Goldstein is prepared to manipulate. The document does not mention anything about the corpses of prisoners from Jasenovac, although it can be read from it that the corpses of people were cast into Sava also by members of the NDH units, although still mostly “enemies of the state”. It also states that some of the corpses may have been the home guards that the rebels killed and cast into Sava, which Goldstein, in need of disabling the “Ustasha propaganda”, cut and left out. The apparent is the following: Goldstein either failed to properly master the “craft” of a historian, scholar, or he cannot resist fabricating (falsifying, faking) the original document with intention to deceive.

Since Goldstein was really keen on proving that the corpses floating in the Sava River were those of the Jasenovac prisoners and that it was “not some fantasy or propaganda”, he went on. Thus he mentioned a report by the “County Constabulary of County of Livac-Zapolje” directed to the Ministry of Health of NDH in August 1942, which states that they organized to collect bodies on the bridge in Bosanska Gradiška “that were passing through Sava and they were taken out and buried there” (pp. 364–365). In fact, it wasn’t the report of the “County Constabulary” but of Greater County of Livac-Zapolje dated 19 August 1942 regarding health conditions on its territory the week before.³⁸ The stated document nowhere mentioned that those were the bodies of Jasenovac prisoners, and it is obvious that Goldstein would not consider the possibility that those were - for example - the bodies of partisans who had died there during July 1942 when they tried to break through the encirclement on Kozara.³⁹

Therefore, Goldstein proved absolutely nothing about the bodies from Jasenovac floating in Sava, except showing his readiness to “twist” sources to prove his point. Anyway, he seems even more ridiculous when taken into consideration that, before manipulating the aforementioned documents from 1942, he stated that the Usthas conducted mass killings of prisoners in Gradina (so they didn’t throw them into Sava), or that “mass killings” in Granik,

³⁷ Hrvatska [Croatia, HR]-Hrvatski državni arhiv [Croatian State Archives, HDA]-1204, Zapovjedništvo 6. pješačke divizije – Mostar [Command of the 6th Infantry Division – Mostar], Taj. No: 3067/1942.

³⁸ Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac. Dokumenta*, Bk. I, doc. no. 169.

³⁹ Cf. *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, Vol. XII, Bk. 2: *Dokumenti Nemačkog Rajha 1942*. (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1976), Contribution I, p. 1117.

that is on the banks of Sava, were conducted “from the end of 1943.” (p. 364). So if the prisoners were killed in Gradina, and in Granik only as late as the end of 1943, how can the NDH documents from June and August 1942 be a proof of (mass) casting of bodies from Jasenovac into Sava?

In the book, Goldstein ponders over the thesis of the “banality of evil” in Jasenovac, but at the same time the banality of his superficiality and ignorance is evident in the manuscript. While extensively writing about and reiterating the depravity and persecution of the Serbs in NDH, and about committing genocide against them, he accidentally mentions that Sarajevo lawyer Sava Besarović was “a representative of the Serbs in the Croatian State Assembly” in 1942 (p. 582). How could Besarović be a representative of the Serbs in NDH when Serbs as a nation were not recognized and officially did not exist there, they are referred to as “Greek-easterners”, “Orthodox”. Thus, according to Goldstein, the nation exposed to the genocide in NDH still had a representative in the Parliament.

According to Legal Regulations about the Croatian State Parliament from January 24, 1942, it is precisely determined who the members of the Parliament are, and the representatives of minorities are exclusively representatives of the German national group.⁴⁰ Therefore, I would like to point out to Prof. Goldstein, the reviewers of his book and similar experts, that there were no representatives of Serbs in the Croatian State Parliament during NDH.

Goldstein’s way is actually an extraordinary allegory in which anything is possible. If he declared Sava Besarović a Serb representative in the NDH Parliament, should we be surprised then when he states that the circular of the Organizational Office of the Main Ustasha Headquarters from May 20, 1942 was drawn up by “Minister Mladen Lorković” (pp. 43-44), when in fact the circular was signed by Lorković, but Blaž, as the Administrative Commander of the Main Ustasha Headquarters. Reviewers, where were you?

There is a great number of factual errors in the book, out of ignorance or negligence, and the way in which the notes are kept is, to put it mildly, problematic. Specifically, you can go through the pages of Goldstein’s book without coming across a single note. When you finally reach a note, it is not entirely clear which source Goldstein used for which claim.

Goldstein informs us that from an order of the Poglavnik’s Main Headquarters can be concluded that “the actual capacity of Jasenovac III Brickworks ranged from 2,000 to 3,000 detainees, but due to constant selections and mass liquidations it could receive ‘an unlimited number of detainee’” (p.

⁴⁰ Cf. Ivo Perić, *Hrvatski državni sabor 1848.-2000.*, Vol. 3: 1918.-2000. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest; Hrvatski državni sabor; Dom i svijet, 2000), p. 66.

498). Goldstein has reached this “fabrication” because he does not know how to read the literature he cites, and obviously he is not familiar with the content of some of the better known Jasenovac documents. Then, there is no order of the Poglavnik’s Main Headquarters from which the “actual capacity” of Jasenovac can be derived, but solely a circular of the Poglavnik’s Main Headquarters from April 27, 1942 that, according to the notification of the Ustasha Surveillance Service (UNS), the Jasenovac camp could receive “an unlimited number of detainees” and therefore to that camp should be directed “all communists” who get caught while clearing certain areas. I repeat to Goldstein and the reviewers of his book: the “capacity” of the camp is not mentioned at all in this circular.

If Goldstein does not know the content of a document that has been repeatedly published, such as the aforementioned circular of the Poglavnik’s Main Headquarters, then it is obvious that knowing other relevant documents for him can be an insurmountable difficulty. Thus, Goldstein cites a letter from Stjepan Uroić, Grand Mayor of Great County of Livac and Zapolje, in which Uroić states that he demanded that the Ustashes strictly obey Ante Pavelić’s order from April 16, 1942. Goldstein then writes that the aforementioned “probably” refers to some “pardon provision” issued on the occasion of the first anniversary of the proclamation of NDH (p. 384). In fact, it is not probable but certain that Goldstein does not know the key documents for the topic he is dealing with.

However, Uroić was referring to the circular of the Poglavnik’s Main Headquarters dated April 16, 1942, entitled “Provisions for the procedure regarding operations (actions) to clear rebel territories”. Moreover, the said circular was also published in the literature Goldstein allegedly used.⁴¹

Instead of being familiar with and using first-rate sources, Goldstein would embellish his book with third-grade, peripheral sources, thus stating that the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-exile in 1943 had information that Jasenovac was “the central camp that everyone must go through before being sent to other camps” (p. 26). And what other camps? - When Goldstein already refers to the Yugoslav royal government, it is strange that he does not wonder what the allegation that Jasenovac is “the central camp that everyone must go through” means. Does this actually mean that there was a massive exit from Jasenovac? Is this in the wake of the claims set forth by his fellow historian Stjepan Razum?

And if he does not know the contents or even about the existence of certain important documents and relevant literature, how can we expect Gold-

⁴¹ Cf. Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac: Dokumenta*, Bk. III, doc. no. 53.

stein to know more elaborate things? ... Therefore, it is no surprise that he does not distinguish the *Wiking* operation (sending detainees from Jasenovac to the German camp in Zemun, and then to forced labour in Norway) from mobilizing the workforce in the NDH camps, which was implemented by Karl Petersen, German official for workforce in NDH (p. 520). Should Goldstein have consulted, and yet by chance he did not, the books on that,⁴² maybe some things would become somewhat clearer to him.

After that it is almost understandable that Goldstein incorrectly refers to certain Ustasha and home defence units. For this, many examples could be provided (pp. 87, 396, 398, 426, 435, 442, 548), but, with regard to that we shall boldly approach Goldstein's ignorance gap just with his claim that in February 1942 there was the Poglavnik's Bodyguard Brigade (p. 402), although it was founded only in May of the same year. But he and the reviewers of his book could not care less for accuracy. It is no better even when it comes to the German army in NDH. [Nevertheless, I am calm and satisfied that Goldstein does not mention the Battle group Geiger (*Kampfgruppe Geiger*) and its activities in NDH.] – We write by heart and as we please. Thus Goldstein explains to us that at some point Edmund Glaise von Horstenau took command of the German forces in NDH (p. 66). Professor Goldstein, General Rudolf Lüthers, commander of German troops in Croatia sent his regards.

Goldstein's allegations and claims, to put it mildly, require adjusting with facts. Namely, on 20 October 1942, Adolf Hitler, as commander-in-chief of the German Armed Forces, issued an order for the reorganization of German commands in NDH. Thus, from November 1, 1942, Lieutenant General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau was appointed German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia and, with regard to his position, powers and duties, he was equal to the commander of a military district, and he also assumed the task of organizing, arming and training the NDH armed forces. At the same time Lieutenant General Rudolf Lüthers was appointed Commander of German troops in Croatia.⁴³ Following the foregoing, it would be too much to expect that Goldstein correctly spelled the surname of German "Major Huve" (p. 71). Let Major Huve stand in line behind General Lüthers to correct the inaccurate statement.

⁴² Cf. Milorad Ašković, Blagoje Marinković, Ljubomir Petrović, *U logorima u severnoj Norveškoj* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1979), Ljubo Mladenović, *Pod šifrom Viking: Život, borba i stradanja jugoslovenskih interniraca u logorima u Norveškoj 1942-1945. Studijsko-dokumentarna monografija* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju; Republička sekcija bivših interniraca iz Norveške pri SUBNOR-u Srbije, 1991) and Anna-Maria Gruenfelder, "U radni stroj velikoga Njemačkog Reicha!": *Prisilni radnici i radnice iz Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007).

⁴³ Cf. Nikica Barić, *Ustroj kopnene vojske domobranstva Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2003), pp. 288-289 and sources there cited.

It is still more interesting when Goldstein amply describes the biography of yet another Jasenovac butcher, Mile Orešković, and mentions that he was nicknamed “Gandhi” (pp. 425-427). And poor me, I thought that Nikola Orešković, an Ustasha officer who had no connection with Jasenovac, was nicknamed Gandhi. But, big deal, it is all the same. Anyway, Gandhi, not Gandhi, Mladen, Blaž, I do not care, I write what I like ...

But if Goldstein doesn't really know the sources and the facts, and precision is not his strong suit either, perhaps he can make valid conclusions? Let us look at some examples of his analytics. In several places (pp. 67, 544) Goldstein refers to a telegram sent by General Glaise von Horstenau to the German 718th Infantry Division at the end of February 1942, stating that three Ustasha companies that had secured the Jasenovac camp were to be subordinated to that division. Based on that, Goldstein ponders whether the subordination of the Jasenovac Ustashes to the German army was an attempt by the Germans to prevent the terror of the Ustashes from Jasenovac over nearby Serb villages. In this wise analysis, he forgot to mention that the same telegram stated that the command of these Ustashes would be assumed by the very - Ustasha Captain Vjekoslav Luburić (whom Glaise von Horstenau could not stand). In the depth of the analysis rested on fragile ground, Goldstein failed to realise that maybe the German 718th Infantry Division needed the aforementioned Ustasha forces to fight against the uprisings that took place in the Prijedor area at that time.

Certainly - later, when the Germans did in fact take command of almost all the Home Guard and Ustasha forces, the Ustasha Defence Division, that is, the Camp Defence Division, was excluded since it was part of the State Police Guard. Thus, as a formally “police” unit, the Ustasha division from Jasenovac was not under German command. Yes, that would be interesting to mention, but then it goes without saying that Goldstein did not write anything about it in his book.

After a naive and unsubstantiated interpretation of the aforementioned German telegram, things are in no way improved. Goldstein will show the new sharpness of his analytics on page 524, which reads: “Unlike the deportations of Serbs and Jews, where all the work, or at least its major part, was carried out by the Ustashes, the deportations of the Roma were carried out primarily by the gendarmes and the home guards, as well as by members of Kulturbund. This is not accidental but is, as it seems, a result of an assessment that neither gendarmes nor home guards will be reluctant to take part in these actions, as could be presumed to possibly occur in the deportations of Serbs or Jews.”

