

Mladen Ančić

Odjel za povijest / *Department of history*
Sveučilište u Zadru / *University of Zadar*
Ruđera Boškovića 5
HR - 23000 Zadar
mancic55@hotmail.com

UDK/UDC

94(497.5)“11/14“

doi: 10.15291/misc.3173

Izvorni znanstveni rad / *Original scientific paper*

Primljeno / *Received*: 25. X. 2020.

NEOČEKIVANI POBJEDNIK: USPON KARLA ROBERTA DO VLASTI



THE UNLIKELY WINNER: CHARLES ROBERT'S RISE TO POWER

Autor razmatra okolnosti u kojima je planiran, pokrenut i izveden pohod kojim je Karlo Robert prebačen s juga Italije na istočnu obalu Jadrana, kako bi odatle krenuo u ostvarivanje svoga nasljednog prava na krunu sv. Stjepana i prijestol Ugarsko-Hrvatskog Kraljevstva. Nasuprot uvriježenim stajalištima dosadašnje historiografije, autor zastupa tezu da je pohod organiziran ne s ciljem da Karlo doista ostvari to svoje pravo, već s nakanom da ga se ukloni iz Napulja, gdje je zbog prava nasljeđa tamošnje krune predstavljao potencijalni izvor političkih prijepora i sukoba. Argumente za takvo stajalište autor nalazi u raščlambi svih okolnosti pohoda, kao i u pogledima suvremenika na njega koji su dostupni u sačuvanoj materijalu vrela. K tomu autor razmatra razloge koji su u prvim godinama 14. stoljeća stvorili posve novu političku situaciju u kojoj je Karlo Robert iznenada došao u situaciju da može stvarno realizirati svoje potencijalno nasljedno pravo na kraljevski položaj.

Ključne riječi: dinastičke politike; kruna sv. Stjepana; papinski *plenitudo potestatis*; Karlo Robert

The author is analyzing the circumstances surrounding the planning, launching and carrying out the expedition intended to transfer Charles Robert from Southern Italy to Eastern Adriatic so that he could realize his inherited right to Crown of St. Stephen and the throne of the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in historiography, the author advocates a thesis that the expedition was organized not to enable Charles to realize his claim, but to remove him from Naples where he, being the heir to the local throne, was a potential source of political disputes and conflicts. Analyzing the details of the expedition and the contemporaries' views on it (as found in the preserved sources), the author finds arguments for such a viewpoint. He also analyzes the developments that, in the early 14th century, generated a whole new political situation that in turn created an opportunity for Charles Robert to actually realize his potential claim to the throne.

Key words: dynastic policies; Crown of St. Stephen; papal *plenitudo potestatis*; Charles Robert

Tradicionalni prikazi dolaska napuljskih Anžuvina u Ugarsko-Hrvatsko Kraljevstvo, bar što se tiče hrvatske i mađarske historiografije, uglavnom su taj sklop događaja tretirali u kratkim crtama i teleološki, kao prirodan i samorazumljiv. Sukladno takvim shvaćanjima dinastija je napuljskih Anžuvina imala pravo na krunu sv. Stjepana te je Karlo Robert i krenuo u ostvarenje svoga gotovo pa prirodnoga prava, pri čemu su hrvatski povjesničari redovito isticali zasluge poglavito Bribirskih Šubića. S obzirom na to da je mladi pretendent u svome naumu konačno i uspio, doduše tek nakon desetogodišnjih nastojanja, pa je potom tijekom više od trideset godina stvarnoga vladanja izgradio snažnu i centraliziranu organizaciju vlasti, činilo se kako je taj ishod bio predodređen od samoga začetka pohoda, iskrcavanja u Splitu 1300. godine.¹ Pritom su izazovi i poteškoće na koje je mladi vladar nailazio u prvim godinama svoje vladavine uglavnom prikazivani kao usputne prepreke koje nisu imale važnijega značenja u širem sklopu gibanja.² S druge strane, značenje „ugarske“ politike za napuljske Anžuvince nije privlačilo ni veću pozornost u djelima posvećenima toj dinastiji – ono se pojavljivalo na historiografskome obzoru samo posredno, kao govor o pravu Karla Roberta na napuljski prijestol.³ Tek su rijetki autori, poput Balinta Hómana, iskazivali dvojbe glede toga, pa je tako Hóman, i to više implicitno nego eksplicitno, naznačio da je odlazak Karla Roberta na istočnu obalu Jadrana bio napuljsko-hrvatski projekt.⁴ No, ni Hóman nije postavljao pitanje stvarnoga cilja toga pothvata u trenutku kad

As far as Croatian and Hungarian historiographies are concerned, the events relating to the arrival in the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia of the member of the Naples branch of the House of Anjou have traditionally been described in brief outline and in a teleological manner, as natural and self-explanatory. According to such perception, the Naples branch of the Angevine dynasty was entitled to Crown of St. Stephen, which is why Charles Robert set out to realize his right – practically birthright. In this context, Croatian historians typically point out that credit for his success is primarily due to the Šubići of Bribir. As the young pretender was ultimately successful in his intention (albeit after ten-year efforts) and managed to build a strong and centralized reign during more than thirty years of effective rule, it seemed that such an outcome had been predestined from the very beginning – specifically, from the landing in Split in 1300.¹ The challenges and hardships the young ruler had to face in the first years of his reign were mostly depicted as casual obstacles that were of no significance in the wider context, as if the success had been predestined.² On the other hand, the significance that the “Hungarian” policy had for the Angevines had never attracted particular attention in the literature dealing with this dynasty – it was addressed in historiography only indirectly, in the context of Charles Robert’s right to the Neapolitan throne.³ Only a few authors, such as Balint Hóman, expressed their dilemmas about it. Hóman suggests, more implicitly than explicitly, that Charles Robert’s departure for Eastern Adriatic was a joint Neapolitan and Croatian

* Rasprava je rezultat rada na projektu koji financira Hrvatska zaklada za znanost pod brojem IP-2019-04-9315 (*Anžuvinski archiregnum u srednjoistočnoj i jugoistočnoj Europi u 14. stoljeću: pogled s periferije*).

¹ Često ponavljane tvrdnje u hrvatskoj historiografiji v. prema V. Klaić 1897, 72–76; Šišić 1916, 108–11; N. Klaić 1976, 504; Karbić 1999, 227–230; Budak & Raukar 2006, 186–187. Za uvid u mađarsku i slovačku historiografiju, s također često ponavljanim tvrdnjama, dostatno je uputiti na novija djela kakva su Engel 2005, 128 i d.; Sroka 1996, 78–79; Skorka 2013, 243–245.

² Kao izuzetak u odnosu na standardni historiografski pristup mogu se izdvojiti Kieserwatter 2006 i Csukovits 2012 – oboje su zamijetili neke od elemenata u postojećim vrelima na koje ću se ovdje opširnije osvrnuti i koje ću, bitno drukčije no oni, podrobnije raščlaniti

³ Za ilustraciju v. Caggese 1929, 6 i d.; Kelly 2003, 1, 8, 276–278, 280–282; Lucherini 2013, 342.

⁴ Hóman 1938, 97–98.

* The work on this paper has been supported by the Croatian Science Foundation under the project IP-2019-04-9315 (*Angevin Archiregnum in East Central and Southeastern Europe in the 14th Century: View from the Periphery*).

¹ For the frequently repeated claims in Croatian historiography see V. Klaić 1897, 72–76; Šišić 1916, 108–11; N. Klaić 1976, 504; Karbić 1999, 227–230; Budak & Raukar 2006, 186–187. For an insight into Hungarian and Slovak historiographies, where such claims are also frequently repeated, one should consult relatively recent works such as Engel 2005, 128 ff.; Sroka 1996, 78–79; Skorka 2013, 243–245.

² As exceptions to the standard approach we can single out here Kieserwatter 2006, and Csukovits 2012 – both of them have noticed in the sources some of the elements that I am elaborating on and analyzing here in a quite different way than they do.

³ For illustration, see Caggese 1929, 6 ff.; Kelly 2003, 1, 8, 276–278, 280–282; Lucherini 2013, 342.

je pokrenut, a što se inače u svjetlu dosadašnjih spoznaja čini posve legitimnim. Osim, dakle, pitanja stvarnih ciljeva pokretanja pohoda u kojem je Karlo Robert prebačen na istočnu obalu Jadrana i toga kako je on izveden, ovdje ću se pozabaviti problemom kako je stvarno izgledala njegova „vlast“ u prvim godinama nakon krunidbe u Ostrogonu 1301. godine te time kakva je doista bila uloga hrvatskih velikaša, onih iz rodovskih zajednica Bribirskih Šubića i (Blagajskih) Babonića, na putu koji ga je doveo do uspjeha 1309. godine.

Dolazak, dakle, Karla Roberta na istočnu obalu Jadrana pored ostaloga i zbog uloge hrvatskoga plemstva bio je razlogom nastanka brojnih tekstova različite naravi, a od kojih je relativno velik broj i sačuvan. U raščlambi toga materijala valja poći od činjenice da je, u trenutku kad je u srpnju 1300. krenuo k Splitu, budući kralj imao tek dvanaest godina. Njegov odlazak iz Napuljskoga Kraljevstva valja staviti u kontekst onoga doba te početi od toga da je u tome trenutku, a od smrti svoga oca Karla Martela 1295. godine, upravo on bio puni i pravi legitimni nasljednik tamošnjega kraljevskog prijestola. Naime, s obzirom na jasna iako nepisana pravila o nasljeđivanju po načelu primogeniture, Karlo Robert je s punim pravom mogao očekivati da će naslijediti svoga djeda, Karla II. Njegov je otac bio Karlov prvorodeni sin, a sam Karlo Robert također prvorodeni sin svoga oca. Nasljeđa ga je, međutim, lišio upravo njegov djed,⁵ i to u dogovoru s papom Bonifacijem VIII., ako već ne i na njegovu inicijativu.⁶ Razloge tomu svakako valja tražiti prije svega

⁵ Karlo II. ostavio je oporukom iz 1308. Karlu Robertu 2.000 unci zlata ili 10.000 florena (Bartlett 2020, 215), što jasno daje do znanja postojanje u najmanju ruku osjećaja duga spram unuka. Caggese 1929, 6, i Kelly 2003, 281, citiraju djelo anonimnoga provansalskog pjesnika iz sredine XIV. stoljeća koji govori o priznanju, ali i kajanju kralja Roberta na samrtnoj postelji zbog činjenice da je nećaka lišio nasljeđa krune, što otvara pitanje uloge designiranoga nasljednika kraljevskoga prijestola, Roberta, u zbivanjima iz 1299. i 1300. godine.

⁶ O ulozi Bonifacija VIII., koji je posebnom bulom od 24. veljače 1297. godine definirao Roberta kao nasljednika napuljskoga prijestolja u tome trenutku, v. Caggese 1929, 6–7, Kiesewetter 2006, 162, te Bartlett 2020, 215. R. Bartlett posebno ističe tumačenje pojma „prvorodeni“ (*primogenitus*) u toj buli, a koje ovdje valja reproducirati: „Od (tvoje) prijerečene djece onaj kojega treba smatrati prvorodeni i koji treba biti tvoj nasljednik u kraljevstvu je onaj za kojega će se iznaći u trenutku tvoje smrti da ti je najbliži po srodstvu i najstariji po rođenju“ (*Is autem de predictis liberis primogenitus*

project.⁴ However, not even Hóman inquires about the actual objective of the expedition in the moment of its launching, which seems to be a legitimate approach. In addition to addressing the actual objectives of Charles Robert's expedition to Eastern Adriatic and how it was carried out, I will also analyze here the real nature of his "rule" in the first years following his coronation in Esztergom in 1301 and the true role of the Croatian nobility – the ones from the clans of the Šubići of Bribir and the Babonići of Blagaj – on his road to final success in 1309.

Consequently – and, among other things, due to the actions of the Croatian nobility – many texts of various nature, many of which have been preserved, were written about Charles Robert's arrival on Eastern Adriatic coast. When analyzing these documents, one should keep in mind that, when setting out to Split in July 1300, the future king was only twelve years old. His departure from the Kingdom of Naples should be placed within context of that period, starting from the fact that, at that moment (after the death of his father Charles Martel in 1295), he was the heir-apparent to the Neapolitan throne. Given the clear, though unwritten throne succession rules based on primogeniture, Charles Robert could expect with all reason that he would succeed his grandfather, Charles II. His father was Charles II's firstborn son and Charles Robert himself was also his father's firstborn son. However, it was his own grandfather who deprived him of his right of succession,⁵ by arrangement with Pope Boniface VIII, if not even at the Pope's initiative.⁶

⁴ Hóman 1938, 97–98.

⁵ In his will, written in 1308, Charles II bequeathed Charles Robert 2,000 ounces of gold (or 10,000 gold florins) (Bartlett, 2020, 215), clearly indicating that he at least had a sense of debt to his grandson. Caggese 1929, 6, and Kelly 2003, 281, quote the work of an anonymous mid-14th-century Provençal poet who gives an account of King Robert's confession and remorse on his deathbed over the fact that he had deprived his nephew of his right to the crown. This begs the question of the role of Robert, the designated heir to the throne, in the events of 1299 and 1300.

⁶ For the role of Boniface VIII, whose special bull of 24 February 1297 defined Robert as the heir to the throne of Naples at that moment, see Caggese 1929, 6–7, Kiesewetter 2006, 162 and Bartlett 2020, 215. R. Bartlett particularly points out at the interpretation of the term "firstborn" (*primogenitus*) used in this bull. It deserves to be reproduced

u papinskoj želji za osiguranjem stabilnosti u Kraljevstvu, s obzirom na zaplete oko vlasti nad Sicilijom, ali i na to da su odnosi kurije, odnosno samoga pape, s francuskim kraljem Filipom IV. Lijepim, kao i rimskim klanom Colonna, već bili prilično narušeni.⁷ No u trenutku kada je donesena odluka svakako je u prvome planu i za Karla II. i za papu stajao sukob s Aragoncima, koji su zaposjeli Siciliju i odatle ugrožavali vlast Karla II. i na kopnu, a u tome se ratu kralj mogao mnogo više osloniti na trećega sina, Roberta, nego na nedorasloga unuka, pa ga je sukladno tomu valjalo i nagraditi.⁸ Inače, do toga je vremena Napuljsko Kraljevstvo tradicionalno bilo posljednje papinsko pribježište u slučaju bilo kakva napada na Rim te je Bonifacije očito želio zadržati sigurnu odstupnicu za svaki slučaj, što bi s malodobnim kraljem i otvorenim ratom u tijeku bilo mnogo teže. Formalno je papa, kao senior, mogao ovjeriti odluku kralja Karla II. da prijestolonasljednikom odredi svoga trećega po rođenju sina, Roberta, jer se time nisu kršile odredbe ugovora kojim su Anžuvinci došli do napuljske krune.⁹ No sam je Karlo Robert u kasnijim vremenima jasno davao do znanja da se smatrao zakonitim za svoje punopravno nasljeđe, iz čega će se izroditi cijeli niz komplikacija što će se protezati sve do sredine 14. stoljeća.¹⁰ Uglavnom, odluka o lišavanju Karla Roberta prava nasljeđa na napuljsku krunu i promocija Roberta u punopravnoga nasljednika, iz čega je proizašlo i stajalište o nezakonitosti postupka Karla II. i pape Bonifacija VIII., doista je dugo i glasno odzvanjalo što

The reasons for this should primarily be sought in Pope's intention to ensure stability in the Kingdom after the entanglements with the rule over Sicily and in the fact that the relations between the Curia (i.e. the Pope himself) on the one hand and French king Philip IV the Fair and Roman clan of Colonna on the other had already been rather disturbed.⁷ But in the moment when the decision was made, featuring prominently both for Charles II and for Pope was the conflict with the Aragon, which had taken Sicily and used it to threaten Charles II's rule on the mainland. In that war, the king could rely on his third son Robert much more than on his young grandson; consequently, the son deserved a reward.⁸ Until that time, Kingdom of Naples had traditionally been the Pope's last sanctuary in case of any attack on Rome, so Boniface obviously wanted to retain this line of retreat in a contingency. With a minor on the throne and with an ongoing open war it would be much harder to do. Due to his rights of seniority, the Pope was in position to verify King Charles II's decision to proclaim his third-born son Robert the heir to the Neapolitan throne, because it would not represent a breach of the contract that led the Angevines to that throne.⁹ But Charles Robert himself would later make it clear he considered himself deprived of his birthright, which would result in numerous complications that stretched all the way to the mid-14th century.¹⁰ By and large, the decision to deprive Charles

intelligatur et in eodem regno tibi sit successor et heres, quem mortis tue tempore priorem gradu et maiorem natu reperiri continget – cit. prema Bartlett 2020, 510 bilj. 88).

⁷ Za odnos Bonifacija VIII. i Filipa IV. Lijepog v. Strayer 1980, 251 i d. te Canning 2011, 12–18.

⁸ Od veljače 1297. godine Robert je i formalno bio „kraljev vikar“, a 1299. preuzeo je zapovjedništvo nad snagama pripremljenim za pohod na Siciliju koji je i počeo tijekom lipnja te godine – usp. Caggese 1929, 9–12.

⁹ Za uvjete pod kojima je Karlo I. preuzeo Kraljevstvo obiju Sicilija 1266. godine v. Dunbabin 1998, 132. Složeni sklop odnosa Bonifacija VIII. i Karla II. zorno, uz poziv na raniju literaturu, raščlanjuje Tocco 2006.

¹⁰ O talijanskim zapletima Karla Roberta i Ludovika Velikoga opširno raspravlja Hóman 1938, 143, 317–352. R. Bartlett ide čak tako daleko da tvrdi kako je ovaj „slučaj oblikovao europske politike za cijelo jedno stoljeće“ – Bartlett 2020, 216.

here: “Among (your) children, he is to be understood as *primogenitus* and to be your successor and heir in the kingdom who, at the time of your death, is found to be prior in degree and older in birth”. (*Is autem de predictis liberis primogenitus intelligatur et in eodem regno tibi sit successor et heres, quem mortis tue tempore priorem gradu et maiorem natu reperiri continget* – quoted according to Bartlett 2020, 510 n. 88).

⁷ For the relations between Boniface VIII and Philip IV the Fair, see Strayer 1980, 251 ff. and Canning 2011, 12–18.

⁸ As of February 1297, Robert had formally been the “King's vicar”; in 1299, he took command over the troops prepared for the Sicily campaign, which would be launched in June that year – cf. Caggese 1929, 9–12.

⁹ For the terms under which Charles I took the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1266, see Dunbabin 1998, 132. The complex rapport between Boniface VIII and Charles II is lucidly analyzed by Tocco 2006, with references to earlier literature.

