Making Sense of 'Popular Art'

DAVID DAVIES
McGill University, Montreal, Canada

The aims of this paper are twofold: first, to identify a sense of 'popular art' in which the question, 'can there be popular art?' is interesting and the answer to this question is not obvious; second, to propose and defend a challenging but attractive answer to this question: challenging in that it draws some distinctions we might not initially be inclined to draw, and attractive in offering a productive way of thinking about the ontology, epistemology, and axiology of the kinds of artifacts proposed as examples of 'popular art'. I take the 'interesting' question to be whether, given a way of distinguishing artworks from other kinds of artifacts, there can be artworks that meet the conditions set out by Noel Carroll for what he terms 'mass art'. I sketch a way of thinking about the distinction between artworks and other artifacts—what I term the neo-Goodmanian approach—and then explore the implications of the neo-Goodmanian approach for the existence of 'popular art', and vice versa. In so doing, I subsume these issues under a more general problem for the neo-Goodmanian—what I term the problem of 'fast art'. I argue that, while the neo-Goodmanian can embrace artworks that are 'popular' in the sense of being targeted at a wide audience, she should insist that there cannot be artworks that meet all of Carroll's requirements for being 'mass art'.

Keywords: Popular art, 'mass art', popular music, 'fast art', neo-Goodmanian aesthetics, the 'functional artwork' problem.

1. *Aims and structure*

My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I want to identify a sense of 'popular art' in which the question, 'can there be popular art and if so under what circumstances?' is interesting and the answer to this question is not obvious. Second, I want to propose and defend a challenging but attractive answer to this question: challenging in that it draws some distinctions we might not initially be inclined to draw, and attractive in offering a productive way of thinking about the ontology, epistemology, and axiology of the kinds of artifacts proposed as exam-

ples of 'popular art'. I begin by distinguishing the sense of 'popular art' of interest to me from other senses of the term. I further suggest that the 'high art/low art' and 'art/not art' distinctions are attempts to answer different questions. I then introduce a way of thinking about the distinction between artworks and other artifacts that I have proposed elsewhere. In the remainder of the paper, I explore the implications of this conception of artworks for the nature and existence of 'popular art' in the designated sense.

2. *Making sense of 'popular art': What is the question?*

The term 'popular art' (or sometimes 'popular culture') is usually employed to pick out what is taken to be an accepted extension, rather than by reference to an accepted meaning for the term, or of the unit terms that it comprises. This supposed extension, furthermore, is not usually understood as a subset of a wider set whose members are taken to satisfy accepted conditions for being art. Unlike 'point-and-shoot' cameras, we do not have a prior conception of what it is for something to be an artwork which allows us to take some things satisfying this conception to have the further property of being 'popular'. To arrive at a well-defined and interesting question that we can proceed to explore, therefore, we must start by distinguishing different senses in which artworks might be described as 'popular', and, indeed, different senses in which artifacts might be described as being 'art'.

There are artifacts that are indisputably artworks and that are also 'popular' in the sense of *being liked or admired by many people*. Examples might include Leonardo's *Mona Lisa*, Vivaldi's *The Four Seasons*, and Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*. Equally uncontroversially, there are presumed artworks whose creators *intended* that they be popular in the sense of being liked or admired by many people. This might be the case with at least some of the first set of examples, but it would also apply more widely to artifacts with artistic pretensions aimed at a mass audience. Less obvious, however, is whether an artifact can be an artwork if it is intended for appreciation by a wide audience *in virtue of not requiring*, in those targeted, the kinds of cognitive or perceptual skills normally employed in our appreciative engagement with artworks. Such artifacts fit Noel Carroll's definition of what he terms 'mass art'. A mass artwork, according to Carroll, "is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for example, its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences" (Carroll 1998: 196).

The question I want to ask in this paper is whether some or all works of 'mass art' in Carroll's sense are rightly thought of as works of mass *art*, rather than as non-artistic mass *artifacts*. Note that something's being designed so as to be able to fulfil its assigned function for

the widest possible number of consumers by not requiring refined cognitive or more broadly perceptual skills normally does not prevent that thing from being an artifact of a given kind. A 'point-and-shoot' camera is still a camera, a 'large-print' information sheet in a museum is still an information sheet, and a self-described 'dummy-proof' income-tax programme is still an income-tax programme. Why, then, might being maximally accessible in virtue of requiring minimal cognitive or perceptual skills in a competent receiver disqualify something from being an artwork? There are no reasons to think that the conditions something must satisfy to qualify as a camera, a museum information sheet, or an income tax programme make any reference to the specific cognitive or perceptual skills required in the target audience, other than certain linguistic skills. But in the absence of some prior grasp of what conditions must be satisfied for something to qualify as an artwork, we cannot draw a parallel lesson in the case of 'popular art'. Our task is to see if there are indeed any good reasons to think that, given the most plausible account of the conditions for being an artwork, these conditions bear materially on the possibility of something's being 'mass art' in Carroll's sense.

First, however, we must say something about a couple of other distinctions in the neighbourhood. Consider the distinction sometimes drawn between 'high art' and 'low art', usually in terms of differences in the *intended functions* of artifacts. High art, it might be said, aims at edification, moral improvement, and cognitive insight, whereas low art aims at entertainment, pleasurable experience, and distraction from worldly cares. The high art/low art distinction, so conceived, relates to whether a work is intended to promote 'higher' human capacities and interests, or 'lower' human capacities and interests. On the other hand, those who make a distinction between that which *is* art and that which *is not* art assume that there is a principled difference between artworks and other artifacts. In principle, the two distinctions are orthogonal to one another. A sermon might be an example of high non-art, while Egon Schiele's pornographic drawings commissioned to speak to the baser natures of patrons might exemplify low art.

But can we draw such a principled distinction between artworks and non-artistic artifacts? There are reasons embedded in our linguistic and non-linguistic practice to think that intuitively, at least, we draw such a distinction. We resist saying that *all* artifacts, or even all artifacts with aesthetic properties intended to perceptually or cognitively engage an audience—such as cars, televisions, clothes, and cereal packages—are artworks. We also resist saying that any artifact that employs what are *recognized artistic media* is art. It is true that, as Larry Shiner (1994) has noted, there *is* a *broad* sense of 'art' in which what primary school children do with paint and brushes in art class is art. But this 'broad' usage seems restricted to cases where the predominant use of a medium is artistic, as it is with the kinds of materials

standardly used in art-painting (as opposed to those standardly used in house painting), and we do not speak here of *works* of art, save occasionally in an evaluative sense. There is no analogous temptation to say that the vast majority of holiday photographs, or home movies of family events, are, in a broad sense, art. Similar considerations would deny most linguistic artifacts status as (works of) literary art, even in a broad sense. Music and dance are interesting cases: most uses of musical instruments result in events that are 'art' in this broad sense, but not works of art, whereas social dance is rarely thought of as art at all in spite of its expressive elements.

