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CROSSBORDER CO-OPERATION AS A TOOL FOR TRANS-NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE UPPER ADRIATIC EUROREGIONAL EXPERIENCES

If we portray borders as places for exchange and co-operation instead of barriers, it is straightforward to picture them as resources for re-unification and conflicts' resolution. The development of institutionalised forms of cross-border co-operation, originating from a will of populations and institutions of different states to face common problems, lead to the concept of Euroregion. The enlarged EU has been encouraging the creation of such forms of decentralisation of power, in the economic and cultural fields in particular. In the Upper Adriatic area, this experience of cross-border co-operation gave origin to the EureGo province.

Keywords: Upper Adriatic border, region/regionalism, cross-border co-operation, Euroregion

Introduction

The last wave of accession to the European Union has added to the interpretation of the Adriatic Sea in general, and of the Upper Adriatic in particular, as a strategic territory and a proactive laboratory for European integration and development. The oxymoron *liquid territory* used to depict some salient characteristics of this area does not erode the validity of the concept, identifying, in the need of any social group to organise and structure itself, the manifestation of a border social dimension. Nor does the progressive cultural disconnection from traditional customs and institutions portrayed in Bauman's *liquid modernity* exclude the parsonian reference of "boundary maintenance" to a system's need for stability.

Therefore, it seems appropriate to analyse the Adriatic Sea and the Upper Adriatic – a "territory" characterised by a past drive to the unification of its geography – in terms of borders or, rather, given the recent geopolitical changes, in terms of cross-border co-operation.

The historical and socio-economic framework

Since its "pacification" under the Roman rule, the Adriatic sea was an area characterised by the strong cultural, social and economic ties of the populations inhabiting its coasts and hinterland(s). Such ties grew even stronger under the influence of Venice. Thus the Adriatic Sea in general – even where its waters blend into the Mediterranean Sea – and the Upper Adriatic in particular, was a sea lengthening (and, thus, connecting) the coastal routes and those reaching the Apennines, the Danube Valley and the Balcanic hinterland. Being a trade area for salt, cereals, raw materials for Western European manufactures, the Adriatic Sea experienced, up to the Austria-Hungarian times, a dynamic economy which was not completely interrupted even during the 16th centuries wars between Christianity and the Ottoman Empire. The "liquidity" of the Adriatic Sea was, to some extents, reproduced in its contiguous territory: an emblematic example is that of Niccolò Tommaseo who, defined as a philologist and an Italian patriot, defined himself as deeply Venetian and proud of being Slav.

The modern interpretation of the Adriatic Sea, consequent to the creation of the Nation-State, as a divided but fixed and solid space, implied the disintegration of its original unity and the socio-economic comparative advantages. However, the fall of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes and the European integration process, on the one hand, and the civil society growth, on the other, call for a new non-dichotomist interpretation of the area based on the past, fluid and integrated multilateral approach. From this perspective it seems possible to overcome disputes such as "the on-going vitriol between Croatia and Slovenia over their disputed maritime boundary in Piran Bay (which) increased throughout the spring and summer of 2004" (Donaldson and Pratt 2005:413).

Borders and borderlessness

The acknowledgment of the establishment of border is *per se* useful only insofar as it clearly distinguishes what country is on one side or the other of the border itself. However, such clarification does not tackle in the least the significance of the border or what sort of behaviour is affected by it. Similarly, the mere appreciation of the removal of a border-line tells nothing about its possible enduring permanence in people's minds, about the feasibility of a multifaceted border-crossing behaviour, and about its effects

on the integration of the border area. Thus, it appears more appropriate not to conceptualise borders as self-evident lines marking differences, but rather as resources being both material and non-material; the first undergoing a constant re-configuring in terms of social relations, and the latter synthesising multifarious imagination and representation. Consequently, borders assume an active role as carriers and producers of meanings in discourses and practices (Paasi 2001).

Thus, borders – at least at the territorial level – can be defined according to the function they perform within a given system. Borders, hence, may act as barriers, filters or contact spaces characterising borderlands accordingly, varying from alienated divided borderlands to integrated borderless areas along a spectrum of border permeability and openness (Martinez 1994). Such conceptualisation is based on the interpretation of the (territorial) border as regulating the networks of relations between two systems. From this perspective a few tentative hypotheses on the differences between territorial and liquid (i.e. maritime) borders are sketched.