¹⁰ The Italian entanglements of Charles Robert and Louis the Great are extensively discussed by Hóman 1938, 143, 317–352. R. Bartlett goes to such lengths to say that “the case shaped European politics for almost a century” – Bartlett 2020, 216.

se ponajbolje vidi iz činjenice da su svoje komentare o tomu u kasnijim vremenima davali Baldus de Ubaldis, jedan od najvećih pravnih autoriteta srednjega vijeka, ali i Dante Alighieri, ovaj drugi uz jasno iskazane simpatije za Karla Roberta.¹¹ Valja uza sve ovo ipak primijetiti da kršenje prava primogeniture, u to doba još uvijek ne u punoj mjeri učvršćenoga jasnim pravilima, u sklopu odnosa unutar vladarskih dinastija europskoga srednjovjekovlja nije bila izrazito rijetka pojava, no i kao takva je ipak privlačila pozornost „javnosti“ onoga doba.¹²

Polazeći od tih spoznaja valja se na sljedećoj stepenici upitati kako se u tu sliku uklapa vrijeme početka pohoda koji je Karla Roberta doveo na istočnojadransku obalu. Jedan od mogućih odgovora bio bi onaj koji je svojedobno naznačio D. Karbić, smatrajući da se (valjda u Napulju) „zaključilo da bi duže odlaganje moglo izazvati gubitak krune u korist drugih pretendena.“¹³ Takav pristup implicira, a što je i inače značajka ukupnoga historiografskog pristupa ovome problemu kako je on ranije ocrtan, da se u Napulju doista ozbiljno računalo s pravom na krunu sv. Stjepana nakon smrti Ladislava IV. No s takvim pristupom, poglavito s tezom o „gubitku krune u korist drugih pretendena“, postoji ozbiljan problem – pripreme su za pohod na istočnu obalu Jadrana počele 1299. godine, a onda je i plan ostvaren u ljeto 1300. godine, u vrijeme dok je kralj Andrija III. još uvijek živ (i zdrav), bez ikakvih naznaka da mu se približava smrt, pa stoga na političkome obzoru, bar onome stvarnom, još uvijek nema (ozbiljnih) pretendena. Stoga se čini uputnijim razloge ovakva tempiranja vezati za nutarnje stanje u Napuljskome Kraljevstvu – prije svega uz činjenicu, na koju je ranije upozoreno, da su upravo u vrijeme kad se počelo govoriti o pohodu počele napadne operacije na Siciliji pod vodstvom designiranoga nasljednika Roberta. Bio je to zapravo pravi trenutak za „uklanjanje

Robert of his right to the Neapolitan crown and to proclaim Robert the heir-apparent, from which followed the viewpoint that the action of Charles II and Pope Boniface VIII had been illegal, reverberated for quite a long time. This is best reflected in the fact that figures like Baldus de Ubaldis, one of the leading legal authorities in the Middle Ages, and Dante Alighieri (who clearly expressed his liking for Charles Robert) commented on it in later periods.¹¹ However, it should be noted that, while still not fully defined with unambiguous rules in those days, violation of the right of primogeniture was not a particularly rare phenomenon in the context of the internal interrelations within ruling dynasties of Europe's Middle Ages. Nevertheless, it attracted “public” attention.¹²

Based on all of the above, the question arises how does the timing of Charles Robert's expedition to Eastern Adriatic fit in the bigger picture? One possible answer would be the one offered by D. Karbić in his time. He believed that they (those in Naples, probably) “concluded that any further delay could result in losing the crown to other pretenders.”¹³ Such an approach implies – and this is typical of the general historiographic approach to this problem as outlined above – that Naples quite seriously, and with good reason, counted on the right to Crown of St. Stephen after the death of Ladislaus IV. But there is a serious problem with such an approach – particularly with the thesis of “losing the crown to other pretenders”. The preparations for the expedition to Eastern Adriatic began in 1299 and the plan was finally realized in summer 1300, while King Andrew was still alive, with no indications of any serious illness, not to speak about immediate death, so there were no (serious) pretenders on the realistic political horizon at the time. This is why it may be advisable to seek the reasons for such timing in the internal situation in the Kingdom of Naples, primarily in the aforementioned fact that the first considerations of the expedition coincided with

¹¹ V. Kelly 2003, 8, 276–278, te Bartlett 2020, 214–215.

¹² Bartlett 2020, 210–226.

¹³ Karbić 2015, 182, a slično stajalište artikulira i Kieserwatter 2006, 174. Takvo tumačenje može naći potporu i u sačuvanom diplomatskom materijalu s početka Karlove vladavine – v. ovdje bilj. 17.

¹¹ V. Kelly 2003, 8, 276–278 and Bartlett 2020, 214–215.

¹² Bartlett 2020, 210–226.

¹³ Karbić 2015, 182; similar viewpoint can be found in Kieserwatter 2006, 174. Support for such an interpretation can also be found in the preserved diplomatic documents from the beginning of Charles' reign – see n. 17 here.

iz slike“ Karla Roberta,¹⁴ kao legitimnoga pretendenta na djedov prijestol, koji je svojom pukom nazočnošću u Napulju bio potencijalni izvor nevolja i nestabilnosti.

Uzimajući u obzir te činjenice, može se bez mnogo zazora zaključiti da je slanje dječaka na istočnu obalu Jadrana, odnosno dalje u njezino duboko zaleđe, ako se s time uopće ozbiljno i računalo, bilo način uklanjanja potencijalnoga ishodišta političke nestabilnosti. I ovdje je, kao i u slučaju promjene reda nasljeđa, naravno, postojao formalni pretekst za pokretanje cijele ekspedicije, koji se temeljio na činjenici da je dječak po svojoj baki, kraljici Mariji, ženi Karla II., polagao pravo na krunu sv. Stjepana. No to je pravo 1300. godine izgledalo vrlo daleko od mogućega ostvarenja jer je krunu i vlast čvrsto u svojim rukama držao Andrija III. kojega se općenito, nakon početnih dvojbi, smatralo zakonitim sljednikom unutar dinastije Arpadovića, čak i na papinskoj kuriji.¹⁵ On, doduše, nije imao muškoga potomstva, ali je još uvijek bio relativno mlad te se moglo računati s tim da će ipak uspjeti osigurati nasljednika. Andrijino se pravo iz Napulja osporavalo još od njegova uspona na prijestol, pa je Karlo Martel vjerojatno već 1292. godine čak bio i formalno okrunjen za ugarsko-hrvatskoga kralja, no praktičnoga nastojanja na ostvarenju njegovih prava zapravo nikad nije ni bilo. S postojećim vrelima nemoguće je stvarno prosuditi što je za napuljski dvor doista „pravo nasljeđa na krunu sv. Stjepana“ značilo 90-ih godina 13. stoljeća. Uzimajući, međutim, u obzir ono što istraživanja R. Bartletta otkrivaju o europskome „dinastičkom misaonom sklopu“ i strategijama izvedenim iz toga sklopa, čini se opravdanim pretpostaviti da je to „pravo“ otvaralo mogućnost nalaženja rješenja, pod određenim okolnostima stvorenim izgledima za izumiranje muške linije nasljeđa dinastije Arpadovića, za nekoga od prinčeva,

the beginning of the Sicilian campaign under the command of the designated heir Robert. It was the right moment for removing Charles Robert from the picture,¹⁴ on the ground that his mere presence in Naples, him being a legitimate pretender to his grandfather's throne, was a potential source of troubles and instability.

Taking these facts into account, we can safely conclude that sending the boy to the Eastern Adriatic coast and further into its hinterland – if the effort was from the start taken seriously at all – was a way of eliminating a potential source of political instability. Just like in the case of rearrangement of the line of succession, here, too, there was a formal pretext for launching the expedition. The pretext was the fact that the boy laid claim to Crown of St. Stephen through his grandmother Queen Mary, the wife of Charles II. However, in 1300, this claim seemed far from realistic, because the crown and power were firmly in the hands of Andrew III who, after initial dilemmas, was considered the legitimate heir in the line of the Arpad dynasty, even by the Papal Curia.¹⁵ True, he had no male issue at the time but was still relatively young and there was a chance that he would provide a successor eventually. Also true, Andrew's right to the throne had been contested in Naples ever since he had become king and Charles Martel was even formally crowned Hungarian-Croatian king as early as in 1292, although no practical efforts to exercise his rights had ever been undertaken. Based on the existing sources, it is not possible to judge what exactly did the “right to Crown of St. Stephen” actually meant for the Neapolitan court in the 1290s. However, taking into account R. Bartlett's discussions of the European “dynastic mindset” and the strategies arising from that mindset, it seems justified to assume that

¹⁴ Iskaz „uklanjanje iz slike“ nije ovdje čak ni puka metafora jer u „Bibliji iz Malinesa“ stoji oslikano dinastičko stablo napuljskih Anžuvina na kojemu nedostaju likovi i Karla Roberta i Karla Martela, njegova oca – v. Kelly 2003, 278.

¹⁵ U historiografiji ustaljeno stajalište, prema kojemu je papinska kurija od smrti Ladislava IV. jasno i nedvojbeno podržavala anžuvinske pretenzije na krunu sv. Stjepana ne priznajući Andriju III. za legitimnoga kralja Ugarsko-Hrvatskog Kraljevstva, jasno je i nedvojbeno opovrgnuo Kieserwatter 2006.

¹⁴ The expression “removing from the picture” is not even metaphorical here: the “Malines Bible” contains a picture depicting the genealogy of the Neapolitan Anjou dynasty on which Charles Robert and his father Charles Martel are missing – see Kelly 2003, 278.

¹⁵ The viewpoint – deep-rooted in historiography – that the Papal Curia had, ever since the death of Ladislaus IV, unambiguously supported the Angevine aspirations to Crown of St. Stephen while not recognizing Andrew III as the legitimate king of the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia, was clearly and indisputably refuted by Kieserwatter 2006.

brojnih muških potomaka Karla II. i njegove žene Marije.¹⁶ Ono što je, međutim, ovdje bitno naglasiti jest spoznaja da se takve okolnosti, odnosno uvjeti, *nisu* stekli u trenutku kad je planiran i pokrenut pohod koji će Karla Roberta odvesti na istočnu obalu Jadrana, što se onda odrazilo i na način na koji je taj pohod organiziran i izveden.

Formalni pretekst za organiziranje ekspedicije upravo 1300. predstavljao je poziv koji su politički protivnici Andrije III. na čelu s braćom Héderima (u historiografiji se za braću često koristi i oznaka Kőszegi) uputili na papinsku kuriju, a vjerojatno i napuljski dvor, 1299. godine. Okolnosti upućivanja toga poziva, kao i njegov oblik, zasad su još uvijek zagonetke, jer o njemu tek s nekoliko riječi govore ugarske kronike 14. stoljeća, no čini se da je ta akcija ostavila i posredan trag u diplomatskoj građi.¹⁷

¹⁶ Marija je rodila čak osam sinova: Karla Martela, Ludovika, Roberta, Filipa, Ivana, Petra, Rajmonda Berengara i Ivana Tristana, od kojih su zadnja trojica umrli relativno rano – Kelly 2003, 124 bilj. 183. Za „dinastičke strategije“ Anžuvinača kao svojevrstnu materijalizaciju političkih planova, ali i način stvaranja te uporabe simboličkoga kapitala, v. Runciman 1992, 135–147; Dunbabin 1998, 89–98; Kelly 2003, 52 i d., 119–132.

¹⁷ Različita tumačenja v. prema Hóman 1938, 96–98, Kiesewetter 2006, 174–176, i Zsoldos 2013, 231–232. Što se pak diplomatske građe tiče, trag ove akcije može se naslutiti u darovnici što ju je 22. svibnja 1304. kancelarija Karla Roberta izdala stanovnome Benediktu, sinu Bude *de Gezth* – Nagy 1878, 80–82 br. 74. U naraciji te darovnice, pri popisu Benediktovih zasluga govori se o tomu da je on čak tri puta dolazio u Napulj kao izaslanik ugarskih „prelata i baruna“ s porukom da mladi pretendent treba požuriti s dolaskom u Ugarsku kako bi ostvario svoja prava – *idem magister Benedictus, a prelatibus et baronibus regni vngarie, ad nos in apuliam, regnum nostrum in legacionem transmissus graciosas et vtilis, tam ipsi regno Vngarie, quam nobis legaciones retulit et attulit, videlicet, quod nos celerius quam possemus in ipsum regnum Vngarie, tam electione predictorum prelatorum, et baronum, quam iure geniture nobis debitum, iter et intratum nostrum accelerare festinaremus*. Spomenuti kroničarski tekst, u jednoj od sačuvanih verzija, govori o tomu da su poslanstvo papi uputili ne samo Héderi već i Ugrin Csák, isti onaj koji će nakon 1301. biti glavni oslonac i podrška Karlo Robertu: *In cuius imperio* (sc. Andrije III.) *quidam nobiles regni, Iohannes scilicet et Herricus banus filius Herrici ac Vgrinus filius Pouch de Vylac aliique* (na mjestu Ugrinova imena u drugoj sačuvanoj verziji teksta stoji tek: *ac alii*) *quamplures in preiudicium regis Andree a papa Bonifacio VIII-o regem (ut dicitur) petierunt* – Szentpétery 1937, 477 r. 4-13. Temeljem danas poznatih činjenica može se dakle razaznati kako se izričaj „prelati i

this “right” offered possible solution (in the circumstances created by the prospects of extinction of the male lineage of the Arpad dynasty) for one of the princes – the numerous male children of Charles II and his wife Mary.¹⁶ However, it is important to underline here that such circumstances – or conditions – did *not* exist in the moment when the expedition that would take Charles Robert to Eastern Adriatic was planned and launched, which, in turn, reflected in the way the whole expedition was organized and carried out.

The formal pretext for organizing the expedition in that particular year – 1300 – was the invitation that Andrew III's political opponents headed by the brothers Héder (often referred to in historiography as Kőszeg) sent to the Papal Curia, and probably to the Neapolitan court, in 1299. The circumstances of the invitation and its form are still subject of scrutiny because it is only offhandedly mentioned in the Hungarian 14th-century Chronicle. It seems, however, that the invitation also left an indirect trace in latter documents.¹⁷ It is clear

¹⁶ Mary gave birth to as many as eight sons: Charles Martel, Louis, Robert, Philip, John, Peter, Raymond Berengar and John Tristan (the last three died relatively early) – Kelly 2003, 124 n. 183. For Angevine “dynastic strategies” aimed at realization of their political plans and for the methods used to create and use this symbolical capital, see Runciman 1992, 135-147; Dunbabin 1998, 89-98; Kelly 2003, 52 ff., 119-132.

¹⁷ For various interpretations of invitation see Hóman 1938, 96-98, Kiesewetter 2006, 174-176, and Zsoldos 2013, 231-232. As regards latter documents, a deed of gift issued by Charles Robert's chancery to a certain Benedict, son of Buda *de Gezth*, on May 22, 1304, hints at the invitation – Nagy 1878, 80-82 no. 74. Listing Benedict's merits, the deed specifies that he visited Naples as many as three times as an envoy of Hungarian “prelates and barons”, with a message that the young pretender should come to Hungary as soon as possible to realize his right – *idem magister Benedictus, a prelatibus et baronibus regni vngarie, ad nos in apuliam, regnum nostrum in legacionem transmissus graciosas et vtilis, tam ipsi regno Vngarie, quam nobis legaciones retulit et attulit, videlicet, quod nos celerius quam possemus in ipsum regnum Vngarie, tam electione predictorum prelatorum, et baronum, quam iure geniture nobis debitum, iter et intratum nostrum accelerare festinaremus*. As far as the 14th-century Chronicle is concerned, one of the preserved versions of this chronicle states that envoys were sent to the Pope not only by the Héders, but also by Ugrin Csák, who would become one of Charles Robert's main supporters after 1301: *In cuius imperio* (sc. Andrew III's) *quidam nobiles regni, Iohannes scilicet et Herricus banus filius Herrici ac Vgrinus filius Pouch de Vylac aliique* (in the second preserved version there is no Ugrin's name; it merely says: *ac alii*) *quamplures in preiudicium regis Andree a papa Bonifacio VI-II-o regem (ut dicitur) petierunt* – Szentpétery 1937, 477 ll. 4-13.

Iz kasnijega slijeda događaja jasno je tek toliko da se taj poziv, bar što se tiče Hédera, najvjerojatnije koristio kao ulog u pregovorima nezadovoljnika s Andrijom III., koji su započeti još 1298. godine.¹⁸ Vijesti o pripremama dječaka pretendenta za pohod na istočnu obalu Jadrana, koje su se rastegle na gotovo cijelu prvu polovinu 1300. godine, zacijelo su stigle i do samoga Andrije III., pa je vjerojatno i to utjecalo na pregovore koji su trajali. Naime, Andrijin djed Mihajlo Morosini bio je upravo od veljače 1299. do veljače 1301. godine zadarski knez i pritom iskazivao itekakav interes za zbivanja vezana za krunu sv. Stjepana, pri čemu se može pretpostaviti da tu nije bilo riječi samo o pasivnome interesu.¹⁹

baruni“ praktično odnosio na izabranoga, ali ne i potvrđenoga, ostrogonskoga nadbiskupa Grgura te na braću Hédere i Ugrina Csáka. S druge strane, činjenica da je posjed, koji je kraljevskom darovnicom dobio Benedikt, bio u Srijemskoj županiji daje za pravo zaključiti kako je on bio Ugrinov službenik, „familijar“. Svakako valja upozoriti da registri anžuvinske kancelarije, uništeni u Drugome svjetskom ratu, bar koliko se danas zna, nisu sačuvali trag veza napuljskoga dvora s Ugrinom Csákom, iako se on pokazao kao najdosljedniji anžuvinski pristaša među ugarskim svjetovnim velikašima.

¹⁸ Proces pregovaranja, ali bez naznake da je poziv u Napulj mogao biti ulog u tim pregovorima, ukratko prikazuje, a potom i jasno analizira njegove rezultate Zsoldos 2013, 231–233.

¹⁹ Za pismo kojim mletački podanik, u tome trenutku u službi ugarsko-hrvatskoga kralja, Petar Bonzano u ljeto 1300. godine izvješćuje Mihajla Morosinija, tada zadarskoga kneza, o zbivanjima na Andrijinu dvoru v. ovdje bilj. 37. Morosiniji su inače držali od početka 13. stoljeća nasljedni položaj kneza otoka Osora i Cresa (Ljubić 1868, 24 br. XXXIII), no tijekom 90-ih godina toga stoljeća uspijevali su dobiti u nekoliko navrata položaj knezova u Zadru i Dubrovniku (za zadarska kneštva Rugerija Morosinija od 1292. do 1295. v. *DZ VII*, 113 br. 93, 30. 11. 1292. i 196 br. 175, 02. 01. 1295., Fiofia (Feofia) Morosinija od 1295. do 1297. v. *DZ VII*, 211 br. 191, 28. 10. 1295. i 261 br. 230, 04. 12. 1296. te Mihajla Morosinija od 1299. do 1301. v. *DZ VII*, 329 br. 286, 11. 03. 1299. i *DZ VIII*, 2 br. 3, 31. 01. 1301.; Marin Morosini je bio dubrovački knez od 1295. do 1297. – *DZ VII*, 207 br. 186, 13. 06. 1295. i 265 br. 234, 24. 03. 1297.; Mihajlo Morosini bio je inače tijekom 70-ih i 80-ih godina 13. stoljeća u dva navrata na položaju dubrovačkoga kneza – *DZ VI*, 110 br. 98, 02. 07. 1275, 493 br. 409, 12. 08. 1284.). S obzirom na gustu mrežu kontakata i veza istočne obale Jadrana i južne Italije teško može biti dvojbe da je položaj knezova u ključnim točkama te mreže, Dubrovniku i Zadru, mogao osigurati važne promatračnice, ako ne i nešto više za mletački patricijski rod koji je u tome dobu imao i „svoga čovjeka“ na ugarsko-hrvatskome prijestolju, a kojemu su napuljski Anžuvinci predstavljali neku vrst prijatelja.

from subsequent developments that the invitation, at least as far as the Héders were concerned, was probably used as a stake in the malcontents' negotiations with Andrew III, initiated back in 1298.¹⁸ The news of the young pretender's preparations for the expedition to Eastern Adriatic, which stretched throughout the first half of 1300, must have also reached Andrew III, which must have affected the ongoing negotiations. Andrew's grandfather Michael Morosini was Zadar's rector in that particular period (from February 1299 to February 1301). He showed great interest in the entanglements around Crown of St. Stephen. We can assume that his interest was not merely passive.¹⁹ Be it as it may, it was only recently that Hungarian historian Atilla Zsoldos very convincingly demonstrated that Andrew

Based on what we know today, it is clear that the expression “prelates and barons” referred to the elected – but not confirmed – Bishop Gregory of Esztergom, the Héder brothers and Ugrin Csák. On the other hand, the fact that the estate given to Benedict by the royal deed of gift was in Syrmia County supports the conclusion that he was Ugrin's retainer. We should certainly note here that, to our best knowledge, no evidence of any connection between the Neapolitan court and Ugrin Csák has been preserved in the records of the Angevine chancery, destroyed in World War II, although he turned out to be the most consistent supporter of the Anjou dynasty among the Hungarian secular high nobility.

