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AUTHENTICATION FORMULAE IN DEMONOLOGICAL LEGENDS

An attempt is made in this article to describe, classify and interpret those parts of demonological legend texts, which call upon either their authenticity or dubiousness. I shall be referring to such textual parts as authenticity formulae, differentiating the type of formulae used (temporal, spatial /local, testimony-like or supported by testimony, and narrator stance formulae), explaining the manner in which the narrators shape the formulae and the way in which they achieve their persuasive function.

Keywords: demonological legends, authenticity formulae, genre

One of the most important characteristics of legends in genre terms, also relating to demonological[1] legends, are those statements which call upon the authenticity of the content,[2] including the exact date, pinpointing the place where the event took place and specifying witnesses, but also those

[1] I have decided to use the term demonological legends in this text. Other terms in use are mythic or mythological legends. Neither of these terms is precise. This is not a matter of neither classical myths nor mythology, or of real demons. But all those terms indicate a mythic stance towards phenomena that are experienced as being supernatural and demonic.

[2] Legend is an oral prose genre that is based on belief in the truth, "in the reality of what is being narrated (recently or formerly)" (Bošković-Stulli 1975:122); "legend is a valid word for a report, in respect of which a person is accountable and cannot misinterpret according to his/her own discretion" (Biti 1981:166). Ranke wrote that legend demands belief, both on the part of the narrator and the recipient: "Die Sage verlangt ihrem Wesen nach, daß werde, vom Erzähler wie vom Hörer, sie will Wirklichkeitgeben, Dinge erzählen, die wirklich geschehen sind" (Ranke 1969:3), while Čistov, similarly, insists that legends, when observed from the perspective of the narrator and recipient, become senseless and unworthy of narration if they are incredible and/or if they do not have some existential function in the community and do not include the everyday credibility of what is being depicted. (Čistov 1969:344). Gerndt points out that the link between legend and reality is more specific than in all other oral literary genres (according to: Dégh 2001:38), but also "A story becomes a legend only if it is presented in the twilight zone of credence and doubt" (according to: Dégh 2001:38).

statements which express ambivalence towards the truth of the content. Ljiljana Marks gave examples of such accounts which contribute to authenticity ("precise dating of the event in the introduction to the legend", "customary introductory formulae of the following types: *It is said... They say... People say... I have always heard... Some people think... Folks say... It's an old tradition... It's the real truth...*", followed by "at the beginning of the legend the narrator call directly upon his forebear: *Grandfather used to say...* and then: "The closing sentence summarises, and recapitulates the presented account and wants to confirm its authenticity, and to underscore the sense of the narrative: *They say that that's where Zagreb got its name*; *And then that settlement* (...) *was called Šestinski Kraljevec because the king (*kralj) *was there* (...) can express the narrator's distancing him/herself from the content: "*... but now whether that's true or not, I don't really know*, (...)" (Marks 1996:27-28). In relation to such examples, Marks says "Of course, these do not guarantee the factual veracity of the content, but they are stylistic elements of the legend, and its characteristic in genre terms" (Marks 1996:28).

Apart from such statements being marked in terms of the genre and its inseparable style elements, they are also a point of difference in relation to the fairy tale, for example, and a point of similarity, for example, in relation to the *facenda*.[3] Nonetheless, what certainly differentiates expressions of authenticity in both historical and demonological legends, for example, from the expressions of authenticity in the *facenda*, is just that certain degree of ambivalence in those statements, which is frequent among the historical, and even more frequent, it seems, when demonological legends are in question, because of the specific status that they enjoy. The specific status of demonological (mythic) legends is seen in the stance towards them of their narrators and their recipients.[4] When a narrator tells stories from other genres

[3] "According to M.B. Stulli's definition, by using the phrase *narrating about life* we can also encompass the narrative type that we have called by the traditional term, *facenda*. *Facenda* belong to the type of story that comes from the personal experience of the narrator or that of someone near to the narrator. Individual *facenda* are known within the narrow ethnic community since, if they are interesting, they make up for decades part of an individual narrator's repertoire, and transfer into the repertoire of other story-tellers, except that they are not telling a story from their own personal experience, but that of persons whom they know well. (...) we need also to examine its humoristic character as a fundamental feature differentiating it from similar types of story within the borders set by the term *narrating about life*" (Božanić1992:60).

[4] Namely, certain potential story-tellers or narrators gave up the idea of narrating after I had explained what it was that concretely interested me; others asked at several junctures that I switch off the tape-recorder while they were narrating some particular legend (although others allowed me to tape it); in some cases, participants in the narrative situation (friends, family members) listened to all the genres that I had recorded, except the demonological legends (when they either left the room or interjected with ironic and enlightening comments).

and oral literary forms, he/she risks only his/her own legitimacy as the best narrator or as a poor one. When narrating a demonological legend, he/she also risks his/her own legitimacy as a person, since knowledgeability about supernatural, other-worldly phenomena often encounters – particularly in more recent times – aversion rather than admiration. For that very reason, a considerable number of authentication formulae (including those which express a certain ambivalence and distancing from the story) are being developed.

However, the belief factor is important for legends even when the actual narrator/recipient relationship no longer certifies it, and/or: when the degree of authentication between the narrator and the recipient is harder to uncover, "refined procedures can still reveal it in the narration of the legend and its form" (Bošković-Stulli 1997a:23).

Belief in verity and reality can be achieved on the level of the recipient's and/or narrator's actual stance toward the told story and at the level of the text itself. In fact, it would be more precise to say that it *may be* achieved in the first case, while it *must be* achieved in the second, since that is at the foundation of the genre and/or it is on that basis that the genre builds its identity. According to Dundes divisions (Dundes 1980:20–33), the first case would belong to the context level. I shall not be dealing with that in detail in this paper, that is, I shall be touching on that level to the extent that it be necessary for a more profound explanation of the other level. The other level upon which that belief is realised is the text (according to Dundes' cited division of text and texture).

That means, in fact, that certain text units of the story exist, which demonstrate that authenticity or the belief in that authenticity, or whose function it to achieve that end. The term I shall be giving to those units is authentication formulae and I shall be trying to explain the justification for the use of that term, to differentiate the types of authentication formulae that are used, the manner in which narrators shape them and the ways in which they achieve their persuasive function.

