Geography and Nationalist Visions of Interwar Yugoslavia by Vedran Duančić

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Studija slučaja / Case study



Map of South-East Europe illustrating territorial changes since 1914. [Scale 1:4,500,000]

Philips' International Atlas: A Series of 160 pages of coloured maps and plans forming a complete Geographical Survey of the International Relationships of the New Era, Its Territorial Changes and Commercial Communications with an index of over 65,000 names; edited by George Philip, F.R.G.S.: London: George Philip & Son, 1945.

Map demonstrates in two shades of green the territorial area representing the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Slovenes, created on 29 October 1918 by a proclamation of independence from Austria-Hungary

by the Croatian Sabor (Parliament), and the Kingdom of Serbia, with the Kingdom of Montenegro incorporated, which united on 1 December 1918 to create a new state community called the Kingdom of Serb, Croats, and Slovenes. As the title suggests, the map shows the changes to the frontier since 1914, including treaties reached at the Paris peace congress and beyond.

The map shows the radical changes to the map effected by the Balkan wars of 1912-13, where Greece increased its territory by 68 percent; Bulgaria, 29 percent; Serbia, 82 percent; and, Montenegro, 62 percent. As a result, four-fifths of European Turkey was wrestled from the Ottoman Empire.

Treaty Legend:
I.T.Y. Italian-Yugoslav Treaty
L.T. Lausanne Treaty
M.T. Margherita Treaty
N.T. Neuilly Treaty
Ra. T. Rapallo Treaty
St. G.T. St. Germain Treaty
T.T. Trianon Treaty
V.T. Versailles Treaty
C. of A. Council of Ambassadors
L. of N. League of Nations

R. W. Seton-Watson observed in his review of O. Randl's *La Jugoslavia* (Napoli; 1922) that geography has been unkind to the Jugoslavs.[1] A summary of geographical vicissitudes and misfortune is a fitting prelude to a review of Vedran Duančić's *Geography and Nationalist Visions of Interwar Yugoslavia: Modernity, Memory and Identity in South-East Europe* (2020). Seton-Watson's reflections on the geographical torments of Yugoslavia were written with realism, deep understanding of geography, history and geopolitics, and as a champion of Yugoslavia, merit citation extēnsiō:

> Dalmatia, their façade to Europe, is more accessible from the sea than from the land, isolated from world-currents, though at critical moments all too exposed to the march of armies alike

1 This observation should be contrasted with Seton-Watson's assessment of the triune and one Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia and its independent political position within the territory of the Austrian-Hungarian empire. Seton-Watson states that Croatia owes its independent position within the territory of St. Stephen in large measure to geographical reasons: "Croatia falls naturally into two portions: first, the triangular territory between the Drave and the Save, extending from Friedau in Styria and Rann in Carniola as far as the frontier town of Semlin (Zimony) which looks across the water to Belgrad; and second, the high limestone walls which consist the mountain system of the Balkans with the Karst above Trieste (and so with the Styrian Alps), and which sink abruptly down to the Adriatic at Fiume." See under the *non de plume* Scotus Viator (H. W. Seton Watson), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd.; 1908), page 7.

> from East to West, using it as a corridor of advance. Thus, from the decay of the Roman Empire till 1918, there has never been a single powerful and independent state, uniting all the regions to-day known as "Jugoslavia." For nearly thirteen centuries the Jugoslavs have been torn between the rival influences of Rome and Byzantium, and political developments in modern times have complicated still further a conflict which is spiritual even more than political, by adding the dual and mutually hostile influences of Vienna and Budapest. When at last a supreme achievement of unity, the nation, as a whole, was barely ready for so great a change. Thanks to unfavourable geographical conditions, lack of communication and education, and a deliberate policy of separation and division on the part of their rulers, large sections of the nation were still utterly parochial in outlook and living in water-tight compartments. Hence a considerable time must, of necessity, elapse before "Jugoslavia" can "find herself," and there is no need for pessimism or impatience if the new state, when faced by such gigantic problems of reorganization and readjustment, has, even after four years, not succeeded in clarifying the political situation, or even reaching a constitutional settlement acceptable to the majority. It is not merely, or indeed not so much, the very definite distinction between Serb, Croat and Slovene that has to be overcome, but the barriers which a long historical process has established between at least eight different units—Serbia, Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Slovene lands, Dalmatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Southern Hungary. (*Review* of *La Jugoslavia* by O. Randi. (Pubblicazioni dell' Istituo per l'Europa Orientale in Roma. Seconda Serie, vol. I.) Napoli (R. Ricciardi); 1922. R. W. Seton-Watson: *The Slavonic Review: (Vol. 1, No. 3 (March, 1923), pp. 680-683*)).

In "*Geography and Nationalist Visions of Interwar Yugoslavia: Modernity, Memory and Identity in South-East Europe*," Vedran Duančić brings to life the major geographers who shaped the discipline and defined the boundaries of geography in interwar Yugoslavia. When King Alexander proclaimed the royal dictatorship in 1929 and singly changed the name of the new state to the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia" from the cumbrous "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," cartographers and cartoonists of the world expressed a collective sigh of relief that Southeastern Europe had finally been simplified by an enchanters' wand. The demand, however, for simplicity and conformity expected by scholars and statesmen alike was betrayed by the vexatious complexity and opaqueness of what made Yugoslavia "Yugoslavia" and what made Yugoslavs "Yugoslav." As the flamboyant Count Ferdinand Czernin commented wittily if not flippantly in his mischievous *Europe, going, going, gone* (1939), unlike Czechoslovakia, which after all is honestly inhabited by

Czechs and Slovaks, Jugoslavia is not inhabited by Jugs and Slavs, but by Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes, which is, of course, very illogical and doesn't exactly show a helpful spirit.

There appears to be no single definition of "Yugoslavia" or "Yugoslav" in Slovenian, Croatian, or Serbian, let alone in any other language. Woislav M. Petrovitch, author of "*Serbia: Her People, History, and Aspirations*" (1915), and an attaché to the Royal Serbian Legation to the Court of St. James's, wrote that the new appellation "Jugoslavia" is combined from "Jug" (meaning in Serbian *South*) and "Slavia" (meaning *Slavdom*), being "a collective appellation of all Serbian-speaking lands, namely, Serbia, Montenegro, the greater part of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Batchka, Banat, Syrmia, Carniola, Carinthia, Croatia, Slavonia, and part of Istria." Petrovitch explains that owing "to the territorial situation and foreign influences there appear three names for one and the same people in those provinces, but all the three groups—Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenians (or Slovenes)—speak the same language, with only slight dialectic differences, (what language has not its own?) again largely due to foreign influences. As for religions, the Serbians mostly profess the Eastern Orthodox, while Croatians and Slovenians adhere to the Roman Catholic faith." ("*Serbia's history in the light of the war*," by Woislav M. Petrovitch: *Current History: A Monthly Magazine of The New York Times*: (April 1918, pp. 141-149).)[2] If only it were so simple.

Duančić explores the discipline of geography whose practitioners played an extraordinary role in making and breaking interwar Yugoslavia. The author argues that geographers, more than any other group of experts, found themselves in a unique position to address the politically sensitive questions, for they could provide accounts of Yugoslavia's past, present and future. He also believes that as time and space, geography and history, appeared inextricable connected, geographers examined the physical and cultural landscapes of the new country in the present, but they could also reflect on the history of Yugoslav "tribes"—especially the ways in which geography had affected it—and the prospects of Yugoslavia by comparing it with European countries old and new, which they believed resembled Yugoslavia in geographical location or composition—and therefore historical destiny. These sentiments echoes the thinking inhering the discourse of the Croatian revivalists of the early 1800s who viewed geography as the grammar, and history as the syntax, of good citizenship and patriotism.

2 Contrast the map and description attached to Petrovitch's article on page 147, which states "*Serbia in its relation to surrounding states, the heavy line indicates the South Slavic peoples who desire to unite, forming the new state of Jugoslavia*," with virtually the same map attached to an article "*Growth of the Jugoslav movement: project for a South Slavic state, aided by Czechs, threatens to disrupt Austria-Hungary*," (*Current History* of July 1918) on page 116, which states: "*Shaded area shows the projected state of Jugoslavia, including Serbia, Montenegro, and Slavic portions of Austria-Hungary*." This philosophical and terminological inexactitude was woven into the fabric of the new states' political, constitutional and thought matrix and systems of power and identity.

Geography and Nationalist Visions of Interwar Yugoslavia is divided into six superbly articulated, readable, and copiously documented chapters with an introduction that sets the tone of the study and an *au fait* conclusion that brings together the key issues woven throughout the discourse. Duančić is masterful in describing geographers as builders of nations and states, but discounts too quickly the impact of geography and geographers on the statesmen and diplomats assembled at the Paris peace conference at the end of the war to action the three emerging principles of legitimacy of international life: democracy, national self-determination, and a commonwealth of peaceful states. Democracy and self-determination were essential prerequisites of the third and all three were necessary for a new era of world peace. Principles and the taming of power politics aside, the congress of peace also required acute geographical knowledge. This was a virtual renaissance in the geographer's craft that brought together a startling range of scholars from different perspectives who only shared a vague notion of what a common South Slavic state community would look like beyond its physical contours and geographical dimensions. Yugoslavia was founded on a concatenation of unlikely and impossible-to-be repeated events—twice in the twentieth century. In short, Yugoslavia was a two-act drama with a fleeting but jarring proscript. The congress also assembled some of the sharpest minds in geography from the great powers, including the United States who had greater knowledge of history and geographical aspects than many in the official delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Reaching for a constitutional and territorial definition of the new state and its boundaries proved so difficult that it nearly broke the conference. It is as if Yugoslavia was what Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Italy were not. Greater attention to granular detail at the Paris peace conference by Duančić would reveal that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was not a participant at the opening of the congress nor was it recognized by the Allied and Associated powers assembled in Paris nor the collective will of the international community. Rather, Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia were the only southern Slavic states admitted to the conference while *the* Yugoslavia that was formed on 1 December 1918 remained outside in the bitter winter cold menaced with uncertainty. Dr. Ante Trumbić, was the founder of the South Slav Committee in exile but at the Paris peace conference he participated as the minister of foreign affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia and head of the Serbian delegation.

