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The relevance of axiological dynamism in metaphors based on image schemata

This paper deals with the analysis of innovative structural metaphors and metaphors based on image–schemata from the corpus of H. James's novels. The introductory section includes a review of the relationship between the two elements of the conceptual metaphors, referred to as tenor and vehicle (I. A. Richards), focus–frame (M. Black), source/donor domain and target/recipient domain (Lakoff & Johnson), etc. The relationship has been analyzed by various theoreticians and has greatly influenced the comprehension of metaphors. The first section deals with structural metaphors conceptualizing the abstract concept of life by using more concrete concepts of journeys, theatre and play. The second section deals with innovative metaphors based on image–schemata where a schema is defined as a recurrent pattern in, or of, our ongoing ordering activities Johnson (1987: 29). The axiological dynamism embodied in the image schemata is transferred to the metaphorical expressions; hence, it can be stated that image schemata have an overall importance in the metaphorical expression of value judgements. In our analysis of metaphors in both sections special attention is paid to the contribution of specific donor domains to the expression of value judgements which may be transferred from the source domain directly, or may come in only after the extension to a specific aspect of the target domain. The conclusion deals with the interplay of metaphors, i. e. the processes of extension, elaboration and composing which lead to the creation of complex innovative metaphors.

INTRODUCTION: TENOR/FOCUS–VEHICLE/FRAME RELATIONSHIP

This section deals with the relationship between the two elements of the metaphorical expression which have been defined in various ways in the history of metaphorical discussions. In talking about the two referents theorists have described the metaphorical referents as: tenor/topic–vehicle (I. A. Richards, 1936), focus–frame or primary/principal — secondary/subsidiary subject (M. Black, 1962), source domain–donor domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) etc. The emphasis shifted from the consideration of similarities, resemblances (Aristo-

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tle, M. Black) between the two terms to the inclusion of dissimilarities (I. A. Richards). The relationship was seen as "rapprochement" between two distant things existing in a semantic space belonging to different semantic fields. The essence of metaphor seemed to be bringing together two disparate things, bridging the semantic distance between different clusters by long or short vectors in the semantic space (MacCormac, 1985). Various theories attempted to solve this problem by examining the cause of the transfer of meaning from one realm to another since it is not the meaning of one word that changes, but it is the transfer of an entire realm invading another realm.

Classical rhetoric based its definition of metaphor on resemblance which is just one particular form of the approximation /rapprochement/ through which we describe one thing in terms of another. What Aristotle called the *epiphora* of the metaphor, that is, the transfer of meaning, is nothing else than this move or shift in the logical distance, from the far to the near. In the first step, imagination is understood as the "seeing", which effects the shift in logical distance, the rapprochement itself. The place and role of productive imagination is in the *insight,* to which Aristotle alluded when he said that to make good metaphors is to contemplate likeness. This insight into likeness is both a thinking and a seeing. It is a thinking to the extent that it effects a restructuring of semantic fields. This can be shown on the basis of the kind of metaphor in which the logical aspect of this restructuration is the most conspicuous, the metaphor which Aristotle called metaphor by analogy, that is, the proportional metaphor: A is to B as C is to D: The cup is to Dionysus as the shield is to Ares. Therefore we may say, by shifting terms, Dionysus's shield or Ares' cup. This thinking is a seeing, to the extent that the insight consists of the instantaneous grasping of the combinatory possibilities offered by the proportionality and, consequently, the establishment of the proportionality by the rapprochement between the two ratios (P. Ricoeur, 1980).

A more contemporary influence on the theoretical study of metaphor was that of Richards (1936). Richards not only proposed a set of useful terms for talking about metaphors (the "topic" or "tenor", the "vehicle", and the "ground"), but he also proposed a theory about how they function. This theory called the "tensive" view emphasized the conceptual incompatibility, the "tension" between the terms in a metaphor (Ortony, 1993: 3).

Richards (1936) has argued that by overemphasizing the role of similarities the theory ignores the sometimes crucial role of differences. The previous objection is preliminary to the more serious criticism that "the metaphorical assertion can remain true even though it turns out that the statement of similarity on which the inference to the metaphorical meaning is based is false" (Searle, 1979: 89). *Richard is a gorilla* may be true if it is taken to mean *Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence,* etc. According to the comparison theory this metaphor is based on the belief that Richard and gorillas are similar in being fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so on. However, it is, in fact, false that gorillas have these characteristics. So the metaphor is true but the relevant statement of similarity upon which it is based is false. The point here is similar to that of Beardsley (1962) who shows that metaphors need not depend on

actual properties of existing objects, but rather on relations at the level of meanings or of beliefs about objects.

The merits of Black's interaction view, a development and a modification of I. A. Richard's valuable insights, should be viewed against the traditional "substitution view" and "comparison view" (a special case of the former) (Ortony, 1979: 28). In the now classic essay "Metaphor", M. Black (1962) considers and rejects various formulations of the "substitution view" of metaphor. Black devotes most of his critical attention to a special case of the "substitution view", the "comparison" view, according to which a metaphor consists in the presentation of an underlying analogy or similarity (R. Boyd in Ortony, 1993: 481). As an alternative Black proposed the adoption of an "interaction" view of metaphor. According to this view, metaphor works by applying to the principal (literal) subject of the metaphor a system of "associated implications" characteristic of the metaphorical secondary subject.

Max Black's article entitled 'Metaphor' has become a classic in its field; he condenses the essential theses of a semantic analysis of metaphor at the level of the statement as a whole in order to account for a change in meaning which is centered in the word. Black's work marks decisive progress in clarifying the field in at least three ways. The first concerns the very structure of the metaphorical statement which Richard expressed through the tenor–vehicle relationship. Before being able to introduce this distinction and criticize it, one must begin with this point: an entire statement constitutes the metaphor, yet attention focuses on a particular word, the presence of which constitutes the grounds for considering the metaphorical statement. In 'The chairman *plowed* through the discussion,' the word *plowed* is taken metaphorically. The definition above allows us to isolate the metaphorical word from the rest of the sentence. The word *focus,* then, will designate this word and *frame* will designate the rest of the sentence. The advantage of this terminology is that it directly expresses the phenomenon of focusing on a word without returning to the illusion that words have meanings in themselves. Indeed, the metaphorical use of *focus* results from the relationship between focus and frame. Richards was also aware of the fact that metaphor arises from the joint action of the tenor and the vehicle. Black's more precise vocabulary allows us to get closer to the interaction that takes place between the undivided meaning of the statement and the focused meaning of the word.

I. A. Richards described the underlying idea (principle subject) of a metaphor as the tenor and the less well known as the vehicle of the imagined nature (Mac Cormac, 1985). Black's interaction theory of metaphor accounted for this possible inversion and employed focus and frame to talk about the two referents. Through interaction, focus and frame combine in a relationship called the ground. Black's interaction theory allows for a reversal of his own terms — the focus may become the frame and the frame the focus.

Adherents of the Interaction theory recognized that there are two distinct subjects: topic and vehicle; the metaphorical utterance projects certain features of the vehicle, i. e. grounds, onto the topic. The vehicle and the topic interact in two ways: through a process of selection, suppression and emphasis of a

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feature which can be predicated of the topic and through the fact that not only is the topic made to seem more like the vehicle, but the vehicle is made to seem more like the topic. In Black's (1962: 231) example: *a battle is a game of chess* there are two distinct subjects, the battle (Topic) and the game of chess (Vehicle). The metaphor projects features of the vehicle onto the topic. The selection of these features, i. e. the suppression of some and the emphasis of others, is determined by the interaction of topic and vehicle. In this case positions, relationships and status of combatants, casualties, speed of movement, will be presumably emphasized as Grounds, whereas other features of battles — topography, weapons, supplies, etc. will be suppressed. This theory suggests, finally, that not only is a battle made to seem more like a game of chess, but a game of chess is made to seem more like a battle (Black 1962: 230ff).

Contrary to the standard Comparison theory, comprehending a metaphor is not merely a matter of comparing objects to determine what discrete properties or relations applying to one also apply to the other in the same or in some similar sense. Instead, we use one entire system of commonplaces (e. g. that of wolf) to "filter" or organize our conception of some other system (e. g. that of man). The "interaction" is a screening of one system of commonplaces by another to generate a new conceptual organization of, a new perspective on, some object. The metaphor, Black says, thus "selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject" (Black, 1962: 45).

According to M. Black's earlier work a metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects to be identified as the "primary" subject and the "secondary" one. Changing this terminology in *Metaphor* (1962) Black spoke instead of the "principal" and "subsidiary" subjects. The duality of reference is marked by the contrast between the metaphorical statement's *focus* (the word or word used non–literally) and the surrounding literal *frame*. The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing. Thus, he thinks of Wallace Stevens's remark that, "*Society is a sea*" as being not so much about the sea (considered as a thing) as about a system of relationships signaled by the presence of the word "sea" in the sentence in question. In retrospect, the intended emphasis upon "systems", rather than upon "things" or "ideas" (as in Richards), looks like one of the chief novelties in the earlier study. Hence, according to Black, the metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary subject a set of "associated implications", comprised in the implicative complex, that are predictable of the secondary subject.

However, in the two decades since Black's essay appeared, it has become clear that a more detailed account of the alleged "interaction" upon which metaphors are based is needed. Black's latest work on this problem (Black, 1977) supplied some long–awaited details, but it did not substantially alter his initial formulation. Much of the recent literature on how metaphors work consists of attempts to go beyond Black's groundwork to explain more fully the "mechanism" by which a metaphor creates new meaning and generates insight.

Monroe C. Beardsley (in M. Johnson, 1981) argues that inherent tensions within the metaphor cause the metaphoric predicate to lose its ordinary exten-

sion and thereby to obtain a new intention, namely, its previous connotation. More specifically, a term will have a central meaning (its ordinary designation) and a marginal meaning (its connotation). The standard designation of "wolf" e. g., might include "mammal," "four–legged", whereas the marginal meaning would include "fierce", "voracious", etc. In metaphor there occurs a "logical opposition" between the ordinary designated properties of the two things juxtaposed by the metaphor — men are not four–legged nor are they members of the canine family. This failure of primary reference forces us to call up the associated connotations of the modifying term (wolf) which are then applied to the principal subject (man) in their new senses. Thus, *Man is a wolf* suppresses the conflicting designated properties and highlights such potential connotations as "is fierce", "is clever", "is greedy", etc., which can be seen as applying to human beings.

