
What is epistemic injustice? Who is vulnerable to it, and whom does it affect? What forms does it assume? What are its political and social consequences? And finally, how can we counter it? In a colossal volume extending over forty chapters, Ian James Kidd, Jose Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. have collected a rich philosophical resource on epistemic injustice. Although epistemic injustice is roughly outlined to include those cases where a person is harmed as an epistemic subject, it is, according to the authors, best understood by reference to the sheer plurality of its forms. The volume pro-
gresses in a linear fashion: after opening with a section on central theoretical concepts, it elaborates on the philosophical and political ramifications of epistemic injustice and closes with case studies of localized injustices. As the editors stress in the introduction, our social setting of incessant communication calls for special attention to the power dynamics immanent in those interactions. The authors, bridging the analytical-continental divide, draw from a diverse pool of intellectual sources. Amy Allen, for one, lauds Foucault’s analysis of the role of power in the production of knowledge (187), and Lisa Guenther expands epistemological debates to Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological tradition (195).

The volume is structured into five thematic clusters. The first, titled Core concepts, introduces the reader to the vocabulary used in discussions about epistemic injustice, pointing at potential interpretative difficulties and points of conflict. Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., for instance, underlines the difficulty of defining epistemic injustice without inadvertently excluding those experiences of marginalization obscured by our limited social perspective (14). Although the focus is chiefly on those debates about epistemic injustice that had followed Miranda Fricker’s eponymous work, the contributors acknowledge prior mentions of silencing and marginalization in feminist and intersectional discourse. With chapters defining the notions of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, the first cluster functions as a toolbox for navigating the rest of the volume, and literature on epistemic injustice in general. The second section, Liberatory epistemologies and axes of oppression, explores how discussions about epistemic injustice interact with political currents in feminism, racial theory, post-colonial movements, and disability studies. The third thematic unit, Schools of thought and subfields within epistemology, examines different philosophical toolkits that can aid us in thinking about epistemic injustice. The mentioned sources range from continental thought, such as that of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty, to the pragmatist tradition (205) and the nascent branch of vice epistemology (223). In the fourth section, Socio-political, ethical, and psychological dimensions of knowing, the authors consider non-epistemological approaches to the epistemic injustice. While some authors inquire about the psychological phenomena of implicit bias and stereotype threat that often underlie unjust epistemic interactions, others analyze epistemic wrongs from a political perspective. The fifth and final thematic unit, Case studies of epistemic injustice, analyses the distinctive epistemic injustices that arise in specific political, scientific, professional, and social domains. Here, the authors link the unique epistemic configuration of each domain to different manifestations of epistemic injustice. For the sake of simplicity, I will follow the volume’s structure in offering brief comments on some chapters of interest. Reviewing a volume that encompasses more than forty leading theorists in their field is no small feat. I will do what I can.

Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. opens the volume with a chapter on the general phenomenon of epistemic injustice, and instantly recognizes the difficulty of defining such a broad field without omitting some of its subtler implications. Striving, then, to define epistemic injustice without unwittingly perpetrating it, Pohlhaus Jr. offers four lenses – or explanatory frameworks - for approaching the concept. The first lens approaches epistemic injustice by assessing
relationships of domination and oppression, and then explores how epistemic marginalization fits into these broader patterns. The second, drawing from the feminist tradition, focuses on intersubjectivity, or the shared epistemic institutions and practices that rear us into mature epistemic agents, and inquires about exclusions and breaches of trust. The third lens explores changes in epistemic systems, such as the systematic exclusion of specific perspectives that generates hermeneutical injustice. The fourth and final lens considers epistemic labor and knowledge production, analyzing those cases where agents are barred from contributing, where their contributions are invalidated, or where they are expected to produce excessive testimony about their social position, so that their epistemic labor is exploited (22). To prevent overly narrow definitions of epistemic injustice, Pohlhaus Jr. advises against limiting our analytical toolkit to only one explanatory lens.

