THE LEGACY OF AGENT NO. 25*

The history of espionage is replete with unknowns and ambiguities, and the legacy of Agent No. 25 is no exception. Historians are not even sure who he was. Conventional wisdom holds that he was, indeed, the notorious Colonel Alfred Redl, one-time chief of Austro-Hungarian counterintelligence and in 1912-13, chief of staff for the Austro-Hungarian VIII Corps in Prague.342 However, as noted elsewhere, there are many weak links in the chain of circum-

---

* With permission, this is the English-language version of an article that first appeared in Russian in Родина, No. 8 (August 2014), pp. 32-35, as Наследие Агента № 25. The article is based on a paper of the same title originally read on 28 March 2014 at a conference held at RGGU/РГГУ, «Первая мировая война и последствия распада европейских империй». Dates within this article are rendered variously, depending upon context: “N.S.” indicates New Style, or the Gregorian calendar generally in use in the West, while “O.S.” denotes Old Style, or the Julian calendar, then in use in Imperial Russia. At the time, the Julian calendar lagged the Gregorian by 13 days. Dual citation applies to dates of international significance.

342 K. K. Zvonarev, Agenturnaia razvedka (reprint ed., Moscow, 2003), 143-44.
stantial evidence supporting the claim that Redl was Agent No. 25. Consequently, it seems fair to conclude that we will never be one-hundred percent certain about Agent No. 25’s true identity. We can assert only with reasonable probability he was Redl.

Perhaps more serious in historical perspective is a gap in our knowledge of exactly what information Agent No. 25 passed to the Russian Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSh), and with what consequences? It is commonplace that before the Great War he transmitted Austro-Hungarian plans for strategic deployments against Russia, Serbia, and Italy. It is also commonplace to acknowledge that the majority of these transmissions dated to 1911, 1912, and, to a lesser extent, 1913. Lesser known is the fact that some major documents dated at least to 1909 and even to 1908. Whatever the date, these materials came to St. Petersburg in bulk documentary format. That is, they comprised a series of photographs by page of significant documents that often extended to 70 folio sheets and more. The value of these materials made Agent No. 25 a “super spy.” To his fellow ministers, War Minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov characterized him in November 1912 “as an agent meriting great credibility because of his previous communications.”

Unknown until recently is the fact that in late 1912 Agent No. 25 passed information not just on anticipated strategic deployments, but on current intelligence. Materials from the Russian military archives indicate that in November-December Agent No. 25 sent at least five timely messages related to the mobilization crisis that accompanied the onset of the First Balkan War. These messages had two important consequences. First, they influenced the outcome of the mobilization crisis of 1912, a crisis that in important ways was a precursor to events that transpired some twenty months later. And, second, these messages afforded significant insight into the Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization regime. This insight, in turn, would figure in Russian strategic calculations during the mobilization crisis of July 1914. The drama

346 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv [hereinafter RGVIA], f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, l. 76; d. 2857, ll. 402-03.
347 John R. Schindler, „Redl—Spy of the Century?” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, XVIII, no. 2 (Fall 2005), 483-85.
348 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv [hereafter RGIA], f. 1276, op. 8, d. 454, l. 455.
349 RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2857, l. 405.
of espionage and identity issues aside, these two consequences constituted perhaps the most significant aspects of Agent No. 25’s legacy for the two crises.

Let us first turn to the substance and immediate impact of the heretofore unknown messages of late 1912. They either imparted new information on Austro-Hungarian military measures—especially in Galicia—or confirmed intelligence estimates based on information from other sources. Materials from Agent No. 25 cataloged the transit of military materiel and armaments to Galicia and noted the increased readiness rate of Vienna’s naval assets. More important, his messages indirectly affirmed other sources on the call-up of separate classes of reservists in Galicia, and still more important, the covert mobilization of the three resident corps (I, X, and XI) in Galicia. Agent No. 25 also chronicled the rising tide of mobilization measures within the interior corps districts of Austria-Hungary. When combined with materials from other agents, especially Čedomil Jandrić, it became clear why corps within the interior districts were mobilizing without their support infrastructure. Separate infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons were being transferred from them to reinforce the three Galician corps, thus raising their composite strength to five full corps. Berlin was well aware of these measures, and it was from Agent No. 25 that the Russians also learned that Germany had promised six corps for further reinforcement, should the situation lead to war. Exactly where these six corps might be deployed remained unclear.

