Some aspects of the low-intensity conflict

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Abstract

Low-intensity conflict is a concept whose beginnings date back to the 1980s and it is defined as a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below the intensity of conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in developing countries, but contain regional and global security implications. The most significant content of the low-intensity conflict in the country being acted upon is insurgency, whether it is being helped or crushed. Insurgency is an organized, armed political struggle aimed at seizing power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. This paper provides an overview of previous research on the topic of low-intensity conflict and presents its key components.

Keywords

low-intensity conflict, insurgency, strategy, military doctrine, subversion, armed forces

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Introduction

The topic of this study resulted from my wish to make a review of the past research and to determine basic theoretical tenets of the low-intensity conflict (hereinafter referred to as LIC). Very little attention has been devoted to this topic in Croatian scientific discourse. This has particularly come to the fore when the shift of the modern warfare doctrine towards asymmetric form is taken into account. Conventional conflicts that dominated through history have largely lost importance, whereas operations other than war\(^2\) have become a rule. This paper is structured in two parts: the first part outlines past research on low-intensity conflicts, while in the second part its key theoretical features have been analysed.

Low-intensity conflict is defined as a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below the intensity of a conventional war, and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces and it is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in developing countries, but contain regional and global security ramifications.\(^3\) Unlike traditional war, LIC has characteristics of an indirect impact, it is more adaptable and cheaper, and requires considerably fewer human forces, relying on local participants. Due to stated reasons, LIC is better adapted to causes of the conflicts in developing countries and it is there that we can find its origins.

As a concept, low-intensity conflict emerged in the 1980s and it resulted from experiences and efforts of the theorists of war and war skills for different deliberation, organization, planning, realization and control of the contemporary (non)war conflicts. A need to change a method of warfare

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ensued from an unfavourable attitude of the American public towards the war in Vietnam. A change of philosophy and approach to warfare served Reagan’s administration to combat revolutionary endeavours of the nationalists in developing countries.\(^4\) Reasons for the U.S. commitment to conduct low-intensity war in the 1980s can be found in shifting of the warfare focus from Central Europe towards developing countries that became the arena of conflict between Cold War powers, rendering their direct intervention unnecessary. Concurrently with the development of LIC, roots of the globalization can also be followed, a process conducive towards intensified connection and interdependence of some parts of the modern world. Decreasing the number of wars among states and increasing the number of wars within states is a basic feature of the modern global age. Globalization process has contributed to the creation of the integration processes and therefore, major disruptions within the proper system that transcends national borders of the involved countries are almost impossible. Instabilities in developing countries are central problem of the U.S. security policy and probable threats to its interests can be traced in local and regional conflicts in developing countries that have become fertile ground for the development of the LIC concept.

Unlike other warfare concepts, LIC is primarily focused on political character of the conflict and not on its military level. Military segment represents a tactical dimension of the strategic plan, resulting in restricted use of the military assets (determined by social and political usefulness). Therefore, the objective of LIC is not a military conquest but social supervision. In comparison with similar concepts ("the fourth generation of warfare" and "asymmetric warfare") that have been identified as a result of efforts of the non-state elements, LIC is a concept that has been developed by military theorists of great powers (primarily the U.S. and France) as a form of conflict the most appropriate to developing countries.

From methodological vantage point, I shall construct the LIC concept through comparison with dominant forms of warfare, followed by an analysis of its basic components and formulation of the strategic and doctrinal features of

the concept. The argument that will be pursued through the paper will be based on display of the relevance of the LIC concept in modern warfare.

Overview of past research

Conceptual originator of the LIC concept is Professor Sam Sarkesians from Loyola University of Chicago in the U.S. While developing the idea of a „different war”, he classified elements of the low-intensity conflict into unconventional war operations.\(^5\) In his book *America’s Forgotten Wars* from 1984, Sarkesian started from a thesis that low-intensity conflicts – and not large-scale conventional wars – would dominate in the future. He also emphasized the importance of differentiating special operations from LIC, primarily due to differences in goals. His primary assertion is that American strategic thought has mainly missed out to learn lessons from low-intensity conflict.\(^6\)