Continuing with a chapter on testimonial injustice, Jeremy Wanderer defines it as a form of injustice that is categorically connected with the social practice of testimony as an interaction between a speaker proffering knowledge and a hearer in need of information (27). Although he remains true to Fricker’s original account, inheriting most of her examples, Wanderer extends the analysis of testimonial injustice by considering its structural forms. Wanderer, thus, identifies three main varieties of testimonial injustice. The first is Fricker’s preferred notion of injustice as transactional, wherein a hearer attributes the speaker less credibility than she deserves because they harbor prejudice towards her social group. Echoing Elizabeth Anderson, Wanderer expands upon this strictly interpersonal account and introduces the second, distributive dimension of testimonial injustice. In such cases, speakers genuinely lack the required markers of credibility – such as a refined vocabulary or a firm grasp on grammar – due to structural inequalities in access to education. Wanderer then goes even further by proposing a third variety of testimonial injustice, testimonial betrayal, an emotionally saturated phenomenon that emerges between individuals otherwise involved in intimate relationships. When we are denied trust by someone we have come to depend on, testimonial injustice assumes a distinctive weight, the experience of “humiliating rejection” (38). It remains unclear whether the patterns of identity prejudice present in testimonial betrayal at all differ from those in ordinary cases of transactional injustice.

In the third chapter on the varieties of hermeneutical injustice, Jose Medina adopts Fricker’s early definition of the phenomenon. Hermeneutical injustice, then, occurs when an individual or an entire community cannot render their experiences meaningful to others due to gaps in collective interpretative resources, or, simply put, because their perspective is not accounted for in the public sphere. Yet, unlike Fricker, who depicted hermeneutical injustice as a structural occurrence without identifiable perpetrators, Medina stresses our individual hermeneutical responsibility in treating eccentric statements and expressive styles with maximum charity. Medina distinguishes between different varieties of hermeneutical injustice by referring to their source, dynamics, breadth, and depth (45). The most extreme form of hermeneutical injustice he terms hermeneutical death, and defines it as the complete loss of one’s voice and one’s interpretative capacities, resulting in the inability to socially situate oneself as a complete sub-
ject (41). Finally, Medina pleads for individual acts of hermeneutical resistance and insurrection. To embolden those vulnerable to injustice, we must be especially charitable in interpreting their claims, which we, due to differences in perspectives and expressive styles, might initially struggle to understand. Medina stresses that oppressed subjects, as an act of resistance, can strategically refuse to adapt to dominant conversational practices and work on building alternative rhetorical spaces.

Miranda Fricker’s brief chapter on evolving concepts of epistemic injustice functions both as a retrospective review of her early work and a glance into the future of the discipline. In an effort to define the scope of discussion, she notes that, when speaking of epistemic injustice, she referred primarily to discriminatory cases of it, rather than distributive, and that the focus was on unintentional – yet culpable – displays of prejudice. Fricker then pleads for an enlivened and humane philosophy that begins its inquiries with lived experiences of marginalization, and, in a normative twist, seeks to rectify dysfunctions in present epistemic practices (57). Finally, looking to promising developments in social moral epistemology, Fricker points to case studies of epistemic injustice in the domains of healthcare and psychiatry.

Proceeding with a chapter on distributive epistemic injustice, David Coady argues that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can be fruitfully understood as instances of unequal distribution. In the case of testimonial injustice, we are dealing with an unequal distribution of credibility: the fact that marginalized groups are, due to prejudice, awarded less trust, entails the fact that privileged groups are given too much trust in return. If a black defendant is distrusted by an all-white jury, it is because the jury is attributing too much credibility to his white plaintiffs. Attributions of credibility, in Coady’s view, sometimes function as a zero-sum game. Regarding hermeneutical injustice, different groups can be said to compete for hermeneutical power. Hermeneutical injustice can thus be portrayed as the unequal distribution of meaning-making capacities, which is unfairly tilted towards privileged social groups. Coady then inquires whether certain groups, such as Neo-Nazis, can be justifiably deprived of hermeneutical power, and calls for a more careful analysis of whether unequal distributions of credibility are always unjust (65). However, Coady’s account of hermeneutical injustice might be too broad, as he seems to conflate influence on the public opinion with hermeneutical power. In other words, although Neo-Nazis might struggle to make their opinions widely known, they are not systematically prevented from attaining self-understanding and forming a vocabulary for their experiences, which are the central facets of hermeneutical injustice.