¹⁸ The process of the negotiations, without any suggestion that the invitation to Naples could have been a stake in them, is briefly outlined by Zsoldos 2013, 231–233, who also analyzes its results.

¹⁹ For the letter in which Peter Bonzano, a Venetian subject in the service of the Hungarian-Croatian king notifies in summer 1300 Michael Morosini, then rector of Zadar, of the events on Andrew's court, see n. 37 here. Since the early 13th century, the Morosinis had been hereditary rectors of Osor and the island of Cres (Ljubić 1868, 24 n. XXXIII); in the 1290s, they also managed to become rectors in Zadar and Dubrovnik (for Rugeri Morosini as the rector of Zadar from 1292 to 1295, see *CD VII*, 113 no. 93, November 30, 1292 and 196 no. 175, January 2, 1295; for Fiofi (Feofio) Morosini from 1295 to 1297, see *CD VII*, 211 no. 191, October 28, 1295 and 261 no. 230, December 4, 1296, and for Michael Morosini from 1299 to 1301, see *CD VII*, 329 no. 286, March 11, 1299 and *CD VIII*, 2 no. 3, January 31, 1301; Marin Morosini was the rector of Dubrovnik from 1295 to 1297 – *CD VII*, 207 no. 186, June 13, 1295 and 265 no. 234, March 24, 1297; Michael Morosini was the rector of Dubrovnik on two occasions in the 1270s and 1280s – *CD VI*, 110 no. 98, July 2, 1275, 493 no. 409, August 12, 1284). Given the dense network of contacts and links between Eastern Adriatic and Southern Italy, there can be no doubt that having rectors in place in the network's crucial points of Dubrovnik and Zadar meant having important observation posts, if not more, used by Venetian patricians who also had “their man” on the Hungarian-Croatian throne at the time; to this “man”, the Angevines of Naples posed a threat of a sort.

Bilo kako bilo, tek je nedavno mađarski povjesničar Atila Zsoldos vrlo uvjerljivo pokazao da je Andrija III. uspješno okončao te pregovore upravo u vrijeme kad je ekspedicija s budućim kraljem u srpnju isplovljavala iz Barlette. Suština je dogovora bila da je, u zamjenu za lojalnost kruni, kralj četvorici velikaša priznao pravo na korištenje titule palatina, jednom titule transilvanskoga vojvode, a Henrik Héder dobio je pravo na titulu slavonskoga bana. Ako je, dakle, bar formalno, pohod Karla Roberta i bio pokrenut po pozivu Henrika Hédera i njegova kruga upućenom 1299. godine, u trenutku kad je on konačno pokrenut u ljeto iduće godine, politička je situacija u Ugarsko-Hrvatskom Kraljevstvu bila stubokom promijenjena, a pozicija aktualnoga kralja nikad čvršća i stabilnija.

Iz ovakvoga prikaza stanja nije teško zaključiti kako je temeljni cilj cijeloga pothvata bio zapravo maknuti dječaka na stanoviti način iz Napulja, što se daje potvrditi nekim zapažanjima koja bacaju malo drukčije svjetlo na pothvat preuzimanja krune sv. Stjepana. U tome kontekstu posebnu pozornost privlači pismo kralja Karla II. od 13. srpnja 1300. godine,²⁰ upućeno svega petnaestak dana prije isplovljavanja flote iz Barlette, „upraviteljima kućanstva“ (*magistris hospicii*) Karla (Roberta) od Ugarske, a nastalo nakon kraljeva razgovora s priorom dominikanaca iz Barija. Prior Petar de Andria upozorio je, naime, kralja Karla II. da dječak koji se spremao postati kralj u opravi koja mu je priređena za pohod, nema posebnih, „bojnih“ konja, niti pak svilenih odora, stvari za koje je, navodno, bilo uređeno da mu se prirede.²¹ Stvar izgleda to čudnije što je jug Italije bio naširoko poznato područje uzgoja konja, među njima i onih posebnih „bojnih“, pa je tako primjerice Karlo I., otac Karla II. i djed Karla Roberta, svojim novim vazalima u Grčkoj samo 8. srpnja 1280.

III had successfully brought the negotiations to an end in June, just when the expedition was about to leave the port of Barletta with the child/future king aboard. Essentially, the arrangement was that, in return for loyalty to the crown, four noblemen would be entitled by the king to use the title of palatine, one the title of duke of Transylvania and Henry Héder the title of *ban* of Slavonia. If, at least formally, the expedition of Charles Robert was indeed initiated by the invitation sent by Henry Héder and his circle in 1299, in the moment when it was actually launched in summer next year the political situation in the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia was fundamentally changed and the position of the incumbent king had never been stronger and more stable.

The above description of the situation clearly indicates that the expedition's main objective was to remove the boy from Naples. Some observations that cast a somewhat different light on this project of taking over Crown of St. Stephen can be seen as evidence of such an interpretation. In this context, particularly interesting is King Charles II's letter from July 13, 1300,²⁰ sent to the “majordomos” (*magistris hospicii*) of Charles Robert of Hungary only a couple of weeks before the fleet left Barletta. The letter was written after the king's conversation with Peter de Andria, a Dominican prior from Bari. The prior had warned King Charles II that the supplies and equipment prepared for the expedition of the boy who was about to become king did not include special “war horses” or silken robes – the things that had supposedly been ordered.²¹ The whole thing seems all the more strange because Southern Italy was known as a horse-breeding region, which included the special war horses (for example, on July 8, 1280, alone, Charles I – father of Charles II and grandfather of Charles Robert – sent to his new vassals in Greece not less than 63 horses, mostly the ones intended for

²⁰ Pismo je tiskano u Wenzel 1874, 151–152 br. 188.

²¹ Wenzel 1874, 151: *Religiosus vir frater Petrus de Andria de Ordine Predicatorum Prior in Baro presens coram nobis exposuit, quod non sine amiratione accepimus, eundem nepotem nostrum non habere destrarium nec curserium, aut roba de seta pro persona sua, prout extitit ordinatum.* Prior Petar očito je bio dobro obaviješten o tome što se događalo s pratnjom dječaka pretendenta jer je sudjelovao u pripremi pohoda, a onda mu se i pridružio te se nalazio u Karlovoj pratnji i u dječakovo ime dolazio u Napulj i nakon iskrčavanja u Splitu – Wenzel 1874, 144 br. 176; 164 br. 207 (s pogrešnom godinom 1301. umjesto 1300.).

²⁰ The letter was published in Wenzel 1874, 151-152 no. 188.

²¹ Wenzel 1874, 151: *Religiosus vir frater Petrus de Andria de Ordine Predicatorum Prior in Baro presens coram nobis exposuit, quod non sine amiratione accepimus, eundem nepotem nostrum non habere destrarium nec curserium, aut roba de seta pro persona sua, prout extitit ordinatum.* Obviously, Prior Peter was well-informed about the young pretender's entourage because not only he had taken part in the preparations for the expedition, but he also joined it. He also came to Naples in the boy's name even after landing in Split – Wenzel 1874, 144 no. 176; 164 no. 207 (specifying a wrong year – it should be 1300 instead of 1301).

poslao 63 različita konja, uglavnom ona namijenjena vojnoj službi.²² Izrazito skupi (na europskim tržištima) posebni „bojni“ konji (*dextrarii*)²³ i svilene oprave po onodobnim su shvaćanjima predstavljali temeljno fizičko, odnosno vanjsko i vidljivo simboličko obilježje društvenoga ugleda, posebice pak onoga kraljevskog veličanstva. Jasno se to raspoznaje na primjeru oca Karla Roberta, Karla Martela, koji je neposredno pred smrt po Italiji paradirao kao „kralj Ugarske“ i očevo nasljednik u sjajnoj pratnji 200 mladih vitezova iz Francuske, Provanse i Napuljskoga Kraljevstva. Njihova bogata oprema, sa zlatnim ostrugama i posrebnim te pozlaćenim sedlima urešenim anžuvinskim i ugarskim herladičkim simbolima, kao i jednoobrazna luksuzna nošnja koju im je priskrbio sam „ugarski kralj“, očito je privlačila pozornost i jasno davala do znanja društvenu važnost onoga kome su služili.²⁴ Nije teško naslutiti da

military).²² Being very expensive (in European markets), special war horses (*dextrarii*)²³ and silken robes in those days represented a fundamental external and visible symbols of high social standing, particularly of kings. It is clearly seen in the case of Charles Robert's father Charles Martel: just before his death, he paraded through Italy as “King of Hungary” and his father's successor, escorted by 200 young knights from France, Provence and Kingdom of Naples. Their rich accoutrements, golden spurs and silver-plated and gold-plated saddles with Angevine and Hungarian heraldic symbols, as well as the uniform luxury attires provided by the “King of Hungary” himself, obviously attracted attention and reflected the social relevance of the person they had served.²⁴ We can safely assume it was this

²² Davis 1989, 62–64.

²³ Po jednome opisu londonskoga tržišta konja iz 70-ih godina XII. stoljeća „skupi bojni konji“ (*dextrarii*) su se odlikovali „elegantnom formom i plemenitim držanjem, s ušima koje podrhtavaju, uzdignutim vratom i golemim sapima“ (Davis 1989, 66). Kako je izvježbano oko srednjovjekovnoga promatrača jasno razlikovalo takva posebnog „bojnog konja“ od onih običnih, pokazuje primjer splitskoga patricija i kroničara druge polovine XIV. stoljeća, A. Cutheisa. On, naime, u opisu ulaska novoga nadbiskupa, Hugolina de Branca, u Split 1349. jasno razlikuje „bojne“ i obične konje te veli kako je nadbiskup svečano ušao u grad „s pratnjom mnogih klijenata s posebnim bojnim i mnoštvom običnih konja“ – *cum magna clientum societate cum destreriis et equis multis* (citirano prema fotografijama teksta s kraja XIV. stoljeća reproduciranim u *Legende i kronike* 1977, 392). Cijena je pak takvoga *dextrarius*a u Napuljskome Kraljevstvu 90-ih godina XIII. stoljeća iznosila oko 20 „unči zlata“ ili 100 florena – za cijenu v. Hardi 2012, 64 te 61 bilj. 113 za tečaj zlatnoga novca.

²⁴ Firentinski kroničar Giovanni Villani opisuje pojavu Karla Martela u Firenci 1295. ovako: *con sua compagna CC cavalieri a sproni d'oro, Franceschi, e Provenzali, e del Regno, tutti giovani, vestiti col re d'una partita di scarlato et verde bruno, e tutti con selle d'una assisa a palafreno rilevate d'ariento e d'oro, co l'arme a quartieri a gigli ad oro, e accerchiata rosso e d'argento, cioè l'arme d'Ungaria, che pareo la più nobile e ricca compagna che anche avesse uno giovane re con seco* – Villani s.a., 540. Važnost prikazivanja luksuza i sjaja u svezi s kraljevskom pojavom pokazuje opis pogrebnih svečanosti upriličenih upravo za Karla Roberta 1342., što ga je ostavio Ivan Aprod, a potkraj XV. stoljeća objavio Ivan Thuróczi. U tome se opisu, koji stoji u oštrome kontrastu spram onoga što se zna o odlasku iz Napulja, spominju čak tri „svečana bojna konja“ opremljena u purpuru, a koje su jahali vitezovi s kraljevskom ratnom opremom (*tres solennes dextrarii ipsius domini regis Karoli suis falerati purpureis operimentis: super quos milites strennui armis eiusdem*

²² Davis 1989, 62–64.

²³ According to an account of the London horse market in the 1170s, high-priced war horses (*dextrarii*) were characterized by their “elegant form and noble stature, with ears aquiver, necks upright and a large buttocks” (Davis 1989, 66). An experienced medieval observer made a sharp distinction between special “war horses” and ordinary ones, as can be seen in the example of A. Cutheis, a 14th-century Split patrician and chronicler. When describing the arrival in Split of the new archbishop Hugolin de Branca in 1349, he distinguishes “war horses” from ordinary ones, saying that the archbishop made solemn entrance “escorted by numerous clients, on special war horses and many ordinary ones” – *cum magna clientum societate cum destreriis et equis multis* (quoted from the photographic reproduction of the late 14th-century manuscript in *Legende i kronike* 1977, 392). In 1290s, the price of one such *dextrarius* in the Kingdom of Naples was approx. 20 “ounces of gold” or 100 florins – for the price, see Hardi 2012, 64 and 61 n. 113 for the gold coin exchange rate.

²⁴ This is how Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani describes the arrival of Charles Martel in Florence in 1295: *con sua compagna CC cavalieri a sproni d'oro, Franceschi, e Provenzali, e del Regno, tutti giovani, vestiti col re d'una partita di scarlato et verde bruno, e tutti con selle d'una assisa a palafreno rilevate d'ariento e d'oro, co l'arme a quartieri a gigli ad oro, e accerchiata rosso e d'argento, cioè l'arme d'Ungaria, che pareo la più nobile e ricca compagna che anche avesse uno giovane re con seco* – Villani s.a., 540. The importance of displaying royal luxury and glamour can be seen in the description of the ceremony of Charles Robert's funeral in 1342, written by John Aprod and published in late 15th century by John Thuróczi. In this description, in sharp contrast with what is known about the departure from Naples, as many as three crimson-covered “solemn war horses” are mentioned. They were carrying knights with regal accoutrements (*tres solennes dextrarii ipsius domini regis Karoli suis falerati purpureis operimentis: super quos milites strennui armis eiusdem domini regis induti sedebant* – Thuróczy 1986, vol. 1, fol. 2v).

je prior iz Barija, vjerojatno pod utjecajem takve „slike u glavama“ onoga što se dostoji jednoga kralja, i intervenirao kod Karla II. Čudeći se i sam propustu onih koje je zadužio da skrbe oko dječakovih priprema, kralj ih pismom upozorava na sredstva, a riječ je o 15 unči zlata, namijenjenih upravo nabavi četiriju svečanih svilenih oprava (*quator guarnimentis robe de seta*), i izdaje nalog da se propust otkloni, odnosno da se kupe svilene oprave (četiri su svilene oprave inače stajale 25 florena manje no *dextrarius*; ostaje pod znakom pitanja zašto kraljev nalog ne govori ništa o nabavi bar jednoga konja). Iako je to bar na prvi pogled nebitan detalj, pismo jasno upozorava na ne baš pretjeranu skrb kraljevskoga dvora oko ekspedicije na koju je upućen dvanaestogodišnji dječak s konačnim ciljem da postane ugarsko-hrvatski kralj. Zapravo, cijeli je „ekspedicijski korpus“ bio ukrčan na dvije galije i jedan manji brod, galion, pri čemu je veliki dio toga prostora vjerojatno bio potreban za prijevoz ukupno predviđenih **unajmljenih** sto pedeset konja i njihovu opskrbu.²⁵ Unatoč tomu što dokumenti napuljske provenijencije spominju „kućanstvo“ ili „dvor“ (*hospitium*) Karla Roberta i čak trojicu njegovih „predstojnika“ (*magistri hospitii*) te posebnoga „rizničara“ (*thesaurarius*),²⁶ činjenica da su za pohod bili **unajmljeni** posebni ko-

public perception of a king that the prior from Bari had in mind when he intervened with Charles II. The king himself was surprised by this failure of the persons he had charged with the preparations, so he warned them in a letter that funds – 15 ounces of gold (75 florins) – had been allocated for purchasing four formal silken robes (*quator guarnimentis robe de seta*) and he ordered that this omission be corrected and that four silken robes be purchased (four silken robes cost 25 florins less than a *dextrarius*; it is not clear why the king's order says nothing about purchase of at least one horse). While seemingly an irrelevant detail, the letter clearly reflects that the royal court did not give much concern to the expedition intended to enable the twelve-year-old boy to become the Hungarian-Croatian king. Actually, the entire „expeditionary corps“ boarded two galleys and a smaller ship (galleon). Most of the ship space was probably intended for the planned one hundred fifty **rented** horses and their supplies.²⁵ Although the Neapolitan documents mention Charles Robert's "household" or "court" (*hospitium*), as many as three of his "majordomos" (*magistri hospitii*) and a special "treasurer" (*thesaurarius*),²⁶ the fact that special horses were **rented** for the expedition indicates that the pretender's entourage on his journey to Eastern Adriatic

domini regis induti sedebant – Thuróczy 1986, sveš. 1, fol. 2v), dok je kraljevo tijelo, izloženo u Višegradu, bilo opremljeno tako da mu je na glavi stajala zlatna kruna, bio je odjeven u skrletnu tuniku urešenu dragim kamenjem, a na nogama su mu bile cipele rađene od zlata (*preciosissimus caput eius iuxta decentiam regni: sui honoris corona aurea: corpusque ipsius splendidissimum tunica scarletina ac etiam caligis solutaribus gemis preciosissimis contextis: et desuper calcaria aurea pulcherrimis pedibus sue excellentie annexendo induentes* – Thuróczy 1986, sveš. 1, fol. 2).

²⁵ V. kraljevske naloge od 19. svibnja 1300. koji donose broj brodova i konja – Wenzel 1874, 149–150 br. 184 i 185. Drugi od tih naloga jasno govori o **unajmljenim konjima** – *De armatura galearum pro transitu Karoli de Vngaria, et de naulizandis centum quinquaginta equis, ac salmis frumenti ducentis, et ordei quadringentis ad usum hospitii dicti Karolo, ac biscotto necessario pro panatica* (naglasio kurzivom M. A.).

²⁶ Za „predstojnike dvora/kućanstva“ v. ovdje bilj. 20; za „rizničara“ v. Wenzel 1874, 148 br. 182 i 150 br. 186. Za tradiciju zasebnih prinčevskih „kućanstva/dvorova“ napuljskih Anžuvina, koja su inače predstavljala umanjenu kopiju kraljevskoga „kućanstva/dvora“, v. Passerini 2019, 80–88. U internoj hijerarhiji tih „kućanstava/dvorova“ na vrhu su stajali „maršal“ i „predstojnik“, dok je „rizničar“ bio činovnik koji je bio podređen „predstojniku“. Je li doista i dvanestogodišnji Karlo Robert imao svoje potpuno „kućanstvo/dvor“ prije no što je krenuo na pohod, teško je reći, no spomenuta vrela upućuju na takav zaključak.

King's body was exhibited in Visegrad, and during this time he had a crown on his head and was dressed in a jewel-decorated scarlet robe. He had golden shoes on his feet (*preciosissimus caput eius iuxta decentiam regni: sui honoris corona aurea: corpusque ipsius splendidissimum tunica scarletina ac etiam caligis solutaribus gemis preciosissimis contextis: et desuper calcaria aurea pulcherrimis pedibus sue excellentie annexendo induentes* – Thuróczy 1986, vol. 1, fol. 2).

²⁵ See royal orders of 19 May 1300, specifying the number of ships and horses – Wenzel 1874, 149–150 no. 184 and 185. The second order clearly mentions **rented** horses – *De armatura galearum pro transitu Karoli de Vngaria, et de naulizandis centum quinquaginta equis, ac salmis frumenti ducentis, et ordei quadringentis ad usum hospitii dicti Karolo, ac biscotto necessario pro panatica* (italic by M.A.).