Although the threat to Serbia was an important concern, reinforced Austro-Hungarian deployments in Galicia were a source of alarm. They uncovered a serious vulnerability both in peacetime Russian dispositions opposite Galicia and in possible Russian strategic deployments for a general European war. The military reform of 1910, which had re-deployed 5.5 corps from the western state frontier into the Russian interior, had thinned out peacetime dispositions in the Warsaw military district. By 1912, only the 14th cavalry division and two under-strength rifle brigades covered the immense distance between Częstochowa and Li-

350 See below, documents 1, 4, and 5.
351 See below, documents 2 and 4. A corps was an infantry-heavy combined arms formation, numbering more than 30,000 troops. Two-four corps under unified command formed a field army.
352 See below, documents 1, 3, and 5.
353 Various agents and sources had sent information about corps not cited by Agent No. 25. From these additional corps, especially IV, V, and VI, separate battalions, squadrons, and batteries had been dispatched to Galicia. See, RG VIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2827, ll. 153-54ob., d. 2856, ll. 19-19ob., 28-34, and 80-81ob.
354 Ibid., d. 7148, ll. 110ob.-111.
ublin. To the east, only two under-strength corps (XIV and XIX) covered the Liublin-Kholm-Kovel’ railroad corridor. Similarly, in the neighboring Kiev military district, only two under-strength corps (XI and XII) covered key terrain and railroad junctions near Rovno and Proskurov.

As antidote to Russian weakness, Emperor Nicholas II in late October (O.S.) held the senior class of reservists on active duty after expiration of their service terms. This measure reinforced the above-mentioned four corps in the Warsaw and Kiev districts with about 10,000 troops each, but these formations still fell far short of parity with the equivalent of five full corps now opposite them in Austrian Galicia.

Should the crisis lead to war, the situation was still more lop-sided. According to the recently adopted Mobilization Schedule 19A, the two corps (XIV and XIX) on the south face of the Warsaw military district were to receive reinforcements from the distant Moscow and Kazan military districts to form two field armies, the Fourth and Fifth. These two armies would then slice through the Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia from west to east in a gigantic reincarnation of the classical Greek battle of Leuctra. The Russian Third Army, advancing from the Kiev military district, would serve as cutting board. However, in December 1912, additional Austrian reinforcements were one-two weeks’ closer in time to the three mobilized Galician corps than Russian reinforcements from the interior were to the Liublin-Kholm-Kovel’ corridor.

This stark reality presented the Russian military high command with a time-distance-mass dilemma that defied easy resolution. Austria-Hungary had covertly reinforced its deployments in Galicia by only 75,000-85,000 troops, but Habsburg dispositions were now well-situated for a rapid cross-border offensive and seizure of the Liublin-Kholm-Kovel’ railroad corridor. The initial concentration of Russian troops in accordance with Mobilization Schedule No. 19A was now threatened with pre-emption. For Russia, there was neither time nor nearby military assets to effect a timely counter-mobilization. Lieutenant General Nicholas Alekseevich Kliuev, the chief of staff of the Warsaw district, spelled out the nature of the problem: “... while the Austrian army is on the frontier, it is impossible to count upon the concentration of the Fourth and Fifth Armies in the Warsaw military district, and we must forego it." Should war come, the only viable alternative for concentration according to Schedule 19A was to withdraw initial

357 RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7148, ll. 51-2.
358 Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossisskoi Imperii [herinafter AVPRI], f. 151, op. 482 (1912), d. 3717, l. 47.
360 RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1819, l. 8.
Russian strategic deployments in the Kiev district to the River Sluch. In the Warsaw district, initial deployments would be withdrawn to a line that ran along the Western Bug, and that was anchored in the north on the fortress complex at Brest-Litovsk. Withdrawal to this latter line would make any advance northward by Russian forces into East Prussia vulnerable to attack from the rear. Thus, should the crisis prompt war, St. Petersburg simultaneously confronted surrender of the strategic initiative, along with ten Polish provinces, and the inability on the sixteenth day of mobilization (M+15) to support the French ally with an immediate offensive into Germany.