In a brisk chapter on trust, distrust, and epistemic injustice, Katherine Hawley proposes a normative account of trustworthiness in interpersonal interactions. She surveys whether trust is an appropriate attitude in different relationships and inquires about the connection between trust and social power (71). Expanding on Wanderer’s account, Hawley explores the role of trust in accepting testimony. She then closes the chapter by inquiring whether a lack of trust can give rise to epistemic injustice in otherwise non-culpable attributions of credibility.

In a chapter on forms of knowing and epistemic resources, Alexis Shotwell argues that a stern focus on propositional knowledge is in itself a form
of epistemic injustice that fetters oppressed groups in improving their social position (87). She then calls for a broader account of other epistemic resources, such as emotions, skills, tacit knowledge, social position, and embodiment. Shotwell, criticizing traditional thought experiments which endorse a distinction between knowing that and knowing how, claims that we base our identities on a more vibrant array of epistemic resources, and that the lived experiences of disability and bodily change cannot be grasped by reference to propositional knowledge alone. Epistemic justice, according to Shotwell, should account for the epistemic systems that oversee social relationships, emotions, and skills, rather than mere propositional transactions.

Lorraine Code, reflecting upon her concept of epistemic responsibility, inquires why analytical epistemology had long lacked the vocabulary to form a coherent account of responsible epistemic behavior. Due to its restrictive individualism, inherited from logical positivism, analytical epistemology was reluctant to place its subject within society, as a knower who deliberates, feels, learns from others, and engages in interpersonal interactions (91). This self-imposed limitation to an abstract and isolated subject hampered it in recognizing the salient social aspects of being a responsible agent. As social epistemology expanded to include ethical and political concerns, prominent in discussions about epistemic injustice, talk of epistemic responsibility gained an additional normative dimension. What, then, are the requirements of responsible epistemic conduct? While epistemic responsibility cannot be reduced to a universal set of rules, Code argues that we should always approach our agency as situated within a particular "epistemic imaginary," an intellectual system akin to a Kuhnian paradigm or a Foucauldian episteme, which defines all epistemic practices in our social context. Code concludes the article by underlining the relevance of epistemic responsibility in the era of social networking and climate change denial, proposing fruitful topics for further debate.

Charles W. Mills closes the first section by rehabilitating the Marxist concept of ideology. Mills starts by noting that progressive academics have abandoned the notion of ideology in favor of postmodern conceptual tools, rendering debates about false consciousness either outmoded or seemingly conspiratorial (100). He explains ideology by noting that power differentials entail harmful epistemic consequences for all involved social groups, in that privileged groups actually cannot comprehend the social experience of oppressed factions. Central to the notion of ideology, according to Mills, is its materialism, or the fact that privileged groups have a vested socioeconomic interest in depicting extant inequalities as necessary. Mills illustrates this with the example of modern racism and explains how anti-black ideology attempts to depict socially generated inequalities as natural. Connecting ideology with contemporary discussions about epistemic injustice, he then argues that marginalized groups, albeit vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice, enjoy unique epistemic access to their social experience, and can use this advantage to form alternative rhetorical spaces.

Patricia Hill Collins opens the second section with a chapter on intersectionality, defining it as the project of connecting resistant forms of knowledge and using this unity to subvert oppressive social structures (115). As intersectionality recognized that the experiences of belonging to a specific
gender, race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality overlap, it sought to create a platform for marginalized groups to voice their problems and demand social justice. Yet, according to Collins, its entrance into an academic context was met with persistent ignorance. Since intersectionality’s focus on lived experiences clashed with the dominant epistemological paradigm of asocial objectivity, its pioneers struggled to connect the political project of attaining social justice with academic agency. Drawing from the history of black feminist thought, Collins shows how intersectionality was, within academia, sanitized and stripped of its emancipatory potential. Collins then points at those academic practices, such as peer reviews and keynote lectures, which silence more radical intersectional endeavors, and calls for resistance to epistemic injustice.