²⁶ For „household/court majordomos“, see n. 20 here; for „treasurer“, see Wenzel 1874, 148 no. 182 and 150 no. 186. For the tradition of separate princely “households/courts” of the Angevines of Naples, otherwise a smaller version of a royal “household/court”, see Passerini 2019, 80–88. On the top of the internal hierarchy of these “households/courts” there were “marshal” and “majordomo”. “Treasurer” was a clerk subordinate to “majordomo”. It is hard to say whether the twelve-year-old Charles Robert really had his “household/court” before setting out on the journey, but the above mentioned sources so indicate.

nji, ukazuje na to da cijela ona pretendentova pratnja s kojom je krenuo prema istočnoj obali Jadrana nije bila zamišljena kao trajna. Da je tomu doista bilo tako, jasno pokazuje i to što se u kasnijim vremenima uz Karla Roberta nalazi samo Filip Druget, kao *jedini* na njegovu dvoru koji je s njim došao iz Italije.²⁷ Vraćajući se na trenutak spomenutim brojevima unajmljenih konja i brodova koji su tvorili ekspediciju, valja poći od toga da oni sami za sebe ne govore mnogo. No ti se brojevi pokazuju u posve novom svjetlu uspoređujući se ova ekspedicija s onom koju je 1277. godine u Ugarsko-Hrvatsko Kraljevstvo poslao Karlo I. kako bi pomogao učvršćivanje vlasti svoga zeta, kralja Ladislava IV, oženjenoga njegovom kćeri Elizabetom. Na čelu ekspedicije stajali su Jakov de Bursono, označen kao „kapetan naših plaćenika koji odlaze u Ugarsku“ (*capitaneus stipendariorum nostrorum iturorum in Vngaria*), i Guillelmus Brunelli, kojega se naziva *maresclacus milicie*.²⁸ Tu je ekspediciju na istočnu obalu Jadrana prevezla cijela jedna mala armada, sastavljena također od dvije galije i jednoga galeona, ali i trinaest brodova za transport konja zvanih *terida*.²⁹ Prema napatku koji je dobio zapovjednik armade, galije i galeon trebali su zaštititi transportne brodove, koji su sa svoje strane, s obzirom

was not meant as permanent. Another evidence that it was so is the fact that, in a later period, Charles Robert is accompanied only by Philip Drugeth, as the *only* member of his court who came with him from Italy.²⁷ As for the above mentioned numbers of horses and ships rented for the expedition, they do not indicate a lot as such, but they speak volumes if this expedition is compared to the one sent to the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia 1277 by Charles I in order to help establish the rule of his son-in-law Ladislaus IV, who married his daughter Elisabeth I. The expedition was led by Jacob de Bursono, described as the “captain of our mercenaries leaving for Hungary” (*capitaneus stipendariorum nostrorum iturorum in Vngaria*), and William Brunelli, defined as *maresclacus milicie*.²⁸ This expedition was transported to Eastern Adriatic aboard a small armada, also consisting of two galleys and a galleon, together with thirteen horse-transporting vessels called *teridas*.²⁹ The armada’s commander was instructed to use the galleys and the galleon to protect the transport vessels. As a standard of the day, these transport vessels could accommodate 350-400 horsemen with their horses

²⁷ Đura Hardi nakon detaljnoga istraživanja jasno ističe da je Filip Druget bio „jedini njegov napuljski podanik za koga se može pouzdano dokazati da je u pratnji svoga gospodara stigao u Ugarsku“ (Hardi 2012, 33), ali se ne upušta u razmatranje konzekvencija te spoznaje. Čini se, međutim, da je i jedan od spominjanih „predstojnika kućanstva/dvora“ Karla Roberta, po imenu Petar *Parui Passus*, bio određen za pretendentovu trajnu pratnju, pa djed, Karlo II., nalaže svome unuku da Petru u Ugarskoj osigura dostojan posjed – Wenzel 1874, 151 br. 187. Poznati dokumenti, dakle, otkrivaju samo tri stalna pratitelja koja su trebala ostati uz dječaka pretendenta – ranije spominjanoga dokiminkanca Petra, potom Filipa Drugeta i konačno Petra, „predstojnika kućanstva/dvora“, no dva se Petra ne spominju u dokumentima nastalim nakon 1301. godine. Sve ovo naravno ne znači da je dječak nakon iskrcavanja u Splitu ostavljen praktično sam – dva naloga Karla II. iz prosinca 1300. u kojima se spominju Karlovi *hospitium* i *militia* koji su još uvijek dijelom opskrbljivani iz južne Italije (v. Wenzel 1874, 164–165 br. 207 i 208), pokazuju da je on doista imao određenu pratnju, no svakako ne onakvu kakva bi se očekivala kao „kraljevska pratnja“.

²⁸ Za njihovu misiju i njezine rezultate v. Nekić 2017, 16.

²⁹ Točan sastav armade donosi dopis kraljevske kancelarije od 13. kolovoza 1277. – Wenzel 1874, 46 br. 49. Kraljevska se ekspedicija inače vraćala u Napulj u ljeto 1278., i to na dvije galije – Perićić 1984, 260–261, pri čemu ostaje nejasno kako je došlo do ove razlike.

²⁷ After detailed research, Đura Hardi clearly points out that Philip Drugeth was “his only subject from Naples for whom there is reliable evidence that he accompanied his master in Hungary” (Hardi 2012, 33), but he does not analyze the consequences of his conclusion. It seems, however, that one of the above mentioned Charles Robert’s “household/court majordomos” named Peter *Parui Passus* was assigned as the pretender’s permanent escort, so the boy’s grandfather Charles II ordered his grandson to ensure that Peter receives a decent piece of property in Hungary – Wenzel 1874, 151 no. 187. Documents reveal only three permanent escorts who were supposed to stay with the young pretender – the aforementioned Dominican Peter, Philip Drugeth and Peter the “household/court majordomo”. However, neither of two Peters is mentioned in any documents issued after 1301. Of course, all this does not mean that the boy was left almost alone upon landing in Split; two Charles II’s instructions from December 1300, mentioning his *hospitium* and *militia* the supplies for which were still partly coming from Southern Italy (see Wenzel 1874, 164-165 no. 207 and 208), indicate that he really had certain entourage with him, but definitely not the one expected from a king.

²⁸ For their mission and its results, see Nekić 2017, 16.

²⁹ The exact composition of the armada is described in a letter from the royal chancery dated 13 August 1277 – Wenzel 1874, 46 no. 49. In summer 1278, the royal expedition returned to Naples aboard two galleys – Perićić 1984, 260-261; this difference remains unexplained.

na onodobne standarde, mogli prevesti između 350 i 400 konjanika s njihovim životinjama i opremom.³⁰ Postavljeni ciljevi dvaju pohoda već se i na prvi pogled stubokom razlikuju – prva je ekspedicija imala za cilj pomoći aktualnome kralju u uspostavi reda i autoriteta, dočim je druga trebala osigurati uspostavu vlasti novoga kralja. No sastav odnosno brojnost tih dviju ekspedicija (ona prva očigledno je bila znatno brojnija od druge) upravo su obrnuto proporcionalni postavljenim ciljevima, što samo potvrđuje zaključak kako pohod iz ljeta 1300. po svojoj organizaciji i razmjerima nije bio u skladu s formalno postavljenim ciljem.

Isti se zaključak nameće promotri li se temeljna politička infrastruktura toga pothvata. Naime, prema zamislima koje ocrtavaju dokumenti napuljske provenijencije, podršku su novome kralju trebali, a to u historiografiji nije dovoljno naglašeno, osigurati praktično samo hrvatski velikaši – Šubići Bribirski, Babonići Blagajski i knezovi Krčki – kojima su u prvoj polovini 1300. podijeljene razne povlastice koje su ih u tome smislu trebale motivirati. Hrvatski su povjesničari u svojim prikazima priprema i samoga dolaska Karla Roberta uobičajeno posezali za odgovarajućim svescima Smičiklasova *Diplomatičkog zbornika* (VII i VIII) propuštajući konzultirati Wenzelovu zbirku³¹ iz koje je, međutim, jasno vidljiva odsutnost iole ozbiljnije svjetovne političke infrastrukture u krajevima sjeverno od Drave. Jedini izuzetak u tome smislu predstavlja pismo proglas Karla II. od 10. veljače 1300. u kojem se, uz moćnike iz krajeva južno od Drave, navode i neki ugarski velikaši za koje se može naslutiti da su u tome trenutku vodili pregovore o priznanju vlasti Andrije III. – riječ je o braći Héder, Mateju Csáku i njegovu bratu, vojvodi Rolandu Borsi te izabrano-me ostrogonskom nadbiskupu Grguru. Pismo proglas na istočnu je obalu Jadrana, kako se čini, nosio Juraj Šubić, pa teško može biti dvojbe glede toga da je on sam bio ujedno i jedno od vrela informacija na kojima se temeljio stav napuljskoga dvora da će

and the appertaining equipment.³⁰ The difference between the objectives of the two expeditions is easily seen: the former expedition was supposed to *help* the incumbent king to restore order and authority, while the latter one was supposed to ensure *rise to power of a new king*. But the composition and size of the expeditions (the former had much more members than the latter one) was in inverse proportion with the objectives, thus confirming the conclusion that, in terms of both its arrangement and its size, the 1300 expedition was not in accordance with its formal objective.

The same conclusion offers itself if we analyze the basic political infrastructure of this project. Based on the plans outlined in the Neapolitan documents, effectively it was only the Croatian nobility (the Šubići of Bribir, Babonići of Blagaj and Counts of Krk) who were supposed to ensure support to the new king. They all had been granted various privileges in the first half of 1300 in order to motivate them to this end. Historiography has underemphasized it so far. In their descriptions of the preparations and arrival of Charles Robert, Croatian historians usually resort to particular volumes of Smičiklas's *Codex diplomaticus* (VII and VIII) but they fail to consult Wenzel's collection³¹ that clearly shows lack of any relevant secular political infrastructure in the lands north of the River Drava. The only exception in this respect is Charles II's proclamation letter of 10 February 1300 in which, together with potentates from the lands south of the Drava, some Hungarian high nobility is mentioned; the letter suggests that they were negotiating the recognition of Andrew III's rule at the moment. These are the brothers Héder, Matthew Csák and his brother, Roland Borsa, and Gregory, archbishop-elect of Esztergom. As it seems that the proclamation letter was delivered to the Eastern Adriatic coast by George Šubić, there is hardly any doubt that he was one of the sources of information based on which the Neapolitan court believed

³⁰ Prema preciznim i uvjerljivim izračunima i rekonstrukciji Johna Pryora, *terida* je 70-ih i 80-ih godina XIII. stoljeća upravo u Kraljevstvu obaju Sicilija bila standardni transportni brod s mogućnošću ukrcaja 30 konjanika sa životinjama i opremom – Pryor 1982, 115–119.

³¹ Jasan je u tome smislu izuzetak Šišić 1901, 8–9, no on se ne upušta u razmatranje problema koji se ovdje pretresaju.

³⁰ Based on the very accurate and convincing calculations and reconstruction by John Pryor, *terida* was a standard transport vessel in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the 1270s and 1280s. It could accommodate 30 horsemen with their horses and the appertaining equipment – Pryor 1982, 115–119.

³¹ An exception here is Šišić 1901, 8–9, but he does not analyze the problems discussed here.

spomenuti velikaši pružiti podršku Karlu Robertu.³² Popis pak onih koji su doista predstavljali siguran dugoročni oslonac anžuvinske pretendentu sastavljen je isključivo od onih čiji su se posjedi nalazili južno od rijeke Drave – riječ je o hrvatskim velikaškim rodovima Šubića Bribirskih, Babonića Blagajskih i knezova Krčkih; tu je i magister Ugrin Csák, čiji su se posjedi inače širili zapadno i istočno od Dunava, praktično od Požege (u današnjoj Slavoniji) do Temišvara (u današnjoj Rumunjskoj);³³ na popisu je i bivši srpski kralj Stefan Dragutin sa svojom ženom Katarinom, kćeri kralja Stjepana V. i sestrom napuljske kraljice Marije, a koji je, nakon što je 1284. postao podanik ugarsko-hrvatskoga kralja, kontrolirao krajeve pod njegovom vlašću južno od Save, s obje strane rijeke Drine, sve do utoka Save u Dunav pa i dalje na istok.³⁴ Iako su sva

that the above mentioned nobility would support Charles Robert.³² But the list of those who indeed were the long-term mainstay of the Angevine pretender included only those whose landed properties were located south of the Drava – Croatian noblemen the Šubići of Bribir, Babonići of Blagaj and Counts of Krk; it also included Ugrin Csák, whose properties stretched to the east and west of the Danube, virtually from Požega in present-day Slavonia to Timisoara in present-day Romania.³³ Also on the list were the names of former Serbian king Stephen Dragutin and his wife Catherine, the daughter of King Stephen V and the sister of Neapolitan queen Mary (having become a subject of Hungarian-Croatian king in 1284, Stephen Dragutin controlled the lands south of the Sava, on both sides of the Drina, stretching to the confluence of the rivers Sava and Dunav and further to the east).³⁴ Although these lands, controlled by

³² Pismo proglas od 10. veljače 1300. v. u *DZ VII*, 367 br. 320 – ono je objavljeno u krajnje skraćenoj i ponešto nejasnoj formi, a začudo nije ušlo u Wenzelovu zbirku. Istoga dana kraljevska je kancelarija izdala još dva dokumenta u svezi s odlaskom kneza Jurja Šubića na istočnu obalu Jadrana (*DZ VII*, 367–368 br. 321 i 322), iz čega se može jasno zaključiti kako je upravo on trebao i nositi pismo proglas. Braća Héder i Matej Csák doista su spadali među one koji su 1299. tražili na papinskoj kuriji novoga kralja, no upravo su u vrijeme sastavljanja proglašenja već ušli u pregovore s Andrijom III. i ti su pregovori okončani uspjehom, ali tek u ljeto 1300. – *Zsoldos 2013*, 232. Može se, dakle, realno pretpostaviti da su Šubići bili upoznati s njihovim odnosom spram Andrije III. prije pregovora, pa je njihovo ranije raspoloženje knez Juraj mogao penijeti u Napulju (za vojvodu Rolanda Borsu nisam uspio pronaći relevantne informacije, ali on je bio tek jedan od šestoro braće, pa nije nevjerojatno da je iz nekoga osobnog razloga i on doista bio nezadovoljan Andrijom kao kraljem).

³³ Za posjede i položaj Ugrina Csáka v. *Zsoldos 2013a*, 39–40.

³⁴ Tri dana nakon sastavljanja ovdje spominjanoga pisma proglašenja od 10. veljače 1300. (v. bilj. 31) kralj Karlo II. je uputio i posebno pismo „svojoj dragoj sestri“ Katarini, Dragutinovoj ženi, kojim joj posebno „na dušu“ stavlja da se pobrine kako bi ugarski baruni Karla Roberta proglasili za kralja – Wenzel 1874, 422 br. 401 (173b). Inače, za oblast pod vlašću nekadašnjega srpskoga kralja Stefana Dragutina nakon 1282. odnosno 1284. godine kao i njegov položaj v. Dinić 1978, 123–147 i 281–284, te Vásáry 2005, 102–108. U novijim raspravama koje govore o kralju Dragutinu uglavnom se, prilično besplodno, razmatra njegova vjerska orijentacija iz kuta modernih shvaćanja o katolicizmu i pravoslavlju. Stoga se previđa važna darovnica Andrije III. od 13. srpnja 1298. (*DZ VII*, 309–310 br. 268) na ime familijara Ugrina Csáka, sinova kneza Urbana, koju je nažalost Mihailo Dinić krivo protumačio (Dinić 1978, 284–284 bilj. 54). Dokument

³² The proclamation letter of 10 February 1300, see in *CD VII*, 367 no. 320 – it was published in a very abridged form; surprisingly, it was not included in Wenzel's collection. On the same date, the royal chancery issued two other documents, concerning Count George Šubić's departure for Eastern Adriatic (*CD VII*, 367–368 no. 321 and 322), suggesting that it was he who was supposed to deliver the proclamation letter. The brothers Héder and Matthew Csák were indeed among those who sought a new king in the Papal Curia in 1299, but their negotiations with Andrew III had already begun by the time the proclamation was made. These negotiations ended successfully, but not before summer 1300 – *Zsoldos 2013*, 232. Consequently, we can realistically assume that the Šubići were familiar with their relations with Andrew III before the negotiations, so Count George could have conveyed their earlier sentiments to Naples (I could not find any relevant information about Roland Borsa but, as he was merely one of six brothers, it is not unlikely that he had some personal reasons for not being satisfied with Andrew as the king).

³³ For the landed properties and position of Ugrin Csák, see *Zsoldos 2013a*, 39–40.

³⁴ Three days after the above mentioned proclamation letter of 10 February 1300 (see n. 31), King Charles II sent a separate letter to his “dear sister” Catherine, Dragutin's wife, urging her to make sure that Hungarian barons proclaim Charles Robert king – Wenzel 1874, 422 no. 401 (173b). For the territories under control of the former Serbian king Stephen Dragutin after 1282 (and 1284, respectively) and for his position, see Dinić 1978, 123–147 and 281–284, and also Vásáry 2005, 102–108. Recent papers on King Dragutin have discussed, rather fruitlessly, his religious affiliation, using the modern perception of Catholicism and Orthodoxy. This is why they have failed to consider the important deed of gift issued by Andrew III on 13

ta područja stvarnih anžuvinskih pouzdanika doista tvorila zaokruženu teritorijalnu cjelinu, koja je u tome smislu mogla predstavljati čak i realnu bazu za pothvat u kakav je poslan Karlo Robert, ostaje činjenica da se radilo o periferiji (inače golemoga) kraljevstva i ljudima koji nisu spadali u onaj krug koji je mogao odlučivati o sudbini krune sv. Stjepana.³⁵

Orisana slika u najmanju ruku neozbiljno organiziranoga pohoda koji je dječaka trebao dovesti do kraljevskoga prijestola nalazi jasnu potvrdu i u ono malo informacija što ih o viđenju suvremenika donose dva sačuvana pisma mletačkoga podanika Petra Bonzana koji se u ljeto i jesen 1300. našao i na dvoru kralja Andrije III. i, ali sad u njegovoj službi, na papinskoj kuriji u Rimu.³⁶ Prvo od tih pisama,

otkriva da je u srpnju 1298. Ugrin bio upravo u pregovorima s kraljem (raniji događaji o kojima se u darovnici govori datiraju se *eo tempore quo idem magister Vgrinus nostre maiestatis uestigia sequebatur* – činjenica da je Ugrin došao „pred kralja“, iako je po tome izričaju tek „nekada“ bio njegov vjerni podanik, ukazuje implicitno na pokušaj vraćanja u takvo stanje, dakle pregovore), ali i da je ranije tijekom 90-ih godina ugarski velikaš imao dobre odnose s kraljem Dragutinom, u čiju je oblast, Mačvu, prešao kako bi ovome pomogao u sukobu s Tatarima (Kumanima), što je i sam Andrija III. razumijevao kao zaslugu u odnosu na kraljevsku vlast.

³⁵ O nedostatku iole čvršće političke infrastrukture pothvata jedini govori Hóman 1938, 96 i d., no iz njegova izlaganja proizlazi, kako je već naznačeno, da je dolazak Karla Roberta velikim dijelom ideja i pothvat hrvatskih velikaša. Drukčiju sliku, sidejom da se radilo o ozbiljnijoj političkoj infrastrukturi, pokušao je ocrtati Báling 2015, 85–94, koji u tome smislu onda ne govori o „hrvatskim“ krajevima, već o „južnome dijelu“ (Ugarskoga) Kraljevstva gdje je, kako on to vidi, Karlo II. stvorio „mrežu“ velikaša koji su podupirali njegova unuka. No na kraju ipak zaključuje kako su „pretendent i njegova ‘stranka’ uspostavili snažan mostobran na teritoriju Slavonije i Hrvatske“ (Báling 2015, 94).

