VENETIAN RULE OVER DUBROVNIK IN THE EARLY THIRTEENTH CENTURY AND THE “LEASED COUNTSHIP” OF GIOVANNI DANDOLO (C. 1209-1235)*

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ABSTRACT: Based on a variety of sources, this article aims to investigate the character of Venetian rule over Dubrovnik in the first decades of the thirteenth century, drawing a parallel with the administrative models in other Venetian possessions. The abundance of documents related to the countship of Giovanni Dandolo (1209?-1235) allows the reconstruction of the count’s family and social background, his earnings from the Ragusan function, as well as an insight into his business pursuits. In addition, some old approaches are reassessed and new interpretations of the Ragusan political situation of that time—impacted by international developments in the Adriatic, Mediterranean and the Ragusan hinterland—are offered. Analysed and interpreted are the first two pacts between Dubrovnik and Venice (1232, 1236), along with the reasons for their conclusion.

Key words: Dubrovnik, Venice, 13th century, Giovanni Dandolo, count, lease of public office

Departure points

This article surveys early thirteenth-century Dubrovnik from the Venetian stance, setting aside social relations in the Ragusan commune, along with other

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issues which have been discussed in more recent literature. A departure from local circumstances, with a sharp focus primarily on Venice, and shifted throughout the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean, allows, in my opinion, a more realistic picture of the Venetian-Ragusan relations in that period, and at the same time sheds a fresh light on some of the Ragusan sources, prompting their reassessment.

In the spirit of its famous political pragmatism, on the territories acquired in the early thirteenth century Venice did not impose unique administration patterns. Instead, it established various models of the relationship between the central and local administration, each being the result of different determinants: strategic value of the territory and its economic potential, method of acquisition, resistance of the local population, political power of the directly involved families who participated in decision-making and who, in return, expected new opportunities and privileges, as well as many other factors.

From the territory in the northern Adriatic across which it had already been stretching, Venetian dominion during and after the Fourth Crusade expanded further to the outposts dotted along the Adriatic coast and eastern Mediterranean. Its title to a part of the Byzantine Empire according to the division agreement of 1204, Venice managed to realise gradually through a policy tuned to the local conditions. If the circumstances so required, Venice resorted to force in

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3 The analysis of the very complex situation regarding the Kvarner Islands and a part of Istria in the twelfth and early thirteenth century goes well beyond the framework of this study. However, Nada Klaič’s interpretation of the gradual “feudalisation” of the first “Venetian administrators” may be rightly discarded. Nada Klaič, Povijest Hrvata u razvijenom srednjem vijeku. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1976: 39 et sq. With regard to discrepant circumstances prevailing in the territories under Venetian sovereign rule, with which this chapter deals, significant differences, for example, between Krk and Osor on the one hand, and Rab on the other, should be emphasised. See Dušan Mlacović, Gradani plemići: Pad i uspon rapskoga plemstva. Zagreb: Leykam international, 2008: pp. 165-166.
establishing dominion over the strategically important islands and ports, while with regard to the mainland areas of its lesser interest, it would secure political influence by means of negotiation instead,\textsuperscript{4} as in the case of Durrës.\textsuperscript{5} Some territories Venice enfeuded to individuals or families, such as Naxos to Marco Sanudo and Lemnos to the Navigaioso family.\textsuperscript{6} With some possessions, new privileges merely reconfirmed the \textit{status quo}, in that Venice only appropriated the status and rights of a feudal overlord.\textsuperscript{7} In 1207, Venice allotted the strategically important Corfu to ten of its patricians from the most distinguished houses.\textsuperscript{8} With the partition of Crete in 1211, a territory of key significance for the strategic influence in the Aegean basin, the pressure of those who deemed themselves circumvented was such that eventually hundreds of possessions of various quality and rank were allotted, which also gave way to the first centrally conducted colonisation.\textsuperscript{9} In 1205 a decree was even issued with an aim to

\textsuperscript{4} M. Pozza, »Introduzione«: pp. 48-49.