After such conclusions, it is not “in all likelihood” but black-and-white that Goldstein does not know anything about the topic he is writing about. In the first place, why, for example, would the Home Guard participate in the

deportation of Jews to the camps at all? The Jews mostly lived in cities, did not resist arrest, so why would the home guards participate in their deportations? Jews could also be sent to the camps by the gendarmes, with the involvement of the NDH administrative authorities and the Ustasha movement bodies. On the other hand, it was precisely the home guards, as well as the military units of the German People's Group - and not the Ustashes (I repeat: not the Ustashes!) - who participated in numerous deportations of the Serb population to the camps. So - the home guards (and the gendarmes) did not "object" when they participated in the deportations of the Serbs to the camps but carried out those deportations. Another pair of shoes is the fact that that Goldstein knows nothing about that, so he contemplates the alleged reluctance of home guards and gendarmes to participate in Serb deportations as opposed to their willingness to participate in Roma deportations.

By the way, since Goldstein does mention Kulturbund (*Schwäbisch-deutscher Kulturbund*), the Swabian-German Cultural Alliance, the German minority association in the Kingdom of SHS / Yugoslavia, he should know that after the German Reich attacked the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Kulturbund ceased to operate because in newly created states (NDH) or in occupied territories or territories annexed to other states (German Reich, Hungary), Germans were organized into German people's groups. Thus, in April 1941, the German People's Group was formed in NDH (*Die Deutsche Volksgruppe im Unabhängigen Staate Kroatien*).⁴⁴ As a professional historian, he should know when something happened and what it was called and he should use, as opposed to amateur historians, correct titles.

Undoubtedly, members of the German People's Group in NDH also participated in the deportations of the "unsuitable" population and other crimes, which later served to the new "people's authorities" as a reason and justification for the inhumane treatment of the German minority after World War II. However, I do not understand why on page 816 in the bibliography Goldstein listed: Geiger, Vladimir – Jurković, Ivan, *Što se dogodilo s Folksdojčerima? Sudbina Nijemaca u bivšoj Jugoslaviji [What Happened with the Volksdeutsche? Destiny of the Germans in Former Yugoslavia]*, Zagreb, 1993, because he does not use the book at all in his book *Jasenovac*. Rightly so since it has nothing to do with the Jasenovac camp.

And then Goldstein will explain to us that the "direct and indirect" responsibility of Ante Pavelić for Jasenovac crimes can be "substantiated" in "many ways", among others, by the fact to whom Pavelić gave decorations, and he gave them to many Ustashes who served in Jasenovac, but - Gold-

⁴⁴ Cf. "Kulturbund", in: *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, Vol. 6 (Kn-Mak), EIC August Kovačec (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod "Miroslav Krleža", 2004), p. 341.

stein observes - in public explanations “it was never written” that an Ustasha received this decoration “because of his excelling in the camp” (p. 376). After this statement, there is only one thing certain - a scrupulous conclusion. However, Goldstein needs to research further, and he just has to be persistent, so maybe he “will discover” that Pavelić officially awarded an Ustasha from Jasenovac with a medal “for excelling in the camp”, etc.

Unfortunately, there are many similar examples of Goldstein’s analytics. Thus, he informs us that NDH was at the “peak of power” at the end of 1941 and in early 1942, meaning that its overall military, police and other forces were “strong enough and effective” to kill “on the spot” or carry out “mass arrests and deportations to camps” (p. 505). How ridiculous this “analysis” is, it is shown, for example, in the extensive report by the Home Guard General Staff dated December 12, 1941, which, instead of the “peak of power”, states that the Home Guard is unable to suppress the uprising, that it lacks sufficient forces and that - by looking “with eyes wide open” - one should be concerned about the parts of NDH in which the insurgents operate, about the loyal population in those parts, and the “possibility of the survival of the very operation of our home guards, gendarmes and Ustashes”.⁴⁵

Within Goldstein’s general ignorance, his unfamiliarity with the events in connection with the village, that is, the municipality of Crkveni Bok, is a special *case study*.

Goldstein extensively writes about the case of the village of Crkveni Bok near Sunja (pp. 553-555). On October 13, 1942, the Ustashes from Jasenovac invaded the villages of Crkveni Bok, Ivanjski Bok and Strmen, killed a number of inhabitants, plundered the villages, and while some of the inhabitants managed to escape, other Serbs were taken to Jasenovac, but they were later released. Goldstein states that “two years later” Vjekoslav Luburić submitted a report on the incident (p. 554).

But in the report that Goldstein mentions, Luburić does not speak about the events in Crkveni Bok in October 1942, but the intrusion of the Ustashes into Crkveni Bok two years later, on August 27, 1944, when that village was burned and many residents were killed or taken away to the camp. So, to avoid any confusion, Luburić does not report on the events of October 1942, as Goldstein claims. Surprisingly, there is an extensive literature about these events - at least two books.⁴⁶ But for Goldstein to possibly use such literature is

⁴⁵ *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda*, Vol. V, Bk. 2: *Borbe u Hrvatskoj 1941 god.* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut Jugoslovenske narodne armije, 1952), doc. no. 140.

⁴⁶ Savo Skrobo, *Ratni događaji i sjećanja: Općina Crkveni Bok u NOB-u 1941.-1945.* (Sisak: Self-published, 2012) and Maja Kljajić Vejnović, Nikola D. Turajlić, *U raljama genocida. Stradanja*

more difficult than it was for General Lüthers to deal with Comrade Tito. So, I place the 1944 event in 1942. Maybe I realize that I was wrong – “two years later”. Where were competent reviewers to warn Goldstein about that on time?

However, it is impossible to ignore lightly Goldstein’s claims that “two years later”, Vjekoslav Luburić submitted to the NDH Interior Minister a report on “the crime in Crkveni Bok”. In that report, as Goldstein also states, Luburić also mentions the Cossacks (p. 554). And it is really tedious to point out Goldstein’s ignorance when it is so abundant, but he still needs to be asked a few questions. The first question would be: “Why would Luburić submit a report on the 1942 event only ‘two years later’?” Another question would be: “If Luburić mentions the Cossacks, what would the Cossacks be doing in Crkveni Bok in October 1942?” The third rhetorical question would be: “Prof. Goldstein, do you know how to read sources critically?”

The answers are in fact clear, banal, only for them one has to have a minimum of knowledge that Goldstein does not have. Thus, Luburić did not report on the October 1942 events in Crkveni Bok “two years later”. After all, if Luburić did mention the Cossacks, and competent historians - unlike Goldstein - know that the German 1st Cossack Division arrived in NDH at the end of 1943, then Luburić apparently reported on another event. Finally, if relevant literature is used,⁴⁷ which Goldstein does not, then it is clear that Luburić did not report “two years later” about the October 1942 events in Crkveni Bok, but that he explained why Ustashes invaded that village in late August 1944.

When in October 1942 the Ustashes from Jasenovac invaded Crkveni Bok, Ivanjski Bok and Strmen, Greater County of Gora, as well as the Home Guard, reacted negatively to this event, considering this Ustasha action was a mistake that brought unrest and caused great violence and injustice to the then quiet and loyal villages. General Glaise von Horstenau was also against that action. Eventually the inhabitants of these villages were released from Jasenovac. About this Goldstein writes, not quite accurately: “On the news of the attack on the village, General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau immediately went to Crkveni Bok and the neighbouring plundered villages” (p. 553). But who directed him there? Mladen Lorković (not Blaž - a special warning to Prof. Goldstein) in his notes, which Goldstein surely did not use, says that he met General Glaise von Horstenau on October 25, 1942: “He returned from Crkveni Bok where he was sent to by Poglavnik with [Aleksandar] Seitz and

stanovništva Strmena, Crkvenog Boka i Ivanjskog Boka u XX vijeku (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2017).

⁴⁷ Skrobo, *Ratni događaji i sjećanja*, pp. 169-174.

[Erih] Lisak to examine the position. He submitted the report to Poglavnik in writing.”⁴⁸

In a completely different place in the book, Goldstein will, merely to write something, mention that in late October or early November 1942 Jasenovac was visited by a committee headed by Aleksandar Seitz (p. 503). As Goldstein’s analytics are superficial, he did not realize that the visit of the committee led by Seitz was probably related to the release of the people who had been brought to Jasenovac from the municipality of Crkveni Bok. But let us not be too strict, this is all negligible, since Goldstein, who, like Jackson Pollock, swings wide brush strokes, does not need to be warned of little things.

And so, it could be listed further, but here is just one more example of Goldstein’s ignorance of the sources, literature, chronology, and issues of the topic he is writing about. Thus, on page 600, he makes a brilliant assessment: “Under pressure from the Germans, Pavelić somewhat revised his policy toward the Serbs: he declared them ‘Croats of the Orthodox religion’, promised to cease persecution and established the Croatian Orthodox Church for the NDH area. The Serbs were recognized the status of ‘Orthodox citizens’, they were invited to join the Ustasha movement, and they were conscripted into the army. Instead of harsh anti-Serb writings, suddenly more conciliatory tones appeared. The transports of Serbs to Jasenovac stopped.” There are, of course, quite vague and poorly worded formulations in what Goldstein writes. For example, where did Pavelić specifically “promise to end persecution”? In the TV show *Dobro jutro, Hrvatska* [Good morning, Croatia]? Secondly, of course that he founded the Croatian Orthodox Church “for the NDH area”, and not for the territory of Bulgaria or Greece. What kind of a category is that of “Orthodox citizens”? There is no such category, but there is a category of NDH citizens and NDH members. So, it is as if Goldstein cannot write a single line without making a mistake.

But all that is nothing compared to Goldstein’s underlying ignorance of the topic he is dealing with. Pavelić did not “revise” his policy towards the Serbs, so the transport of Serbs to Jasenovac “diminished”, but the “revision” of the policy during 1942 went hand in hand with intensive operations by the NDH forces against the insurgents, when mass deportations of Serbian population to camps also took place.

At a session of the Croatian State Assembly on February 28, 1942, regarding the existing policy of forced religious conversions, Ante Pavelić declared: “a brother is dear regardless of his religion.” Then, on April 3, 1942 Pavelić

⁴⁸ Nada Kisić Kolanović, *Mladen Lorković – ministar urotnik* (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1998), p. 253.

decreed the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church,⁴⁹ on June 11, 1942 the establishment of Home Guard labour units (DORA) started, which were to be filled by Orthodox Christians or converted Orthodox Christians,⁵⁰ in mid-1942 the NDH authorities made a truce with certain Chetnik units,⁵¹ and on 2 July 1942 a meeting of senior NDH officials was held in Zagreb. On July 20, 1942 the NDH Ministry of the Interior delivered the conclusions of that meeting to all authorities in the country in a secret circular under the subject “Calming the country – instructions”⁵² (needless to say, Goldstein did not mention that circular in his book). At the same time as all these events, the NDH forces conducted (independently or with the Germans) a series of counterinsurgency operations from Kordun via Kozara to Srijem, in which numerous Serb civilians were deported to camps. So - NDH was trying to suppress the uprising movement, with mass deportations to camps being carried out, while at the same time trying to apply different methods of “peaceful pacification”.

Understandably, all of the above is an interesting topic for serious discussion, but Goldstein will not be able to participate in it because he has serious problems with facts and in linking events into a cause-and-effect sequence.

Additionally, Goldstein, with some 70-something years hindsight, burdened the National Liberation Army led by Comrade Tito with yet another new special task - to prevent NDH from deporting people to Jasenovac. As Goldstein explains, at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 there was no “armed resistance” that would stop the “criminals”, since the partisans would strengthen and begin to “more successfully protect civilians only in the months to follow” (p. 505). Goldstein should only more specifically explain to us how the partisans managed to “more successfully” protect civilians. Didn’t many deportations of Serbs to camps occur exactly as a retaliation for partisan attacks? Where were then partisans and comrade Tito to protect those Serbs? But, Goldstein does not give up, so he states that partisans “resisted” the Ustaša deportations to caps “as much as they could” (p. 552).

