Marković’s Critique of Hegel’s Logic

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Franjo Marković (1845-1914) was the first professor of philosophy at the restored University of Zagreb (1874). The manuscript of his Logic is kept at the Archives of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and consists of the autograph indexed as XV 37/1 and six lithographed copies (a-f), the most extensive of which is indexed as 2a (approximately 820 pages). The manuscript Logic can be said to consist of two parts: the first is an introduction and the second is entitled The System of Logic. The first part is further divided into seven sections, while the second part includes eleven sections. This article discusses the sixth section of the first (introductory) part, entitled Reasons against Absolute Logic (in 2a pp. 94-119), in which Marković sets out his criticism of Hegel’s logic. First, the manuscript Logic is described, and then, Marković’s two substantial objections to Hegel are considered: first, that it is not possible, starting from one concept (the most abstract one), which would be the beginning of all other concepts, to develop the wholeness of concepts (and at the same time the totality of the whole of everything that is) without the aid of thoughts acquired by perception; and second, that the procedure of absolute logic is in itself »illogical«, i.e. contrary to the irrefutable laws of logic. Finally, it is concluded that Marković’s criticism of Hegel’s logic, which is actually metaphysics, is made exclusively from a logical viewpoint, as he does not accept Hegel’s »transformation« of logic into metaphysics. Marković’s intent to »outline« his (philosophical) position on Hegel is particularly pointed out, since numerous opponents of Hegel’s philosophising, to whom Marković himself belongs, are generally reluctant to deal with Hegel’s philosophy.

Key words: anti-Hegelianism, Austrian realism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, logic, Franjo Marković.

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**Introduction**

The Archive\(^1\) of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb treasures the manuscript *Logic* by Croatian philosopher, classical philologist, writer, theatre and literary critic Franjo Marković (1845-1914). The manuscript consists of an autograph (very poorly legible) indexed as XV 37/1, and six lithographed copies (a-f), as XV 37/2, the longest of them indexed as 2a (comprising approximately 820 pages). All the lithographed copies are quite legible. All contain Marković’s corrections, but they differ from each other with regard to the completeness and the quantity of included corrections. Most of the corrections are to be found in copies a, b and c. All the corrections and additions are written by Marković in hand.\(^2\)

Marković taught logic for 32 years, from 1875 (he held his first lecture on 18 October) until 1907, holding lectures in cycles, at regular intervals of two or three years.\(^3\) When he started teaching logic, Marković must have already prepared his lectures and written them down in some form. However, he gradually expanded and complemented this basic or core form with various additions and insertions, which is clearly visible from his references to some works, including those published after 1900. This is why these lectures grew longer with time and finally reached (approximately) the 820 pages of the manuscript mentioned above, with clear indications that Marković had intended to publish them. The manuscript *Logic* can be said to consist of two parts: the first part is an introduction and the second part is entitled *The System of Logic*. The first part is further divided into seven sections, while the second part includes eleven sections.

Although Marković expounded his critique of Hegel’s »absolute« logic in the sixth section (*Reasons against absolute logic*, pp. 94-119), which is thus the object of study of this article, a certain announcement of this critique can already be found in the fifth section of the introductory part. Here, Marković poses the question what is »the right direction of logic«, as he puts it, simultaneously providing the answer and saying that it is the one that »moves along the middle, between pure formal and completely real (or objective) logic«.\(^4\) In the fifth section, Marković thus strives to maintain this »middle« direction, or way, between completely formal and completely real logic, not siding with either of

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\(^1\) This is a significantly shorter and partly changed version of the text entitled *Markovićeva kritika Hegelove logike* published in *Rad Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*, 539, 2019, 33-96.


\(^4\) See lithographed copy 2a, 62. Only the page reference in brackets will be given further in the text.
the two extremes. However much Marković cared to show »the justification« of such an understanding of logic, he tried perhaps even harder to warn of the totally unfounded status of Hegel’s approach and his notion of logic in general, as this »most rigorous representative of German idealism turns science into mere speculation, saying that concepts are the real beings of the world« (pp. 88-89).