\textsuperscript{5} Formally, Durrës belonged to the Despotate of Epirus, with which in the early thirteenth century Venice maintained close political relations (Freddy Thiriet, \textit{La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age, Le développement et l’exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XIle-XVe siècles)}. Paris: E. De Boccard, 1959: p. 85). Durrës owed its importance to the fact that Roman road running to Thessaloniki and Constantinople (via Egnatia) started from it (ibidem: p. 44).

\textsuperscript{6} Gerhard Rösch, \textit{Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schliessung des Grossen Rats. Zur Genese einer Führungsschicht}. Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1986: p. 121. In these cases the term \textit{feudum} is usually used; see the examples in Gottlieb Lucas Friedrich Tafel and Georg Martin Thomas, »Der Doge Andreas Dandolo un die von demselben angelegten Urkundensammlungen zur Staats- und Handelsgeschichte Venedigs« \textit{Abhandlungen der historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften} 8/1 (1856): pp. 68-70. Marco Sanudo was the nephew of Doge Enrico Dandolo, one of the leaders of the Holy Crusade (Robert Lee Wolff, »A New Document from the Period of the Latin Empire of Constantinople: The Oath of the Venetian Podestà.« \textit{Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et Slaves} 12 (1952) [= \textit{Mélanges Henri Grégoire}]: p. 543). For the elements of feudal culture and practice see especially Gherardo Ortalli, »Venezia mediterranea e grecità medievale: relazioni, conflitti, sintonie«, in: \textit{L’eredità greca e l’ellenismo veneziano}, ed. Gino Benzoni. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki editore, 2002: pp. 60-61, 65.


\textsuperscript{9} G. Rösch, \textit{Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schliessung des Grossen Rats}: p. 122; Charalambos Gasparis, »Great Venetian families outside Venice: the Dandolo and the Gradenigo in 13th-century
encourage Venetian individuals and families to take possession of the once Byzantine-ruled Aegean islands and nearby estates.  

The building of administration did not progress at the same pace on all the acquired possessions. By the end of the twelfth century Venetian territory in Constantinople saw the establishment of the first forms of public administration which, already by 1204/5, in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, had a potential to develop into a permanent structure with the podestà as governor and institutions modelled after those of Venice. It was not by chance that the first elements of permanent administration were introduced immediately in 1204/5 in the strategically very important, recently conquered Zadar.

However, the shaping of a more developed administration model (regimen) was usually a long and gradual process. On many dominions, in the beginning the term of governor’s office was not limited. Even in Constantinople, the first podestà, Marino Zeno, remained in office for thirteen years, while the two-year mandate and regular salary were introduced only in 1218. In a treaty with Venice of 1204/5, the city of Zadar agreed to accept a Venetian as their count, also with an indefinite term of office, so that Pietro Michiel remained count for at least fifteen years (1209-1224). According to the same agreement, he


Jacoby defines that process as “the transition from indirect to direct state presence”. D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: p. 103.

D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: pp. 84-85.

Listine I: doc. 30, p. 21-22.

had to reside in the city for at least nine months per year.\textsuperscript{17} In all likelihood, it was not until 1217 that \textit{bailo} at the head of Acre had, in the true sense, become a salaried official with a pre-established term of office.\textsuperscript{18}

The same hesitant policy of introducing permanent administration forms marked the early Venetian rule over Dubrovnik. Probably estimating that the situation in this newly acquired possession was stable, the new Venetian supreme administration did not interfere much into the extant structure of communal government, but merely “leaned” on it, by instituting countship that was granted to Venetian patricians under some sort of lease.\textsuperscript{19} This model of administration stretched to the first three decades of Venetian rule and marked the countship of Giovanni Dandolo (and his immediate predecessors). However, in the 1230s the role of legal instruments in the relations between Venice and Dubrovnik gradually strengthened (agreements, instructions and formulas of the count’s oath, first normative collections etc.),\textsuperscript{20} preparing the shift towards a new, permanent model of Venetian rule, accomplished after Dandolo’s death.