Partisans, in fact, many times could not protect people from deportations into camps, and it is also true that with the general expansion of the partisan

⁴⁹ Cf. Ante Pavelić, *Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva* (Madrid: Domovina, 1984), pp. 20, 31; Đurić, *Ustaše i pravoslavlje*, pp. 137, 141-142; Petar Požar, *Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva u prošlosti i budućnosti* (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1996), pp. 118-120, 136.

⁵⁰ Cf. Barić, *Ustroj kopnene vojske domobranstva Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, p. 174.

⁵¹ Cf. Rasim Hurem, “Sporazumi o saradnji između državnih organa Nezavisne države Hrvatske i nekih četničkih odreda u istočnoj Bosni 1942. god.,” *Prilozi: Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta Sarajevo II* (1966), no. 2: 285-325.

⁵² HR-HDA-223, Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova NDH [Ministry of the Interior of NDH], V. T. No: 515/1942., I. A.

movement the NDH authorities were not able to conduct more extensive operations to deport people to camps. But it is also completely ahistorical to even give partisans led by the Communist Party the task of “protecting” civilians from deportations to camps or various kinds of retaliation. The essence of partisan warfare was in the spiral of violence in which the Germans or the Italians or NDH responded to their attacks with repression against the population, but that did not stop the partisans, although they knew very well that because of their actions the target of retaliations would be exactly civilians.⁵³ So, contrary to Goldstein’s ahistorical politically correct concoctions, not some imaginary “anti-fascists” but real communists and revolutionaries were much more practical.

Branko Ćopić, a partisan fighter from the uprising in Bosnian Krajina in 1941 until the end of the war, for a time also the political commissar of the Krupa-Sana joint detachments, a writer from whose literary works on World War II much more can be learned than from Goldstein’s scientific works, in his novel *Glavi barut [Silent Gunpowder]*, describing “Tiger”, a partisan commander, but also a communist and a revolutionary, a participant in the Spanish Civil War, writes that when he first saw Serbian peasants fleeing their village from the Ustashas, he “sighed with evil relief” and concluded: “Eh, holy Ustashas!” - Because “Tiger”, contrary to Goldstein’s constructions about partisans who “protect” civilians from deportation to camps, knew very well that only the Ustashas with their terror could inspire a “stupid peasant half-animal” to turn to “Tiger”, a professional soldier of Comrade Stalin and the revolution, to “save” them from the Ustashas.⁵⁴ And that is how the partisan army was created and the war was eventually won. And comrade Tito is certainly not a civil rights activist.

I am not sure that Čedomir Višnjić, one of the biggest experts on of the history of Serbs in Croatia during the Second World War and the post-war period, would agree with Goldstein’s interpretation. When describing the Serbs in the Kordun uprising and later war events, he clearly writes: “For the military-political leadership of the uprising at the time it was a fortunate circumstance that in the wartime a conflict was easily forced and provoked, and the people anyhow played the role of hostages in all partisan actions throughout the war. Namely, it is a rarely mentioned fact that Partisan units were gener-

⁵³ Cf. Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945. – 1991.: Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest; Školska knjiga, 2006), pp. 32-33 and the sources and literature listed therein.

⁵⁴ Branko Ćopić, *Glavi barut / Bronzana straža* (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1963), p. 42.

ally unable to really protect the people from a more serious campaign of any hostile army.”⁵⁵

Goldstein resents historian Danijel Vojak because in the title of his book *Stradanje Roma u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941. – 1945. [The Suffering of Roma in the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945]*⁵⁶, as well as in the title of the introductory chapter in that book (“Stradanje Roma u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj” [“The Suffering of Roma in the Independent State of Croatia”]), the term “suffering” “is striking”, “as an ugly euphemism, because it is quite clear that it was genocide” (p. 836, note 20).

However, Vojak, with his co-authors Bibijana Papo and Alen Tahiri, in the said book – collection of documents describe not only the mass killings and deportations of Roma to camps and forced labour, Roma in Jasenovac, etc., but with the somewhat better known issue of “White Gypsies” they pay considerable attention and give space to a little-known and insufficiently researched issues of the relations between Roma and the partisan movement, cooperation of Roma and the NDH authorities, and various examples of rescuing Roma with the help of Croats. For these reasons, “suffering” - as a term denoting enduring hardship, pain, misery, and losing a life — is in the title. For everything that Roma underwent in NDH, Vojak does not walk away from the term “genocide” or “Porajmos” [Porraimos] and explains that it is “similar to the notion of the Holocaust” (p. 24, note 18). After all, other researchers, such as Filip Škiljan in Croatia⁵⁷ or Dragoljub Acković in Serbia⁵⁸, use the term “suffering” because they obviously do not consider it an “ugly euphemism”. Therefore, Goldstein’s criticism of the inappropriate use of the term “suffering” for what happened to the Roma in NDH is almost absurd.

Nevertheless, Goldstein further accuses Vojak that in the introductory chapter on the “suffering” – “he did not use series of documents” published in that book, “so his portrayal of that “suffering” [of the Roma] is unfortunately extremely incomplete” (p. 836, note 20). Fortunately, Goldstein’s “presentation” of the “suffering” of the Roma in his book *Jasenovac* is complete. Goldstein writes and concludes that “almost all the Roma” who lived in NDH lost their lives in Jasenovac (p. 536), although he previously wrote that “most of the White Gypsies” were exempt from persecution by the NDH authorities (pp. 49-50). This is a very good example of Goldstein’s hypocrisy: he resents others,

⁵⁵ Čedomir Višnjić, *Kordunaški proces: Fragment iz historije nestajanja* (Zagreb: Srpsko kulturno društvo Prosvjeta, 2004), p. 76.

⁵⁶ Danijel Vojak, Bibijana Papo, Alen Tahiri, *Stradanje Roma u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941.–1945.* (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar; Romsko nacionalno vijeće, 2015).

⁵⁷ Filip Škiljan, “Stradanje Srba, Roma i Židova u virovitičkom i slatinskom kraju tijekom 1941. i početkom 1942. godine”, *Scrinia Slavonica* 10 (2010): 341-365.

⁵⁸ Dragoljub Acković, *Stradanje Roma u Jasenovcu* (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1994).

while he himself is unable to avoid the ambiguities with which he falls below the level of scientificity.

Besides, as a rule, when Goldstein wants to be smart, he falls into the trap of his own ignorance. For example, he writes that Roma in NDH were called “Gypsies’, which was a pejorative term” [from the French *péjoratif*, a derogatory word used for mockery and expressing contempt, etc.] (p. 49). And what else could they call them? What were they called by, shame on them, the “people’s authorities” of post-war Tito’s Yugoslavia? Certainly not the Roma, because that name became official only in 1971, as one of the decisions of the First Roma Congress in London!

In his latest book *Jasenovac*, Goldstein “mentioned” all those who do not think and write like him. In doing so, he only proved his own modest knowledge, as well as his tendency to deceive. Thus writing about the visit of the delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross Julius Schmidlin to the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška camps in the summer of 1944, he tries to be smart so in the note 3 (p. 919) he states: “Perhaps Schmiedlin could not have known, but [Mario] Kevo had to know that Milo Bošković was killed two months and four days after Schmiedlin had left the [Jasenovac] camp in September 1944.” However, in his article “Posjet poslanika Međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa logorima Jasenovac i Stara Gradiška u ljeto 1944.” [“ICRC delegate’s visit to concentration camps of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška in the summer of 1944”] published in 2008 in *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* [Journal of Contemporary History]⁵⁹, which was also used by Goldstein, historian Kevo clearly wrote on page 557 that Milo Bošković was killed in the Jasenovac camp at the end of September 1944.

After that, in note 3 (p. 919) Goldstein, in the manner of a member of the party committee for ideological construction, accuses Kevo of being “ignorant” and criticises him for using “unacceptable revisionist terminology” calling the NDH authorities “Croatian authorities”. Goldstein could have, and in fact should have consulted (and yet he does not even mention it, which I still cannot believe) a book - collection of documents *Veze Međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa i Nezavisne Države Hrvatske* [Connections of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Independent State of Croatia]⁶⁰, which contains transcripts of the original archival documents, so he could familiarise himself with Schmidlin’s, and also with the terminology of the

⁵⁹ Mario Kevo, “Posjet poslanika Međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa logorima Jasenovac i Stara Gradiška u ljeto 1944.”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 40 (2008), no. 2: 547-585.

⁶⁰ *Veze Međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa i Nezavisne Države Hrvatske: Dokumenti*, Bk. 1, ed. Mario Kevo (Slavonski Brod; Zagreb; Jasenovac: Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje; Hrvatski državni arhiv; Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2009).

International Committee of the Red Cross, for which, for the most part, there are “Croatian authorities” in Zagreb and not the “NDH authorities”. Therefore Kevo, well acquainted with the documents of the ICRC because he is the editor of the aforementioned collection of documents, uses both names in his works. As much as Goldstein cannot understand that - the authorities of NDH are “Croatian authorities”, no matter what they were like. The fact that the NDH authorities were not democratically elected and that a significant number of Croats were against these and such authorities, undoubtedly also responsible for the crimes, does not mean that it is “revisionist” to call them “Croatian authorities”.

In one of his recent articles British historian Rory Yeomans says that Drago Roksandić, one of the inglorious reviewers of Goldstein’s book, suggested that instead of “aryanisation” of Jewish property in NDH the term “Croatianization” of Jewish property should be used. (“Drago Roksandić has suggested to me that the term ‘Croatianisation’ should be used instead of aryanisation. However, Croatian economic planners, journalists and theoreticians almost always used the term ‘aryanisation,’ never ‘Croatianisation’” –Yeomans explains that he disobeyed Roksandić.)⁶¹ Is not this hypocrisy, two-facedness? - Goldstein first resents Kevo for using the term “Croatian authorities” for the NDH authorities, while the reviewer of Goldstein’s book Roksandić advises his colleagues from the whole wide world, reckless enough to listen to him, to declare the appropriation of Jewish property by the NDH authorities “Croatianization” of that property? Perhaps it would be good for Goldstein and his reviewer to agree on this first, certainly in the Euro-Mediterranean context, and for Goldstein to hold Roksandić accountable for recommending the unacceptable “revisionist” terminology to his colleagues around the world, and at the same time he should not patronize others.

Besides, if I am to split hairs, it is unclear why Goldstein in his book, “the first scientific monograph” on the Jasenovac camp, so acerbically refers to *Comité International de la Croix-Rouge* (French) or the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (English) accurately as the “International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)” (p. 455) and inaccurately as the “International Organization of the Red Cross (IORC)” (p. 709). The international organization – known as the “International Red Cross” (*Croix-Rouge Internationale*) – is a completely different thing. And here in Goldstein’s book we have a third, non-existent option.

⁶¹ Rory Yeomans, “Purifying the Shop Floor: Kastner and Oehler Department Store as a Case Study of Aryanisation in Wartime Europe”, https://www.academia.edu/38133133/Purifying_the_Shop_Floor_Kastner_and_Oehler_Department_Store_as_a_Case_Study_of_Aryanisation_in_Wartime_Europe, accessed on February 15, 2019.

I cannot resist offering some more examples of how Goldstein in his book first claims one thing and then something completely different, so that he turns out to be contradictory and tragicomic. Goldstein writes that “the complete dependence of the Ustashes on the German master is evident” (p. 66), and then again the German representatives “requested” NDH to do something, but the Ustashes only “partially fulfilled” it (p. 67). So, if the Ustashes are completely dependent on the “German master”, how can the Germans “request” for something without their wish being fulfilled immediately?

The statements of the Ustashes who served in the Jasenovac camp in the days after the war, during the investigation before the Yugoslav authorities, Goldstein declares mostly “credible” (p. 31), and then, a few hundred pages later, states that these Ustashes “confessed everything, probably under pressure and torture by investigators” (p. 380). First I tortured you well, and then you mostly credibly confessed everything. Further, the Ustashes used a number of “brutal, but also very subtle” methods towards the detainees in Jasenovac (p. 275), but they, compared to the Nazis, acted from “their primitive perspective” (p. 277). Thus, the Ustashes were very subtle, but still also primitive.