For further theoretical elaboration and practical analysis, it is necessary to mention three American military theorists who theoretically formulated and doctrinally formalized the concept of a low-intensity conflict. The first among them American military theorist James Motley included terrorism, unconventional war and small conventional war, or rather special war and local conflict, into the low-intensity conflict. With reference to this, he emphasized that „the most important security challenge confronting the United States, aside from maintaining a strong strategic deterrent against the Soviet Union, is to improve its military capabilities for low intensity conflict—that is, the range of activities and operations on the lower end of power by nations or organizations to gain or protect territory and interests through various non-combat and combat activities without provoking conflict on a larger scale“.\(^7\) The next contribution to development of the doctrinal concept of the low-intensity conflict was provided by LTC of the U.S. Armed Forces

\(^{5}\) Milan Živojinović, *Protivrečnosti strategije sukoba niskog intenziteta i međunarodnog prava u kontekstu sukoba u SFRJ* (doctoral dissertation), 2016., 125. (Contradictions of the strategy of the low intensity conflict and international law in the context of the conflict in SFRJ)


David Dean who considered that actions related to low-intensity conflict could include a large range of military, economic and political measures. According to him, all local and limited wars the forces of the U.S. participate in can be included in this type of conflict, utilizing various pressures, dictates, extortions and other means of coercion.\(^8\) The third military theorist, Juri Raus, under the notion of a conflict understands „a coordinated and systematic struggle, short of an all-out war between states or rival governments, for the control of population, territory, resources and government by military, political, economic, psychological, religious and civic means“.\(^9\)

It is obvious from the aforecited definitions that low-intensity conflict in American military theory and doctrine has not been defined precisely and that there are fundamental differences among various military approaches, primarily in understanding and utilizing the concept.

Of other authors who dealt with low-intensity conflict, it merits mentioning Israeli military historian and theorist Martin van Creveld who emphasized - in his book *The Transformation of War* – that numerous wars waged after 1945 were actually low-intensity conflicts. Great military powers eventually lost those wars because the forces were persistently prepared to combat a conventional war, instead of a low-intensity conflict they were actually facing.\(^10\) Australian political scientist Ivan Molloy dealt with low-intensity conflict in his book *Rolling Back Revolution: The Emergence of low-intensity Conflict*. He stated that

“LIC, however, is a multidimensional but primarily political strategy. It seeks to achieve its objectives by avoiding direct military intervention, pursuing instead a varying combination of political, economic and psychological initiatives, and some covert military involvement by ‘official’ and ‘private’ US agencies. In practice, the emergence of LIC in the 1980s represented an increasing US concern with North–South conflicts that often involved issues of nationalism and self-determination.”\(^11\)


\(^11\) Molloy, 8.
Robert Asprey in his book *War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History* very extensively addressed the entire topic of the guerrilla warfare from the 18th century to Vietnam war. He concluded that guerrilla war has developed into an ideal instrument for realization of the social, political and economic aspirations of poor nations.\(^\text{12}\) Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, authors of *Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War*, define insurgency as a driving force of the revolutionary war aiming to destroy tenets a society rests upon, resulting eventually in negative ramifications.\(^\text{13}\) The book *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* by Max Boot, thematizes American background of the small wars, showing such type of conflict as a standard, and not exception for American military.\(^\text{14}\) Brian Crozier in the book *The Rebels, A Study of Post-War Insurrections* explores the origin of the outbreak and technique of insurgency, as well as the background and character of the typical insurgency leader.\(^\text{15}\) In *Revolution in the Revolution*, Regis Debray provides a pragmatic assessment of the situation in Latin America of the 1960s and the book became a specific guide for guerrilla warfare soon after it was published.\(^\text{16}\) David Galula stated his experiences as a French official in Greece, China, SE Asia and Algeria in the book *Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice*.\(^\text{17}\) Charles Gwynn is the author of *Imperial Policing*, a book that includes general principles of the internal security operation and a series of case studies from British interwar experience (India, Burma, China, Palestine, Egypt).\(^\text{18}\) Janie J. Geldenhuys in the text *Rural Insurgency and Counter-Measures* presents an insurgency and methods of combat against insurgency in South Africa from the government’s perspective.\(^\text{19}\) T. N. Green in *The Guerrilla*


\(^{17}\) David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice*, 1964.