In her chapter on feminist epistemology, Nancy Tuana trails how standpoint theory aimed to unearth the interests implicit in professedly neutral scientific practices. Instead of starting with Fricker’s work, Tuana reverses the process, showing how debates on epistemic injustice resumed the ethical and political project launched by feminist epistemology. Feminist epistemologists, in Tuana’s recounting, focused on the subject of knowledge as a socially situated agent at the crossing of different identities, and explored how power differentials mold our ability to participate in intellectual exchanges. More specifically, they sought to disclose just what kind of person traditional epistemology presupposed by its asocial knower. Once this universal subject was revealed to be white, male, educated, able-bodied, and economically privileged (126), liberatory epistemologies strived to acknowledge alternative perspectives and to oppose the institutional silencing of ostensibly strange or overly subjective voices. When writing about the subject of knowledge, Tuana explores which social features we must possess to be recognized as a credible epistemic agent. Much like Mills, she stresses that vulnerable groups have unique epistemic access to their social experience, and that privileged groups have a vested interest in remaining ignorant to the fact of their unjust opportunities. Tuana closes the article by recognizing the limits of her perspective and appealing for further opposition to epistemic violence.

With the chapter “Knowing disability, differently,” Shelley Tremain concludes the second section by arguing that debates on epistemic injustice have failed to acknowledge disability. According to Tremain, this omission, evident in the usage of ableist metaphors, such as “epistemic blindness” and “epistemic deafness,” renders social epistemology short of a fully intersectional approach (175). Tremain first claims that disabled individuals are, due to social stigma, particularly vulnerable to unjust hermeneutical exclusions that cannot be disregarded as mere epistemic bad luck. To further substantiate her point, Tremain shows that Fricker’s prized example of testimonial injustice, the rigged trial against a black man, Tom Robinson, from Harper Lee’s novel *To Kill a Mockingbird*, does not account for the fact Robinson was disabled. This fact, along with his race, class, and gender, played a crucial role in shaping his identity as an emasculated “conceptual impossibility” in the eyes of his prosecutors (181). Since whites usually equate black men with virility, physical force, and callousness, they struggled to make sense of Robinson, a disabled black man who showed empathy for his
In her chapter on Foucault, Amy Allen dispels some common misconceptions about his attitude towards truth and argues that his thought is a fruitful resource for social epistemology. She focuses on three aspects of Foucault’s work. First, Allen explores his dual theory of power as both constitutive and agential. Power, in Foucault’s rendition, both structures us as social subjects and takes places between subjects who, on a quotidian level, internalize and reproduce social power relations. Allen links this distinction to Fricker’s concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, showing how it can inform a richer understanding of epistemic harm. Second, she uses Foucault’s analysis of knowledge regimes to offer an alternative account of hermeneutical injustice. Foucault’s analysis of the historical processes by which knowledge is justified, institutionalized, and, finally, legitimized as credible knowledge, can help us understand the epistemic exclusions that generate hermeneutical injustice. Third, Allen rehabilitates his notion of genealogy, a “counter-memory that articulates subjugated knowledges,” as a model of resistance against epistemic injustice (187). By coupling marginalized experiences with historical erudition, we can place them within the appropriate context and attempt to counter them. Allen, wondering why Foucault is not more readily cited by scholars studying epistemic injustice, attributes this oversight to the animosity between analytical and continental philosophy, and to the widespread perception of Foucault as an epistemic reductionist. She concludes the chapter by underlining the emancipatory potential of Foucault’s thought.