According to this "Verbal–opposition theory", then, a metaphor induces insight by calling up or actualizing connotations that were previously potentially available but unnoticed. Beardsley goes beyond Black in claiming that metaphor does not simply call upon "associated commonplaces" but may actualize connotations not yet brought forward in our present conceptual system. He stresses the difference between Class I metaphors like "smiling sun" and different metaphors from Class II: "the spiteful sun", "unruly sun". The Class II metaphors are more complex since they are more precise, more discriminating. To speak of the sun as "unruly" is to imply a sharper distinction between this quality and other qualities conceived with comparable specificity: obedience, punctuality (Beardsley, 1981: 113). Hence, the Verbal–opposition theory allows degrees of complexity and can at least partly explain the difference between the two classes. While comparison theories assert that metaphorical utterances involve a *comparison or similarity* between two or more objects, semantic interaction theories claim that metaphors involve a *verbal opposition or interaction* between two semantic contents, that of the expression used metaphorically and that of the surrounding literal context (S. R. Levin in Ortony, 1979: 124). According to Nelson Goodman a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting (in Johnson, 1989: 124).

The problem of resemblance receives a new articulation in the semantic theory characterized by Max Black as an interaction theory (as opposed to a substitutive theory). The bearer of metaphorical meaning is no longer a word but the sentence as a whole. The interaction process does not merely consist of the substitution of a word for a word, which defines only metonymy, but in an interaction between a logical subject and a predicate. If metaphor consists in some deviance, this deviance concerns the predicative structure itself (P. Ricoeur, 1977). Metaphor, then, has to be described as a deviant predication rather than a deviant denomination. A French theoretician in the field of poetics, Jean Cohen, in *Structure du Langage Poetique* speaks of this deviance in terms of semantic impertinence, meaning by that the violation of the code of pertinence or relevance which rules the ascription of predicates in ordinary use. The metaphorical statement works as the reduction of this deviance by the establishment of a new semantic pertinence. In turn, this new pertinence is

secured by the production of a lexical deviance which is therefore a paradigmatic deviance, that is precisely the kind of deviance described by classical rhetoricians. Classical rhetoric, in that sense, was not wrong; but, it only described the "effect of sense" at the level of the word while it overlooked the production of this semantic twist at the level of sense.

P. Ricoeur (1977) thinks that the decisive problem that an interaction theory of metaphor has helped to delineate, but not to solve, is the transition from literal incongruence to metaphorical congruence between two semantic fields. The metaphor of space can be useful to account for this; it is as though a change of distance between meanings occurred within a logical space. The *new* pertinence or congruence proper to a meaningful metaphoric utterance proceeds from the kind of semantic proximity which is suddenly obtained between terms in spite of their distance. Things or ideas which were remote appear now as close. Resemblance ultimately is nothing else than this rapprochement which reveals a generic kinship between heterogeneous ideas. What Aristotle called the *epiphora* of the metaphor, that is, the transfer of meaning, is nothing else than this move of shift in the logical distance, from the far to the near.

All new rapprochement runs against a previous categorization which resists, or rather which yields while resisting (N. Goodman in Ricoeur, 1977: 196). This is what the idea of a semantic impertinence or incongruence preserves. The predicative assimilation involves a specific kind of tension which is not so much between a subject and a predicate as between semantic incongruence and congruence. The insight into likeness is the perception of the conflict between the previous incompatibility and the new compatibility. "Remoteness" is preserved within "proximity". To *see the like* is to see the same in spite of, and through, the different. This tension between sameness and difference characterizes the logical structure of likeness. Imagination, accordingly, is this *ability* to produce new kinds by assimilation and to produce them not *above* the differences, as in the concept, but in spite of and through the differences.

The discovery that the semantic markers of the referents of a metaphor can be represented as fuzzy sets and that semantic markers can exist in a hierarchy of categories does not describe how these markers are related in that hierarchy (Mac Cormac, 1985: 110). Rules for semantic change often describe how new semantic markers are added to and how old semantic markers are deleted from the list of semantic markers ordinarily associated with the semantic meaning. When we comprehend a metaphor such as *"The locomotive is in bed"*, the construction of semantic rules explaining how a locomotive can be Animate or a bed Inanimate involves adding the feature Animate to Inanimate (locomotive) or Inanimate to Animate (bed), where each of the semantic markers is represented by a fuzzy set. Deeper than semantic rules for change in meaning lies a psychological account of cognition. Viewed as a knowledge process, metaphoric comprehension requires identification of both similar and dissimilar salient features accompanied by the imaginative combination and rearrangement of these features (S. R. Levin, in Ortony, 1979: 129).

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Samuel Levin proposed a series of relationships of adjunction and displacement to account for the change of semantic meaning in metaphor (Ortony, 1979: 129). In this relationship, the imagination takes the semantic marker Animate of "sleep" and juxtaposes it with the semantic marker Inanimate of "locomotive". This produces a contradiction only if "locomotives" cannot be Animate to a certain degree in a fuzzy set. Levin's relationship of displacement applies when the "locomotive" is interpreted as "person". Levin's feature–change relationships demonstrate more precisely just how the process of moving features from one word to another occurs. Somewhere within the brain, an imaginative process of feature modification takes place that sometimes displaces and sometimes juxtaposes. This allows us to create fuzzy sets by altering membership functions.

Black says that metaphor creates novel meaning by giving modified senses to various concepts. If Black is correct, metaphor is a principal device for altering or restructuring our concepts and categories. Drawing on Gilbert Ryle's (1949) notion of a "category mistake", which consists in presenting the facts pertaining to one category in the terms appropriate to another (Mac Cormac, 1985: 110), Turbayne (1970) argues that metaphor is a form of "sort–crossing" in which objects ordinarily falling under one category are seen as falling under some new category (Johnson, 1981: 32). The point of departure is the same for Richards, Black, and Beardsley. Metaphor is a kind of 'attribution', requiring a 'subject' and a 'modifier' — an obviously analogous pair to those others: 'tenor–vehicle' and 'focus–frame'. What is new here is the stress put on the notion of 'logically empty attributions; on incompatibility, that is, on 'self–contradictory attribution'.

The comprehension of the metaphor follows from the conceptual ability to hold two disparate things in mind at the same time; Douglas Berggren in his work "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor" (1962) called this ability stereoscopic vision. This conceptual ability and the ability to transform one referent into another results from our imaginative powers. Hence, metaphor not only performs semantic changes in meaning but also serves as the engine for conceptual change in images and ideas.

The theory of semantic conceptual anomaly (Mac Cormac, 1985) asserts that the difference between metaphor and nonmetaphor, especially analogy, rests on the conceptual recognition of the semantic anomaly of metaphor and its interpretation as meaningful. Emotional tension exists as a symptom of this recognition rather than as the origin of it. Not all semantically anomalous constructions are metaphors; only those semantic anomalies that we can interpret as suggesting new insights and new possible meanings are metaphors.

This interaction between the referents of a metaphor creates new word associations; hence the relationships among concepts and the words designating these concepts in the semantic memory must not limit the meanings only to the meanings that we have experienced in the past. If one imagined the human memory to be a series of filing cabinets and if the concepts for "raindrop" and "logic" were in separate cabinets, then the very organization of memory would prevent the creation of Thomas Hardy's metaphor in *Tess of the D'Ur-*

bervilles: "The drops of logic Tess had let fall into the sea of his enthusiasm served to chill its effervescence to stagnation". Certainly this metaphor conjures in the mind of the reader a visual image of raindrops falling into a large body of bubbling water, where the drops are arguments and the sea consists of beliefs reinforced by emotional feelings. Hence, the inventor of a metaphor retrieves from the long–term memory combinations of words that are not normally associated, and the motivation for doing so may arise from particular experiences etched in the episodic memory. The structure understood to underlie the organization of concepts within the semantic memory must allow for the possibility of change or else the meanings of concepts will be permanently fixed. In Hardy's metaphor, "raindrops" must be capable of being understood as "logical arguments", and "logical arguments" must be capable of being understood as "raindrops". This interaction between the referents of a metaphor creates new word associations; hence the relationships among concepts and the words designating those concepts in semantic memory must not limit the meanings only to the meanings we have experienced in the past (MacCormac, 1985: 130).

Levin's account of semantic change allows for only simple addition and simple displacement of semantic markers. Many semantic markers, however, find association through a complex, often hierarchical conceptual relationship. Lakoff and Johnson observed numerous conceptual relationships involved in the juxtaposition of the referents of a metaphor. In this approach, "conceptual domain" refers to a vast organization of knowledge. A conceptual domain has a basic structure of entities and relations. A conceptual metaphor consists of a partial mapping of the basic structure of one conceptual domain (the source) onto another (the target). Basic conceptual metaphors are part of common conceptual apparatus shared by members of a culture. They are systematic in that there is a fixed correspondence between the structure of the domain to be understood (e. g. death) and the structure of the domain in terms of which we are understanding it (e. g. departure).

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (1980: 5). In their example of a metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, although arguments and wars are different kinds of things, i. e. verbal discourse and armed conflict, ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed and talked about in terms of WAR. The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another will necessarily hide other aspects of the concepts that are inconsistent with that metaphor. In another kind of metaphorical concept, one does not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to another, i. e. orientational metaphors, since most of them have to do with spatial orientation. There is an overall external systematicity among the various spatialization metaphors which defines coherence among them. Thus, GOOD IS UP gives UP orientation to general well–being, and this orientation is coherent with special cases like HAPPY IS UP, HEALTH IS UP, ALIVE IS UP, CONTROL IS UP, STATUS IS UP is coherent with CONTROL IS UP.

