

This Festschrift presents many different pieces of excellent philosophical work for further study and discussion. So, take a real experiment—take this book and read whatever interests you and find out Mišćević’s answers to articles particularly mentioned here and, as well, for all the others. We can praise editors for their immense work done.

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Boran Berčić (ed.), *Perspectives on the Self*, Rijeka: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2017, 375 pp.

The collection *Perspectives on the Self* brings together seventeen essays which explore the notion of the Self. Employing both historical and conceptual analyses of the Self, the authors cover a variety of topics from research areas that include metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, ethics and history of philosophy. The book, published by the University of Rijeka, is a result of a conference, *The Self*, which took place at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka (Croatia) on March 31 and April 1, 2016. As noted in the preface by the editor Boran Berčić, Full Professor at the Rijeka Department of Philosophy, the participants of the conference, whose essays make up the volume, are in different ways involved in the research project *Identity* at the University of Rijeka. Those include both Croatian and foreign philosophers along with the reviewers of the book, Nenad Smokrović and Dušan Dožudić.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter, titled “Self and Body”, starts with “The Central Dogma of Transhumanism” by Eric T. Olson (University of Sheffield). Olson argues against the transhumanist claim that it is metaphysically possible to upload our psychological selves into a digital computer. He identifies the transhumanist claim as resting on a metaphysical assumption that we are essentially patterns (the *pattern view*) which can be transmitted as information. He then confronts the claim by insisting that we are essentially material things (more specifically—biological organisms), not patterns, and as such cannot be “detached” from our biological substrate and transferred into a computer. He also considers the so-called *constitutional view* and the *temporal parts view* but concludes that they cannot serve the transhumanist’s purposes.

Miljana Milojević (University of Belgrade) in “Embodied and Extended Self” combines a functionalist ontology of the self with an embodied and extended view on the mind. She starts by accepting the psychological-continuity criterion of personal identity (Parfit). She then casts it in a realizator-functionalist ontology which, Milojević believes, allows for an embodied view on the mind for which she finds justification in the works of Gallagher, Shapiro and others. Finally, she uses multiple realizability of the mental to extend the self beyond the boundaries of the organism.

Zdenka Brzović (University of Rijeka) in “The Immunological Self” surveys a number of possible identity criteria for a biological organism (functional integration, autonomy, genetics). After showing their flaws, Brzović shifts her analysis to different versions of the *immunology criterion*. She discusses the *self-nonself theory* (Burnet), several versions of the *systematic*

theories of immunity—the self as an *autopoietic* entity (Maturana and Varela, Jerne), the *danger theory* (Matzinger) and the *continuity theory* (Praudu)—but concludes that all of them share a problem of presupposing the identity of the organism, and thus cannot serve as the criterion of identity.

The second chapter of the book, titled “Self-Knowledge” starts with “The Value of Self-Knowledge” by Nenad Mišćević (University of Maribor). Mišćević starts by drawing a distinction between two kinds of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s inner phenomenal states (such as knowing that my back is in pain) and knowledge of one’s causal and dispositional properties (knowing that I am easily frustrated or impatient). Mišćević then turns to the question of their intrinsic and instrumental value. He argues against the claim that our knowledge of our phenomenal states has no instrumental value (Cassam). In addition, he insists that it also has an enormous intrinsic value for our conception of the self. Also, following Lehrer, he defends the instrumental value of knowledge of one’s causal and dispositional properties as a prerequisite for a wise life.

In “The Self-ascription of Conscious Experiences” Luca Malatesti (University of Rijeka) wonders how do we make the step from experiencing X (Malatesti uses color perception) to knowing (consciously) that we are experiencing X. He analyses two models of self-awareness (Armstrong’s quasi-perceptual model and Moore’s transparency of experience) but finds them both unsatisfactory. He concludes by offering a conception of the self which he believes to be a prerequisite for the possibility of conscious self-ascription of experiences. Here he follows Millar and claims that the concept of the self “involves the capacity to think about ourselves as entities that have sense organs and internal states that are determined by interactions with certain sorts of stimulation of these sense organs” (135).

