Constructing a Happy City-State. In memoriam Heda Festini

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The paper honors Heda Festini; it's first part contains author's personal memories of Heda. The central part of the paper addresses a favorite author of Heda Festini, Franjo Petrić, and his Utopia The Happy City-State. *It then places the utopian construction on the map of contemporary understanding of political theorizing. Utopias, like the one due to Petrić, result from thought-experimenting; in contrast to purely epistemic thought-experiments they are geared to "guidance", as Petrić puts it, namely advice giving and persuading. Political thought-experimenting can be understood to a large extent as work in ideal theorizing; a matter little noticed in the literature. Classical cases cover "ideal theory" in the sense of given, non-temporal arrangement; "ideal" either in a very limited sense of strict compliance (Rawls), or in a wider sense of normatively marked properties, not instantiated in actual political reality. Platonic tradition belongs to a third genus, "ideal" in the sense of recommended end-state; Utopias add to this theoretical quality the dimension of "guidance", so that they are motivational, time-related ideal theories. The paper depicts these relations between thought-experimenting as a wider genus, and ideal theorizing as its prominent political-philosophical sub-species. The paper is thus a tribute to Heda Festini who helped me find my way to analytic theorizing, and help analytic philosophy to start serious institutional life in our native Croatia.*

Keywords: Franjo Petrić, *The Happy City-State*, Renaissance Utopia, ideal theorizing, political thought experiments.

1. Introduction

The paper honors Heda Festini; at the same time important historian of philosophy, and the head of Zadar philosophy department, who has started the most successful line of analytic philosophy teaching in Croa-

tian (and has helped me enormously in my philosophical career). The paper follows these lines; I shall refer to her simply as "Heda". The following section is dedicated to Heda's work in the Zadar department, which I retell as part of precious personal memories. The next section briefly summarizes Petrić's *The Happy City-State,* stressing his obsession with health, individual, environmental and social-political, reminiscent of contemporary green ideologies. The fourth section turns to theory, and attempts to place Petrić on the map of ideal theorizing. In order to do this, it places ideal theories within the framework of thought experimenting and proposes a fresh taxonomy of ideal theories, stressing two elements that have been absent from the literature: the specificity of motivational ideals, characterizing Utopias, from Moore and Petrić to socialist utopias, and the functioning of dystopias as a kind of (anti-)ideal theories. The conclusion returns to Heda's reading of Petrić, stressing her original proposal to see him as an early utilitarian.

2. *Memories of Heda Festini*

So, let me start briefly with my personal memories. The encounter with Heda that has changed my life happened in spring of 1975. At that time I had worked at the Medical faculty in Rijeka, teaching "Marxism", and I was avidly looking for a university job in philosophy. So, at a conference in Ljubljana I met Heda Festini, who was in company of her colleague Saša Kron, a first-rate logician from Belgrade. I had a presentation on philosophy of Althusser, fresh from a meeting with him in Paris. After the presentation I joined Heda and Saša. I had no idea they were commenting my paper; suddenly Heda asked mi if I would come to work in Zadar, and it was obvious that Saša was very much in favor of this offer.

"When?" I asked. "Soon, in the fall, if you want." I accepted with enthusiasm, and this decision has shaped my professional life from then on. Thanks to Heda, and Saša, I got the job in philosophy, at the age of twenty five. So, I ended up in Zadar.

The local philosophy department was ruled by two lady philosophers, Heda, the younger of the two, and Marija Brida, the senior, supported by old and tired Anđelko Habazin. They both took care of me, way beyond any formal obligations. Heda tried to persuade me to do more exercise to get rid of my asthma, she loved sport and exercise in general. She was taking care of me all the time I was in Zadar. You can guess how much all this meant emotionally for me from the fact that my daughter got her name Heda after Heda Festini.

Philosophically the most important component of the story was Heda's interest and enthusiasm for analytic philosophy. She was working all her life on the history of Croatian philosophy, but the area where she left the deepest trace was the creation of analytic tradition in Zadar. In the seventies, I become disappointed with French continental philosophy fashion(s) and was looking for a new area. Heda supported

me enthusiastically, so I become converted, like Saint Paul, suddenly and totally; thus, we became the leading analytic duo on the Adria. We spent a lot of time discussing the literature we were reading. The biggest challenge was logic; I remember how we deciphered the newly published texts on recursion and similar topics.