Although outside the scope of this review essay, an interesting line of inquiry would be to explore the evolution of the Corfu declaration signed by the exiled South Slav Committee and the Serbian government-in-exile, and the Geneva treaty that was signed by the Slovene, Serb and Croat State and

the Kingdom of Serbia after its victorious return to Belgrade.[3] It should not be forgotten that the declaration of Corfu was portrayed by the *New York Times* of 9 November 1918 as the "pleasing hallucination of a few visionaries." It was a significant leap from the Corfu declaration to the Pact of Rome. The Pact of Rome was adopted on 10 April 1918, essentially represents Italy's recognition of the unity and independence of the new Yugoslav state community, with a pledge to that all territorial controversies would be settled in a friendly manner according to the principle of nationality *qua* the right of national self-determination. A less accommodating attitude dictated Italian policy at the peace conference after the armistice. It was an even farther leap from the Corfu declaration to the Geneva treaty, and still a staggering leap to the act of union of 1 December 1918. The Corfu declaration and the Geneva treaty contained a clear hierarchy of principles of equality and mechanisms of power sharing. The Geneva treaty, as a bilateral agreement between two sovereign states, specifically declared that the governments of Belgrade and Zagreb were to retain their former spheres until a constituent assembly, elected by universal suffrage, could draw up a new constitution. As we know, the elections were not fair nor universal as women were not allowed to vote nor were minorities, who constituted approximately twenty percent of the population. The electoral districts were not uniform and significantly distorted the constituent assembly in Serbia's favour. It is an axiom of political philosophy that civil society and democracy are difficult to achieve and to maintain because it requires for its success the active cooperation of a large contingent of able, experienced, and publicly spirited citizens and institutions of governance that are confident in the continuous and orderly transfer of power. Despite its flaws, philosophers

3 The Croatian attitude in the Austrian parliament can be taken from the 30 May 1917 declaration of the Southern Slav parliamentary caucus, which declared that "they will demand, on the basis of the principle of nationality and of Croatian states' rights, the union of all territories of the Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in an independent state community, free from the rule of any foreign nation and resting on a democratic basis, under the sceptre of the Hapsburg-Lorraine dynasty; and that they will devote all their energies to the realization of this demand of their nation, which forms a single unit." The reference to Croatian states' rights is a significant point of departure to understanding the approach to independence during a repressive war time regime in Austria. The Tito-Šubašić Agreement on the new Yugoslav state community concluded on 1 November 1944 also made reference to states' rights in the form of "sovereignty of the national individualities within the state and their equal rights." The relevant passage reads: "The new Government will publish a declaration proclaiming the fundamental principles of the democratic liberties and guaranteeing their application. Personal freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, freedom of assembly and association, will be specially emphasized and guaranteed; and, in the same way, the right of property and private initiative. The sovereignty of the national individualities within the State and their equal rights will be respected and safeguarded, as decided at the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia. Any predominance of one nation over another will be excluded." The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union sponsored the new Yugoslav state community by virtue of this declaration issued at the close of the Yalta conference, which explicitly endorsed the terms of the Tito- Šubašić Agreement. The *sovereignties of the national individualities* within the state found expression in the form of a federal state structure in which each republic reflected a people constituting a majority with two autonomous provinces. Bosnia and Herzegovina was restored to its sovereignty with a complex population matrix that supported its uniqueness and statehood. The significance of 30 May 1917 as a declaration asserting Croatian states' rights runs parallel to the 30 May 1990 constitution of the first democratically elected parliament in modern Croatian history. To suggest a direct link in the thinking that went into the Croatian government's decision to nominate 30 May 1990 with the 30 May 1917 declaration would be a long bow.

and statesmen recognize that democracy has proven itself by experience to be the least unsatisfactory of all political systems that have been devised so far. As the peace congress in Paris advanced, the Croatian republican movement demonstrated with powerful dynamism the extent to which the political leadership and citizens of Croatia sought to independence, casting a thick shadow over efforts to seek recognition of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.[4] In response to the global success of the republican movement in Croatia, Stjepan Radić was arrested and confined to prison for over a year without due process. The Croats, Serbs and Slovenes assembled in Paris as official delegates of "*the new state*" whose existence was not legitimized by a signed and ratified treaty but a mere exchange of speeches and pleasing salutations, adopted the "*Paris Resolution*," a platform formulated at rolling meetings held on 15, 18 and 22 March 1919, which narrowed the scope of the constitutional possibilities and negated previously agreed parameters of unification. This resolution specifically sought to negate the republican and independence movement in Croatia, as well as reject the idea that the new state could be constituted as a state community defined as either a federation or confederation. It also refuted the validity of the claims espoused by the Macedonians and Montenegrins. The Paris resolution underscored that "our state is to be unitary (*jedinstvena*), not complex, therefore, it is not to be

4 It has been observed that despite the unilateral American recognition of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 7 February 1919, President Wilson retained certain reservations about the new state. Wilson was concerned about the future position of Montenegro and the effect of Croatia's republican movement as there is evidence that the 19 May 1919 memorandum with 157,669 Croatian citizens asking for a Croatian republic reached him from Zagreb. Although the Yugoslav national council enjoyed representation in the United States, the outlook on unification and the new constitutional order evolved, and by mid-November 1918, a majority of its members were in favour of a democratic federal southern Slav state, stressing that they preferred a "republic after the model of the United States." See "*The South Slavs*," by George J. Prpic, *On Wilson's Peace Policies*, edited by Joseph P. O'Grady (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press; 1967). On the issue of the new Southeastern Europe that emerged in conversation with Orlando on 30 January 1919, President Wilson supported the ideal of national self-determination that would lead to two or possibly three states in the region. Wilson outlined his view on South-eastern Europe in a conversation with Orlando, the Italian Foreign Minister. President Wilson's thinking on Croatia, as captured by David Miller, is quite compelling: "Yugo-Slavia might be divided into one, two or three States. He was prepared to admit two Yugo-Slav States to the League of Nations but, if it were found advisable to separate them into three parts, he would prefer to place the more unformed and less developed of the new States under the mandatory of the League of Nations," ("*Notes of a Conversation between President Wilson, Signor Orlando, Colonel House, and Signor Scialoja*," David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* [20 volumes]: Privately printed, 1928. Quotation taken from Volume IV, document 268). The U.S. Department of State conducted a strategic review of President Wilson's Fourteen Points on 29 October 1918, the same day that Croatia declared its independence from Austria and Hungary, prepared by Frank I. Cobb, editor of the *New York World*, and Walter Lippmann, Secretary of *The Inquiry* and later attached to the Commission to negotiate peace, that contrasted the fourteen principles against the emerging new international realities. The memorandum identified the growing international importance of the Croatian question as a factor for consideration at the peace congress at Paris. Specifically, the memorandum stated: "An international problem arises out of the refusal of the Croats to accept the domination of the Serbs of the Servian Kingdom. (Diplomatic cable number 763.72119/8979, London, 29 October 1918; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*: (1918: *Supplement* 1, *The World War*, Volume 1)). The Kingdom of Montenegro also found its valid claims to self-determination frustrated during and shortly after the peace congress. The restoration of Montenegro to independent status had been explicitly included in the American Fourteen Points. Montenegro's independence, according to Stephen Bonsal, was one of the Fourteen Points "nearest to President Wilson's heart." Bonsal also observed the fundamental significance of President Wilson's decision to press for the establishment of the League of Nations, including embedding the League in the peace treaties, at the expense of the full application of the principle of national self-determination. (*Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles*. By Bonsal Stephen. Introduction by Krock Arthur. (New York: Prentice-Hall; 1946.).)

arranged as a federal state, akin to Germany or Switzerland, nor an united states, like the United States." Signatories of this resolution included Jovan Cvijić , Dr. Ante Trumbić, Dr. Josip Smodlaka, and Dr. Ferdo Šišić. This resolution was a political document without legal effect. It also did not reflect the new political mood in Croatia or the realities within the new state with Montenegro and Macedonia asserting their sovereign statehood.

The United States unilaterally recognized the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 7 February 1919 through a statement released to the press by the U.S. Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk without prejudice to the outcome of the peace conference, particularly with regard to the boundaries of the new Southern Slav state. The other allies were not so swift in recognizing the new kingdom. Britain recognized the new state on 2 June 1919 and France on 6 June. Observers looked askance at the official British announcement on the recognition of the new state, noting that the statement was a "somewhat unsatisfying appearance, and the absence of any official congratulations on the event will probably lead many people to believe that it is premature" (The *Near East* magazine of 6 June 1919). When the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, it did not refer to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but rather to the "Serb-Croat-Slovene State." Italy's signature on the treaty only suggested at best *de facto* recognition of the new state. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which was not a party to the congress, only recognized each other and entered into mutual diplomatic relations in June 1940.

The Kingdom of Montenegro was still asserting its rights as a sovereign state in international law and diplomacy while an armed revolution took place in the mountains contesting the country's coerced dissolution and inclusion into the Kingdom of Serbia prior to the act of union. Macedonia was also asserting its independence as a sovereign state. At the same time, Croatia was seeking international recognition of the Croatian republic as a sovereign state, petitioning the Paris Peace Conference, asserting its right to national self-determination and statehood. Legal scholars, such as the renowned professor of constitutional and international law at the University of Belgrade Jivoin Péritch (*Droit International Yougoslave*: 1928) and the international legal expert at Geneva Krystyna Marek (*Identity and Continuity of States in International Law*: 1968) observed that three sovereignties were renounced in the formation of the new state: the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (proclaimed 29 October 1918), the Kingdom of Montenegro, and the Kingdom of Serbia. V. R. Savić, the head of the press bureau in the Serbian Foreign Office and author of *South Eastern Europe* (1917), noted that Serbia and Montenegro have ceased to exist as independent states and have merged themselves in a large national commonwealth of "*Jugoslavia*," now officially called the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. ("*A Danubian Confederation of the future*," by V. R. Savić: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*: (Vol. 84, July 1919).)

The reference to *the triple renunciation* of sovereignty by the kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro, and the new State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs is

a poignant statement on the issue of whether Yugoslavia was a new state with its own distinct personality in international law and diplomacy, or rather, an extension of the Kingdom of Serbia. Smodlaka, one of Croatia's pre-eminent advocates of the formation of a South Slavic state community, reminded the great powers, diplomatists, and legal experts assembled at the peace congress:

> The new State, the official title of which is the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," but which is more commonly referred to by the name of "Jugoslavia," expects more than the demarcation of its frontiers from the Peace Conference: it demands its formal admission into the family of States. There are several new States placed in analogous positions; but the case of our Kingdom is of a special nature, the result of the following fact. Its formation is not merely the outcome of the dissolution of great empires vanquished and overthrown—as was the case with Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic, for instance—but it also involves the disappearance of two sovereign and living Kingdoms, namely Serbia and Montenegro. By the unanimous and spontaneous decisions of their National Assemblies held respectively at Belgrade and Podgorica, these two States have signified there complete adhesion to the principle of their fusion in one singe State with their Jugoslav co-nationals of the ex-Monarchy of Austria-Hungary: the latter, on their part, passed similar resolution at the meeting of the Zagreb National Council; which body, comprising representatives of all Jugoslav provinces of the late Habsburg Monarchy, solemnly renounced the sovereign authority it had acquired by their deliverance from the Austro-Hungarian yoke, and voted for fusion with Serbia in a new State.
>
> The union thus achieved by this triple renunciation certainly constitutes the fairest victory of national right and the right of peoples freely to dispose of themselves—those two "rights" which are to serve as foundation for the new political world order.
>
> These unanimous resolutions of three national representative bodies—Serbian, the Montenegrin, and that of the Jugoslav of the late Dual Monarchy—afford proof conclusive of the unswerving will of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to base the foundations of their common political future upon national unity and the complete fusion of three sections, politically separated by history, but in truth only the three branches of one and the same people. (*Jugoslav Territorial Claims*: Lecture delivered by Dr. Josip Smodlaka, Deputy for Spalato and Member of the Peace Conference Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, at a meeting of the *Union des Grandes Associations françaises contre la Propagande ennemie*, on Tuesday, 11 March 1919: Paris: Lang, Blanchong & Co's Printing. 7 Rue Rochechouart, 7. 1919.)