Goldstein writes that for Ljubo Miloš some said he was “limited, unintelligent” (p. 398), while others claimed that he was “sharp and highly intelligent” (p. 399). From the autumn of 1942 Miroslav Filipović Majstorović did not “directly commit crimes” because “the policy had changed” and “mass and arbitrary killings” were no longer allowed (p. 408), but then on Christmas Day in 1942, during the performance of the inmates, he personally shot nine Jews (p. 409). In the spring of 1942, Eugen Dido Kvaternik, the commander of the Ustasha Surveillance Service (UNS), started, “it seems”, to “change his attitudes” because he realized the counterproductivity of the terror carried out by NDH (p. 374). This is what Goldstein writes in one place, while in another he writes something completely different, and concludes that the terror against the Serbs did not diminish even after Dido Kvaternik was removed from the post of the UNS commander at the end of 1942 (p. 552).

After the described examples of Goldstein’s ignorance and lack of knowledge on the subject one is almost fed up with enumerating further, but – it has to be done. So, regarding Ustasha officer and official of the UNS Viktor Tomić, Goldstein states that in August and September 1942 he was leading operations in Srijem “by order of Minister Artuković” (p. 451). In fact, it was not “by order” of Andrija Artuković, when the “open order” for the establishment of the Higher Police Commission based in Vukovar and headed by Tomić was issued by the Poglavnik’s Headquarters, i.e. commander Slavko Kvaternik by order of

Ante Pavelić. This is mentioned even in the literature that Goldstein allegedly used.⁶² But who would carefully read all those numerous books.

While Viktor Tomić was in Srijem in August and September 1942, many Serb civilians were killed – “allegedly 6,000”, and the survivors were deported to Jasenovac (p. 451). Goldstein then changes his tune, mentioning that during August and September “as a result of a large military-police operation” in Srijem and eastern Slavonia, about 6,000 people “listed by name and surname” were deported to Jasenovac (p. 514). Goldstein states one thing, then quickly changes his mind. I do not care! First, 6,000 Serbs were allegedly killed, and the rest were deported to Jasenovac, and then about 6,000 were deported, who were “listed by name and surname”. And when you look at the source he uses for this last claim (note 65, p. 895), there is no mention of any data on the 6,000 persons “listed by name and surname”. Moreover, it is stated that there is no exact data on how many people were deported to Jasenovac in that operation, but it is stated that, according to the data of the Provincial Commission to Investigate Crimes by the Occupiers and their Collaborators in Vojvodina, it is “estimated” that a total of more than 6,000 people were deported to Jasenovac. To confirm that deportations were massive, only the number of people taken from some villages in Srijem is stated.⁶³ So, Goldstein does not care what is written in the literature and sources he uses, he will adapt the content to his needs... Goldstein could have consulted the report of the Provincial Commission to Investigate Crimes by the Occupiers and their Collaborators in Vojvodina *VII grupa masovnih zločina – logori: Zemun – Kustodija – Jasenovac* [*VII group of mass crimes – camps: : Zemun – Kustodija – Jasenovac*] from 1947, which was after all published⁶⁴, so he would establish that there is also no mention of the things he claims happened in the way that he claims.

Regarding the aforesaid, since he wants to be as acribical and scrupulous as possible, Goldstein brings data on the total number of inhabitants and the number of “Orthodox” inhabitants of a several Srijem villages (from where people were taken to Jasenovac) according to the list from 1931 (pp. 514–515), while in the note 65 on page 895 he refers to: “Korenčić, *Naselja i stanovništvo SR Hrvatske 1857-1971* [*Settlements and Population of the Socialist Republic*

⁶² Cf. Davor Kovačić, *Redarstveno-obavještajni sustav Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od 1941. do 1945. godine* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2009), pp. 297–298.

⁶³ Dušan Lazić Gojko, “Žrtve narodâ i narodnosti Srema u logoru Jasenovac (1941-1945)”, in: *Okrugli stol 21. travnja 1984.: Materijali s rasprave*, ed. Dobrila Borović (Jasenovac: Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1985), p. 91.

⁶⁴ *Pokrajinska komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača u Vojvodini. Zločini okupatora i njihovih pomagača u Vojvodini 1941-1944: VII grupa masovnih zločina (Srem). Logori Zemun – Kustodija – Jasenovac*, ed. Drago Njegovan (Novi Sad: IK Prometej; Malo istorijsko društvo Novi Sad, 2016).

of Croatia 1857–1971], at various places.” The only problem is that Mirko Korenčić does not even mention national or religious structure of inhabitants in villages by lists, but only the number of inhabitants, and in that book – of course – there is no data for Srijem settlements in the Socialist Republic of Serbia⁶⁵ so Goldstein must have found the data on confessional affiliation somewhere else, but in his typical rush and negligence he forgot where. Reviewers, where were you?

I write one thing, then another, and you, dear reader, manage and decipher what was it that I had thought, written and what should be concluded. No need to particularly point out that it is all accompanied by technical carelessness. Thus, on page 341, regarding the mass grave in Uskočka šuma (Uskoci Woods), Goldstein warns us with an exclamation mark: “see previous page”. And then you look at the previous page, and there is no mention whatsoever of Uskoci Woods. On page 552 Goldstein managed to even multiply the Ustaša crime, I guess he must have messed up *copy-paste*. He first states that in September 1942 the inhabitants of a large number of villages in the area of Bosanski Brod were deported to Jasenovac, then states that the Ustaša Defence continued to deport the inhabitants of villages in the wider Jasenovac area, and then reiterates the already mentioned villages in the Bosanski Brod area. So twice the same on the same page! I repeat: reviewers, where were you?

Goldstein states that “even” Serbs and Jews from Bijeljina and Zvornik were sent to the camp in Gospić (p. 75). So why “even” if those places were also part of NDH and if there also orders were received to send certain persons to the camp in Gospić? By the way, I cannot believe it, but Goldstein did not consult and does not cite, neither in the notes nor in the bibliography, the essential article by Mario Kevo “Lišavanje slobode i prisilni rad u zakonodavstvu Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941.-1945.)” [“Restricting Freedom and Forced Labour in the Legal System of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945)”].⁶⁶

One of the controversial issues about the human losses of Croatia, i.e. NDH in the Second World War, is the number of victims of the so-called Gospić group of camps (Gospić, Jadovno, Pag). Estimates, calculations, and lists of individual victims are too widely ranging from 1794 to 120,000 victims and vary greatly from one author to another and are largely conditioned by

⁶⁵ Cf. Mirko Korenčić, *Naselja i stanovništvo Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske 1857-1971*. (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1979).

⁶⁶ Mario Kevo, “Lišavanje slobode i prisilni rad u zakonodavstvu Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941.-1945.)”, in: *Logori, zatvori i prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945. / 1945.-1951. Zbornik radova*, eds. Vladimir Geiger, Martina Grahek Ravančić and Marica Karakaš Obradov (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), pp. 9-39.

the (daily)political atmosphere.⁶⁷ Establishment, operation, and dissolution of the so-called Gospić group of camps is well described in historiographical, journalistic and memoir literature. However, previous research has not provided well-founded, unambiguous, and satisfactory answers to the important and unavoidable question about the number of detainees and the number of victims of these camps.

In the book, Ivo Goldstein states that estimates of the number of people killed in the “Gospić camp” differ. He thinks the total number of victims could be around 25,000. How did he come up with that estimate? Simply. Namely, he states only: “The commander of the Gospić camp system, Stjepan Rubinić, in 1942 told Ilija Jakovljević ‘in confidence’ that 28,700 detainees had been recorded on these lists, and that about 3,500 had survived. The obvious conclusion is that the total number of victims could be around 25,000. The vast majority of the victims were Serbs, about 2,500 of them were Jews. A small number of Croats and Roma were also killed” (p. 77).

Let us remember - according to Slavko Goldstein’s simple calculation in the book (co-authored with Ivo Goldstein) *Holokaust u Zagrebu [Holocaust in Zagreb]*, published in 2001,⁶⁸ which he also repeats in the books published later (alone or co-authored with Ivo Goldstein),⁶⁹ there were at least 24,000 victims of the so-called Gospić camp group. Slavko Goldstein’s calculation is based on the file of the Ustasha Disciplinary and Criminal Court on the investigation and court proceedings that were conducted from October 1941 to February 1942 against Stjepan Rubinić, director of the County Police in Gospić, due to the alleged arbitrary closure of the Jadovno Camp. However, the file does not mention the number of people killed in the camp at all, but at the end of October 1941 Rubinić stated in the investigation only that at the time the camp was disbanded, in it there were “approximately 4,000 people”.⁷⁰ The above calculation is also based on Rubinić’s alleged statement to writer Ilija Jakovljević in the Stara Gradiška camp. According to this claim, which Goldstein took for granted, the County Police Directorate in Gospić kept accurate records of the arrived detainees, so according to that, from June 18 to August 23, 1941, a total of about 28,700 people were received, noting: “Hardly a few hundreds were saved. The others were killed. Add those who were not recorded in the

⁶⁷ Cf. Vladimir Geiger, Mario Jareb, Davor Kovačić, *Jadovno i Šaranova jama: Kontroverze i manipulacije* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2017).

⁶⁸ I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, p. 301.

⁶⁹ S. Goldstein, *1941. Godina koja se vraća*, p. 240; Slavko Goldstein, Ivo Goldstein, *Jasenovac i Bleiburg nisu isto* (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2011), pp. 25-26.

⁷⁰ HR-HDA-1549, Zbirka zapisa upravnih i vojnih vlasti Nezavisne Države Hrvatske i narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta [Collection of records of the administrative and military authorities of the Independent State of Croatia and the national liberation movement], II – 91, 736-868.

books at all [...].⁷¹ (However, this may also be Jakovljević's assumption, as it contradicts Rubinić's claim to Jakovljević that the County Police Directorate in Gospić kept accurate records of the detainees who arrived. It also contradicts Rubinić's statement of 29 October 1941 he gave in the Ustasha Police prison on about 4,000 inmates at the time the Jadovno camp was disbanded.) At the end of August 1941, after the dissolution of the Jadovno camp, the remaining detainees from Gospić were sent to other camps (Jasenovac, Jastrebarsko, Loborgrad, Krušćica), and several hundreds were released. As the lists of detainees in the Gospić-Jadovno-Pag camp have not been preserved, it is difficult, almost impossible, to judge the credibility of Rubinić's testimony or Jakovljević's allegations. This issue and the issue of the number of victims of the so-called Gospić group of camps is addressed in more detail in the mentioned book *Jadovno i Šaranova jama: Kontroverze i manipulacije [The Jadovno Concentration Camp and the Šaran Pit: Controversies and Manipulation]*⁷², which Ivo Goldstein, of course, did not use.

Slavko Goldstein wrote about "at least 24,000" victims of the Gospić - Jadovno - Pag camps. Ivo Goldstein now writes that the total number of victims "could be around 25,000". Of course, I consider Slavko Goldstein's above-mentioned calculation to be a manipulation that is not based on exact sources. In addition, I do not understand on what basis Goldstein increased the number of 24,000 by a thousand and "rounded it up" to 25,000. As I am not aware of any recent research on the number of victims of the so-called Gospić group of camps, it is obviously a "guesstimate", a method that Ivo Goldstein applies in this case as well, probably guided by logic: more is better than less. Either way - scrupulous!

Ivo Goldstein argues that German representatives were often dissatisfied with and appalled by the Ustasha violence against Serbs, but - Goldstein teaches us - it was actually "pretence" because the Nazis did not restrain the Ustasas from applying measures against Roma, Jews and Communists (p. 70). Yes, it really was pretentious.

It is equally ridiculous when Goldstein concludes that the German envoy to NDH, Siegfried Kasche, when he was a member of the commission that visited Jasenovac in early 1942, in his report on that visit "knowingly concealed the truth" because he was "too smart and too experienced" to believe what he saw. Hence - Goldstein concludes - Kasche should have realized what the real situation in the camp was, unless "he didn't want to or didn't have to". Etc., etc. (p. 68). Well Siegfried Kasche was not a member of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, but a representative of the German Reich! And besides, Kasche

⁷¹ Ilija Jakovljević, *Konclozor na Savi* (Zagreb: Konzor, 1999), p. 328.

⁷² V. Geiger, M. Jareb, D. Kovačić, *Jadovno i Šaranova jama*.

was one of the few German representatives who always unreluctantly defended the Ustashas and Pavelić.

Our prominent historian Mirjana Gross wrote: “The important difference is that dilettante, but sometimes also professional ideological historiography does not distinguish the past from the present but assesses historical figures as forerunners or culprits of certain important events in the present. Prominent people of the past become our contemporaries, and therefore - like living people - eligible, ineligible, or selectively eligible. In contrast, scientific historiography approaches the past as “alterity”, starting from the principle that intentions and activities of historical figures and events arise from completely different sets of circumstances than today, that they occur in special situations that have to be researched and presented in such a way that contemporaries are able to understand them.”⁷³

Unfortunately, it seems that Goldstein did not learn this lesson. Therefore, he often seems ridiculous in his book.

Goldstein, unable to properly analyse the structure of the NDH government and the differences in actions of its various bodies in different periods and in different parts of NDH, opted for a wise approach and adopted a “dual chain of command”, but also inconsistently, so he only further increased the already great confusion in his book. Thus, he first states that the “parallel chain of command” enabled the Ustashas to commit crimes, that “parallelism”, i.e. a sort of dual power of the Ustasha authorities and the civilian ones, “perfectly” suited Pavelić and his followers because they justified some of their actions by law, and things outside legal framework were “covered” precisely by the “parallel chain of command” (p. 56). But, as many times in the book, Goldstein again contradicts himself. Thus, he states that after the war some NDH officials claimed in their defence before the Yugoslav court that there was a “dual system of governance” in NDH, the former being implemented through regular institutions and the latter outside them, and that in that latter system crimes were often committed. But Goldstein ingeniously concludes, it was a “rather unconvincing story” that the court did not believe (p. 385). Of course, but Goldstein himself on page 56 “established” the very existence of the “parallel chain of command”.

In an equally ridiculous way, Goldstein recounts the orders of German General Friedrich Stahl on the conduct of forces under his command during the attack on partisans on Kozara in mid-1942. General Stahl forbade his troops to “burn houses, destroy and plunder property, and commit other acts

⁷³ Mirjana Gross, *Suvremena historiografija: Korijeni, postignuća, traganja* (Zagreb: Novi Liber; Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1996), p. 380.

of violence”, threatening to have such individuals court-martialled. Goldstein explains that General Stahl’s orders regarding the treatment of partisans and suspicious persons during the attack on Kozara were “a legal framework for mass deportations to Jasenovac”. So, with his orders, Stahl first widely enabled mass deportations to Jasenovac, and then he “strongly insisted” that the “Ustasha plans” for the killing of Serbs from Kozara not be implemented? After realising that something was wrong here, Goldstein, understandably, wondered why some Nazi general would issue such orders there, and concluded that the course of events on Kozara “clearly” shows that the said Stahl’s order “was neither partially, and certainly not entirely, obeyed” (pp. 547–548).

But Goldstein again ahistorically does not understand anything. Yes, perhaps the aforementioned order of General Stahl was not obeyed, or perhaps it was, but the point is in something quite different, which Goldstein is unable to comprehend. Namely, General Stahl really did not need robbers, marauders. What he needed was a disciplined army to create an encirclement around Kozara that no one would break. With such an organized force, Stahl was able to kill thousands of partisans and civilians and displace tens of thousands. But Goldstein is unable to analyse the intensity and direction of the NDH violence in 1941, compare it to the NDH violence in 1942, and then compare it all to German “mechanical” violence as practiced by General Stahl. Unable to comprehend it all, break it down, compare it, Goldstein would pray on mischievous home guards who stole chickens, but would miss a firing squad of some Home Guard mountain infantry brigade that was in Kozara forests shooting hundreds and then displacing thousands of people...

It is even more ridiculous, almost tragicomic, when Goldstein, regarding the requests that people wrote to the NDH authorities to release their relatives from Jasenovac, states that they were written “pathetically or adulatory” since they were signed by a salute “For Homeland Ready” (*Za dom spremni*) (p. 584). Well, shame on those people who wrote in “adulatory” manner and signed their petitions with then official state greeting. Perhaps the chances for release from the camp would have been more favourable had the petitions been signed with “Death to fascism - freedom to the people” (*Smrt fašizmu – Sloboda narodu*). It is best for Goldstein to report those unfortunates who signed their petitions with “For Homeland Ready” to the competent authorities of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian media.

Ivo Goldstein, formerly alongside, and now following in the footsteps of his father Slavko, has for years been persistently promoting the number of about 100,000 victims of the Jasenovac camp (somewhat less is also ok, but more is better). Therefore, in Croatian *anti-fascist* circles, the number of 100,000 victims of the Jasenovac camp was accepted, even though it was

Vladimir Žerjavić's estimate, made without systematic research and without confirmation in the sources, which he then corrected and reduced to 83,000.⁷⁴

In his book *Jasenovac*, Ivo Goldstein states that Bogoljub Kočović⁷⁵ came to an estimate that between 150,000 and 200,000 Serbs lost their lives in the camps in NDH, "which later led Žerjavić⁷⁶ to (quite logically) conclude that Kočović would estimate that around 70,000 people died in Jasenovac" (pp. 788–789).

But Goldstein, like some other Croatian historians who take over this Žerjavić's allegation without checking it, did not actually consult Kočović who in 1990 in *Introduction to the Yugoslav edition* of his book *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* [*World War II victims in Yugoslavia*]⁷⁷ clearly says: "A major debate has arisen over the number of victims at the Ustasha concentration camp in Jasenovac. And there my study was cited in many debates, in the press or on television, although I did not calculate the number of those victims at all. I have repeatedly stated publicly that I am not in a position to say the number of Serbs killed in Jasenovac, as I do not know the number of people killed in Bleiburg." (p. XVI). – "I said that I do not know how many casualties there were in Jasenovac", Kočović also reiterated next to the table of his calculations/estimates on the human losses of Serbs on the territory of NDH. (p. XVIII). Žerjavić, apparently keen to confirm his calculations/estimates, from this table drew his conclusion on what Kočović assessed about Jasenovac. Goldstein, apart from the second Yugoslav edition of Kočović's book *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* [*Victims of World War II in Yugoslavia*], did not use Kočović's book *Nauka, nacionalizam i propaganda* [*Science, Nationalism and Propaganda*], published in France in 1999,⁷⁸ because he does not mention it in the notes or in the bibliography. If he did not get that book in Paris, because he had too many obligations, he could look for it in Zagreb in the National and University Library [Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, NSK]. If Goldstein had made an effort to consult the aforesaid book, he would have seen that on pages 147–148 Kočović emphasizes: "I have regularly refused to engage in discussions about the number of people killed in Jasenovac [...]. Although I still claim that I am sure that that number is not 700,000 or more [...] if a number has to be given, I would say that the number for Serbs could be between 150,000 and 200,000, but I immediately said that I had no proof

⁷⁴ Vladimir Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga: Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), pp. 69, 72.

⁷⁵ Bogoljub Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London: Naše delo, 1985).

⁷⁶ Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga*, p. 74.

⁷⁷ Bogoljub Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990).

⁷⁸ Bogoljub Kočović, *Nauka, nacionalizam i propaganda (Između gubitaka i žrtava Drugoga svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji)* (Paris: Editions du Titre, 1999).

to support that claim. I later specified that with that number I covered all the death camps in NDH [...] and that my above-mentioned figure covers the total number of casualties in all the camps on the NDH territory.”

Kočović therefore, to clarify to Goldstein, estimates that the number of Serbs who lost their lives in all NDH camps “can be” between 150,000 and 200,000 and, which is of the utmost importance, Kočović also notes “I have no evidence for this claim”. So, if Kočović says that his figure “can be possible” and that “there is no evidence to support this claim”, I do not understand on the basis of what Goldstein claims that Žerjavić “quite logically” concluded that Kočović would estimate that about 70,000 people died in Jasenovac. If this were “quite logical”, Kočović, who “regularly refused to engage in discussions about the number of people killed in Jasenovac”, would – logically – estimate so. But it is rather illogical. As it is illogical that Goldstein had no need to check what exactly Kočović means and writes.

Undoubtedly, Kočović and Žerjavić are greatly responsible for destroying the myth of 1,700,000 human losses that Yugoslavia suffered in World War II, and thus the significantly exaggerated allegations about the scale of human losses in NDH and the casualties of the Jasenovac camp. In historiography they are recorded as such. Kočović did not engage in calculating the number of casualties of the Jasenovac camp, nor Bleiburg. Žerjavić, by contrast, was ensnared by excessive wants and expectations regarding the number of casualties in both Bleiburg and Jasenovac, which cannot be properly resolved by statistical method or assessments.

As Goldstein’s estimates of the number of the Jasenovac camp victims are 90,000-100,000, the accuracy of Žerjavić’s calculations and estimates should be strengthened and confirmed at all costs, and numerous complaints about the shortcomings of the list of individual victims of JUSP Jasenovac that numbers 83,145 victims should be disregarded and minimise as much as possible⁷⁹. And doubts regarding the number of Jasenovac victims should be over, I guess. In public Goldstein persistently insists that “the truth” on the Jasenovac camp is “more or less known, including the approximate number of victims”.⁸⁰ And he should be the one who determines what is “true” about Jasenovac and what is not, and what the number of Jasenovac victims is.

Unlike Goldstein, I neither know the number of Jasenovac victims, nor I dare claim to know. But unlike various charlatans who keep repeating the

⁷⁹ Cf. Spomen područje Jasenovac, “Poimenični popis žrtava KCL Jasenovac 1941-1945”, <http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6284>, accessed on February 10, 2019.

⁸⁰ Ivo Goldstein, “Komisija za Jasenovac: nova besmislena inicijativa šefice države”, <https://www.jutarnji.hr/globus/Globus-komentari/pise-ivo-goldstein-komisija-za-jasenovac-nova-besmislena-inicijativa-sefice-drzave/7321071/>, accessed on November 20, 2018.

figure from hundreds of thousands to millions of Jasenovac victims, or rather reduce the casualties to almost negligible figures of only a few thousand victims and justify them in all ways, I am aware it is not minor, moreover that it is a large scale of human suffering.

For some citations and data Goldstein often does not bring references or refer to sources and literature, so we can only guess at the source of his statements. When he writes about the “Kozara offensive” of 1942, he says: “The German Command of the entire action, notably General Stahl, but also General Glaise von Horstenau, following an order from Berlin, strongly insisted that healthy men and women without children be sent as a workforce to the [German] Reich. Although this was contrary to the Ustasha plans under which these people should have been liquidated, the German will was executed” (pp. 550-551). Goldstein has no sources to support that claim. What order from Berlin, when and to whom was it addressed, what “strong insistence” and by which representatives of NDH, what “Ustasha plans”? Where are the sources for everything he stated? I am afraid Goldstein has concocted all of the above, although I cannot believe it, but he has not cited the source for these audacious claims. When you turn to page 900 where the sources for the aforesaid should be, in the note 148 it is referred to Nikica Barić’s article “Kozara 1942. – sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece [Axis Offensive on Kozara Mountain, 1942 – the Fate of the Prisoners of War, Civilians and Children]”, but there is nothing in this article about the “Berlin order”, the insistence of German generals with representatives of NDH and the “Ustasha plans”.