Habazin unfortunately died in 1978, but we then got the offer, indeed the command from the ministry of education to employ several younger persons. This employing, done by Heda, became the crucial event in the history of the Department. With four young, promising assistants, we had the first analytic philosophy department in Croatia; our six-membered group was small, but clearly oriented in the analytical direction. We were getting support from Zagreb, from colleagues working in philosophy of science, and, above all from Belgrade, thanks to Heda's good relations with Kron. The young professor Vanda Božičević joined in with sympathies for analytic tradition. She was followed by Boran Berić, and from English language department by Dunja Jutronić, interested in philosophy of language. Heda also engaged several younger colleagues from Rijeka, Elvio Baccarini and Boran Berčić started as visiting teachers in Zadar; the event later turned out to be very important, for the future philosophy department in Rijeka.

The outbreak of the war at the beginning of nineties changed everything. We were staying under artillery fire in besieged Zadar. After the end of the war, the political countdowns began. As the result, Berić and Vanda Božičević left for the US, and Dunja Jutronić and myself ended with jobs in Slovenia. Boran Berčić and Elvio Baccarini got some teaching engagement in Rijeka. Right at the end of the millennium the philosophy department in Rijeka was created, to become an important center for analytic philosophy in Croatia, with four international conferences per year at the IUC in Dubrovnik, and a whole lot of local symposia.

It is quite obvious, in retrospect, that Heda, with her activity in Zadar in the seventies and eighties, has done a lot for the creation of this new analytic team. Berčić, Baccarini, Jutronić and I started in analytic philosophy in her institutional framework.

Heda thus stands at the beginning of the only institutionalized home analytic tradition; if the tradition goes on successfully, her name will be written on it in golden letters.

3. *Petrić—Heda's long time favorite philosopher. Pursuing the health of the republic*

Let me now pass to Franjo Petrić, philosopher extensively discussed by Heda; for an overview of her interest see the paper by Boršić and Skuhala Karasman in this issue. Here we shall discuss his short booklet, *La città felice* from 1553. Heda has been reading Petrić from a contemporary, even clearly analytic perspective; we shall later discuss briefly

her paper on Petrić and utilitarianism (2004). I shall here follow her inspiration and attempt to do the same for his utopianism.

Petrić's avowed goal of the treatise is to persuade his prominent readers, to whom it is dedicated, to implement it in reality. The work is dedicated to the two Della Rovere nobleman, Vigerio and Girolamo, and here is the leading metaphor of what the work is supposed to do:

> It will make the path easier and more passable for you, namely the path that leads to the top of the mountain on which the happiness has built the paradise of its enjoyments (*ha posto il paradiso delle sue delizie.* (Petrić 1553: iii)[1]

We shall take this guidance motivation as central for placing Petrić's work in relation to the rest of ideal theorizing. And here is the other guiding metaphor: the city offers the relief of our thirst, physical and spiritual, needed for our health and happiness.

The most adored city of the world

> If our city will be such as we have described, it will be able most abundantly to relieve the thirst and to be sated with the waters that will fall upon it from that blessed stream. This city in its greatest height, elevated among all the other cities of the world and placed in the sight of all, will be venerated by them, and adored, and implored to deign to dip its finger in the saving waters of its happy stream and to bathe their mouth, burned and thirsty, with a drop as a comfort to their miseries. (Petrić 1553: 16)

What about the adored city itself? One interesting, and probably central feature of the picture proposed is the importance of *health* as the ideal of a good city. He talks of the bodily health of the inhabitants and the need for healthy environment, going into details, relying probably on his two years of study of medicine in Padua. Here is a typical passage:

> So we shall chose places where there are no swamps or other stagnant and muddy waters, and places without those forests we have described, and places high and open, and exposed to the east wind and the north wind. But because health is corrupted not only due to the above described reasons, but by the style of our ongoing life and by the disorders which all bring upon themselves and which arise from innumerable accidents that come upon us, which are born neither from the cold nor from the heat nor from corrupt air, we need another sort of artisans who oppose these evils, with whose help we shall be liberated from the violence of them. Such are the physical medical experts, the surgeons and their assistants, the barbers, the assistants in the baths, and the specialists. (Petrić 1553: 6)