\(^{19}\) Janie J. Geldenhuys, *Rural Insurgency and Counter-Measures*.
and How to Fight Him offers a summary of the case study about methods of insurgency and assessment of their success.\textsuperscript{20} Frank Kitson in the book \textit{Low-intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping} interceded for aggressive use of the governmental armed forces during suppression of the insurgencies.\textsuperscript{21} Through representation of its role in Arab Revolt from 1916-1918, T.E. Lawrence in his book \textit{Seven Pillars of Wisdom} concluded that military power alone would not be sufficient to win in unconventional war, emphasizing a need to use other, non-military methods.\textsuperscript{22} John McCuen in \textit{The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War} analyses military methods of the Chinese style of revolution.\textsuperscript{23} In \textit{Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency}, the author Roger Triquier developed the idea how military tactics and techniques are useless if a population among whom the insurgency was conducted lost trust.\textsuperscript{24} In closing, it is worth to mention \textit{Small Wars Manual}, a manual of the American marines that represents practical and relevant contemplations about waging small wars from strategic to tactical level.\textsuperscript{25}

\section*{Theoretical determinants}

\textit{Nature of low-intensity conflict}

A dominant form of the warfare through history rests on a paradigm of the industrial war among states. The decision about that was made at strategic level through massive use of the military power in order to crush the adversary. Concurrently with industrial \textit{total war}, colonization wars and conflicts emerged, aiming to spread influence and control of the great powers to developing countries. Due to ratio of the balances between conventional

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{20} T. N. Green, \textit{The Guerilla and How to Fight Him}, 1963.
\bibitem{22} T. E. Lawrence, \textit{Seven Pillars of Wisdom}, 1996.
\bibitem{25} \textit{Small Wars Manual}, 1940.
\end{thebibliography}
military power of the West and the rest of the world that is superiorly on the side of the first, a need to seek different ways of warfare emerged in developing countries, in order to stand up to conventional military supremacy of the West. Avoiding adversarial force and attacking its weaknesses are leading ideas of that manner of warfare, mostly realized through insurgency operations and guerilla form of the warfare. Regular armies of the developed countries had major strategic problems regarding use of the armed forces in such conflicts. Despite technological equipment of the regular army prepared for conventional war, its weakness was demonstrated in conflict with insurgents, terrorists and armed social groups.\textsuperscript{26} Causes for that are numerous, thus Žunec stated in his book \textit{Rat i društvo} (War and Society):

”Attainability on the market and technological development, particularly of the portable anti-aircraft and anti-armour weapons have made the strongest striking force of those armies easily vulnerable and non-economical; furthermore, modern weapon systems operate with difficulty in a more complex environment where enemy forces – hence targets – are fragmented, scattered and mixed with their own forces and where the front line is unclear and fluid. However, deeper reason of the non-efficiency is that ”traditional military wisdom, training and traditional professional education are obviously inadequate for challenges of the political-military proportions of the revolutionary war; the principle of centring energies and forces on one objective, namely on enemy’s military power, the principles of discrimination and proportionality, as the majority of the basic operational-tactical principles and rules that are taught at military academies are not valid in conflict with guerrilla, groups led by SNI or “social war”.\textsuperscript{27}

The concept of SNI has been developed due to a need to adapt to the new conditions of conflict in developing countries. It is primarily based on social-political dimension, has general character and implies restricted military action. The process of reorganization and adaptation to new conditions of operation is primarily manifested through professionalization of the military system. In example of the SNI, it means creation of multi-purpose forces,

\textsuperscript{26} Žunec, 93.

\textsuperscript{27} Same.
bigger openness in relation to civil society, and internalization of the armed forces as a consequence of the already stated globalization process.  