When considering a relation beam among subjects (or communities of) – not transcending from the abovementioned borders typologies – it is plausible to assume analytically that potential relations do not encounter other obstacles beside those linked to national administrative/legal frameworks. It is, thus, possible to assume an almost identical potential ability for relations among members of the same community and among them and their border-counterparts. The intensity and propensity of such relations are obviously influenced by ecological variables, but it seems plausible to assume that both communities share similar structural conditions nonetheless characterised by the existence of *strong and weak ties* (Granovetter 1998). Conversely, a liquid border does mark a difference between the relations taking place on one side or the other of the border. It appears plausible to assume that interactions' potentiality is different and limited not only due to technological reasons but, especially, given the different conceptualisation of the territorial element as compared to a terrestrial border-line and, thus, seem to hinder disproportionately wide-ranging bottom-up approaches to cross-border co-operation. The propensity to co-operate of the communities inhabiting the coasts facing a stretch of sea and their interpretation of it may vary according to its historical functions, their relations to the hinterlands and to the potential development arising from a joint exploitation of its resources.

When acting as barriers, borders prevent an actor or a group from realising a given objective, limiting the resources needed for its achievement. Hence, such borders often are the cause of conflict (Johansson 1982), defined here as a function of incompatible positions of at least two parties in neighbouring state arising from the physical and symbolic aspects of the border itself, or, as Galtung puts it, as the difference between "the actual" and "the possible" (Galtung 1969). In fact, a border may present social and

economic limiting factors not only frustrating people's efforts to achieve those values determining their thoughts and actions, but also exacerbating the differences in the ability to achieve them and, thus, transforming them in conflicting positions (i.e. ethnic, religious – state – values, material and political values).

Regionalism and the conceptualisation of the region

The EU's rhetoric envisaging (macro) co-operation policies in order to overcome political, economic and cultural borders, reflects the (enlarged) Europe need for a concrete political stability and economic growth dialectically linked to its internal and external regional partners. The consequent objectives and actions are variously interpreted as neo-liberal strategies for economic hegemony or as progressive "post-Westphalian" or "post-modern" regionalism (Agnew 2001). An alternative "new regionalist" approach, combining, for instance, the contributions outlined by Hettne (1999) and Brenner (1999), depicts the role of sub-national state and non-state actors whilst recognising the importance of the state in the wake of the interdependence between states, rather than of the balance of powers, as key factor for post-Westphalian security strategies aiming to political and economic integration. Moreover, the increasing importance of regions within this process is entwined to the new forms of governance (i.e. international organizations, regional authorities and civil society and cross-state/regions/communities) congruent to the post-Fordist interpretation of modern capitalism and of post-national democracy (Mény 2003).

EU policies focusing on territorial governance stimulated a re-scaling of the state by which powers are redistributed throughout the governmental levels. Thus, they challenge the modern conceptualisation of the nation-state based on the drive to homogenise the internal structure of the state-system, whilst differentiating it to the external environment. However, such policy-led theoretical approach, whilst offering solutions to the core/periphery divide suffered disproportionately by the border areas (i.e. periphery areas) in political, social, and economic terms, seems to overlook its negative (centrifugal) consequences. In fact, this regionalist perspective endangers the relations between the central state and its border regions (and cities) in terms of legitimisation of the first by the latter, and, especially, in terms of stringent reforms contexts congruent to post-transitional restructuring of the state.

Beside the different interpretation given to the concept and impact of (European) regionalism, such approach appears useful insofar that it highlights a historical process that has been taking place – although to different extents – throughout Europe over the last sixty years, and whose importance is more than actual in the contemporary European geo-political context. The relevance of this concept could be summarised in the discourse

(or conflict) interposing nation-state sovereignty to regional claims for autonomy, whose implications are extremely relevant for borders regions in terms of however defined development and cross-border co-operation.

Thus, it might be useful to recall here some conceptual elements of the region in order to plot it within the framework of the cross-border context. The first conceptualisation outlines the capability of the region to create autochthony. The latter refers to the concepts of group belonging, ethnicity, mass exodus... most importantly it implies the "embedddness" (Polany, 1944) of the members of a community living together for centuries and for many generations, the contiguity of the living and working space, of the daily life and of local rules' frameworks established in the traditions and forms of government at the local level. Creating autochthony is, thus, the ability to create regional identity, building on existing ethnic roots or, when lost, to "invent" new ones, thus, the solidarity arising from an autochthony experienced in the day-by-day will persist. The importance of a so conceptualised region is a key issue – in centralised nation-states – when the cultural and political importance of the region is claimed.