In »announcing« his critique of Hegel, Marković explicitly mentions Adolf Trendelenburg’s well-known work Logische Untersuchungen, on which he relies to a large degree. Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) was professor of philosophy in Berlin, but also a classical philologist. In 1874, Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who attended Trendelenburg’s lectures in Berlin, was made professor of philosophy in Vienna. He took up his tenure on 22 April, and five days later, on 27 April, Emperor Franz Joseph I appointed Franjo Marković as the first »full, public professor of theoretical and practical philosophy and history of philosophy« at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb. Marković had earned his doctorate two years earlier, on 8 March 1872, also in Vienna, with Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898) as his supervisor, who was Brentano’s (senior) »colleague« at the University. Although Brentano was well acquainted with the works of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), it was Marković’s »teacher« Robert Zimmermann, who belonged to so called »Bolzano’s circle« (Bolzanokreis).

Through Zimmermann, Marković was therefore indirectly connected with Bolzano, too, while, on the other hand, Brentano himself was indirectly linked to Bolzano’s philosophy. Thus, it can be said that in the background of the whole development of what is sometimes referred to as »Austrian philosophy« (as opposed to »philosophy in Austria«), or »Austrian realism«, is actually Bernard Bolzano.

1. The fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy

But what does Marković’s critique of Hegel’s logic actually look like? The key question here, and when dealing with criticism of Hegel and his philosophy in general, is where to start. Or, in other words, from what standpoint is it possible to undertake this criticism? Where can a stronghold be found for a possible critical approach?

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7 See details in Peklić, Život i djelo Franje Markovića..., 48.
8 Ibid., 23.
9 See for example the journal The Monist, 83, 1. This whole issue entitled Austrian Realism. From Aristotelian Roots to the Vienna Circle was dedicated to »Austrian philosophy«.
In order to find such a stronghold, or to establish it somehow, in the first passage of section six of the introductory part of his Logic, Marković first endeavours to put Hegel’s approach to logic – or, better to say – Hegel’s philosophy as a whole, rather Hegel’s understanding of everything there is, into a broader frame, that is, into the horizon of the history of philosophy. Thus, he presents a very concise account of the trend of philosophy to which, according to his view, Hegel himself belongs. This leads him to the very beginnings of European philosophy, to Heraclitus (Ἡράκλειτος) and Parmenides (Παρμενίδης). After briefly outlining their basic claims, he moves on to Plato, for whom he claims that »he established a doctrine, which builds on those previous two mutually opposite ones« (p. 94). What Plato actually attempts to do, in Marković’s opinion, is »reconcile« or »bridge the gap between« those two opposing philosophies, Heraclitus’ on one hand, claiming that »the only constant and substantial thing in the world is eternal and perpetual change« (p. 94), and Parmenides’ philosophy, on the other hand, saying

>that there is only one, eternal, unchangeable, non-material being, which itself has the true Being, and that all the individual material changeable things are mere passing appearances without a Being« (p. 94).

Plato holds, according to Marković, that what has an unchangeable Being, what really is a being or »something«, cannot be material, for all that is material is in constant change. But non-material ideas exist »above« matter, and they are true beings, as they are invariable and eternal. This is so to the extent that every concept of ours, for example the concept of table, has its »arche-form« in an idea. Nevertheless, in this, the arche-form is not a mere thought, either of the human or divine mind (or spirit), but is an independent being, which »exists as a being beyond time in the space above the sky« (p. 95). Plato, Marković continues, has elevated our concepts to the level of beings, or substances, and »ὑπόστασις, substance, is the name for that being which stands and remains eternally under the appearing transient matter« (p. 96). By having been turned into beings, concepts have become »conceptualizations« (or »massive concepts«).