The triple eclipse of sovereignties that constituted the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a new state can also be found in the fact that international recognition was sought for the new state rather than an expanded or enlarged Serbia. It can also be found in the treaties entered into by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as part of the Paris peace conference settlement. One striking example is the definition of the new state in the minorities treaty signed on 10 September 1919, accepted by Belgrade as a vivid example of coercive diplomacy. The treaty was in fact signed under protest by its delegates, arguing that the minority clauses amounted to an infringement of the country's sovereignty, the treaty is important from the perspective that it defined the new state as an amalgamation between two principal entities, the Kingdom of Serbia and the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy *qua* the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The three key provisions from the preamble of the treaty are:

> Whereas, Since the commencement of the year 1913 extensive territories have been added to the Kingdom of Serbia,[5] and
>
> Whereas, The Serb, Croat and Slovene peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have of their own free will determined to unite with Serbia in a permanent union for the purposes of forming a single sovereign independent State under the title of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and
>
> Whereas, The Prince Regent of Serbia and the Serbian Government have agreed to this union, and in consequence the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes has been constituted and has assumed sovereignty over these territories inhabited by these people. (*The Jugoslav Minorities Treaty*: *Contemporary Review*: published in the rubric World of Nations: Facts and Documents: The Contemporary Review (Vol. CXVII: February; 1920. Pp. 274-279.)

The state for Croats was not a vapid abstraction, but a real, vivid, and continuous experience. What, in fact, did the term "state" signify? The independent political communities *qua* states that constituted the association of states in Austria and Hungary, each state was fully conscious of its unity in its own right, with its own territory, constitution and law, and traditions, including in the case of Croatia, autonomous defence forces and military organization. While the medieval state cannot be compared with the modern state created by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), it nevertheless constituted a solid reality. The Treaty of Westphalia has been described proudly as the

5 The Principality of Serbia was under the suzerainty of the Ottomans for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, and at the Congress of Berlin (1878), Serbia was recognized as an independent state. The independence of the Principality of Montenegro was also recognized at the Congress of Berlin. Serbia's borders were delimited to exclude the northern part of Macedonia, which was retained by the Ottomans, and Austria-Hungary took possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first time that the two provinces were detached from the Turkish empire. Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908 and shortly after given a separate constitution. Serbia nearly doubled its territory in the first and second Balkan wars (1912 and 1913), adding nearly fifty percent to her population to the disadvantage of Bulgaria and the Ottoman empire.

fundamental pact of modern Europe, a significant landmark in the universal political evolution of the sovereign state. For the Croats, it is a convenient marker for their conception of political community and statehood as the sovereign state ascended to supreme authority in the international realm. There are, in my view, three factors that, above all others, have shaped Croatian politics and conceptions of statehood in the twentieth century. The first factor is the idea of the republic, certainly the greatest innovation in Croatian political thinking that marks a leap forward in the self-definition of Croatia. Very little attention has been given to this innovation by constitutional and legal scholars and historians, and Duančić is no exception. The independent republics of Dubrovnik and Poljica are two examples of a long tradition of statehood which found expression in the republican form, which enjoyed a high degree of independence and freedom of manoeuvre of the great powers in Eurasia. At the end of the First World War, the trend was for new states to be formed as republics, and Poland, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Turkey all developed rapidly into republics. The old order monarchies were not only menaced by republicanism, but also the spectre of communism which was sweeping Central and Southeastern Europe. Karl Marx famously flung his challenge to Europe in 1848 that a spectre was haunting Europe—the spectre of communism. In 1919 the spectre was not exorcised, but rather it's expanding shadow was becoming a reality in Europe.

The second factor, without a doubt, consists in the states' rights tradition and ideas supporting Croatian constitutional and legal system and the experience of association with other sovereign or independence political communities. Indeed, the associations with Hungary and Austria, however contentious and difficult to comprehend in modern political and legal terms, display simultaneously the vitality of complex political associations and their vulnerabilities. It has been Croatia's boast since it sprang into existence to profess and practice extreme moderation, preference for peaceful settlement of disputes and an unique capacity for creative compromise. All these traits are encapsulated in the "*Pacta conventa*" of 1102 between Croatia and Hungary, one of the most durable security and political arrangements in European diplomacy. No other state or independent political community enjoyed the special relations with Hungary that the "*Pacta conventa*" offered to Croatia, even if it required constant refinement and protection from encroachments or degradation. Under this treaty, Croatia lost its national rulers but it nevertheless retained its kingdom and conception of statehood or individuated political community. Croatian scholars widely consider the treaty and constitutional linkages between the triune and one Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia and Hungary during the medieval period to have been that of *regna social* (*associated kingdoms*) since the Croats voluntarily entered into the special arrangements. Hungarian constitutional lawyers refer to the triune kingdom *partes adnexae* (*collateral lands*) or *pars subjecta* (*conquered territory*), claiming Croatia was conquered by Hungary. The revolutions that shook the foundations of Europe to its core in 1848 also caused the dissolution

of the *indissoluble* and *indivisible* Austria and Hungary. As a result, the treaty and constitutional linkages between Croatia and Austria and Hungary were dissolved and held in abeyance until 1868, when Croatia and Hungary entered into new treaty arrangement.[6] The treaty of 1868 was not a mere law of Hungary, but a treaty between two states, represented by the parliaments of Budapest and Zagreb, and the treaty asserts in the most explicit terms that no agreement between the two states can be legally valid unless it obtains the sanction of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). The other Slavic domains and principalities did not constitute at that moment specific attributes of statehood but rather came within the Hungarian law on nationalities (1868). The law on nationalities did not extend to Croatia because Croatia was recognized as "a political nation possessing a special territory of its own."[7]

Originally, Austria and Hungary was a number of sovereign states, and the first union was established in 1713 by the common constitutional law of the states called the "*Pragmatic Sanction*," a law that was accepted by all the parliaments (diets) of the several states of which the realm was composed. The states may have been "indissolubly united" under the same sceptre, but each possessed distinct fundamental laws and other individuated political institutions. The Slavs within Austria and Hungary all developed unique political institutions and practices that neither Austria nor Hungary could erase, and more fundamentally, their sense of shared Slavic identities were not strong enough to universalize the singular or create a Slavic commonwealth beyond a few rhetorical flourishes. The political unity of Austria and Hungary constituted an association or community of states, a community which "reposes" on historical antecedents and their ancient constitutions. Austria and Hungary was a state of intense equilibrium, having a constant sway of centrifugal and centripetal forces from within and without. However, Austria never succeeded in erasing the sovereignties of it's constitutive states and create Austria "*ein Totum*," that is, made into "*a whole*" despite enormous effort put into this enterprise, a state that would use the Danube as its axis. In the international jurisprudence on

6 Croatia along with Transylvania joined Hungary in declining to send representatives to the formal opening of the new Austrian parliament on 1 May 1861 asserting that they possessed a constitution distinct from the empire. In 1867 Austria and Hungary forged the *Ausgleich* (Compromise), a state treaty which divided the entire Habsburg dominion into two autonomous parts: the empire of Austria and the kingdom of Hungary, and the Emperor assumed the joint title of emperor of Austria and King of Hungary.

7 A detailed discussion of these themes can be found in Scotus Viator (H. W. Seton Watson), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd.; 1908), page 139.. The transcripts of notes and negotiations on the state treaty are contained in *Spisi odnoseći se na provedenje Nagode izmedju Kraljevine Ugarske te kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije godine 1868*. [*Documents relating to the implementation of the Settlement between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia concluded in the year 1868*] (Zagreb: Kralj. Zemaljska tiskara; 1868). A more detailed elaboration of the treaty relations and diplomatic practice that evolved since 1868 is contained in *Spomenica o Državopravnih Pitanjih Hrvatsko-Ugarskih* [*Memorandum on questions of Croatian-Hungarian constitutional law*], by Josip Pliverić (Kr. Zemaljska tiskara; 1907). A thorough analysis of the state rights philosophy and practice was elogquently elucidated in *Temelji državnoga prava*: (*Fundamenta iuris publici Regni Croatiae*), *najstarije doba: Pacta conventa*, Napisao Dr Nikola pl. Tomašić, drugo znatno popunjeno izdanje (Zagreb: Tisak kr. Zemalj. Tiskare; 1915) and its equivalent published in German posthumously *Fundamente des Staatsrechtes des Konigreiches Kroatien* (*Fundamenta iuris publiciregni Croatiae*) *Älteste Zeit*: *Pacta conventa*: Von Nikolaus von Tomašić; Deutsch von Dr. Ivan von Bojničić.[Aus dem Kroatischen übersetzt von Hofrat universitatprofessor Ivan von Bojničić] (Zagreb: Landesdruckerei; 1918).

states and the community of sovereign states of the nineteenth century, it was recognized that a nation *qua* people or independent political community may be either a single independent state, or an independent system of states united together by a federal compact, the conditions of which are susceptible of infinite variations. Oxford professor of law and one of Her Majesty's Counsel, Travers Twiss, in *The Law of Nations considered as Independent Political Communities: On the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of Peace* (1861), observes that a system of states may be federally united under an hereditary prince, or under an elective President, or under a representative Council, and in each of these cases the national unity of the system may be as complete as in the case of a single independent state. Twiss makes an important difference with significant import for Croatia which helps explain why the leading legal scholars and historians in the nineteenth century so rigorously established that Croatia's association with Hungary and Austria was voluntary and based on an associations of states. Twiss in his treatise states that it is of importance not to confound a body politic of states, incorporated together *jure imperii* under a common sovereign prince, with a federal system of states united together *jure societatis*, which has been, as such, the subject of international recognition.

The Croatian experience with statehood could not be extinguished by an act of union that consisted of an exchange of felicitations and toasts as occurred in Belgrade on 1 December 1918.

The third, the idea of a shared state community for Southern Slavs as originally conceived as the third sovereignty in a new Austrian-Hungarian-Croatian state community or independent, which may or may not include the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. The 1848 Croat thought in terms of the state as a sovereignty in association with other sovereignties, and declared independence, supported by the thirty "demands of the Croats" for "perfect independence," prior to Hungary declaring its independence in 1849. The world appraised by Croats in 1848 was not imbued with a South Slavic consciousness, but a distinct Croatian perspective paralleled and buttressed by an Illyrian concept of the world. This was a complex interplay between conceptions of the particular and the universal; the self and other that privileged a Croatian outlook on the inclusion of a grand Illyrian kingdom within Europe. The Croat in 1918 thought in terms of trialism within a common state community that would be formed as Austria-Hungary-Croatia, or complete independence from Austria and Hungary, or an association with Serbia and Montenegro. This third image of Croatia did not envisage the eclipse of all institutions of state, political community, or legal traditions. The republican innovation was built on the states' rights tradition and shaped the Croatian perspective on a South Slavic state community but could not support a Yugoslav consciousness or state entity which was undifferentiated and excluded Croatian statehood and the ideal of the republic. The dissonance in Croatia over these three aspects of Croatian statehood resulted in the Croats being impaled on the horns of a dilemma between respect for their own sovereignty and the creation of a

new state community that hollowed out the foundations of political traditions and institutions that shaped Croatia as an independent political community. What the Croats failed to appreciate is the danger of a new state community that diminished and reversed agreements and treaties less than a few months old could not survive without the existence of robust institutions of statehood that characterised Croatia's continuous existence, institutions that not even the combined power of Austria and Hungary could extinguish despite centuries of overt and covert stratagems. After practicing one of the historically incongruous traits of self-delusion, the Croats seemed powerless to prevent the progressive fading of Croatia from the map of Europe in 1918 and beyond.

