Populists, Samaritans and Cosmopolitans. What is the Right Alliance?

NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ
University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

In the last decade the international situation has been marked on the one hand by refugee crisis, and on the other by right-wing populist reaction to it. This constellation forces a new playground for the traditional philosophical cosmopolitan–nationalist debate. The moral and political issues raised in this new context concern duties to "strangers at our doors", and these duties and the awareness of them are the first step in a cosmopolitan but realistic direction. Cosmopolitanism now has to start as "samaritan" cosmopolitanism, openness to and engagement for the close and present strangers. Once the present urgent problems are on the way to be solved, we should turn our attention to deeper causes of the crisis. These causes are the evils traditionally discussed by cosmopolitan authors, from dramatic North-South inequalities, to exploitation and warmongering done by the richest countries. The initial samaritan motivation naturally leads to attention to deeper issues, and toward a more ideal cosmopolitan theory. The resulting Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model fits well with Ypi's engagement with the principle/activism divide, and offers a way of understanding, and hopefully, overcoming it. At the meta-level it connects the appeal to empathy as the relevant moral sentiment and the more rationalist, contractualist justification of global justice.

Keywords: Populism, refugee crisis, Samaritanism, cosmopolitanism.

1. Introduction

The topics of cosmopolitanism and the issues tied to cosmopolitanism in practice, to which this paper is dedicated, are topics on which Lea Ypi has been working for decades, and that are addressed in her original and challenging book on global justice (Ypi 2012), her (co-) edited volume on migration (Fine and Ypi 2016), and in a series of papers. Some issues are also connected to the more general theoretical con-

trasts, like the one between the ideal and non-ideal theory and the like (some addressed in the book presented in Rijeka in 2018 by Jonathan White and Ypi (2016)).[1]

What shall we mean by "cosmopolitanism"? In her book, Ypi discusses "[t]he shift in the use of the term 'cosmopolitanism' from an associated with the conduct of single individuals to a politically relevant interpretation of justice" (2012: 27). She characterizes cosmopolitanism as focusing upon global distributive equality (2012: 104). This core idea belongs to "political" cosmopolitanism (as described, for instance, in *Stanford Encyclopedia* entry and sources mentioned there). But the tone of Ypi's book suggests a strong moral motivation, and thus a link with "moral cosmopolitanism", which I shall assume in the sequel.

Of course, I am aware there are a lot of problems that arise for cosmopolitanism, the ones that has been formulated by its critics. For instance, Miller proposes a dilemma for cosmopolitans:

> So cosmopolitanism as a moral outlook seems to be profoundly ambiguous. In its strong form it readily excludes any preference for one's compatriots, but by simultaneously ruling out other forms of partiality that are integral to a worthwhile human life, it becomes hard to accept. In its weak form, by contrast, it reduces to a broad humanitarianism that does not rule out anything much at all beyond repugnant ideologies that regard some human lives as of no value. The interesting question is whether we can find some intermediate view. (Miller 2016: 24)

Ypi has an answer: Distinguish the level of principles and the level of action, the ideal and the non-ideal. The ideal (and principles) is the right level for cosmopolitanism. But how shall we connect the two? I think I have an answer to suggest that agrees with Ypi's distinction of levels, but stresses the possibility of passage from one to the other.

In order to introduce my proposal, I shall start from the fact that a new playground has been opened for and made obligatory to cosmopolitan reflection. A few decades ago philosophers were writing about post-communist conflicts going all the way into wars (like the post-Yugoslav one) and international penal justice applying to the war crimes (Hague and Rome above all), and about the cosmopolitan promises of supra-national bodies, like the EU. The hope in a relatively egalitarian liberalism was in the air.

Now, the most urgent problems are different. On the side of human suffering, it is immigrants and refugees in general that are in focus. On the opposite side, the one of rejection and national-cultural egoism one encounters the mass success of populism. Someone might object that the problematics of wars is still alive, and indeed in a dramatic form, say in the Middle East, from Mediterranean to Afghanistan, and that the idea of an allegedly new playground is part of a myopic Western perspective. (A follower of Ingram's more pessimistic moments, e.g. (2013: 18), might argue for such an objection.) If this is the case, please

relativize the formulation "the new playground" into "the new playground-for-us", countries where the analytic political-philosophical discussion is going on.

My proposal starts from trans-national, and in this sense cosmopolitan interaction, the activity of helping strangers, refuges, immigrants in general. I shall borrow from J. Waldron the metaphor of the Good Samaritan, who helps the suffering individual not belonging to his tribe:

> We tend to think carelessly that the moral functions of the state must be easier to explain on an affinity model. But this is not the case. The most demanding moral requirements are those that insist on our taking care of strangers and doing justice to those with whom we are not already bound by ties of kinship. (Waldron 2011)

The key here to all this—in the rescue cases—is something like proximity, the persons in question being there, on the spot: "[A] certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was" (Waldron 2000: 1075). This all sounded strange, at least to me in 2000, when I read Waldron; suddenly, with the immigration crisis and the populist explosion, it became most realistic and actual (see also Waldron 2011 and Valentini 2015). The Good Samaritan is the right intermediate figure, connecting the local and the cosmopolitan.