Sandorf Goldberg proceeds by analyzing epistemic injustice from the perspective of social epistemology. He broadly defines social epistemology as a philosophical branch concerned with the epistemic relevance of other minds, one focused on the way we acquire, store, and communicate information in a social setting. Goldberg introduces his brand of social epistemology as a middle way between Steve Fuller’s relativistic project and Alvin Goldman’s more normative approach: he acknowledges that knowledge is produced in a social setting, but, like Goldman, retains objective standards for its justification. According to Goldberg, knowledge communities, formal and informal alike, manage their epistemic practices by imposing certain normative expectations upon other people. When approaching someone as a knower, regardless of whether they are an expert or a family member with whom we share our daily chores, we will expect them to substantiate their knowledge with a certain degree of evidence, or to display a certain degree of epistemic responsibility (215). If these expectations are illegitimate, they can generate epistemic injustices. First, injustice occurs when certain individuals are excluded from participating in epistemic practices, or when their contributions are invalidated, such as in male-dominated scientific
communities. Second, social practices can warrant normative expectations that treat people unjustly. Goldberg illustrates this with the example of low-income schools that, due to structural limitations, have lower expectations of its students, and thus fail to rear them into fully functioning epistemic agents. Third, seemingly legitimate social practices can be enforced in a way that treats certain groups unjustly. Goldberg brings this point home by describing teachers who only interact with more successful students, thus effectively excluding struggling pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, and notes cases of referees overlooking ethnic-sounding job applications. He closes the article by appealing for the utility of social epistemology in thinking about epistemic injustice.

Writing from the perspective of virtue epistemology and its nascent branch of vice epistemology, Heather Battaly examines whether testimonial injustice can be understood as an epistemic vice. Battaly starts by broadly defining epistemic vices as bad cognitive dispositions that impede us in attaining knowledge, and then distinguishes among three notions of epistemic vice. First, there is effects-vice, the general stance that vices are dispositions, both constitutive of our characters and entirely impersonal, that result in adverse epistemic effects. Second, the notion of responsibilist-vice implies that we have a bad character trait for which we are responsible, such as the motivated tendency to side with the easier solution, or to uncritically uphold the status quo. Third, as a middle way, Battaly introduces personalist-vice, the stance that epistemic vices are intrinsically bad cognitive traits which are not entirely under our control (228). She then argues that testimonial injustice usually takes the form of a personalist-vice, as we are partially exonerated for inheriting prejudiced beliefs from our social context, but still display bad cognitive traits. Battaly closes the article by encouraging further debate about whether we can be blamed for implicit epistemic vices that, due to social conditioning, slither beneath our conscious control.

In the opening chapter, Jennifer Saul examines the concepts of implicit bias and stereotype threat, defining them, in the above order, as the automatic tendency to identify a social group with certain features, and the fear that stereotypes might affect the way we are perceived by other people (235). Saul then denies that they should be treated as cases of epistemic injustice. First, according to Saul, someone can harbor implicit biases inherited from their social context without ever committing testimonial injustice. Simply put, while implicit bias is strictly a psychological disposition, testimonial injustice requires interaction between a speaker and a biased hearer. Second, she argues that not all implicit biases are related to credibility. It is unclear, though, whether Fricker herself, once she had defined testimonial injustice, indeed limits it to deflated attributions of credibility, or whether she allows for broader judgments of character. Third, implicit biases are wider than epistemic injustice in that they can also be positive, such as when whites automatically associate other whites with positive features. This claim depends on whether we treat testimonial excess as a form of epistemic injustice, and whether we, as Coady does, consider testimonial excess a distributive epistemic failure. The link between testimonial injustice and stereotype threat is, in Saul’s recounting, that of a self-fulfilling
prophecy: members of stigmatized groups, fearing their testimony will not be received well, indeed deliver a shifter and less convincing performance. Saul illustrates this with the examples of female mathematicians who underperform due to pressure, and Aboriginal rape victims offering clumsy responses to hostile questions in court (238). Speaking of hermeneutical injustice, Saul notes that the concepts of implicit bias and stereotype threat had filled critical hermeneutical gaps, and that implicit biases often potentiate hermeneutical marginalization. Finally, Saul inquires whether individuals can be trained to overcome their implicit biases. She concludes that, given these cognitive constrains, appeals to individual virtue must be supplemented with institutional measures for countering epistemic injustice.