The Croats enjoyed the idea of creating new states so much that they created the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (29 October 1918),[8] participated in the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1 December 1918), only to declare Croatia a pacific republic in 1919 on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, seeking international recognition of their claims to national self-determination and independence at the congress. The Croatian republican movement was abundantly confident that Europe and the United States would recognize Croatia's incontestable right to self-determination and independence as a state in republican form. So *outré* were the Croatian actions in petitioning the American President and the most impressive galaxy of statesmen assembled at Paris that it gave rise to enormous interest in the global media, diplomatic community, and an electrified response from Belgrade. Reaching out to Paris rather than Belgrade indicated the extent to which the republican movement believed that the peace congress was the ideal forum to address the Croatian political question and the aspirations of the Croatian people. The idea of the republic of Croatia emerged in 1918 and burgeoned in 1919 was a legal and logical corollary of the state's rights tradition. The political history of Croatia can be summarized as one long drawn-out parliamentary and legal enterprise to defend and expand the historical states' rights and territorial ambit of the Croatian state. On 25 July 1918, the Croats assembled in Zagreb endorsed the idea of the republic for Croatia, and on 25 November 1918, 2,832 delegates assembled in Zagreb representing 50,000 citizens resolutely declared their opposition to the concept of centralism. At a meeting on 3 February 1919, 6,882 delegates of the Croatian republican movement, speaking on behalf of 200,000 citizens, resolved to send a petition to the Paris Peace Conference. As a result, a telegram was sent to President Wilson and the statesmen assembled at the congress on 8 February 1919 demanding the withdrawal of the Serbian army from Croatia and the convening of a Croatian constituent assembly and convoking the Croatian parliament, as well as protesting against

8 To commemorate this historical milestone, the City of Zagreb gave the name of Woodrow Wilson to its most beautiful square, formerly named after Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry, formerly ban of Croatia and premier of Hungary known for his unique style of governance characterised by ruthless Hungarian national monomania and political oppression. In anticipation of this event, Stjepan Radić delivered a speech in front of the University of Zagreb on *Wilson Square* in Zagreb, speaking for three hours to a great multitude of electrified Croatian citizens (28 October 1918) ["*Stephen Raditch*," *The Living Age:* (Volume 318: 1923. page 112)].

the proclamation of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene state.[9] In fact, the appeal to President Wilson and the peace congress, with 115,167 signatures, is compelling and succinct enough to quote in full:

> All of us here undersigned or marked Croat citizens over 18 years of age declare on the basis of the internationally recognized right of national self-determination that we are in our hearts and minds for a neutral Croat peasant republic, and therefore we demand the convening of a special Croat constituent assembly for the thousand-year-old Croat people, (and) furthermore unconditionally, before the peace congress in Paris makes the final decision about the fate of the Croat people.
>
> We authorize the Main Committee of the Croatian People's Peasant Party (HPSS) and the HPSS's president Stjepan Radić to bring this demand of ours before the peace congress in Paris.[10]

There was mild hope that Radić would lead a delegation to the Paris

9 This petition for a Croatian republic and repetition received significant attention in the Washington Post, cited extensively in Ryley Grannon, "*Plead For Republics: Roumanians and Croatians Resist Monarchical Aggressions: Complain Through Wilson: Serbs Said to Be Killing Advocates of Jugoslav Federation: Croatians Ask to Be Allowed to Express Their Free Will Against a United Serbian Kingdom—Roumanian Republican Protest Restoration of King Ferdinand, Threatening Revolution*," *The Washington Post*: (23 February 1919).

10 Ivo Banac, in his seminal study *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*: (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1984), reproduces this petition on page 240. Banac's source is J. Josipa Pave, comp., *Zbornik građe za povijest radničkog pokreta i KPJ 1919-1920*: Sisak: Historijski arhiv Sisak; 1970, p. 54. The Italian Information Bureau at New York on 23 February 1919 issued a petition with this text as a preface to a much longer document, also dated 8 February 1919, in English on the basis of a dispatch form Paris. See *Italy and the Jugoslavs*, by Edward James Woodhouse and Chase Going Woodhouse (Boston: The Gorham Press; 1920, pages 128-129). Woodhouse and Woodhouse also published the 8 March 1919 protest sent to the Paris congress, which is significantly longer than the one cited in this review. Its curiosity extends beyond differences in length for it was originally published in "*Modern Italy*" (Vol. 2, 1919, pages 64-65). Rudolf Horvat in his otherwise detailed compilation of documents and narrative of the Croatian political question in the first Yugoslavia, is rather thin on this issue. In his seminal *Hrvatska na mučilištu* (Zagreb; Kulturno-historijsko društvo *Hrvatski rodoljub*; 1943), Horvat is rather scant on the petitions and memorandums issued during this critical period. He may have intentionally downplayed the importance of the Croatian republican movement to give more attention to the Croatian revolutionary movement that aligned itself with the Axis powers in the Croatian of the "Independent State of Croatia" (NDH) on 10 April 1941. He does make brief references to the petitions of 3 February, 8 March, and 19 May 1919, noting that the last of these was sent to Paris in 9 large envelopes and had actually reached President Wilson. Horvat, however, strangely observes that the entire effort amounted to nothing. One of the only living participant that experienced and shaped these events to write a memoir was Vladko Maček, who in his *In the Struggle for Freedom* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press; 1957), notes that the early February 1919 "resolution" was printed in special forms and distributed throughout Croatia, and that within six weeks 260,000 peopled had singed it (page 81). After Stjepan Radić's arrest, Maček states that the responsibility of sending the memorandum to the Paris peace congress fell upon him. He solicited the help of Ljudevit Kežman to translate it into French. According to Maček, Radić drafted the text of the resolution himself and then sent it piece by piece from his prison cell through a friendly policeman and was later transcribed and translated. Josip Predavec and Maček signed it, while Kežman took it on himself to find a way to send it to Paris. Maček underscores that they did not seek the assistance of the French military mission in Zagreb as reported at the time. They did, however, solicit the support of the Italian military mission at Ljubljana. The Italians agreed to dispatch the memorandum and the list of signatories to Paris and assist Predavac and Kežman to travel personally to the peace congress. This gambit paid off as the memorandum and package of signatures passed the frontiers of Yugoslavia in the hands of an Italian officer, but Predavec, Kežman and Maček were arrested. Maček states that he never learned where the list of signatures finally ended up, and because he was released from prison months later, "it was immaterial." Despite these two admissions by members of the movement itself that the resolutions and petitions were inconsequential, the reviewer, after close examination, suggests that the internationalization of the Croatian political question had profound consequences on the decision makers and world opinion, not sufficient to change the course of history, nevertheless. The French daily *Temps* of 18 February 1919 carried a major stories the issues as did the 16 March 1919 edition, as did many of the other major world newspapers.

congress to address the forum directly. On the 8 March 1919, the Croatian republican movement issued a declaration which set out Croatia's rejection of the new state:

> Croatian citizens do not recognize the so-called Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Karadjordjevic dynasty because this kingdom was proclaimed outside the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) and without a mandate from the Croatian people.
>
> Croatian citizens do not recognize the state council of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that is, the transitional national representation in Belgrade.
>
> We deny all legal authority of the central government in Belgrade.
>
> We protest against (military) recruitment and against the barbaric nature, which is being used to recruit.
>
> We deny the state administration the legal authority in every respect.
>
> We protest against violations of the constitution, and moreover, we are against the fact that the new Ban of Croatia and Slavonia was appointed on the basis of decrees of the unrecognized Regent Alexander.[11]

On 4 May 1919, the following resolution was sent to the congress:

> The popular peasant party of Croatia, numbering one million adherents, addresses the following protest, considering the following points, to the Peace Conference at Paris:
>
> 1. Mr. Etienne Radik (with other representatives of the peasant's party) has been in prison for six weeks, and has not yet been called in court; he is guarded by four Servian soldiers. We ask that he should be regularly deferred to the tribunal with the other representatives arrested.
> 2. Seventy amongst the most influential and respectable members of the peasant party have been arrested by Servians, and flogged by the soldiers.
> 3. We protest against the fact that the Servian law be extended to

11 The Paris *Temps* of 4 March 1919 reports on the various national assemblies held throughout Croatia to protest against the regime which Belgrade has introduced into Croatia. *Temps* reports that the assembly held at Karlovac voted a resolution against the government of Belgrade, stipulating: (1) Croatia does not recognize and consider as its representatives agents who have not been elected by the will of the people; it considers all its decisions null and void as contrary to democratic principles and the interests of the people; (2) demands prosecution of the members of the provisional government who wish to introduce the monarchical regime without even consulting the people, trampling under foot national rights and constitutional liberties; (3) it invites the Council of Zagreb urgently to intervene against the bastinade, the imprisonment of individuals, the prohibition of meetings and republican agitation, and against the barbarous actions of the Serb soldiers and agents at Bijelovar, Raca, Brod, Pakrac, Zagreb, and other localities, and to put an end to barbarism and militarism in the Jugoslav countries.

Croatia and Slavonia when innovations or changes can only be brought about by our Constitutional Parliament.

4. As Croatians, we protest also that the Servian Delegation should be recognized by the Peace Conference as delegate of Jugo-Slavia. It has not been empowered by the Croatians to act in their name. It ought to be known that the Croatians are being misled and that they do not see in the Servians liberators but oppressors, whose culture and civilization are of some centuries behind that of Croatia.

Finally, we ask:
That President Wilson and the representatives of the Great Powers should recognize the independence of the Croatian people.
That an international Commission should be sent to Croatia to inquire.
That the Constituent Assembly should be formed so that the Croatian people be free to decide of their fate.
That the Servian army should be withdrawn.
That the Sabor (Parliament), should be respected as being alone authorized to the making of laws in Croatia; today, they are being dictated by Servia and executed in the most brutal manner by the military.