A number of theorists have suggested that metaphor may play a special role in organizing conceptual knowledge through the interaction of two different domains (Black, 1954/1981; Gentner, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1982; Verbrugge and McCarrell, 1977). According to some formulations, conceptual metaphors systematically influence the way that their topic domains are understood (D. W. Albritton & Gail McKoon & Richard J. Gerrig, 1996). The representational structure that maps knowledge about a conceptual metaphor's vehicle domain onto its topic domain can be termed a *metaphor–based schema*. The domain of love, for example, is often understood through the schema LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE. Their view was further elaborated in D. Albritton's work "When Metaphor Function as Schemas: Some Cognitive Effects of Conceptual Metaphors" (1996). What makes the CRIME–AS–DISEASE schema special is that it is not simply a summary of things that one knows about crime, but rather an encapsulation of a particular way of understanding crime that results from the metaphorical comparison of crime to disease. A related cognitive function that metaphor often fulfills is that of providing a framework for understanding a new domain or for restructuring a familiar domain.

Uriel Weinreich (Mac Cormac, 1985: 112) distinguished between semantic features that were unordered, calling them clusters, and semantic features that were ordered, calling them configurations. The relationship of "linking" results in the formation of new clusters. "Nesting", a nonlinking construction, attempts to represent the intuitive feeling of transitivity as when the verb "fix" operates on the object noun "teeth". A configuration rather than the cluster represents the combination of "fix" with "teeth".

Legitimate metaphors usually result from configurations rather than from linking relationships. In other words, not all the juxtapositions of referents produce successful metaphors; some are so strange as to prevent comprehension of relationships of similarity. On the other hand, if the configurations produced by association of the referents of a metaphor are so explicit and obvious, then the metaphor is an analogy rather than a metaphor because semantic anomaly is one of the necessary characteristics of a legitimate metaphor. The comprehension of metaphor (Mac Cormac, 1985: 34) follows from the conceptual ability to hold two disparate things in mind at the same time; Douglas Berggren called this ability "stereoscopic vision".

This semantic space is potentially infinitely large so that the number of semantic dimensions of a word may also be large. The length of the vector between two words determines how closely they are related. Words closely associated in meaning will have short vectors and can be imagined to exist in subspaces or clusters (Mac Cormac, 1985: 114). Thus, the semantic marker Inanimate will have relatively short vectors to words such as "automobile" and "locomotive" but a much longer vector to "human being". Similarly, Animate will have relatively short vectors to "dog" and "human being" but a much longer vector to "locomotive". The possibility of constructing relatively long vectors between usually unassociated words allows for the creation of metaphors. By linking words not normally associated (referents of a metaphor), one can cre-

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ate new meanings. If the new vector produces enough analogy between the words to allow for comprehension and enough disanalogy for suggestion of a novel hypothesis, then a new, legitimate metaphor is born.

Mac Cormac's theory of semantic change is an attempt at clarifying this relationship as well as the theory of semantic fields of Kittay and Lehrer. The important advance which their donor field–recipient field terminology makes over I. A. Richard's "vehicle" and "tenor" seems to be centered on the word field (A. & J. Thompson, 1987: 50).

Earlier, Mac Cormac argued that the semantic markers of the referents of a metaphor could be represented by fuzzy sets allowing the juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated or opposed terms without producing an outright contradiction. He has claimed that the degree to which two words are associated can be expressed as a function of the length of the vectors between the words and that these vectors can also be tabulated in a matrix. The lengths of these vectors are also an expression of membership in fuzzy sets representing semantic markers. The distance between the words can be defined as a measure of the degree of association in meaning of the words; the longer the vector between the words, the further apart in meaning.

The relations by which words change their semantic meaning can be simply described as those of (1) the addition of a semantic feature, (2) the deletion of a semantic feature, (3) the inversion of a semantic feature, and (4) the transformation of a semantic feature. Although deletion and inversion are involved, the dominant aspect of semantic change in meaning involved in this interpretation of the metaphor requires the addition of a semantic feature. By transformation as a relation of semantic change Mac Cormac means to convey the notion of the creation of new semantic features through cognitive processes such as synaesthesia, image formation and abstraction. Many metaphors depend on moving from one form of sensation to another to achieve their meaning; others depend on a visual picture expressed in words, and still others depend on a process of abstract analogy (Mac Cormac, 1985: 124).

The method of feature cancellation, introduced in semantics may be exploited for the analysis of the relationship between metaphorical constituents. L. Jonathan Cohen (in Ortony, 1979: 67) distinguishes between those semantical features that represent attributes which are "empirical", i. e. immediately evident or relatively obvious, and those which are "inferential" or relatively latent. In metaphorical sentences empirical features tend to be cancelled. Hence, in a metaphorical sentence: *Their legislative program is like a rocket to the moon* the legislative program is said to be a rocket only in the sense that it has shed such empirical features as + MATERIAL, + AIR–CLEAVING, + CYLINDRICAL, which are incompatible with the features of "legislative" program, while retaining such features as + FAST MOVING, + FAR–AIMING (J. Cohen, 1972).

Metaphors may possess more than two referents. Hence, in the metaphor, *"The wind thinks outrageous thoughts aloud"* one might propose three referents: "wind", "thoughts" and "person". Among these three referents one may find an interaction, the wind is a person who thinks outrageous thoughts or a

person who thinks outrageous thoughts is like the wind howling in the wilderness (Mac Cormac, 1985: 25). Metaphor is a linguistic combination which must have at least two referents. In the following metaphor: *"Stars are merely projections of the human psyche–they are pimples of consciousness–but they are at the same time quite real."* (Tom Robbins, *Another Roadside Attraction)* there are at least three referents. One might object that this mixed metaphor confuses the mental and physical in its application to stars. Consciousness is first transformed to a skin, and then the stars become pimples on that surface when projected to the celestial realm.

In elaborating the relationship between the two elements of the metaphorical statement Goatley (1995) adopts the terms of Richards (1965: 96) as adapted by Leech (1969: 9), substituting the word *Topic* for their *Tenor.* The conventional referent of the unit is the Vehicle. The actual unconventional referent is the Topic. The similarities and/or analogies involved are the Grounds. Goatly defines metaphor as follows: Metaphor occurs when a unit of discourse is used to refer unconventionally to an object, process or concept, or colligates in an unconventional way. And when this unconventional act of reference or colligation is understood on the basis of similarity, matching or analogy involving the conventional referent or colligates of the unit and the actual unconventional referent or colligates (Goatley, 1995: 96).

Reinhart (1976) presents a synthesis of the proposals by Richards (1936), Beardsley (1958) and Black (1962). After a careful discussion of such terms as *tenor* and *vehicle* and *focus* and *frame,* she puts forward a novel distinction between 'focus interpretation' and 'vehicle interpretation.' Goatly slightly amends these term by making use of 'focus processing' and 'vehicle construction'. Focus processing is understanding the entire metaphor in terms of the domain of the topic, tenor, or the target domain; it involves a reading of the focus (the non–literal word of a metaphor) in terms of the current domain of discourse. Thus T. S. Eliot's metaphor: *I have seen the mermaids riding seawards on the waves* may receive a reading for *riding* (the focus) as *floating* ('focus processing'). Vehicle construction, by contrast, pertains to a relatively independent activation of the domain associated with the focus of the metaphor, or the source (vehicle) domain. For instance, *waves* may be read as *horse* ('vehicle construction'). From the point of view of analogizing, we see a two–way use of the non–literal proportional comparison: floating: waves:: riding: horse. Focus processing uses the analogy for deriving information about the current domain of discourse, while vehicle construction uses the analogy to enrich our view of the focus in relatively independent terms. Reinhart (1976: 392) claims that vehicle construction is especially necessary if 'the "image" aspect of the metaphor' is to be invoked. That is the way to a full *imaginative* understanding of the metaphor: a double vision of floating on the waves and riding a horse.

The theory of analogical processing can now explain *double vision* as involving an exploitation of a possibility which is inherent in all analogy, namely that of concentrating upon both source and target domain instead of focusing only on the latter. As these two acts of activation are not likely to occur simul-

taneously, it seems to be a matter of co–ordinative but serial processing with reference to two distinct cognitive domains. During focus processing, the reader is busy with the general topic of the text, but during vehicle construction, he or she is attending to the nature of an image. Hence 'double vision' is a good example of the polyvalent use of analogy construction.

This is not far from such formulations as Martin and Harre's 'Metaphor is a figure of speech in which one entity or state of affairs is spoken of in terms which are seen as being appropriate to another' (A. & J. Thompson, 1987: 81). Their consideration of the focus–vehicle relationship is based on the concept of a semantic field. The expression itself is spatially metaphorical; one is to imagine 'around' each word an organized space in which other words related to it are laid out. While a word can be related to its 'neighbors' in a great number of ways, two chief varieties of relation can be distinguished. Paradigmatic relations exist among a set of words which are *like or unlike* one another in meaning in certain regular ways.

Another important theory dealing with the relationship between tenor and vehicle is the Semantic Field Theory. In their article, 'Semantic Fields and the Structure of Metaphor' (1987), Eva Kittay and Adrienne Lehrer claim 'that in metaphor the lexical items from one semantic field are transferred to another semantic field and that the structure of semantic relations of the first field provides the structure or reorganizes some previous structure of the second field' (A. Thompson & J. Thompson, 1987: 50).

The important advance which their donor field/recipient field terminology makes over I. A. Richards' 'vehicle' and 'tenor' seems to us to be centered on the word *field*. But if metaphor involves some sort of transaction between two fields, it does not follow that a single account of that transaction is to be sought: armed with the field concept, we are free to describe a number of ways in which the fields can be related to one another (A. & J. Thompson, 1987: 81). The Kittay and Lehrer analyses have a contiguity–based 'what–goes–with–what' emphasis, so that the 'fish' field important for them would be that involving fishing verbs, fishermen, line, hook, bait, river, etc. Such a field can be seen, in Lakoff and Johnson's terminology, an as experiential gestalt; and it is positive enough (large enough, complex enough) to donate.

Another perspective of the focus–vehicle relationship is the class–inclusion model of the metaphor as elaborated by J. Kennedy (1990), in which the metaphor is treated as a form of classification. In a metaphor: *The camel is the ship of the desert* the reason why a camel can be placed with the vessels is the fact that they share something in common. This is why the metaphor is apt. Vessels and camels carry people across trackless wastes. The reason why the classification is metaphoric is, in part, that the person already knows a primary classification scheme. One important implication of this examination of metaphor as special–purpose classification is that the classification need not arise from the invention of a new higher order category, subsuming both vessels and camels. We do not change our classification of vessels to accommodate the new arrival. Rather, the vessel category remains as it was. It is the camel that is changed from its standard category to a secondary one. Expressing a meta-

phor as a form of class inclusion, or one used for limited, special purposes, handily shows the asymmetry that is inherent in metaphors (Kennedy, 1990: 120). Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) reject the view that metaphors are implicit comparisons because they believe that metaphors are not comparisons at all; they are just what they seem on the surface: class–inclusion statements (Ortony, 1993: 12).