So, I see good samaritanism as a variant of cosmopolitanism (or as its closest ally). More importantly, *it is the variant (or ally) that is crucial in the times of populist explosion. It takes us from the local to the universal, and merges principles and practice in a constructive way.* The road to take is from samaritanism to deeper cosmopolitan measures. So, my framework here is the issue of cosmopolitanism in the populist age, but towards the end of the paper, I shall pass to the more standard variants of cosmopolitanism, where I agree with Ypi a lot.

Here is then the preview. The first sub-section of the next section introduces populism—the relatively new player, focuses upon its right-wing variety and briefly discusses what it is and how it functions, connecting it very briefly to issues of nationalism and communitarianism. The second sub-section turns to a crucial example: Immigration and immigrants, and the populist challenge of the refusal of potential immigrants, focusing on the work of David Miller as the opponent and philosophical guide to the problems. The second section is dedicated to the proposal for a cosmopolitan solution, to be called "the Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model". It contains two parts, first, the one concerning immediate Samaritan duties, here-and-now, the project of Samaritan cosmopolitanism. The second part turns to deeper causes of the migration disaster, and briefly mentions the standard longer-term cosmopolitan solutions in terms of peace and distributive justice, which brings us back to Ypi and her two level picture. We propose to combine it with a two level view of justification, combining fitting sentiments, like empathy, at the basic level and rational contractualist justification at the higher, more theoretical level. Finally, the conclusion sum-

marizes the issues awaiting those who deal with cosmopolitanism in practice, either through activism, or through reflection of both.

2. *The new playground*
2.1 *Populism*

The present day populism is a relatively new anti-cosmopolitan political machine, a spectre, to quote Gellner and Ionescu: "A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of populism." (Gellner and Ionescu 1969: 1). Leaders like Orban, Trump, Erdogan and their likes are to a large extent shaping the global situation; together with the refugee crisis, populism is determining the new playground that is surrounding us. But, how should we think of it? What is it, in the first place?

The first thing to note about the notion of populism is that it is very thin. It covers all sorts of movements and ideologies suspicious towards elites and friendly to the wide masses of "people". Margaret Canovan, in her 1981 book *Populism*, has suggested seven different "types" divided into two major categories:

Agrarian Populism

1. Farmers' radicalism (e.g., the U.S. People's Party)
2. Peasant movements (e.g., the East European Green Rising)
3. Intellectual agrarian socialism (e.g., the Narodniki in Russia)

Political Populism

4. Populist dictatorship (e.g., Peron)
5. Populist democracy (i.e., calls for referendums and "participation")
6. Reactionary populism (e.g., George Wallace and his followers)
7. Politicians' populism (e.g., broad, non-ideological coalition-building that draws on the unificatory appeal of "the people").

As noted by authors like Cass Mudde:

> Populism is understood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the People. (Mudde 2007: 23, see also Mueller 2016)

What this richness and variations in Canovan's taxonomy, read together with Mudde's and Mueller's characterizations, suggest is that populism is probably not a political kind, the concept is too thin, plus vague and general. Right-wing populism *is,* in contrast, a political kind (as is, probably, its left-wing counterpart, which we shall not need to discuss here).[2] So, let us concentrate upon right-wing populism, the only one relevant for our topic. Right-wing populism is exclusively focused upon one's community. But the question is, which one? What about nationalism? Is the relevant community the national one, as Taguieff

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[2] But see, for example, the chapter on "Leftist populism" (chapter six) of March (2011), Aslanidis (2017), and Ingram (2017).

(2015) would have it? Interestingly, in the US populism is more like pro-American nationalism or patriotism, while in Europe, it is typically concentrated upon wider belonging, like belonging to Christian civilization in contrast with the Muslim one, and the like.

Let me illustrate. Start from the US populism. Randall Curren (Forthcoming) gives a depressing overview. He notes that the leading populist activist groups, like the Tea Party, are "composed of people who believe that the government is plotting to deprive Americans of their liberties" (2019: 38–39). "Intensely focused on the federal government as its chief enemy, the Patriot movement swelled when the nation was led by a black man suspected of being a foreign-born Muslim and worse" (39). Its militia groups have engaged in armed standoffs with federal authorities and contested federal control of public lands. Its brand of patriotism is focused on the gun rights and the like, he remarks. He talks about Trump's "pluto-populism" and concludes by noting the following:

> This chapter has argued that expressions of patriotism in the USA following the attacks of September 11, 2001, differed in ways that reflected preexisting social, political, and religious divisions. These revolved around the role of Christian fundamentalism and theological variants of it that influenced the Bush administration's response to 9.11, the role of Southern regionalism and race in shaping US policy and citizenship, and the reactionary movements and economic polarization that set the stage for the emergence of populism in both the USA and Europe following the financial collapse of 2008. The events of 9.11 are identified as a landmark within larger overlapping periods in which reactionary fundamentalist and libertarian movements have emerged, together with the declining economic fortunes of Western societies, waves of immigration, and declining trust in public institutions. (Curren forthcoming: 38–39)

Overgeneralizing from some nationalistic features of some populist movements, authors like Taguieff (2017) conclude that populism is just a manifestation of nationalism, its "vengeance" for phenomena of globalization, as he puts it in the introduction to his book. Benjamin De Cleen in his "Populism and nationalism" quotes earlier analogous proposals. He notes that Stewart (1969: 183) "goes as far as" to call populism "a kind of nationalism". And he lists other examples (Akkerman 2003: 151, Jansen 2011 and Taguieff 1997: 15). He then explains why this strategy is wrong, why populism is not nationalism:

> Populism is a discourse centred around the nodal points 'the people' and 'the elite', in which the meaning of 'the people' and 'the elite' is constructed through a down/up antagonism between 'the people' as a large powerless group and 'the elite' as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populism is a claim to represent 'the people' against a (some) illegitimate 'elite', and constructs it political demands as representing the will of 'the people' (for similar definitions see Laclau 2005a, 2005b; Stavrakakis 2004, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). (Rovira Kaltwasser et. al. 2017: 309)

Let me add that one can note that populist parties like German AfD primarily stress the alleged "civilizational" contrasts and then connect

them to more patriotic or nationalist slogans. A typical poster for Federal elections (in this case those that were held in Germany in September 2017) show young women in bikinis, with the simple text: "Burkas? We are for bikinis." At the bottom, comes the more patriotic encouragement: "Germany, have confidence in yourself!" Other typical posters refer to alcohol drinks: We are not like Muslims, we love brandy, local wine and the like. And again "Germany, have confidence in yourself!"

So, if populism can be wider than nationalism, although connected with it, how should we characterize it? Harald Stelzer has been stressing common elements of communitarianism and populism, and I agree with him. He talks about criticism of modernization processes (involving alleged dissolution of communities, of embedded individual identity in the community and then moral chaos, all this critique imbedded in a criticism of liberal understanding of democracy). He next lists institutional orientation (involving emphasis on participation, demanding solidarity and social order). Finally, there is the assumption of the homogeneity of collectives (with fear of cultural dissolution, cultural particularism and the shared notion of the good).[3]

This does not make right wing populism into communitarianism, since communitarianism is primarily a philosophical standpoint, not political movement. For populist attitude we need a related but not synonymous term, more tied to politics than to philosophy. Call it "communitarian loyalty" or "strong communitarian loyalty" if you prefer.

So, cosmopolitanism is confronting new problems in the populist age marked by migration crisis and the like. It makes us aware of problems with classical cosmopolitan answer. The ideas of global governance, global economic justice and global justice in general do not speak to the burning issues of the populist age. Cosmopolitanism faces this new playground and the populist challenge. How should we react to it? The crucial example is immigration and immigrants, the favorite topic of population urging.

2.2 *Immigration*

In Europe immigration is probably the main topic of populist uproar. In the US it is one the main topics. So, immigration plus populist reaction are at this moment the main testing ground for cosmopolitan views. Let me start very briefly (with apologies) with anti-cosmopolitan pro-national side, pointing to my disagreements along the way.

Some authors, on the moderate pro-national side, like David Miller (particularly in his 2016), claim that national responsibility to accept immigrant refugees is balanced by considerations of the interest of would-be immigrants and the interests that national communities have in maintaining control over their own composition and character. But in fact, his reservations are much stronger. In discussing outcome

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[3] Harald Stelzer, "Communitarianism and right wing populism", a talk on conference in Bled, Slovenia. I thank Harald for sending me his powerpoint.

obligations to the poor, Miller reminds the reader of possible responsibilities of the "people in poor countries who support or acquiesce in regimes that reproduce poverty by siphoning off a large portion of GDP into military expenditure, presidential palaces, and Swiss bank accounts" (Miller Undated: 6).

How seriously should we take this? Take Ghana, mentioned by Miller in the same paper. Its actual GDP per capita is 4.604 US dollars, and it is on the 126th place on the list of countries. Imagine two women from Ghana, one from agricultural, the other from working class family, who migrate with their families to your country. "Sorry ladies, you are co-responsible for corruption of your government. You have acquiesced in a regime that reproduces poverty, that's the sad fact. So, you merit no help", you are supposed to argue, from your comfortable seat in the park of Nuffield college. I just cannot believe that Miller would really suggest such a reaction.

He admits that "[...] there may indeed be some refugees to whom redress is owed" but points to the danger "of double bind" (Miller 2016: 176): on the one hand, Western powers are blamed for their intervention, on the other, blamed if they don't intervene.

In any case, he is convinced of the irrelevance of cosmopolitanism:

> In Chapter 2, I discuss cosmopolitanism in general terms as a background to the debate over immigration. Here I simply want to indicate why, even if one is convinced by the general arguments in its favor, it may be less helpful than one might suppose in thinking about the practice of immigration, where this involves not only the question "should borders be open or closed?" but a much wider set of issues about the selection of immigrants, the treatment of refugees, integration policy, and so forth. Thinking about cosmopolitan approaches is, however, a good way of focusing on the question of what we should take as given and what we should regard as amenable to change when discussing immigration. How realistic or idealistic should we be? For example, should we take for granted a world made up of separate states in the first place? Should we assume that global inequalities will be roughly as large as they are now? How else might the current international order be changed?

> The argument for swallowing a considerable dose of realism here is simply that the immigration issue would either disappear altogether or at least become much less pressing in a world that was configured quite differently from our own. Suppose there were no separate states, but simply administrative districts accountable to a world government of some sort. There would then be no immigration in the sense in which we understand it. (Miller 2016: 16–17)

Miller very reasonably notes that steps have to be taken to reduce the migrant flows themselves to manageable proportions. He suggests that: "[T]his is partly a matter of working with local authorities in the sending states to clamp down on people-smuggling operations, and to better police their own territorial waters (this is most relevant in the case of states such as Turkey which are themselves safe havens for refugees), and partly a matter of improving living conditions and pro-

viding work opportunities around the camps already established near conflict zones" (2016: 272).

> ...[T]he refugee issue was likely to prove morally excruciating under certain circumstances, and the European crisis appears to confirm that prophecy. No humanitarian could fail to respond to the plight of drowning boat people, or of land migrants who find themselves blocked by border fences and without basic means of subsistence. They are the hikers in the desert from my second chapter. But equally a co-ordinated response by states to the crisis must consider the longer-term consequences of what is now done—the signals it gives and the incentives it creates for those who might want to move in the future. And where states have developed (justified) policies for different categories of immigrants—refugees, economic migrants, temporary workers, and so forth—these policies should not be torn to shreds because of the current emergency. Citizens and government officials alike have to find a way of compromising between these two imperatives: how to rescue those in need of rescue without turning the border into a free-for-all? (2016: 172)

An urgent question, however, is how this is to be done. Nowadays, if you stop the smugglers, people in the threatened countries will be killed, or raped, or enslaved. So what about alternatives to smuggling? How about us making escape easier by organizing transportation for them?

On the pro-refugee side, Kymlicka has been stressing the advantages of the host state being multi-cultural, offering Canada as his prime example. He is rightly enthusiastic about cultures meeting each other, but also wants to save national solidarity, as against „ neoliberal multiculturalism". He sees it as " a progressive political resource". So, wishing at the same time to save "immigration and multiculturalism" he tries "to identify the prospects for a multicultural national solidarity" (Kymlicka 2015: 3). Here is his advice:

> we need to develop a form of multiculturalism that is tied to an ethic of social membership: that is, a form of multiculturalism that enables immigrants to express their culture and identity as modes of participating and contributing to the national society. A solidarity-promoting multiculturalism would start from the premise that one way to be a proud and loyal Canadian is to be a proud Greek-Canadian or Vietnamese-Canadian, and that the activities of one's group—be they religious, cultural, recreational, economic or political—are understood as forms of belonging, and of investing in society, not only or primarily in the economic sense, but in a deeper social sense, even (dare I say it?) as a form of nation-building. (Kymlicka 2015: 12)

I find the advice correct and convincing, but unfortunately, the main populism infected (or at least under such threat) European states are far from being multicultural to the extent typical of immigrant countries like Canada. We need a workable cosmopolitan political philosophy of immigration. So, let us go back to the main issue. Miller has been arguing that cosmopolitan arrangement is too distant and far away to point in the direction of actual practice. So, what should (we) cosmopolitans do?

Ypi has one answer: The contrast between ideal and non-ideal. I would, for my own part, like to ask the question whether the here-and-now approach could solve it: the immediacy of sight and mutual recognition is the main point, as Waldron suggests:

> I argue that the important moral work in the story of the Good Samaritan is not done by any abstract cosmopolitan universalism—which is very easy to lampoon [...] but by the sheer particularity of the accidental conjunction in time and space of two concrete individuals [...] (Waldron 2011: 16)

So, accept refugees at your doors, organize decent life for them, prove that they are not the threat to 'us', and be generous in accepting them. Miller, however, has a warning against starting with samaritanism. He points to a wide range of psychological experiments that suggest that people are not good at helping suffering or threatened others even when the others are in their sight. In the chapter of his *Justice for Earthlings* entitled "Are they my poor: the problem of altruism in a world of strangers" he lists a series of depressing psychological experiments, suggesting that people are bad in samaritan situation. Here is the most ironic of many testimonies recorded:

> The experimenters witnessed on several occasions the bizarre spectacle of theology students hurrying to deliver a talk on the Good Samaritan and in the process literally stepping over a man who to all appearances had fallen in the street. Changing the cost of helping, in this case the cost of being a few minutes late to give a talk, transformed the subjects' willingness to be altruistic. (Miller 2013: 190)

I would think that the psychological material just reinforces the point of the Biblical story of the Good Samaritan. In the story, the victim is ignored by a priest (*hiereus tis*, probably of Jewish faith, on his road to the Temple in Jerusalem) and by a Levite who were passing by, and then helped by our hero. The rate of ignoring is thus over 65%, and the psychologists would probably find it realistic. The psychological point is not that everybody would help, but that more would help in presence than in absence, and that is all. The normative point is that urgency produces the duty to aid, and that the primary bearer of duty are persons present in the situation.

So, why not start with the simplest potentially cosmopolitanism engaging situation, the one of Samaritan help?

3. A solution: Samaritan cosmopolitanism
3.1 The proposal: The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model

Why bother? Well, because migrants might be dying in front of our eyes. In her book Ypi recounts the tragic story of Adonis Musati, a migrant from Zimbabwe, starved to death in Cape Town while queuing at the offices of South Africa's home affairs refugee centre (Ypi 2012: 107). We have lots of moral obligations to migrants that derive from the past, from their life circumstances and from their general human dignity. But, obligations come alive most clearly in the actual meeting with the likes of Musati. Waldron, who invented the samaritan approach in the ethics of international relations, rightly talks about "the sheer particularity of the accidental conjunction in time and space of two concrete individuals":

> I argue that the important moral work in the story of the Good Samaritan is not done by any abstract cosmopolitan universalism—which is very easy to lampoon [...] but by the sheer particularity of the accidental conjunction in time and space of two concrete individuals [...].

Who is "we" in the concrete case of Rijeka, the place of our conference? On the one hand, the local community, but from a wider perspective, „we" is best construed starting from our supra-state framework, EU, and then proceeding to particular countries.[4]

Who is primarily responsible for helping? We have been illustrating our proposal with the examples of individuals. But, of course, traditionally the official helper will be the nation-state, as Ypi rightly notes. And here there is a difference mostly multicultural vs. mostly mono-cultural states (Canada vs. Germany (or Poland), and the former might be more ready helpers, as Kymlicka has been suggesting. The third way is to start above the state, and it is dramatically illustrated by the dilemmas concerning the role of the EU in the refugee drama. But we cannot enter these complications here. We shall just look at the dynamic of interaction.

Here, the immediate help comes first, both normatively and causally; just accept the would-be refugees (indeed, the would-be refugees should be helped in leaving their countries and travelling to us). In longer term, staying should involve opportunity for work and training. Those who wish to stay in countries like Slovenia or Croatia**,** should be allowed to stay (and there should be a quota for each member-state of the EU, and perhaps wider). Distinguish at least three stages, first, the immediate emergency (starvation, freezing, urgent medical problems) and catering to it, second, settlement and learning (on the host's and the immigrant newcomer's side), and third, the stage of (some kind of) citizenship, of relatively stable life in the host country.

The differences between economic migrants and refugees exist, but there is a continuum of cases, and a large space in-between, that should tilt our decisions in favor of the needy. Let me say more about these samaritan stages of the trans-national engagement, even risking some small repetition.

Consider the problems of the first stage. The immediate emergency is assumed psychologically to trigger the samaritan reaction, and nor-

[4] We might need to take a wider look on samaritanism. It suggests a Proximitist Proposal: The density and the entanglement of interaction in a given location or territory is the crucial first condition. Speaking about a suffering person, Waldron writes: "Never mind ethnicity, community, or traditional categories of neighborness. The fact that you are there makes you his neighbors" (Waldron 2011: 16). But how large is "there"? Once upon a time, with simple means of transportation it was the geographical openness that counted. To take the example of Hungary and south-Slavonic countries, the Pannonian plain was the relevant "there"; in Central Asia it was the old Transoxiana, in particular Ferghana valley. Switzerland and its history illustrates openness for interaction in spite of intervening mountain ranges. Cultural proximity has been offering opportunities for interaction: smaller Slavonic peoples and Russia, the Muslim world from Morocco to Indonesia and the like.

matively to command it. But can the process start at all? With great numbers of immigrants, and with unprepared host countries (see Žižek's doubts below)? Present day Greece and Italy are offering the spectacular proof of practical possibility. Greece, an economically heavily burdened country, is showing hospitality to something like fifty thousand immigrants (almost a million have passed through the county since 2015). Their life is still difficult, but they do survive, and are getting the necessary minimum. Since 2013, Italy took in over 700,000 migrants! (Turkey has taken more than three million of refugees but has not offered them the minimum as we see it from our more Western perspective.) So, in this case, can implies ought, and the antecedent is fulfilled.

At the second stage, once the migrant lives are not threatened, the ideological issues, re-education etc. steps in. Next, and much later come issues of "ideological disagreement" refugee culture should be accommodated as much as possible (in elements wether threaten elementary human not to rights)

At this second and third stage important changes hopefully take place. On the host's side, the initial empathetic reaction connects the local to the (once) distant strangers and to their society and culture: Had someone been helping Adonis Musati, Zimbabwe would become for him/her "the country from which our Adonis came to us". The host would learn in an empathetic, engaged way what the life is like there, how difficult it is to survive, and so on. (To give a Croatian example, our tradition contains sufficiently many multicultural features, most importantly the centuries long presence of Islam, that might serve as a bridge.)

On the immigrant citizen's side, the welcome and the new way of life might produce positive changes. First, our immigrant, call her Saba, learns to appreciate the host country, say Croatia, and the community of Rijeka which has accepted her. Second, she might, after the experiences of both suffering and welcome, develop a better understanding of compassion. And finally, she starts understanding how her new country fits the larger framework. Simon Keller sees the accomplished perspective as "the perspective of the worldly citizen" (Keller 2013: 250).

Now, this Samaritan obligation can function as a preparation for wider, classically cosmopolitan activity. Waldron would disagree; judging by her reaction in the discussion, Ypi might come closer to agreeing.

Ypi presents the cosmopolitan setting as having to do primarily with distributive justice and equality. However, what she has to say in the book can be linked to the issues of peace (a condition of global distributive justice), to some degree of common governance, and probably to multiculturalism.

Of course, these wider issues linked to cosmopolitanism come in once we turn to causes of migration, at its sources. Take Bush-type war-provoking interventionism and the actual tragic profile of the Middle East. The causes have to do with war, extreme poverty (look at Africa) and bad governance (e.g., in Mexico). What is needed, as we all know, is peace plus more: The decent government, some fairness in the

distribution, the respect of human rights. And only a more cosmopolitan arrangement can guarantee this. We need measures significantly deeper than samaritan hospitality; but fortunately, the later might be a preparation for the former.

Here is Kok-Chor Tanm or how:

> [...] to rule out patriotic concern in the real world. What the limited patriotic thesis requires, when applied to the nonideal world in which justice is never fully realized, is that patriots ought also to take their duties of global justice seriously, and that they should be striving actively towards a more just world arrangement, if they want their practice of patriotic favoritism to be legitimate. They may show compatriots special concern, but they must also be sincerely attempting to minimize the background injustices by working towards a more egalitarian world. (Tan 2004: 161)

So, we have two theoretical steps, first, accepting samaritanism and second, agreeing with general cosmopolitan ideology. Let us call this "Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model". It hopefully offers a tentative answer to a more general question raised by Ypi, the issue of the need of two level playground:

> Without cosmopolitanism at the level of principle, statist agency is morally indefensible. Without statism at the level of agency, cosmopolitan principles are politically ineffective and motivationally unsustainable. The avant-garde is crucial to both principles and agency. (Ypi 2012: 179)

But how shall the two come together? Principles are not enough—we cannot do without some cosmopolitan activism. The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model offers an answer. It starts with host experience with refugees and vice versa, where the participants on each side become familiar with the other side and more sensitive (to what we, philosophers, would describe as cosmopolitan principles). The further cosmopolitan steps might, in the good case, lead to deliberative political process in which the need for deeper measures will lead to more cosmopolitan proposals. (The simple, all-too-simple example is the rising awareness of EU administration that a lot of money should be spent on North-African countries in order to take care of the potential migrants there. The similar process is to be expected in relation to Middle East, once the perspective of peace becomes more realistic.)

So, activism (to turn to Ypi's favorite topic) starts with refugees, the needy, in the vicinity; participants do the Good Samaritan part within the boundaries of state (or a state-like entity like the EU). The activity prompts cosmopolitan widening and the state deeper measures (search for peace, for more economic equality, for common supra-state governance) will naturally fit into the new activist, more cosmopolitan framework. Let us locate this explicitly into framework proposed by Ypi. She talks about how a

> [...] dialectical way of conceptualizing associative political relations combines features of the civil society and family models and clarifies the conditions under which political agency would be effective, and the outcome of political actions would be motivationally sustainable. (Ypi 2012: 133)

These features, according to her view, emphasize popular sovereignty and civic education.