Then, Marković proceeds to medieval philosophy, specifically to scholasticism. In this respect, he studies two strongly opposed views: nominalism and realism. Nominalists maintain, Marković claims, that only individual things have a Being, i.e. that that which is individual (or single), really is, and that concepts are not beings, but that they are only our thoughts which are expressed through words, that is to say, that concepts are mere words. Realists, on the other hand, claim the opposite, namely that concepts are not mere thoughts (and even less so mere words), but they are beings, i.e. res (»things«). And here Marković took care to further intensify this contrast, in order to be able, after

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10 He actually refers to the »Eleatics« (p. 94).
having discussed nominalism and realism, to present his main statement (p. 97):

> »It is to Plato’s teaching that ideas or conceptualizations [or ‘massive concepts’, i.e. concepts made into beings] are true beings, and to scholastic realistic teaching that concepts themselves are true things, res, i.e. beings, that Hegel’s teaching on absolute logic connects«.

Accordingly, this direction in the history of philosophy, to which Hegel belongs, or can be linked, looks like this: Plato (and Neoplatonism) – medieval realism – Hegel. Because, according to Marković, for Hegel, the pure concept of a thing »that is its concept abstracted from all its sensory marks« (p. 97) is not only the essence (substance, or »beingness«), but the Being of that thing. This again means that a pure thought about a thing, »detached (abstracted) from all the sensory conceptions of a thing, is not separated from the thing, but is identical to it« (p. 97). Thus, Hegel also makes concepts into beings, into that which really is. And that is actually the fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy. And based on this understanding, it is directly possible, if »we start with the most detached (the most abstract) concept« (p. 97), to develop from it an uninterrupted sequence of concepts »which in their wholeness and in their development will be identical to the wholeness of true beings, and of the true Being itself, and to the development of the whole world« (p. 98).

And this is exactly what Marković does not agree with. It is exactly the same, only expressed in other words, as what he had claimed towards the end of section five, i.e. that Hegel’s logic is »the most elaborate transformation of logic into metaphysics«. Indeed, it should be noted that Hegel is completely aware of this. Thus, for instance, in his *Introduction (Einleitung)* to *The Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik)*, in the section entitled *General Division of the Logic (Allgemeine Einteilung der Logik)* he says the following:

> »Die objektive Logik tritt damit vielmehr an die Stelle der vormaligen Metaphysik, als welche das wissenschaftliche Gebäude über die Welt war, das nur durch Gedanken aufgeführt sein sollte.«

Marković, however, strictly distinguishes between logic and metaphysics. He wishes to draw a hard border between that which in thinking is (only) thought (and does not really need to be) and that which really is. He insists on a clear distinction between that which belongs to the thinking – be it a thought, or an idea, and the like – from the (individual) being.

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In this way, Marković opened space for himself, that is, he found »a place in the system«, and thus obtained a stronghold from where to begin a real critique of Hegel’s logic. This critique is condensed in two fundamental objections:

1. It is not possible, from one (most abstract) concept, which would be the beginning of all other concepts, to develop a totality of concepts (and, at the same time, the totality of everything there is) without the aid of sensory conceptions.

2. The procedure of absolute logic is »illogical« in itself, i.e. contrary to the irrefutable laws of logic.

Marković mostly dwells on Hegel’s objective logic, which is understandable, since it is precisely here that the »transformation of logic into metaphysics« is most clearly manifested.

2. The »planting« of sense perception

Marković starts his critique of Hegel with an analysis of entirely simple, existential judgments, such as »God is«, »man is«. These »existential judgments«, i.e. »existencijni« (or, existence’s), as Marković calls them, claim only the Being of the subject. The only judgments simpler than these are the »subjectless judgments« or »subjectless sentences«, such as »grmi« (literally, »[it] thunders«, Ger. *es donnert*), which assert only the Being of this sensation, that is, just »the feeling of thunder«. If, however, all the subjects are removed from »existential« judgments, only the predicate (»is«) remains, asserting Being. And this is the simplest concept, the concept of Being, for if we were to remove this concept as well, there would be nothing left. This is why, according to Marković, Hegel starts from this concept in *The Science of Logic*, i.e. from the concept of Being, which, after it has been abstracted from all subjects, is actually the pure Being itself (hence not only the concept of Being, but to be itself).

However, since all subjects have been removed from this concept of pure Being (also from Being itself), which means they have all been negated, this concept of pure Being is simultaneously pure (or the most complete) negation, hence pure *nothing*. In this place, Marković quotes the well-known passage from Hegel’s *The Science of Logic*, namely »das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist dasselbe« (p. 100).12 Thereby, in order to grasp Hegel’s understanding of logic, it is essential to notice that this first, initial concept develops from itself, so to say »demands« that second concept. And, as Marković thinks, since these two concepts are, consistent with their substance, »identical«, they, in his opin-

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12 The sentence is actually worded as follows (Wissenschaft der Logik I, 83): »Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe.« Cf. also the English translation (The Science of Logic, 59).
ion, »unite« into a new, third concept, the concept of being in existence, or the concept of becoming (das Werden). In attempting to explain it more closely, Marković says that »becoming brings together and unites the Being with the non-Being« (p. 100), and provides an example for it (p. 100): »[...] as the day breaks (becomes day), it is not yet, but it already is; its becoming represents the gradual transition from non-Being to Being, or the merging of non-Being with Being.«

For Marković, the most controversial concept in this »triad« is the third concept, i.e. becoming. This is because he maintains that this third concept cannot be deduced from the previous two by means of pure thinking, without the aid of sense perception. In other words, it is not true that the concept of becoming (and, consequently, the becoming itself) »arises« from the concept of pure Being and from the concept of pure non-Being. This would mean that there is a certain »arbitrariness« involved in Hegel, if not a sort of »concealment«. Marković expresses it in the following way (p. 101):

»The concept of becoming has been discovered (reached) through sense perception of real changeable phenomenal things, and it is from there stealthily added to pure Being and non-Being, and it is not figured out by pure thinking itself«.

Moreover, it is actually a matter of »planting«.

Thus, it is already in the first »triad« that the third concept is contestable, precisely because pure thinking is powerless: thinking alone, without the help of experience, i.e. without perception, cannot reach that third concept. But this, Marković believes, recurs further on, too, »throughout all the development of the concepts of absolute logic« (p. 102), since such is Hegel’s »methodological procedure«, which is, in fact, threefold: »first there is an assertion (position), then its denial (negation), and, after that, for the sake of the internal sameness of denial and assertion, the composition (synthesis) of both into the third affirmative concept» (p. 103). It should be noted that the adjective ječan is used here by Marković in the sense of »affirmative«, »positive« (in Croatian usually potvrđan, jestan). This is, indeed, one of the key words in Marković’s Logic, as well as the noun jek.

Thus, Hegel’s well-known three-part sequence in dialectics, i.e. thesis (affirmation) – antithesis (negation of affirmation) – synthesis (negation of negation), according to Marković, would be: jek – nijek – sastav (which is a recurring jek).

Having shown the controversy of the third concept, Marković, so to say, reverses his proof. In other words, not only is the third concept reached, or obtained, by means of experience, i.e. on the basis of the perception of reality, but the second, too, i.e. negation, is reached in the same way, and so is the first concept, i.e. affirmation.

Finally, Marković specifically discusses two »movers« in Hegel’s method, as he calls them, i.e. negation and identity or sameness, of which only the first will be considered here.
2.1. What kind of negation appears in Hegel’s thinking procedure?

In order to demonstrate »the power of negation« (p. 108) in Hegel’s logic, Marković considers these two examples: the concept of Something (German *Etwas*; Marković uses the form *nješto*, *nječega* in Croatian), and the relation between spirit and nature. Something is, Marković says, »an indeterminate singularity«, or »an indeterminate single unit« (p. 106). The question is raised about how Something further develops, say, a circle, which is such a Something, and is also Something that is affirmative. Since every Something, including the mentioned circle, is a certain singularity, that means it has limits, actually its Being has limits, which, in the case of the circle, is its circumference. Although a limit is a negation of the Being of Something, and in this case the circumference is the negation of the Being of the circle, that limit, i.e. the circumference, nevertheless still belongs to the very substance of the circle. This, on the other hand, means that the Being of the circle receives in itself its own negation. Marković calls the Being of Something within its limits – *samòbitak*, i.e. *Being-in-itself* (German *Ansichsein*), whereas he calls the Being outside its limits – *inòbitak*, i.e. *Being-for-other* (German *Anderssein*). Consequently, Being-in-itself receives (its own) Being-for-other, which again means that the Being-in-itself and the Being-for-other identify with each other and merge, and thus a certain determinate Something develops its own Being-for-other from its Being-in-itself, i.e. it changes. Therefore, every Something, since it is singular and thus limited, is also changeable. Marković concludes this derivation of his own in the following way (p. 107):