Change, dissatisfaction, poverty, violence and instability are driving forces of the dynamics of the low-intensity conflict that create conditions for conflict in mutual interaction. Success in such conflicts depends on several factors. The first of them is surely political domination. Political goals trigger military decisions at all levels (from strategic to tactical) and therefore Clausewitz’s assertion that “war is not only a political act but a real political instrument, continuation of political relations, their implementation by other means”, a definition that is most suitable exactly in the example of the low-intensity conflict. A prerequisite for political domination is familiarity of all commanders and staff officers with political goals and impact of the military operations on them. Military commanders also have to coordinate their actions with other governmental organizations in order to gain mutual advantage in low-intensity conflict; that is a determinant of the second factor crucial for success and integrity of the political and military operations. Consideration of the initiatives emanates therefrom and those are initiatives of political, economic and psychological nature, cooperation of the military with civilian sector respectively. The next factor represents adaptability. Successful military operations in low-intensity conflict require modification of the existing methods and structures if a particular situation demands it, as well as development of new, tailor-made for each situation separately. The factor of legitimacy depends on voluntary acceptance of the government’s right to manage, as well as to reach and implement decisions. Legitimacy emanates from perception that the governing authority is transparent and effective and uses appropriate institutions for reasonable purposes. The last factor of key importance for success of the low-intensity conflict is

30 Carl von Clausewitz, O ratu, 2010., 34. (About War)
perseverance. Low-intensity conflicts rarely have a clear beginning or end, marked by resolute actions that culminate in victory, but are long-lasting battles by their nature.31

Factors of low-intensity conflict

Theoretical determinants according to which we can qualify a certain conflict as LIC are the following: an exceptionally great influence of the politics on operation of the military force, restricted use of the force and personnel, concealment of the enemy’s operations, importance of the psychological factors, specific tactical methods based on guerilla attacks, ambushes, hostage crises, etc. and insurgency as the most important content of the LIC. There is a clear distinction in high intensity conflicts between politics and military affairs, and at operational level soldiers operate in conformity with military priorities. That is not the case with LIC where even a small volume of activities in a restricted area can have significant political implications.

The most important feature of the low-intensity conflict in the country towards which activities are directed is insurgency, whether supported or crushed. Insurgency represents an organized armed political battle aimed to seize power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. In some cases, objectives of the insurgency can be more restricted and leaders of the insurgency may have as objective detachment from governmental control and establishment of the autonomous state within traditional ethnical or religious territorial frames. Insurgencies mostly follow revolutionary doctrine and use the armed force as an instrument of politics. They also mobilize human and material resources to provide active and passive support to their programs, operations and goals. Leadership of the insurgency expresses its discontent by blaming the government, and offers a programme for improvement of conditions to transform people in unfavourable position into an effective force for political action. Insurgents ultimately need active support by a great number of politically active people

and passive acceptance of the majority. Insurgency leadership emphasizes and takes advantage of the questions supported by key social groups. Insurgency begins at a moment when a government does not give its consent to requests of “important social groups”, and opponents of government unite and start using violence in order to change the government’s position. Insurgencies are coalitions of various forces united through common hostility of the government. Their prospects improve to the extent in which these coalitions are able to find a joint position. In order to succeed, insurgency has to develop a unifying leadership, doctrine and organization, as well as vision of the future.\footnote{FM 100-20, Chapter 2: Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency, unpaginated (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html, accessed on 10/08/2020)}

American \textit{Field Manual 100-20} provides a definition that a doctrine of the low-intensity conflict contains seven elements common to all insurgencies. Those are: leadership, external support, ideology, phasing and timing, objectives, organizational and operational patterns, environment and geography.\footnote{Same.}