Paivio (in A. Ortony, 1979) argues that the central question surrounding the comprehension (and the production) of metaphors concerns the way in which a novel conception arises from apparently disparate parts. This question, he claims, involves three important concepts, namely those of integration, relation, and similarity. Similarity is involved because the two terms in a metaphor share attributes. Relation is implicated because a metaphor may take advantage of common relations and also because of its involvement in integration. Integration is significant because of the emergence of something new, presumably a result of integrating certain aspects of the parts (Ortony, 1979: 186). The second concept that Paivio considers to be important in metaphors is that of relation. When metaphors involve common relations, as they do in proportional metaphors, their essential structure seems to me to be the same as that of similarity metaphors. Typically, similarity metaphors have two terms: the first term often called the *topic*; and the second term often called the *vehicle*. A similarity metaphor such as, "*The man is a sheep*", gains its currency from the fact that there is something in common between the topic (man) and the vehicle (sheep). In a proportional metaphor the only difference is that the topic and the vehicle refer to relations rather than objects. Thus, relations are no more nor less important to the nature of metaphors than are objects. As Paivio observes, the underlying notion of a proportional metaphor is that of analogy. What the metaphor does is to express the analogy in an indirect fashion by leaving out some of its components. George Miller's view on metaphor is most relevant in this connection. At the same time, as with similes, the proportional metaphor expresses a similarity between relations that are not really alike.

Another important concept in explaining the relationship topic–vehicle is "stereoscopic vision". As Berggren says in "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor" (1962: 243): The possibility of comprehension of metaphorical construction requires, therefore, a peculiar and rather sophisticated intellectual ability which W. Bedell Stanford (Ricoeur, in Sacks, 1993: 152) metaphorically labels 'stereoscopic vision': the ability to entertain two different points of view at the same time. That is to say, "the perspective prior to and subsequent to the transformation of the metaphor's principle and subsidiary subjects must both be conjointly maintained." Hence, it can be concluded that what Bedell Stanford called stereoscopic vision is nothing else than what Jakobson called split reference: ambiguity in reference.

Double vision is the activation by metaphor of two ideas at the same time which normally would not be associated with each other; their co–ordinate activation leads to an interaction of images which may produce a double vision. In the *Man is a wolf metaphor* the integration is brought about by linking

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'man' to the current topic of discussion, and by adapting one's picture of man in such a way that a whole range of literal and non–literal attributes of man suggested by the domain of wolves, may be attached to the mental model resulting from the previous discussion. That range may begin with a simple and unspecific negative picture of man, but it may also extend into association with animals, predators, fierceness etc. quite possibly even evoking an actual picture of wolves in some people's minds. Double vision is explained by Reinhart (1976) in terms of a process called vehicle interpretation. It can be fruitfully explained and developed as a form of additional communication about the vehicle domain from the angle of analogizing.

The problem is that the phenomenon of double vision need not imply the rise of a twofold meaning by definition. On one hand, most interaction theorists have spoken of some kind of fusion of meaning which may be complex and many–sided, but can still be seen as unitary (cf. Richards (1936), Black (1979), and Kurz (1982)). The new domain–interaction theory of Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982), which is a very sophisticated and attractive synthesis of previous insights, is not very clear in this particular respect; it seems to allow for metaphorical interaction as both unitary and divisive.

Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) state that metaphor processing involves the recognition of an abstract resemblance, or abstract relation, between the vehicle and topic domains, which is more than the sum of the attributes of each constituent (Paivio, in Ortony, 1979: 162). Topic and vehicle can be considered as retrieval cues for relevant information. The vehicle and the topic are the key terms; the former is usually prepotent because by definition its properties are to be conveyed to the topic. Moreover, the concreteness of the vehicle should be crucial because a concrete term provides rapid access to information–rich images. Pictures or concrete nouns are good reminders for their associates, abstract nouns are not. This effect was metaphorically expressed as "conceptual peg" hypothesis: concrete nouns and pictures are effective pegs for storage and retrieval of associative information (Paivio, 1963; Paivio & Yarmey, 1966). The vehicle serves as an efficient conceptual peg for metaphor comprehension to the extent that it promotes retrieval of images and verbal information that intersects with information aroused by the topic.

In a customary view of conceptual metaphor, metaphor carries structure from one conceptual domain (a "source" to another (a "target") directly (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Turner, 1987; Lakoff & Turner, 1989, Turner, 1990). All these contemporary accounts of metaphor have focused on structure–mapping from a source onto a target. Such mappings can exploit existing common schematic structure between domains or project new structure from the source onto the target (S. Levin, in A. Ortony, 1979).

The most recent view of the relationship between the two metaphorical constituents, i. e. of metaphor in general, is the theory of blending and conceptual integration. In blending, structure from input mental spaces is projected to a separate "blended" mental space. For example, in "*They are digging their financial grave*," there is projection from one input of gravedigging and another of financial investment. In the previously used example "*This surgeon is a but-*

cher", there is also a projection from two input spaces. In both cases, the central inference is constructed in the blend. Through completion and elaboration the blend develops structure not provided by inputs.

The work on conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 1994, 1996; Fauconnier, 1997) has shown, that in addition to such mappings, there are dynamic integration processes which build up new "blended" mental spaces. Such spaces develop emergent structure which is elaborated in the on–line construction of meaning and serves as an important locus of cognitive activity (M. Turner & G. Fauconnier, 1998). This can be illustrated by the example of a conceptual blend "If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink". The blend has two input mental spaces: one with the Titanic and the other with President Clinton. There is a blended space in which Clinton is the Titanic and the scandal is the iceberg. There is a generic space that has structure taken to apply to both inputs: one entity that is involved in an activity encounters another entity that poses an extreme threat to that activity. The extreme superiority of Clinton as a force and the extreme status of the scandal as a threat are constructed in the blend, as well as their predictive inference that Clinton will survive. This structure which is not available, from the source or the target, is constructed in the blend and projected to the target to reframe it and give it new and clearer inferences.

This model assigns roles to the two input spaces ("source" and "target" in a metaphor) but also to two middle spaces: a generic space which contains skeletal structure that applies to both input spaces and a blended space which is a rich space integrating in a partial fashion specific structure from both of the input space. The blended space often includes structure not projected to it from either input space.

1. STRUCTURAL METAPHORS: EVENTS ARE ACTIONS

This section deals with structural metaphors conceptualizing the abstract concept of life by using more concrete concepts of journeys (sailing, train, coach). In structural metaphors one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another. In the analysis of these structural metaphors special attention is paid to metaphors based on image–schemata, as defined by Lakoff & Johnson (1987), Turner (1987) and to the axiological dynamism (T. Krzeszowski, 1993) embodied in these schemas which is transferred, either directly or indirectly to the metaphorical expressions.

1.1. LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY

Life and death are such all–encompassing matter that there can be no single conceptual metaphor that will enable us to comprehend them. There is a multiplicity of metaphors for life and death. A purposeful life has goals and one searches for means towards those goals (Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 3). We conceive metaphorically of purposes as destinations and of the means to those

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destinations as paths. We speak of *"going ahead with our plans", "getting si-detracked"*, and *"working our way around obstacles"*. Thus, there is a common metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, and various expressions and instances of it. When we think of life as purposeful, we think of it as having destinations and paths toward those destinations which makes life a journey. But life can be conceptualized in many other ways as a play, a theatre, a circus, a card game.

Since different metaphors for life are about different aspects of life, it is not surprising that source–domain structures used for understanding them are often inconsistent. For example, LIFE IS A PRECIOUS POSSESSION and LIFE IS BONDAGE provide different perspectives on life. In addition to the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor other basic conceptual metaphors for life include the following: A LIFETIME IS A YEAR, A LIFETIME IS A DAY, LIFE IS A FLAME, LIFE IS A FLUID, LIFE IS BONDAGE, LIFE IS A BURDEN. The reason why there are so many conventional metaphors for life is that it is a very rich concept and when we try to conceptualize the wealth of experiences of this domain, no single, consistent structuring of that experience is possible; instead we need to import structure from a wide variety of source domains if we want to characterize anything approaching the full richness of the target domain (Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 52).

LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is only a sub–group of a more general metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This metaphor is further exploited by Goatly (1996: 61) in his Root analogies where he states that activity in general is conceptualized as movement, more specifically as a voyage. This is illustrated by the following conventional metaphorical expressions: starting an activity is starting a voyage: *embark on, to launch;* the activity is to sail/voyage: *plain sailing, sail through;* to have difficulties with an activity/life is to have difficulties sailing (since difficulties are likely to cause emotions): *ride out (a period of difficulty cf. a storm), make heavy weather (of something), takes the wind out of your sails, (change, try a different) tack, on the rocks, rough (time, on someone).* If an activity/person fails then it/they are shipwrecked: *wreckage (of plan, policy, career etc.), in deep water, will have to sink or swim, washed up (on the shore), wrench (someone's chances).* To keep the activity/persons going is to rescue/protect the boat: *keep your head above the water, salvage (the situation), clutch at straws, any port in a storm;* hence, the place/pattern of an activity is the sea/water: *tidal (activity=periodic), rough/uncharted, deep waters;* the actors are sailors and their action those of sailors: *pilot (scheme), know/learn someone the ropes, stick your oar in;* a related metaphor is humans are a ship: *nervous wreck, to harbour (somebody), people sail past, etc.*

The metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is thus a mapping of the structure of the JOURNEY schema onto the domain of LIFE in such a way as to set up the appropriate correspondences between TRAVELER and PERSON LEADING A LIFE, between STARTING POINT and BIRTH, etc.