In the analysis that preceded this paper, I used my own manuscript material (200 selected legends of the demonological type)[5] collected in field research carried out in Istria during the 2000 to 2003 period. The reason for my using personally collected material for fundamental analysis was primarily because familiarity with the concrete narrative context and the narrative situation seemed important, in order to establish why the text of a particular legend was shaped precisely with that information and precisely in

[5] Details on the narrators, and place and time of notation will be given only for those legends partially quoted as examples.

those sentences, along with the manner in which that then influences the formation of the authentication formula.[6]

Analysis of such personally collected material in fact make possible improved control over the contextual[7] influences on the text.[8]

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[6] For example, when Kate Kuhar as the narrator says in her legend about the healer aspect of the *krsnik* (a sorcerer): "And I went to Potpićan that time, while Martin drove to Sutivanac" (Žavori 2001, Kuhar) without explaining further who Martin is and how the *kurijera* ended up in the story, familiarity with the concrete narrator context and the concrete narrative situation makes it possible to give a more precise answer to the question of how that concrete sentence becomes part of the story, and what it actually means in the function of the authentication formula. Namely, that is the only information provided by the text of the legend, since the narrator correctly assumes that the recipient knows who Martin is and what he is by occupation, and that she knows that, at the time of Martin "driving to Sutivanac", bus connections were infrequent. If the recipient had been less informed about the context (more precisely: if the narrator had doubted her familiarity with the context), that *omission in the context* would have to be avoided, either by not mentioning Martin and his drive or, which is more probable, mentioning them, but with a more extensive explanation.
Omission in the context by which she explained one of the characteristic of communication between adolescents (according to: Velčić 1991:47) was: "That was Amy Shuman's first postulate. Mastering 'contextual information' becomes a means of attaining superiority in communication. With the help of implicit information, speakers attain the right to belong to a group, and conditions for a privileged position – within it (...). Retention of contextual information is thus, on the one hand, a means of singling out a speaker in relation to another group, and a means for establishing internal hierarchy among members, on the other" (Velčić 1991:47). Further on in the text Velčić underscores the fact that the strategy of *omission in context* is also implemented in other types of communication, and not necessarily those among adolescents: "Stratification of participants into outsiders and insiders is a phenomenon which extends to all types of interaction and is not characteristic only to adolescent conversations. Anyone at a specific moment and in a particular situation can 'join in the game', because unfathomable tacit messages always exist that can be utilised at a specific juncture as a means of attaining 'superiority in communication'" (ibid.:51).
In the above example of *omission in context* the recipient is really shown as someone whom the narrator regards as an insider, but that does not interest me so much in this case in the context of attainment and/or demonstration of superiority or powerlessness in communication, as in the context of selection of particular information in the formation of authentication formulae. And their selection by skilful narrators often counts on the assumed (un)familiarity of the recipient with the context.

[7] Describing the narrative situation in Šenoa's work *Zlatarevo zlato* (*The Goldsmith's Treasure*), Lj. Marks writes: "In that story the situation of oral narration is actually represented as a polyphonic spectacle in which, along with the main story-teller, Grga Pokolin, the listeners actively participate in various roles (...). Šenoa gave a written version of a contemporary, taped oral utterance" (Marks 1998:34). That claim is particularly applicable to the narrative situation in which legends are narrated. In such situation, the narrators ask questions of the recipients, the recipients give verbal confirmation (and not only with mimicry or gestures), and they themselves ask questions, and the like. The interaction is certainly much greater than with the telling of, for example, a fairytale or other genres with a more marked tacitly fictional agreement.

[8] Naturally enough, as far as space allowed, the analysis was also confirmed on the examples of earlier and later notations by other researchers.

Objections can be found to the term *authentication formulae*. In other words, not all statements by which authenticity (or doubt) are expressed are of the following type: *That's what they said about it; Look, I don't know whether that really happened or not*; and the like, but that term seems to me to be the most acceptable, especially if the notion of a formula is comprehended in broader terms, as H. Peukert did: "from individual words, through the verse right up to all the firm expressive forms which become typical through frequent repetition, not in the static sense but in an active creative function" (Bošković-Stulli 1978:35). In oral literary forms, as Holzapfel states in connection with the ballad (according to: Bošković-Stulli, 1978), apart from linguistic fixation and traditional material, the structure of that fable, can also be formula-like. For its part, the definition given by H. de Boor and W. Mohr, which states that a formula is "a fixation of a certain thought or concept, which has become traditional and can in diverse circumstances be regularly repeated in identical or nearly identical version" (according to: Bošković--Stulli 1978:33), can be applied only to utterances such as: *That's the way it was*; *Yes, that's true*; *That's what they say*; *They used to say*, and similar. For other situations, the formula concept should be comprehended somewhat more broadly.[9] And this comprehension should be broader than represented by the formula examples given by Max Lüthi in connection with fairytales (Lüthi 1975:57-67). Consequently, authentication formulae will be comprehended in this text as those textual parts in legends in which the recounted event is confirmed and/or which guarantee to the recipient its veracity, either directly or indirectly. When speaking of a direct guarantee I am thinking of the direct claim and persuasion about the authenticity of the event, while the indirect guarantees are those claims and statements that are in the function of persuasion, although they do not directly claim that the recounted event actually took place. The following are examples of direct guarantees: "*So, that's the truth*" (Sutivanac 2002; A. Šugar) or: "*Yes, that's the real thing*" (ibid.); or: "*Ah yes, but it is, it is really so*" (ibid.); while examples of indirect guarantees are: "(...) *when he arrived at his sister's, because his sister was my neighbour here where I am living now*" (ibid.) or "*One season when I was nine years old, my only female cousin and I were herding the sheep, the cows, and we even had a donkey, towards the house*" (Hrboki, 2002; B. Benčić).

In the quoted examples, the truth is mediated by statements in which the narrator speaks of herself ("*me and my cousin*"), the time ("*nine years old*"

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[9] Not even Parry's precise definition of a formula in which he speaks of it as a group of words which are regularly used under the same metric conditions to express a basic idea (Lord 1990:67) corresponds with what I shall comprehend as a formula here, since it refers to epic poetry.

– allowing the actual year of the event to be calculated), the place that can still be seen today and is connected to the narrator ("... *here where I am now*"), drawing them into the text as guarantees of what has been recounted so that she need not, but can, directly claim that the event spoken about truthfully happened, since the cited data ensures a certain degree of credibility.