1. \textbf{LEADERSHIP}. Insurgency is an oriented and focused political violence, coordinated by leadership with a key task to discontinue relations between a nation and its government and to establish credibility of their movement. Social factors shape their approach to solving problems because leadership is a function of the organization and personality, and it can be divided into two different models. The emphasis in the first model is on organization that provides mechanisms that create collective power and it does not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be efficient. It is easier to penetrate an organization based on this model but such an organization is also more resistant to change. In the second model organizations depend on a charismatic person who ensures cohesion and motivation, as a central personality around whom a movement is concentrated, as it happened often in history. In this way organized leadership can make decisions quickly and initiate new actions. However, an organization is susceptible to disturbances if key personalities are suspended.
2. IDEOLOGY. Ideology represents a system of ideas and beliefs that provide orientation for social activities, in this context insurgency. In order to succeed, insurgency has to be based on a program that provides perspective and orientation. Future plans for insurgency have to be sufficiently vague for a broad attractiveness and sufficiently specific for solving important questions. Leaders of insurgency use ideology to provide an overview of the noted social and political diversities in terms of history, to justify the use of violence and illegal action for disputing the existing social order and to draw up a framework of the programme for future times. Ideology is a useful evidence for military analysts because through it, it is possible to identify segments of the society insurgency aims at. Thus, ideologies of various groups within insurgency movement can point to various viewpoints regarding strategic goals. In addition, ideology can suggest probable goals and tactics that considerably affect insurgent’s perception of the environment. Combination of the insurgent’s ideology and his perception of his own environment give form to organizational and operational methods of the movement.

3. OBJECTIVES. Strategic objective is decisive for cohesion among insurgency groups and it represents a desired end state of the insurgents. Substitution of the authority is only one of the steps on that pathway. Operational objectives insurgents strive to as part of the entire process of destruction of the government’s legitimacy and gradual establishment of the desired end state. Examples of operational objectives are: isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support and increased international support for the insurgency, destruction of the self-confidence of the government’s leaders, cadre, and armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw, establishment of civil services and administration in areas under insurgent control, and capture of the support or (or neutrality) of critical segments of the population. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, such as psychological operations or the attack and seizure of a key facility, and may be of psychological and physical nature.

4. ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY. Environment and geography include cultural and demographic attributes as well as climate and terrain, and are factors that affect all participants in a conflict. Their effects are most visible exactly at the tactical level and may affect decisions regarding force
structure, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures, distribution of insurgent efforts between urban and rural areas, adoption of appropriate organizational and operational patterns, advancement to a new phase of operations, return to an earlier phase or change patterns, programs, or strategies, opening of new operational areas.

5. EXTERNAL SUPPORT. Moral acknowledgment of the insurgent cause as just, politically active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in international forums, resources (money, weapons, food, advisors, and training), enabling, operational and logistic bases are types of support and their acceptance may affect the legitimacy of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. The state or group that provides support attaches its legitimacy to the group being supported and accordingly, it can gain or lose legitimacy along with the insurgent or counterinsurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation. The probability of a long-term, harmonious relationship between a nation and the insurgents or counterinsurgents it supports increases if their objectives and ideologies are compatible. It decreases if they are incompatible.

6. PHASES AND TIMING. Phases of the LIC range from subversive activities to employment of armed forces, a moment in which the insurgent side exposes its organizations and intentions. Early timing or rather recognizing a situation when the existing government has lost its legitimacy is critical for the success of insurgency.

7. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of all factors discussed above. Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purpose. They seek elective and appointed offices and employ violence selectively in order to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system to be incompetent and that it may provoke the government to an excessively violent response, which further undermines its legitimacy. A highly compartmented armed element carries out insurgent violence. A political element guides the armed element and also maneuvers for control of the existing political structure.
A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of this model.\textsuperscript{34} Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police and internal intelligence agencies, whilst national defense forces usually act in a reinforcement role.

In the second pattern insurgents also infiltrate government institutions and their object is to destroy the system from within. Generally, the insurgents do not reveal their affiliation or program, and their violence remains covert until the institutions are considerably weakened that the insurgency’s superior organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian revolution of October 1917, or Leninist model, followed this pattern.\textsuperscript{35}

There are two different variations of destroying a system from inside. The first is the co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The Sandinistas’ takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case in point where the insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government.\textsuperscript{36} The insurgent movement then takes over leadership, activating all its cells to guide reconstruction under its direction and it provides a disciplined structure to control the bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces around that structure. A second variation is the revolution through guerrilla warfare and its most famous example is the Cuban model of insurgency.\textsuperscript{37} It emerges from hidden strongholds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. The insurgents erect new institutions and establish control on the basis on that support. The Cuban revolution occurred in this manner and the Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative revolutionary attempts patterned on it (mostly failed), principally in Latin America. However, that does not discredit this


model of insurgency but it does emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model. Early timing is critical to this model and insurgency has to build up at the same time, as the government loses legitimacy, and before any alternative appears. The Nicaraguan insurgency combined this model with a broad-front political coalition, indicating a synthesis of methodologies typical of successful insurgencies. In general, insurgencies led according to this pattern are police and intelligence services problems. They usually involve the national defense forces only in a reinforcement role. However, this variation of insurgency may also require more direct action by regular armed forces.38