But then, in the sequel, health becomes the paradigm of the well-functioning of the city-state as a whole: "the health of the republic" (*la salute della republica*, Petrić 1553: section 7). He seems quite obsessed with the health ideal; in contemporary fashionable terms, closer to

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[1] I shall refer to Istrianet website, with Italian original, and English translation by E. Ryan: http://www.istrianet.org/istria/illustri/patrizi/works/citta-felice.htm.

Greta Thunberg than to Slavoj Žižek. Of course, this plays a role in the imagined geography of the City:

> Now I come to the second defect, when, after the spirits are generated, they are dispersed. And this usually happens in two ways: either being pure and natural beyond the body, or being broken within the body. They are broken within the body due to too much condensation or too much rarefaction, or due to a poisonous quality contrary to their substance; or they become corrupt due to some other accident. Too great density is usually caused by the cold, internal or external. The rarifying likewise comes from heat that is either internal or external. And the poisonous quality is in the same way either internal or external. (Petrić 1553: 5)

We now pass to the political. The most important motivation is love among the citizens:

> Thus, there will not be private enmities in our city if love reigns among the citizens; and love is not generated except toward something that is known. So, the citizens must have information about one another. This is had in a medium-sized and manageable group rather than in an innumerable one; and even here it becomes more still easy if the group is not simply thrown together but distinguished by lineage. (Petrić 1553: 7)

How should this ideal of love be implemented? Here is the project:

> Our city, then, should not be filled with an infinite multitude of people, but with such a number that they will be able to know each other easily; and to bring this about better, they shall be divided on the basis of blood and lineage. And in order that this root of reciprocal love grows and comes to such perfection that it produces perfect fruit, I will that the people be fed in public dinners which will be celebrated at least once every month in accordance with the ancient custom of Italus, King of Italy, who put this practice into use before anyone else. Thus, let there be situated public rooms in public places where these dinners may be celebrated, and let one part of the territory of the city be public, the fruits of which may be destined only for this purpose. (Petrić 1553: 6)

Now, the equality among the citizens is an important factor of stability. The division between rulers and the ruled is determined by age: the old should rule, the young should obey and act in accordance. This then gives to the members of young generation the reasonable hope that they will be rulers in the future: "All civil discords and dissensions will cease, then, if the fire of youthful ambition will be extinguished by water of the certain hope of ruling." (Petrić 1553: 8).

However, we soon discover that things are not as ideal as they seem. Not all citizens are equal, and here is the division. There are "six types of men" in the polis. The first three are the following: (i) rural workers, (ii) artisans, for instance those "who produce for us carriages and carette and manage the horses and the mules," and (iii) "the merchants who by their industriousness lighten the road for us."[2]

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[2] I shall neither introduce nor comment Petrić's use of metaphor in characterizing the task of the workers; we don't need it here.

The last three are the ones we expect from Platonic-Aristotelian tradition: (iv) the warriors, (v) the magistrates and (vi) the priests. Here comes the dramatic inequality. Categories (i)–(iii) involve so much effort and so many impediments that they block the perspective of happiness: "due to these impediments they (the members of the three categories-NM) cannot acquire the activities and the habits of the virtues that constitute the last step in arriving at beatitude." And here is the final picture of inequality:

> The remaining three orders, that is the warriors, the governors and the priests, can live for a long time, since necessities are provided for them by the three other orders that have already been described, so that with a quiet mind and without the anxiety of procuring food for themselves, they can devote all their souls to virtue both civil and contemplative. Therefore, since we want to institute a city that is blessed, because the three laboring orders cannot be clothed in the wedding garment nor be seated at table together with those wearing these garments, they will not be recognized among the invited. But they will serve at this banquet, some as cooks, others as food bearers, and the third as servers of the knife and the cup. (Petrić 1553: 1)

The city thus "has two parts, the one servile and miserable (in the original: *l'una servile e misera*), the other seigniorial and blessed (*l'altra signora e beata*)" (Petrić 1553: 1). Only the second one is made of citizens.