These reflections put us in a better position to clarify what is philosophically interesting about the artistic status of Carroll's 'mass art'. If by 'art' we mean art in the *broad* sense identified by Shiner, then Carroll's works of 'mass art' are probably art, but, as we just saw, this doesn't make them 'works of art'. But the broad sense of 'art' is not of any obvious philosophical interest. Shiner himself, discussing debates over the artistic status of artifacts used in African and other non-Western cultures, argues that those involved in such debates often fail to properly distinguish the broad sense of 'art' from 'high art' and fallaciously infer, from the existence of 'art' in the broad sense in such cultures, to their possessing works of high art. But the question whether works of 'mass art' are works of *high* art is no more philosophically interesting than the question whether they are art in the broad sense. For in this case the answer is presumably negative: works of 'mass art', if they *are* works of art, will generally be works of low art. As may now be clear, if there is a philosophically interesting question pertaining to the status of 'mass art' as art, it is one we can raise only if we first offer some kind of principled distinction between artifacts that are works of art—a class taken to comprise both high and low art—and artifacts that are not works of art. How such a principled distinction might best be drawn is the subject of the next section.

3. *Artworks and other artifacts: The 'functional artwork' problem*

If we seek a way of distinguishing artworks from other artifacts that might aid us in assessing the idea of 'popular art' or 'mass art' in Carroll's sense, a useful strategy is to consider what may be termed the 'functional artwork problem'. It is clear that there are visual and verbal creations widely viewed as being works of art that have as their primary intended function the promotion of some instrumental end. Obvious examples are early Renaissance religious paintings such as the devotional works of Perugino (see Baxandall 1988), drawings by Schiele and Klimt executed to serve the pornographic interests of patrons, and art intended to promote a political end such as later works by Lyubov Popova, Eisenstein's *October*, and Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the*

Will. What conditions must be met if such artifacts are to be correctly viewed as artworks, while other artifacts with the same kind of instrumental primary intended function—sermons, pornographic drawings in male washrooms, and Nazi anti-semitic films—are not? The 'functional artwork problem' is the problem of accounting for the artistic status of some, but not all, artifacts with a given instrumental primary intended function.

It has generally been assumed that an answer to the functional artwork problem follows unproblematically from a consideration of artifacts whose primary intended function *is* an artistic one—that is, artifacts created with the primary intention that they be appreciated *as* artworks. The assumption here is that what makes artifacts with an instrumental primary intended function artworks is that they have an artistic *secondary* intended function—that is, that, whatever their primary intended function may be, their makers also intended that they be appreciated as artworks. Where theorists of such a mind differ is over what 'being appreciated as an artwork' itself requires, and thus over what must be intended by the maker if the resulting artifact is to be an artwork. Is this a matter, for example, of (i) intentionally possessing certain kinds of manifest 'aesthetic' qualities (e.g. Beardsley 1983), (ii) being intended for consumption within a particular kind of institutional context (e.g. Dickie 1974), or (ii) being intended for the kind of (artistic) regard accorded to those things already accepted as artworks (Levinson 1979)?

The idea that artworks are artifacts produced with the primary or secondary intention that they be appreciated *as* artworks is the residual legacy of 19th century assumptions about the autonomy of art, and more particularly of the otherwise discredited idea of 'art for art's sake' (on the latter, see Wilcox 1953). But it is difficult to reconcile this idea not only with much pre-nineteenth century Western art but also with the widely shared belief that the extension of our concept of art comprises many artifacts produced in cultures historically and culturally remote from our own where the idea of art as an autonomous practice seems to have no hold. This motivates seeking a different kind of answer to the functional artwork problem. I have proposed elsewhere, as the basis for such an answer, what I have termed the 'neo-Goodmanian approach' (Davies 2011: chapter 1). This, I have suggested, offers an alternative account of the arthood of canonical artworks that unproblematically extends to putative artworks whose primary intended function is instrumental. I shall not defend this approach here,[1] but shall briefly sketch its principal claims and then assess its bearing upon Carroll's notion of 'mass art'.

The central claim of the neo-Goodmanian approach is that artworks differ from other artifacts in that they require *a particular kind of re-*

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[1] I defend this approach in the monograph provisionally titled *The Workings of Art* that I am currently completing.

gard on the part of the receiver in virtue of *how they are intended to perform whatever primary intended function they have*, whether artistic or instrumental. This approach draws on Richard Wollheim's talk (1980) of a kind of regard for which artworks call, and Nelson Goodman's talk (1968, 1978) of 'symptoms of the aesthetic' that characterise the ways in which artworks function as symbols.

Wollheim's notion of a distinctively artistic kind of regard should not be confused with the notion of 'artistic regard' central to Jerrold Levinson's 'historical definition of art'. Levinson (1979) claims that 'what it is to correctly regard an artwork varies both synchronically and diachronically. Nevertheless, we can define what it is for an artefact to be an artwork in terms of its maker's intention, opaquely or transparently construed, that the artefact be regarded in a way that is a correct way of regarding those things already accepted as artworks.' But Levinson's notion of 'artistic regard' is tied to the idea that artworks are artifacts whose makers intend them to be appreciated *as artworks*, not to the idea that a particular kind of regard is necessary for works to perform whatever primary intended function they may have. In a later paper he writes: "It is a necessary condition for something to be an artwork that its maker intends that receivers take an 'artistic interest' in the artistic vehicle—an interest in 'the way content is embodied in form, the way medium has been employed to convey content'" (Levinson 2005: 232)

Wollheim, on the other hand, speaks of 'artistic regard' in responding to 'aesthetic attitude' theories of what is required for the experiential appreciation of artworks (Wollheim 1980: 91–98). Perhaps the most discussed such theory involves Jerome Stolnitz's distinction (1992) between two kinds of perception, 'practical perception' and 'aesthetic perception'. He characterizes the latter as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone" (Stolnitz 1992: 10). Wollheim responds that, if talk of the 'aesthetic attitude' is to contribute to our understanding of artworks, it must be defined in terms of a kind of 'regard' proper to artworks and only derivatively applied to things we take to be non-art. The 'regard' called for by something taken to be an artistic manifold is addressed to an entity taken to have the following distinctive qualities:

1)   It is an artifact, whose details ('form') must be seen as organized for some purpose. An artistic manifold calls, therefore, for an 'interrogative' exploration—one that seeks to make sense of the manifold in terms of reasons for its being ordered in the way that it is.