> Popular sovereignty, on the one hand, allows cosmopolitan interpretations to enter a deliberative political process, enabling the transformation of political institutions in accordance with their normative requirements. Civic education, on the other hand, complements this process by progressively inserting new normative commitments of cosmopolitan pre-existing cultural, political, and historical practices. Both, I suggest, are indispensable conditions if we want global justice to be more than a cosmopolitan manifesto: popular sovereignty for global egalitarian principles to become politically effective in the first place and civic education for them to be motivationally sustained. (Ypi 2012: 133)

The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model offers both motivation for a political bite of cosmopolitan practices, and for the relevant civic education. The topic of the latter brings us to our last question:

What is the wider, in particular second-order philosophical framework for the model? My personal preference would be a contractualist one, in the wider sense, above all referring to Rawls and Scanlon. The theory of global justice goes well with it, and my preferred version of justification would be the one of slightly idealized parties in the discussion (see Scanlon 2018). He requires that a proposed basic structure be justified to all those who are asked to accept it and notes "that justification must therefore appeal to the reasons individuals have for accepting such institutions based on how their lives would be affected" (Scanlon 2018: 157). He I talk about "the reasons that individuals have for accepting or objecting to institution" (Scanlon 2018: 157).[5] This contractualist framework is ideal, to my opinion, for specifying the general cosmopolitan principles. However, the question that is particularly relevant here concerns the first, Samaritan part of the model. Where does it fit into second-order ethical-political theory? I would suggest that we look at the structure of the relevant contractualist justification. Among the reasons individuals have for accepting the proposed institutions are self-centered ones. But we also need other-directed attitudes. If Ivana, the Croat, is to accept the idea that we, Croats, have an obligation to help Saba the Zimbabwean, she might need some empathy-sympathy.

Lacking such a morally fitting sentiment, Ivana might simply refuse to admit the obligation for Croats, in the manner made infamous in the right-wing populist discourse: "I just want to close my doors to Africans, no matter in which situation they are!" It is here that the *samaritan considerations become important for the viability to contractualist justification*: The first steps of contractualist reasoning might appeal to constructive, morally positive sentiments, and the empathy-sympathy is the shining example of such a sentiment.

A purist Kantian Scanlonian might object that empathy is not needed. We are free to appeal to idealization and postulate the idealization

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[5] For a fine application to issues of global justice, see (Gilabert 2012).

according to which Ivana is a moral person.[6] But this is an unnecessary *ad hoc* measure, given that people are actually empathetic in the relevant situations, and we need as much psychological realism as possible: Do not idealize beyond necessity!

A particular episode of empathy is finally justified at the general level of principle agreed upon in the contractualist procedure of justification in which a proposed basic structure is being made acceptable to all those who are asked to accept it. Pure contractualism specifies for us the final state of any particular piece of moral reasoning—the universal acceptance or somethning of the sort. It is relatively silent on the first stage(s), but stresses perspective taking and explains how it makes one's reaction more appropriate. The sentimentalist addition fills the void, and suggests how the later achievements are grounded in the initial ones.

Let me note that a similar dialectics seems to appear more generally in the justification of specifical attachements, national(ist), patriotic, purely cultural, or class-focused ones. Attachement is a sentiment, or a deep, standing disposition towards sentiment, and, according to my preferred account of moral-political justification, this sentiment has to survive confrontation with other attitudes in a reasonable, open discussion within the contractualist framework.

More needs to be said about the complications of Samaritan situation. So, let me return to the first-order issue and say more, indeed, in a dialogue with my colleagues, in Rijeka and in Slovenia.

3.2 *Objections and replies*

Let me start with the actual discussion in Rijeka, with warm thanks to all participants**.** First**,** Chiara Raucea: "For the action you are recommending, you need strangers at your doors. But many governments are engaged in preventing refugees, and migrants in general, to get to the doors at all. So, what are we to do in this case?"

If you need a name, call this "the Mexican wall problem" in honor of Trump and his bricklayer creativity.

Reply: We should distinguish two elements in our characterization of the "new playground", with migrants moving to our countries, the factual and the normative element. To start with the latter, the duty to help remains even if the strangers are not literally at our doors; people on boats travelling towards our port are a case in point. In all the cases alluded to by Raucea, of strangers "close to our doors", literally or metaphorically, we have the duty to engage in providing them the possibility to get to our doors. Americans should annihilate the Mexican wall. In the extreme Orbanesque case, where we are legally threatened if we try to help them, we have the duty to oppose the threat, in whatever way we can.

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[6] Ulrike Heuer came close to a general version of such a position in a discussion on the general issue of affect and reason in a Dubrovnik conference; I thank her a lot!

The other element is psychological: People are more prone to help suffering others at their doorstep, than at a distance. Here, Raucea's comment has a serious bite; the psychological ease of engagement and the natural rise of empathy-sympathy is blocked, and this is what Orban and his executioners are counting with.

Zsolt Kapelner has articulated a similar worry: What about intolerant and xenophobic media that systematically keep the locals ignorant about the sufferings of the potential strangers-at-the-doors? What would be samaritan obligations in such a case? It's the "communicational Mexican wall", if you like, to connect it with Raucea's question.

Answer: I agree that ordinary citizens cannot do much here. But the situation is especially relevant for intellectuals: It is a task for us to act as public intellectuals, and write, blog, tweet and the like, about the burning issues covered by silence in the media. Internet is offering possibilities unimaginable two decades ago. And again, can implies ought, and produces a version of samaritan obligation especially demanding for us, intellectuals.