The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Unlike those in the two previous models, mass-oriented insurgents emphasize creating a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Their focus is on building a large armed force of guerrilla members, along with constructing a base of active and passive political supporters. The insurgents plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Their movement establishes a rival government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, leaders of the insurgency mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government. Examples of this model are the communist revolution in China39, the Vietcong insurgency40 and insurgency of the Marxist guerrilla in Peru.41 Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely resilient due to their considerable depth of organization. To defeat them requires coordinated action by all branches of government, including the armed forces.

38 FM 100-20, Chapter 2: Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency, nepaginirano (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html, pristupljeno 10.08.2020)
The traditional insurgency usually grows from very specific grievances and initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other groups. The insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. They frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy, and seldom to overthrow the government or to control the whole society. Their use of violence can range from strike and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Such type of insurgency may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents’ demands. Examples of this model include insurgency of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet withdrawal,\(^{42}\) the revolt of the Igbo people in Nigeria\(^{43}\) and the insurgency of the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka.\(^{44}\) The common pattern of these insurgencies is a wish of the minority groups to gain their right to autonomy that results from affirmation of their own ethnical identity.

The essence of the low-intensity conflict is mostly of political nature and therefore an exclusively military operation, without being accompanied by political operation, is rarely sufficient to put down an insurgency. Although through history, governments of the great powers have been successful in military aspect of the conflict, e.g., France in Algiers or the U.S. in Vietnam, political legitimacy of the government was nevertheless lost or it has never been established.\(^{45}\) Governments typically treat these insurgencies as military problems because they present a clear target for applying coercive force. Still, a lasting settlement requires significant political action. Different groups within the same movement may adopt different patterns. This indicates incompatibilities in leadership, ideology, or objectives. No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively, as the cited examples reveal. Each develops unique characteristics appropriate to its own circumstances.


\(^{45}\) John P. Cann, *Low-intensity conflict, insurgency, terrorism and revolutionary war* u „Palgrave advances in modern military history“, 2007., 117.
Methods change as conditions change, so that these patterns can serve as a useful starting point for comparative analysis.\footnote{FM 100-20, Chapter 2: Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency, unpaginated (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html, accessed on 10/08/2020)}

One of the most basic and most acceptable assumptions that low-intensity conflict is based on is that civilian population is the most critical factor of the low-intensity warfare. Civilian conflicts blur the difference between civilian and military participation, they conceal the real nature of such conflicts and avoid antagonizing nationalist feeling among local population. In the process of \textit{civilizing} a conflict, civilians can be used in different manners. One of the examples is arming insurgency contrarian group for anti-governmental operation in Nicaragua.\footnote{Walker, 1991.} The opposite example is mobilization and arming for protection of the government facilities against attacks of the insurgents, as it was the example with Civilian Democratic Forces (CHDF) in the Philippines in the 1980s.\footnote{Alfred W. McCoy, \textit{An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines}, 2009.} In Reagan’s time, \textit{civilizing} of the revolutionary or counter revolutionary conflict in the target state enabled the U.S. to realize military and other interventional goals through a plenipotentiary.\footnote{Molloy, 20.} The essence of the low-intensity conflict doctrine and in particular its importance, represent direct endeavours of the American administration and Pentagon to find solutions for more efficient presence, influence and penetration into areas rich with energy resources (Central and SE Asia, the Near and Middle East, South America and South Africa). In his Ph.D. thesis, Živojinović concluded how the use and further elaboration of this doctrinal concept will serve in the following years as a matrix for creation and shaping new strategic concepts to realize the policy of domination at global level.\footnote{Živojinović, 126.}

We can therefore consider mobilization of the civilians as one of the main factors of the low-intensity conflict. The correlation of Clausewitz with the idea of low-intensity conflict springs therefrom, long before it was formalized.