However, if information from Agent No. 25 assisted in defining the dangerous situation confronting Russia, the same information also implied a viable exit option. That option was to temporize, to decide not to make a decision. Agent No. 25’s message of 17 November (N.S.) indicated divided counsel at the highest reaches of Habsburg military and civil officialdom. Colonel Mikhail Ippolitovich Zankevich, the military attaché in Vienna, independently echoed this understanding. However, if the situation finally came to war, another of Agent No. 25’s messages maintained that an ultimatum against Serbia would be forthcoming on 15 December (N.S.). When this date passed without incident, the obvious conclusion was that war was not imminent. Consequently, Nicholas II might temporize in pursuit of a compromise solution to the mobilization impasse. On 11/24 December, he chose to re-deploy select cavalry detachments forward within the two frontier military districts and to extend service beyond the New Year (O.S.) for the senior class of conscripts. In the event that Vienna chose to attack, the Russian Emperor would withdraw his initial strategic dispositions farther into the interior.

The height of the crisis had passed, although it would rattle on until the beginning of March 1913 (N.S.). To be sure, factors other than intelligence were at work in resolving the crisis, including the distinct possibility of a diplomatic resolution in London. Nonetheless, in November-December 1912 Agent No. 25’s messages had not only helped define the military-technical dimensions of the crisis, but had also inadvertently supported the search for a way out. There would be no such exit in July 1914. Although Agent No. 25 was by then dead, important aspects of his legacy persisted. Along with many other bits of intelligence on Austria-Hungary, information from him had entered institutional memory. There it would undergo resurrection as an integral part of pattern recognition during a second mobilization crisis. After the first crisis, General Staff officers had subjected their intelligence sources and findings to intense

361 Ibid., d. 7140, ll. 54-5, and 63.
362 See below, document 3.
363 RGIA, f. 1276, op. 8, d. 454, l. 465.
364 See below, document 5.
365 RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1819, ll. 38ob.-39.
On the basis of the late-1912 experience and additional materials forwarded by Agent No. 25 during the first months of 1913, these specialists drew at least three significant conclusions.

First, with the help of materials dating to 1909, they concluded that the Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization regime displayed a high degree of decentralization and flexibility. True, the Habsburg high command remained wedded to set-piece formulae and procedures, including deployment by groupings for specific strategic scenarios: Fall R (against Russia), Fall B (against Serbia, and if necessary, against Montenegro), and Fall I (against Italy). However, variations might occur within these scenarios to permit an unexpectedly rapid buildup against Russia. Although the GUGSh officers saw little reason to discard emphasis on the 1912-vintage pattern, they were aware of the necessity to view force allocations among scenarios as flexible. Thus, various missives from Agent No. 25 had both affirmed prevailing Russian views on Austro-Hungarian flexibility and provided reinforcing detail.

Second, on the basis of materials gleaned from other sources and confirmed by Agent No. 25, intelligence specialists understood—indeed simply assumed—that the three Austro-Hungarian corps in Galicia would undergo covert mobilization either in advance of, or upon declaration of „alarm,” the beginning of a pre-mobilization period. In the future, during any partial Austro-Hungarian mobilization, the assumption was that the three Galician corps must be added to the any mobilization calculus, whether their mobilization was announced or covert. The secret Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization manual in GUGSh possession (probably from Agent No. 25) affirmed this proposition.