It should be added to the above description and definition that authentication formulae, apart from vouching to their truth and persuading the recipient that the event and experience spoken about were real, can also express doubt, hesitation, uncertainty, and an overall retreat from a guarantee, that is, a certain ambivalence, for example: "*Perhaps it happened, and perhaps it didn't*" (Pula 2002; Vale) or: "*We can think whatever we like, it could be or not. Maybe it happened, maybe someone had that power, that electricity, that force*" (ibid.). In the second example, ambivalence is also introduced through the possibility of a rational explanation (electricity). The function of that ambivalence can, on the one hand, really be confirmation of the integrity of the narrator, and that is the most frequent case; or, on the other hand, ambivalence can be in the function of changing the status of the legend. The story of the legend is question is no longer experienced as a factual story among the narrators themselves, but as fiction. There will be more on this point later in the text, but, for the moment, I shall cite the case in which the narrators legitimise their stories themselves as being another genre[10]: "*But that's only a story, I don't believe it, you know*" (Pula 2002; Vale). The narrator actually differentiates her stories as being of two types: those that are "true" and those that are "only stories – legends". However, whatever the reason for her ambivalence, in the end even the fact that she expresses such ambivalence indicates the need to demonstrate her stance towards the truthfulness of the narrated text.

One of the most interesting authentication formulae which demonstrates maximum hesitation is: "*It's not that I heard it speak, but that it was a* mrak (a supernatural creature)" (Sankovići 2002; K.), while the legend that begins in that way is framed at the end with another authentication formula *via negativa*: "*I didn't see it myself* (…)". The researcher could well ask: if the narrator did not see it and did not hear it speaking, how did she then know "that it was a *mrak*"? Still, however much it may seem that the cited statements do not guarantee credibility and/or that they refute it, the need on the part of the narrators for such definition places them in the authentication formulae category. This example simply shows in a radical

[10] In communication-oriented analysis of a narrative text, such a statement, according to Elisabeth Gülich, is marked by substitution on a meta-level: "Directing to a part of the text by a term which defines that part of the text as a narrative text, thus, for examples as a 'tale', 'a story', 'a novel' etc…" (Gülich 1984:113).

manner the possible ultimate bounds of the ambivalence of authentication formulae.

Narrators are also very skilful in using authentication formulae in those legends that they themselves define as legends, that is, as "*just stories*".

In the following example[11] the legitimation of the story as a legend did not take place only on the level of literal designation in the metanarrative introduction to the story, but in the ironical intonation (which the transcription of the recording cannot show), which is spoken in the metanarrative commentary in the body of the story: "(…) *I don't know where they were carrying those rocks from*". However, this very story and its metanarrative introduction show how the legend and its verbal context (even when the narrator herself call it a legend in the sense of a false and incredible story) does not omit the textual signals that promote the authenticity of the story. In other words, this is not only a matter of a provable location which ensures credibility in its material manifestation, but also a skilfully woven explanation on how there were no rocks of that size in the vicinity and/or the fact that such a large *sten* (rock) is found there is actually very strange.

Analysis of texts shows that authentication formulae can be divided into the following types:

1) temporal

2) spatial (local)

3) testimony-based

4) narrator stance

The first two types of authentication formulae are largely firm parts of the topics themselves, while the third and the fourth can be metanarrative in nature, but, at the "time of performance, they make up a functional entity" (as Maja Bošković-Stulli says about the introductory and concluding formulae in fairytales (Bošković-Stulli 1978:38). Authentication formulae, unlike other formulae in other oral literary forms, can also be spoken in the context of the

[11] "Narrator: But you know that rock near Ripenda?

Researcher: I'm not sure now.

Narrator: Ripenda is a village three kilometres from Labin. There's asphalt there now. And when you go from Ripenda towards Labin, there is a small road and when you turn onto that road there is a rock. It's huge. No, it's something extremely huge. No, something extremely huge, a colossal rock, and there are no such large stones anywhere around there.

And it's already a legend. But it's not a proven story. The legend says that fairies, when they were building the arena in Pula, as they were flying over the rocks on Cress (island), and I don't know exactly where else – to Korčula. I don't know where they were bringing the stone from to build the arena. Then they were flying from Ripenda towards Pula. And one of them... one of them spied a handsome young man at the Rabac – Labin – Ripenda crossroads, and she dropped her rock. And so that stone stayed there like that" (Vižinada 2001, Razzi).

narrative situation in the conversation that precedes the story or in the subsequent conversation. Authentication formulae that relate to a particular story can even be transferred to some other story, or the entire second story can be in the function of an authentication formula for the first one. Consequently, the narrator, Kata Kuhar from Žavora, inserted as many as two legends in place of authentication formula in her chronicle, with the information about the *krnik's* shirt, both of which, one in the form of a *memorata*, and the other in the form of a *fabulata*, served as guarantors for the authenticity of the first statement (Žavori 2001; Kuhar).

1) Temporal authentication formulae

Temporal formulae relate to those parts in the text in which the time of the event is defined. The time of the event can also be defined by a certain objective measure such as, for example, the exact date or year: "(...) *that was sixty-five years ago, six* (...)" (Pula 2002; Vale). However, this is used rarely. One more often sees the inclusion of objective measures, which, at the same time, draw in testimony-based formulae; even the above quotation is, in fact, an example of such a case, since in full it reads: "*I was nine years old, that was sixty-five years ago, six, I am seventy-seven now* (...)" (Pula 2002; Vale). The narrator is also a personage in the legend so that this is a formula of threefold authentication: first of all, there is the objective temporal measure: "*sixty-five years ago, six...*", followed by the relational and material measure (the narrator calls upon herself and her age while here with the recipient, she is in a communicational relationship with her, and apart from that she is palpable and real and there is no reason for the recipient to disbelieve her, because the implicit persuasive series continues in the following way: if I am real here before you, then my age is real now and, thus, as it was then, so what I am telling you must be credible – and the final and third intensification of authenticity: the narrator as a personage in the legend. A similar example is found in: «*It happened during my childhood, that was before I was fifteen. That means, quite a lot of years ago, that was forty and some years ago*» (Hrboki 2002; N. Benčić). The narrative strategy is similar to the one in the first example cited. In both cases, the temporal formula is at the beginning of the text of the legend and can, because of the way in which it functions in the text, also be treated as a metanarrative, while the real story commences somewhat later. The second case is when the narrator includes the authentication formula and the beginning of the plot in the same sentence: "*One season when I was nine years old, one of my cousins and I were herding sheep, cow – and we even had a donkey – homewards*" (Hrboki 2002; B. Benčić).