2)   It is historically situated, thus requiring that the purposiveness found in the details be a purpose reasonably ascribed in light of the historical context of the making.

Wollheim further claims that "it is part of the spectator's attitude to art that he should adopt *this* attitude towards the work: that he should make it the object of an ever-increasing or deepening attention," so that

more and more of the properties of the art object "may become incorporated into its aesthetic nature." (Wollheim 1980: 123)

Wollheim suggests that "if we want to test any hypothesis about the spectator's attitude to artworks, it would be instructive to take cases where there is something that is a work of art which is habitually not regarded as one, and which we then at a certain moment come to see as one" (1980: 120). Applying Wollheim's suggestion to such works as Yvonne Rainer's *Room Service*, I have identified (2011: chapter 1) the following distinctive features of the regard for which artworks call:

1)   *Close attention* to the fine details of the artistic vehicle is necessary if we are to correctly determine the content articulated,

2)   Artistic vehicles often serve to *exemplify* some of their properties,

3)   Many of the *different properties* of the vehicle contribute to the articulation of content, and finally

4)   The vehicle not only serves a number of distinct articulatory functions, but does so in a '*hierarchical*' manner, where 'higher level' content is articulated through lower level content.

These seem to be the features characterised in more technical terms by Goodman as what he terms the 'symptoms of the aesthetic'. The latter are identified as:

1)   'syntactic density'—where the finest differences in certain respects between characters is a difference in symbols.

2)   'semantic density'—where symbols are provided for things distinguished by the finest differences in certain respects.

3)   'exemplification', where a symbol symbolizes by serving as a sample of properties it literally or metaphorically possesses,

4)   'relative repleteness'—where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, and

5)   'multiple or complex reference'. (Goodman 1968: 252–55; Goodman 1978: 67–68)

According to the neo-Goodmanian account, artworks differ from other artifacts that involve content articulated through vehicles—e.g. road signs, everyday uses of ordinary language—in virtue of the ways in which they articulate the contents bearing upon the performance of their primary intended functions, whatever those functions may be. This is a matter of being intended to function as an 'aesthetic symbol' in Goodman's sense. It is in virtue of these distinctive ways of articulating content that artworks must be regarded in a distinctive way. To adopt the 'aesthetic attitude' (in Wollheim's sense) to an artistic vehicle is to engage in an interrogative exploration of that vehicle constrained by a knowledge of its history of making, in the interest of grasping a specific artistic content articulated 'aesthetically', as characterised by Goodman. There is no need for the maker to intend that we take an *artistic interest* in Levinson's sense in the artifact, even if it *is* necessary that

we take such an interest if we are to *critically appreciate* the artifact as an artwork (on the relevant notion of 'critical appreciation' here, see section V below).

A notion introduced by Levinson (2005) in arguing against the possibility of pornographic art is helpful here. Levinson acknowledges that the most difficult cases for his account are cases of what he terms 'artful pornography', where artistic means are used to further pornographic ends. For the neo-Goodmanian, however, it is through being 'artful' in a neo-Goodmanian way—through articulating the content that bears upon an artifact's primary intended function 'aesthetically' in Goodman's sense[2]—that something qualifies as an artwork. This generalizes from artifacts with a primary intended pornographic function to artifacts with the other kinds of instrumental primary intended functions discussed earlier in setting out the 'functional artwork' problem. For the neo-Goodmanian, a 'functional artwork' is an *artwork* in virtue of being 'artful' in this sense. To illustrate this idea, consider Matthew Kieran's defence (2001) of the artistic status of the pornographic drawings of Klimt and Rodin. He says of some of Rodin's nude drawings:

> In such drawings we have an emphasis on compositional and design elements, some of which are a striking deviation from classical nude studies, in order to evoke sexual stimulation by sexually explicit means... The specifically artistically innovative developments in Rodin's line drawing enabled him to characterize the lines of action, sexual embraces, and actions in a more athletic, impulsive, vigorous manner which enhances the evocation of sexual arousal. (Kieran 2001: 37)

And he describes the 'artful' nature of Klimt's erotic drawings as follows:

> Formal artistic techniques are deployed in a highly imaginative manner in order to emphasize explicitly sexual parts, features, actions, and states—including the use of extreme close-up views, foreshortening, exaggerated perspective, distortions of posture and proportion, shifts in framing, heightened contrasts between right-angles and curves of the body. The effect is not only beautiful in terms of the grace of line drawing and structural composition, but serves to draw attention to sexual features such as the genitals, breasts, buttocks and open legs. Furthermore, these formal artistic techniques are used to emphasize our awareness of the states of sexual absorption, sensual pleasure, or languid sexuality represented. (Kieran 2001: 39–40)

4. *Neo-Goodmanian aesthetics and the problem of 'Fast Art'*

What kind of account can we give of 'popular art' or 'mass art', as conceived by Carroll, if we subscribe to the neo-Goodmanian account of what it is for an artifact to be an artwork? In a number of places

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[2] But being 'artful' in using traditional aesthetic properties for such a purpose is another matter. For this kind of approach, see Stephen Davies's claim (2006) that artworks are artifacts that possess 'functional beauty'.

(Davies 2004: 16–23; Davies 2009; Davies 2017) I have defended what I term the 'pragmatic principle' as a general principle for assessing claims about the nature of art:

> Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly ascribed to what are termed 'works' in our reflective critical and appreciative practice; that are individuated in the way such 'works' are or would be individuated, and that have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to 'works,' in that practice. (Davies 2004: 18)

This instantiates, in the case of the arts, the more general idea that the philosopher's task in dealing with a human practice is to seek a conceptual framework in terms of which to think about that practice, a framework to be assessed in terms of how it helps us to achieve the proper goals of, and make best sense of, that practice. The suggestion above was that the neo-Goodmanian account of the artistic status of certain artifacts is better placed to answer the 'functional artwork' problem than accounts grounded in the aestheticist tradition, and might thereby explain the artistic status of certain artifacts from cultures not historically continuous with our own, and the possibility and scope of artworks in our own cultural tradition with religious, pornographic, or propagandist primary intended functions.