Zagreb, 4 May 1919
The Republican Committee of Croatia

On 19 May 1919, the republican movement sent a petition with 157,699 signatures to President Wilson and the peace conference at Paris demanding recognition of an independent Croatian state in republican form, according to its historical and national rights, as Stjepan Radić sat in jail, a prison house he called "hotel republic," and signed off his letters as "*your prezident*."[12] On 8 July 1919, the Croats again sent a petition signed by 150,000 citizens of Croatia demanding a neutral Croatian republic. These prodigious manifestos and desiderata were repeated several times, namely on 28 November 1920, by 230,000, and on 15 March 1923 by 480,000 citizens of Croatia supporting the independence of Croatia. The neutral Republic of Croatia was proclaimed

12 Should there be any doubt that the petition reached the American President, as proof we have the memoirs of Harry Hansen published in 1919, where he gives an account of President Wilson's correspondence. Hansen states that the president's "mail bag is jammed full to the very top every day" with appeals, petitions and memorandums. Hansen ran through these appeals and his colleague took a pencil and set down the name of the nationality, and opposite "something about its wishes." The entry for Croatia reads: "Croatia—Dr. Raditch signs a protest against the usurpation of sovereign powers by the Serbian government over the autonomous nation of Croatia, and asked the conference to guarantee self-government for the Croats and organize the greater Serbian state along the lines of a federative republic like the United States," Harry Hansen, *The Adventures of the Fourteen Points: Vivid and Dramatic Episodes of the Peace Conference from its Opening at Paris to the Signing of the Treaty of Versailles* (New York: The Century Co.; 1919, page 115).

on 8 December 1920, in Zagreb, where 80,000 representatives of the Croatian republican party (HRSS) took the oath to the country and to the Croatian Republic, which also formally promulgation of the Constitution of the neutral Republic of Croatia, 26 June 1921, followed by a manifesto declaring as null and void the "*Vidovdan*" Constitution of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was promulgated without the participation of the Croats on 28 June 1921. Individually and as an ensemble over several years, these petitions and memorandums reflect Croatia's attitude towards the new state, can be considered a rolling plebiscite for independence.[13] The republican movement led to the adoption of a separate Croatian constitution, a parliament through the vehicle of a national representative body, as well as continuous efforts seeking international recognition, including from the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain. Eliding over these factors, as well as other petitions and memorandums from other political movements in Croatia, leaves the impression that the Paris Peace Conference created the new state and that it was uncontested within by its constituent parts.[14] The principles enshrined in the purposes of the war were to end Prussian militarism and Germany hegemony as a factor in world politics and to create

13 The author of this review has obtained an original copy of an little-known 8-page desiderata entitled "*The Independence of Croatia*," which contains several of the petitions, resolutions and memorandums as supporting evidence for the "principal" petition of 19 May 1919. The item was relinquished by the U.S. Library Congress along with other documents related to the Paris peace conference of 1919. This copy possesses the Library of Congress acquisition stamp, received 2 January 1947 as "copy 3," with the surplus duplicate rubberstamp on the rear page. The only other copy that has been identified is held in the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library at the University of Montana-Missoula, with the signature missing. A French translation was published under the rubric "*La Croatie Independante*," also published in 1919 and consisting of 8 pages. No Croatian version seems to be recorded despite an exhaustive search. There are no details on who translated the document or where and when it was published.

14 The vigorous petitioning of the great powers and appealing to world public opinion was a perpetual dynamo in the early phase of the Croatian republican and independence movement. A striking example is the memorandum that the Croatian republicans issued in several iterations in 1922 that was ultimately published in *The New York Times* of 14 May 1922, an event that dazzled the statesmen and diplomats of the world. In advance of Stjepan Radić's visit to London, he published an extensive expose on the Croatian and Serbian *problematique* in *The Near East* of 31 Mary 1923. Radić demonstrated his prudent and unwavering determination in advocating Croatian independence, stressing that the "true and unshakable resolve of the Croat people, of the Croat nation, expressed in the hundreds of meetings comprising ten to fifty thousand heads, confirmed by 780,000 voters, and formulated by the constitutional Croat representation, that is by 70 Croat deputies, is the complete independence of Croatia (Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia) in a confederation with Serbia on the basis of an entente, by means of a treaty which would leave to Slovenia, to Bosnia-herzegovina, to Batchka, to the Banat, to Montenegro, and to Macedonia the free choice by plebiscite either to remain tied to militarist and centralized Serbia or to enter into a federation with pacifist and neutral Croatia." Radić also stressed that "Croat republicanism is, therefore, sufficiently explained by these three political heads (confederation, pacifism, and neutrality), without taking into account the powerful moral and social shocks engendered by the world War, which was looked upon by the entire Croat people as a mighty experience and as an unprecedented calamity, but above all as a great political schooling, from which the Croat people have emerged more industrious and thoughtful than ever, and—this is essential—more humanitarian than nationalist, which meant that they are capable of extinguishing the ultra-nationalist flames of the Balkan hell, where all the 'great' territorial ideas (Great Greece, Great Serbia, Great Roumania) clash and destroy themselves in regimes of mutual oppression, of perpetual and barbarous vengeance; of extinguishing these nationalist flames by a sincere and practical humanitarianism in the whole of their political life. For they believe that any particular nationalism is worth just so much as it contains of humanitarianism and progress. Croatian republicanism, therefore, is not a means of electoral agitation, or simply a political mot *d'ordre*; but it is a popular post-War conception, in which the Croatian people see all the necessary guarantees of real self-government and sincere parliamentarianism; that is, an administration and a government by the people and for the people."

a new Europe based on the principle of self-determination. Jean Finot, the editor of *La Revue*, noted in an expose published in the *New York Times* of 30 May 1915 that in creating the new Europe, the geography of the world must be corrected to conform with the intimate aspirations of nations. For a large segment of the Croatian people, an independent republic was the starting point of being part of the new European architecture and to defy the salient characteristics of geography.

The peace conference at Paris was the first peace conference to assemble expert commissions with professional geographers that had real impact on the diplomatic discourse and decision making at the highest level. The statesmen had at their disposal the best in class geographic, ethnographical, historical, economic, and strategic knowledge unlike any other peace congress. It is unclear when the role of geographers shifted from demarcating the line that followed the contours of the balance of forces on the ground and an armistice to informing the peace treaty itself and shaping the territorial boundaries between states. At the Congress of Vienna knowledge of countries and the distribution of peoples and their rights was simply ignored. At the Congress of Berlin, the statesmen and diplomats actively sought this knowledge as an imperative to perpetual peace and a strategic equilibrium to ensure stability and regional order. The Berlin correspondent reporting on the progress of the Congress observed the impact of cartography on the peacemakers: "The diplomatic world here is at present inundated with ethnographical maps, which do more honour to the patriotic zeal than the scientific accuracy of those who construct them. The only sure practical conclusion which can be drawn from these new instruments of diplomatic warfare is that we have as yet very little trustworthy information concerning the population of the Balkan Peninsula." (*The Times* of 27 June 1878.)

Duančić's study focuses on three major scholars: Jovan Cvijić, Filip Lukas, and Anton Melik. Jovan Cvijić is certainly the doyen and towering authority amongst the three giants, but his stature was acquired prior to the creation of the new state. Duančić deals with the evolution of Cvijić's work with aplomb and respectful thoroughness, interrogating the shifting focus on Cvijić's geographical perspectives, methodology, and national visions. Cvijić's opus can be reduced to two themes: the delineation of the Serbian and Yugoslav national space and the ethnopsychology of the Balkan peoples, which have been interpreted as Cvijić's attempt to assert the primacy of Serbs over other groups in Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general. It is noteworthy that Duančić stresses Cvijić's articulation of the geographical cannons on "South Slav lands" but was reluctant to enter a discussion on the political consequences of his research. Perhaps it is impossible to evaluate Cvijić in a single book and capture a continuous line of thought on the nation and state. *La Péninsule Balkanique*, funded by the Serbian government in exile and published in French in 1918, is certainly a ground-breaking study, but Duančić suggests that its main task was to provide scientific support for the

anticipated establishment of Yugoslavia and determining its boundaries. Duančić oversteps a boundary when he asserts that *La Péninsule Balkanique* was "a central narrative on the state that had not yet existed when it was written and published," suggesting that it showed an international audience that the southern Slavic territories constituted a geographical and cultural unit, and that Yugoslavs were both deserving and capable of ruling over themselves according to the principles of national self-determination.

After perusing much of Cvijić's pre-1919 studies, including *La Péninsule Balkanique*, there is very little to suggest that Cvijić articulated a clear vision of a common state community for Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia on the basis of any principle, including the imprescriptible right to self-determination. In the concluding pages of *La Péninsule Balkanique* Cvijić speaks of democratic societies of emancipated states, natural democratic societies without institutional and democratic government, and the principle of differentiation of uniform agrarian societies. It seems odd that Duančić does not mention the remarkable study written by Count Louis Voinovitch's *La Dalmatie, l'Italie Et l'Unité Yougoslave* (*1797-1917*): *Une Contribution à la Future Paix Européenne* (1917) and its English translation published in 1920.

Perhaps the reviewer's scepticism may be indulged by reference to a contemporary review of *La Péninsule Balkanique* by an authority on the Balkans. Ferdinand Schevill reviewed Cvijić's book in *The American Historical Review* (1919), observing the imprecision of the underlying direction of the question of national identity:

> For the psychical disposition of a group or people which the human geographer sets out to discover must, to be successfully described, be also evaluated, and Professor Cvijić, a modern Serb and Serb of Serbs, quite naturally brings to bear upon the problem a set of values born of our time and culminating in nationalism as the master-value. In this way he gives us an engrossing picture of the gradual and piecemeal formation of a common consciousness among the originally distinct elements of the Jugo-Slavs, but he also has the air of indicating a proud, self-conscious nationalism as the very end and apex of existence. True, in express terms he nowhere upholds this philosophical absurdity, yet he constantly implies it and does not see whither it leads him, even when he turns to the Bulgar soul and is moved to express a Serb's naif horror at the exclusiveness and ferocity of Bulgar nationalism. In short, the anthropogeographer is likely to discover, like the historian before him, that the trouble about being scientific is not the dispute about the facts, though the historians are apparently forever wrangling over them, but changing divergent viewpoints, that is, disagreement in the all-important matter of human values.

Schevill makes the striking observation that what made Cvijić a unique geographer of the Balkan peninsula was the fact that he was "on friendly terms with every separate area and gives the impression of knowing and loving every nook and corner," capable of replacing "empty concepts with graphic vision." Any one reading *La Péninsule Balkanique* can glean this passion, vividness, and compassion for other cultures and political traditions.

No South Slavic state community would be complete without Bulgaria, and few if any geographers or cartographers conceived of Yugoslavia as stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. Three exceptions stand out from Croatia: Stjepan Radić advocated a Danubian[15] or Balkan confederation that would include Bulgaria; Dr. Nikola Zvonimir Bjelovučić outlined his vision of an expansive southern Slav realm in *Etnografske Granice Slovenaca, Hrvata, Srba i Bugara sa etnografskom kartom* (Zagreb; 1929); and Mato Pećar's pleasing fancy of a pan-Slav world in *Za federaciju slavenskih naroda Bugarske, Crne Gore, Češke, Hrvatske, Poljske, Rusije, Srbije, Slovenije, Slovačke, Ukrajine* (Zagreb; 1936).[16] There are two questions that the creators of a southern Slav state did not address: why stop at the limes of Serbia when referring to the outermost eastern southern tier of the Slavic realm. And why other Slavs in the Central and Northern belts were not included in the grand enterprise?