Third, on the basis of other materials received from Agent No. 25 in early 1913, Russian intelligence specialists understood that under Austro-Hungarian terms the subjugation of Serbia (even allied with Montenegro) would at most require seven corps. The same figure in Russian threat estimates for 1911 had been three, while in the formal threat estimate for March 1914, Russian intelligence specialists placed the number at six. Six became the accepted figure for a localized war. Any number more than the seven noted by Agent No. 25 would be a source of grave concern.

These three points constituted a short list of reasonable assumptions for indicators and warnings not only of Austro-Hungarian troop mobilization, but also of possible war immi-
ence. The assumptions were based on recent experience, and buttressed by materials from both Agent No. 25 and other sources. Figuratively speaking, it was this short list that Russian General Staff specialists would take from the crisis of late 1912 into the July Crisis of 1914.

However, there was also another legacy unrelated to Agent No. 25 that carried over from 1912 to 1914. This second legacy was a litany of serious shortcomings in Russian preparation for possible European war. For various reasons, these shortcomings, ranging from inadequate armaments to an underdeveloped strategic railroad network, were either imperfectly addressed or addressed not at all. Foremost among deficiencies was the absence of a viable partial mobilization regime, one that might address Austria-Hungary only. Another largely unmet requirement—despite adoption in 1913 of the Grand Program [Большая программа по усилению русской армии] for strengthening the Russian army—was reinforcement of peacetime forward deployments, so that the war plan would not remain mortgaged to the outcome of a race for railheads along the frontier.373

However, in light of recent historiography on the July Crisis, it should be noted that one significant direct consequence of late 1912 was Russian adoption of a formal pre-mobilization period. It was called the Period Preparatory to War [Период подготовительный к войне], and it provided for important enhancements to military readiness during a period of crisis (for example, the recall of officers from furlough, and the imposition of security measures at railroad bridges and military installations).374 It was not a variety of „secret mobilization,“ since, inter alia, it did not provide for mass reservist call-ups, troop assembly, or transit of large formations to concentration for strategic deployment along the state frontier.375

These and related issues figured in the July Crisis, but no more so than military intelligence, especially in its capacity to serve as institutional memory and cataloger and disseminator of indicators and warnings of war imminence. Until Germany might set in place the final large tile for war, indicators and warnings were major factors that determined the military content and pace of the crisis. And, these same factors served as drivers for determining the nature of Russian military counter-measures.

373 According to the revised war plan of September 1913, an additional field army, the Eighth, was formed from the Proskurov grouping of the Third Army. However, there were no fundamental changes either in peacetime deployments or in the mobilization schedule.


Agent No. 25’s legacy figured in the July Crisis of 1914 at two important junctures. The first occurred on 14/27 July, by which time the GUGSh understood that Vienna was mobilizing six full corps and elements of two others for possible war against Serbia. In addition to Vienna’s formal announcement, the GUGSh had also learned that the two corps in Czechia, VIII and IX, were distributing call-up notices. The formal intelligence estimate for the day, forwarded by War Minister Sukhomlinov to the emperor and the foreign ministry, noted that exceptional measures automatically came into effect with Vienna’s mobilization declaration. An addendum spelled out these measures: “in general the actual conduct of mobilization is possible before its declaration, and in frontier corps districts such will transpire without any

376 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, l. 12; d. 4, l. 7.
377 Ibid., d. 4, ll. 5, 7.
doubt as the experience of the 1912 conflict indicates.” 378 Thanks at least in part to the legacy of Agent No. 25, the clear understanding was that the three corps in Galicia were also undergoing mobilization, although of a covert nature.