Part of the power of such a metaphor is its ability to create structure in our understanding of life. That structuring of our understanding of life comes from

the structure of our knowledge about journeys. When we reason about life in terms of destinations, forks in the road, roadblocks, guides, etc. we are importing patterns of inference from the domain of journeys to the domain of life. We understand and reason using our conceptual system which includes an inventory of structures of which schemas and metaphors are established parts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1989).

The metaphor LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY has several sub–groups considering the vehicle of traveling; it can be sailing in a boat, traveling in a coach or on the train. Depending on the means of travelling different obstacles can be encountered, different routes taken; hence different source domains, e. g. sailing include specific concrete concepts such as vessels, sails, oars, shipwrecks, using a compass, being stranded, left on a deserted island, while coach or a train journeys include concepts such as compartments, jumping on or off the vehicle, obtaining the equilibrium, falling in the dust, being thrown out of the vehicle, etc.

1.1.1. LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY (SAILING)

In the LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY metaphor with sailing as the source domain the positive and negative value judgements are not always directly transferred to the target domain of life. The concept of the port which is positively valued in the source domain can change its axiological parameter and can express a negative value judgement when it stands for the end of one's active participation in life, not daring to face the challenges, the rocks representing difficulties and obstacles in the target domain of personal relationships.

1.1.1.1.

The metaphor LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY has been extended to include the activity of orientation during the sailing journey, the compass to be provided by a fellow–traveler to lead the traveler; thus, the necessity for guidance in life amid the dangers encountered during a life–course is mapped onto a necessity of ensuring concrete guidance by a compass. The sailing metaphor is a very productive one, perhaps the dominant metaphor in The Ambassadors with numerous extensions to shipwrecks, ports, getting aboard, leaving the boat.

> But what seems the matter with me is that **I can't sail alone; my ship must be one of a pair, must have, in the waste of water, a — what do you call it? — a consort**. I don't ask you to stay on board with me, but I must keep your sail in sight for orientation. **I don't in the least myself know, I assure you, the points of the compass, but with a lead I can perfectly follow.** You must be my lead" (The Golden Bowl, 45)

1.1.1.2.

The sailing metaphor is combined with the Depersonification metaphor where persons, fellow–travelers, are conceptualized as vessels; sailing together

implies greater safety; hence one does not wish to be deserted by his companion; guidance is provided to the very dock and assurance of continuous assistance is conceptualized by having a friendly vessel in the next berth, referring to the faithful companion who will not desert us.

> *Why, from you having brought me safely thus far. I should never have got here without you.* **You've provided the ship itself,** *and, if you've not quite seen me aboard,* **you've attended me, ever so kindly, to the dock. Your own vessel is, all conveniently, in the next berth, and you can't desert me now".** *(The Golden Bowl, 45)*

1.1.1.3.

The sailing experience implies tossings just as the life experience implies excitement, both positive and negative; when the tossings are over one ends up in the port. In this metaphor being in the port is not valued positively, it does not stand for safety, but for the end of one's active life, full of joy and excitement.

> **You talk about ships,** *but they're not the comparison.* **Your tossings are over — you're practically in port.** *(The Golden Bowl, 45)*

1.1.1.4.

Steering the boat is compared to the activity of heading through life; physical control over the vessel once more implies emotional control. Heading straight has positive connotations of being honest and reliable, since STRAIGHT as an image schema is evaluated positively in English and Russian (A. Cienki, 1998). The relations between symmetry and balance in the physical world provides a concrete basis for the metaphors which portray the asymmetric non–straight as unstable, mentally or socially (e. g. *warped, bent, twisted*) while STRAIGHT represents the norm, the natural state. The metaphor CONTROL IS STRAIGHT is coherent with many STRAIGHT metaphors especially in domains characterizing human action. The salient evaluation of the STRAIGHT as positive in the metaphors for these domains must be recognized within the context of certain factors in Western and American history.

> **She had settled in Paris, brought up her daughter, steered her boat.** *It was no very pleasant boat, especially there, to be in;* **but Marie de Vionnet would have headed straight.** *(The Ambassadors, 142)*

1.1.2. LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY (TRAIN)

1.1.2.1.

In this section the LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY metaphor implies the train as the means for travelling. The people being involved in mutual relationships and

interaction are seen as travelling together on the train. This metaphor is combined with the BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER metaphor and the CONTROL/FORCE schema. The train is conceptualized as a container for these people interlocked in relationships of love, jealousy, generosity and revenge. The passive attitude of the partners is projected upon their treatment as labelled boxes, to be thrown around, packed, shoved and loaded upon the train; their willingness to participate in the journey is taken for granted; everything has been arranged for them by others, by those who are in control of their life and destiny. Thus, the control schema has a negative value judgement and is combined with depersonification, where persons are seen as boxes, objects to be handled with no will or control over their own destiny.

> *... if Amerigo and Charlotte had at last got a little tired of each other's company they should find their relief not so much in sinking to the rather low level of their companions as* **in wishing to pull the latter into the train in which they so constantly moved. "We're in the train"**, *Maggie mutely reflected; "we've suddenly waked up in it and found ourselves rushing along,* **very much as if we had been put in during sleep — shoved, like a pair of labelled boxes, into the van.** *And since I wanted to "go" I'm certainly going; I'm moving without trouble — they're doing it all for us". (The Golden Bowl, 346)*

1.1.2.2.

This train metaphor is combined with the BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER metaphor where people travelling together through life are seen as sitting in the same compartment, with doors slammed upon them. These metaphors are combined with the CONTROL schema where manipulation over others has a negative value judgement: forcing other persons to act, popping them into a compartment and organizing their life has negative connotations. This metaphor of forcing somebody into an action, which is conceptualized as a container with negative connotations, is very productive and is extended to other situations such as forcing a person into a bath, etc. The life course one take does not represent our free choice, but is a part of somebody else's scheme. This situation has a negative value judgement transferred from the source domain of physical action where exerting force or compulsion over others is seen as negative.

> *It had helped him to place her and she was more and more sharply conscious of having —* **as with the door sharply slammed upon her and the guard's hand raised in signal to the train — been popped into the compartment in which she was to travel for him.** *(The Wings of the Dove, 104)*

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1.1.3. LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY (COACH)

The metaphor of travelling on the coach, sharing life experiences and adventures, is combined with the BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER metaphor. Jumping on the coach, joining the other passengers implies taking part in mutual relationships; staying out implies isolation, not being part of the company. The coach is seen as a metaphor for inclusion, for sharing a relationship where "bouncing in" implies inclusion, while staying out means exclusion from the relationship. The LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY metaphor is combined with the Container metaphor where being inside or outside a container, a coach, implies sharing a relationship or being excluded from it.

1.1.3.1.

*That door stood so strangely ajar that **he was half prepared to be conscious, at any juncture, of her having quite bounced in. But**, friendly, familiar, light of touch and happy of tact, she exquisitely stayed out. (The Ambassadors, 268)*

1.1.3.2.

The LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY metaphor includes both travelling in a coach and leaving it, jumping from it at a safe place which implies that relationships and experiences can be abandoned. This metaphor of jumping out of the coach is extended to a detailed description of a jump, by closing one's eyes and gathering one's skirts, being prepared for the jump, for the final decision. In this interplay of metaphors, the LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY metaphor is combined with the DIFFICULTIES–ARE–BURDENS metaphor, where the abstract entity of personal responsibility is conceptualized as receiving a weight, a burden and being prepared to take it.

*Strether positively had moments of his own in which he found himself sorry for her — occasions on which **she affected him as a person seated in a runaway vehicle and turning over the question of a possible jump**. Would she jump, could she, would that be a safe place?*

*He believed, on the whole, she would jump, yet his alternations on this subject were the more especial stuff of his suspense. One thing remained well before him that **if she should gather in her skirts, close her eyes and quit the carriage while in motion, he would promptly enough become aware. She would alight from her headlong course more or less directly upon him; it would be appointed to him, unquestionably, to receive her entire weight.** (The Ambassadors, 274)*

1.1.3.3.

People being involved in a mutual relationship are seen as travelling in a coach; an outsider may join them on their journey by alighting the coach; this

metaphor is combined with the LIFE–IS–A–PLAY (circus) metaphor where hesitation to join them is seen as circling round the ring in the circus; emotional activity is seen as physical movement in space.

> *It was impossible to keep Mrs. Lowder out of their scheme. She stood there too close to it and too solidly;* **it had to open a gate, at a given point, do what they would to take her in. And she came in, always, while they sat together rather helplessly watching her, as in a coach–in–four;** *she drove round their prospect as the principal lady at the circus drives round the ring,* **and she stopped the coach in the middle to alight with majesty.** *(The Wings of the Dove, 44)*

1.2. LIFE IS A PLAY METAPHOR (Theater, Circus, Game of Cards)

1.2.1. LIFE–IS–A–PLAY (THEATRE)

Everyday phrases like "It's curtains for him," "She's my leading lady," "She always wants to be in the spotlight," "That's not in the script" all rely on our metaphoric understanding of significant parts of life (including the entire life span) in terms of a play. This is an extraordinarily productive basic metaphor for life, perhaps because plays are often intended to portray significant events and parts of life, and the ways in which a play can be made to correspond to life are extensively developed and conventionalized in our culture. Our schema for a play is also very rich. It includes actors, make–up, audiences, scripts, parts, roles, prompts, directors, casting, playwrights, applause, bowing, etc. Very many of the components of the schema for play have a function in the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor. We say "He always plays the fool", "That attitude is just a mask," "Take a bow!"

Plays prototypically have a formal structure (prologue, acts and scenes, intermission, epilogue, etc.). Thus we can refer to the beginning of something in life as "act one", or to a calm period as an "intermission". Plays also prototypically have a narrative structure (introduction, complication, climax, etc.). Thus we can refer to the high point of a part of life as the "climax".

In the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor, the person leading a life corresponds to an actor, the people with whom he interacts are fellow actors, his behavior is the way he is acting, and so on. If all of life is the span under consideration, then birth is the beginning of the play and the event of death is the falling of the curtain (Lakoff–Johnson).

This extremely productive metaphor for understanding life has been extended in Western culture in any number of ways. We can think of a deity as the playwright who assigns us roles. Our business in life is to play admirably the role assigned to us. An example of this metaphor is Shakespeare's: *All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts.* (As You Like It, 2. 7)

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1.2.1.1.