³⁶ Pisma, sačuvana inače u jednoj od zbirki Državnoga arhiva u Veneciji, tiskana su u Wenzel 1864, 260–263 br. 168 i 169. Iz istoga konteksta potječe i treće pismo Petra Bonzana (Wenzel 1864, 263–264 br. 170), koje ne donosi informacije o političkim zbivanjima o kojima se govori u prva dva, ali jasnije osvjetljava misiju koju je Petar obavljao na papinskoj kuriji za Andriju III. Iako su pisma odavno poznata, povjesničari nisu obraćali previše pozornosti na njih, izuzimajući Andreasa Kiesewattera i Enikő Csukovits – Kieserwatter ih koristi kako bi obrazložio svoje stajalište da je pohod Karla Roberta bio slabo organiziran uslijed žurbe izazvane vijestima o uspjesima Andrije III. (Kieserwatter 2006, 175–176). E. Csukovits međutim postupa drukčije te koristi i ono što o pohodu otkrivaju neki od naloga Karla II. koji su i ovdje pretreseni.

true Angevine loyalists, were interconnected into an undivided territory and could thus be used to facilitate projects such as Charles Robert's expedition, they were still on the outskirts of an otherwise huge kingdom and the people who controlled them did not belong to the inner circle of those who would decide on the fate of Crown of St. Stephen.³⁵

Supporting the claim that the expedition supposed to take the boy to the throne was poorly organized – to say the least – is the scarce information about contemporary perceptions of the expedition found in the two letters sent by Peter Bonzano. In summer and fall of 1300, as a Venetian subject, he found himself at the court of King Andrew III and, now in his service, at the Papal Curia in Rome.³⁶

July 1298 (CD VII, 309-310 no. 268) to the sons of certain Urban, who were Ugrin Csák's retainers. Unfortunately, Mihailo Dinić misinterpreted it (Dinić 1978, 284-284 n. 54). The document reveals that, in July 1298, Ugrin was negotiating with the king (the earlier events mentioned in the deed are dated to *eo tempore quo idem magister Vgrinus nostre maiestatis uestigia sequebatur* – the fact that Ugrin appeared “before the king”, although it is said that he was “once” his loyal subject, implies his intention to restore such a position through negotiations) and also that this Hungarian lord had had good relations with King Dragutin earlier in the 1290s. At that time he entered the king's region of Mačva in order to help him fend off the Tatars (Cumans) – the move that even Andrew III interpreted as a favor to his own rule.

³⁵ Hóman 1938, 96 ff. is the only one pointing out that the expedition lacked any consolidated political infrastructure. However, as had been said earlier, he suggests that Charles Robert's arrival was largely conceived and organized by Croatian nobility. A different picture is outlined by Báling 2015, 85-94, suggesting that more consolidated political infrastructure was involved. In this respect, the author does not mention “Croatian” lands, but “southern parts” of the (Hungarian) Kingdom where, according to him, Charles II had created a “network” of nobility who supported his grandson. Still, in the end, he concludes that the “claimant and his party established a strong beach-head in the territory of Slavonia and Croatia” (Báling 2015, 94).

³⁶ These letters, kept in one of the collections in the State Archives in Venice, were published in Wenzel 1864, 260-263 no. 168 and 169. Also belonging to this context is a third letter by Peter Bonzano (Wenzel 1864, 263-264 no. 170). While not offering information about the political developments mentioned in the first two letters, this letter casts more light on the mission Peter carried out in Papal Curia on behalf of Andrew III. Although these letters have been known to historians for a long time, they have not paid much attention to them, with the exception of Andreas Kiesewatter and Enikő

napisano 18. rujna 1300. godine, upućeno je iz Venecije ranije spominjanome zadarskom knezu Mihajlu Morosiniju, ocu Tomasine Morosini, majke Andrije III., a u njemu se spominje i Mihajlov sin Albert pod nadimkom *Turchus*, dakle kraljev ujak koji je inače boravio na nećakovu dvoru, gdje je dobio titulu hrvatskoga hercega (*dux tocius Sclauonie*).³⁷ Iz samoga pisma, odnosno iz formulacije da je kralj „dobro upoznat“ (*bene sciebat*) s dolaskom Karla Roberta na istočnu obalu Jadrana, može se zaključiti i da je zadarski knez izvijestio unuka o tomu, što je posve razumljivo s obzirom na to da su informacije iz Splita gotovo automatski i u najkraćem roku stizale do Zadra. No, informacije kojima je Andrija III. u tome trenutku raspolagao navodile su ga na to da taj čin ne shvati kao ozbiljnu prijetnju (*de eo non curabat*), čime se jasno potvrđuje sve ono što je ovdje ranije rečeno. Drugo Bonzanovo pismo, upućeno 25. listopada 1300. iz Rima samome kralju Andriji III., otkriva da se i na kuriji gledalo na Karlov pohod na posve isti način kao i na dvoru ugarsko-hrvatskoga kralja. Pritom, Bonzano je na kuriji doznao i da je Karlo II. pohod organizirao i pokrenuo „nasuprot savjetu i volji gospodina pape i kardinala svojih prijatelja“ (*nepos regis Caruli contra consilium et voluntatem domini pape et cardinalium amicorum suorum missus fuit per dominum regem ad partes illas*), kao i da za to nije dobio nikakvu pomoć s kurije. Pohod se općenito na papinskoj kuriji držao kao „ne osobito pametan“ (*omnes de curia reputant stulticiam*), te stoga Bonzano savjetuje kralju kako bi najbolje bilo kad bi on sa

Njezino je pak stajalište kako je pohod bio neozbiljno organiziran jer je iza njega stajao treći po starini sin Karla II., Robert, koji je svoju šansu za preuzimanje nasljeđa od oca vidio u tome da malodobnoga nećaka ukloni iz Napulja (Csukovits 2012, 57–60, te nešto kraće Csukovits 2013, 72–74 – autorica inače kao da nije svjesna činjenice da je Robert postao i formalno očev nasljednik još 1297., što ipak bitno mijenja cijelu sliku).

³⁷ Za Mihajla Morosinija, sina dužda Marina Morosinija, i njegovu djecu vidi: <http://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/VENICE.htm#TomasinaMorosinidied1300> (pristup ostvaren 1. 10. 2020.). Veza je jasna i iz samoga teksta koji je nepotrebno korumpirao izdavač: *Filii Henrici venerunt et filius vester Turchus accipit filiam Henrici bani in uxorem*. Izdavač je međutim to pročitao ovako; *Filii Henrici venerunt (ad regem?), et filius vester (cum illis); Turchus accipit filiam Henrici bani in uxorem* – Wenzel 1864, 261 br. 168.

The first of the two letters, written on 18 September 1300, was sent from Venice to the earlier mentioned rector of Zadar, Michael Morosini, father of Andrew III's mother Tomasina Morosini. The letter also mentions Michael's son Alberto, nicknamed *Turchus*, the king's uncle based at his nephew's court, who also had the title of Croatian duke (*dux tocius Sclauonie*).³⁷ The letter and the formulation that the king is “well informed” (*bene sciebat*) about Charles Robert's arrival to Eastern Adriatic suggest that the rector of Zadar must have notified his grandson about it; it seems very probable, because information from Split would reach Zadar almost automatically and in a short period of time. However, based on the information available to him at that time, Andrew III did not perceive the expedition as a serious threat (*de eo non curabat*), which clearly confirms everything discussed here. Bonzano's second letter, sent from Rome to King Andrew III on 25 October 1300, reveals that the Curia perceived Charles' expedition the same way as it was perceived at the court of the Hungarian-Croatian king. Bonzano also found out at the Curia that Charles II had organized and launched the expedition “against the advice and will of Seigneur Pope and his cardinal friends” (*nepos regis Caruli contra consilium et voluntatem domini pape*

Csukovits – Kieserwatter uses them to explain his viewpoint that Charles Robert's expedition was poorly organized because of the haste caused by the news on Andrew III's successes (Kieserwatter 2006, 175-176). E. Csukovits has a different approach and uses the information about the expedition found in some of Charles II's orders discussed here. In her opinion, the expedition was improvised because it was organized by Robert, the third eldest son of Charles II, who believed that removing the minor nephew from Naples would increase his chances for the throne (Csukovits 2012, 57-60, and also, shorter, Csukovits 2013, 72-74 – the authress seems to be unaware of the fact that Robert was formally proclaimed his father's successor back in 1297, which substantially changed the whole situation).

³⁷ For Michael Morosini, the son of Doge Marino Morosini, and his children, see: <http://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/VENICE.htm#TomasinaMorosinidied1300> (accessed on 1 October 2020). The connection is very clear from the text; its publisher corrupted it for no reason: *Filii Henrici venerunt et filius vester Turchus accipit filiam Henrici bani in uxorem*. However, the publisher interpreted it as follows: *Filii Henrici venerunt (ad regem?), et filius vester (cum illis); Turchus accipit filiam Henrici bani in uxorem* – Wenzel 1864, 261 no. 168.

svojim vjernim barunima organizirao vojni pohod jer „bi lako mogao dobiti dječaka u svoje ruke“ (*quia de facili potestis habere puerum in manibus vestris, si vultis*). Može se, dakle, bez velike dvojbe zaključiti da su informacije što su o pohodu Karla Roberta na istočnu obalu Jadrana kolale u političkoj areni koja je objedinjavala Ugarsko-Hrvatsko i Napuljsko Kraljevstvo, Veneciju kao i papinsku kuriju, bile prilično jednoznačne i vodile k istom zaključku koji je i ovdje donesen – pohod je bio krajnje neozbiljno pripremljen i izveden te je, očito, imao za cilj u prvome redu udaljiti iz Napuljskog Kraljevstva dječaka čiji je dalji boravak u toj sredini mogao izazvati samo političke nevolje. Upravo u takav kontekst valja smjestiti i ono s čime Bonzano završava dio pisma posvećen Karlu Robertu. On naime navodi kako je kardinalima pripovijedao da je od samoga Andrije III. slušao kako ovaj, uspije li dobiti dječaka u svoje ruke, ima namjeru poslati ga „gospodinu papi“, a što je kardinalima „jako dobro sjelo“.³⁸

Čini se ipak da sve ono što je Bonzano napisao o odnosu papinske kurije spram pohoda što ga je Karlo II. organizirao i izveo u ljeto 1300. godine valja primiti sa stanovitom dozom rezerve – ponajbolje u prilog tomu da papinski odnos spram pitanja anžuvinskoga prava na krunu sv. Stjepana nije bio baš takvim kakvim ga ocrtava Bonzanovo pismo govore izbor kapelana kraljice Marije, franjevca Petra, za splitskoga nadbiskupa,³⁹ kao i postupak s izabranim ostrogonskim nadbiskupom Grgurom, otvorenim protivnikom kraja Andrije III. nakon 1298. i praktično jedinim ugarskim prelatom koji je jasno stao na anžuvinsku stranu. Unatoč tomu što se praktično cijela ugarska crkva okrenula protiv Grgura, Bonifacije VIII. odbio je poništiti njegov izbor te ga je ostavio kao „izabranog“ (ali ne i potvrđenog) nadbiskupa. No nakon smrti Andrije III. Bonifacije VIII., odnosno rimska kurija kao institucija, postaje stvarno najvažniji oslonac, zacijelo važniji od političke infrastrukture što su je trebali providjeti hrvatski velikaši, pothvata koji možda na početku i nije imao punu papinsku podršku. Može

et cardinalium amicorum suorum missus fuit per dominum regem ad partes illas) and that he had received no help from the Curia. The Papal Curia generally considered that the expedition was “not very smart” (*omnes de curia reputant stulticiam*). For this reason, Bonzano’s advice was that the king and his loyal barons should organize a military expedition because “You should easily get hold of the boy” (*quia de facili potestis habere puerum in manibus vestris, si vultis*). There is no doubt that the information about Charles Robert’s Eastern Adriatic expedition circulating in the political arena (the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia, Kingdom of Naples, Venice and Papal Curia) was rather unequivocal and that it led to the same conclusion as the one reached in this paper: the expedition was improvised and poorly organized and its primary objective was clearly to remove the boy from the Kingdom of Naples because his presence there could cause political turmoil. This is the context in which the final part of Bonzano’s letter to Charles Robert should be placed. Bonzano says that he informed the cardinals that Andrew III had told him that, if he manages to get hold of the boy, he intends to send him to “Seigneur Pope”. Bonzano also says that the cardinals “were very pleased by the idea”.³⁸

However, it seems that everything Bonzano wrote about the Papal Curia’s attitude about the expedition organized and launched by Charles II in summer 1300 should be taken with a pinch of salt, because of the hints in sources indicating that the papal viewpoint about the Angevine claim to Crown of St. Stephen was not exactly as described in Bonzano’s letter. For example, the fact that Franciscan monk Peter, Queen Maria’s chaplain, was appointed archbishop of Split,³⁹ and the treatment of Gregory, archbishop-elect of Esztergom, an undisguised opponent of King Andrew III and, after 1298, practically the only Hungarian prelate who openly sided with the Anjou dynasty. Although almost entire Hungarian Church turned against Gregory, Pope Boniface VIII refused to annul his

³⁸ Wenzel 1864, 262 br. 169: *Et ego dixi pluribus cardinalibus quod aud(iverim a majestate) vestra; quod si haberetis puerum in manibus vestris, quod mitteretis eum ad dominum papam, et multum eis placuit.*

³⁹ Kieserwatter 2006, 173–174.

³⁸ Wenzel 1864, 262 no. 169: *Et ego dixi pluribus cardinalibus quod aud(iverim a majestate) vestra; quod si haberetis puerum in manibus vestris, quod mitteretis eum ad dominum papam, et multum eis placuit.*

³⁹ Kieserwatter 2006, 173–174.

se slobodno ustvrditi kako je to stvarno bio najozbiljniji segment pohoda u njegovoj drugoj fazi, pa je u vremenima što su slijedila smrti posljednjega Arpadovića papinska kurija na različite načine osigurala potporu gotovo cjelokupne institucionalne strukture crkve u Ugarsko-Hrvatskome Kraljevstvu kandidaturi Karla Roberta. Crkveni prelati koji nisu bili spremni podržati tu kandidaturu postupno su odlazili sa svojih stolica, a na njihova su mjesta papinskim imenovanjima dovođeni oni koji su bili spremni slušati naloge kurije – tako je, primjerice, zagrebačkim biskupom 1303. postao Trogiranin dominikanac Augustin de Casoctis.⁴⁰ Sa svojih položaja prelati su djelovali na dva načina – s jedne strane, kao veliki posjednici raspolagali su i realnom fizičkom silom koja je, u ovisnosti o lokalnim prilikama, mogla dobro poslužiti zasad još kandidatu za kralja, dok su s druge strane, zbog golemoga utjecaja na komunikacijski sustav srednjovjekovnoga društva, mogli javno projicirati sliku o legitimitetu njegove vlasti. Jasan primjer načina na koji se to ostvarivalo bio je proglas vikara splitskoga nadbiskupa, pročitan 22. kolovoza 1303. godine u trogirskoj katedrali sv. Lovre – s pozivom na papinski i autoritet splitskoga nadbiskupa, tim se proglasom, uz prijetnju ekskomunikacijom za one koji ga ne bi poštivali, zahtijevalo da gradski javni bilježnici ubuduće u dokumente koje sastavljaju unose ime kralja Karla Roberta, što je gradsko vijeće odmah prihvatilo i donijelo odgovarajuću odluku.⁴¹

⁴⁰ O dolasku Augustina na zagrebačku biskupsku stolicu v. N. Klaić 1982, 332–333, sa znakovitim detaljima poput činjenice da je Benedikt XI. prigodom Augustinova imenovanja „posebno naglašavao da apostolskoj stolici i nikome drugome pripada ‘provisio’ za tu stolicu“ (ovdje, naravno, valja zanemariti autoričino „psihologiziranje“ u objašnjenju, prema kojemu „kao da se Benedikt XI. bojao da će mu netko oteti pravo imenovanja zagrebačkoga biskupa“), a onda i zahtjevom iz 1305. godine da novi korisnik crkvenoga posjeda „i njegovi nasljednici sudjeluju ‘u svim vojnama kraljevstva, crkve i našim’“ (autoričin komentar da biskup „nije mogao znati kako će završiti Karlova borba sa suparnicima za krunu sv. Stjepana“ tek je djelomično točan – biskup je imao zadaću utjecati na ishod te borbe). V. i ovdje bilj. 44.

⁴¹ Proglas i odnosnu odluku sažeo je u obliku bilješke trogirski povjesničar Ivan Lucius, a ta je bilješka objavljena u Rački 1881, 221. Pozivanje na papinski autoritet posve izvjesno je proizlazilo iz pravorijeka Bonifacija VIII. donesenoga 31. svibnja 1303. kojim je pravo na krunu sv. Stjepana pripadalo kraljici Mariji te susljedno njezinu unuku Karlu Robertu, pri

appointment and left him in the status of an “elected” (but not confirmed) archbishop. However, after the death of Andrew III, the support of Pope Boniface VIII and the Roman Curia as an institution became of utmost importance, certainly more important than the political infrastructure supposed to be provided by Croatian nobility – a project that may not have had full papal support in the beginning. We can safely say that it was the most important segment of the expedition in its second stage; in the years following the death of the last member of the Arpad dynasty, the Papal Curia made sure that the entire institutional structure of the Church of the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia provided support to Charles Robert’s candidature. Those church prelates who were not ready to support the candidature gradually left their posts and were replaced by others, appointed by the Pope because of their willingness to follow the instructions of the Curia – for example, Augustin de Casoctis, a Dominican from Trogir, became the bishop of Zagreb in 1303.⁴⁰ From their positions, the prelates acted in two ways: on the one hand, as large estate owners, they had at their disposal the real physical force that, depending on local circumstances, could be used by the royal candidate; on the other hand, their extensive influence on the medieval communication system enabled them to project to the public the legitimacy of his authority. One example of such influence is the proclamation of the Split archbishop’s vicar read in St. Lawrence’s Cathedral in Trogir on 22 August 1303. Invoking the authority of the Pope and archbishop of Split, the proclamation demanded that the city’s notaries

⁴⁰ For Augustin’s taking up of the post of bishop of Zagreb, see N. Klaić 1982, 332–333, with characteristic details such as the fact that, at the occasion of Augustin’s appointment, Benedictus XI “particularly pointed out that to the Holy See and no one else belongs the ‘provisio’ for this post” (of course, one should disregard here the authress’ “psychologizing” in her explanation: “as if Benedictus XI was afraid that someone would rob him of his right to appoint the bishop of Zagreb”), and the 1305 requirement that the new beneficiary of the Church land property “and his successors should take part in all of the military campaigns of the Kingdom, Church or us” (the authress’ comment that the bishop “could not know the outcome of the struggle for Crown of St. Stephen between Charles and his rivals” is only partially correct – it was the bishop’s task to have some influence on this outcome). See also n. 44 here.

No, kad se jednom „ekspedicijski korpus“ iskrcao na istočnoj obali Jadrana, u Splitu, u situaciji kada su pojedini velikaši kojima je bila povjerena skrb oko pothvata još uvijek priznavali aktualnoga kralja Andriju III., dječak i njegova pratnja su vjerojatno brzo shvatili da s tom i takvom političkom infrastrukturom nikad neće doći do kraljevskoga prijestola. Naime, spomenuti se hrvatski velikaši nisu mogli, a vjerojatno svjesni svojih dosega nisu ni htjeli, igrati uloge *king-maker*a, pa se njihov udio u pothvatu svodio na prihvaćanje dječaka iz Napulja i njegovo čuvanje. Valja u tome kontekstu samo podsjetiti da aranžman kralja Andrije III. sa skupinom velikaša iz 1299./1300. godine nije uključivao, pa time ni prepoznao kao glavne „igrač“ u političkoj areni, ni Bribirske Šubiće ni Blagajske Baboniće.⁴² K tomu, stajalište bana Pavla i njegova kruga (za ostale se hrvatske velikaše i plemiće ništa ne može s iole sigurnosti tvrditi) o načinu na koji se dolazilo do krune sv. Stjepana stubokom se razlikovalo od stajališta goleme većine ugarskoga plemstva, koje je smatralo da njima pripada pravo odrediti tko će im biti kralj.⁴³ Nasuprot tomu, ban Pavao je, bar na deklarativnoj razini, smatrao da pravo raspolaganja i Hrvatskim i Ugarskim Kraljevstvom pripada papinskoj stolici, temeljeći takvo stajalište na tvrdnji da su i hrvatski kralj Zvonimir i ugarski kralj sv. Stjepan svoje krune dobili iz Rima.⁴⁴

čemu je odgovarajuća papinska bula bila javno oglasena u Ugarsko-Hrvatskome Kraljevstvu krajem srpnja – papinska bula tiskana je u Theiner 1859, 397–399 br. DCXXXV, a za njezinu javnu objavu v. Skorka 2013, 250.