Analysing the development of the national administrative structures in (European) historical terms from the feudal system – mostly universal – to the elaboration of administrative gravitational systems, a second conceptualisation of the region arises. This refers to the region's ability to develop through time a dimension organizing the territory in administrative, political and economic sub-frameworks, which are able to be sufficiently autonomous (e.g. the French administrative system).

From a more analytical economic perspective, a third conceptualisation emphasises the regional value as its potentiality for the development of a strong economy within a given small territory. The economic development is thus interpreted in the enhancement of the human resources and social capitals at the local level, but also in the transformation of the endogenous economic resources. Vital to these developments is the ability of the local government to exploit the local and national synergies in order to activate developmental strategies bypassing the heavy industrialisation phase. Such conceptualisation, thus, does stress on the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist economic outlooks where small and medium enterprises, self-employment and flexible interpretation of the markets are preferred to state-centralisation and macro-economic structures (Knippenberg 2004).

Finally, any conceptualisation of the region should take into account its framework of spatial organization, thus, considering how production process, administrative organisation and dwellings are organised within it. Such exercise allows for deconstructing the area of study in terms of dwelling, roads, commercial units, industries, culture, identity... and then to recompose it as single whole at the municipal, inter-municipal, provincial, district levels and, finally, at the regional level. This dimension enhances the effectiveness

of an analysis focusing on the gravitational forces existing within a region (Gasparini 2005a).

Conceptualisation based on autochthony elaboration, political-administrative identity, economic and social development, and internal gravitational organization offer an efficient framework in which to plot regions constituting a border area in order to understand their potentiality/propensity to cross-border co-operation. The so-depicted conceptual framework explores the feasibility of regional building from several perspectives which, however, do not transcend the process of social construction of the region. Territorial and symbolic regional shaping, institutional building, and the establishment of a common identity are key elements (re-)producing the regional social reality emphasising the consciousness of the people inhabiting it (Paasi 1986).

The role of Cross Border cooperation and its institutionalisation

The so-called cross-border (or transborder) co-operation, is a multifarious and multifaceted process which is activated when populations of a given border-area *and* regional institutions realise borders not only divide, but also unite, creating identical problems on both sides. Its main aim is generally to overcome borders, interpreted as limits to social and economic development, in order to create areas of economic and services development, protection of the environment, and territory planning (Ferrara, 2001). Moreover, cross-border co-operation, in its European dimension, has been seen as a tool for regionalism and integration to merge in a subsidiary fashion (Gasparini 2003). Such phenomenon has gained momentum with time, not only for people living on the borders, but also for the process of European integration itself. Thus, it appears that cross-border co-operation, whilst maintaining a predominant functional nature, has a strong political component to be found in the aspiration of local politics to project itself in a broader, and more proactive context external to national (restricting) administrative frameworks.

However, in broader terms, it appears useful, especially in an Upper Adriatic perspective, to conceptualise cross-border co-operation as the factual capability to overcome and re-compose fractures between (and within) national systems, often caused by acts of power deriving from wars, coups, asymmetric conflicts' resolution and similar operations. Such fractures do appear in different forms, hereafter outlined: first of all, there are border areas which are peripheral to the national and supra-national economic systems and find border co-operation as an opportunity to overcome their own marginality. Secondly, stronger and more decisive fractures arise when border areas are prevalently managed by the political society (i.e. state agencies) and where the local and international civil society role is not only limited but also hindered. In such cases there is a strong political reliance on the military, police forces, and economic activities are limited to the action of

institutionalised (shipping) agents. Thirdly, a further – and possibly more artificial - fracture between border regions is represented by the discontinuity of ideological, social and economic nature among two nation states.¹ Finally, a fourth type of fracture is represented by the process of forced assimilation of national minorities promoted by the nation-states, either violently in the light of a strong nationalistic spirit, or as a consequence of the very recent nature of the borders.