Duančić elides over the mapping of southern Slav realms by Serb and Croat émigrés. The earliest official map published by émigrés is the *Map of Southern Slav Territory, published on behalf of the Jugoslav Committee* (1915), prepared by Dr. Niko Županić, the curator of the Ethnographical Museum in Belgrade. This is a stunning example of aspirational cartography that set

15 Stjepan Radić, in a short letter sent from Moscow on 3 July 1924 to the editor of *The Nation*, refers to the Croatian conception of a broader Adriatic and Danubian federation but inexplicably without reference to Bulgaria. His other writings are replete with references to the Southern Slav state including Bulgaria. The letter was published in the correspondence section of *The Nation* of 27 August 1924 under the banner headline *The Croatian Peasant Movement*, the key section states: "The immediate aim of the Peasant Party of Croatia is not a Balkan federation but rather an Adriatic one—the federation of all peoples now subjugated or threatened by the present Serbian militarist bureaucracy in Belgrade. The Adriatic federation can and must be completed and enlarged into the Balkan and Danubian federation extending from the Bohemian Mountains to the Adriatic Sea. The present Serbian rulers are not only autocrats, crude absolutists, but they are, almost without exception, dishonest grafters and exploiters of their own Serbian people, and the tyrants, murderers, and exterminators of all others—the non-Serbian peoples and national groups. The Croatian peasant movement has organized literally all the Croatian peasants (four million) in Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina; half a million Hungarian and half a million German peasants now under Serbian rule, and many thousands of Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Rumanians, dispersed through the former South Hungary, now called Voivodina. This peasant movement is already taking deep root in Montenegro, in Macedonia, and even in Serbia—and therefore the foundation and the settlement of a peaceful peasant republic on the Adriatic and on the Danube is a question not of many years but rather of months." Stjepan Radić held views highly favourable and respectful towards Bulgaria as it found its international footing as a sovereign state. In 1917, Radić published *Obnovljena Bugarska: poglavlja o bugarskom narodnom preporodu, oslobodjenju i ujedinjenju* (*Bulgaria Rediviva: Essays on Bulgarian National Revival, Liberation and Unification*).

16 At the end of the Second World War this vision may not have seemed so fanciful as communism embraced these and many other areas under a singular umbrella known as Cominform. Should anyone imagine what a pan-Slavic world would like, this amphitheatre of miscellaneous Slavs within the great Soviet empire is the supreme example.

the standard motif for the movement to create a South Slavic common state.[17] Another striking example is Marcel Kolin's dazzling and detailed wall map and explanatory memorandum *Zemlja Srba, Hrvata, Slovenaca. Territorio de los Serbios, Croatas, Eslovenos. Territoire des Serbes, Croates, Slovenes. Land of Serbians, Croats, Slovèns,* published in Buenos Aires (1918). Other examples include Sir Arthur Evans' *Diagrammatic Map of Slav Territories East of the Adriatic* (1916) published in *The Geographical Journal* (Vol. 47, Nol. 4, April 1916) or his *Diagrammatic Map of a Future South Slav State* (*With explanatory notes*), published at Oxford and reproduced in *The New Europe* (1917).[18] The latter map and essay was published in French also and sought to provide the geographical and historical background supporting the concept of a South Slavic unification. It also incorporated the ancient landmarks of the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Porte, and of the Habsburg Monarch around the centrality of the Orient Railway and the free ports on the Adriatic and Aegean seas. Evan's was also considered the architecture of power possible within

17 This map was reproduced several times, most importantly in large format as attachments in *The Future of the Southern Slavs*, by A. H. E. Taylor (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd.; 1917), and *A Dying Empire: Central Europe, Pan-Germanism, and the downfall of Austria-Hungary*, by Bogumil Vosnjak, with a preface by T. P. O'Conner, M.P. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; 1918).

18 Arthur J. Evans has a long history of scholarship on Southeastern Europe, and in his essay "*The Austrians in Bosnia*," speculates on the possible political and territorial reconfiguration after the Austrian and Hungarian empire occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878. Evans suggests in the future the natural union between the four provinces of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina "will be too strong" for an artificial separation between Austria and Hungary. He notes that the *triune* Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, by the addition of Bosnia and Herzegovina may become *quadripartite*, to be taken from Austria, this arrangement would be hardly less fatal to Hungarian aspirations. The Croatian under-kingdom, according to Evans, divorced from Hungary, would lose that which it has been her perpetual ambition to possess—a sea coast. Another possible arrangement contemplated by Evans is that the grouping of the *triune kingdom* and Bosnia and Herzegovina into "a third body politic," and their detachment from both Cis- and Trans-Leithania," which would entail the reconstitution of the Monarchy on a "trial" in place of a dual basis. ("*The Austrians in Bosnia*," by Arthur J. Evans: (*The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, Science, and Art*: 1878.) These considerations of a quadripartite Croatia and the triple kingdom of Austria, Hungary and Croatia are prefigured in Evans' *Illyrian Letters: Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, addressed to the "Manchester Guardian" during the year 1877*: (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; 1878). Evans renders a charming escutcheon for the new Croatian state with the heraldic devices of Dalmatia (azure, three leopards' heads, crowned), Croatia (chequy, argent and gules), Bosnia (the Morish trophies of Bosnia with the six-pointed mullet in chief and crescent), Slavonia (leashes of hounds) and the Primorje (an arm vambrace, with a sword) wrapped from below by the *Illyrian* estoile of eight points (Mars) and crescent moon, surmounted by the two headed crowned eagle of Austria. A review of this book in *The Saturday Review* of 18 May 1878 suggests that there is little "substantial consolation to bewildered statesmanship in the whimsical heraldic device of an escutcheon symbolizing a restoration of 'the lapsed sovereignty of the Hapsburgs over the whole of Illyria.' History, as well as statesmanship, may find it somewhat bewildering to hear of that apocryphal phenomenon in the past, and of its visionary revival in the future near at hand." Evans acquired intimate knowledge of heraldry in Fojnica, at the Franciscan monastery with an esquisite library, including one of the oldest heraldic manuals of the Illyrians entitled *Rodoslovje Bosanskoga aliti Iliričkoga, i Srbskoga vladanja, zai eno postavlieno po Stanislaú Rubčiću popu, na slavu Stipana Nemanjiću, Cara Srblienak Bosniakak. 1340* (*The Book of Arms of the Nobility of Bosnia or Illyria, and Serbia, together set forth by Stanislaus Rubčić, priest, to the glory of Stephen Némanja, Czar of the Serbs and Bosnians. In the year 1340*). See *Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on foot during the insurrection, August and September 1875 with an historical review of Bosnia. Revised and enlarged and a glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the ancient Republic of Ragusa*., by Arthur J. Evans, B.A., F.S.A. With a map and fifty-eight illustrations from photographs and sketches by the author. Second edition: (London: Longmans, Green and Co.; 1877). Another interpretation of the armorial roll is elaborated in *An official tour through Bosnia and Herzegovina with an account of the history, antiquities, agrarian conditions, religion, ethnology, folk lore, and social life of the people*, by János de Asbóth, Member of the Hungarian Parliament. Authorized English edition: (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Paternoster Square; 1890).

the concept of the new Southern Slav state community: "To form a unitary state after the model of France or Britain would be out of the question under existing circumstances. Government in the various districts must therefore be largely under local control, and the larger component states of the union should embrace more than one provincial diet." Evans outlined the structure of the new state in the *Diagrammatic Map of a Future South Slav State* (1917), with the following salient features:

> The Capital itself—whether the New State be federal or more centrally governed—could only be at Belgrade. Some personal suggestions are made in the map as to the seats of Provincial Diets or "Sabors" in the future. The seats of these, as here proposed, are:—
> 1. Ljubljana (Laibach) for the Slovene region (S.E. Carinthia, N. Styria, Carniola, N. Istria).
> 2. Zagreb (Agram) for Croatia-Slavonia.
> 3. Spljet (Spalato) for Dalmatia.
> 4. Karlovic (Karlovitz), or possibly Novisad (Neusatz) for a North Serbian Province representing the W. Banat (including the greater part of the old Serbian Vojvodina) and the Serb districts of Backa and Baranja in S. Hungary. With these it would be certainly convenient to group the Slavonian district of Sirmia, inhabited by a Serb population and for long connected with the Vojvodani.
> 5. Nis (Nish), or possibly Kragujevac, for Serbia proper as it existed before the Balkan Wars.
> 6. Skoplje (Uskup or Skopia) for territories acquired in 1913.
> 7. Podgorica for Montenegro.
> 8. Sarajevo for Bosnia.
> 9. Mostar for Herzegovina, perhaps including Primorje, the old Serbian maritime tract.

R. W. Seton-Watson in paying homage to Arthur Evans in his 1946 obituary, stressing the latter's interest in the territorial and political structure of the new state:

> Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Posts, the main lines of Communications, and higher Education would be Common Affairs: all else would be in the sphere of the local Diets. In this scheme there would be the following units—(1) Pre-1914 Serbia, (2) Macedonia, (3) Voivodina, (4) Hercegovina and Dalmatia, (5) Bosnia, (6) Montenegro, (7) Croatia-Slavonia, with Northern Dalmatia and the Islands and that fragment of Bosnia once known as Turkish Croatia, and Eastern Istria, (8) Slovenia. Each of these would have a diet of its own sitting at (1) Nis or Kragujevac (Belgrade being reserved for the Federal Parliament), (2)

Skoplje, (3) Karlovci or Novi Sad, (4) Mostar, (5) Sarajevo, (6) Podgorica, (7) Zagreb, (8) Ljubljana. ("*Arthur Evans*," by R. W. Seton-Watson: *The Slavonic and East European Review* (Vol. 24, No. 63: January, 1946).)

Evans added special arrangements for Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, and Rijeka (Fiume). One of the spectacular successes of the South Slavic Committee in exile, originally founded in Italy during 1915, was the triumphant proliferation of the map of the maximum claims of southern Slav territorial aspirations. The purpose of referring to these permutations in the concept of what a Yugoslav state community would look like is to demonstrate the variances and incarnations that scholars outside the South Slavic realm amused themselves within the cosmos of infinite possibilities. It is as if the Balkan space was an alphabet of various scripts but without grammar and syntax.