⁴² Zsoldos 2013, 232.

⁴³ Za praktično djelovanje plemstva sukladno takvim shvaćanjima v. Hóman 1938, 101 i d.; Engel 2005, 128 i d.; za jasnu pak eksplikaciju takvoga stajališta ugarskoga plemstva u okolnostima kad je papinski legat fra Gentilis 1308. na saboru proglašavao Karla Roberta za kralja v. Ančić 1997, 40 i d.

⁴⁴ Stajalište bana Pavla i njegova brata Jurja bilo je iskazano kroz posebno izaslanstvo, o čemu je ponešto znao u XVIII. stoljeću Baltazar Krčelić, očito temeljem dokumentacije koja je u međuvremenu izgubljena. Njegov tekst glasi: *Hæc dum à Michaele Episcopo, ac Alberto (qui in Chronico Veneto Albertinus Moresinus Legitur, ab Andrea III Dalmatiæ banus constitutus) Nicolao item Sclavoniæ Bano aguntur, PAULUS BANUS & Comes Breberinſis, Georgius item Comes, ad BONIFACIUM VIII Romanum Pontificem, mittunt nuncios. Regna Dalmatiæ & Croatiæ Ejus eſſe, à Zvonimiri Regis temporibus, ac Papa Gregorio VII. Hungariæ Item, ob CORONAM D. Stephano miſſam, ac per eum ſedi Apoſtoliciæ oblatum Regnum. Quare nec alium, horum*

use King Charles Robert's name in the documents in the future. Should they fail to do so, they would be excommunicated. The city council immediately accepted it and passed an appropriate decision.⁴¹

But once the “expeditionary corps” landed in Eastern Adriatic, in Split, in the situation when some of the noblemen entrusted with care of the project still recognized the incumbent King Andrew III, the boy and his entourage probably quickly realized that such political infrastructure would never enable them to obtain the throne. The said Croatian nobility could not and (probably aware of their real social standing) would not play the role of kingmakers, so their share in the project was limited to welcoming the boy from Naples and taking care of him. In this context, we should remind that King Andrew III's arrangements with a group of noblemen in 1299/1300 did not include (and thus recognize) as the main “players” in the political arena neither the Šubići of Bribir nor Babonići of Blagaj.⁴² Also, Ban Paul and his circle (nothing certain can be claimed about other Croatian nobility) had a completely different attitude about deciding on the right to Crown of St. Stephen than most of Hungarian nobility, who believed they had the right to decide who would be their king.⁴³ Contrary to them, Ban Paul believed, if only formally, that it was the Holy See that should control both Croatian Kingdom and Hungarian Kingdom, on the ground that Croatian King Zvonimir and Hungarian King

⁴¹ Both the proclamation and the decision were summarized in a note by Trogir historian Ivan Lucius. The note was published in Rački 1881, 221. Invoking the authority of the Pope was certainly based on Boniface VIII's ruling from 31 May 1303, by which the right to Crown of St. Stephen belonged to Queen Mary and, consequently, her grandson Charles Robert. A papal bull announcing this was released in the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia in late July – this papal bull was published in Theiner 1859, 397–399 no. DCXXXV; for its wider dissemination, see Skorka 2013, 250.

⁴² Zsoldos 2013, 232.

⁴³ For practical examples of the activities of the nobility in this context, see Hóman 1938, 101 ff.; Engel 2005, 128 ff.; for clear explication of such attitude of the Hungarian nobility at the time when the papal legate Friar Gentilis was proclaiming Charles Robert king in the parliament in 1308, see Ančić 1997, 40 ff.

O svemu ovomu sačuvana vrela na izravan način ne govore gotovo ništa, ali se pouzdani zaključci mogu izvlačiti iz praktičnih čina. Jasno se to vidi po postupku Bribirskih Šubića koji su Karla Roberta posve vjerojatno na svojim posjedima držali i čuvali sve do smrti Andrije III., koji je umro 14. siječnja 1301. godine.⁴⁵ Zabunu u modernoj historiografiji izazvalo je pripovijedanje splitskoga kroničara Mihe Madija, koji je u svome djelu ustvrdio da je ban Pavao dječaka odveo u Zagreb gdje je bio predan u ruke Ugrina Csáka te onda dodaje kako je kralj Andrija (III.) na vijest o dječakovu dolasku preminuo.⁴⁶ Iz činjenice, međutim, da

Regnorum Legitimum Regem esse posse, nisi qui à Romano Pontifice inauguretur. Nunciant totius Hungariæ hunc sensum esse, Clero solum excepto, ac Quibusdam exiguis. Pontifex alius implicatus (quemadmodum ex Spondano, Ciaconio & et aliis videre est) Cardinalem Nicolaum Bocafini de Tarvisio, qui postea Benedictus XI, à quibusdam dictus X, fuerat. ... (98) Appulit Bocafinus in Dalmatiam, à Dalmatis & PAULO Bano, acceptus optime. Zagrabiam quoque ad Michaellem Venit Episcopum, & ab eo Condigne habitus ... BONIFACIUS VIII, an post, vel ante Legati sui redditum ignoramus: Carolum Hungariæ regem declarant – Kercselich 1994 [1770], 97–98. Krčelićeva je kronologija prilično zbrkana, pa ovo poslanstvo i pismo koje je ono nosilo, a iz kojega očito potječe ono što je zagrebački povjesničar znao o tomu, treba staviti u 1300. ili 1301. godinu, odnosno izravno vezati uz dolazak papinskoga legata Nikole Boccasinija – o legatu i njegovu djelovanju v. opširno Mihalache 2011, koji temeljem suvremenih vrela nedvojbeno pokazuje da na svome putovanju Nikola Bocassini nije posjetio Dalmaciju ni Zagreb. No, isto tako, iz toga je izlaganja jasno kako je legat ostvario dobre kontakte sa zagrebačkim biskupom Mihajlom, koji je nakon smrti Andrije III. čvrsto stao na papinsku stranu podržavajući anžuvinska prava te je 1303. bio član izaslanstva koje je na papinskoj kuriji zastupalo anžuvinsku stranu u prijeporu s češkim kraljem Vaclavom II., odnosno njegovim sinom Vaclavom III. Sve mu je to donijelo nagradu iste te godine kad je dotadašnji (izabrani) ostrogonski nadbiskup umro, pa je upravo on od novoga pape Benedikta XI., istoga onoga Nikole Boccasinija, bio postavljen na ostrogonsku nadbiskupsku stolicu, čime se ujedno otvorila mogućnost postavljenja Augustina de Casoctisa. Poznavanje ovih promjena na zagrebačkoj biskupskoj stolici vjerojatno je utjecalo na to kako je B. Krčelić oblikovao svoje domišljanje u pripovijedanje.

⁴⁵ Da je do kraja 1300. godine Karlo Robert doista boravio u hrvatskim krajevima, jasno je pokazao Šišić 1901, 9. Za datum smrti Andrije III. v. Hóman 1938, 99.

⁴⁶ *Legende i kronike 1977*, 366 (fotografija istoga rukopisa koji sadrži i već spominjani spis A. Cutheisa): *Anno domini millesimo trecentissimo mense augusti tempore Bonifacii pape dominus Karulus nepos Karuli regis Sicilie per mare in galeis*

Stephen received their respective crowns from Rome.⁴⁴

Preserved sources offer no direct information about all this, but reliable conclusions can be drawn from some actions. One such example is what the Šubići of Bribir had done. It is very likely that they kept Charles Robert on their estate and took care of him until Andrew III's death on 14 January 1301.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The viewpoint of Ban Paul and his brother George was reflected in a letter delivered to the Papal Curia by special delegation. In the 18th century, historian Baltazar Krčelić presumably had an insight into that letter which had been lost in the meantime. It is presumably on the basis of that latter that he was able to produce the following text: *Hæc dum à Michaelle Episcopo, ac Alberto (qui in Chronico Veneto Albertinus Moresinus Legitur, ab Andrea III Dalmatiæ banus constitutus) Nicolao item Sclavoniæ Bano aguntur, PAULUS BANUS & Comes Breberinfis, Georgius item Comes, ad BONIFACIUM VIII Romanum Pontificem, mittunt nuncios. Regna Dalmatiæ & Croatiae Ejus esse, à Zvonimiri Regis temporibus, ac Papa Gregorio VII. Hungariæ Item, ob CORONAM D. Stephano missam, ac per eum sedi Apostolicæ oblatum Regnum. Quare nec alium, horum Regnorum Legitimum Regem esse posse, nisi qui à Romano Pontifice inauguretur. Nunciant totius Hungariæ hunc sensum esse, Clero solum excepto, ac Quibusdam exiguis. Pontifex alius implicatus (quemadmodum ex Spondano, Ciaconio & et aliis videre est) Cardinalem Nicolaum Bocafini de Tarvisio, qui postea Benedictus XI, à quibusdam dictus X, fuerat. ... (98) Appulit Bocafinus in Dalmatiam, à Dalmatis & PAULO Bano, acceptus optime. Zagrabiam quoque ad Michaellem Venit Episcopum, & ab eo Condigne habitus ... BONIFACIUS VIII, an post, vel ante Legati sui redditum ignoramus: Carolum Hungariæ regem declarant – Kercselich 1994 [1770], 97–98.* Krčelić's chronology is rather confused; this mission, and delivering of the letter (if this ever really happened) should be dated to 1300 or 1301 and linked directly to the arrival of the papal legate Nicholas Bocassini – for the legate and his activities, see in detail Mihalache 2011, 158 ff, who, based on sources of the day, credibly argues that Nicholas Bocassini never visited Dalmatia or Zagreb during his journey. But it is also clear from this discussion that the legate established good contact with Michael, bishop of Zagreb, who, after the death of King Andrew III, firmly sided with the Pope and supported the Angevine claims. In 1303, he was a member of the delegation that, at the Papal Curia, represented the Angevines in their dispute with Bohemian King Wenceslaus II and his son Wenceslaus III. For these services he was rewarded when archbishop-elect of Esztergom died the same year; Pope Benedict XI appointed Nicholas Bocassini as the new archbishop of Esztergom, thus creating an opportunity for the appointment of Augustin de Casoctis. B. Krčelić's insight into these changes on the bishop's see in Zagreb probably influenced the way he shaped his assumptions into his account.

⁴⁵ Šišić 1901, 9 convincingly shows that Charles Robert indeed stayed in Croatian lands in 1300. For the date of Andrew III's death, see Hóman 1938, 99.

je u kasnijim vremenima u naraciji kraljevskih isprava, kroz pripovijedanje u prvome licu, jasno naznačeno da je Karlo Robert „dočekan“ na Savi, gdje ga je primio požeški kaštelan Pavao de Gara (vidi ovdje bilj. 49), tada službenik Ugrina Csáka, postaje razvidno da po svemu sudeći nikakva odlaska u Zagreb nije bilo. Dječaka pretendenta je, kako izgleda, ban Pavao izravno predao u ruke službeniku ugarskoga velikaša koji je doista stajao na anžuvinskoj strani, a povod za to je mogla biti samo smrt Andrije III., odnosno trenutak u kojem je dječak iznenada dobio stvarnu šansu ostvariti svoj potencijal za nasljednika krune. Slijedeći tu misaonu nit, nije teško naslutiti da je do čina na Savi moralo doći negdje krajem siječnja ili početkom veljače 1301. godine jer je Karlo, sukladno preciznoj i uvjerljivoj Šišićevoj raščlambi,⁴⁷ bio okrunjen već do kraja ožujka iste godine. Pripovijedanje pak Mihe Madija o putu u Zagreb najvjerojatnije je samo domišljanje splitskoga kroničara, kao i tvrdnje da je Karlo Martel bio okrunjen 1295. godine, ili da je Andrija III. umro, valjda od straha, na samu vijest o dječakovu dolasku. Tomu svakako valja dodati da susreta „na Savi“ nije moglo biti bez privole Blagajskih Babonića koji su čvrsto kontrolirali krajeve kroz koje su dječak i ban Pavao s pratnjom morali proći kako bi došli do rijeke. Uglavnom, gotovo deset godina kasnije, kad je njegov položaj kralja već bio konsolidiran, prisjećao se Karlo Robert svojih kraljevskih početaka kroz privilegije koje je izdavao velikašima konstruirajući ujedno jednu vrst kolektivne memorije, koja je predstavljala društveno vezivno tkivo vladajućega sloja, odnosno onoga njegova dijela vezanoga za dvor i samoga vladara.⁴⁸ Ključno je, ali i simboličko, značenje pri tomu pridavao događaju koji je tumačio kao „ulazak“ u Ugarsku.

It was the account of the Split chronicler Michael Madii that created confusion in modern historiography. According to Michael, Ban Paul took the boy to Zagreb and handed him over to Ugrin Csák. The chronicler also claims that King Andrew (III) passed away on hearing the news about the boy's arrival.⁴⁶ However, as the royal documents from a later period, written as a first-person account, clearly mention that Charles Robert was “received on the River Sava, where he was met by the Požega fortress commander Paul de Gara” (see note 49 here), then in service of Ugrin Csák, there is every indication that no visit to Zagreb had ever happened. It seems that Ban Paul handed over the young pretender directly to a man in service of the Hungarian nobleman who indeed supported the Angevine cause. The reason for this could have only been the death of Andrew III – in other words, the moment that suddenly gave the boy a real chance to realize his potential as the heir to the throne. Following this conclusion, it is easy to assume that the meeting on the banks of the river Sava could have taken place in late January or early February 1301, because Charles, according to Šišić's very accurate and convincing analysis,⁴⁷ was crowned king by late March that same year. Michael Madii's account on the visit to Zagreb is most likely a set of assumptions of the Split chronicler, just like the claims that Charles Martel was crowned in 1295 or that Andrew III died – perhaps he was scared to death – on hearing the news of the boy's arrival. Also, the “Sava meeting” could not have happened without the approval of the Babonići of Blagaj, who kept under firm control the lands the boy, Ban Paul and their entourage had to pass through in order to reach the river. By and large, almost ten years later, when he had been established on the throne, Charles Robert reminisced of his beginnings by granting privileges

Spaletum aplicuit, ubi per mensem uel fere duos stetit. Egrediensque de ciuitate Spaleti in comitatu Pauli bani uersus Hungariam ad usurpandum regnum predictum de manu regis Andree uenit Sagrabie et ibi in manibus magistri Vgrini traditur. Audiens uero Andreas Bulde /sic/ regem Karolum uenisse ad occupandum regnum predictum moritur et ibidem sepelitur honorifice.

⁴⁷ Šišić 1901, 10.

⁴⁸ O značenju „pripovijesti“ o prošlosti za oblikovanje i reprodukciju političkih identiteta uopće izvanredne spoznaje donosi Tilly 2002.

⁴⁶ *Legende i kronike 1977, 366* (photographic reproduction of the same manuscript as in note 23): *Anno domini millesimo trecentissimo mense augusti tempore Bonifacii pape dominus Karulus nepos Karuli regis Sicilie per mare in galeis Spaletum aplicuit, ubi per mensem uel fere duos stetit. Egrediensque de ciuitate Spaleti in comitatu Pauli bani uersus Hungariam ad usurpandum regnum predictum de manu regis Andree uenit Sagrabie et ibi in manibus magistri Vgrini traditur. Audiens uero Andreas Bulde /sic/ regem Karolum uenisse ad occupandum regnum predictum moritur et ibidem sepelitur honorifice.*

⁴⁷ Šišić 1901, 10.

Riječ je o dolasku u Požegu, opisanome u privilegiju izdanom Pavlu de Gari, rodonačelniku jedne od najmoćnijih velikaških loza anžuvinskoga, ali i susljednoga doba kralja Sigismunda. Pripovijest kako je artikulirana u naraciji privilegija vrijedi citirati jer pokazuje kako je iz kraljeve, a onda i kolektivne memorije izbačena „hrvatska epizoda“ početka vladavine. Naime, u kraljevo se ime u dokumentu veli: „kad smo poslije smrti svijetle uspomene kralja Andrije našega predragoga stričevića ušli u kraljevstvo Ugarske koje nam pripada pravom i redom rođenja, tad nam je u susret do rijeke Save došao magister Pavao, koji je tada kao kaštelan držao Požegu te nam je istu utvrdu predao u ruke i priznao nas za prirodno gospodara i kralja.“⁴⁹ Ovako se oblikovano kraljevsko „sjećanje“ bitno razlikuje od onoga što se stvarno može razabrati za 90-e godine 13. stoljeća, kada je Andrija III. bio sve samo ne „predragi stričević“. Razlikuje se ta slika, kako je rečeno, i od onoga što pripovijeda nešto kasniji kroničar Miha Madije, koji je išao tako daleko da je tvrdio kako je Karlo došao „preoteti“ kraljevstvo iz ruku Andrije III. Bilo kako bilo, u nadolazećim godinama, poslije krunidbe koju je obavio u Ostrogonu *izabrani* (ali ne i potvrđeni) ostrogonski nadbiskup, ali ne i „svetom krunom“ (dakle bez ijednoga elementa koji bi davao puni legalitet tome činu), Karlo Robert doista je bio pod zaštitom Ugrina Cháka.⁵⁰ Bez obzira dakle na punu odsutnost elemenata koji su krunidbu činili punopravnom, Karlo Robert kasnije je računao svoju vladavinu upravo od trenutka „traljave“ krunidbe, što je u konačnici prihvatila i moderna historiografija, pa se redovito njegova vladavina prikazuje kao zaokružena

to noblemen, thus creating a collective memory of a sort, which functioned as the fixed collective memory of the ruling class, or at least of the inner circles around the court and the King.⁴⁸ He attached crucial – and also symbolical – importance to an event that he perceived as his “entry” to Hungary. It was his arrival to Požega, described in the privilege granted to Paul de Gara, the progenitor of one of the most powerful aristocratic lines during the reign of the Anjou kings and also during the reign of his successor, King Sigismund. The account as told in the grant deed is worth quoting because it shows how the “Croatian episode” from the early days of the reign was eliminated from the King’s memory and, thus, from the collective memory. Written in the King’s name, the document says: “When, upon the death of illustrious King Andrew, our dearest cousin, we entered the Kingdom of Hungary that belongs to us by law and by birthright, master Paul came out to meet us by the River Sava. As he was the Požega fortress commander at the time, he delivered the fortress to us and recognized us as his natural master and king.”⁴⁹ This version of royal “memory” significantly differs from what can be realistically discerned about the 1290s, when Andrew III was anything but “our dearest cousin”. As indicated above, this picture also differs from the account of the later chronicler, Michael Madii, who went to such lengths that he claimed that Charles had come to “take over” the Kingdom from the hands of Andrew III. Be it as it may, in the years following the Esztergom coronation, carried out by an elected (but not confirmed) Esztergom archbishop and without the “holy crown” (in other words,

⁴⁹ DZ VIII, 259 br. 217, 20. 3. 1310.: *cum post mortem regis Andree felicitatis recordacionis nostri karissimi patruelis regnum Ungarie nobis debitum iure et ordine geniture adissemus, idem magister Paulus castrum nostrum de Posoga, quod tunc idem ut castellanus tenebat, in fluuio Zoua uocato nobis occurens, in manus nostras statuit nos pro domino et rege naturali recognoscens.* Uz izvornik kraljevske darovnice iz koje potječe tekst (MOL DF 265778), sačuvana je i isprava (MOL DF 265780) iz koje se v. da je privilegij u svečanoj formi prepisala dvorska kancelarija kralja Karla Roberta 28. travnja 1323. godine, da bi zatim taj prijepis ponovno prepisala kancelarija kralja Ludovika Velikoga 2. veljače 1347., što već samo po sebi jasno govori o čestoj uporabi izvornoga dokumenta.