This (non-exhaustive) list of fractures may call for several strategies and policies which, however, cannot transcend from their spatial and time context. Thus, it rather seems appropriate to state here that cross-border co-operation, in general, presents itself as an important landmark for the re-composition and consolidation of fractures. Furthermore, cross-border co-operation is an essential strategy which, in any case, must be based on two conditions: it must start from concrete facts, and it must be endeavoured by policies fostering the reciprocal knowledge among all the stakeholders divided by a border, in order to demolish stereotypes, to de-nationalize history, and, finally, to put an emphasis on an empathic understanding of people.

The aim of co-operating for the joint development of two halves was almost ignored by the central states, but found the enthusiasm of the border regions, hoping, this way, to find new centralities for their peripheral areas, which could finally develop in each state in a symmetrical, but complementary fashion. However, such collaboration was often already in place. In other words, cross-border co-operation is not only prompted from the top (for instance, through European programmes), but, on the contrary, is based on a long-lasting capability to create autochthony by the new region existing on both sides of the border, the Euroregion...

The new *regionalistic* role of Europe revolves around various policies designed to invent, conceptualise and realize new regions, overcoming the states. Building regions across one or more borders was the aim of a new European idea: such regions, obtained by unifying a region in one state with another of a neighbouring state, needed to be somehow defined and the term Euroregion seemed the most appropriate new term best describing the visible core concept of the European integration. The Euroregion represents a phase of greater integration between border regions belonging to contiguous states. The Euroregion is made operational in an agency institutionally aiming to create favourable conditions for cross-border co-operation legitimising operators and associations with determined goals, providing expert support and services to gain from the opportunities created by EU programmes, and,

¹ A recent and glamorous example was represented by the Iron Curtain. Such situation, experienced through almost 50 years, has created, in the *stakeholders* living in the border area, an attitude of not-needing the counterpart living on the other side of the border.

finally, elaborating strategies orienting civil society to create and/or support cross-border co-operation.

In concrete terms, the Euroregion is usually made up by a presidency and by an operative secretariat, which might be articulated in committees or work areas stimulating favourable conditions to such co-operation and eventually by a small parliament representing the wills and needs of cross-border regions inhabitants. Nowadays, national laws usually allow for a private law institution, but the aim is to give to the Euroregion a juridical status.

The functions of the Euroregions are of a, broadly speaking, economic-cultural nature. However, these have more specific traits or more general characteristics depending on the local situation. For matter of definition, three main functions can be identified within the Euroregion. The first takes into consideration the need to create a centrality around a Euroregion. This follows from setting the Euroregion centrally within a network of road, maritime, aerial, railroad infrastructures: linking the Euroregion to Europe, it will be possible to speak of a *Euroregion of macro infrastructure*, a Euroregion characterised by a vast territory. The second function is represented by the creation of conditions enabling firms and institutions located in the Euroregion to connect one another and synergistically operate although they are physically separated: such is the *Euroregion of the functional networks*, a Euroregion extending on a territory including the border areas. Finally, the third function of the Euroregion is that of favouring the cooperation of stringently contiguous areas, where the daily life and the civil society has a predominant cross-border nature. Such is the *cross-border Euroregion*, a Euroregion limited on the cross-border contiguous territories (Gasparini 2003).

As mentioned above, the Euroregion represents here the fullest and most advanced form of institutionalisation of cross-border co-operation given the following four characteristics: (i) the Euroregions deals on an institutional level with cross-border co-operation involving areas relatively contiguous with borders; (ii) A Euroregion tends to favour complete cross-border co-operation, comprising support for local players in the use of European and local funds, the creation of reciprocal knowledge and the promotion of the formation, activation and transformation of actions and organisation for cross-border co-operation. Its primary interlocutor is therefore civil society; (iii) The work of a Euroregion extends to economic, social, cultural, educational, service provided and institutional activity – all involving trans-national players; (iv) A Euroregion may take on a configuration that varies over time according to the objectives being pursued by cross-border co-operation players, according to legal consideration and according to the public and/or private actors belonging to it. Since at present there are no other ways – in many a case – of giving a public legal personality to the Euroregion, it may take the form of a private Association between the regional and other public

bodies such as provinces and municipalities (or preferably Associations of Municipalities). From 2007 a Euroregion will be able to take the form of an ECCG, provided that the regulations to this effect are approved by the European Parliament by that time and that the partner agencies are (or become) public bodies (Gasparini 2005b).