Regarding the displacement of Serbs from Kozara to the regions north of the Sava River, on page 550 of his book *Jasenovac* Goldstein writes: “About 16,500 Kozara inhabitants were moved to the villages in Slavonia, Posavina and Moslavina, where, due to the mobilization of men, there was a lack of workforce”. Goldstein does not have any note for this claim, and he is in fact manipulating because relevant sources indicate that only to the territory of Great County of Bilogora about 16,500 people were displaced from the Kozara area. Great County of Bilogora in Bjelovar on July 16, 1942 reported to the NDH Ministry of Interior that from 14 to 16 July 16,500 “prisoners” from Kozara came to its territory, of which 8,500 were located in Grubišno Polje and 8,000 in Garešnica. Thousands and thousands of Kozara inhabitants were relocated to various other places, primarily in Slavonia. Thus around 8,000 of them were sent to the Lipik area and about 10,000 to the Požega area, but this probably isn’t the complete data.⁸¹ Immediately after stating that 16,500 Serbs from Kozara were moved to Slavonija, Posavina and Moslavina, Goldstein himself quotes a record from August 30, 1942 on the situation of refugees

⁸¹ Cf. Barić, “Kozara 1942. – sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece”, pp. 81-91.

from Kozara in the Požega district, which said that about 10,000 refugees from Kozara had been brought to the territory of this district.⁸² So, the total number of displaced people is apparently much higher than 16,500, as Goldstein claims. In addition to the NDH documents this is confirmed by the contemporary Partisan and communist documents. The Headquarters of the 3rd Operational Zone of the People's Liberation Partisan Units of Croatia estimated that number to "50 to 60 thousand" people in mid-August 1942⁸³, and the Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia for Slavonia assessed in early October 1942 that it was the case of "several tens of thousands" of people.⁸⁴

Goldstein eventually, "all in all", concludes that for "several thousand" Serbs from Kozara, and "probably up to 15,000" of them, the Jasenovac camps "became a tomb" (p. 551). How Goldstein came up with a calculation of "probably" up to 15,000 Serbs from Kozara killed in Jasenovac, he did not explain. A sad impression remains – Goldstein would decrease the number of Serbs from Kozara who had been resettled in an area north of Sava to increase the number of Serbs – "probably up to 15,000" - who had died in Jasenovac...

When it comes to saving children from Kozara and the role of Diana Budisavljević, Goldstein does not allow anyone to intervene in the life and work of the aforementioned lady, so on page 561 he states: "Diana Budisavljević, through the Germans who again exerted pressure, forced Dido Kvaternik to approve, with much hesitation and with the consent of Pavelić himself, the extraction of children from the camp." Understandably, nothing that does not fit into this is not acceptable. Sources that do not fit were concealed by Goldstein because he does not need the "Ustasha propaganda" since he knows the true state of things... There is no mention there that Ante Pavelić on July 14, 1942 told German envoy Siegfried Kasche that the children from Kozara would enter state run educational institutions, nor that Lorković (Mladen, not Blaž!, a remark to Prof. Goldstein) wrote to Pavelić that in addition to orphans from Kozara, parents could be persuaded to allow a majority of other children to be taken for state run education, and thus "the issue of evacuees would be substantially simplified" (and then Mrs. Budisavljević worked on "persuading" parents to hand over their children). Goldstein also does not mention a memo that the Minister of Associations Lovro Sušić sent to the NDH Ministry of Health on August 1, 1942, or Minister Sušić's guidelines on the treatment

⁸² Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac: Dokumenta*, Bk. I, doc. no. 172.

⁸³ *Građa za historiju narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Slavoniji*, Bk. II (Slavonski Brod: Historijski institut Slavonije, 1963), doc. no. 178.

⁸⁴ *Građa za historiju narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Slavoniji*, Bk. III (Slavonski Brod: Historijski institut Slavonije, 1964), doc. no. 5.

of those children from August 23 of the same year.⁸⁵ Why should he refer to something that does not suite him? Anyway, just like with that unnecessary story about corpses dressed in Home Guard uniforms that were floating in the River Sava, he simply cuts pieces out...

With righteous anger Goldstein lashed out at a “report of the Ministry of Associations”, without specifying when that report originated and in what context. So he calls out that report when he states that children were not forcibly separated from their parents, “which, of course, was a lie” (p. 558). Elsewhere, Goldstein points to the “report of the Ministry of Associations” since it states that there were no deaths in the transport of children, and finally makes a point by concluding that it was a lie and that only in the first transport from Jasenovac to Zagreb 17 children died (p. 562–563).

But, lo and behold, in one document which Goldstein of course did not use, Lorković himself (Mladen, not Blaž! I mention to Professor Goldstein again just in case) on July 16, 1942 reported – to whom? – Ante Pavelić himself! – on the condition of people resettled from Kozara and stated: “The first days were more difficult, and on the first transport of children to Zagreb 18 children died on the train.”⁸⁶

Goldstein is moralising. He refers to “callous frauds” (p. 48) and “deep immorality” (p. 49) of the NDH authorities, assesses the Ustasha “peak of sarcasm” (p. 539), warns us of the “dishonesty” of the NDH authorities and the “incredibly deceitful manner” of its propaganda (p. 551). In many places, Goldstein, unburdened by facts, righteously argues with the NDH documents, concluding that what stands in them is a lie, a lie, and a lie again, and this lie cowardly cries before Goldstein’s righteous analysis.

From a person who moralizes so much it would be expected not to resort to manipulation himself, and much less to fabrications, and I have shown how many times Goldstein manipulated sources. Goldstein, after all, admits himself the usage of sources the authenticity of which he doubts. Thus he mentions the “alleged letter” that Andrija Hebrang wrote from the Ustasha prison, and then he uses it nonetheless as a relevant source (p. 388). Since in that alleged letter he found something that he liked, so he had to...

But, as Mirjana Gross warned us: “After all, sources are ‘stubborn’ and their statements cannot be altered due to specific political needs, but they are modified by omitting ‘unsuitable’ parts or by misinterpretation, down to fab-

⁸⁵ N. Barić, “Kozara 1942. – sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece”: 98-108.

⁸⁶ HR-HDA-227, Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova NDH [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NDH], Ured ministra [Office of the Minister], Dnevno izvješće Ministarstva vanjskih poslova broj 42 Poglavniku Nezavisne Države Hrvatske [Daily Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 42 to Poglavnik of the Independent State of Croatia], Zagreb, July 16, 1942.

ricating. Such a procedure, of course, has nothing to do with science, but it can have a significant impact on the historical consciousness of a given time and place.”⁸⁷

But in his book, Goldstein often writes and claims one thing, and in the sources or literature referred to in the references there is entirely something else. One such example is when Goldstein discusses the possible number of Jews killed in the Jasenovac camp. Therefore, regarding the research – calculation/assessment of Dragan Cvetković from Muzej žrtava genocida (Museum of Genocide Victims) in Belgrade, he states: “Cvetković’s assessment has weaknesses already at first glance, because he estimates that around 22,000 Jews were killed at the Jasenovac camp system, which is not possible – by general and multi-confirmed studies of Jasenovac camp victims, among Jews there could be no more than 17,000” (p. 790). In footnote 203 on page 931, Goldstein, to support this claim, refers to “Cvetković, *Stradanje stanovništva NDH u logorima – numeričko određenje* [*The Plight of the Population of the Independent State of Croatia in Camps – a numerical overview*], [p.] 84; Cvetković, *Jasenovac u sistemu stradanja civila u NDH* [*Jasenovac in the system of the plight of civilians in NDH*], [pp.] 76, 82; Geiger, *Brojidbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac* [*Numerical indicators of the victims of the Jasenovac Camp*], [p.] 231”.

Without discussing here Cvetković’s, Goldstein’s or some other calculations/estimates on the number of Jewish victims of the Jasenovac camp, in the said Goldstein’s assertion the only truth is: “which is not possible.” Because the figure Goldstein attributes to Cvetković, of “about 22,000 Jew”, Cvetković does not state anywhere nor he ever did. Goldstein just made it up. Cvetković’s article “Stradanje stanovništva NDH u logorima – numeričko određenje [*The Plight of the Population of the Independent State of Croatia in Camps – a numerical overview*]” was published in the proceedings *Logori, zatvori i prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945. / 1945.-1951.* [*Camps, Prisons and Forced Labour in Croatia/Yugoslavia 1941-1945, 1945-1951*]⁸⁸ on pp. 41-56, whilst Goldstein is referring to page 84! The figure of “about 22,000 Jews” is not mentioned in this article. In the article “Jasenovac u sistemu stradanja civila u NDH – kvantitativna analiza (ili, ponovno o brojevima)” [*Jasenovac in the system of the plight of civilians in NDH – quantitative analysis (or, again about numbers)*], published in *Jasenovac: Zbornik radova Četvrte međunarodne konferencije o Jasenovcu* [*Jasenovac: Proceedings of the Fourth Interna-*

⁸⁷ M. Gross, *Suvremena historiografija*, p. 380.

⁸⁸ Dragan Cvetković, “Stradanje stanovništva NDH u logorima – numeričko određenje”, in: *Logori, zatvori i prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945. / 1945.-1951. Zbornik radova*, eds. Vladimir Geiger, Martina Grahek Ravančić and Marica Karakaš Obradov (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), pp. 41-56.

tional Conference on Jasenovac]⁸⁹, Cvetković also does not mention “about 22,000 Jews” at all. In his papers, Cvetković brings a calculation/estimate of 18,000 to 19,000 Jewish victims of the Jasenovac camp, as I quote in the article “Brojidbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac, 1941.-1945. (procjene, izračuni, popisi)” [“Numerical indicators of victims of the Jasenovac camp, 1941 - 1945 (estimates, calculations, lists)”] published in 2013 in *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* [Journal of Contemporary History],⁹⁰ on page 231, which Goldstein refers to in his footnote. After all, in the proceedings *Jasenovac – manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam* [Jasenovac – manipulations, controversies and historical revisionism] published by JUSP Jasenovac [Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac] in 2018, in which Goldstein also has a contribution,⁹¹ Cvetković in his article “Koncentracijski logor Jasenovac i njegova uloga u uništavanju naroda NDH – izračun mogućeg broja žrtava na temelju djelomično revidiranog popisa iz 1964. godine” [“Jasenovac Concentration Camp and its role in the destruction of the nations of NDH – the calculation of the possible number of victims based on the partially revised 1964 census”] specifies his calculation/estimate of the number of Jewish victims of the Jasenovac camp at 17,926 to 19,076.⁹² Goldstein, apparently, did not read carefully or did not understand what he was reading, because in his book he also refers to this Cvetković’s article. Or are there other reasons? Some would say “very precisely”, “acribically and responsibly”. It is hard to grasp what the reviewers of Goldstein’s book, this “first scientific monograph” on the Jasenovac camp, were doing in this case, as in the case of his numerous other “excogitations”.

Oddly, after so many years of research, in his “scrupulously” and “acribically” written book *Jasenovac*, Goldstein does not mention SS-*Obersturmbannführer* Hermann Alois Krumej, an important, indeed inevitable figure in describing the Holocaust and understanding the deportations of Jews also in

⁸⁹ Dragan Cvetković, “Jasenovac u sistemu stradanja civila u NDH – kvantitativna analiza (ili, ponovo o brojevima)”, in: *Jasenovac: Zbornik radova Četvrte međunarodne konferencije o Jasenovcu*, eds. Zdravko Antonić and Janko Velimirović (Kozarska Dubica; Banja Luka: Javna ustanova Spomen-područja Donja Gradina; Udruženje Jasenovac – Donja Gradina, 2007), pp. 69-82.

⁹⁰ V. Geiger, “Brojidbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac, 1941.-1945. (procjene, izračuni, popisi)”, p. 231.

⁹¹ Ivo Goldstein, “Zločin i kazna (ili kakva je veza Jasenovca i Bleiburga): Psihološki profili ratnih zločinaca iz logora Jasenovac”, in: *Jasenovac – manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam: Zbornik radova*, ed. Andriana Benčić, Stipe Odak and Danijela Lucić (Jasenovac: Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2018), pp. 65-85.