The man who lacks courage to participate in an action, in an unpleasant experience is seen as a hero refusing to play his part. This experience is seen as an object that can be approached or avoided; the abstract situation is materialized and, hence, it can be kept at a distance; one can shirk and dodge.

> *I don't want to turn the knife in your vitals, but that's naturally what you just now meant by our all being on top of you.* **We know you as the hero of the drama,** *and we're gathered to see what you'll do.*
>
> *I think that must be* **why the hero has taken refuge in this corner. He's scared at his heroism–he shrinks from his part.** *(The Ambassadors, 285)*
>
> **Ah, but we nevertheless believe that he'll play it.**
>
> **There positively isn't a sign of a hero to–night; the hero's dodging and shirking, the hero's ashamed.** *Therefore, I think,* **what you must all really be occupied with is the heroine.** *(The Ambassadors, 286)*

1.2.1.2.

According to this metaphor the person travelling through life facing an unexpected situation is seen as an actress studying her part: this metaphor is combined with the EQUILIBRIUM SCHEMA where the only rule to be obeyed is to remain within bounds, to preserve the equilibrium, not to lose one's control of emotions (which are seen as beasts within a person to be controlled in the Western civilization).

> **... she reminded herself of an actress who had been studying a part and rehearsing it, but who suddenly, on the stage, before the footlights, had begun to improvise, to speak lines not in the text.** *It was this very sense of the stage and the footlights that kept her up, made her rise higher; just as it was the sense of action that logically involved some platform–action quite positively for the first time in her life.... The platform remained for three or four days thus sensibly under her feet..*
>
> **She had but one rule of art — to keep within bounds and not lose her head**. *(The Golden Bowl, 322)*

1.2.1.3.

The life–as–theater metaphor, being a very productive one, is used here to imply that we are all playing our roles in life, the leading roles as well as the minor ones. Occasionally, the roles can be reversed, a character playing a minor role may be assigned a leading role, appearing in all the acts. Hence, one may suddenly take such decisions, exerting control over oneself, as to gain the main role and sometimes take other at surprise.

> *... and she felt not unlike* **some young woman of the theater who engaged for a minor part in the play and having mastered her cues with anxious effort, should find herself suddenly promoted to leading lady and expected appear in every act of the five.** *(The Golden Bowl, 439)*

1.2.1.4.

The LIFE–IS–A–PLAY metaphor is in this example combined with two image schemas: CONTROL SCHEMA and WHOLE–PART SCHEMA. Being the author of the play implies knowing what is going to happen, having everything under control, other people, their relations, controlling the plot, their lives. The Life is a Play metaphor is also combined with the CONTROL/FORCE metaphors where the key of the mystery, the spring for unwinding the crisis, is kept and can be released at will. By the press of a spring everything can be changed from happiness and serenity to terror and shame. These two schemas are coherent with the Part/Whole schema where the fragments of the bowl express disintegration of a relationship, discontinuity and disequilibrium; fragmentization implies a negative value judgement, while integrity represents balance, dignity and decency of personal relations and hence implies a positive value judgement transferred from the source domain, since integrity is valued positively and fragmentization negatively in our life experience.

> **... they might have been figures rehearsing some play of which she herself was the author;** *they might even, for the happy appearance they continued to present, have been such figures as would, by the strong note of character in each, fill any author with the certitude of success, especially of their own histrionic. They might in short have represented any mystery they would; the point being predominantly that the key to the mystery,* **the key that could wind and unwind it without a snap of the spring, was there in her pocket — or rather, no doubt, clasped at this crisis in her hand and pressed, as she walked back and forth, to her breast.**
>
> *Spacious and splendid,* **like a stage again awaiting a drama, it was a scene she might people, by the press of her spring, either with serenities and dignities and decencies, or with terrors and shames and ruins, things as ugly as those formless fragments of her golden bowl she was trying so hard to pick up**. *(The Golden Bowl, 458)*

2. IMAGE SCHEMATA

In our analysis of corpus–based metaphors in the novels of H. James we have found a great number of metaphors based on the image schemata, as defined by Lakoff & Johnson (1987), Turner (1987), T. Krzeszowski (1993) et al. Our concepts of time, of events in time, and of causal relations seem to be

structured by these image–schemas. We conceive of time, which has no shape, as having a shape, such as linear or circular, and of that shape as having skeletal structure (M. Turner, 1993: 297). We conceive of causal relations as having skeletal shapes such as links and paths.

In its canonical shape the human body is directed upwards (Lakoff & Johnson, 1987). Growing upwards appears to be our primary positive experience associated with the orientation UP. There is an abundance of supporting socio–cultural experience: when we are healthy, when we feel well, we stand erect with our heats lifted. Conversely, when we are ill and when we die, we stoop to the ground. The orientation DOWN is charged with negative values and, thus, the direction downwards signifies evil. Innumerable linguistic expressions illustrate the two opposing poles of this axiology: *this was a top performance, you're in high spirits*. By contrast, we associate what is negative and bad with the orientation DOWN: *he fell into depression, he dropped dead, he fell into the abyss of depravity,* etc. Kinaesthetic image schemata give rise to abstract concepts through metaphorical projections from physical to abstract domains. Among these schemata are CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE as well as such orientations and relations as UP–DOWN, FRONT–BACK, PART–WHOLE, CENTER–PERIPHERY, and a few more. As a matter of fact, the number of various image schemata may not be fixed (Johnson 1987: 126).

According to Johnson (1987) metaphors are based on our abstract bodily experience of the world which we translate into *basic schemata*. Schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, regularity, in/of ongoing activities; these patterns are meaningful structures. Johnson describes preconceptual image schemata as recurring patterns involved in "human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interaction"; without these patterns "our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible" (Johnson 1987: 29).

In the analysis of metaphors based on image–schemata in our corpus special attention is paid to the existence of plus–minus axiology, i. e. axiological dynamism embodied in these image schemata which is transferred to the metaphorical expressions. T. Krzeszovsky (1993) shows that each image schema is activated by the fundamental dynamism PLUS–MINUS as a vector built into each schema according to the following preconceptual axiological principles: 1. Image schemata are bi–polar, i. e. they have a plus pole and a minus pole. 2. Being is plus, not being is minus; negation is fundamentally experienced as LACK; 3. WHOLE, CENTER, LINK, IN GOAL, UP, FRONT, RIGHT are plus; PART, PERIPHERY, NO LINK, OUT, NO GOAL, DOWN, BACK, LEFT are minus; 4. BALANCE is plus, IMBALANCE is minus. 5. In their canonical form all things are plus, because they are in the state of balance; 6. When OFF BALANCE everything tends to RESTORE BALANCE; 7. When IN BALANCE everything is prone to LOSE BALANCE; items 6 and 7 underlie the dialectical struggle between plus and minus, positive and negative, and, on the conceptual level between good and bad, as basic axiological concepts.

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2.1. BALANCE/EQUILIBRIUM and FORCE/CONTROL SCHEMAS

In our interaction with the environment our body exerts/and/or undergoes forces. We only notice them when they are extraordinarily strong or when they are not balanced off by other forces. Maintaining the balance of the body in action constitutes such a fundamental experience that we are normally unaware of balance until we lose it and strive to restore it. We also experience other things as being *"out of balance"*, whenever there is "too much" or "not enough" in comparison with what we feel to be the normal organization of forces, processes and elements (Johnson 1987: 75).

Through bodily experience, the BALANCE schema is related to the UP–DOWN schema and to the SOURCE–PATH–GOAL schema: when we LOSE BALANCE we fall DOWN and are unable to move FORWARD and reach the GOAL, while MAINTAINING BALANCE allows us to retain the UPWARD vertical position and continue FORWARD towards the GOAL. Therefore, BALANCE and all the associated concepts receive positive axiological charge, while IMBALANCE is evaluated negatively.

The BALANCE schema permeates our experience of the world and is present in all walks of our physical and spiritual life. Johnson distinguishes various kinds of balance, including systemic balance, psychological balance and mathematical balance. Thus the balance schema appears to be the central schema providing grounds for various ethical and aesthetic concepts. Among others, it directly motivates that sense of good which can be spelled out as *'having the right or desired qualities'*, which in fact means *'balanced with regard to relevant properties, not excessive in any direction'*.

REMOVAL involves reassertion by the agent of his self–control; BALANCE involves freedom from external pressure: BALANCE is a symmetrical arrangement of forces and a point or axis. (H. James's metaphor *'jumping off the coach'* means disturbing balance). Balance could be reinterpreted in terms of another bodily experience CONTROL. CONTROL SCHEMAS operate when it is present and when it is not; SELF–CONTROL is the reassertion of self–control after an experience of outside or inside pressure.

2.1.1. Balance/Equilibrium schema

A very similar schema to the FORCE schema is the equilibrium schema; a form of systemic equilibrium is metaphorically extended to include the "non-physical" side of emotional experience. The meaning of balance is tied to the physical experiences and to the image–schematic structures that make those experiences.

Some of these schemata are further specifications of a more general experience such as compulsion, blockage, counterforce, restraint, removal, enablement and attraction which all specify the force schema. As the balance can be redressed, the moral equilibrium in our personal relationships can be restored if the given opportunity is seized.

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2.1.1.1.

The equilibrium is reached if the wheels are kept in place and if none are missing; the four wheels grant perfect equilibrium to the coach, i. e. to the relationship between the four persons, the two couples. The BALANCE schema is combined with the BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER schema where the persons involved in emotional relationships are seen as travelling together in a coach, i. e. with the LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY METAPHOR. These metaphors and schemas are combined with the DIFFICULTIES–ARE–BURDENS metaphor where mental strain is seen as physical strain, i. e. mental responsibilities are seen as physical burdens; helping someone in this difficult situation is seen as taking the burden/weight off his/her shoulders.