## 4. *Placing Petrić in the theoretical context: Ideal theory and thought experimenting—a general overview*

How should we classify Petrić' proposal, his ideal of *La città felice*? Fortunately, in recent times there has been an abundance of theorizing on political ideals, all under the name of "ideal theory" that has been introduced by Rawls half a century ago (for the source passage see footnote 3). However, we now have a wealth of proposals of classifications of "ideal theories"; here, we shall propose a classification that is to large extent our own, and then try to locate Petrić within it.

Let us start from initial, Rawlsian cases; they implement "ideal theory" in the sense of given, non-temporal arrangement; "ideal" either in a very limited sense of strict compliance (Rawls), or in a wider sense of normatively marked properties, no instantiated in actual political reality. Here is the description offered by Laura Valentini in her excellent overview:

> This methodological debate on the proper nature of political philosophy, and its ability to guide action in real-world circumstances, has become known as the debate on ideal and non-ideal theory. A quick glance at what falls under the heading 'ideal /non-ideal theory', however, reveals the heterogeneity of this debate. (Valentini 2012: 654)

Here I would like to introduce two proposals. The first is to situate the construction of ideal theory within the framework of thought-experi-

menting. Although the connection is obvious, it is largely unmentioned in the literature; one valuable exception is Rippon and Zala (2018: 55).[3] The second is to introduce a distinction, not noticed by Valentini and other authors. Many ideal theories, from Plato to Rawls, have primarily epistemic purpose: find out what is justice, most prominently. Application is secondary, and its discussion is not mandatory. Others take the opposite path: they propose the motivational function as primary, and the epistemic function as subservient to the motivational one. I shall place Petrić's work in this category. Let me reserve the term Utopia (with capital "U" for this kind):

Thought-experimenting—ideal theory

Epistemic   motivational
                                                                         Utopia

Utopias stress the dimension of "guidance", so that they are motivational, time-related ideal theories.

The present paper depicts these relations between thought-experimenting as a wider genus, and ideal theorizing as its prominent political-philosophical sub-species.

Let me start by sketching the epistemic side: here is the main division of "ideal theorizing" taken as theorizing with the central epistemic goal: finding out the nature of the just arrangement of society. I am borrowing the main idea from Valentini:

Ideal theory—epistemic

compliance   theory of the ideal   end-state theory

We shall look at the three sub-kinds in the three sub-section that follow. I shall later add two more sub-kinds, the fourth one purely motivational, and a fifth one quite distinct from the rest of ideal-theoretical constructions. But now, let us look at the three kind focused on the epistemic goal.

4.1 *Compliance*

Rawls has introduced the term "ideal theory" in his *Theory of justice* in a quite modest way, as the theory of the just arrangements that relies on the assumption of full compliance of the participants in the arrange-

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[3] It is also mentioned by Oana Crusmac in her (2018: 66). Amartya Sen does mention thought-experimenting (2009: 268) when talking about "transcendental" theorizing, only in the critical context and not using the term "ideal theory."

ment. He simply says at the beginning of his work that he shall "for the most part" "examine the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society" (1999: 8), and then calls the resulting theory "ideal".[4] Of course, the biggest part of the discussion of this sense of "ideal theory" was dedicated to the relation with the non-ideal situation: what are we supposed to do if we know that citizens will not comply? In fact, Rawls' original suggestion is neutral in regard to the status of other characteristics of the just arrangement being discussed: we can imagine that it is a very demanding arrangement, or just a variant of existing ones. What makes it "ideal" in the first and weak sense is simple the assumption that participants comply with the rules of the arrangement.[5]

The full compliance meaning of "ideal theory" is too modest for our purpose of locating Petrić's political philosophizing, and we shall not discuss it further. Instead, we have to make the next step, as most discussants of the notion of ideal theory have.