The time can also be determined in hours: "(...) *at midday, at eleven o'clock – they always said that that was the worst time*" (Sutivanac 2000;

Šugar). Mentioning the exact time in this example mediates authenticity on two levels; one is textual (the implicit message being: if I know at exactly what time the event unfolded, then the credibility of that event is less questionable); while the second level is pre-textual and/or contextual: the belief at the core of such legends[12] that contain that piece of information about eleven o'clock being a dangerous time (admittedly, more often at night than during the day) is largely known to recipients informed about the content. Because of the other recipients in the concrete narrative situation (the narrator's sister and nephews, the sister being only partly in the role of recipient since she goes out every so often), the direct metanarrative augmentation: "(...) *they always used to say that that was the worst time*" would not have been necessary. As far as they were concerned, the meaning was already interwoven in the information that it happened *at eleven o'clock*. However, my recipient competence was not fully known to the narrator and she used that additional information in order to inform me, at the same time using the testimony-like formula "(...) *they always used to say* (...)". That formula also serves as a reminder and an enhancement of authenticity to those recipients who already understand the narrator from her prior message.

Intensification of the temporal formulae can also be achieved through their repetition and/or so that they function as the framework of the story or its introduction: "(...) *when I was going out at one o'clock, listen, it was about one after midnight, or thereabouts* (...)" (Zeci 2001; Zec) and the closing formula: "*It was during the night, I'm telling you, one hour after midnight*" (ibid.). In previous notations from Istria (Bošković-Stulli 1959), temporal authentication formulae were rarely implemented with exact mention of the date or year, and I found only one example of direct date-fixing: "*In the Summer of 1938, I was out hunting*" (Bošković-Stulli 1959:138) and an indirect piece of information: "*I was small, I was twelve years old* (…)" (ibid.:144), which is, in fact, a combination of the temporal and testimony--like formulae (this statement will be quoted in full later in the text). However, those times are often mentioned that are already part of tradition as dangerous or especially interesting for particular supernatural phenomena, such as certain parts of the day or night. Bi-locations and transformations linked with them in the form of the emergence of certain tiny animals (such as a fly or a mouse) usually happen around midday: "*At midday when it was very hot, the haymakers and the women would rest in the* ***kažun*** (a round dome-shaped field shelter built of dry-stone walls)" (ibid.:144); "*After lunch, they would sleep for a while*" (ibid.:145) (and lunch was usually around midday); "*After midday, the men would go into the shade and fall asleep*" (ibid.:146). Such temporal location of events mediates authenticity on two levels: on one

[12] I shall not be going into detail here with the doubt about whether one can speak of beliefs that exist outside of the stories that have them as their theme.

level, the exactness of the information is vouched for by the fact that noonday rests on jobs of this type (hay-making, harvesting) were customary in completely ordinary situations, too, and on the other: the precision itself with which the time is mentioned. The evening or night were reserved for unusual encounters: "*A young man was strolling through the village in the evening*" (ibid.:152), "*Last night, when I was going home from the dance* (…)" (ibid.:153), "*Once I was grazing the sheep at night*" (ibid.:150). However, apart from these less precise stipulations, there are also those similar to the example already mentioned from a more recent notation, that precisely fix the time (times that are definitely linked in tradition with dangerous activities): "*A woman from near Strmac told me that her father had told her that their uncle invited him to his place one evening. It was about eleven-thirty in the evening*" (ibid.:153). Such invitations at times known in tradition to be dangerous (in the following example, that dangerous time does not relate to a concrete time but to a period of the year), are evident, of course, in notations of legends from other regions: "*Josip Gorupec says that his father, one night around the four days of Christmas...* (…)" (Lang 1992:906). The selection of legends presented by Lj. Marks (Marks 1996:256-347) shows that temporal authentication formulae with precise date-fixing are more frequently seen in written texts (Krčelić, Jerand, Tkalčić, Laszowski), but there are also examples of noted oral legends that more or less precisely state the year of the event: "*That was a couple of years ago*" (Marks 1986:285, notation – N. Bonifačić), "*It could have been around 1930*" (ibid.:294, ibid.). In the legend noted down by a student, Suzana Bliznec, on December 28, 2005 the narrator, Milica Marić (b. 1986.) distributed the temporal authentication formulae in such a way that they have, in fact, a twofold effect. The credibility effect, but also the chills (in question is the death of a dear one heralded by sound) "*Well... it was in 2001, a little before Christmas, yes… the day before Christmas Eve. We were all sitting in the house at breakfast, the outer door of the house... normally it was shut.* (...) *The next day was Christmas and somewhere around 8 o'clock in the morning the phone rang*" (Bliznec, MS Botica 2006c:38).

2) Spatial (local) authentication formulae

Spatial authentication formulae relate to those parts of texts that call upon known areas, places, and localities where the narrated event took place, or that are in some connection with the event, either through the narrator or through a personage in the legend.

Examples: "I went to Svetivinčenat to buy myself an outfit (...)" (Rajki 2000, Rajko); "And those krsniks that were coming from Rijeka (...)" (Sutivanac 2001; Šugar); "So they drove him to Pula (…)" (ibid.); "(...) she went to Krnica" (ibid.; Frančula); "And in the morning they found her near