Eletra Repetto has articulated a worry often heard in potential host countries, in particular in Central Europe. Here, the local working class, including an army of jobless young and old people, is poor and needy enough, and the activists have enough work protecting its interests. How should we balance the interests of "our" needy with the interests of would be newcomers? Eletra's question comes close to the "progressive dilemma" as formulated by Kymlicka:

> In the postwar period, projects of social justice have often drawn upon ideas of national solidarity, calling upon shared national identities to mobilize support for the welfare state. Several commentators have argued that increasing immigration, and the multiculturalism policies it often gives rise to, weaken this sense of national solidarity. This creates a potential "progressive's dilemma", forcing a choice between solidarity and diversity. (Kymlicka 2015: 3)

Answer: As far as the immediate, first stage of helping is concerned, the survival for immigrants is less costly than the normal life of the home needy. Take as example the medical help. In countries I know well, Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary, the main debate concerns relatively costly medical interventions. In contrast, urgent medical help for refugees often concerns much more simple matters that are much cheaper.

Similarly, in Slovenia we have been massively collecting second-hand, somewhat worn out warm garments, that were precious for the refugees freshly arrived from Middle East. In contrast, in the same country, the radical left is taking as a sign of abject poverty possible cases of local retired elderly people who have to wear second-hand worn out garments. I remember how shocked I was when I discovered how many people are doing it in a country I recently visited.

The dilemma gets much more serious with the issue of jobs and long term prosperity. Here, more sociological and economical research is needed, and I leave the issue open.

4. *Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism in practice*

The migration crisis has brought to the attention of wide public the issues connected with the right of immigrant refugees. What duties, if any, do we, members of third countries, have to such immigrants or would-be immigrants? There is a national responsibility to accept people in dire need, but how far does it go? Second, how should we treat cultural differences that become a central issue once the immigrants, in this case the asylum seekers, settle down?

At one end of the spectrum are authors like Slavoj Žižek (2016), who accept in principle the rights of asylum seekers, but demand from them total cultural integration, almost immediately.

Some authors, like Miller, claim that national responsibility to accept immigrant refugees is balanced by considerations of the interest of would-be immigrants and the interests that national communities have in maintaining control over their own composition and character. In discussing outcome obligations to the poor, Miller reminds the reader of possible responsibilities of the "people in poor countries who support or acquiesce in regimes that reproduce poverty by siphoning off a large portion of GDP into military expenditure, presidential palaces, and Swiss bank accounts". The remedial responsibility should be focused on the responsibility of citizens of rich countries to ensure fairness in cooperation, and to create an international order that would ensure opportunities to develop.

On the other end of the spectrum we have open multiculturalist option of widely opening the doors, and demanding minimum of integration. Our Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model finds its place at this end of spectrum. So, what would cosmopolitanism look like in actual practice in our world, marked by the rise of right-wing populism and refugee crisis?[7] Our Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model suggests the following: The moral and political issues raised in this new context concern first and foremost the duties to "strangers at our doors" or at least "close to our doors" (literally or metaphorically), and these duties and the awareness of them are the first step in a cosmopolitan but realistic direction. We have argued that the correct immediate cosmopolitan answer to populist threat is the samaritan one: accept refugees, organize decent life for them, and prove that they are not the threat to "us".

Thus Cosmopolitanism has to start now as "Samaritan" cosmopolitanism, openness to and engagement for the close and present strangers. This can be done within one's national state and it connects both the within-state activism and its cosmopolitan counterpart. The contrast is familiar from Ypi's book, but is not as stark as we might fear. The initial empathetic reaction connects the local to the (once)

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[7] See Nowicka and Rovisco (2009). It is concerned with cosmopolitanism "as a practice which is apparent in things that people do and say to positively engage with 'the otherness of the other' and the oneness of the world" and with "cosmopolitanism as a moral ideal" (Nowicka and Rovisco 2009: 2) having to do, among other things, with "the possibility of a more just threat and the refugee crisis".

distant strangers. Once the present urgent problems are on the way to be solved, we should turn our attention to deeper causes of the crisis. These causes are the evils traditionally discussed by cosmopolitan authors, from dramatic North-South inequalities, to exploitation and warmongering done by the richest countries. The initial Samaritan motivation naturally leads to attention to deeper issues, and toward a more ideal cosmopolitan considerations, both in theory and in practice.

At the second-order level, I have proposed a connection between the initial empathetic sentiment that is rational and fitting in the circumstances of strangers-at-our-doors, and the subsequent process of reasoning, contractualist process of justifying the cosmopolitan global-justice proposal to parties concerned. The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model and its sentimentalist-plus-contractualist interpretation fit well with Ypi's engagement with the principle/activism divide, and offers a way of understanding, and hopefully, overcoming it. Its second-order counterpart, going from empathy to mutual justification could offer a definitive understanding of the principles-activism connection, crucial for Ypi's project.

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