Duančić suggests that few issues had a more profound impact on the geographical narrative on Yugoslavia than the internal structure, cohesion, and unity of the Balkan Peninsula and the Yugoslav territories. Yet this is precisely the political realm that geographers were unable to enter or define. While Duančić makes clear in the introduction that Yugoslavia faced the predicament of divergent historical trajectories, Yugoslavia could not be described in concrete terms because the most obvious marker of its statehood remained unknown, observing that the search for unity was complicated by the ongoing disagreement regarding fundamental issues such as whether Yugoslavia should be a republic or a monarchy. As a result, getting to know what Yugoslavia was an what it could have become was a delicate task. The author further notes that during the interwar period the geographical works kept oscillating between describing it as an inherent geographical unity to dismissing it as unsustainable due to geographical fragmentation. Where political and cultural traditions of the south Slavs pointed to separation, geography could offer a seemingly plausible unifying framework. He also suggests that geography offered a more applicable and persuasive apparatus to think about the common south Slavic state than historiography itself. That the Greeks were unable to go beyond a network or loose commonwealth of city states on this peninsula should not be lost on anyone reflecting on the challenges of state building in the twentieth century, nor that the Romans were also unable to fully tame the region into its organizational and civilizational streams. *Pax Ottomanica* succeeded in some respects of creating a sterile network in its own image, but that disappeared without much of trace on the political world of the Balkans.

One of the most fascinating aspects of Duančić's study is the notion that geography is versatile, a promiscuous harlot if you like. It was Filip Lukas who recognized that the same "geographical language" and reasoning could serve opposed political aims: not only to "naturalize" but also to "denaturalize" Yugoslavia, denying it a future on grounds of irreconcilable geographical differences within it, which resulted in unsurmountable cultural and therefore political tensions. Duančić elaborates on this plasticity of geographical

arguments, suggesting that in Yugoslavia the same line of geographical argumentation could serve the opposing political projects, which only ended in blurring the relationship between the Yugoslav and particular national spaces. This versatility could not be used with countries outside the boundary of Yugoslavia, except Bulgaria, and perhaps the frontier where a nationality within Yugoslavia existed, such as Kosovo and Albania. In these cases, the boundaries of identity turn against Yugoslavia.

There is some prosaic irony in that Jovan Cvijić, after the creation of the new Yugoslav state, advises his German mentor Albrecht Penck to discourage him and other German scholars from visiting the new country for fear of reprisals or discomfort. This suggests a latent fear of German scholarship and power politics in the immediate post-war period. Contrast this with the temporal and geographical span of Cvijić's research: he made no less than thirty-one trips to what became Yugoslavia between 1888 and 1925, and twenty-four prior to the formation of Yugoslavia (between 1888 and 1915). These excursions into the Austro-Hungarian Empire were published in a special biographical essay by the Czech geographer and diplomat Jiří Viktor Daneš, which included a detailed and magnificent large map of Southeastern Europe filled with lines that traced each of the research trips conducted by Cvijić (*Karta ekskurzija Jovana Cvijić a po Balkanskom poluostrvu i juznoslovenskim zemljama* (*Map of Excursions by Jovan Cvijić through the Balkans and Southern Slav countries*)). Even after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cvijić was not prevented nor molested by the Austrian and Hungarian authorities from conducting his research, nor during the earlier phases of the war. His tract on the annexation of Bosnia was published in Serbian, French, and Russian as Duančić mentions, but there is no evidence that it was translated into German. An English translation was published in London, not mentioned in this study. Cvijić's vision of Serbia and access to the sea is vividly captured in "*Geographische und kulturelle Zusammenhange Serbiens mit dem Adriatischen Meere*," and described in detail in the explanatory article "*Der Zugang Serbiens zur Adria*," (*Militargeographie Beilage zu Dr. A. Petermanns Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt. Herausgegeben* von Prof. Paul Langhans in Gotha: December 1912). Another map and text issued by Cvijić that was popular in diplomatic circles includes "*Map showing territory destined to be included in Servia and Montenegro as a result of the war*," published as an attachment to his "*The Genesis of a Great Power: Servia and the Balkan League*," published in *The Review of Reviews* (November 1912).

An allusion to Stjepan Radić's *Živo hrvatsko pravo na Bosnu i Hercegovinu* [*The Vital Croatian Right to Bosnia and Herzegovina*] (1908) would give readers a better understanding of the competing visions of Bosnia within the scope of divergent notions of statehood the new regional architecture. A similar line of argument was made in *Herceg-Bosna prigodom aneksije: geografsko-etnografsko-historička i državopravna razmatranja* [*Herceg-Bosnia on the occasion of the annexation: geographical, ethnographical, historical and*

state-legal assessment] (1908) by Ferdo Šišić. Šišić explains his vision of Bosnia within the scope of Croatian statehood:

> If the occupation thirty years ago was to mean liberation from the Ottoman oppression and the inauguration of humane opportunities among its inhabitants, the annexation brings Herzeg-Bosnia's constitutional life, and with it the final solution to the state law issue of her affiliation. I speak as a Croat, and that means as much as in today's circumstances I am looking for the unification of Herzeg-Bosnia with Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia into one state legal body.

An earlier exposition of the linkages between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was published in 1898 with the *nom de plume* Petrinjensis (Fran Milobar) under the rubric *Bosnien und das Kroatische Staatsrecht eine historisch-juridische studie* (*Bosnia and Croatian constitutional law: A historical and legal study.*) (Zagreb: Druck von Antun Scholz; 1989).[19] This study had a profound impact on the discourse within Austria and Hungary on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and buttressed the linkages Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina based on historical, legal, and constitutions conceptual frameworks revolving around the state rights' idea of statehood, which can be seen from frequent usage in the parliamentary debates in the *Reichsrats* in Vienna and in the principal discourses on Croatia. Between the occupation and annexation, there were myriad resolutions from Croatian political parties and the Sabor (parliament that advocated the unification of Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was, however, the annexation that fundamentally altered the Croatian strategic compass and calculus in the shifting power equilibrium in Southeastern Europe. The Croatian Sabor on 28 August 1906 passed a resolution calling for the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the state structure of the triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The Croatian Party of Right on 12 January 1912 drafted a memorandum on the Croatian political question and dispatched it to Vienna. The memorandum in its penumbra scopes out the fact that the Croatian people are dispersed within the Habsburg realm but divided and separated into unnatural administrative divisions and artificial "*staatsrecht*." The memorandum sought to create a single Kingdom of Croatia in special relations with Austria and Hungary. Croatian statesmen and leaders sought to put the integration of the triune kingdom and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the international diplomatic stage. Croatian statesmen and leaders sought to put the integration of the triune kingdom and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the international diplomatic stage. In the

19 For an exceptional historical survey of the states' rights paradigm and as they related to the triune and one Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, as much as Bosnia and Herzegovina, see the two volume *Geschichte der österreichischen gesammt-staats-idee, 1526-1804*, by Hermann Ignaz Bidermann (Innsbruck: Wagner; 1867-89). Bidermann's point of departure for this study on Croatia is Pavao Ritter Vitezović. Vitezović is more than fascinating as a point of departure as his *Croatia Rediviva* (Zagreb, 1700) and *Bossna Captiva* (Vienna, 1712) were widely used in discourses on the linkages between Croatia and Bosnia.

popular literature on the founding of Yugoslavia, the Resolution of Rijeka and Zadar occupy an important place. Indeed, Dr. Ante Trumbić as the author of the Resolution of Rijeka encapsulated an early articulations of the right of nations to self-determination. What is left out of political discourse on the founding of the Southern Slav state community are the other discourses on Croatian independence and statehood. In 1894 major political parties in the Sabor drafted a political program of a united opposition calling for unity and unification of Croatia's territorial space and the consolidation into the Kingdom of Croatia within the orbit of the association of Austria and Hungary. The salient points of this programme are:

1. The united Croatian opposition, based on the foundation of state rights and national principles, will seek through all lawful means to ensure that the Croatian people, residing in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, Rijeka and the *kotari* and Medjumurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Istria, be united in a single independent state entity within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy, and it shall support with all its energy the efforts of its Slovene brothers that the Slovene lands join this state entity.
2. The united opposition will also seek to ensure that the Kingdom of Croatia is organised as a state governed by the rule of law, constitutionality and freedom, so that the nation will enjoy its representatives in all branches of state life on the basis of parliamentarian government exercised in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) and lawful government in agreement with the Crown. The Ban (Vice-Roy) of the Kingdom of Croatia will be the head of the parliamentary government.
3. Affairs relating to the whole of the monarchy, stemming from the programmatic principles, will be resolved by the Kingdom of Croatia on an equal basis of the Kingdom of Hungary and the other countries of the Monarchy.
4. The united opposition will work towards ensuring that the constitution, freedom and rule of law of the independent Kingdom of Croatia are revived and all legal guarantees, especially free elections, lawful assembly and association, the freedom of conscience and speech and the press.
5. The implementation of program is entrusted to the implementation committee, which can second others to participate in this effort and in other lands even if they are not members of a party.[20]

20 *Politička povijest Hrvatske* (*A Political History of Croatia*), by Josip Horvat and *Introduction to the Political History of Croatia*, by Ferdo Šišić. Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski pisci, 1936. The best and authentic account of the political backdrop to this resolution, see *Programi oporbenih stranaka u Hrvatskoj* (*Programs of the Oppisition Parties in Croatia*) Napisali Dr. Šime Mazzura i Dr. Marijan Derenčin ((Preštampano iz "*Obzora*"): Zagreb: Tisak Dioničke tiskare; 1894). The resolution informs Dinko Tomašić's analysis "*Croatia in European Politics*," published in the *Journal of Central European Affairs* (Volume 2; Number 1: April 1942).

Moreover, much of Cvijić's articles were published in German in the German and Austrian specialised geography journals, giving him wide berth to further his findings in the academic press, including studies that specifically advanced the geopolitical interests of the Kingdom of Serbia and his attitude to the areas demarcated as Serbia's preferred access to the sea prior to the spark that ignited the war. They are do not comport with a Southern Slav common state and envisage the continuation of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Another anomaly with Cvijić is his use of "Yugoslav" or "Yugoslavia," which appears absent in the bulk of his books and articles. In Cvijić's world view, "Yugoslav" and "Yugoslavs" did not exist. Dwelling on Cvijić is not idle for he is a critical feature of Duančić's study and pivotal to understanding one of the most important Serbian geographers. Yet Cvijić's references to Balkan peoples and Southern Slavic peoples and territories were all predicated on plurality and recognition of the infinite beauty of political and cultural diversity rather than a plastic, undifferentiated singularity.