4.2 *The theory of the ideal*

The second meaning we shall identify here is 'theory of the ideal' as opposed to 'realistic' theory.[6] Commentators and historians point to differences between projects of the theory of the ideal (and ideal theory in general). The most famous pair are Plato's "*Republic*" and his *Laws*. The project of the first takes to some extent into account the psychological and institutional possibilities (not sufficiently, Aristotle will criticize in his *Politics*, ch. 2). *Laws* are much less demanding than the *Republic*, relying on traditions and experience of various Greek polises, from very conservative ones, like Crete, to the less conservative ones. We can add a third possibility, the most radical one: the claim that factual possibility and impossibility are irrelevant for the status of the ideal. Cohen comes close to embracing this third, strongest option. We thus have three kinds of the theory of the ideal.

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[4] Here is the relevant statement by Rawls:
Thus I consider primarily what I call strict compliance as opposed to partial compliance theory (§§25, 39). The latter studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice. It comprises such topics as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification of the various ways of opposing unjust regimes, ranging from civil disobedience and conscientious objection to militant resistance and revolution. Also included here are questions of compensatory justice and of one form of institutional injustice against another. Obviously the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matters. These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems. (Rawls 1999: 8)

[5] The now standard source is Simmons (2010), but see also Stemplowska (2008).

[6] Valentini notes that "/O/n this second reading of the 'ideal ∕ non-ideal' distinction, the debate on ideal and non-ideal theory focuses on the question of whether feasibility considerations should constrain normative political theorizing and, if so, what sorts of feasibility constraints should matter" (2012: 654).

- Weak (second-best, relatively undemanding) exemplified by Plato's *Laws*.
- Moderate, exemplified by his "*Republic*" and
- Strong: exemplified by Cohen at his most radical incarnation.

The reader primarily interested in contemporary political philosophy might notice the following: Rawls, in his *Theory of justice* presents his view as a variant of the full compliance theory, nothing more. But his development suggests a different picture, reminiscent of Plato's progress. After the publication of the *Theory of justice* he came to the view that it is, as it stands, too non-realistic. And in his later work he turned to building up a more moderate theory, which was then achieved in his *Political liberalism*.[7]

The least pessimistic way is the one suggested by G. A. Cohen (2008).[8] Just a few words about this third, strongest kind. As Valentini notes, G. A. Cohen has been stressing the theoretical independence of this second meaning that she also describes as "utopian": for him it points to the value of the arrangement considered, value that can be in competition with other factors when people decide how to act politically.

There is an additional subtlety waiting in the offing. Often the proponent of an ideal arrangement proposes her scenarios as moderate, and the interlocutor sees it as strong, and almost impossible. The dialogue of Plato and Aristotle is an early example of this contrast. The history of Marxism is full of more recent examples: *The Communist Manifesto* proposes communism as a relatively normal goal; the proposal has triggered criticism that have lasted till our days.

It is hard to discuss this second, and very important meaning without briefly introducing the next one, namely the understanding of "ideal theory" as the "end-state" theory, a kind of blueprint of ideal future. The two meanings are quite connected in the practice of theorizing and writing. Our thought-experimenter imagining the idealistically valid arrangement of a community can hardly avoid seeing it also as state that would be a desirable future state of the community.

I propose that we see this second meaning as a philosophically relevant abstraction from the way actual thought-experimenting (TE) proceeds; considering it, we should stay with the imagined arrangement, and abstract from the temporal dimension that shows its relevance in the third meaning of the "ideal". The debate and our tentative systematization points to the richness of thought-experimental methodology.

4.3 *End-state theory*

The mentioning of a blueprint for a future arrangement brings us to the already mentioned third meaning of the contrast: "ideal theory"

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[7] See, for instance, Weithman (2010).
[8] Discussed by Valentini in her (2012).

is "end-state theory". The non-ideal theory might concern stages of transition from the present-day arrangement(s) to the end-state one(s). This is how philosophical constructions of the ideal political world are usually read and understood in teaching philosophy and political theory: the thought-experimenting author, say Kant or J.J. Rousseau, probably had hopes that his ideal arrangement, or something recognizable close to it, will become implemented at some point in future times.