⁵⁰ V. Hardi 2013, 255–257.

⁴⁸ For an extraordinary insight on the importance that narratives about the past have for the shaping and reproducing of political identities in general, see Tilly 2002.

⁴⁹ CD VIII, 259 no. 217, 20.03.1310.: *cum post mortem regis Andree felicitatis recordacionis nostri karissimi patruelis regnum Ungarie nobis debitum iure et ordine geniture adissemus, idem magister Paulus castrum nostrum de Posoga, quod tunc idem ut castellanus tenebat, in fluuio Zoua uocato nobis occurens, in manus nostras statuit nos pro domino et rege naturali recognoscens.* In addition to the original of the King’s deed of gift from which the text was reproduced (MOL DF 265778), another document has also been preserved (MOL DF 265780) that makes it clear that the deed of privilege was transcribed, in a solemn form, by King Charles Robert’s chancery on 28 April 1323 and then again by King Louis the Great’s chancery on 2 February 1347, clearly indicating that the original document was frequently in use.

kronološka cjelina ograničena 1301. godinom kao početkom vladavine.

No u stvarnosti prvih nekoliko godina nakon krunidbe u Ostrogonu krajnji je ishod ekspedicije započete u Splitu u ljeto 1300. godine bio još uvijek vrlo neizvjestan. Doista sumorne izglede dječaka kralja, koji je pribježište našao u južnim dijelovima Ugarske (očito mu nije padalo na pamet vratiti se pod zaštitu hrvatskih velikaša), izvrsno zrcali jedna od rijetkih sačuvanih kraljevskih darovnica iz toga doba, ona koja je pod godinom 1302. izdana magistru Beki, sinu Tominu. Tim dokumentom, naime, kralj obdareniku daje ni manje ni više nego „naše kraljevsko selo“ (*villa*) u kojemu zapravo sam boravi zajedno sa svojim „barunima“ – tekst dokumenta, međutim, pokazuje da je u kraljevu okruženju bilo jasno da sve to ne slični na kraljevski dvor i ponašanje, pa je stoga i zapisana misao da ono što kralj sada čini, nagrađujući svoje vjerne podanike, predstavlja tek mali dio onoga što će raditi kada se okolnosti promjene.⁵¹ Ni dvije godine kasnije, u vrijeme kad je iz kombinacija o nasljeđu krune sv. Stjepana konačno izbačen češki pretendent Vaclav III., pozicija Karla Roberta nije izgledala bitno bolje. U pohodu na Češku koji su u jesen 1304. poduzeli njegovi zaštitnici Habsburzi, Karlo Robert je poslao i svoje snage, no prema onome što je zapisao austrijski kroničar Ottokar u svojoj *Austrijskoj kronici u stihovima* (*Österreichische Reimchronik*) odred je (još uvijek) pretendenta iz Napulja izgledao u najmanju ruku čudno, unatoč činjenici da je on već imao nove, znatno snažnije zaštitnike iz središnjih krajeva golemoga kraljevstva – palatine Amadea Abbu i Rolanda Ratota. Naime, prema onome što je Ottokar napisao, gotovo polovicu snaga Karla Roberta tvorilo je *sedam tisuća strijelaca, Bosanaca i Rašana* (Srba), uz snage koje su doveli sedmorica

without two key elements that would make the coronation fully legal), Charles Robert was indeed under protection of Ugrin Chák.⁵⁰ Still, in later years, despite the fact that the elements that would make the coronation fully legal had been missing at that occasion, Charles Robert considered that his reign had begun at the moment of this “sloppy” coronation. This attitude was eventually adopted by modern historiography and his reign is therefore always perceived as chronologically uninterrupted, with the year 1301 marking its beginning.

In reality, however, in the first years following the Esztergom coronation, the outcome of the expedition launched in Split in summer 1300 was still very uncertain. The grim prospects for the boy-king who found sanctuary in southern parts of Hungary (clearly he would not even think of enjoying the protection of Croatian nobility again) are perfectly reflected in one of very few preserved royal deeds of gift from that time, issued to master Beke, son of Thomas, in 1302. With this document, the King presents the beneficiary with no less than “our royal village” (*villa*) in which he is actually staying together with his “barons”. However, the text in the document clearly shows that the royal entourage was full aware that both the setting and the behavior were far from royal – hence the note that everything the King was doing now by rewarding his loyal subjects was just a small part of what he was going to do when the circumstances changed.⁵¹ But less than two years later, when the Bohemian pretender Wenceslas III had finally been eliminated from the combinations about Crown of St. Stephen, Charles Robert's prospects did not seem much better. When his protectors, the Hapsburgs, sent their troops on Bohemia in fall 1304, Charles Robert sent

⁵¹ MOL DL 40285, 1302. Parafrazirani dio teksta glasi: *pro fidelibus seruiciis huiusmodi ipsi magistro Bekee occurrere regio cum fauore licet id quid ad presens agimus respectu horum que in futurum facere intendimus et cupimus modicum et exile uideatur tamen in recompensacionem ... villam nostram regalem Bezermen telwk uocatam nobis personaliter cum baronibus nostris quibusdam et presencialiter in eadem villa tunc existentibus cum omnibus suis utilitatibus et pertinenciis que ad eandem possessionem seu villam Bezermen telwk nuncupatam pertinere dignoscuntur de plenitudine nostre gracie dedimus, donauimus et contulimus.*

⁵⁰ See Hardi 2013, 255-257.

⁵¹ MOL DL 40285, 1302. The paraphrased part of the text reads: *pro fidelibus seruiciis huiusmodi ipsi magistro Bekee occurrere regio cum fauore licet id quid ad presens agimus respectu horum que in futurum facere intendimus et cupimus modicum et exile uideatur tamen in recompensacionem ... villam nostram regalem Bezermen telwk uocatam nobis personaliter cum baronibus nostris quibusdam et presencialiter in eadem villa tunc existentibus cum omnibus suis utilitatibus et pertinenciis que ad eandem possessionem seu villam Bezermen telwk nuncupatam pertinere dignoscuntur de plenitudine nostre gracie dedimus, donauimus et contulimus.*

ugarskih biskupa.⁵² Interpretacija Ottokarova navoda koju u svojoj raspravi nudi Nikola Milivojević ide za tim da se iza izričaja *Razen* njemačkoga izvornika kriju srpski podanici ovdje već ranije spominjanoga kralja Dragutina, no čini se da tu postoji prostor i za nešto drukčiju interpretaciju. Pritom valja pripomenuti kako se brojevi koje donosi austrijski kroničar ne mogu tek tako jednostavno prihvatiti kao precizni, no s obzirom na to da se radi, po svemu sudeći, o sudioniku pohoda, dakle očevidcu, može se zaključiti da je njegov dojam bio da su gotovo polovicu snaga Karla Roberta tvorili „strijelci Bosanci i Rašani“. Tomu svakako valja dodati i kako postoji mogućnost da su u pohodu, osim podanika kralja Dragutina sudjelovali i *Rašani* u smislu podanika Dragutinova brata, raškoga kralja Milutina – njegovi su izaslanici upravo u proljeće i ljeto 1304. u dva navrata putovali preko Dubrovnika u Skradin na pregovore s tadašnjim „banom Hrvata i gospodarom Bosne“ Pavlom Šubićem Bribirskim. Doda li se tomu da je u lipnju te godine, između dvaju putovanja srpskih izaslanika, u samoj Bosni ubijen Pavlov brat, tadašnji bosanski ban Mladen I. Šubić Bribirski,⁵³ ostaje otvorenim pitanje nisu li „ban Hrvata“ i raški kralj, obojica u ovo doba anžuvinske pristaše, dogovarali slanje kontingenata koji bi pomogli preseljenje Karla Roberta s juga na sjever i nije li otpor upravo toj regrutaciji izazvao sukob u kojem će Mladen I. izgubiti život.⁵⁴ Bilo kako bilo, stvarna je pretendentova pozicija bila

⁵² Za premještanje Karla Roberta iz južnih u sjeverozapadne krajeve kraljevstva i zaštitu dvojice palatina v. Hardi 2013, 259–263, koji precizno datira i vrijeme pohoda u Češku. Ottokarov tekst reproducira i komentira Milivojević 2017, 60–63.

⁵³ O svim ovim zbivanjima detaljnije v. Ančić 1997, 93–95.

⁵⁴ Ovakva interpretacija oslanja se i na činjenicu da vrela ovoga doba, poglavito ona ugarske provenijencije, ali i tzv. *Opis istočne Europe (Descriptio Europae orinetalis)* čiji se (anonimni) autor osobno upoznao sa stanjem ovoga dijela svijeta, razlikuju kao zasebne „zemlje“ pod različitom vlašću „Rašku“ i „Srbiju“ – onom prvom vlada kralj Milutin, dočim je vladar u drugoj kralj Dragutin (v. o tomu Dinić 1978, 41–43; *Opis* to ovako naznačuje: *Regnum enim [hoc] uidelicet Rasie duas habet partes, prima que est principalis dicitur Rasia, sic appellata a nomine cuiusdam fluvii ... Secunda pars huius regni uocatur seruia a conditionibus populorum sic dicta, quia quasi omnes sunt seruilis conditionis* – Górká 1916, 29 r. 10–12; 31 r. 12–14). Činjenica, dakle, da Ottokar koristi pojam „Rašani“ (*Razen*), govorila bi u takvu kontekstu da je riječ o Milutinovim podanicima.

his troops, too. However, according to the Austrian chronicler Ottokar in his *Austrian Rhymed Chronicle (Österreichische Reimchronik)*, the detachment sent by (still) the pretender from Naples looked strange, to say the least, despite the fact that, by that time, he had new, much powerful protectors from the central parts of the vast kingdom – palatines Amadeo Abba and Roland Ratot. According to Ottokar’s account, almost half of Charles Robert’s troops consisted of *seven thousand archers, Bosnians and Rascians (Serbs)*, and the troops brought by seven Hungarian bishops.⁵² According to the interpretation of the Ottokar’s account offered in Nikola Milivojević’s paper, the term *Razen* in the German original refers to the Serbian subjects of the earlier mentioned King Dragutin. However, it seems that another interpretation is possible. It should be noted that the numbers used by the Austrian chronicler cannot be accepted as accurate without any doubt. As these numbers were probably provided by a participant of the campaign – an eyewitness – we can conclude that it was his impression that “archers, Bosnians and Rascians”, accounted for almost half of Charles Robert’s troops. There is also the possibility that, in addition to the subjects of King Dragutin, the *Rascians* who were the subjects of Dragutin’s brother, King Milutin of Rascia, also took part in the campaign – for it was Milutin’s envoys that made two trips to Skradin (in Croatia) via Dubrovnik in spring and summer 1304 to attend the negotiations with the then “Ban of the Croats and the Lord of Bosnia”, Paul Šubić of Bribir. Given also the fact that, in June that year, between the two trips of the Serbian envoys, Paul’s brother, the then Bosnian Ban Mladen I Šubić of Bribir was murdered in Bosnia,⁵³ the question remains whether both “Ban of the Croats” and King of Rascia – both of them supporters of the Angevine cause at the time – made an arrangement to send contingents that would facilitate the removal of Charles Robert from south to north and was it not the resistance

⁵² For Charles Robert’s removal from southern to northwestern parts of the Kingdom and for the protection provided by the two palatines, see Hardi 2013, 259–263, who also accurately dates the Bohemian campaign. Ottokar’s text was reproduced and commented on in Milivojević 2017, 60–63.

⁵³ For a detailed discussion on these events, see Ančić 1997, 93–95.

takva da je još 1305., unatoč stvaranju novih saveza, njegova baka, napuljska kraljica Marija, preko koje je Karlo Robert potraživao krunu, morala kod agenata firentinskih bankarskih kuća Bardi i Peruzzi založiti dio svoga nakita (*coronam vnam de auro cum diuersis lapidibus pretiosis*) za kredit koji je on podigao u visini od 300 unči zlata, odnosno 1.500 florena.⁵⁵ Stvarni izgledi za uspjeh pojavili su se tek kad su drugi pretendenti na prijestol nakon višegodišnje borbe odustali od svojih nauma, no prikaz tih gibanja nadrađa ambicije ovoga priloga.⁵⁶ Unatoč tomu, neke činjenice ipak zaslužuju bar letimičan osvrt i komentar, pa tako valja istaknuti kako je češki kraljević Václav, sin kralja Václava II., imao 1301. godine znatno veće izgleda za uspjeh u nastojanju da za sebe osigura kraljevski prijestol.⁵⁷ Iza njega je stajao otac, češki i poljski kralj, sa svim svojim resursima, ali je taj isti otac donosio i ključne odluke, između ostaloga i onu o odustajnju od dalje borbe za prijestol u Ugarskoj. Može se zapravo posve jasno ustvrditi da je razlika između njega i Karla Roberta bila u tome da je Václav, kao predestinirani očevo nasljednik, imao puno odstupnicu, što očito s dječakom iz Napulja nije bio slučaj jer je on, kao što je ranije rečeno, u Napulju bio samo potencijalni izvor političkih problema te je njegov povratak tamo bio praktično nezamisliv, a sama pomisao na to izazivala zloradost rimskih kardinala. Upravo je u tome kontekstu kasniji pritisak papinske kurije bio doista učinkovit, pri čemu valja voditi računa da se smisao uplitanja kurije u problem nasljeđa ugarske krune mijenjao tijekom vremena. Ako je u početku aranžman kojim se rješavao problem u Napulju izgledao neprihvatljiv papinskoj kuriji, nakon

⁵⁵ Wenzel 1874, 174 br. 224. Vrijedi svakako istaknuti da je po svemu sudeći cijeli pothvat Karla Roberta od početka bio financiran kreditom firentinskih bankara u visini od 1.300 unči zlata ili 6.500 florena – v. Wenzel 1874, 150 br. 186. Taj iznos valja usporediti ponajprije s kreditom što ga je 1305. godine Karlo II. uzeo za pripreme još jedne vojne ekspedicije na Siciliju, a koji je iznosio 9.000 unči zlata ili 45.000 florena (Abulafia 1981, 380). O ulozu firentinskih bankarskih kuća u Napuljskome Kraljevstvu pod anžuvinskom vlašću v. inače Abulafia 1981, te Poloni 2017.

⁵⁶ U novije vrijeme ta su zbivanja detaljnije pretresali Skorcka 2013 te Kozłowski 2013, koji začudo zanemaruju činjenicu da su oba pretendenta bili zapravo dječaci u čije je ime netko drugi donosio odluke.

⁵⁷ Njegovu poziciju, pa susljedno i izgleda za stjecanje prijestola, dobro ocrtava Hóman 1938, 101 i d.

to that particular recruitment that had triggered the conflict in which Mladen I would lose his life.⁵⁴ Be it as it may, the pretender's real position was such that, back in 1305, despite new alliances, his grandmother Mary, Queen of Naples (it was through her that Charles Robert claimed the crown) had to pawn some of her jewelry at the Florentine banks Bardi and Peruzzi (*coronam vnam de auro cum diuersis lapidibus pretiosis*) in order to take a loan in the amount of 300 ounces of gold (1,500 florins) on his behalf.⁵⁵ Real prospects of success were created only when other pretenders to the throne had given up their claims after years of struggle (but this exceeds the limits of this paper).⁵⁶ Nevertheless, some facts deserve at least a brief comment. For example, in 1301, Bohemian Prince Wenceslas, son of King Wenceslas II, had much better chances for securing the throne for himself.⁵⁷ He was backed by his father, the Polish and Bohemian king, with all his resources, but it was also his father who was making key decisions, including the decision to give up

⁵⁴ This interpretation is also based on the fact that contemporary sources, particularly Hungarian ones, but also the so-called *Description of Eastern Europe* (*Descriptio Europae orientalis*) the (anonymous) author of which was personally familiar with the situation in that part of the world, make difference between "Rascia" and "Serbia": the former is ruled by King Milutin and the latter by King Dragutin (for this, see Dinić 1978, 41-43; according to the text of the anonymous author *regnum enim [hoc] uidelicet Rasiae duas habet partes, prima que est principalis dicitur Rasia, sic appellata a nomine cuiusdam fluminis ... Secunda pars huius regni uocatur seruia a conditionibus populorum sic dicta, quia quasi omnes sunt seruilis conditionis* – Górká 1916, 291. 10-12; 31 l. 12-14). The fact that Ottokar uses the term „Rascians“ (*Razen*) indicates that, in such context, he refers to Milutin's subjects.

⁵⁵ Wenzel 1874, 174 no. 224. It should certainly be pointed out here that, to all appearances, the entire Charles Robert project had from its very beginning been financed with a loan of 1,300 ounces of gold (6,500 florins) extended by Florentine bankers – see Wenzel 1874, 150 no. 186. This amount should be compared with the loan taken by Charles II in 1305 to finance yet another Sicilian campaign – a total of 9,000 ounces of gold (45,000 florins) (Abulafia 1981, 380). For the role of Florentine banking houses in the Kingdom of Naples under the Anjou dynasty, see Abulafia 1981, and Poloni 2017.

⁵⁶ These events were recently analyzed in detail by Skorcka 2013 and Kozłowski 2013; surprisingly, they both neglect the fact that Charles Robert and Wenceslas III as pretenders were practically boys and that decisions were being made in their name by others.

⁵⁷ His position and, consequently, his chances of acquiring the throne are outlined well in Hóman 1938, 101 ff.

smrti Andrije III. početkom 1301. cijeli je problem dobio novo značenje. Inzistiranje Bonifacija VIII. na njegovu pravorijeku pri određivanju „zakonitoga“ nasljednika krune sv. Stjepana predstavljalo je zapravo praktičnu eksplikaciju ideja o hijerokratskoj uređenju svijeta. Te su ideje, izvedene iz učenja o papinskoj „punini vlasti“ (*plenitudo potestatis*),⁵⁸ ubrzo, nakon pojave čuvene bule *Unam sanctam* u studenome 1302. godine, dovele do teškoga sukoba s francuskim kraljem koji će završiti njegovom smrću i poremećajima u funkcioniranju kurije. S druge strane, nestanak „domaće“ dinastije sa smrću Andrije III. i susljedni „dinastički rat“, u koji su bili upeleteni Anžuvinci, Premislidi i Habsburzi (uloga ovih posljednjih, iako nisu imali izravnoga pretendenta, bila je vjerojatno presudna upravo na dinastičkoj razini), bitno su utjecali na duboku društvenu promjenu. Ona se ponajbolje vidi u promjenama političke arene u kojoj će načelo konsenzusa između vladara i vladajućega (plemičkoga) sloja ubuduće igrati ključnu ulogu,⁵⁹ o čemu će svakako valjati voditi računa u budućim raspravama o stanju u XIV. stoljeću.