The third chapter, “Self in the History of Philosophy” starts with “The Logical Positivists on the Self” by Boran Berčić (University of Rijeka). After analysing the logical positivists’ (Shlick, Ayer, Carnap, Weinberg, Reichenbach) critique of the Cartesian *Cogito*, Berčić shifts our attention to various ways in which the positivists understood the self. He draws a distinction between *conceptual*, *epistemological* and *ontological* reductionism about the self and concludes that, although the positivists were reductionist in all three senses, their reductionism should be understood primarily in its epistemological sense, meaning that we come to know about the self only *a posteriori*, that is, when we know what its elements are.

Ljudevit Hanžek (University of Split) in “Brentano on Self Consciousness” examines a theory of self-consciousness by Franz Brentano, as put forward by Brentano in his *Psychology from an Empirical Stand-point* (1874). In order to avoid an infinite regress of mental states, Brentano argued that in addition to being aware of an object, mental states possess a certain kind of self-awareness. While analysing arguments *pro et contra* Brentano’s views, Hanžek considers a number of similar proposals—Uriah Kriegel’s theory which rests on the distinction between focal and peripheral awareness; transitive and intransitive awareness (Kriegel, Gennaro, Rosenthal) and Amie Thomasson’s adverbial theory—but finds them all unsatisfactory.

Goran Kardaš (University of Zagreb) in the “No-Self View in Buddhist Philosophy” analyses the Buddhist claim that there exists no such thing as the self. Buddha believed that the self is an illusion rooted in bad cog-

nitive mechanisms and linguistic practices. Kardaš surveys a number of arguments made by Buddha and his followers which were directed against earlier Indian metaphysicians who held a substantialist position on the self. In doing so, Kardaš reveals the empiricism, reductionism and eliminativism which is present in the Buddhist view of the self.

In “The Self in Ancient Philosophy” Ana Gavran Miloš (University of Rijeka) argues against the claim that ancient Greeks didn’t possess the idea of subjectivity (Gill). She draws on the texts by Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus and concludes that, although the Ancients didn’t possess the modern, Cartesian conception of the self—understood “in terms of epistemic certainty and primacy of the pure subjective self-consciousness” (212)—their ontological and (especially) ethical deliberations presuppose a subjective, first-personal point of view and a subjectivity/objectivity distinction.

The first essay in the fourth chapter, titled “Self as Agent” is “Ideal Self in Non-Ideal Circumstances” by Matej Sušnik (University of Rijeka). As an internalist about the (normative) reasons of one’s actions, Sušnik analyses three suggested answers on the question about the relation between the real and the ideal self. He rejects the first two (the *straight-forward model* and the *advice model*) and accepts the third, according to which an agent has a reason to do *x* only if there exists a “sound deliberative route” from the agent’s actual motives to his doing *x* (Williams).

Filip Čeč (University of Rijeka) in “The Disappearing Agent” analyses the *disappearing agent objection* (Pereboom) which is directed against the *event causal* version of the libertarian position about free will. According to the objection, the event-causal ontological framework (based on events and states) doesn’t secure the agent’s role in the decision-making process, especially in the so-called *torn decisions* which figure prominently in several event-causal accounts (Kane, Balaguer, Franklin). Torn decisions involve indeterminism in the decision-making process which seems to undermine the agents role in it. Čeč analyses five possible ways in which an event causal libertarian might respond. He concludes by choosing the last option which claims that the event-causal libertarian can secure the agents role in spite of there being some indeterminacy in the decision-making process.