The Paris Peace Conference failed to address conclusively the territorial boundaries of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The League of Nations was also powerless to tackle the Adriatic Question. A just and durable solution to the Adriatic Question was of vital interest to Croatia, continental Europe, and the world community not only in terms of fidelity for the principles enunciated in allied war aims, but the outside world seeking to trade with Central and Southeastern Europe via the Mediterranean routes. One of the key justifications for the rush to form the new state found expression in flagitious power and sprawling aspirations of Italy in the Adriatic and the broader Mediterranean theatre as expressed in the secret treaty of London signed on 16 April 1915 at the urging of London, Moscow, and Paris to incentivize Rome's entry into the war contingent clearly on allied victory, which was not certain until the very end. The secret treaty stipulated that Italy would receive significant parts of the Adriatic after the war. Rather than envisaging the changes that eventually took place in Central and Southeastern Europe with the collapse of the Russian, Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires and the creation of a new Southern Slav state community, the treaty envisaged the existence of an independent Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. At the beginning of the Paris Peace Congress, London, Paris, and Washington as an associated power and late entrant in the war, urged Italy to adjust its aspirations and renounced the secret treaty of London. It was obvious to London and Paris that if Italy were to stand on her claims under the treaty, the entire edifice of the peace congress would be compromised and the problem of making peace made insoluble by alienating the United States and creating new antagonisms in Central and Southeastern Europe. The United States was not only not a party to the treaty, but openly renounced "secret treaties" as anathema to international peace and security and in direct conflict with the principles of open diplomacy. It has been observed that Italian power and aspirations from the fall of the Orlando-Sonnino government in June 1919 to

the *coup d'état* in October 1922 that ushered in an era of fascism in Italy, the entire tendency of Italian foreign policy was conciliatory and retreatist. Italy was powerless to make any consequential show of strength because of internal discontent and breakdown of state authority. In the summer of 1920 Italian military adventurism in Albania led to a mutiny, compelling the government to evacuate Albania, and Italy did not make an effort to retrieve their fortunes until 1939, when they occupied Albania again. There was considerable growling of the wolf in Rome but the Adriatic Question remained a global concern as long as it was a question to be decided by the big powers at conference or through the diplomatic contact group of four-plus-one. Once the Adriatic Question was transformed into a bilateral issue between Italy and Yugoslavia, the growl turned into roar but without teeth. That the Italian parliament and people accepted the Treaty of Rapallo as the best possible solution in a difficult predicament but short of Italy's declared territorial ambitions. The lack of protest in Italy on Christmas even as Italian troops controlled the evacuation of Rijeka by renegade Gabriele D'Annunzio reflected the lack of will and power in Rome. That Ante Trumbić, who was intimately familiar with Rome and its political leadership, could not have known otherwise but the limits to Italian power, and to feign otherwise is either a strategic blind spot or abject failure if not acquiescence on the part of those advocating a compromise on the Adriatic boundaries for the new South Slav state community.[21]

The unhurried international recognition of the new state, the prolonged Adriatic dispute and the danger of renewed conflict hampered the consolidation of the new state even as Paris, London, and Washington encouraged the new state to take control of the navy of Austria-Hungary, and American marines present in the Adriatic landed in Split in a demonstration of support. Croatian expectations of Yugoslavia at its founding sought peace abroad and tranquillity at home with a sense of social and economic justice and legitimate institutions as well as an association between independent political communities. It not possible to discern within the scope of this review the estrangement that grew out of disagreements, and the disappointment stemming from the failure of either the Croats or Serbs, or both, to live up to expectations, pledges, and agreements. However, it is characteristic of political disagreements that they are often, in part at least, disagreements about where disagreements lie.

21 Contrast the stance of the Italian government regarding the Adriatic at the zenith of its power in 1937. The Italian and Yugoslav foreign ministers signed a political agreement to last for five years, containing guarantees highly advantageous to the latter. The agreement guaranteed mutual respect for frontiers, which indicated that Italy abandoned her claims on Dalmatia and undertook not to support Hungarian revisionist claims. Italy also renounced its support for Croatian separatists, while also pledging better treatment for Yugoslav minorities in Italy. Yugoslavia's only concession was to acknowledge the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. In Yugoslav foreign affairs, by 1937 the country gravitated toward the orbit of Italy and Germany. This was due to the emerging geopolitical shape of Europe and advances made by Italy and Germany which Yugoslavia could not feel justified in rejecting. The Rome accords reached with the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in May 1941 demonstrate the churlish *auriere-pensei* in Italy's strategy toward Yugoslavia. This radical departure in sentiment and attitude towards the eastern coastline of the Adriatic was seen in the shift from the Pact of Rome (1918) to Italy's position on Adriatic negotiations at the peace conference, which effectively kept the Adriatic question outside the scope of the congress and its treaties as well as the League of Nations.

The period of tumultuous flux experienced by the Croats in 1918 posed gave problems for the Croatian people and their conceptions of statehood, and as a result of the philosophical confusion within Croatian leadership and lack of popular legitimacy, Croatia found itself in a politically untenable position. The leadership within the ranks of the South Slav movement could, at least, see only the top of the ice-berg of events, while the Croatian republican and statehood movement saw the bulk below the surface, giving them an unique insight into political action and the incalculable catastrophe as the Croatian ship of state was drifting towards the tempestuous shores of utopian statecraft. On the question of legitimacy, which is beyond the line of sight of geographers, Yugoslavia's only plebiscite during this period was held in Carinthia on 10 October 1920 where the majority of the population, predominantly German-speaking but also the Slovenes, opted to not be part of the new state and chose to revert to the new Republic of Austria. The declarations of independence by four republics and an autonomous province of the Yugoslav federation in 1991—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, as well as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo—was the first genuine expression of popular will through the ballot box, the legitimate expression of the will of the people and democratically elected government, in the history of Yugoslavia. There was no referendum or plebiscite or testing of popular will on creating the first Yugoslavia in 1918 or in 1945 after the Second World War when Yugoslavia was reconstituted as a federation of republics that reflected the historical and national individuality of political communities. Portions of the Serbian minority in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1990 and 1995 held numerous referendums to "secede" but failed in their individual and combined efforts, including the failure of Serbia to support or formalize unification despite waging a war of aggression from the land, sea and year during the same period. In 1992 Montenegro held a referendum to remain in the rump Federation of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and another in 2006 to separate from Serbia. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008 as a result of failed negotiations mediated by the European Union, and without a referendum or plebiscite. There were, however, at least eight issues apart from the definition of a boundary with Italy on land and sea that complicated the formative stages of the new state. They are as follows:

1. The internationalization of the Croatian political question and the rapid expansion of the republican and independence movement in Croatia.
2. The assertion of sovereignty by Montenegro and its right to participate in the peace conference at Paris, as well as efforts to reverse its contested and coerced inclusion in the Kingdom of Serbia prior to the act of unification that created the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Kingdom of Montenegro was not consulted in forging the Declaration of Corfu or any other

document, treaty or act that became part of the creation of the new Southern Slavic state community.

3. The claims of Macedonia to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. The frontier with Hungary was among the last to be regulated by the Paris peace conference. The Treaty of Trianon satisfied the most essential claims of Yugoslavia, by dividing the whole of Banat (save a small Magyar tringle opposite the city of Szeded) between Yugoslavia and Romania, part of the Baranja (forming the angle between Drave and Danube) and the Medjumurje (between Drava and Mur).
5. The regulation of the boundary with Austria was also challenging. Maribor, a town with a German majority but surrounded by a purely Slovene district, was assigned to Yugoslavia, but under the Treaty of St. Germain a roughly triangular district north of the Karawanken range was referred to a popular plebiscite.
6. Under the armistice concluded at Belgrade on 12 November 1918, the Serbs were allowed to occupy Temesvar and most of the Banat, the east of which is overwhelmingly Romanian and which was claimed in its entirety by Rumania, in right of her treaty of August 1916 with the Allies.
7. Claims against Bulgaria included frontier rectifications at (a) the Strumnica salient, which threatened the Vardar railway from the east, (b) the district of Kochana (Tocana) and the Bregalinits (Bregalnica), (c) a strip of territory running parallel with the old Serbo-Bulgarian frontier the whole way from Zajecar to Kyustendil, and (d) the town of Vidin on the Danube and the salient between it and the Timok.
8. The claim of *pax Serbiannica* coveting northern Albania. (A full elaboration of these territorial elements are outlined in "*Yugoslavia, or Jugoslavia*," by H. W. Seton Watson: *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1922).)

It is doubtful that Yugoslavia had ever enjoyed such a unity, singularity, and coherence that would justify talk about a single national Yugoslav consciousness or a permanent Yugoslav identity or people *qua* nation as if it were a whole cut of the same seamless fabric. Nor did Yugoslav citizenship become coequal with a Yugoslav nationality. Despite systemic efforts to create a Yugoslav nationalism and consciousness, it was not able to obliterate or erase the historic and enduring national loyalties of the Serbs to Serbia and the Croats to Croatia, or other cradles of individuated political community and identity. Yugoslav nationalism, including national communism that Tito created after the break with Stalin, meant political support for the Yugoslav state community as an alternative to independence for its constitutive republics. It proved difficult to differentiate the Southern Slavs from any other

Slavs in Europe and even more difficult to precisely demarcate the territorial boundaries of what is Yugoslav and what is not. Yugoslavia was forged as an imagined community with a strong sense of purpose but without history or legitimacy. Far too much clipping and cutting occurred to seriously entertain the possibility that even a baseline of national consciousness could be easily recognized as representing a unified Yugoslav tradition or school of thought in geography or any other discipline, let alone a single nationhood. Indeed, even within the boundaries of geography as a discipline or the imagination of the geographers as scholars embarking on nation building and constructing a state it seemed impossible to create a permanent state community. Even if a retrospective look finds unified outlooks and shared points of departure in which individual scholars stand as representative, it is unlikely that any individual thinker of any originality could face the future in terms of an effort to identify himself with a movement rather than the other way around.

Duančić's study has set a very high bar for future explorations of the nation, state, and geography in Yugoslavia and students of political science, geography, history, and international relations will draw endless insightful observations from this study. The way in which Duančić introduces the problem of geopolitics in Yugoslavia is novel and poignant. But geopolitics is a universal approach that states deploy, so Yugoslavia was surrounded with equally potent forces for territorial change and revision of the treaties. Indeed, geopolitics views history as geography in action. It is clear that geopolitics grew out of political geography; it activates the latter's fund of knowledge and puts it in the service of the state. The fundamental difference between the two is that political geography considers the state in its objective conditions while geopolitics considers that state in its context from the perspective of its needs in the service of foreign policy. In short, political geography examines a state only in its space conditions, while geopolitics is concerned with the spatial requirements of a state. This book certainly demonstrates that geographers may not be the ideal source for constructing nations and states despite their geographical knowledge and imagination. This responsibility rests with elected representatives and consultation of the people involved through plebiscites and referendums, a detail that eluded the founders of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes *qua* the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The state was constructed by fiat, informed more by the rhapsody of the bards than doyens of constitutional and political systems. Nevertheless the trademarks of the common South Slavic state have been etched on the maps of Europe but they were drawn in the hearts and minds of populations and constitutive nations like lines illustrated on water. The archaeologist of knowledge and power will find the maps of Yugoslavia without the boundaries of Serbia and Croatia representative of an enterprise that no amount of geographical knowledge could even ostensibly explain. In many ways, Yugoslavia was the residual of geopolitics. It is also the victim of radical changes in the geopolitical calculus. A state community that is so vulnerable to geopolitical calculations can hardly be expected to bend the

realities beyond its frontiers if it cannot bend those within its boundaries. It is doubtful that Yugoslavia ever found itself within even when it enjoyed a world presence and unique legitimacy in the global community for the best part of the twentieth century. The tossing waves of European and global geopolitics, however, bore Yugoslavia into safe harbour despite the infinite diversity of its internal political, national and geographical constitution. When the cold war ended, the internal pressures of the "cauldron of conflicting historical and cultural traditions" within the amphitheatre of miscellaneous barbarians prevailed and the Yugoslav bark crashed on its own rocks.