⁹² Dragan Cvetković, “Koncentracijski logor Jasenovac i njegova uloga u uništavanju naroda NDH – izračun mogućeg broja žrtava na temelju djelomično revidiranog popisa iz 1964. godine”, in: *Jasenovac – manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam: Zbornik radova*, ed. Andriana Benčić, Stipe Odak and Danijela Lucić (Jasenovac: Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2018), pp. 193, 195, 198, 201, 206.

NDH. It is not clear how Goldstein did not consult *The Holocaust Encyclopedia*⁹³, essential for every Holocaust researcher, in which Hermann Krumej's role in the tragic fate of the Jews in NDH is also mentioned. After all, SS-Obersturmbannführer Krumej is mentioned several times in Hannah Arendt's book *Eichmann in Jerusalem*,⁹⁴ and he is also mentioned in the books that Goldstein listed in the bibliography,⁹⁵ but which he clearly read superficially. Goldstein did not even look at Archives of the German Legation Police Envoy in Zagreb Hans Helm at the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb, where he could also find a note on SS-Obersturmbannführer Krumej.⁹⁶ I will not recount where else in archives and literature there are references on SS-Obersturmbannführer Krumej, but let Prof. Goldstein make some effort and find out himself.

Goldstein dedicated plenty of space in his book to prominent Ustasha member Vlado Singer (1908-1943) and Chetnik commander [vojvoda] Pavle Đurišić (1909–1945), whom he said were killed in the Jasenovac camp (pp. 176, 186–189, 199, 436, 442, 444, 446, 454, 729–731). If so, it is not clear why Goldstein did not ask himself why Singer and Đurišić are no longer on the list of victims of the Jasenovac (and Stara Gradiška) camps of the Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac,⁹⁷ or perhaps for JUSP the victims of the Jasenovac camp (and Stara Gradiška) are only those who are “eligible”. It would also be important to find out when and who removed Singer and Đurišić from the list of Jasenovac victims, on whose decision and order. Let me remind you– just in case – that in a recently published *Poimenični popis žrtava koncentracijskog logora jasenovac 1941-1945* [*List of Individual Victims of the Jasenovac Concentration Camp 1941-1945*] by the Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac it is stated that Singer was killed in 1943 in the Stara Gradiška Camp or the Jasenovac camp, and that Đurišić was killed in the Jasenovac camp in 1945.⁹⁸

At the beginning of his book (p.17), Goldstein states, referring to the Jasenovac camp inmate Ilija Jakovljević (*Konclogor na Savi* [*Concentration Camp on*

⁹³ For example, the German edition: *Enzyklopädie des Holocaust*, Band 2, ed. Eberhard Jäckel (Berlin: Argon, 1993), p. 831.

⁹⁴ H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*.

⁹⁵ For example: Carl Bethke, *(K)eine gemeinsame Sprache? Aspekte deutsch-jüdischer Beziehungsgeschichte in Slawonien, 1900-1945*, Studien zur Geschichte, Kultur und Gesellschaft Südosteuropas, vol. 12 (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2013), p. 346; Anna Maria Gruenfelder, *Sustigla ih Šoa: Strani židovski izbjeglice u Jugoslaviji (1933.-1945.)* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2018), p. 205.

⁹⁶ HR-HDA-1521, Arhiv Helm [Helm Archives], box 7, no. 154 (note Hermann Krumej).

⁹⁷ Cf. Spomen područje Jasenovac, “Poimenični popis žrtava KCL Jasenovac 1941-1945.” / “Prehled i pretraga poimeničnog popisa žrtava KCL Jasenovac 1941.-1945.”, <http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=7618>, accessed on February 10, 2019.

⁹⁸ Cf. *Poimenični popis žrtava koncentracijskog logora Jasenovac 1941.-1945.*, eds. Jelka Smreka and Đorđe Mihovilović (Jasenovac: Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2007), pp. 444, 1510.

the Sava River], p. 19), that in future literature on Ustasha camps “there should be no fabrications”. Based on the aforementioned, it is quite obvious to what extent Goldstein himself has adhered to that.

But all Goldstein’s aforementioned manipulations of sources or their fabrication are actually nothing compared to, now already epic, “Goldstein’s bone crushing machine”.

Shortly before the publication of his first scientific and acribical book on Jasenovac, in the weekly *Globus* [The Globe] from May 5, 2018, Goldstein presented a life-saving idea explaining what happened to the many corpses of Jasenovac camps: “At the very end of the war, in early April 1945, several of the most prominent Jasenovac butchers returned after two or two and a half years to Jasenovac, because they knew exactly the locations of mass graves. The order was that ‘traces of graves are to be destroyed at all costs’. In Gradina, on the right bank of the River Sava, in those days around 500 camp inmates ‘were burning corpses and camouflaging mass graves’. Bodies were burned on iron crossbeams (which some called a ‘grill’) and ashes returned to the tombs. ‘For days, black smoke from burning human remains was rising to the sky,’ witnesses wrote. In addition, bone crushing machines were brought in from the [German] Reich. When pathologists opened some tombs in 1964, they discovered that many corpses had already ‘rotted and disintegrated’ and that somewhere ‘human tissue turned into a soapy mass of yellowish-orange colour’. And what would be discovered today, 75 years after the crime?”⁹⁹

On June 17, 2018 on Croatian television in the show *Nedjeljom u 2* [On Sunday at 2 p.m.] Goldstein repeated the story of the alleged special machines from the German Reich, used to crush and grind the bones of corpses in Jasenovac, thus concealing the crime. Then he stated: “[Miroslav] Filipović Majstorović [...] knew those tombs the best. He went to Chelmno to instruct with the Nazis on how to destroy corpses, they even brought in machines that destroy bones. And they were [...] therefore in the beginning of April [1945], some 500 to 600 camp inmates were working on this destruction, systematically to destroy corpses. In part, they were burned on bars, and then the ashes were returned to the tombs. In other part, the bones, which they found, or excavated, were destroyed in these machines”¹⁰⁰ How many of these machines (“bone crushers”) were there, and when and how their every trace was lost, Goldstein did not explain.

Goldstein’s abovementioned statements about the “bone crushing machine” stirred the masses and attracted the attention of the “fair intelligentsia”.

⁹⁹ I. Goldstein, “Komisija za Jasenovac: nova besmislena inicijativa šefice države”.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. “NU2 – IVO GOLDSTEIN”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2c79KryKCM>, accessed on February 15, 2019.

It was expected that in the first scientific, scrupulously and acribically written book he would finally provide concrete information on the existence of the German bone crusher in Jasenovac. But everyone who expected it was left disappointed. In the book *Jasenovac* Goldstein again camouflaged the whole story in a new way. He reiterates that the Jasenovac Camp Command at the end of the war sought to cover up the traces of crime and insisted that the “traces of graves” be destroyed at all costs. He further explains: “Although there is no immediate evidence, the way the Ustahas burned corpses in Jasenovac is strikingly similar to the method of burning corpses used by the Nazis from 1941 (in Babi Yar and elsewhere in the USSR).” Then Goldstein scrupulously adds that the Ustahas “could learn” how to destroy corpses from members of the *Prinz Eugen* SS Division, since among them were former guards at camp Chełmno, where such methods were used, as well as from some vaguely defined “other group” of Germans who burned corpses in the Jajinci camp near Belgrade in the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 (pp. 726–727).

It is not difficult to get basic information about Babi Yar (Ukrainian: Бабин Яр, Russian: Бабий Яр) and how the Nazis destroyed traces of their crimes there.¹⁰¹ It is also easy to get data on the German bone crushing machine, primarily on Wikipedia¹⁰² This machine was called *Knochenmühle* in German and *костедробилки* in Ukrainian and Russian. Information on the German camp Chełmno (German: Vernichtungslager Kulmhof) in occupied Poland is also easy to find.¹⁰³

Undoubtedly, Goldstein found inspiration for resolving the issue of the removal of mass graves in the Jasenovac Camp in the famous *Sonderaktion 1005*, in which the Nazis were using the above methods to destroy the mass graves of the victims of their concentration camps in Eastern Europe, Poland and Ukraine from 1942 until 1944.¹⁰⁴

Not only did Goldstein not specify in his book where he found data and evidence for the grand discovery that would explain one of the greatest dilemmas and controversies in Croatian history regarding the question of where the bodies of - according to Goldstein himself, about 90,000 to 100,000 victims, were buried, but after everything he had previously stated in public,

¹⁰¹ Cf. “Babi Yar”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babi_Yar, accessed on November 20, 2018.

¹⁰² For example cf. “Holocaust”, <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust>, accessed on February 10, 2019 and “View of the bone crushing machine used by Sonderkommando 1005 in the Janowska concentration camp to grind the bones of victims after their bodies were burned”, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa10007>, accessed on November 20, 2018.

¹⁰³ Cf. “Chełmno extermination camp”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chełmno_extermination_camp, accessed on November 20, 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. “Sonderaktion 1005”, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderaktion_1005, accessed 10. 11. 2018. ili https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderaktion_1005, accessed on November 10, 2018.

in the book *Jasenovac*, I repeat and emphasize, he did not mention German bone-crushing machines at all. Unbelievable! Goldstein also did not specify on the basis of which source he stated that Miroslav Filipović Majstorović visited Chełmno. In his latest book he actually confirms that everything he previously claimed related to that issue is actually a lie, since he writes there is no direct evidence that the Usthas “learned” from the Nazis how to destroy corpses (p. 726).

However, Goldstein does not give up, so he states that the Usthas could have “learned” how to burn corpses from, for example, members of the German SS Division *Prinz Eugen* because some of them previously served in the Chełmno camp. Understandably, Goldstein has no sources to support this assumption. Why would a combat SS division have any contact or cooperate with the Ustasha Defence, which was associated with managing the Jasenovac Camp itself? So, instead of at least apologizing in the book for inventing German machines for crushing bones of human corpses, to apologize for claiming that Miroslav Filipović Majstorović visited Chełmno, he continues with his constructions...

In scientific approach all claims and assertions, including those regarding the Jasenovac camp, should also have credible confirmation – “there should be no fabrications”. However, Goldstein clearly does not have any specific sources that the aforementioned German machine was used in Jasenovac, even though he trumpeted about it in his media appearances. Maybe him too realized that inventing must have some limits? Goldstein does not have any specific sources that the Usthas “could have learned” anything from members of the *Prinz Eugen* SS Division. Still, I am afraid, these assertions will be embraced and persistently repeated by many, even though Goldstein has no relevant sources to support them.

Hence Goldstein is actually highly ranked in the catalogue of various fabrications about the Jasenovac camp. But what Goldstein has no source for, he will find in his mind. Thus, the essential formula used in the lack of credible, or even any indicators, is simple – what does not exist can be concocted. A scientific approach? Maybe for Goldstein! But Goldstein is not the only one.

Before long one of Goldstein’s faithful and steadfast like-minded colleagues, who also proved himself as a reviewer of his book *Jasenovac*, historian Goran Hutinec (Department of History, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb), in the weekly *Nacional* [The National]

from January 15, 2019 repeated Goldstein's story on how bodies of Jasenovac inmates were removed from the mass graves.¹⁰⁵

I have no doubt at all that there were mass graves of Jasenovac camp inmates – numerous sources confirm this. But Hutinec's "sensational discovery" of an aerial footage of Jasenovac from January 1945 (on which little or almost nothing can be seen – i.e. everyone sees what they want) does not confirm it at all. Hutinec's explanations regarding the importance of the aerial footage found, and, I must not forget to particularly emphasise – the way of removing the corpses of Jasenovac camp inmates – presented in weekly *Nacional* are nothing but plain speculations. If historian Hutinec, or anyone else, sees mass graves on that aerial footage, I really doubt they were where he puts them in his fantasy. Hutinec's story - to be blunt - is exaggerated and utterly *serbized*. Since Hutinec announced that he would write and publish a scientific paper detailing who, when and how removed the Jasenovac mass graves, it is not difficult to assume who will be the reviewer who will give positive feedback on the paper.