Agent No. 25’s legacy again figured in Russian calculations on the following day, 15/28 July, when events took a still more ominous turn. About mid-afternoon came the report that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia. 379 Additional intelligence confirmed the beginning of mobilization for VIII and IX Corps, along with the three Galician corps. 380 Altogether, once the Galician corps entered the calculus, the number of mobilizing Austro-Hungarian corps now amounted to 13, or more than three-fourths of the Habsburg army. Meanwhile, Major General Nicholas Avgustovich Monkevits, the former head of the GUGSh Special Office [Особое делопроизводство] and now GUGSh First Over-Quartermaster, was asserting the „late Agent No. 25” had held that no more than seven corps would be required to subdue Serbia. 381 Clearly something more was afoot than either a localized war or a „halt in Belgrade scenario.” Not surprisingly, on the evening of 15/28 July the GUGSh Chief issued a warning order that stipulated 17/30 July as the first day of a general mobilization. 382

During the day and a half following this order, Nicholas II first approved general mobilization, then rescinded it in favor of a partial mobilization directed only against Austria-Hungary (although Russia had no formal plan for such a mobilization). It was only on the afternoon of 17/30 July, when the inevitability of war had become evident, and when warnings and indicators of war imminence had begun emanating from Germany, that the Russian emperor issued the order for general mobilization. Just as in late 1912, the emphasis had been on a waiting game, but this time Germany chose to act differently. 383

The above assertions underscore the importance of Agent No. 25’s legacy for both late 1912 and mid-1914. Within full context, his legacy also underscores the importance of military intelligence as an integral part of the larger story about the outbreak of the First World War. Military intelligence and the role of threat assessment in preparation for war focus attention on the nature of process, as opposed to fleeting perceptions of the moment and the snap decisions of statesmen and diplomats. In the end, even they had to bend to the logic of process.

378 RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, l. 50.
379 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 3, l. 9; MOEI, Seriia 3, V, 197-98.
380 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 372, l. 16.
381 RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2871, l. 30.
383 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470 (1914), d. 372, ll. 36-8.
Documentary Addendum


“The War Ministry just issued instructions, to elevate on 1 November [N.S.] to wartime strength (not fewer than 800 soldiers per battalion) all battalions dispatched from their regiments to Bosnia-Herzegovina. To this end, reservists must not be called up, but evidently the requisite number [will come from] lower ranks on active service with the regiments to which the battalions belong. The regiments themselves will be reduced in composition by the same number of troops. Transit must begin on 1 November [N.S.].

Simultaneously instructions were issued to the fleet from 1 November [N.S.] to have two divisions in complete readiness for sortie to the open sea.

For unimpeded mobilization, all corps staffs received instructions to verify and to maintain in readiness their mobilization plans.

The press is under the strictest censorship.”

RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2850, l. 9. Typewritten in Russian. GUGSh translation from German.

2. Report from the GUGSh Special Office to the GUGSh Section of the Quartermaster General. 13/26 November 1912.

“From Vienna, from secret agent of the Main Directorate of the General Staff was received a telegram from Vienna, 13 November [O.S.], about a mobilization declaration for I, X, and XI Corps. [signed] Enkel”

RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2850, l. 171.

384 The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Verena Moritz, Hannes Leidinger, and Maia Kipp in correcting errors in transcription within the original documents and in translating them from Austrian German into intelligible Russian and English.

385 Document dated on the basis of its contents. It was sent to GUGSh Chief Ia. G. Zhilinskii over the signatures of Major General N. A. Monkevits, assistant to the GUGSh First Over-Quartermaster, and Colonel A. A. Samoilo, action officer for the GUGSh Fifth Section; the document was annotated as having been read by GUGSh Quartermaster General Iu. N. Danilov on 8 November (O.S.).

386 Date according to the document. Notations on the document indicate that it had been read by GUGSh Chief Zilinskii and by Major General Monkevits on 13 November (O.S.).

387 Oskar Paul' Karlovich Enkel’ (1878-1960), Colonel with seniority dating to March 1912; between 1907 and 1913, he was a GUGSh deputy action officer, and after April 1913 a GUGSh action officer; in January 1914 he was named military attaché to Italy.
3. Letter from Agent No. 25. 4/17 November 1912.  