Foli (a village)" (Zeci; 2001, Zec); "There, near Vrećara (a village), it was the very same štriga (a witch)" (Vižinada 2001; Razzi); "It happened in Jopa, I was born in Kranjci, but that happened in Jopa" (Sv. Petar 2001; Bratulić). In all the cited examples, the narrators refer to places known to all the recipients and that familiarity increases credibility. Because of the generally held knowledge about those localities (at the level of the concrete narrative situation), more detailed explanations are not necessary. When a locality mentioned by the narrator is not known to all the recipients, the authentication formula can be expanded by referring to a place that is known to everyone: "(...) suddenly they found themselves above Malinina right above the Raša Valley river" (Sutivanac 2002; Šugar), and somewhat further on in the same legend: "The voice came from Malinina, perhaps a hundred paces from Raša to that place Ruk, where we used to go for water" (ibid.). The examples from Sutivanac show how the narrator skilfully uses the concrete narrative context and the (in)competence of at least one of the recipients to expand the spatial authentication formula. Namely, for the other recipients in the concrete narrative situation, calling on Malinina was already sufficient since they all knew where Malinina was, knew that it was above Raša and at least one of them (the narrator's sister) knew that Ruk was a place where they went for water; still, one recipient (in this case it was me) did not know these things and she was given a more detailed explanation. I was thinking of just such situations when I said that knowing the concrete narrative context and the narrative situation was necessary in order to establish why the text of a legend is formed with just such data as it is. Of course, for the sake of preciseness and caution, I can assume that the narrator would have given such information even if one of her recipients had been equally well-informed and contextually competent as the others. In that case, the function of the expansion of the spatial authentication formula would be only its intensification. However, in this manner, she had the justification of the situation to expand it, and her more competent recipients were aware of that justification. What the narrator did, in fact, was to take advantage of the self-evident need to provide me (as an insufficiently informed recipient) with a broader explanation, and to foist off an expanded authentication formula as part of the text, ostensibly intended for one person, although she very consciously intended it for all the others present. To be completely precise in the explanation of this example, it should be borne in mind that the explanation "(...) when we went for water (...)" is at the same time a testimony-like authentication formula, while the witness is not only the narrator as part of that we, but also one of the recipients (her sister) who participated in such water collecting. Examples from earlier notations from Istria: "I watered them at the ponds..." (Bošković-Stulli 1959:150); "Once, it was near Pazin, there was a servant" (ibid.:151); "There was a krsnik near Dupci" (ibid.:148); "Nane Žakula from Kortina came here to work in the mine" (ibid.:144); "Three haymakers were cutting hay near Rača Vasi" (ibid.: 145). Examples from notations from other areas: "(…) the

late Mate Jurić, he went from Bezera (…) he kicked him, under that wall of Tomaš' that Luić has now taken" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:413). The fact that Lajić has now taken the wall tells us nothing about the credibility of the event with Jurić, but, as in certain other examples, the more skilful narrator utilises such details and weaves them into the story, irrespective of the fact that they, in themselves, cannot confirm or dispute the narrated event. This is a similar example: "And he went once to trade in cattle, he was going down there under the flyover, down there where my godmother Ina lives, who had the bakery. Down there where the trains pass now. Yes, that's the way it was, Son, it was exactly there under that flyover, where he met that man" (Sviben, MS Botica 2006c, 76).

When successfully formulated, multiple, more specific definitions of the places in which the event unfolded with repetition of the same, function as enhancers of credibility. This is even the more so because the actual places can always be checked.

Consequently, calling on the locality, the place, and the area ensures a high degree of authenticity, since this implies material verification.[13]. Localities, places and areas are largely subject to verification even at the time of the narration, while the narrative logic of local authentication formula is achieved in the following manner: if the place referred to still exists today, if you (the person listening) can see it, visit it, and walk around it, then the event we are talking about becomes more credible.

3) Testimony-like authentication formulae

Testimony-like authentication formulae are those parts of the text in which one is directed to witnesses as guarantors of the veracity of the event. Such formulae are most frequently[14] the most developed in the ways in which they introduce witnesses into the text. Of course, the skill shown in this introduction of witnesses and the narrative justification for it depends to a considerable extent on the story-teller's narrative skills. According to the analysed material, the 'witnesses' can be divided as follows:

a) oral tradition

b) a person or more than one person

c) written sources and, in more recent times, the electronic media

a) Testimony-like authentication formulae that take tradition as a witness have a very high degree of linguistic fixation and are repeated without any

[13] Spatial authentication formulae are particularly precise in historical legends cf. (Dragić 1999:194, 221, 225)

[14] By counting through our body of texts, it can be shown that the number of testimony-based formulae is almost four times greater than any other individual type of formula.

major alterations, while their main axes are the verbs: *to narrate (to tell a story)* and *to say*, usually in the perfect tense: "*In fact, it was said that* (...)" (Pula 2002; Vale), "*And that is what they used to say…*" (Sutivanac 2002; Frančula), "*They used to say that it was a* mrak (supernatural creature)" (Zeci 2001; Zec) or in the present: "*And I say* (...)" (Hrboki 2002; N. Benčić), (the present is even more frequent in earlier notations): "*And I say that there are three types of hail* (…)" (Bošković-Stulli 1959:155), "*I say that a priest can* (…)" (ibid.:155), "*They say that on Učka (Mountain)* (…)" (ibid.:135); "*In Mosćenice they say* (…)" (ibid.:134).

The verb *računat* (meaning: to consider) is also possible in such formulae: "(...) it was always considered that if a man got up on his left foot (...)" (Zeci 2001; Zec). "It was once considered that it had a tail. Now, how should I know if it has or not! I never say that" (ibid.). In all the cited cases, that unnamed subject is tradition and or the old ones, old people, our oldsters as the bearers of tradition. The term of reference, jedanput (once upon a time) from the cited example is reminiscent of the fairytale formula, but its function here differs; it is not a matter of an absolute time that is removed from our time and is not connected with it (as is the case with fairytales), but it implies the time that was necessary for tradition to stabilise such belief and then to utilise it as information in the shaping of legend.

The manner of expressing the testimony-like authentication formulae in which tradition is called upon is the one with the da construction, where the verbum dicendi is omitted: "(...) that she drove (...) and that she had (...) and that she walked. That she was dressed in white and that she hitchhiked. And that a man picked her up, and (...) that he stopped (...) that he still (…)" (Balići 1999; M. R.). In all the cited cases, the possible verbs of utterance are omitted: they say that, they said that, I heard that... A similar example of intensive use of the word da in a legend from Brač: "That there was plague in Supertar and that it raged through Supertar, God forbid, and that it moved towards Nerežišć" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:384).