\footnotetext[46]{FM 100-20, Chapter 2: Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency, unpaginated (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html, accessed on 10/08/2020)}
\footnotetext[47]{Walker, 1991.}
\footnotetext[48]{Alfred W. McCoy, \textit{An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines}, 2009.}
\footnotetext[49]{Molloy, 20.}
\footnotetext[50]{Živojinović, 126.}
In the chapter entitled *Arming of the People* he emphasized:

“The requisition system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system, and the general liability to military service, and use of the reserve forces are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point; and the *levée en masse*, or arming of the people, now lies also in the same direction. If the first of these new aids are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them that the enemy has been carried along in the current and obliged to adopt them likewise, this will be the case also with people-wars. In the generality of cases, the people who make judicious use of this means will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use.”

Another factor that low-intensity conflict is based on is made of the paramilitary groups that represent “political, armed organizations that by definition are non-military, non-state and non-institutional entities. They are mobilized and operate with help of important allies, including fractions in a state.” Whilst being officially illegal, paramilitary groups have access to resources generally exclusive for the state and made possible by political and military allies. Paramilitary groups can be considered a very important factor for what Mary Kaldor calls “new wars”, in which key combatants “lend insurgents’ destabilization techniques to those whose aim is to spread fear and hatred.” Like Kalder’s aggressors “of the new war”, paramilitary groups use “banishment through use of the means like mass killings and forced transmigration” to control and eliminate those who oppose it. Although of political nature, paramilitary groups do not have legitimacy of the state behind them. Therefore, they are suitable for manipulation and use in low-intensity conflicts by government agents.

51 Clausewitz, 389.
54 Same, 8-9.
55 Mazzei, 5-6.
**Conclusion**

When deliberating about military science, military thinkers practice learned views they strictly adhere to. The change occurs when anomaly undermines the existing traditions of military practice with shifting of the paradigm from which new presumptions or reconstructions of the previous presumptions ensue. The paradigm of the industrial war among states based on two key elements – a state and industry – has dominated since Napoleon’s wars until recently. More often than not – at strategic level – a war would be decided through massive use of force to crush the adversary.

In strategic and doctrinal terms, the LIC concept has brought novelties in the manner of approaching strategic thought. The LIC concept has been developed from practice, from participation of the nations in conflicts, not from abstract concepts. The aim was to provide a context that would enable understanding of the most recent war experiences, to determine what has or has not confirmed the existing opinion. Strategic deliberation has been adjusted accordingly.

The adaptation of military strategy to existing conditions has been realized through the creation of the doctrine which affects organizational structure, establishes the direction of modernization and standards of professionalization. The professionalization of the military component represents a form of the universal modernization both in technical-technological and operational domain. This has determined a new paradigm of warfare in which the LIC represents the most appropriate type of conflict in a global age.

Maybe the LIC is, more than anything, a concept that primarily functions at strategic level. Tactical patterns of waging a conflict are almost unimportant. The only thing important is to exploit appropriate resources for the existing conditions. The integration of various types of warfare – from cyber, through information to conventional, as well as effective, synchronized and combined operation of all military components – have become key and distinctive features of future conflicts. The LIC concept incorporates in itself both phenomena and that has made it highly relevant nowadays.
War is an imitative and reciprocal activity, implying that activities of one side provoke a particular reaction of the other side. Therefore, it is important to establish various ethical and normative frameworks within which the war will be conducted, in order not to exceed the allowed boundaries of violence and not to turn into barbarism. Strategy and doctrine need to be subordinated to ethics so as to retain the dignity of war. The LIC is exactly, due to restricted use of military means, “the most appropriate” manner to wage war in modern age because disasters of the past, great conventional wars (the two world wars in particular) taught us, or at least should have taught us, that conflicts in which military operations, or rather militarization, are not restricted, have a high price. The Clausewitz’s idea of war as organized violence for achievement of political goals, in example of the LIC, can be supplemented with idea of adaptation to security challenges of the modern age. Violence in modern age is not a key aspect of the conflict but only one of the means that realizes a desired effect, only through integration with others (economic, information and similar).

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