Introduction

The first five papers of this issue of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy presents the proceedings of a mini conference with Michael Devitt that was held in Rijeka in April 2017 under the title ‘Linguistic Intuitions and Natural Kinds’ organized by the Croatian Society for Analytic Philosophy. The other four papers are mainly concerned with different aspects of rationality.

Nenad Miščević’s paper “Intuitions: Epistemology and Metaphysics of Language” deals with epistemology of linguistic intuitions, and defends a moderate Voice-of-competence view in discussion with Michael Devitt, who sees them as products of general intelligence or Central Processing Unit. The second part of the paper deals with validity of linguistic intuitions and offers a compromise solution: linguistic intuitions are valid because their object, the standard linguistic entities, are production -and response-dependent. The solution is briefly situated on the map of general response-dependentism.

Michael Devitt’s and Dunja Jutronić’s papers are direct responses to Nenad Miščević’s articles “Reply to Michael Devitt”, and “Reply to Dunja Jutronić”, both published in 2014. Miščević defends a modified version (“MoVoC”) of the received view that these intuitions are the product of a linguistic competence. Michael Devitt has always rejected all versions of the received view urging instead that intuitions are, like perceptual judgments, empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to phenomena. He emphasizes here, against Miščević, that the claim about a speaker’s intuitions about strings is not to be conflated with a claim about her understanding of strings. Furthermore, he develops his claim that Miščević’s MoVoC is implausible in three important aspects. Devitt finally points out that these are not the main problems for MoVoC.

In her contribution “Intuitions Once Again!” Dunja Jutronić first presents some of her most important answers to Miščević’s objections to her 2014 paper. Secondly and more importantly, she points out that there is a possible confusion or misunderstanding about the distinction between the object-level (sentence produced) and meta-level (sentence judged). Jutronić argues that competentionalist actually conflates object and meta levels and shows the final consequences of such a conflation. Finally, she briefly comments on the so-called ‘Route Question’, that is the path from the underlying competence to the central processor and argue that Miščević, or any competentionalist, cannot provide an explanation for it.
Zdenka Brzović's paper “Devitt’s Promiscuous Essentialism” examines Devitt’s version of essentialism, a view that stirred a lot of debate amongst philosophers of biology by going against the mainstream view of “death of essentialism” in evolutionary biology. Brzović goes through the main tenets of the essentialist view, examines the relation between Devitt’s view and the so-called traditional essentialism, and the cluster approaches to natural kinds. She concludes that Devitt holds a very flexible variety of pluralistic essentialism that she terms promiscuous essentialism.

Urška Martinc in her paper “Devitt’s ‘Intrinsic Biological Essentialism’” primarily focuses on Michael Devitt’s article “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism”. Using examples from biology and the analogy from some examples from chemistry, Martinc analyses advantages and disadvantages of Devitt’s arguments for intrinsic biological essentialism.

In “Structured Propositions, Unity, and the Sense-Nonsense Distinction” Octavian Ion starting point of discussion is Herman Cappelen (2013) who thought that we need to rethink and reintroduce the important distinction between sense and nonsense that was neglected during Logical Positivism’s demise. However, Ion’s delineation of the bounds of sense is different from Cappelen’s. One of his main goals is to argue that category mistakes are paradigmatic examples of nonsensical sentences.

Martina Blečić in her contribution “Do Conversational Implicatures Express Arguments?” suggests that the idea that conversational implicatures express argument can be significant for the notion of communicational responsibility. It is proposed that we should consider conversational implicatures as reason-giving arguments in which the speaker (arguer) addresses a hearer who does not need to reply. In such cases, the speaker is not trying to convince the hearer to accept his position but is explicitly stating a reason in support of his intended message. Blečić argues that her approach can strengthen the idea of the speaker’s communicational responsibility for an implicated message even in the case when he wants to distance himself from it.

Conspiracy theories seem to play an increasing role in public political discourse, and Daniel Cohnitz’s paper “Conspiracy Paranoia: On the Rationality of Conspiracy Theories” urges that we should find out why conspirational thought is recently gaining such support and how to respond to it. People who believe in conspiracy theories are often ridiculed as nutcases or paranoid crackpots, while they portray themselves as particularly critical, better informed and enlightened responsible citizens. One of the central questions that needs to be answered here is what mindset leads to the believe in conspiracy theories? Finding out which of the two above mentioned characterizations is correct, is crucial for coming up with the appropriate response to the rise of conspirational thought.

In his paper “Wisdom and Reason” Andrei Mărăsoiu presents Ryan’s (2012) theory of wisdom as deep rationality. Namely, to believe or act
wisely is to believe or act in a justified way, informed by a body of other justified beliefs about the good life. Ryan elaborates the view along evidentialist lines: one’s belief or act is justified when it is based on the best available evidence. Mărășoiu points to a number of counterexamples to this approach and he argues that, instead of evidentialism, Ryan’s view should include virtue theory, which helps explain the seeming counterexamples. He focuses on the virtues of openness to experience, and of steadfastness in the face of experience.