»Thus Hegel has, by means of pure-thought development of pure concepts alone, regardless of the real world, obtained a living world-ruling concept of continuous change: every Something or everything changes (‘πάντα ῥεῖ’ in Heraclitus)«.

Still, it should be noted that in the quoted passage Marković states only one side of this »dialectics« of the Something and the Other, which »occurs« on their limit. However, the concept of limit is rather more complicated in Hegel. Since the limit is not only the non-Being of Something, in the sense that Something (i.e. the Being of Something) receives into itself its own negation, but it is also the non-Being of this Other, which means that, with it, the Other (i.e. the Being of the Other) takes its own negation into itself (since the Other is a certain Something, too), and with this (the first) Something is maintained as exactly itself. Hegel, in fact, puts it in the following way:13

»Etwas also ist unmittelbares sich auf sich beziehendes Dasein und hat eine Grenze zunächst als gegen Anderes: sie ist das Nichtsein des Anderen, nicht des Etwas selbst; es begrenzt in ihr sein Anderes. – Aber das Andere ist selbst

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ein Etwas überhaupt; die Grenze also, welche das Etwas gegen das Andere hat, ist auch Grenze des Anderen als Etwas, Grenze desselben, wodurch es das erste Etwas als sein Anderes von sich abhält, oder ist ein Nichtsein jenes Etwas; so ist sie nicht nur Nichtsein des Anderen, sondern des einen wie des anderen Etwas, somit des Etwas überhaupt.«

However, Marković does as explained, that is, states only one side of the mentioned »dialectics«, because he finds it crucial to demonstrate that Hegel »involves« spatial relations into pure thought. This is even more evident when he considers another example of negation, when he takes Hegel’s famous antithesis of spirit and nature. According to Hegel, as Marković states, »spirit is the negation of nature« (p. 110). That which for Hegel really is, which is ὄντως ὄν, is exclusively the thought, or the concept. Nevertheless, nature also is, hence it »has« Being, since nature is also thought, or concept, only without knowing it. Thus, nature is »self-less (out-of-itself), conscious-less thought, conscious-less concept« (p. 108). But thought cannot be »out-of-itself«, since it is always »in itself«, and, is inasmuch, »at-itself«, or »in-itself«. This is why, in nature, a tendency can be observed that it would also »come to itself«, i.e. that it would become »at-itself«, or »in-itself«. And this is exactly what gravity is: the tendency of nature to remove its spatiality, its extensibility, or, as Marković says, its »extensibleness« and to arrive to itself, i.e. reach its own centre. This centre is actually a mathematical point, which means a total negation of nature, namely of its spatiality, or »extensibleness«. If nature were to succeed in this, it would cease being nature, but it cannot, it is just not able to do it, so to say, in nature, but only in the human spirit (or in the human mind). In other words, »the human spirit is nature collected in itself, or come-to-itself« (p. 109).

But since the spirit is the negation of nature, Marković poses the question of what kind of negation it is: a contradictory negation, such as white vs. non-white, or a contrary negation, such as black vs. white. Upon that, he offers an answer, in fact, that from Hegel’s viewpoint it is not a contradictory negation, as such a negation would completely eliminate nature, totally deny it, but that it is actually a case of contrary negation, which, instead of nature, states something higher, and that something higher which is affirmative, i.e. itself.

And now there follows the key question (p. 110): »[...] where does absolute logic obtain that which is affirmative (positive) in the concept of spirit?« Marković’s answer is »from observing spatial differences«, hence from experience. This, in Marković’s opinion, can be seen precisely in the prepositions izvan, pri and u (i.e. out of, at and in), as those prepositions used as parts of the words izvanseban, priseban i useban actually indicate the mentioned antithesis: nature is izvanseban-

na (out-of-itself), whereas spirit is priseban (at-itself), or useban (in-itself). Here again, »planting« is in place.