“Your Excellency! The War Ministry has just issued instructions:
1) To prepare for the call up of the last three classes of the mixed reserve and the last class of the manpower readiness pool in such a way so that service-obligated personnel might receive their notices within 24 hours. These notices will be held in district administrative centers, to be dispatched immediately upon receipt of a telegraphic order. This step signifies an immediate increase in combat-ready forces and must be viewed as preparation for war.
2) For each field artillery regiment to immediately form a fifth battery. Guns will be drawn from the arsenal, gun crews assembled from reserve call ups, horses purchased without delay, and harnesses and running gear issued from regimental supplies.
3) For all garrison telegraph stations to function around the clock until the receipt of new instructions; to establish new duty watches where they have not previously existed.

A war-like mood reigns here. They speak only of war and demand it. But it is impossible to elicit a decision from the Foreign Ministry and higher governing authorities. The Chief of the General Staff [General Blasius Schemua] displays complete indifference; he shows no initiative; he lets events assume their own course; he is completely passive, plays an absolutely subservient and detached role; [he is] the complete opposite of Conrad [von Hötzendorf]; he [the Chief of the General Staff] has no influence; he seeks neither the advice nor the opinions of others; an absolutely mediocre personality.

Yours truly. N. N. 17. XI [N.S.]”


“25.XI [N.S.]. VII and XIII Corps (Temeshvar, Agram) received orders to conduct a secret mobilization.

Thus, at the given moment mobilization is proceeding in I, VII, X, XI, XIII, XV, and XVI Corps. All these corps are to be brought to wartime numerical strength. Only their rear services are not in readiness, and, at present, still have not been mobilized.

---

388 Date according to the document. Notations on the document indicate that it had been received on 15 November (O.S.), had been read by Major General Monkevits on 17 November (O.S.), and then „included in a report to the emperor on 17 November 1912 [O.S.]”

389 Document dated on the basis of its contents.

390 Present-day Timişoara, in western Romania.

391 Present-day Zagreb, in Croatia.
Mobilization is proceeding in the navy.\textsuperscript{392}


5. Letter from Vienna from Agent No. 25. Not later than 26 November/9 December 1912.\textsuperscript{393}

“Your Excellency!

In the corps noted by me in a previous letter\textsuperscript{394} a secret mobilization has been conducted, and no new dispositions have appeared in this regard.

It is necessary to wait under 15 December [N.S.], since all intended preparations for mobilization and regroupment will be complete only by that date. Ultimatum.

Germany will deploy six mobilized corps against you.

Freight trains are being dispatched daily to Galicia with provisions and with many other types of support. Yesterday an order was issued to dispatch from the Vienna arsenal the following: to Kraków—12 field guns, [caliber] 9 cm; to Przemyśl—14; to Jarosław—9; to Mi-
kolajów on the D[niester]—9; to Halicz—45, all 9 cm guns are to reinforce\textsuperscript{395} the fortifications there . . . .\textsuperscript{396}

RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2851, l. 20. Typewritten in German. Contemporary translation.

SUMMARY

Abstract: The paper examines, with the analysis of the attached documents and letters, that the Austro-Hungarian head of military intelligence Alfred Redl was really a Russian agent just before the beginning of the First World War and what information he sent within the Russian intelligence community. According to the author’s research, it can only be assumed with a reasonable probability that Agent no. 25 was Alfred Redl.

Keywords: Alfred Redl, Agent No. 25, Espionage, Austro-Hungary, Russian Empire

\textsuperscript{392} The date „20 November [O.S.]” is annotated on the document. The same file of documents (RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 2851. l. 130) contains a report of 24 November/7 December from the GUGSh Special Office in Russian, concluding, „that, thus are currently mobilized I, VII, X, XI, XIII, and XVI Corps, but without their mobilized rear services.”

\textsuperscript{393} Dated according to the time of the document’s receipt, as annotated „26 November [O.S.]”

\textsuperscript{394} Documentary text reads „… im letzten Briefe.” See also, Document 4.

\textsuperscript{395} In the original document „Arierung” should read „Armierung.”

\textsuperscript{396} Corrected from the original document.