Euroregional co-operation in the Upper Adriatic: The example of EureGo

As previously outlined, the meanings of the border are constantly negotiated and re-interpreted dialectically in the daily life of the communities inhabiting it, of the people trespassing it and of those with positive or negative perception of the "(border-) other". The border, thus, is characterised by the tension of the meeting of two or more identities which here converge in their diversities and similarities. Further, the border area becomes a place where all identities meet on equal representative terms and they exist (and resist) because of the existence of other identities. Such perspectives shifts the focus on borders from their vertical or political nature to their horizontal or functional characteristic. In fact, a great part of the international and inter-state activities tend to pay less attention to the geopolitical development of borders than to their attenuation and elimination. Moreover, since the concept of territoriality is entwined to that of in-group socialisation and thus the interpretation of a given area follows the group's traditional social reality, it is most important to activate forms of cultural co-operation, in order to hinder potential nationalistic or violent ethnocentric ideologies. Hence, the social cross-border space will – with time – blur the geo-political, national and ethnic-linguistic notions of border and experience an increased *market* for cultural and economic goods and services.

Such was the rationale that, in 1978, saw the creation of the Alpe-Adria – an agreement among the Italian autonomous region of Friuli Venezia-Giulia and other regions in Northern Italy, Austria, Germany, Yugoslavia and Hungary – which was the first and most fruitful international association between western and eastern regions. The fall of the Berlin Wall, and the independence of Slovenia and Croatia decreased the political relevance of the Alpe-Adria project which, today, is somewhat differently carried on by the Central European Initiative. However, in these early cross-border co-operation actions, the "Euroregion Euradria" project has moved a few tentative steps. This *macro*-Euroregion among the Italian regions of Friuli Venezia Giulia and Veneto, two Austrian *Länder* (Carinthia and Stiria), Slovenia and parts of Croatia finds its main goals in the internationalisation of the euroregional market, focusing on its bridging role on the West-East economic and transport axis. As a macro-Euroregion, Euradria focuses mostly on the need for integrated logistic infrastructures, thus favouring the economic sphere to the

social and cultural ones. Such approach is still struggling to develop into a concrete planning platform whose application is shared among all partners. Therefore, it might be complementary and useful to put forward smaller-scale Euroregional initiatives stimulating not only economic collaboration, but also the daily social and cultural cross-border life. Hence, the EureGo project linking the Italian Gorizia Province (and some municipalities of the Udine Province) with the Slovene Goriška statistical region appears as an appropriate effort to re-evolve the Upper Adriatic original unity.

As drawn in 1947, the Italian-Yugoslav border – laden with several contrasting symbols and interpretations – opened to two different future scenarios: one of socio-economic and cultural disintegration of the border area due to the separation of the local population; and another where the traditional, cultural, and socio-economic ties of the local population would enhance a greater permeability of the border (Buffon 2002). From 1949 onwards, and especially after 1955 with the signing of the Trieste and Gorizia Memoranda, the launching of local trade areas agreements marked the beginning of a long-term process of opening the border.

Unsurprisingly, however, the abrupt and violent establishment of the political, physical border resulting from the geopolitical developments consequent to the second world conflict, implied, along with the division of a previously united area and of its population, and the separation of Gorizia from its original gravitation area, the progressive growth of negative narratives and perceptions of the "border-other". Nevertheless, at the local (micro-)level, due to the transitional agricultural nature of the then-Yugoslavian border area, and to the consistent economic subsidies maintaining and enhancing the traditional economic and societal structure of the Italian (urban) border area, the border was relatively permeable and non-problematic at least in the daily life (trans-) actions of the population inhabiting its contiguous area and forms of cross-border co-operation at least at the familiar/friendship level did take place (Klemencic and Piry 1982). Through social investments on both side of the border, the border area became more and more urbanised and industrialised acquiring, especially on the Italian side, a particular vocation to tertiary and quaternary activities.