Marko Jurjako (University of Rijeka) in “Agency and Reductionism about the Self” starts with an analysis of the psychological-continuity criterion of personal identity developed by Parfit (Parfit 1984, 1995). He then presents some of the problems which seem to follow from the reductionism entailed by Parfit’s account, especially those related to our moral and prudential concerns. Both of these seem to presuppose a “deep unity” underlying our personal identity and that unity is what Parfit’s account seems to eliminate. Jurjako finds the agency based accounts of the self (Korsgaard, Bratman) capable of meeting these problems. He believes them to be compatible with the reductionist view and argues that their focus on our ability to act and deliberate as the source of personal identity provides the unity needed to vindicate our practical concerns.

The fifth chapter, titled “The Non-existent Self” starts with “On never Been Born” by Marin Biondić (University of Rijeka). Biondić wonders whether we can make meaningful judgements about people who were never born. For example, can we feel sorry about those who were never born?

Biondić follows Parfit and concludes that we can not. Here he relies on the view (also by Parfit) that we can evaluate (in terms of good or bad) only lives of actual people.

Iris Vidmar (University of Rijeka) in “Fictional Characters” takes the “literary aesthetics” approach to the nature of fictional characters which focuses on “the way fictional characters come to life within established literary practices”. Within it, Vidmar discusses the ways fictional characters are brought into existence and what makes up their identity. As the main protagonist of her analysis, Vidmar takes Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. She concludes that the identity of fictional characters is multilayered and relational in nature and discusses some of the objections to her view.

The sixth and final chapter, titled “Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language” starts with “Haecceity Today and with Duns Scotus” by Márta Újvári (Corvinus University of Budapest). She discusses the historical and contemporary understanding of haecceity. Traditionally, haecceity was understood as an entity, while contemporary authors see it as a “relational property of being identical with itself” (332). Relying on Chisholm and Scotus, Újvári analyses several contemporary views (Rosenkratz, Diekemper, Gracia) which offer an account for the notion of haecceity but finds them all unsatisfying.

Arto Mutanen (Finnish National Defence University) in “Who Am I?” gives an analysis of the same question. He finds it to be a cluster-question with two possible answers. One is about identification, the other about identity. He then expands on the distinction between identification and identity, which he analyses by relying on Gleason, Hintikka, Quine and Kripke. He finds identification to be a methodological notion concerned with determining *who* somebody is or what their *location in society* is (Gleason). On the other hand, identity is an ontological notion concerned with determining *what* kind of entity one is. Mutanen finds Descartes’ dualism to be the prime example of an answer to an identity question.

The last essay in the collection is “Meta-Representational *Me*” by Takashi Yagisawa (California State University). He starts by differentiating between the notion of *me* (which applies absolutely) from the notion of the *self* (which he believes to be relative). He then proceeds in developing an account of the notion of *me*. In doing so, he analyses the standard indexical theory, but finds it incomplete and offers his own theory which relies on the “way-to-thing shift” strategy. The theory claims that we represent the world in a certain first-person way (Yagisawa calls it *me-way*). The *me-way* of representing enables me to pick myself as the recipient of that representation. Only then, Yagisawa believes, I come to postulate myself as an entity, as *me*.

Each of the seventeen essays found in the collection *Perspectives on the Self* makes a valuable contribution to contemporary explorations and discussions about the notion of the Self. Particularly significant is the fact that the collection brought together a team of international authors, alongside with philosophers working in Croatia. Coming from different areas of philosophical interest, the authors surveyed and analysed a variety of contemporary and historical arguments, theories, traditions and problems related to the notion of the self. In doing so, they covered a wide range of topics related

to the self, such as identity, agency and mind. This volume will primarily be of interest to professional philosophers, psychologists, graduate students in philosophy, and other scientists interested in the philosophical themes related to the self, but with the help of a detailed and admirably clear introduction by the editor, it can perhaps even be accessible to the general, intellectually curious, public. We can conclude that the *Perspectives on the Self* is a successful exercise in contemporary analytic philosophy which brings valuable insights into areas of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and history of philosophy, and is a major contribution to the philosophical literature published in Croatia.

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