Such a manner of expression can have at least three functions:

– it indicates re-telling, which actually means calling upon tradition as a witness;

– it demonstrates the attitude of the narrator towards the narrated text, the relationship in which she still wants to distance herself at least slightly from the story that she is recounting, while that manner of expression is once again located in the authentication formula (of the ambivalent type), but this time in a tale-telling (narrative) way because it also expresses the relation of the narrator to the narrated text

– stylistically (cf. Bošković-Stulli 1975:159-165).[15]

b) Authentication formulae in which one or more persons appear in the roles of witnesses can function in such a way that the narrator calls upon the other narrator, from whom she first heard the legend: "*Aunt Marijana from Blaganišće, she always talked to me about those witches*" (Zeci 2001; Zec). The second narrator called upon in connection with the concrete situation by the primary narrator is often a participant in the event and/or a personage in the legend being recounted:[16] "*I shall now speak the truth as my father told it to me. You know, he was never a man to lie*" (Sutivanac 2002; Šugar). "*The late Mara Jovičinka said that a* tintilin (a sprite) *used to come into her house* (…)" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:415), "*My grandmother told me that once* (…)" (ibid.:415). In the example from Sutivanac, the narrator adds a moral valorisation to her calling upon a witness, all of which intensifies the credibility of the story. As in the above example, the connection between the narrator and the witness is usually mentioned in such cases, or the witness's name is mentioned, especially if that person is known to the recipients: "*But then again, what Frane Baćac used to say at our place* (...)" (ibid.). However, Frane Braćac and his family and the narrator's family ("*at our place*") are all witnesses, and, in this way, one of the recipients (the narrator's sister) is skilfully drawn in as a witness, because she knows both Baćac and the family at whose home the story was told. In the second example, the narrator calls upon the narrator from whom she first heard the legend, and proposes herself as a witness with the phrase *I heard it with my own ears*, which already has the element of intensified persuasion: "*Well that's what Felice said, I heard it with my own ears*" (Rajki 2000; Erman). Even more intensive persuasion is found in phrases like *I saw it with my own eyes*: "*I saw it, God's truth, with my own eyes so nothing can convince me that doing something like that is impossible/*" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:398). In this example, the testimony-like authentication formula is combined with the narrative one: "*God's truth*" and the psychological pattern: if I actually saw it, no-one can convince me to the contrary. And the narrative logic of credibility moves along the following

[15] Referring to that article, published in 1975 in the book *Usmena književnost kao umjetnost riječi*, the author also gives a more summarised report in the article: *Od usmenog pripovijedanja do objavljene pripovijetke* (1983:134-150): "It is stylistically functional (…) and omits the verb of utterance. The declarative conjunction *da*, used in the grammatically incorrect places, is unnecessary at first glance – since it is found frequently in stories, but does not appear at all in printed collections – but, during the flow of the narration, it helps the narrator to introduce a note of subjectivity and distance from the ostensibly objective claim" (ibid.:145).

[16] Of the 11 legends that Lang presents in the section on *coprnicama* (sorceresses) (Lang 1992:903-907) as many as eight of them commence with this formula, which is repeated almost fully throughout, with changes only in the names of those who *pripovedali* (narrated) (and the verb tense), while two of the three remaining stories commence with the name of the protagonists (9) or family connections with the name (11).

sequence: if you cannot convince me to the contrary, me, who am standing here alive before you, and am telling you the story, then you, too, have less reason to doubt it. Those parts of texts in which a name and surname, nickname or exact genealogical determination of a person, who is the main or supporting personage in a legend, also fall under the category of testimony--like authentication formulae: "*A certain Flaho Mioslavić from Makoša* (…)" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:408); "*My late father's sister's husband went outside and was walking beside the house* (…)" (ibid.:412); "*Mate Bruhnjak was a* kudlak (werewolf)" (Bošković-Stulli 1959:139); "*There was a sheepman here, Vaso Vučekuć, he's dead now, and he dozed off to sleep*" (ibid.:149). In other words, those persons (although they cannot confirm the story because some of them, as we see in the examples, are dead), are known to the members of the community. The fact that some of the recipients will remember them (often confirming that they remember them, but in happier situations, and that they had heard the story) produces the impression of veracity. In those situations in which the narrators are recounting the legends for the purpose of research, mentioning the names ensures credibility through the very fact that the persons mentioned are real and did exist, while it is assumed that the external recipient can always check that information with other members of the community. Naturally enough, confirmation is not usually sought, but at the moment of actualisation of the story that is not important. What is important is the generation of the impression of credibility. The narrative success of the authentication formula can also be measured by the skill with which the narrator interpolates it in the text, but also in the degree of persuasion that it can produce. In the following example: "*But her old man, her father, used to tell the story but never, not ever, you know Evelina, it never happened that he* (...), *because when a person lies, then he leaves something out each time. But believe me that he told that story ten times perhaps, but it was always exactly the same*" (Krnica 2000; Jakov Raponja), the narrator calls upon the narrator from whom she heard the story as her witness "*But her old man, her father, used to tell the story* (…)". In addition, she introduces two supporting personages, calling on a recipient by name[17] (in the concrete case, also the researcher): "*you know, Evelina*" and

[17] Addressing the recipient by name in the narration of a story in the function of achieving an intensification of sorts of the persuasiveness of the narrator's text is not merely an isolated example, but a frequent 'aid' in authentic narrative situations, and those that approximate to them, which is testified to by notations of the narrative situation compiled by Venceslava Mandić, a student, who recorded her grandmother's narrative: "*Look, Venka, my grandfather sent me…*"; "*Listen, Venka, a old woman and I, that oldest aunt…*" (Mandić MS Botica 2006b:6). However, I have also encountered direct address in those legends in which the researcher was not particularly close to her narrator (I assume that from the type of address): "*Eh, this is how it was, Madam, and whether it is true or not, that is they way I heard it*" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:371).

includes the psychological *pattern* as a guarantee "(..) *because, when a person lies, he leaves something out each time. But believe me that he told that story ten times, but it was always exactly the same*". Such a guarantee is more convincing than mere testimony in proving that the narrator is telling the truth, since it tends towards greater objectivity.

The skill in interpolation often includes competent stylistic procedures in which rhythmically organised repetition achieves conviction in a graduated manner, as in the following excellent example: "*I was small, I was twelve years old, so I saw. And I saw her come to that sick woman, and I saw when she was sweeping and when she weed, and I saw her tail*" (Bošković-Stulli 1959:144). Fivefold repetition of the first person singular of the verb 'to see' in the perfect tense, the first time as a piece of general information with the temporal authentication formula, three times with the event (*come, sweep, urinate*) and five times with the sign of the physical identification of a witch (her tail). implement the testimony-like formula with both the force of the content and of the expressiveness itself. Otherwise, Lj. Marks links precisely re-duplication and tri-duplication with the formulae utterances in oral prose and stresses their active function (cf. Marks 1993:213-214).

Since narrative situations are frequent among people who know each other well, and are also well acquainted with the community from which the personages in the legend are recruited, it is not unusual for the narrator to expand the procedure of calling upon others in authenticating the story by what could be called a genealogical figure: "*The late Nin, Tonin, Zvane's father, told me about it*" (Rajki 2000; Erman). The role of this figure is broader than simply intensifying credibility. It is used to confirm the cohesive fibre of the community, repeating knowledge about people who made up the community, and recalling blood relationships; this is actually a way of transmitting the history of the community. It transmits what was and still is important in that history. Just as written history remembers the connections and relations of the few who are selected and are famous for some reason (for instance, kings, generals, and the like), this history, the history of small communities in which everyone knows everyone else, remembers and transmits the connections of all those who made up that history in the past and who still do so.