Today, the transformation of the border from separation line to the (non-) present infrastructure line, due to the continuous cross-border relation at the population level, and to the – somewhat unhurried – development of good neighbourhood policies and to the recent accession of Slovenia to the EU, opens to further integration goals. Whereas it could be stated that a good level of integration already exists among cross-border economic actors, local firms and even the competent institutions (i.e. chambers of commerce), further efforts are required to enact the potentialities arising from a more pragmatic political and social co-operation. Several European funded projects (especially, on the Interreg IIIA programs), have analysed and, in part, activa-

ted possible co-operation in the "service" sector (e.g. environmental protection, economic development agencies, cultural events) through the active involvement of local authorities. However, the multifarious cross-border activities seem to lack of broader co-ordination framework perspective which would enable more efficient interactions and a greater visibility and involvement of population inhabiting the border-area. In such perspective the EureGo project was launched. The EureGo structure reflects, under an institutional point of view, the different phases of transborder cooperation: a "political" phase, an organizational phase and an active operational phase. The *political phase* is based on the needs expressed by the population and the subsequent targets drawn. It is brought about by a *General Assembly*. The *organizational phase* implies the designing of specific answers, operational strategies, and the concretisation of the strategies; basically its role is to put into action what was designed by the Assembly. The *Council* and *Work Groups* are in charge of these executive functions. In the *operational phase* a number of institutionalised functions are put into action. The *Secretariat* is responsible for such functions, such as collecting a stable core of information and archives, and it has an administrative role. This cross-border euroregion was conceived as an association of private law, disciplined by a statute in conformity with the law of the State where it is supposed to develop. It has a role in studying, promoting, sensitising and addressing actions for interregional cross-border co-operation with the purpose of urging co-ordination of the activities, undertaken by the members institutions. These can unilaterally conform their conduct to such projects. The euroregional association acts in total respect of the competence and responsibility of the territorial public institutions taking part in it (Gasparini and Del Bianco 2005).

Concluding remarks

The EU has favoured and indicated this model of cross-border integration since its origin, as a prototype of European integration. There is no doubt that putting together parts of different states, prompting their reciprocal trust, encouraging their reciprocal knowledge, having them to co-operate on many things starting from the most concrete ones where cross-border co-operation usefulness can be experienced first hand, is the stroke of genius on the concept of Europe. Such geniality must remain rather implicit, whereas clearly explicit were the economic advantages reaching those who "dared" making projects and joint actions together and with a reciprocal usefulness.

In 1953, Fernand Braudel saw in the Adriatic the most coherent of maritime regions. Such geographic, social, ethnic and economic coherence should be, once more, found here through cross-border co-operation. The Suez channel is not anymore a possible future bridge between Venice and the Ottoman Empire but a real opportunity to link Europe to the Far East. In such

a perspective the Adriatic could become, on the one hand, the Sea of the New Europe, and, on the other, a united social *liquid territory* where degenerated and false conceptualisations of *self-determination* endanger the peaceful coexistence of the Adriatic populations.

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PREKOGRANIČNA SURADNJA KAO ORUĐE TRANSNACIONALNE INTEGRACIJE I RJEŠAVANJA KONFLIKATA: SJEVERNOJADRANSKA EUROREGIONALNA ISKUSTVA

SAŽETAK

Promatrajući prekogranično sjevernojadransko područje unutar povijesnog i gospodarskog okvira u tekstu se upućuje na razvoj koncepcija granice i regije i opisuju glavna obilježja prekogranične suradnje i njezine institucionalizacije - euroregije.

Granice nisu nužno barijere nego su i prostori dodira s razlikama što proizlaze iz zemljopisnih, gospodarskih i društvenih čimbenika, a mogu dovesti do suradnje ili sukoba. Unutar proširene Europske Unije regije su sve važnije te nastaje periferizacija moći; u kontekstu suradnje, regionalizma i integracije, prekogranične regije igraju ključnu ulogu. Potreba za prekograničnom suradnjom nastaje kad stanovništvo i institucije uoče ujedinjuću ulogu granica u definiranju zajedničkih problema. Prekogranična suradnja tada rješava sukobe i konsolidira napukline.

Institucionalni oblik prekogranične suradnje je euroregija – područje koje ujedinjuje dijelove različitih država gospodarsko-kulturnim pothvatima. U sjevernojadranskom području nastao je EureGo euroregionalni projekt između talijanske Gorizie (i nekih gradova u pokrajini Udine) te slovenske Goriške kojim se evocira prvotno jedinstvo toga područja. Projekt želi djelovati na međuregionalnu prekograničnu suradnju.

Ključne riječi: sjevernojadranska granična regija, regionalizam, prekogranična suradnja, euroregija