Israeli historian Gideon Greif, author of the – fortunately for all of us – in Serbia recently published book *Jasenovac – Auschwitz of the Balkans*,¹⁰⁶ in which he scrupulously listed that the Ustashas invented a total of 57 methods of sadistic killings of their victims, primarily Serbs, and argued that in Jasenovac "perhaps even 800,00 Serbs, Jews and Roma could have been killed", expresses the opinion that "the new footages reveal a new fact, that is, the existence of much larger mass graves scattered on the surface of at least ten sq. km. These footages are one of the final proofs on the bases of which we will, I am afraid, have to even increase the number of people killed at Jasenovac from 700,000 or 800,000, which are today's estimates".¹⁰⁷ If Greif, as "a world-renowned Israeli expert on Auschwitz and other World War II death factories", as presented in Serbia, is right – Goldstein's "bone crushing machines" would

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Zrinka Vrabec Mojzeš, "Goran Hutinec intervju: 'Otkrio sam američke snimke koje pokazuju da su u Jasenovcu postojale masovne grobnice' ["Interview with Goran Hutinec. 'I have discovered American footages showing that there were mass graves in Jasenovac'"], *Nacional* (Zagreb), no. 1082, January 15, 2019., pp. 15-18.

¹⁰⁶ Gideon Greif, *Jasenovac – Auschwitz of the Balkans: The Ustasha Empire of Cruelty* (Belgrade: Knjiga komerc, 2018).

¹⁰⁷ [Gideon Grajf:] "U Jasenovcu je ubijeno možda i 800.000 Srba, Jevreja i Roma, o tome se NE SME ĆUTATI" [Gideon Greif: "In Jasenovac perhaps even 800,00 Serbs, Jews, and Roma were killed, and we MUST NOT BE QUIET ABOUT THAT"], <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/u-jasenovcu-je-ubijeno-mozda-i-800000-srba-jevreja-i-roma-o-tome-se-ne-sme-cutati/r7h3pn8>, accessed on February 15, 2019; Slobodan Kljakić, "Intervju: Profesor Dr Gideon Grajf, dobitnik Sretenjske zlatne medalje: Zajednički bedem pred revizijom prošlosti" [Slobodan Kljakić, "Interview: Professor Gideon Greif, PhD, winner of the Sretenje (Serbian National Day) Gold Medal: A common bulwark against the revision of the past"], <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/422959/Zajednicki-bedem-pred-revizijom-proslosti>, accessed on February 15, 2019.

make sense. The only trouble is that Greif thinks Goldstein is a revisionist and accuses him of being “in line with the narrative of the State of Croatia – 83,000 victims”.¹⁰⁸ - It would be best if Goldstein, Hutinec and Greif met and agreed on the number, size and distribution of Jasenovac mass graves and the ways in which the Ustashas removed them. In fact, they can invite Vasilije Krestić, Srboľjub Źivanović, Roman Leljak and Stjepan Razum, as well as other truthful connoisseurs, so they could together draw some clever conclusion.

This latest Goldstein’s book, as all of his previous books, had been in various media favourable to him announced for years in advance. Its emergence and Goldstein’s research efforts were followed. As if it was a long-awaited male firstborn in a royal family. It was announced to be the best book about the Jasenovac camp and the “last say” on the subject. It all intensified a few days before the long-awaited firstborn saw the light of day and when Goldstein’s book (“the first scientific monograph” on the Jasenovac Camp) was, luckily for all of us, published, it was followed by – as it fits the occasion - numerous inappropriate eulogies.

Shortly after the publication of Goldstein’s book *Jasenovac* in the daily *Jutarnji list* [*Morning Paper*] from November 11, 2018 Robert Bajruši stated: “Ivo Goldstein’s book is the most important journalistic title published this year in Croatia.”¹⁰⁹ Some would say – it is also an instruction that Goldstein’s book *Jasenovac* should be nominated for at least one of the prestigious Croatian scientific prizes, and possibly also a new incentive for Goldstein to be elected to the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Miljenko Jergović argued in Zagreb daily *Jutarnji list* [*Morning Paper*] on November 20, 2018 that Goldstein’s book: “is very accurate, documented and to an extent objectivized portrait of the most distinguished concentration camp in Europe with a command that was not German.”¹¹⁰

The presentation of Goldstein’s book *Jasenovac* at Novinarski dom [the Journalists’ Building] on November 21, 2018 in Zagreb received accolades from the Croatian press. Thus, for example, the daily *Novi list* reported on the

¹⁰⁸ Gideon Grajf, “Jasenovac – Aušvic Balkana: Kontroverze o broju Źrtava” [Gideon Grajf, “Jasenovac - Auschwitz of the Balkans. Controversies on the number of casualties”], *Politika* (Belgrade), no. 37809, February 15 and 16, 2019, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ Robert Bajruši, “Knjiga Ive Goldsteina najvaŹniji je publicistički naslov izdan ove godine u Hrvatskoj” [“Ivo Goldstein’s book is the most important journalistic title published this year in Croatia”], <https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/knjiga-ive-goldsteina-najvazniji-je-publicisticki-naslov-izdan-ove-godine-u-hrvatskoj/8041322/>, accessed on September 20, 2018.

¹¹⁰ Miljenko Jergović, “Interliber je bio trŹnica starog papira, a ne sajam knjiŹnih noviteta” [“Interliber was an old paper market, not a novelty book fair”], <https://www.jutarnji.hr/komentari/interliber-je-bio-trznica-starog-papira-a-ne-sajam-knjiznih-noviteta/8075915/>, accessed on November 20, 2018.

book with an article entitled “Scientific monograph. A book that causes nightmares. Ivo Goldstein’s *Jasenovac* ‘a good barrier to negationism.’”¹¹¹

It is undoubtedly the intention of persistent individuals and groups to create the impression in public that Goldstein’s book *Jasenovac* is the crown of his research, indeed the last scientific say on the subject. Thus the panel discussion ‘The History in Society’ with the significant (and somewhat funny) title *Jasenovac by Ivo Goldstein - what next?* was held in the Hall of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb on December 13, 2018. Alongside Goldstein, several historians, his like-minded colleagues, took part in the discussion.¹¹²

Miljenko Jergović, as the most persistent promoter of the life and work of Ivo Goldstein, repeats the eulogies, so on January 2, 2019 he assures us: “Ivo Goldstein’s book ‘Jasenovac’ is not only a brilliantly performed historical synthesis of the research on ‘Balkan Auschwitz’ and a kind of completion of what generations of historians have worked on and the survived camp inmates, including some of the most important Croatian writers of our century (Ilija Jakovljević), witnessed, but it is a book of very strong cathartic potential, which represents a kind of dam against the advancing historical revisionism and the hysteria of the newly composed righteous and innocent. Public honour is defended by the manner in which an individual treats public shame. Ivo Goldstein is one of such Croatian individuals, and he makes Croatia a somewhat better and more honest country. [...]”¹¹³

At the end of his latest book, Goldstein says its “intension” was to “narrow the space for lies” about Jasenovac. And when you “face the Jasenovac truth”, Goldstein tells us, “then you make Croatia a less terrible place” (pp. 800–801). Well, Croatia, I am afraid, truly is a quite scary place if a professor of the Department of History at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Zagreb (“the most important department of history in the Republic of Croatia”, “the oldest and largest Croatian scientific-teaching institution that educates future history teachers”) can write in his book in a manner described

¹¹¹ Boris Pavelić, “Znanstvena monografija: Knjiga koja izaziva noćne more: ‘Jasenovac’ Ive Goldsteina ‘dobra brana negacionizmu’ [“Scientific monograph: A book that causes nightmares: Ivo Goldstein’s ‘Jasenovac’ is a good barrier against negationism”], <http://www.novolist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/KNJIGA-KOJA-IZAZIVA-NOCNE-MORE-Jasenovac-Ive-Goldsteina-dobra-brana-negacionizmu>, accessed on November 25, 2018.

¹¹² “Tribina ‘Historija u društvu’: ‘Jasenovac’ Ive Goldsteina – što poslije?“, <http://www.historiografija.hr/?p=12777>, accessed on December 15, 2018.

¹¹³ Miljenko Jergović, “15 knjiga zbog kojih mi je valjala 2018. godina” [“15 books that made 2018 a good year for me”], <https://www.jergovic.com/ajfelov-most/15-knjiga-zbog-kojih-mi-je-valjala-2018-godina/>, accessed on November 5, 2018.

in this review. When I wrote about some of Goldstein's other excogitations,¹¹⁴ I stated — and I repeat it here — that someone wise said that our historians are in many cases more of an embarrassment than our history.

Kurz und klar – there are many shortcomings to Goldstein's latest book *Jasenovac*, a compendium of all kinds of ignorance, incompetence and sloppiness, and far, far too far, would lead us to list all factual errors and interpretive improvisations – all inaccuracies, untruths, half-truths and nonsense. In this review [which is really only *eine kleine Einführung* about Goldstein's scientific contributions] I have made only some more important and picturesque remarks.

And not to forget – after my recently published shorter reviews and remarks on his book *Jasenovac*,¹¹⁵ Goldstein, so I learned, for the Serbian edition¹¹⁶ of his book – “the first scientific monograph” about the Jasenovac camp, hurriedly made corrections of the most remarkable inaccuracies that I warned about at the time. It is yet another proof of his scrupulousness and meticulousness.

In her review to the Serbian edition of Goldstein's book *Jasenovac*, Prof. Dubravka Stojanović (Department of History at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade) notes: “By having extremely diverse archival documents and, in particular, applying new scientific methods, Goldstein has reconstructed life in the camp, from the way the inmates were killed to many data from everyday life. Thanks to his long-time work on Holocaust issues, Goldstein managed to fit the Jasenovac camp into the European context of mass destruction of ‘undesirable’ nations and by that place it in the trends of European and world history.” What those “new scientific methods” are and which “trends of European and world history” are in question here, is, besides Prof. Stojanović, probably clear to someone. Not to me.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Vladimir Geiger, “Goldsteinologija: Biseri za nezaborav: Krivotvorenje je intelektualni prijestup” [“Goldsteinology: Jewels to Remember: Counterfeiting is an intellectual property offense”], *Hrvatsko slovo* (Zagreb), no. 790, June 11, 2010, p. 14.

¹¹⁵ Vladimir Geiger, “‘Znanstvena’ monografija o Jasenovcu: Goldsteinovo pomanjkanje izvora i vjerodostojnih pokazatelja: Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac, Fraktura i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018.” [“Scientific monograph on Jasenovac: Goldstein's lack of sources and credible indicators: Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac, Fraktura and the Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018”], *Hrvatsko slovo*, br. 1232, November 30, 2018, pp. 14 and 19 and Vladimir Geiger, “Kapitalno djelo hrvatske trivijalne historiografije: Ivo Goldstein, *Jasenovac*, Fraktura i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018.” [“A masterpiece of Croatian trivial historiography: Ivo Goldstein, *Jasenovac*, Fraktura and the Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018”], *Politički zatvorenik* (Zagreb), no. 277, October-November-December 2018, pp. 23-28.

¹¹⁶ Ivo Goldstein, *Jasenovac* (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2019).

Much has been said and written about the Jasenovac Camp “by heart”, both in public and in the media, and even in historiography, allegations and claims are repeated without reservation from the left and the right. The facts about the Jasenovac camp have been contaminated from the beginning, and we are witnessing contamination from various sides the end of which is difficult to see. Precise and accurate establishment of facts about the Jasenovac camp is only possible by verifying and corroborating all allegations and data. This in turn requires time, effort, and responsibility.

In the research of the Jasenovac camp victims and the extent of the crimes committed, most often the problem is lack of not only sources and credible indicators, but also “goodwill”, and also “common sense” to properly address certain issues. In his latest book *Jasenovac* Goldstein showed neither “goodwill” nor “common sense”, on the contrary he continues to *lobotomize* us by expressing everything but the willingness and ability to engage in scientific approach.

Vladimir Geiger