Lorenzo C. Simpson proceeds with a hermeneutical approach to political agency. He draws a distinction between first-order agency, or the ability to act, and second-order agency, or the epistemic preconditions of choosing a particular action. Simpson argues, albeit obliquely, that individuals who cannot fully understand their social experience and thus fail to make good choices are both epistemically and politically harmed. A correct understanding of our present state is, then, a precondition of just political agency. By asking “how things appear from the first-person perspective from which these choices were made,” we can learn whether someone was epistemically hampered from making a better and more just decision (254). This approach, which he terms “narrative representability,” assesses the socially available courses of action for members of particular social groups. It also demotivates us from fallaciously “psychologizing the structural,” or, simply put, from making the false assumption that disadvantaged groups fail to thrive because of innate personal deficiencies, rather than because of structural constraints. Simpson closes the article by stressing that the inability to articulate our social experience and the absence of democratic deliberative platforms are in themselves epistemically unjust.

Sally Haslanger closes the fourth section by analyzing the relationship between objectivity, epistemic objectification, and oppression. What Haslanger wants to explore is how the notion of objectivity sustains oppression by portraying the socially conditioned epistemic weaknesses of disadvantaged groups as inherent to their nature. Haslanger first detects three ways of thinking about objectivity: objective reality, objective discourse, and objective knowledge. While objective reality pertains to the world as it is, regardless of how we conceptualize it, objective discourse refers to discourses for expressing facts, and objective knowledge encompasses claims accessible to any rational agent (279). Objectivity is, according to Haslanger, closely linked to certain forms of essentialism, the idea that observed regularities express a thing’s nature. Essentialism often entails normative assumptions, in that what is statistically “normal” of a thing becomes desirable, or representative of its ideal form. The failure to recognize that certain features are conditioned by social circumstances “leads us to attribute the regularities to something intrinsic to the agents’” (284). In Haslanger’s example, if women are structurally barred from attaining decent education, their seeming inability to participate in the public sphere may be fallaciously attributed to innate domesticity. Similarly, a social structure that unloads the burden of childbearing on women sustains the essentialist claim that women are
inherently more nurturing. This kind of status quo reasoning, when coupled with unjust social institutions, results in the looping effect: members of vulnerable groups are conditioned to attain the unseemly characteristics that are then considered part of their nature. Once the social origin of present inequalities becomes invisible, status quo reasoning justifies these inequities by naturalizing them. Haslanger exemplifies this with the case of black people receiving inadequate education, which denies them the relevant markers of credibility and confines them to poorly paid menial labor. She then identifies three distinct forms of objectification that lead to epistemic injustice: ideological, projective, and Kantian objectification (285). It is ideological objectification that conceals the contingent social roots of our unjust epistemic practices and portrays artificial inequalities as natural. Haslanger ends by stressing that a focus on individual rather than structural solutions and a bias towards stability contribute to epistemic and social injustice, and that epistemic justice will require us to dismantle unjust social structures.

To sum up, Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, Jr. have compiled a fruitful collection of topics that warrants philosophical attention and will surely inspire further inquiry. The volume, however, harbors a general tendency that is worth noting: its authors, aiming for maximum inclusiveness, almost unanimously overlook the question of epistemic quality. There is no mention of whether distrusting underprivileged individuals who lack the relevant markers of credibility, albeit it entrenches inequality, can sometimes be epistemically justified. This trend of disregarding epistemic quality, or its lack, actually makes the authors less attentive to the systemic barriers that prevent vulnerable groups from attaining a decent education. The desire to attain social justice thus results in less social justice, as we end up with an incomplete understanding of the social institutions which, through inequitably distributed education and inaccessible deliberative platforms, reproduce unjust epistemic asymmetries. As this insight was fully present in Elizabeth Anderson’s much earlier article on the structural causes of epistemic injustice, we may wonder whether social moral epistemology should want to revisit a more grounded approach. Nevertheless, anyone interested in epistemic injustice is well advised to expand their analytical vocabulary with the tools here offered, and certain topics, such as Carel and Kidd’s analysis of epistemic wrongs in healthcare, promise fecund practical applications. There is certainly more philosophical work to be done, as most authors diagnose social maladies, leaving their solutions open for future discussions.

HANA SAMARŽIJA
University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia