

## Introduction

*The present issue is dedicated to the Philosophy of Art conference that has been taking place annually at the Interuniversity Centre Dubrovnik since 2012. Initiated by David Davies, a McGill based philosopher whose ties to the region and to the IUC have been firmly established via his role as one of directors of Philosophy of Science conference, the Philosophy of Art brings together philosophers of art and aestheticians from Europe and North America, mostly but not exclusively of analytic bent. This is the first issue of any journal dedicated entirely to this conference, and it is the first time that Croatian Journal of Philosophy has opened itself fully to papers dealing with art and art-related issues. It is our hope that many more are coming.*

David Davies in his “Making Sense of Popular Art” engages with Noel Carroll’s account of mass art, by raising the question of whether some or all works of ‘mass art’ in Carroll’s sense are rightly thought of as works of mass art, rather than as non-artistic mass artifacts. As Davies argues, there isn’t a prior conception of what it is for something to be an artwork which allows us to take some things satisfying this conception to have the further property of being ‘popular’. Therefore, what we need is a way of distinguishing different senses in which artworks might be described as ‘popular’, and, different senses in which artifacts might be described as being ‘art’. Davies’ strategy is to bring into a discussion what he calls a neo-Goodmanian approach (defended in his forthcoming monograph *How artworks work*), ultimately claiming that while the neo-Goodmanian can embrace artworks that are ‘popular’ in the sense of being targeted at a wide audience, she should insist that there cannot be artworks that meet all of Carroll’s requirements for being ‘mass art’.

In his contribution, “Aesthetic and Artistic Verdicts” James R. Hamilton calls for a distinction between the two kinds of verdicts. As he argues, aesthetic verdicts are reflections of the kinds of things we prefer and take pleasure in while artistic are reflections of other judgments we make about the kinds of achievements that are made in works of art. He defends an ‘achievement model’, as an alternative to the ‘ideal critics’ model and to the model that appeals to our preferences regarding works of art. His account is bolstered by theoretical discussions on what counts as an achievement developed in literature on well-being.

Stephen Snyder, in his “Artistic Conversations: Artworks and Personhood” engages with Arthur Danto’s account of the human person and the notion of embodied meaning employed in Danto’s definition of the artwork. Central is the claim that the “artworld” itself manifests prop-

erties that are an imprint of the historical representation of the “world” which is implicitly embodied in the artist’s style. The “world” that is stamped on the people of a historical period entails a point of view, similarly to the logic that guides a conversation. This “conversational” logic is also extant in the artworks that artists of a given period create. On Snyder’s view, this analysis of Danto’s account of how people are connected to their world clarifies Danto’s assertions of a parallel structure of personification in the artwork and the human, and his claims that artworks themselves appear to be in a kind of dialogue.

In “Art History without Theory: A Case Study in 20th Century Scholarship” Deodáth Zuh discusses the case study from 1950s Hungary, centered on Lajos Fülep’s review on the doctoral thesis of Hungarian Renaissance scholar, Jolán Balogh. This case is an initiative to reflect on the status of research programmes in art historical practice. Zuh aims to show that art history’s need for theory remains relevant as the process of research advances, and to argue that a ‘theory-unaware’ history of art would fail to reconstruct how different art-making individuals conceived of aesthetic properties. As he argues, the work of an art historian who does not pursue a research programme might lack coherence and resonance. Further issues raised in this contribution relate to the question of whether in the case of art, internal-normative history is governed by the problem of aesthetic value and whether the external-empirical history could be only formulated in these terms.

David Collins’s contribution, “Aesthetic Possibilities of Cinematic Improvisation” targets the scepticism regarding the artistic potential or the possibility of films being improvised artworks. Collins argues that it is conceptually possible for many elements of the filmmaking process to be performed in an improvisatory manner, and shows how a number of existing films and filmmaking practices provide examples of the realization of such possibilities. He analyzes these films and takes them to show that improvisation by filmmakers can enhance the aesthetic or artistic value of a film, including their artistic potential. In addition, Collins considers several social and ethical implications of improvisatory approaches to filmmaking, and to art in general.

Adam Anderzeyewski unites theoretical discussions of crime genre with the aesthetics of food in his contribution “Tasting the Truth: The Role of Food and Gustatory Knowledge in Hannibal”. The essay is a detailed and meticulous analysis of the famous television series, which Anderzeyewski uses to develop an alternative model to classical epistemology of detective fiction centered on vision and deduction. This new model is built upon gustatory knowledge that takes the central stage in the world orchestrated by Dr. Lector.

James O. Young’s paper “Literary Fiction and the Cultivation of Virtue” brings together theoretical presuppositions of some philosophers, the view that engagements with literature can make people more virtuous, and some most recent empirical findings supporting this view. Three

*claims in particular are discussed: entering imaginatively into the lives of the fictional characters increases empathy; reading literary fiction promotes self-reflection; and readers mimic the prosocial behaviour of fictional characters. However, as Young argues in the second part, there is no guarantee that in reading literary fiction, readers will not mimic antisocial behaviour and thus become morally corrupted.*

*Britt Harrison, in her contribution, "Introducing Cinematic Humanism: A Solution to the Problem of Cinematic Cognitivism" develops an approach to film she calls 'philosophy of film without theory'. Harrison's aims are twofold: first, to develop a 'cinematic humanism', an approach to film that emphasizes its capacity to illuminate the human condition; and second, to show that such an approach cannot be defended within what traditionally seems its natural framework, namely cinematic cognitivism. The focus of Harrison's contribution is a historical reconstruction of the notion of cognitive, for which the author claims has become ambiguous and theory-laden, mostly due to Noam Chomsky's work. Consequently, to appeal to anything cognitive in our research program is problematic.*

*An alternative way of thinking about narrative art's capacity to shed light on the human condition is presented in the final contribution. Iris Vidmar, in her "Literature and truth – revisiting Stolnitz's anti-cognitivism" defends a theoretical account of literary cognitivism, a view according to which literature is cognitively valuable. Vidmar addresses Stolnitz's famous article "On the Cognitive Triviality of Art", countering its claims by findings from contemporary epistemology. Vidmar argues that testimony is the underlying mechanism via which the cognitive transfer between literary works and readers take place, and goes on to show that contemporary epistemology is more embracive of the cognitive values traditionally awarded to literature.*

IRIS VIDMAR