But if a principal desideratum for any tractable account of how artworks differ from other artifacts is that it make sense of the kinds of distinctions that we make in our artistic practice, then the *inability* to account for 'mass art' in Carroll's sense might be seen as a major problem for the neo-Goodmanian. And it takes only a little reflection to see that the neo-Goodmanian conception of art and Carroll's definition of 'mass art' are in tension if not in outright contradiction. Carroll's 'mass art' is perhaps the most obvious example of a larger phenomenon that we might call 'fast art'. I take the latter term from Tom Wolfe who, in *The Painted Word*, writes about the mid-1960's pursuit of 'fast art' by American 'minimalist' painters. Minimalist art 'theory', reacting against 'emotional evocations' in the works of the abstract expressionists and their successors, dictated that "paint should be applied only in hard linear geometries, and you should get the whole painting at once, 'fast' to use the going phrase" (Wolfe 1975: 99). Kenneth Noland, Wolfe claims, was known as 'the fastest painter in the business'. 'Fast', here, does not refer to the time it takes to create a painting, but to the time it takes to 'get' one.

The category of 'fast' art, in Wolfe's sense, generalizes to a wider class of works whose makers also seemingly aim to produce an immediate effect on the receiver. Some works, it might be said, are designed to shock, awe, or surprise the receiver, or overwhelm her with delight—Damien Hirst's notorious 'shark' piece might be cited as an example of the former phenomenon. Carroll, as noted above, seems to define 'mass art' in terms of being 'fast' in this sense, being easy for anyone to access without either specialised knowledge or detailed engagement.

A mass artwork, we may recall, 'is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for example, its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences' (Carroll 1998: 196). Generalizing from Carroll's characterisation of mass art, we may take the 'fastness' of an artwork to be a matter of the kind of *cognitive effort* required to 'get' the work rather than of the total amount of *time* that this takes.

The neo-Goodmanian maintains that what distinguishes artworks from other artifacts is the distinctive manner in which they are *intended* to articulate those contents that bear upon their primary intended functions. (This intentional dimension of the neo-Goodmanian account is one way in which it departs from Goodman's own view.) Artworks, it is claimed, whatever their primary or even secondary intended functions, call for a more careful, cognitively sophisticated kind of regard than non-artistic artifacts, a regard sensitive to subtle differences between artistic vehicles, exemplificational roles their constitutive features may play, and the internally sophisticated structuring of contentful elements in the interests of the higher-order aims of the work. But this seems to distinguish artworks from non-artistic artifacts precisely in terms of the 'cognitive effort' on the part of the receiver required to 'get' those contentful properties of an artifact bearing on the performance of its primary intended function. To the extent that an artefact is 'fast' in the prescribed sense, the neo-Goodmanian view seems to entail that it is not an artwork. So, if there are indeed things generally viewed as artworks that are 'fast', it seems that we must conclude either (a) that we are wrong in taking them to be artworks, or (b) that the neo-Goodmanian view of the artwork/non-artistic artifact distinction is misguided. Since the putative works in question seem to differ from other unquestioned works only in degree—in how much 'cognitive effort' is required to 'get' them—rather than in kind, the first option seems unattractive. The onus is therefore on the neo-Goodmanian to show how her account can accommodate such 'fast' works. Accommodating Carroll's 'mass art' seems to be one of the more significant instances of this problem.

The problem of 'fast art', we should note, consists in a *modal* claim grounded in some putative actual examples. The claim is that there *can* be fast works, and the works cited are actual examples that might be taken to establish this possibility. The formulation of the problem therefore does not entail that neo-Goodmanian interpretive skills are irrelevant to the appreciation of (at least some) artworks. The more limited challenge posed by the possibility of 'fast' artworks is that it seems that such scrutiny is not *necessary* in all cases to 'get' an artwork. At least some artworks, it seems, are intended to articulate their contents in a non-Goodmanian manner.

5. *The problem of 'Fast Art':*
Two neo-Goodmanian strategies

Our examples of 'fast art' include both works of 'popular art' and certain works of late modern (Noland) and post-modern (Hirst) art. In accordance with the pragmatic principle, I take the artistic status of the latter examples as deniable only if there are strong (and non-question begging) reasons to do so. However, I take the status of 'popular art' as a whole to be open to question, for reasons to be given below. For this reason it will be helpful to begin with the works by Noland and Hirst. If we can provide an account of such artworks in neo-Goodmanian terms, we can then see to what extent the same kind of account might apply to at least some works of 'popular art'. This might provide us with a principled way of drawing at least a rough distinction between those 'popular' artifacts that are rightly included in the domain of artworks and other 'popular' artifacts whose claim for inclusion therein is open to question or even to outright denial.

In an initial consideration of neo-Goodmanian aesthetics some years ago, I presented the neo-Goodmanian account in a way that would, as a matter of act, provide an easy and conclusive solution to the problem of 'fast art' (Davies 2004: chapter 10). The proposal was to finesse the traditional distinction between 'functional' and 'procedural' definitions of art (see Stephen Davies 1991) by distinguishing artworks from other artifacts in terms of both functional and procedural considerations:

> An artwork... articulates a content through a vehicle via an 'artistic medium', a system of articulatory understandings in a system of the artworld... An artworld system is a system whose articulatory understandings facilitate the articulation of content through vehicles that perform symbolic functions that are 'aesthetic' in Goodman's sense. 'Artwork' is defined procedurally, by reference to a performance that intentionally draws upon an established system of articulatory understandings, and functionally in that it is by reference to the facilitating of a particular kind of symbolic functioning that a system of articulatory understandings counts as an artistic medium. (Davies 2004: 253)

This proposal aims at a perhaps implausible marriage between 'institutional' theories of art and Goodman's resolutely anti-institutionalist idea that something is an artwork when it performs certain distinctive kinds of symbolic functions (for Goodman's terse dismissal of institutional theories of art, see Goodman 1978: 66). The proposal would serve our current purposes in allowing for there to be artworks that were not themselves neo-Goodmanian symbols (thus allowing for fast art) as long as they employ shared understandings that count as an artistic medium in virtue of fostering neo-Goodmanian forms of symbolisation. The proposal also preserves something that is important both to 'institutional' theories of art (e.g. Dickie (1974) and Danto (1981), albeit in very different ways) and to Levinson's 'historical definition' of art (1979)—the idea of art as a historical practice to which an artifact's

history of making must stand in a certain relation if that artifact is to be an artwork. Danto's artworld has an essential historical dimension, Dickie's artistic practices are historically construed, and Levinson insists that artworks must essentially involve and not merely follow upon past art. But it is precisely this feature of such accounts that renders them parochial. For what is distinctive of artifacts produced in practices outside of our own cultural tradition is that they *don't* stand in such a historical relation to that tradition and therefore, it would seem, cannot qualify as artistic.[3] And this is one reason why such theories cannot provide an adequate response to the 'functional artwork' problem.