A more experienced narrator will also find more complex and narratively intriguing forms of testimony-like authentication formulae, for example, Albina Šugar wittily called upon chance tourist passers-by whom she heard speaking about the legend of how fairies had built the Pula Arena. She had known the legend previously, but, *there you are*, they had confirmed it: "*I was there in Pula beside the Arena and some Italians were looking at the Arena and talking amongst themselves about how it had been built by*

fairies, that people say that" (Sutivanac 2002; A. Šugar). We have a twofold involvement of authentication formulae here: firstly the narrator calls upon other narrators[18] (who had mentioned the legend to her by chance, but had intentionally discussed it between themselves "(...) *and they mentioned it themselves* (...)", and then she calls upon the fact that they called upon tradition "(...) *that people say*". In a series of other examples, the same narrator skilfully organised testimony-like formulae, so that, in another legend, she calls upon herself from a different narrative situation, but with the same legend, only in the presence of a respectable and credible recipient. In this way, that recipient from the previous narrative situation and/or her mentioning him makes him a witness in the current one. After having recounted the legend, she explains and then finally mentions herself in that narrative situation:

> *I also told that to our priest* (...), but he was very surprised *at me*.
>
> *That's the way it was, Father, that's the truth.*

Here, she cleverly sidestepped and did not reveal the reason for the priest's surprise. In other words, we probably wont be mistaken if we assume that his surprise was not connected with any confirmation of the story on his part.

In another example, the same narrator shaped the testimony-like authentication formula so that she named the protagonist, expanded that with a genealogical figure, included the spatial formula and added "the material, physical" proof in the personage of the son, who is still alive. "*Barba* (a title of respect to an older man) *Ive Obojkar, Jozić's father, in Cvitići, that's here in the village, down there* (...). *His son is still living in Cvitići*." The fact that that the son of the personage whom the narrator is calling upon is still alive is not, of course, reliable objective proof that the narrated story actually took place, but uttered in this sequence and included in the authentication formula, it becomes proof.

Apart from a previous narrator and/or personage from the legend, the recipient in the concrete narrative situation can also be introduced as a witness: "*Wasn't the late Ris* (...)" (ibid.). It was in those words that the narrator called upon a named person ("*the late Ris*"), on the one hand, and, on the other, directly addressed one of the recipients, drawing her into the story as a witness. That recipient now becomes a witness in the presence of the others. Experienced narrators are aware of several ways in which they can draw in a momentary recipient as a witness. Thus, the narrator Kate Kuhar, inserted into the legend (simultaneously changing her intonation) a metanarrative piece of information: "*That man was sitting here, just where*

[18] Calling upon other narrators (who, in this case, are speaking in another language) gives additional weight to credibility. The narrator achieves similar weight in the example: "*I was told that by Americans* (…)" (Lozica 2002:79).

you are sitting now" (Žavori 2001; Kuhar). Once again, as in the foregoing example, that fact about the recipient and the personage in the story sitting in the same place cannot be taken as proof of the story's veracity, but it certainly produces the impression of credibility and becomes evidence within the framework of the legend.

The narrator A. Rančić from Brnaz ornaments the testimony-like authentication formula in a similar way: "*The late Stipan Jozir from Turjak was sitting here in Bijadera and said how* (...)" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:386).

Otherwise, the expressions *in the same chair*, *in the same place*, or speaking with someone *just like you and me now,* can often be heard in accounts from life. And such utterances are not used only in authentication formulae in legends, nor only in stories from life, but can also be successfully utilised in other genres, for example, in fairytales, where they can achieve diverse functions, even in the production of humour. This is shown in the example of the Babina Bilka fairytale, in which the narrator does not shrink from "(...) including an allusion to herself or the immediate environment in the story (...) the hero 'pretended to sleep and started gently snoring – like this old woman here', and an old woman was really lying on the bed sleeping, gently snoring" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:37).

As in the example of Albina Šugar, the narrator from Sutivanac, a narrator can call upon the narrative context in which the story was told or heard and mention what was then said, but now with the purpose of expressing her own ambivalent stance to what she then heard:

> I heard that, too, and I said afterwards: for goodness sake, let's talk about something more sensible (Hrboki 2002; B. Benčić).

It is also interesting to note how the testimony-like authentication formula is introduced in situations in which the narrator wants to protect the identity of the protagonists of a legend: "*The family is still alive in the commune, here in the district…*" (Rajki 2000; Rajko). In this example, the narrator has combined the testimony-like formula ("*The family is still alive...*") and the spatial formula ("*... in the commune*") in such a way that the information is sufficiently general, on the one hand, that one cannot identify exactly which family is in question, while, on the other, being sufficient concrete to ensure credibility.

c) Calling upon sources (written or electronic) is not frequent in the analysed body of tests, but it still does occur. Thus, the narrator Albina Šugar calls upon the *Danica Almanac* "(...) *because I read about fairies in* Danica, *too* (...)" or: "*I read that in* Danica*, it was there, too*" (Sutivanac 2002; Šugar). The same narrator also brought Television in as a witness, and, once again, she was very skilful because what had been said in a TV programme about arenas cannot be taken as proof that the Pula Arena was built by fairies. Still, she mentioned it in order for her story to receive credible support. In former

notations of legends in Istria, written sources are called upon in the form of some unnamed *libri* (books): "*It was found in books that the Greeks had built a church underground*" (Bošković-Stulli 1959:133), although the *libri* function as a signal of hidden treasure[19] in that particular example (if they had not found the books, they would not have gone there to seek the treasure), and as a testimony-like authentication formula (if the book exists in which that is written, there is greater probability that the narrated event did, in fact, take place). M. Bošković-Stulli mentions an interesting example of directly calling upon newspapers as a source (also as a signal of treasure) that additionally confirm credibility, since newspapers do not lie. The narrator had not believed that there was treasure, guarded by a snake, buried under Klek Mountain «*right up until he read about it in* Vjesnik (a Croatian daily). "*If he is still alive this Summer, he will go there 'but I don't know how to open it, I will have to ask someone from round there. Look, I read it myself given publicly in the newspaper, and you know if it is in the papers, then it's true*'" (Bošković--Stulli 1997:178).