By contemplating the different meanings of the abovementioned prepositions, Marković points to one more thing. Since nature is spatial, i.e. it extends, its contrary negation would also need to be something spatial, ergo extensible, or it would have to be in the area of spatiality, just as the opposite of white would have to be another colour. But when, speaking of the spirit, we say it is useban (in-itself), Marković claims we say it exclusively metaphorically, as the spirit really is not spatial. It is just said so, in a certain analogy in relation to nature. It could be added that it is only a matter of particular language use. But this means again that this is not a contrary negation, as it might seem at first in Hegel’s »methodological approach«, but a contradictory negation: the spirit is not contrary to nature, but it is its contradiction. The spirit, according to Marković, cannot be brought into connection with nature at all.

Thus, however we understand negation in Hegel’s logic (and this means in Hegel’s philosophy in general), in both cases logic itself stops, becomes paralysed, and this occurs either in the third step, if we suppose that the negation is contradictory, or already in the second step, if we suppose that the negation is contrary. However, in this case, perception comes to the rescue; or, better said, in this case, logic uses it stealthily.

3. The »illogicality« of absolute logic

But absolute logic is at the same time also completely »illogical«, i.e. its procedure is not in agreement with logic, and that is so because, as Marković states, »it makes those mistakes in making inferences, which are called paralogisms« (p. 116). Hence, absolute logic is erroneous, i.e. Hegel makes mistakes in inferencing, and it would be better to say that, during the process of inferencing, he does not respect the laws of logic, already set, as Marković says, by Aristotle, and all the philosophers so far recognise them, »only Hegel’s absolute logic does not recognise and intentionally offends those laws« (p. 116). In order to demonstrate how much absolute logic, i.e. Hegel himself, »offends« the laws of logic, Marković considers the second figure of the categorical syllogism, and quotes the well-known formula for this figure (p. 116):

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\begin{align*}
P & \pm M \\
S & \pm M \\
S & \rightarrow P
\end{align*}
\]

Then, Marković also recounts the rules that are valid especially for this figure and explains (p. 116):
»[...] in the second syllogistic figure the conclusion is always negative, while one premise is negative and the other one affirmative. The second syllogistic figure can never yield an affirmative conclusion«.

Of course, these are the rules that can easily be derived from the general rules for a valid syllogism. It is known that in the syllogism the middle concept must at least in one premise be distributed, i.e. thought of in its full extension. Since in the second figure the middle concept is put in the place of the predicate, this means that at least one premise must be negative, so that this middle concept could be distributed. And if one premise is negative, again, according to the general rules for a valid syllogism, the conclusion must be negative, too.

However, it is precisely against these rules that Hegel errs, because he uses the second figure of the categorical syllogism to derive affirmative conclusions, and does so using two affirmative premises. Marković also exemplifies this (p. 117):

1. Pure Being is the emptiest (the most abstract) concept;
2. Nothing is the emptiest concept;
3. Therefore: Nothing is pure Being, and the other way around: pure Being is nothing.

Of course, Marković adds, Hegel is completely aware of those (his) paralogisms, those erroneous inferences, but he claims »that these laws are outdated and that they have no value« (p. 117). Despite this standpoint, Marković arrives at the conclusion that these laws still do have value, because, besides the fact that everyone, from Aristotle to Mill, agrees about this, it is also confirmed by the »natural intellect of every man« (p. 117). Having considered several additional examples of such (erroneous) inferencing, Marković finishes this sixth section, leaves Hegel’s philosophy aside, persuaded that he has offered sufficient evidence that the procedure of absolute logic is »illogical« in itself, and finally returns to the systematic development of his own logic.

**Conclusion**

Now, Marković »leaves Hegel’s philosophy aside«, and perhaps it would be better to say »leaves Hegel’s philosophy aside with noticeable relief«, because it should be noted that in the whole of the sixth section, which is dedicated to a critique of Hegel’s logic, Marković’s certain »resistance« to Hegel can be sensed, not only to »absolute logic«, but also to Hegel’s philosophy as a whole; or, as he himself says, to this »transformation of logic into metaphysics«.