Will the above understanding of the neo-Goodmanian account face the same difficulties? It might be thought that this problem presents itself only if we restrict the relevant 'artistic practices' to our own, or to others that mimic them. Why can't the neo-Goodmanian take practices in other cultures to be artistic because of the kinds of symbolic expression they permit or foster, and then make the move canvassed above to allow for equivalents of 'fast art'? While this move is tempting, there is, I think, good reason to resist it: this construal of the neo-Goodmanian view is too permissive. For example, it would make ordinary holiday photos works of art unless we are able to identify some features of photographic practice that are constitutive of the 'artistic medium' of photography. But, even if we are able to do this, how can we justify the idea that these features are being 'used' tacitly in some artifacts whose contents do *not* make use of them ('fast' works of photographic art) but not in others that equally do not make use of them in articulating their contents (ordinary holiday snaps)?

A better strategy for the neo-Goodmanian, I think, is (1) to preserve the idea that it is the neo-Goodmanian manner in which an artifact articulates the contents bearing upon the performance of its primary intended function that makes it an artwork—this can avoid the 'parochialism' confronting institutional theories in the broad sense, but (2) to seek a way of accommodating, as artworks so conceived, those apparently 'fast' artifacts whose artistic status it is difficult to deny. Adopting this strategy, we should begin with a word that has thus far been allowed to stand unexplicated in setting up the problem of 'fast art'. I have talked about what is required to 'get' an artwork, where this word presumably functions as a vernacular term for what is involved in the *appreciation* of a work as art. But, we may now note, talk of 'appreciating' an artwork is open to different interpretations. And, if we are to assess the challenge that the problem of 'fast art' poses to the neo-Goodmanian account, it is important that these interpretations are distinguished.

We can begin by setting aside one sense of 'appreciation'—which we may term 'normative appreciation'—that has no bearing on our cur-

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[3] Levinson's acceptance (1979) of 'transparently' construed intended artistic regards only slightly ameliorates the problem by allowing for art outside our own traditions as long as it involves shared understandings that as a matter of act mirror some of our own.

rent concerns. In this sense, to appreciate some entity is to like it, to find it enjoyable, or to find it valuable. In this sense, I may appreciate something you have done for me, or a particular experience I have had. We can talk in this way about artworks—I may (or may not) *really* appreciate the songs of a particular singer or paintings by a particular artist—but the senses of 'appreciate' of interest to us in the present context do not, I think, carry any such determinate normative valence. They relate to various activities that enter into our experiential engagements with the artistic vehicles of artworks, activities that may indeed lead us to appreciate those works in a normative sense but that in themselves are only a precursor to normative appreciation.

With this in mind, let me first distinguish between what I shall term 'primary' and 'secondary' appreciation. Both relate to the particular kind of *experiential response* to an artistic vehicle that the creator of an artwork wishes to produce in fashioning that vehicle in a particular manner. Artworks, we might say, are artifacts that are designed to be 'experience machines'.[4] The production of a particular kind of experience in receivers is the means whereby the work is intended to fulfil its intended function(s). 'Primary' and 'secondary' appreciation are two analytically separable dimensions of this experiential response.

Take first primary appreciation. With a representational painting, or a photograph, or a film, for example, the maker intends that the receiver see certain things—people, objects, or events—presented in a certain way in the visual array. In reading a novel, the maker intends that the reader imaginatively engage with a sequence of events narrated by the text. In listening to a piece of music, it is intended that we apprehend a series of sonic events as making up a larger sound sequence in which the comprised events stand in sonic relationships to one another. If the receiver is to 'get' the artistic manifold presented in her experiential engagement with an artistic vehicle in this 'primary' sense', she must to some extent defer to the manifold, allowing it affect her in certain ways. 'Getting' a work in this way is at least part of what is required to determine any work's artistic content, and is therefore a necessary condition for a work's fulfilling for a given receiver whatever primary intended function it has. However, even if primary appreciation is a matter of letting the artistic vehicle work on us, being so affected by the work will count as a *correct* primary appreciation of the work only if we bring to our encounter with the artistic vehicle relevant kinds of perceptual and conceptual skills and competencies.

Primary appreciation is experientially interwoven with our parallel attempts to 'get' the work in a further sense—to grasp and appreciate what we take to be reasons for the elements being ordered in the way that they are. This is what makes our engagement with the perceptual or conceptual manifold presented by a work's artistic vehicle 'interrog-

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[4] I gesture here towards William Seeley (2011) who, drawing on Mark Rollins (2004), speaks of artworks as 'attentional engines': attention is in such cases a precondition for producing a particular kind of experience.

ative'. We are involved in an ongoing, partly pre-conscious, process of making sense of the manifold by experiencing it as structured in hierarchical ways, where parts derive their sense from the places we assign them in the evolving whole. The 'sense' we make of the artistic manifold should not be confused with the work's primary intended function. The 'sense' of the manifold is, rather, what unifies those contents articulated through the work's artistic vehicle in such a way that, in virtue of having this 'sense', the work can perform its primary intended function. '*Secondary appreciation*', as we may call this, is a matter of 'getting' a work not only through being aware of its first-order artistic content, but also through ascribing to it a higher-order 'sense' as a function of its first order content.

'Primary' and 'secondary' appreciation are analytically separable but empirically fused dimensions of the experiential engagement with a work's artistic vehicle through which the work is intended by its maker(s) to fulfil its primary intended function. But we also use the term 'appreciation' in a way that bears not on the experiences that artworks are designed to generate in order to achieve their intended functions, but on our assessments and evaluations of the works themselves as 'experience machines'. 'Appreciation' here is not internal to what artworks are designed to do, but requires a distancing from the latter, while still involving an experiential engagement with the artistic vehicle. Here is where we will tend to talk about properly appreciating an artwork *as an artwork*. What the latter is taken to require is an interest not merely in grasping the lower- and higher-order content, articulated through a work's artistic vehicle, that bears upon the performance of its primary intended function, but also in how the artist has *used* a particular artistic medium in articulating that content. '*Tertiary appreciation*' of an artwork requires that we take what we termed earlier a Levinsonian 'artistic interest' in the work, an interest in "the way content is embodied in form, the way medium has been employed to convey content" (Levinson 2005: 232).