4) Narrator stance authentication formulae

Narrator stance authentication formulae, similarly to the testimony-like ones that call upon tradition, have a high degree of linguistic fixation. They are found in those parts of the text in which the narrator directly legitimises his/her stance to the story being told. They are usually found at the end of the story, and it is not rare for them to be given in the form of a question: "*Now did that really happen? That's what we are uncertain about, isn't it?* " (Pula 2002; Vale). As in the cited example, and in numerous other examples, it is just this type of authentication formula legitimising the stance of the narrator that includes a certain dose of ambivalence: "*Perhaps it happened, perhaps it didn't*" (Pula 2002; Vale); "*Now, what actually happened, and what didn't?*"; "*Now, if that really happened, or if it didn't*" (Sutivanac 2002; Šugar); "*What do I know what that was*" (ibid.); "*What was that, where can we put that, eh? Perhaps, how can I say it, it's some force, some power, everyone is individual. It's quite possible*" (Pula 2002; Vale). In this latter example, the authentication formula is expanded with a meagre attempt at explanation. It was mentioned in the introduction to formulae that the expression of ambivalence can be made in order to protect the integrity of the narrator because of the specific status that demonological legends, particularly, have in the community, but, on the other hand, the narrator may employ them to express his/her sincere doubt, and, what is even more important, to prevent applying the maieutic method to the doubt of the recipient (or, at least, its verbalisation). In other words, if the narrator herself expresses doubt, then any

[19] On signals about treasure (including books) (cf. Karanović 1989:73-78).

potential verbalisation on the part of the recipient loses its cutting edge. Skilful narrators also intensify ambivalence with a witty remark (corroborating Bahtin's thesis about the laughter culture of peoples), as shown by Marija Bratulic in her comment: "*Who knows whether the flame was in her head or on the road, who can tell*?" (Sv. Petar u Šumi 2001; Bratulić).

Further, those formulae can also express changes in the status of a story, as has been mentioned above with the example: "*But that's a legend, I don't really believe it, you know*" (Vižinada 2001; Razzi), or: "*But that was only a legend, that wasn't any proven story*" (ibid.).

There are, of course, those narrator stance authentication formulae that explicitly claim that the narrated event is true: "*And so, that is true*" (Sutivanac 2000; Šugar), "*This is the real truth…*" (Sviben; MS Collection NZUK 2006c:76) (at the beginning of the legend), and, at the end: "*And that was really true*" (ibid.:76), sometimes also accompanied by the sworn oath on the part of the narrator: "*That's true, may God grant me good health*" (Bošković-Stulli 1997:403).

Narrator stance formulae that are expressed in the construction with the word *da* in the section about testimony-like authentication formula, because they simultaneously satisfy two types of authentication formulae, are: testimony-like, since they call upon an unnamed someone (tradition) who first narrated the story while, on the other hand, they express the narrator's distanced attitude towards the narrated material (which distance, by implication, indicates a mild or stronger ambivalence).

Authentication formulae are an important part of demonological (and other) legends. However, in demonological legends, just because the border between what are being taken as themes (the supernatural and other-worldly) and the situations from which they arise (the natural and of this world), they are much more important, for example, than historical legends (which largely involve diverse periods). The strategies which narrators use in authentication formulae are much more diverse, broader, and, we could say, "more meticulously developed" because they must simultaneously ensure the legitimacy of the narrator (which is not expended only in narrating skill) and the narrator's text, which transmits "knowledge".

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Sankovići, 2001. (narrator M. K., b. 1923 – insisted on anonymity: "Put some other name, not mine, would I want them to read me in Zagreb?"; notation: 22 February 2001)

Sutivanac, 2002. (narrators: Albina Šugar, b. Roce 1926 and Milka Frančula b. Roce 1923 – in 2005, Sutivanac; notation: 24 February 2002)

Sv. Petar u Šumi, 2001. (narrator: Marija Bratulić, b. Jurić, Kranjci, 1944; notation: 6 August 2001)

Vižinada, 2001. (narrator: Roberta Razzi, b. Dimić, 1965, Pula (lives in Rabac, while the narrative situation was recorded in Vižinada); notation 9 June 2001)

Zeci, 2002 (Marija Zec, b. Folo, 1929, Mengići; notation: 23 February 2002)

Žavori, 2001. (Kate Kuhar, b. Lovrečić, 1922, Žavori; notation: 3 February 2001)

FORMULE VJERODOSTOJNOSTI I NAČINI NJIHOVA DJELOVANJA U DEMONOLOŠKIM PREDAJAMA

SAŽETAK

Već je u ranijim radovima istaknuta važna žanrovska značajka predaja: pozivanje na istinitost sadržaja točnim datacijama, preciziranje mjesta događaja, pozivanje na svjedoke (Marks) i postojanost tih iskaza čak i kad je stvarni odnos vjerovanja u istinitost kazivača i recipijenata prestao postojati (Bošković-Stulli). U ovom se radu na temelju osobno prikupljene građe (koja omogućuje bolju kontrolu nad kontekstualnim utjecajima na tekst priče) i one dostupne u publikacijama, dijelove teksta u kojima se posredno ili neposredno jamči istinitost priče, ili izražava ambivalentan stav prema istinitosti, naziva formulama vjerodostojnosti. Formule vjerodostojnosti nadalje se dijele na: vremenske (dijelovi teksta koji se pozivaju na točno vrijeme odvijanja događaja iz priče); prostorne (mjesne) (dijelovi teksta koji se pozivaju na poznate lokalitete); svjedočke (dijelovi teksta u kojima se za svjedoke uzima a) tradicija, b) jedna ili više osoba i c) pisani ili elektronički izvori); kazivačke (pripovjedačke) (dijelovi teksta u kojima kazivači neposredno legitimiraju svoj odnos prema kazivanoj priči). Istražuje se kako kazivači i kazivačice oblikuju formule vjerodostojnosti te načini na koje te formule ostvaruju svoju funkciju uvjeravanja. Pokazuje se da su formule vjerodostojnosti upravo u demonološkim predajama puno opširnije, raznolikije, "temeljitije razrađene" jer je granica između onoga što tematiziraju (nadnaravno i onostrano) i situacija iz koje to čine (naravno i ovostrano) veća nego u drugih vrsta predaja.

Ključne riječi: demonološka predaja, formule vjerodostojnosti, žanr