> *Everything is remarkably pleasant, isn't it? — but where, for it, after all, are we? up in a balloon and whirling through space, or down in the depths of the earth, in the glimmering passages of a gold–mine?* **The equilibrium, the precious condition, lasted in spite of rearrangement; there had been a fresh distribution of the different weights, but the balance persisted and triumphed;...**
>
> **If they balanced they balanced** — *she had to take that (The Golden Bowl, 349)*
>
> *... because they had thus suffered it to be pointed out to them that* **if their family coach lumbered and stuck the fault was in its lacking its complement of wheel. Having but three, it had wanted another, and what had Charlotte done from the first but begin to act, on the spot, and ever so smoothly and beautifully, as a fourth?**
>
> *Nothing had been immediately, more manifest than the greater grace of the movement of the vehicle — as to which, for the completeness of her image, Maggie was now supremely to feel how* **every strain had been lightened for herself. So far as she was one of the wheels she had but to keep in her place; since the work was done for her she felt no weight, and it wasn't too much to acknowledge that she had scarce to turn round.** *(The Golden Bowl, 315)*

2.1.1.2.

Jumping from the coach might cause imbalance, disturb the balanced condition; thus, the person jumping down might be responsible for disturbing the state of equilibrium. This metaphor is combined with the CONTROL schema, or rather LACK OF CONTROL schema, where bringing a decision is seen as letting off a spring under a sharp pressure. Once this physical pressure is released the emotions can be freed, the decision for action can be realized.

> **She had seen herself at last, in the picture she was studying, suddenly jump from the coach;** *whereupon, frankly, with the wonder of the sight, her eyes opened wider and her heart stood still for moment. She looked at the person so acting as if this person were somebody else, waiting*

with intensity to see what would follow. The person had taken a decision — which was evidently because an impulse long gathering had at last felt a sharpest pressure. Only how was the decision to be applied?

Her acceptance of it, her response to it, inevitable, foredoomed came back to her, later on, as a virtual assent to the assumption he had thus made, **and that the spring acting within herself moreover might well have been, beyond any other, the impulse legitimately to provoke it**. *(The Golden Bowl, 315)*

2.1.1.3.

Balancing and rocking we try to preserve the equilibrium even sacrificing some private wishes and goals; personal sacrifices should ensure an overall equilibrium; i. e. perfect personal relations; physical stability stands for emotional stability.

The intensity of his dependence on it — this itself was what absolutely convinced her so that, as if perched up before him on her vertiginous point and in the very glare of his observation, **she balanced for thirty seconds, she almost rocked:** *she might have been for the time, in all her conscious person,* **the very form of the equilibrium they were, in their different ways, equally trying to save.**

She held herself hard; the thing was to be done, by her alone, now, where she stood. (The Golden Bowl, 480)

2.1.2. Force/control schema

According to Johnson (1987: 42) this schema is necessarily involved in our interaction with the environment. Our body exerts and/or undergoes force in any kind of (inter)action. Still, Johnson remarks that "we do not notice such forces when they are extraordinarily strong, or when they are not balanced off by other forces". The force schema is usually further specified in different ways through the combination with other image schemata such as *path, container* and *balance*. Examples of *blockage* can be found most clearly in combination with the container schema (P. Pauwels & A. M. Vandenbergen, 1995: 345)

2.1.2.1.

Tension felt in a personal relationship is compared to stretching a cord until it breaks; subjecting a material to a tensile force until it fails implies risking the failure of a personal relationship. Physical tension is hence emotional tension while lack of control, breaking the cord, leads to a failure.

It was in their silence that the other loomed, as she felt; she had had no measure, of this duration, but **it drew out and out as if she herself**

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were stretching the cord... ten minutes later **she was to stretch it almost to breaking.** *(The Golden Bowl, 336)*

2.1.2.2.

Controlling personal relationships as pulling wires and controlling currents before taking a new turn. Interplay of metaphors; the Balance Schema is combined with a Life is a Journey schema where a new turn of the road, a new start in life is taken after complex decisions, after balancing and pulling wires. Control over others usually implies negative value judgements, while control over oneself is judged positively.

*So it was that her inner sense, in spite of everything, **represented him as still pulling wires and controlling currents**, or rather indeed as muffling the whole possibility, keeping it down and down, **leading his accomplice continually on to some new turn of the road.** (The Golden Bowl, 489)*

2.1.2.3.

The click of a spring, a sudden single stroke, a physical stimulus results in an emotional revelation of the truth. This control schema is combined with the Ideas–are–plants metaphor where the revelation of the truth, a precious finding is conceptualized as a flower to be plucked; this emotion can be saved and guarded as a treasure, as a flower kept in water to be preserved.

*What was clearest of all indeed was something much more than this, something at the single stroke of which–and wasn't it simply juxtaposition? –all vagueness vanished. **It was the click of a spring–he saw the truth.** ...and Chad was better still even than Gloriani. **He had plucked this blossom; he had kept it, overnight, in water; and at last, as he held it up to wonder,** he did enjoy his effect. (The Ambassadors, 136)*

2.3. LACK OF CONTROL SCHEMA

2.3.1.

The BODY–AS–THE–CONTAINER metaphor where the body is seen as a container for emotions, in this case unhappiness and anxiety, is combined with the lack of control schema; letting out the hidden feelings is conceptualized as the release of an emotion not contained any longer by the pressure within the container. The lack of control metaphor implies that pulling out the handkerchief releases screams, i. e. controlled emotions which cannot be held down any longer. The force/pressure schema is combined with the container schema where removal of force, of the blockage, stands for the feeling of relief or more specifically of freedom from external pressure.

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*And if I'm both helpless and tormented **I stuff my pocket–handker-chief into my mouth**, I keep it there, for the most part, night and day, so as not to be heard too indecently moaning. Only now, with you, at last, **I can't keep it longer; I've pulled it out, and here I am fairly screa-ming at you.*** (The Golden Bowl, 375)

2.3.2.

The lack of control schema implies the state of control in a personal rela-tionship where the balance is achieved by keeping the cord tensed to a certain degree; however, going beyond that limit, physically and emotionally, results in the snapping of the cord, a break in a relationship. This schema is combined with a Reification metaphor where mental states take the form of ugly appea-rances, physical forms moving in a procession.

*...her heart stood still when **she wondered above all if the cord mightn't at last have snapped between her husband and her fa-ther.** She shut her eyes for dismay at the possibility of such a passage — there moved before them the procession of ugly forms it might have taken.* (The Golden Bowl, 501)

3. THE CONTAINER METAPHORS

As Johnson and Lakoff rightly point out, we constantly experience our bo-dies as objects in containers or objects coming out of containers. Birth is pri-marily experienced as getting out of that container. It means (1) Freedom and (2) leaving the security; consequently, the PLUS–MINUS parameter in this version of the CONTAINER schema is not systematically correlated with the two orientations IN — OUT. The changing values of the two poles in this ori-entation reflect the continual dialectical struggle of good and evil which also constitutes one of our basic experiences.

One of the most productive metaphors in our corpus is the CONTAINER metaphor. According to Lakoff and Johnson we experience our bodies as con-tainers and as things in containers. Therefore, the CONTAINER schema has two variants based on those two kinds of experience: 1. We are confined to a bounded space, to a cage, a trap which is a prison and means denial of our freedom, and 2. Our mind is a cup for our emotions and feelings; this cup can be only tasted or drunk to the dregs as we can live our life to the fullest de-gree or just watch others live it. The cup can be full of the finest wine to be shared with the person we love or can be full of poison to be drunk as puni-shment.

The fundamental experiences associated with the BODY AS A CONTAINER schema are breathing and eating. Both air, which we breathe IN, and food, which we take IN, are indispensable as sources of life–sustaining energy. The-refore, the orientation INTO associated with these experiences is necessarily positive.

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In the following metaphors we analyze the presence of the axiological dynamism, the plus–minus pole in the two groups of metaphors: BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER and BODY–AS–THE–CONTAINER. The analysis is based on T. Krzeszowsky's assumptions about the presence of axiological dynamism in the preconceptual image schemata. Axiological dialectics is grounded on contradictory values associated with being in and getting out of the original container.

This metaphor is combined with the orientation metaphors of IN and OUT with varying value judgements and the balance/force schema for getting out of the container, for relief or feeling the pressure inside it. BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER variant has a less straightforward axiology; the axiology emerging from this variant is less stable since the assignment of value depends on various factors, other schemata interacting with this schema. Axiology emerging from BODY–AS–A–CONTAINER is stable and straightforward.

3.1. BODY–IN–THE–CONTAINER

3.1.1.

This is probably the most productive metaphor in H. James's novels, particularly in the Golden Bowl. The container is a gilded cage, a prison for the mind; although it is gilded it is nonetheless a cage and it implies lack of freedom, isolation from the rest of the world. The person in a cage is a prisoner looking through the bars. It is a cage of delusion; this state of mind is represented by a cage in which one has been entrapped. In this case IN has a negative value while OUT has a positive value, which is not always the case with containers, since sometimes being in a container, like the port implies safety while going out to the troubled sea implies danger.

> *... the conviction that Charlotte was but awaiting some chance really to test her trouble upon her lover's wife left Maggie's sense meanwhile open* **as to the sight of gilt wires and bruised wings, the spacious but suspended cage, the home of eternal unrest, of pacing, beatings, shaking, all so vain, into which the baffled consciousness helplessly resolved itself. The cage was the deluded condition, and Maggie, as having known delusion, understood the nature of cages.** *She walked round Charlotte's — cautiously and in a very wide circle; and when, inevitably, they had to communicate she felt herself, comparatively outside,* **and saw her companion's face as that of a prisoner looking through the bars.** *(The Golden Bowl, 454)*

3.1.2.

We often conceptualize our existence in this world as being in a container, being confined to a bounded space; this metaphor often has a negative value judgement since bounded space, in this example — a box, implies imprisonment, impossibility of movement, of taking free decisions, of being able to

choose one's path in life. The box our heroine shared with others is a box of anxiety, of negative emotions. It is combined with a monetary metaphor where everything has to be paid, everything has its price: thus, participation in the life performance can be conceptualized as a chair, a bench to be obtained by paying a fee.

> *Here were wanderers, anxious and tired like herself; here doubtless were* ***hundreds of other just in the same box. Their box, their great common anxiety, what was it but the practical question of life?... All she thus shared with them made her wish to sit in their company; which she so far did that she looked for a bench that was empty***, *eschewing a still emptier chair that she saw hard by and for which she would have paid, with superiority, a fee. (The Wings of the Dove, 163)*

3.2. BODY–AS–THE–CONTAINER

The following section includes metaphors in which our body is conceptualized as a container for emotions and feelings. Emotions and passions are conceptualized as beasts to be controlled. One of the best knows metaphors belonging to this group is ANGER–IS–FLUID–IN–THE–CONTAINER where our body is conceptualized as a container containing a fluid under pressure (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

3.2.1.