This brings in one new element: the relevance of time. If you look for a theory that is implementable here and now you will relativize, if you are into reconstructing a "great social ideal" you will stay with idealistic theory[9] (Valentini 2012: 260). To illustrate, we can imagine a theoretician, say an anarchist critic of the historical development of last five centuries or so, call her Kropotkina, who is pessimistic about the possible implementation of her anarchist ideal. The history has taken the wrong turn, she explains; six centuries ago it would still have been possible to implement it, but now, with the development of production and new, fake needs of the majority of population, this has become impossible. This is why, for Kropotkin, the ideal theory is not a temporally relevant one, and its recommendations are not recommendations for a future state.

So, the first meaning of the contrast refers directly to the conflict between the temporal structure and the modal structure in the TE: what is modally possible is not accessible in time, not feasible any more.

The discussion in the last decade has made it clear that the relevant contrast points to several different dimensions of political TE-ing. The clear given is the relative independence of the modal, dimension from the temporal one; the evaluative dimension is the third one, interacting with both in actual proposals (we can think of two non-factual aspects of the situation imagined, the axiological and the deontological one).[10]

We now pass to the second big sub-category, the motivational Utopia.

4.4 *The motivational goal: guidance*

Our fourth sub-kind is marked by motivational elements: the goal of the philosophical work is primarily to serve as guidance to political practice. Interestingly, this important sub-species of political thought-experimenting has not been understood in the literature in these terms.

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[9] Valentini usefully notes the following: "If this is how we understand the ideal ⁄ non-ideal distinction, then the debate on ideal and non-ideal theory focuses on the question of whether a normative political theory should aim at identifying an ideal of societal perfection, or whether it should focus on transitional improvements without necessarily determining what the 'optimum' is" (2012: 654).

[10] Valentini mentions a third, relativisation: it relativizes all the before-mentioned contrasts to the aims of the thought-experimenter and her audience. We shall leave this pragmatic aspect aside here.

Of course, if we read early modern classics as primarily motivation-focused thinkers, we can use their work as examples, with the same classification as above.

- Weak (relatively undemanding) (Bacon 1989).
- Moderate: exemplified by other early modern classical works, of authors like Campanella, More, and Petrić.
- Strong: exemplified by Cohen if we take him as defending and recommending a vison of a future society.

I shall use "Utopia" with capital "U" for this kind of motivational ideal theory (to distinguish this meaning from others, e.g. utopia as a mere unreachable dream and the like).

Most importantly for us now, Petrić clearly belongs here; remember that he recommends his work to the powerful Della Rovere politicians by telling them that "it will make the path easier and more passable" for them, namely the path that leads to a polis of perfect happiness. He describes the function of his work as guidance which is similar to the use of "model" in Bacon's *New Atlantis*. So, we have hopefully located Petrić's project within a taxonomy of ideal theorizing, and thereby taxonomy of constructional political thought experimenting.

Let me conclude the section by noting that motivational ideal theory can be, like the epistemic ones, a-temporal or temporal, relativized to time. The classical modern Utopias are motivational and not relativized to time: Petrić, More and Campanella don't tell us how their Cities would fit into the actual history of mankind. In contrast, socialist utopias, from Owen and Fourrier to Marx, Engels (see References) and Marxist utopians see their ideal societies as marking the end of history as we know it (ironically, they sometimes talk in this sense of "end of prehistory").

4.5 *Anti-ideal theory and negative utopia*

The final sub-species has not been discussed in the literature in the context of ideal vs. non-ideal theory, and it is much more present in the fiction than in philosophy. It is the negative utopia, or dystopia, like Zamyatin's community in his work *We* or Orwell's two imagined countries, one from *1984* and the other from *Animal Farm*. We can imagine a more philosophical anti-utopian theorizing, taking such dystopian construction as its starting point: for example, Chomsky has been arguing that our present-day "freedom of the press" is in fact completely "Orwellized".[11]

If developed, such an argument would be a symmetrical negative image of an ideal theory, and this is why I am calling it anti-ideal theorizing. Another small move in this direction is the chapter titled "1984

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[11] See the summary at https://orwellsocietyblog.wordpress.com/2015/10/06/chomsky-orwell-and-the-myth-of-press-freedom/.