*

U zaključku ove rasprave valja na jednoj razini sumirati dobivene rezultate istraživanja polazeći od toga da je ono bacilo bitno novo svjetlo na okolnosti u kojima je pripremljen i izveden odlazak Karla Roberta iz Napulja, odnosno njegov dolazak u Kraljevstvo na koje je polagao nasljedno pravo. Naime, istraživanje je pokazalo da pretendentov djed Karlo II., koji je u tome igrao glavnu ulogu, nije baš ozbiljno shvaćao taj pothvat, što je, čini se, bilo jasno i dobrom dijelu suvremenika. Isto se tako čini

the struggle for the Hungarian throne. Clearly, the difference between him and Charles Robert was that Wenceslas, as his father's predestined successor, had a fallback position, which was not the case with the boy from Naples. The latter, as we have said earlier, was perceived as a potential source of political problems in his grandfather's kingdom, so his return was practically inconceivable and the Roman cardinals gloated over the very thought of it. The subsequent pressure of the Papal Curia was rather efficient in this context, but it should be kept in mind that the reason for the Curia's interference in the succession of the Hungarian throne changed over time. If the arrangement solving the problem in Naples seemed unacceptable to the Papal Curia in the beginning, the whole thing acquired a new meaning after the death of Andrew III in early 1301. Pope Boniface VIII's insistence that he decides on the "legal" heir to Crown of St. Stephen was but a practical explication of the ideas of the hierocratic order of the world. Soon after the famous papal bull *Unam sanctam* was issued in November 1302, these ideas, derived from the doctrine of the papal "fullness of power" (*plenitudo potestatis*),⁵⁸ led to a bitter conflict with the French king that would end with his death and affect the functioning of the Curia. On the other hand, the extinction of the "local" dynasty brought about by the death of Andrew III and the ensuing "dynastic war" in which the Angevines, Premyslids and Hapsburgs (although the Hapsburgs had no direct pretender, their role was probably crucial on the dynastic level) had substantial impact on deep social changes. It is best seen in the changes that took place in the political arena, where the principle of consensus between the ruler and the ruling class (nobility) would have a crucial

⁵⁸ Za razvoj hijerokratskih ideja i njihovu praktičnu eksplikaciju v. Ullmann 1962, 413 i d. te Canning 2011, 12 i d., koji suštinu „hijerokratskoga modela papinske monarhije“ ukratko formulira ovako (13): „papi kao izravnome nasljedniku sv. Petra pripada poglavarstvo nad zemaljskom kršćanskom zajednicom koju je njegovoj skrbi povjerio sam Krist“. Temperamentni Bonifacije VIII. takve je ideje ukratko sažimao u stvarnome govoru u izričaje poput onoga da „može svrgnuti kralja kao da otpušta slugu“ (*sicut unum garcionem*) – Strayer 1980, 260 bilj. 63.

⁵⁹ Zaključak počiva u prvome redu na konzekvencijama koje proizlaze iz rezultata istraživanja objavljenih u Szücs 1975, 26 i d.; Kozłowski 2013; Haldén 2020, 81–131, i valja ga tumačiti u smislu definiranja agendi budućih istraživanja.

⁵⁸ For development of hierocratic ideas and their practical explication, see Ullmann 1962, 413 ff. and Canning 2011, 12 ff., who offers the following brief formulation of the essence of the "hierocratic model of the papal monarchy" (13): "The pope as the direct successor of St Peter has the divinely appointed headship on earth of the body of the Christian community which has been committed to his care by Christ." The hot-blooded Boniface VIII condensed such ideas in his speeches, using phrases like: "I can dismiss the king like a valet" (*sicut unum garcionem*) – Strayer 1980, 260 n. 63.

opravdanim zaključiti da on nije ozbiljno računao s time da bi njegov unuk doista mogao doći do krune sv. Stjepana te zasjesti na prijestol Ugarsko-Hrvatskoga Kraljevstva. Ono što sačuvana vrela implicitno pokazuju jest da je pothvat imao za prvenstveni cilj udaljiti potencijalnoga nasljednika iz Napulja, gdje je njegov dalji boravak mogao izazvati političke probleme s obzirom na to da je Karlo Robert, s pravima koja su proizlazila iz načela primogeniture, mogao u svakome trenutku postati točka fokusa i okupljanja nezadovoljnika. U tome kontekstu nije teško naslutiti da se uloga hrvatskih velikaša koji su dječaka pretendenta prihvatili na istočnoj obali Jadrana, u prvome redu bana Pavla Šubića Bribirskoga, odnosila poglavito na to da spriječe njegov povratak u južnu Italiju. Takav zaključak nalazi potvrdu u ponašanju bana Pavla nakon neočekivanoga obrata, smrti aktualnoga kralja Andrije III. – u novonastalim okolnostima ban Pavao nije bio taj koji je dječaka vodio na krunidbu, već je to prepustio Ugrinu Cháku, „isporučivši“ dječaka novome zaštitniku „na Savi“.

Smrt je, dakle, Andrije III. stubokom promijenila dinamiku odnosa, ali i samu narav pothvata započeta s bitno drukčijim ciljevima. Glavni materijalni oslonac u sljedećih nekoliko godina, do preseljenja na sjever Kraljevstva, Karlo Robert je našao kod Ugrina Csáka i njegova saveznika, bivšega srpskog kralja Dragutina. U to doba njegovi izgledi za uspjeh još uvijek nisu bili mnogo bolji od vremena kad se iskrcao u Splitu, ali se u tome smislu situacija počela bitno mijenjati papinskom intervencijom pomoću namještanja odgovarajućih crkvenih prelata. Time se oblikovala doista ozbiljna politička, pa onda i materijalna infrastruktura koja će u konačnici, nakon 1304. godine, stvoriti uvjete za stvarni obrat i susljedni uspjeh na putu do krune sv. Stjepana.

Na kraju valja baciti tek brzi pogled na razloge koji su doveli do uspjeha Karla Roberta. Ako bih te razloge redao po važnosti, onda bih svakako na prvo mjesto stavio kontingenciju – bez nagle i neočekivane smrti Andrije III. vjerojatno od dječakova pohoda ne bi bilo ništa. Kao drugi po važnosti razlog izvukao bih činjenicu da dječak pretendent jednostavno nije imao izbora, bio je odstranjen iz slike u Napuljskome Kraljevstvu i naprosto se više u nju nije mogao vratiti. Bio je prisiljen ići do kraja, a to znači ili do uspjeha ili do konačnoga neuspjeha, što je vjerojatno podrazumijevalo i njegov život.

role in the future,⁵⁹ which is something all future papers on the situation in the 14th century will have to make allowance for.

*

In the conclusion, we should summarize the results of the research, assuming it has cast an essential new light on the circumstances in which Charles Robert's departure from Naples and his subsequent arrival to the Kingdom to which he had claimed his inherited right was prepared and launched. The research has shown that the pretender's grandfather, Charles II, who played the leading role in it, did not take the whole project very seriously – something even many of his contemporaries seemed to have realized. It also seems legitimate to conclude that he did not really believe his grandson could actually get hold of Crown of St. Stephen and sit firmly on the throne of the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia. The preserved sources implicitly show that the primary objective of the expedition was to remove the potential heir to the throne from Naples, where his extended stay could cause political problems (because, with his rights arising from the principle of primogeniture, Charles Robert could at any moment become the focal point around which the malcontents would gather). In this context, it is easy to realize that the role of the Croatian noblemen who received the young pretender on Eastern Adriatic coast – primarily Ban Paul Šubić of Bribir – was mostly to prevent his return to Southern Italy. The actions of Ban Paul after the unexpected turn of events – the death of incumbent king Andrew III – can be seen as evidence of such a conclusion: in the new circumstances, it was not Ban Paul who took the boy to the coronation; having delivered the boy to Ugrin Chák on the River Sava, he left this job to the boy's new protector. Thus, Andrew III's death fundamentally changed the dynamics of the relations and the nature of the project that originally had rather different objectives. In the next

⁵⁹ The conclusion is primarily based on the consequences arising from the research results published in Szücs 1975, 26 ff.; Kozłowski 2013; Haldén 2020, 81-131, and should be interpreted in terms of defining the agendas for future research.

Treći čimbenik po važnosti svakako je bila ustrajna podrška papinske kurije koja je još uvijek relativno uspješno kontrolirala Crkvu u Ugarsko-Hrvatskom Kraljevstvu, poglavito u okolnostima nereda izazvanoga naglom smrću Andrije III. No već je i ovaj treći važan čimbenik bio uvjetovan onim prvim dvama. Ovakvu raščlambu čini mi se čvrsto podupire usporedba sa sličnim pothvatom koji je 1403. godine poduzeo Ladislav Napuljski. Sve su vanjske okolnosti obaju ovih pokušaja dolaska do krune sv. Stjepana bile vrlo slične, pri čemu je Ladislav imao na raspolaganju bitno bolju političku infrastrukturu za svoj pohod u smislu znatne podrške i ugarskoga plemstva. No niti je kralj Sigismund otišao s političke pozornice otvarajući time pitanje nasljeđa, niti je napuljski kralj bio u situaciji bez mogućnosti odstupanja. S obzirom na to da se imao kamo vratiti, odustao je već na prvoj prepriki i nakon 1403. samo nastojao što je moguće više izvući iz svoga formalnog prava, dok mu to na kraju nije i uspjelo prodajom toga prava Mletačkoj Republici.

few years, till his move to the northern parts of the Kingdom, Charles Robert's material infrastructure was provided by Ugrin Csák and his ally, former Serbian king Dragutin. In those days, his prospects for success were still not any better than at the time he had landed in Split, but the situation started to change after the Pope had intervened by appointing suitable prelates. Rather solid political and – later – material infrastructure was thus created that would eventually, after 1304, create conditions for a turn of events and a consequent success on his path to Crown of St. Stephen.

And finally, we should take a quick glance at the reasons of Charles Robert's success. If I were to list these reasons by their relevance, I would certainly put contingency on the first place: without the sudden and unexpected death of Andrew III, the boy's expedition would probably fail. As the second most relevant reason I would mention the fact the young pretender simply did not have a choice – he had been removed from the picture in the Kingdom of Naples and could not return there anymore. He was forced to go all the way and either succeed or fail, the latter probably meaning his life. The third most relevant factor was the persistent support of the Papal Curia, which still had a relatively strong control over the Church in the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia, particularly in the context of the turmoil created by the sudden death of Andrew III. But this third factor depended on the two first ones. I believe that a comparison with the similar project undertaken by Ladislav of Naples in 1403 can corroborate such an analysis. All the external circumstances of these two attempts to acquire Crown of St. Stephen were very similar, although Ladislav had much better political infrastructure (the support of Hungarian nobility) working for his project. However, neither King Sigismund exited the political stage opening in that way the question of succession, nor was the King of Naples without a fallback position. As he had a place to return to, he gave up his quest at the very first obstacle and, after 1403, he merely tried to exploit his formal rights as much as possible, until he finally succeeded in it by selling that right to the Venetian Republic.

Bibliografija / Bibliography

- Abulafia 1981 – David Abulafia, Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370, *The Economic History Review*, NS 34/3, 1981, 377–388.
- Ančić 1997 – Mladen Ančić, *Putanja klatna: Ugarsko-hrvatsko kraljevstvo i Bosna u XIV. stoljeću*, Zadar – Mostar, 1997.
- Báling 2015 – Péter Báling, Personal Network of the Neapolitan Angevins and Hungary (1290-1304), *Specimina Nova Pars Prima Sectio Mediaevalis*, VIII, 2015, 83–107.
- Bartlett 2020 – Robert Bartlett, *Blood Royal: Dynastic politics in Medieval Europe*, Cambridge, 2020.
- Budak & Raukar 2006 – Neven Budak & Tomislav Raukar, *Hrvatska povijest srednjeg vijeka*, Zagreb, 2006.
- Caggese 1929 – Romolo Caggese, *Roberto d'Angio e i suoi tempi I*, Firenze, 1929.
- Canning 2011 – Joseph Canning, *Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages 1296-1417*, Cambridge, 2011.
- CD – *Codex diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, I-XVIII, eds. Tadija Smičiklas et al., Zagreb, 1904–1990.
- Csukovits 2012 – Enikő Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I. rész I. Károly és uralkodása (1301-1342)*, Budapest, 2012.
- Csukovits 2013 – Enikő Csukovits, Le innovazioni istituzionali nell'età angioina e i loro parallelismi napoletani, u / in: *L'Ungheria angioina*, ed. Enikő Csukovits, Roma, 2013, 59–119.
- Davis 1989 – Ralph H. C. Davis, *Medieval Warhorse*, London, 1989.
- Dinić 1978 – Mihajlo Dinić, *Srpske zemlje u srednjem veku: Istorijско-geografske studije*, ed. Sima Ćirković, Beograd, 1978.
- Dunbabin 1998 – Jean Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe*, London – New York, 1998.
- DZ – *Diplomatički zbornik kraljevine Hrvatske, Dalmacije i Slavonije*, I-XVIII, eds. Tadija Smičiklas et al., Zagreb, 1904–1990.
- Engel 2005 – Pál Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526*, London – New York, 2005.
- Górka 1916 – Olgier Górka, *Anonymi Descriptio Europae orientalis*, Cracoviae, 1916.
- Haldén 2020 – Peter Haldén, *Family Power: Kinship, War and Political Orders in Eurasia 500-2018*, Cambridge, 2020.
- Hardi 2012 – Đura Hardi, *Drugeti: Povest o usponu i padu porodice pratilaca anžujskih kraljeva*, Novi Sad, 2012.
- Hardi 2013 – Đura Hardi, Petrovaradin – „prestonica“ jednog Anžujca, u / in: *Srednjovekovna naselja na tlu Vojvodine: Istorijски događaji i procesi*, ed. Đura Hardi, Sremska Mitrovica, 2013, 243–279.
- Hóman 1938 – Bálint Hóman, *Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria 1209-1403*, Roma, 1938.
- Karbić 1999 – Damir Karbić, Diplomacija hrvatskih velikaša iz roda Šubića, u / in: *Hrvatska srednjovekovna diplomacija (Zbornik Diplomatske akademije 2)*, eds. Mladen Anderlić & Mirko Valentić, Zagreb, 1999, 225–242.
- Karbić 2015 – Damir Karbić, Hrvatski velikaši i plemići i ugarska kruna u razdoblju kasnih Arpadovića i Anžuvina, u / in: *A Horvát-Magyar együttélés fordulópontjai: Intézmények, társadalom, gazdaság, kultúra / Prekretnice u suživotu Hrvata i Mađara: Ustanove, društvo, gospodarstvo i kultura*, eds. Pál Fodor & Dinko Šokčević, Budimpešta, 2015, 177–183.
- Kelly 2003 – Samantha Kelly, *The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309-1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship*, Leiden – Boston, 2003.
- Kercselich 1994 [1770] – Balthasar Adam Kercselich de Corbavia, *Historiarum cathedralis ecclesie Zagradiensis partis primae tomus I, Zagrabiae 1770*, fasimilni pretisak / facsimile, Zagreb, 1994.
- Kiesewetter 2006 – Andreas Kiesewetter, L'intervento di Nicolò IV, Celestino V e Bonifacio VIII nella lotta per il trono ungherese (1290-1303), u / in: *Bonifacio VIII. Ideologia e azione politica*, ed. Ilaria Bonincontri, Roma, 2006, 140–198.
- N. Klaić 1976 – Nada Klaić, *Povijest Hrvata u razvijenom srednjem vijeku*, Zagreb, 1976.
- N. Klaić 1982 – Nada Klaić, *Povijest Zagreba I*, Zagreb, 1982.
- V. Klaić 1897 – Vjekoslav Klaić, *Bribirski knezovi od plemena Šubić do god. 1347.*, Zagreb, 1987.
- Kozłowski 2013 – Wojciech Kozłowski, Power Winning Contexts and Strategies of Charles I and Wenceslas III. A Comparison of Their Quest for the Hungarian Throne, *New Europe College Yearbook 2012-2013*, 131–174.
- Lucherini 2013 – Vini Lucherini, The Journey of Charles I, King of Hungary, from Visegrád to Naples (1333): Its Political Implications and Artistic Consequences, *Hungarian Historical Review*, 2/2, 2013, 341–362.

- Ljubić 1868 – Sime Ljubić, *Listine o odnošajih između južnoga Slavenstva i Mletačke Republike*, Zagreb, 1868.
- Mihalache 2011 – Robert Marius Mihalache, The Holy See's Intervention in the Struggle for the Occupation of the Hungarian Throne (1290-1310), *Transylvanian Review*, XX, Supplement 2:1, 2011, 156–164.
- Milivojević 2017 – Nikola Milivojević, „Rimovana hronika“ Otokara Štajerskog o učešću Srba u ratu za ugarsku krunu početkom XIV veka, *Vojno-istorijski glasnik*, 2, 2017, 53–64.
- Nagy 1878 – Imre Nagy, *Anjoukori okmánytár* I, Budapest, 1878.
- Nekić 2017 – Antun Nekić, Društvene mreže i uspon oligarha: primjer Babonića (od 1270-ih do 1320-ih), *Historijski zbornik*, LXX/1, 2017, 1–34.
- Passerini 2019 – Davide Passerini, *Familiaritas, Hospitium e giurisdizione: i principi angioini tra XIII e XIV secolo*, *Archivio storico per le province Napoletane*, CXXXVII, 2019, 73–105.
- Peričić 1984 – Eduard Peričić, Zadar u doba prvih veza s Anžuvincima 1269-1280., *Radovi Filozofskog fakluteta u Zadru*, 23(10), 1983-84, Zadar, 1984, 251–265.
- Poloni 2018 – Alma Poloni, Banchieri del re: La monarchia angioina e le compagnie toscane da Carlo I a Roberto I, u / in: *Périphéries financières angevines. Institutions et pratiques de l'administration de territoires composites (XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, ed. Serena Morelli, Roma, 2018, 309–330.
- Pryor 1982 – John H. Pryor, Transportation of Horses by Sea During the Era of the Crusades: Eighth Century to 1285 AD, *The Mariner's Mirror*, 68/2, 1982, 103–125.
- Rački 1884 – Franjo Rački, Notae Ionannis Lucii, *Starine JAZU*, 13, 1884, 211–268.
- Runciman 1992 – Steven Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century*, Cambridge, 1992.
- Skorka 2013 – Renáta Skorka, With a Little Help from the Cousins – Charles I and the Habsburg Dukes of Austria during the Interregnum, *Hungarian Historical Review*, 2/2, 2013, 243–260.
- Sroka 1996 – Stanislaw A. Sroka, Methods of Constructing Angevin Rule in Hungary in the Light of Most Recent Research, *Quaestiones mediae aevi novae*, 1, 1996, 77–90.
- Strayer 1980 – Joseph R. Strayer, *The Reign of Philip the Fair*, Princeton, 1980.
- Szentpétery 1937 – Emericus Szentpétery (ed.), *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum tempore ducum regumque stirpis Arpadianae gestarum* I, Budapest, 1937.
- Szücs 1975 – Jenő Szücs, *Theoretical Elements in Master Simon of Kezas's Gesta Hungarorum (Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 96)*, Budapest, 1975.
- Šišić 1901 – Ferdo Šišić, Studije iz historije anžuvinske dinastije, *Vjestnik kr. Hrvatsko-dalmatinsko-slavonskog zemaljskog arkiva*, III, 1901, 6–15.
- Šišić 1916 – Ferdo Šišić, *Pregled povijesti hrvatskoga naroda od najstarijih dana do godine 1873.*, Zagreb, 1916.
- Theiner 1859 – Augustinus Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, Roma, 1859.
- Thuróczy 1986 – Johannes Thuróczy, *Chronica Hungarorum, Venetiis 1488 – fototipsko izdanje* Budapest, 1986.
- Tilly 2002 – Charles Tilly, *Stories, Identities, and Political Change*, Lanham, 2002.
- Tocco 2006 – Francesco Paolo Tocco, Bonifacio VIII e Carlo II D'Angio: analisi di un rapporto politico e umano, u / in: *Bonifacio VIII. Ideologia e azione politica*, ed. Ilaria Bonincontro, Roma, 2006, 221–240.
- Ullmann 1962 – Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages*, London, 1962.
- Villani s.a. – *Cronica di Giovanni Villani (Letteratura italiana Einaudi)*, Torino, s.a.
- Wenzel 1864 – Gusztáv Wenzel, *Árpádkori új okmánytár* V, Pest, 1864.
- Wenzel 1874 – Gusztáv Wenzel, *Magyar diplomacziái emlékek az Anjou-korból* I, Budapest, 1874.
- Zsoldos 2013 – Attila Zsoldos, Kings and Oligarchs in Hungary at the Turn of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, *The Hungarian Historical Review*, 2/2, 2013, 211–242.
- Zsoldos 2013a – Attila Zsoldos, Province e oligarchi. La crisi del potere reale ungherese fra il XIII e il XIV secolo, u / in: *L'Ungheria angioina*, ed. Enikő Csukovits, Roma, 2013, 23–58.