It may be helpful to give a brief example of these distinct modes of appreciation. Consider Fra Angelico's *Annunciation* situated at the head of the flight of stairs that leads to the dormitories in the monastery (now the convent) of San Marco in Florence. Primary appreciation of this work requires that we allow ourselves to take in the image in all of its detail, to register it as a representational whole with certain formal relations between the different elements and certain patterned chromatic forms with their own affective qualities. We need to bring to our visual scrutiny of the image a familiarity with the general depictive conventions of the tradition to which Fra Angelico belonged, so that we can register the representational, formal, and expressive properties that *this* artistic manifold articulates through the distribution of pigment on surface.

Our scrutiny of the manifold is also informed by an interrogative

interest in *why* it is *this* artistic manifold that Fra Angelico has created for the appreciation of his intended audience. Again, our interrogative exploration should be guided by an awareness of the range of possibilities open to the artist, and also of the significance of different possible ways of rendering the subject. The resulting secondary appreciation of the painting informs our primary appreciation—our experiential engagement with the artistic vehicle. Insofar as our interest is in Fra Angelico's creation as an artwork, however, we must consider what the artist has done in his medium, in order to realize in pigment the kinds of contentful properties—higher and lower—of the painting that bear upon its performance of its primary intended function. In so doing we seek a tertiary appreciation of the painting.

The precise nature and extent of tertiary appreciation is a much contested and controversial matter. In particular, one needs to ask to what extent tertiary appreciation is solely a matter of experiential engagement with an artistic manifold, and, if so, the extent to which that engagement should be informed by knowledge of the way in which that manifold came to have the features that it does. I have elsewhere (forthcoming) argued, here, for a distinction between what I have termed 'experiential appreciation' and 'appreciative understanding'. Fortunately, however, we need not broach these matters further in the present context, since tertiary appreciation is *not* what is at issue in assessing the neo-Goodmanian account and its treatment of 'fast' works. For tertiary appreciation pertains to our activities as critical assessors and appreciators of works for their value as artworks, rather than to our engagement with them so that they can perform their primary intended functions. The issue between the neo-Goodmanian and the proponent of 'fast art' relates to the nature of primary appreciation and secondary appreciation. It is primary appreciation that, it seems, can be 'fast', in the sense that we can take in the first-order artistic content of certain works 'at a glance'. However secondary appreciation is also necessary if a work is to fulfil its primary intended function, whether this be broadly 'instrumental' or more traditionally 'aesthetic', since we need to unify the elements in the artistic manifold by reference to a 'sense' in virtue of which it has a particular content bearing upon the realization of its primary intended function. One way of putting our question, then, is to ask whether, if primary appreciation of a work is indeed sometimes 'fast', this is sufficient for secondary appreciation. If what we can get 'fast' is merely *necessary* for secondary appreciation, and thus bears upon but does not exhaust the 'artistic content' of the work whereby it performs whatever its primary intended function is, then, to the extent that this content is, as we might put it, a neo-Goodmanian function of the 'fast' content, the possibility of fast works will not call the neo-Goodmanian view into question. The proponent of neo-Goodmanian aesthetics might then respond to the problem of 'fast art' by making the following claim:

[NGT] Primary appreciation of a work of art can be fast only if secondary appreciation is a neo-Goodmanian function of primary appreciation.

If we consider the two putatively 'fast' works cited earlier, it is clear that a strong case can be made that they in fact satisfy NGT and do not, therefore, present a problem for the neo-Goodmanian. Let me begin with Noland. In the first place, when we consider his works in more detail, it is not even clear that *primary* appreciation is fast, given the ways in which the rings of colour interact optically. If this interaction is intended as part of the work's artistic content and if it bears upon secondary appreciation and on the realization of the work's primary intended function, then it seems to require the kind of detailed attention to the canvas that, following Wollheim, we have taken to be a distinctive feature of the kind of regard for which artworks call. Second, as Wolfe's account makes clear, even if primary appreciation of Noland's work were deemed to be 'fast', secondary appreciation surely is not. To grasp the 'sense' embodied in the work's first-order properties requires that we understand the *significance* of the speed with which it might be primarily appreciated—the significance, here, of the minimalist aesthetic cited by Wolfe in his account. Furthermore, if the work is intended to be 'fast' for primary appreciation, this seems to bear upon the overall artistic content through which it fulfils its primary intended function in neo-Goodmanian ways. For example, it is through seeing such 'fastness' as *exemplifying* a possibility denied by the painters whose work it is parodying, and doing so in a way that requires *attention to detailed aspects* of what Nolan is actually doing, that the work would, on this reading, articulate the content bearing on its primary intended critical function. So read, the work is at least partly conceptual in being *about* contemporary artworks that pursue experiential goals at the expense of cognitive ones, and its art-critical function is achieved by commenting on the latter in a neo-Goodmanian way, as just described.

Hirst's 'shark' piece also belies its apparent 'fastness' when we attend more closely to how the artistic vehicle is supposed to articulate the content bearing upon its primary intended function. As critics have pointed out, if we accord to the artwork the sort of attention we normally accord to three-dimensional works of visual art—if, for example, we walk around the tank, and examine it from different angles—then interesting properties we would otherwise miss become apparent.

For example, the importance of the optical properties of the physical medium was noted by art critic and historian Richard Cork (2003): "The optical illusion of movement, generated by its abrupt shifts of movement behind the glass as awed visitors walked round the tank, suggested that the shark was still, somehow, alive." As with the Rainer piece to which we alluded earlier, we can assume that there is a difference in *how* the spectator is supposed to regard the object on display.[5]

[5] For a much lengthier discussion of these aspects of the Rainer piece, see Davies 2011: ch. 1.

In a natural history museum, our interest in such an object is directed solely to the shark, its physical properties, how it is presented as moving, etc. The tank is merely a receptacle for the object of interest. When it is located in an art gallery, however, 'getting' the piece arguably requires that we give the object the sort of detailed interrogative attention that we standardly give to three-dimensional works of visual art. When we walk around the tank, we are aware not only of the shark but also of the way in which its visual appearance is influenced by the optical properties of the transparent material of which the tank is made. The shark always appears to be pressing up against the surface closest to us, and, as we pass a corner of the tank, it appears first in duplicate and then in a position quite different from the one it appeared to occupy before we reached the corner. Whether we follow Cork in his reading of the significance of this or offer an alternative interpretation,[6] it seems plausible that our engagement with the object in the gallery must be neo-Goodmanian if we are to grasp the relevant artistic content through which the work fulfils its primary intended function.