Is Upon Us" in Joseph E. Stiglitz's (2012) book.[12] This kind of development might be expected, given the attractiveness of dystopias for political philosophy. Again, we might apply the distinctions used for ideal theory here: distinguish a purely dystopian, "anti-idealizing" construction from a time-relativized one, presentation of dystopia as the fearsome and threatening end-state of the world. [13]

And again, we might distinguish purely epistemic function, making the possible bad things known to the reader (the way LeGuin does it), from a more usual, motivational function (present in Zamyatin and Orwell), namely warning the reader from possible threatening scenarios.

So, here is the main division repeated:

IDEAL THEORY

compliance	theory of the ideal	end-state theory	motivational theory	anti-ideal theory

Let me conclude by pointing to the wider context of idea theory building, namely to political thought-experimenting. It can be understood to a large extent as work in ideal theorizing; a matter little noticed in the literature.

But then, what kinds of thought-experimenting yield ideal or non-ideal theories? Not imagining of some particular event (like in the Trolley problem TE), but rather a construction of a larger social and political arrangement, like a "happy city-state". Such constructive, or constructionist TEs yield ideal/non-ideal theories.

So, to reiterate, we have located Petrić's utopia into the framework of motivational ideal theory. Interestingly, this motivational component has been noticed and stressed by Vladimir Filipović, one of the best historians of philosophy in 20th century Croatia, in his Introduction to the Croatian translation of Petrić's book. He places it together with practically oriented "utopias of the late Enlightenment", "works that give concrete direction about how to change norms and practices of life, so that the relations would become better and more just, and the life better for everybody" (Filipović 1975: 14).[14]

[12] See for instance the doctoral dissertation by Matthew Benjamin Cole (2017) *Dystopia and Political Imagination in the Twentieth Century*, available at ProQuest, for a reading of Habermas and Foucault along the lines of anti-ideal approach.

[13] See for more epistemic sounding approach Ursula LeGuin's *The Dispossessed*, presenting three distinct, quite negative scenarios without suggesting how close they are to actual reality.

[14] He contrasts it to "Romanesque utopias" of other Renaissance thinkers, most prominently More and Campanella. I would not go that far: I think their utopias are equally practically oriented, guidance giving works, only that Petrić is more clear in his intention that, say Campanella (whose silence on guidance might be the result

5. *Conclusion. Back to Heda Festini*

Let us close by very briefly returning to Heda's work on Petrić. What was the implicit normative framework of his construction of his motivational Utopia? We might borrow a characterization of his normative thinking from Festini (2004); she claims it is utilitarian. In her paper she starts from Petrić's appropriation of the Aristotelean "philautia", which she interprets as pursuit of what is useful to one. For Petrić, all relations to others are marked by *philautia*; friendship is grounded in the usefulness of the friend to us, and even the love for god derives from respect of ourselves, and gratitude for goods he gave to us (2004: 62). She notes that in *The happy city* the desire for well-being (*del bene essere*) plays an important role; and this well-being finds it culmination in living together. She also mentions health as the main metaphor for well-being (2004: 63). Her final diagnosis is that Petrić's utilitarianism is closer to Mill's than to Bentham's, but she also points to a possible analogies with the utilitarianism of Peter Singer (2004: 64).

So, let me summarize the main claims of the present paper. Utopias, like the one due to Petrić, also result from thought-experimenting; in contrast to purely epistemic thought-experiments they are geared to "guidance", as Petrić puts it, namely advice giving and persuading. On the opposite end of ideal theories are the ones geared to theoretical understanding; this contrast is our main contribution to classification of ideal theories.

The epistemic deal theories, the ones geared to theoretical understanding, can be either minimal, assuming only compliance with a conception of justice, or wider. The wider variant includes proposals which are not relativized to time; we called them, following proposals in the literature "theory of the ideal". The other groups are those that see the ideal situation as an "end-state" ideal. The final group are dystopias, anti-ideal theories, strong or weak.

Petrić's work can and should be understood as motivational ideal theory, a Utopia whose primary goal is guidance.

I hope that this interpretation fits well with the main line of Heda Festini's interest in Petrić, and other Croatian philosophers, trying to bring their work in connection with present day analytic efforts; it is a tribute to her work and its lasting value.

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