But this is exactly what Hegel’s philosophy is, this »transformation«, namely that logic is actually metaphysics. As we have seen, this is what Marković can-
not accept at all. In this, he completely belongs to anti-Hegelianism, which is one of the fundamental characteristics of »Austrian realism«, the philosophy of the time, which gradually develops in the second half of the 19th century, say, on the line Prague – Vienna – Graz – Zagreb, and whose central personality is Franz Brentano. This position was, however, conceived earlier, in the first half of the 19th century, in the extraordinarily important works of the great Bernard Bolzano.

This might probably be the reason, namely the abovementioned »resistance« to Hegel, that Marković, in his critique of some of Hegel's theses, does not always take into account the entirety of Hegel's derivation, but rather, from time to time, explicates only one »side«, or one »aspect« of this entirety, as, for example, when he interprets the »dialectics« of Something and of the Other, which takes place on their limit, as explained above. And yet, Hegel claims »Das Wahre ist das Ganze«, in Phänomenologie des Geistes. Marković, of course, knows that, but, it seems, he deliberately approaches that »logic which is transformed into metaphysics« only from the logical perspective, and not, simultaneously, also from the metaphysical perspective. In other words, Marković criticises the book entitled Wissenschaft der Logik exclusively logically, and expresses his objections only from that standpoint. He refuses to accept that this is actually metaphysics. It is, however, important to understand that, despite everything, Marković is fully aware that he needs to (philosophically) »position« himself in relation to Hegel, in any case in relation to his logic, and also to his philosophy in its entirety.

Such an approach to the history of philosophy distinguishes Marković from many opponents of Hegel's philosophising, hence from many anti-Hegelians, who, as it often happens, do not wish to deal with Hegel's philosophy at all. Finally, this is, among other things, of course, what makes Marković one of the fundamental philosophers in recent Croatian philosophy (»recent« meaning here: in Croatian philosophy written in Croatian); this is what makes him the philosopher from whom this »recent« philosophy begins.

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Sažetak

Rukopisna Logika Franje pl. Markovića (1845.–1914.), prvoga profesora filozofije na obnovljenome Zagrebačkome sveučilištu (1874.), čuva se u Arhivu Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Zagrebu, i to autograf pod oznakom XV 37/1, a pod oznakom XV 37/2 šest litografiranih primjeraka (a–f), od kojih je najopsežniji onaj s oznakom 2a (obuhvaća oko 820 stranica). Rukopis se Logike, grubo uzevši, sastoji od dvaju dijelova: prvi je uvodni, a drugomu je naslov Sustav logike. Prvi se dio potom dijeli na sedam, a drugi dio na jedanaest odsjeka. U članku se razmatra šesti odsjek prvoga (uvodnoga) dijela pod naslovom Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici (u primjerku 2a str. 94–119), u kojem Marković iznosi svoju kritiku Hegelove logike. Pri tome se najprije opisuje sam rukopis Logike, a potom se raspravlja o dvama osnovnim Markovićevim prigovorima Hegelu: prvo, da nije moguće iz jednoga (najapstraktnijega) pojma, koji bi bio početak svih ostalih pojmova, razviti sveukupnost pojmova (te ujedno sveukupnost cjeline svega što jest) bez pomoći opažajnih pomisli; i drugo, da je postupak apsolutne logike sam u sebi »nelogičan«, tj. protivan neoborivim zakonima logike. Na kraju se zaključuje da Marković Hegelovu logiku, koja je zapravo metafizika, kritizira isključivo iz logičkoga obzora, jer ne prihvaća »pretvorbu« logike u metafiziku. Posebno se ističe Markovićeva namjera da se (filozofski) »odredi« prema Hegelu, jer se mnogi protivnici Hegelova filozofiranja, kojima i sam pripada, uglavnom nerado bave Hegelovom filozofijom.

Ključne riječi: Franjo Marković, logika, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, protuhelgelovstvo, austrijski realizam.

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