6. *Making sense of 'popular art': A case study*

Suppose that such a strategy, captured in NGR, is a plausible way of accommodating those accepted artworks that might at first sight appear to be 'fast' in a way that goes against the neo-Goodmanian account. Would this strategy also be a plausible way of artistically enfranchising works of 'mass art' in Carroll's sense? The answer, it would seem, must be negative because it seems to follow from Carroll's very *definition* of 'mass art' that works that fit that definition must be 'fast' for both primary and secondary appreciation. Not only can we appreciate the manifest features of such works without neo-Goodmanian engagement, but also the 'sense' rightly ascribed to such manifest features is the one that they most obviously serve. Secondary appreciation, it seems, merely requires that the features experienced in primary appreciation be taken to serve no higher purpose than engaging us perceptually and emotionally.

If this were indeed the case for all those 'popular artworks' that Carroll takes to fall within the *extension* of his term 'mass art', we might ask whether such works are usefully grouped with the other artefacts that we view as artworks. For I take it that the artistic status of this *class* of 'popular' artefacts is at least open to reasonable dispute—at least, more open than the works of artists like Noland and Hirst. One

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[6] I have suggested elsewhere (2004: 251–53) the following interpretation of this piece. In taking an interrogative interest in the thing presented as an art object, we might reflect upon the fact that the shark is presented in the gallery as a physically impossible physical object, capable of occupying two spatial locations at the same time and of moving from one location to another without passing through the points in between. Given the title, *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living*, this might lead us to see the physical impossibility of the shark in the tank as exemplifying the physical impossibility characterised in the title.

option for the neo-Goodmanian, then, might be to stand her ground and deny artistic status to these artefacts. But a much better option, I think, is to ask whether all of the things we intuitively take to be examples of popular art do indeed satisfy Carroll's definition. The neo-Goodmanian can adopt here the same strategy that was adopted earlier on in setting up the 'functional artwork' problem. We might seek to distinguish, within the class of artefacts that seem to have as their primary intended function satisfying those kinds of desires in receivers that we earlier identified as distinctive of 'low art', those that should be viewed as *artworks* having such a function. And, it might be claimed, these are the ones that are intended to fulfil that function in neo-Goodmanian ways.

That this strategy may be a promising one is clear when we consider some of Carroll's own examples that are used to justify the claim that works of 'mass art' in his sense are truly *works of art*. He cites works like *Citizen Kane* which, he argues, are aimed at a mass audience but are undeniably works of art. But two conditions in Carroll's definition of 'mass art' must be distinguished: (a) being aimed at a general audience, and (b) being intended to be accessible with minimal cognitive or conceptual effort. While a work like *Citizen Kane* would satisfy the first condition, it does not seem to satisfy the second but, rather, to demand some interrogative engagement with the immediately presented narrative content if the 'sense' of the work is to be grasped. But if such engagement on the part of those who are able to 'get' the work in both the primary and secondary sense was intended by Welles, then it seems that the scope of the work's intended audience need not make it 'fast'. Indeed, given Welles use of cinematographic means in presenting the narrative, it might be argued that neo-Goodmanian techniques are required even for primary appreciation of such a work.

But let us suppose that the makers of many works of what we would intuitively take to be 'popular art' have no such intentions, and that the primary intended function of such works really is to entertain in a fairly effortless way. Surely much popular music, much pulp fiction, and many of the films shown in cineplexes are intentionally 'fast' for both primary and secondary appreciation. The primary intended function is to produce affect and/or movement on the part of receivers, to be infectious, or to arouse widely shared feelings relating to widely shared situations, with minimal cognitive effort on the part of the receiver. Such artefacts are certainly legitimate objects of *tertiary* appreciation: we can take an interest in how they are able to have the effects that they do, how they 'work'.[7] But, as we have seen, it is the nature of primary and secondary appreciation that is at issue in assessing the neo-Goodmanian account. And, as we might also note, we can take a tertiary appreciative interest in many artefacts that are clearly not artworks, as demonstrated by

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[7] Tertiary appreciation of this kind seems to be what is at issue in the analysis of pieces of popular music in the *Switched on Pop* podcast discussed below.

Baxandall's use of the Forth Railway Bridge to exemplify the 'historical explanation' of an artifact (Baxandall 1985).

What can the neo-Goodmanian say about such instances of 'popular art'? As with other artifacts with instrumental primary intended functions, what the neo-Goodmanian will urge is that we need a principled way of distinguishing those artefacts intended for general appreciation that clearly are artworks from those that clearly are not, while allowing for cases whose artistic status is open to debate. What we should not assume is that *all* mass artifacts that meet Carroll's definition of 'mass art' must be mass *art*. But, to sharpen the point with which we began, can we make the stronger point that *no* artifacts intended for a broad audience that meet Carroll's further requirement—minimal cognitive effort required for appreciation—are art? Or, to approach this from another direction, can we explain why some of the things we would intuitively think of as popular artworks do not in fact meet Carroll's further requirement? We have already looked at how some mainstream films might in fact operate in a neo-Goodmanian way, being intended to achieve their primary intended function in virtue of articulating an artistic content in ways that call for 'artistic regard' in the stipulated sense. But it may be instructive to consider what might seem a more challenging case—the artistic credentials of popular music. Can we identify a basis for drawing the required distinction between works of popular music the realisation of whose primary intended function requires a neo-Goodmanian 'artistic regard' on the part of the receiver and those for which no such requirement obtains?

With popular music, matters are complicated by the fact that the pieces we tend to think of as 'artistic' often involve lyrics that by themselves engage our 'higher' interests and cognitive capacities. Examples of works of popular music that fit this description would include Bruce Springsteen's *Born to Run*, Bob Dylan's *Blonde on Blonde*, and David Sylvian's *Brilliant Trees*. On the other hand, other works of popular music—such as *Sugar Sugar* by the Archies and *Hey Jude* by The Beatles—are not in this sense 'literary'. The words of such songs function more through their sound than through their meaning, as we discover to our shock when we actually inspect the words of *Hey Jude*! Such songs produce affect—and are designed to do so—but do so largely through sub-personal mechanisms that respond to tone, timbre, and rhythm. There *can* sometimes be an artistic dimension in such songs that requires us to focus our attention on the ways in which words and music have been made to work together. The appropriate model for understanding such pieces as artworks would come from the 'lieder' tradition of combining music and words, as in Schubert's musical setting of Goethe's *Erlkonig* (see Davies 2013). But this seems implausible in the cases just cited.