The cup filled to the brim represents the fullness of emotions, of love to be given without any restraint; spilling the cup symbolizes complete surrender as the most important act of one's life. This metaphor is combined with the EQUILIBRIUM schema where the disturbed equilibrium, the presence of too much of the substance, too intensive emotions, exceeds the limit of perfect balance. Hence, the cup has been too full; too implies a negative value judgement since the excessive quantity of anything leads to imbalance.

> ***... there comes a day when something snaps, when the full cup, filled to the very brim, begins to flow over.*** *That's what has happened to my need of you* — ***the cup, all day, has been too full to carry. So here I am with it, spilling it over you and just for the reason that is the reason of my life.*** *(The Golden Bowl, 311)*

3.2.2.

In this metaphor the container is no longer a cup, but a bottle, a vessel used for preserving the emotions to be analyzed later in the laboratory of thoughts; the mind is a container metaphor has been extended to include a laboratory as a special type of container and is, thus, more innovative than the conventional metaphors of this type. It is combined with Emotions are Liquids

metaphor. Thoughts and emotions are analyzed like chemical substances in the laboratory of our mind. Abstract becomes concrete; emotions and feelings are substances to be analyzed.

> *She found his eloquence precious; there was not a drop of it that she didn't catch, as it came, for immediate bottling, for future preservation. The crystal flask of her innermost attention really received it on the spot, and she had even already the vision of how, in the snug laboratory of her afterthought, she should be able chemically to analyze it. (The Golden Bowl, 208)*

3.2.3.

The dominant metaphor of the novel, the leading theme, is the metaphor of the golden bowl which stands for a revelation of the truth. The metaphor implies positive value judgements for the bowl which is perfect and of purest gold, but at the same time it implies a negative value judgement since it has a crack; the Part/whole schema is combined with the Container metaphor since integrity means perfection, balance and happiness in personal relationships, while a crack, a flaw, means imperfection, disintegration and hence unhappiness. The bowl is the proof of betrayal; smashing the bowl, however, does not destroy the proof which cannot be destroyed. These two metaphors are also combined with Materializing the Abstract metaphor where a physical crack stands for mental disorder and emotional failure.

> *That cup there has turned witness — by the most wonderful of chance.*
> *...it was inscrutable in its rather stupid elegance, and yet, vivid and definite in its domination of the scene. Fanny could no more overlook it now than she could have overlooked a lighted Christmas–tree;*
> *Then it all depends on the bowl? I mean your future does? For that's what it comes to, I judge.*
> *It's of value, but its value's impaired, by a crack.*
> *A crack in the gold?*
> *That's the point. It's glass and cracked, under the gilt.*
> *Then your whole idea has a crack. (The Golden Bowl, 411)*

CONCLUSION

The last section deals with processes of extension, elaboration and composing (mixing) of metaphorical expressions with special attention paid to the expression of positive and negative value judgements which are either directly or indirectly transferred from the source domain and image schemata to innovative metaphorical expressions.

Extension involves the inclusion of those parts of a conceptual metaphor which are conventionally omitted so that these further extensions of the meta-

phor yield new insights. This can be illustrated by an example from Shake-speare's Hamlet where the DEATH IS SLEEP metaphor is extended to inclu-de the aspect of dreaming. Elaboration of schemas implies filling the slots in unusual ways rather than by extending the metaphor to map additional slots. Thus, Emily Dickinson elaborates DEATH IS DEPARTURE by including the destination and filling it as 'home'. Finally, perhaps the most powerful of all ways in which poetic thought goes beyond the ordinary way we use conventio-nal metaphors is Composing (Lakoff & Turner, 1989), i. e. the simultaneous use of several metaphors for one target domain or the use of metaphors com-bined with image schemas. Goatly distinguishes another process of forming new creative metaphors, i. e. Diversification where multiple vehicles refer to an identical topic. This process can be observed in the LIFE metaphors where multiple vehicles from the source domain of sailing, theater and plays refer to the same topic, i. e. target domain of life.

In the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphors from our corpus with 'sailing' as the source domain, the conventional metaphors are extended to include the activity of getting into the boat, guidance through life, i. e. being led by some-body else not knowing the points of the compass. Extensions of this metaphor include the activity of steering the boat and heading straight although the boat is rocking, taking an oar and pulling, drawing someone publicly into one's boat, being in the port, etc.

The FORCE/EQUILIBRIUM conventional metaphors are elaborated by fil-ling the slots in unusual ways to refer to the balance which is either estab-lished or restored; different vehicles from the source domain of physical action are employed to refer to the abstract entities of emotional and personal rela-tionships. Hence the ideas of emotional and mental balance is conceived as a person acting so smoothly and beautifully as a fourth wheel of the coach; the distribution of weights is effected by putting a person into the scale to keep the scale straight. The concept of control is conceived of as stretching a cord, grasping one's seat on a plunging horse with one's knees, pulling wires and controlling currents, managing people by lassoes. Control is reestablished at a touch of the spring, control over the others is conceptualized as keeping the lock of the dam and controlling the current.

The following group includes composite metaphors formed by combining metaphors with image schemata with special emphasis on the expression of value judgements transferred from the source domain. The first sub–group re-fers to the BALANCE/EQUILIBRIUM and FORCE/CONTROL schemas and their combination with the CONTAINER metaphors.

The Container metaphors combined with these image schemas include dif-ferent vehicles (cup, pail, bowl) as containers for emotions while the confined space is represented by a cage as prison, referring to the state of delusion in the target domain or a monastic cell standing for complete isolation. The con-tainer metaphors are elaborated by adding specific details to the conventional container metaphors; thus, the cage has gilt wires; the innovative metaphor includes the prisoner looking through the bars. In this composite metaphor the CONTAINER schema is combined with the PERSONIFICATION metap-

hor; a person conceptualized as an imprisoned bird in a gilded cage trying to push the door, fluttering the wings. These metaphors are further combined with the FORCE/CONTROL schema which implies keeping the prisoner inside by closing the window and giving the alarm to keep the creature inside the cage. The positive and negative value judgements are transferred either directly or indirectly from the source domain. Most frequently the same axiological parameter (plus or minus) is retained in the target domain; thus, the negative value judgement implied in the concepts of the cage or a trap in the source domain is transferred to the target domain of abstract entities with the same negative parameter of a situation with no options. However, in the extended metaphors, where the CONTAINER is a gilded trap, a cage with gilded bars or a gilded shell, the negative value judgement is combined with the positive value judgement from the source domain of precious metals. This combination of positive and negative value judgements is used to refer to an emotional situation which is apparently pleasant but actually represents being controlled by others which is always valued negatively. The positive value judgements from the source domain of materials, i. e. metals expressed by gilded bars and traps, does not change the prevalent negative value judgement of this metaphor.

In the LIFE–IS–A–JOURNEY metaphor with sailing imagery, the positive and negative value judgements are not always directly transferred from the source domain. Hence, the concept of port, which is valued positively in the source domain of sailing, can change its axiological parameter and have a negative value judgement in the target domain where it implies a passive attitude to life, absence of motivation, the end of active life, of all adventures and excitement which almost equals to the end of life, to death.

In the EQUILIBRIUM/BALANCE and CONTROL/FORCE metaphors the value judgements are transferred directly from the source domain retaining the same plus–minus sign. Thus, experience of physical equilibrium within our bodies, which is valued positively, is transferred to the target domain of abstract entities since the mental is understood and experienced in terms of the physical. Emotional balance is also valued positively since a proper balance of emotional forces should be reestablished after the exertion of various types of pressure. Hence, releasing a force, i. e. expressing one's emotions is valued positively. This transfer of a positive value judgement can be followed in a metaphor where a person tries to control one's emotions by stuffing a handkerchief into his/her mouth, while relief is gained by pulling it out. Thus, the positive value judgement implied in Control over oneself is changed by conceptualizing the release of the pressure inside oneself as having a positive value. However, it can be concluded that most frequently the same value judgement, either positive or negative, is retained after the projection from an image schema generated in the experience of physical balance onto a nonphysical, less clearly structured domain.

It can be concluded that the combination of structural metaphors and metaphors based on image–schemata with the expression of value judgements makes these metaphors innovative and creative as extensions and elaborations of the so–called Root Analogies, i. e. conventional metaphorical expressions.

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Značenje aksiološkoga dinamizma u metaforama koje se temelje na slikovnim shemama

U radu se analizira odnos između konvencionalnih metaforičkih izraza i inovativnih strukturalnih metafora i metafora koje se temelje na slikovnim shemama iz korpusa romana H. Jamesa. U uvodu se razmatra odnos između dvaju elemenata konceptualne metafore koje teoretičari metafore definiraju na različite načine, odnosno kao sadržaj i prijenosnik (I. A. Richards), središte i okvir, primarni/glavni i sekundarni/sporedni predmet (M. Black), izvorno i ciljno područje (G. Lakoff i M. Johnson), itd. Prvi dio sadrži analizu strukturalnih metafora u kojima se apstraktni entitet, kao što je život, predstavlja konkretnijim, jasnije određenim pojmovima putovanja, kazališta i igre. U drugom dijelu analiziraju se inovativne metafore koje se temelje na slikovnim shemama, kao što su shema sile, upravljanja, ravnoteže, spremnika, itd. s naglaskom na aksiološki dinamizam koji je ugrađen u ove sheme. U analizi metafora iz obje skupine posebna pozornost posvećuje se izražavanju vrijednosnih sudova koji se mogu izravno ili neizravno prenositi iz izvornog područja. Konačno možemo zaključiti kako svi ovi faktori, tj. procesi proširivanja, razrađivanja i spajanja metafora, kao i interakcija metafora sa slikovnim shemama te izražavanje vrijednosnih sudova doprinose stvaranju nekonvencionalnih metafora.

Key words: metaphors, theory of metaphor, image schemata, value judgements

Ključne riječi: metafore, teorija metafore, slikovne sheme, vrijednosni sudovi