One strategy that might be used to artistically enfranchise mainstream pop music is exemplified in the podcast, *Switched on Pop*, that

examines chart-topping pop songs through the lens of musical theory.[8] The authors of the podcast, songwriter Charlie Harding and Fordham University musicology professor Nate Sloan, take the work of pop stars such as Carly Rae Jepsen, Justin Bieber, and Ariana Grande and focus not on the lyrics but on the use of particular chord progressions and instrumentation. They describe their project as follows:

> Our goal is always to figure out why a song is resonating with people. Often the reason has to do with some musical technique that people might understand viscerally but not intellectually. In the case of DJ Khaled's "I'm the One," we thought the secret was the chord progression. Khaled is using a chord progression, the 1–6–4–5 progression, that has been used in some capacity for centuries. It's the same progression that undergirds songs like "Blue Moon", "Stand By Me", and "I Will Always Love You." Khaled is using this chord progression that we are all deeply familiar with, and it can't help but get stuck in our heads. So for that episode we dive into the world of tonal harmony and how the music theorist Jean-Philippe Rameau first encoded the way that musical harmony can work on our emotions in 1723. Now, three centuries later, whether he knows it or not, DJ Khaled is taking advantage of those same principles.
>
> The idea that writing "frivolous" music doesn't take a lot of artistry is misguided. Mozart's opera buffa "Così fan tutte" has the most ludicrous and silly plot, but man is it complex. It took all of Mozart's considerable compositional skill. The music being put out by Justin Bieber and Diplo is completely analogous...
>
> We had a producer duo on our show called Grey, who produced the Hailee Steinfeld song "Starving." They said they spent 60 hours just fine tuning the sound of the snare drum on one of their songs. That gives you an idea of the immense efforts of a song you digest in three minutes and 30 seconds like an amuse-bouche.

If, as seems to be the case, this is intended as an argument for the artistic status of the kind of mainstream pop music cited, it clearly fails. That certain pop songs employ the same chord structures or harmonies used by classical composers to elicit affect does not make either the pop songs or the classical pieces works of art. Producing affect does not by itself make something art, especially if that affect is generated solely through the activation of sub-personal cognitive and perceptual mechanisms. The use of lighting, camera movement, and editing to produce strong affect via sub-personal mechanisms in films like *Blade Runner* is essential to those films as works of cinematic art (Coplan 2015), but it is the ways in which such affect is integrated with other aspects of the films rather than the production of affect by itself that grounds their artistic status. The same devices are used in advertising to get us to look favourably on a given product or politician, but one should only speak here of artworks when the elicitation of affect by such sub-personal means is used in concert with other features that engage us consciously.

This ties in with our earlier discussion of primary and secondary appreciation. Where an artwork is intended to produce affect or perceptual experience by mobilising sub-personal psychological mechanisms—as in 'op art' works by Bridget Riley, for example—the achievement of a work's primary intended function requires not merely a passive 'primary' response but also the interrogation of the manifold that is producing such affect. In Riley's case, this requires that the viewer not merely respond perceptually through the operation of sub-personal mechanisms in the visual system, but interrogate the canvas and thereby engage with the principles of visual perception that Riley is exploiting—and exploring—in her works. Works of op art are *about* visual perception and are only appreciated by one who engages with them as such. That something conjures with our senses or with our emotions is not sufficient for its being art, even when the conjuror is an artist!

We can make a similar point concerning the use of rhythm and dynamics in music to produce movement. We often find ourselves unconsciously moving our feet, hands or bodies in time as music is playing—as in the café where I'm writing this—but this happens as much (if not more!) when I am thinking about the sentence I am writing as when I actually attend to the music. But, the neo-Goodmanian will insist, if such music is to be art, grasping the content that bears upon the artifact's performing its primary intended function must require perceptual and/or cognitive *activity* on the part of the receiver—listening to or looking at a perceptual manifold interrogatively in my sense—not mere passivity. As an example of this, consider the standard methods used to produce movement and affect in works of techno, and consider the use by more self-consciously 'artistic' producers—such as Underworld in a track like 'Dark Train'—of not merely sound textures—which is a general feature of techno—but also complex polyrhythms that emerge from, merge into, or play off of one another. While such a piece is intended to produce movement and affect, it is intended to do so through our active awareness of the ways in which the different elements play against one another and our anticipation of how this play will continue: we can be enthralled even after many listenings by the way in which the contrasting elements can be brought together. This might be seen as analogous to the aesthetic richness of works by a composer like Sibelius when he brings strings and brass into sonorous dialogue or discord. In both cases, the intention is that the 'lower' pleasures of movement and affect be elicited through our attention to features of the acoustic manifold that function in a neo-Goodmanian way: the pleasures are elicited 'artfully', to use once again the term that Levinson applies to the pornographic images of artists like Klimt, Rodin, and Schiele. Generalising from these examples, while in nearly all popular music and cinema, certain kinds of affective and motor triggers are employed that affect us passively, in those such works that qualify as artworks these serve to frame or complete our active engagement with the perceptual manifold.

7. *Conclusion*

The foregoing reflections suggest that the neo-Goodmanian should insist that there can be no works of *art* that satisfy both conditions in Carroll's definition of 'mass art'. While artworks are 'experience machines' not all such machines are artworks. The experiences an 'experience machine' is designed to produce are those that will enable it to fulfil its primary intended function, whatever that is. For the neo-Goodmanian, however, what differentiates artworks from other 'experience machines'—e.g. advertisements, much dance music, B-horror movies—is that they can fulfill their primary intended functions only if they elicit the perceptual *activity* of the receiver in interrogating the perceptual manifold via an artistic regard. This perceptual activity is necessary because the artistic content through which the primary intended function is to be achieved is articulated 'artfully', in a neo-Goodmanian way. Just as there can be 'artful' pornography, there can be 'artful' works of pop music, 'artful' movies, etc., that have as their primary intended function entertainment or the satisfaction of some 'lower' capacity or desire on the part of the receiver. But these would not be works of 'mass art' in Carroll's sense, since they require the activity and not merely the passive receptivity of the receiver. So to the extent that something is an artwork, it can't be 'mass' in Carroll's sense, and to the extent that it is 'mass' in this sense it can't be an artwork.[9]

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