\textit{Count Dandolo’s lesser-known predecessors}

According to the data derived from extant sources, prior to the beginning of the thirteenth century Dubrovnik had always been headed by a local count, regardless of the sovereign rule the city acknowledged at the time.\textsuperscript{21} With the establishment of Venetian supreme rule in 1205, the pattern changed, but not because of the lack of trust into the locals. If Vekarić’s assertion is correct, the submission of Dubrovnik to Venetian rule was aided by the members of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Listine} I: doc. 31, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{18} D. Jacoby, »The Venetian Government«: p. 25; D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: pp. 92-93.
\textsuperscript{20} For a general overview of this topic see: A. Rizzi, »Dominante e dominati«: pp. 235-271.
\textsuperscript{21} David Abulafia, »Dalmatian Ragusa and the Norman Kingdom of Sicily.« \textit{Slavonic and East European Review} 54 (1976): pp. 423-425. A list of counts known by name is available in N. Vekarić, \textit{Nevidljive pukotine} p. 32.
\end{footnotesize}
Bobaljević clan and their “coup d’état”,
and therefore, it is within that noble
circle that a new administrator loyal to Venice could be found. However, by
introducing “lease” of Ragusan countship Venetian administration redefined
the count’s function, which was assumed by the leaseholder, Venetian patrician.

Hardly anything is known about the first Venetian count after Dubrovnik’s
submission to the supreme rule of Venice in 1205. In a document, which in
Listine and Diplomatički zbornik is erroneously dated to the 1220s, among the
Venetian counts in Dubrovnik a mysterious Zellovello, that is, Lellovello is
mentioned. In sifting information on him, the list of Venetian counts in the
statute of the Confraternity of St. Andrew has been most useful, in which Lello
opens the list, with no surname entry. Although fairly uncommon, the men-
tioned name features in the onomastic pool of the Venetian patriciate (e.g. Lello
Gradonicus, 1112). In a ducal letter from 1207, among Venetian iudices et sapi-
entes who signed the document, is also Lello Vilio. There is reason to assume
that this very patrician, though somewhat earlier, was the first Ragusan count,
and that his name variant Lello Vello/Vellus was incorrectly transcribed as

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23 Listine I: 31-32; Codex III: doc. 182, pp. 208-209. This concerns a letter of the Ragusan count to the podestà of Split and the Trogir count Vučina [Šubić]. In both editions the document is erroneously dated to 1221-1223, i.e., 1221-1222. Dating was already corrected by Vinko Foretić, who also drew attention to the list of counts in the statute of the Confraternity of St. Andrew, yet in it he misread the name as Lelovello (Vinko Foretić, Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808., I. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1980: p. 58). Steindorff dates the letter only to 1272, when the podestà of Split was another Vučina Šubić, and holds that the account of Count Damjan Juda was inserted as a memento of the ancient times (Ludwig Steindorff, Die dalmatinischen Städte im 12. Jahrhundert. Köln-Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1984: p. 140, n. 53); however, the author was not familiar with the data from the otherwise reliable statute of the Confraternity of St. Andrew, according to which the abovementioned is clearly placed at the very beginning of the list of counts. On Vučina Šubić from the early thirteenth century see Damir Karbić, »Odnosi gradskoga plemstva i bribirskih knezova Šubića«: Prilog poznavanju međusobnih odnosa hrvatskih velikaša i srednjovjekovnih dalmatinskih komuna.« Povijesni prilozi 35 (2008): pp. 45-46.
24 F. 14v; the name was omitted in the edition of that list in Bratovštine i obrtna korporacije u republici dubrovačkoj od XIII do konca XVIII vijeka, II, ed. Konstantin Vojnović. Zagreb: JAZU, 1900: p. 4. The statute is kept in the Archive of the Dubrovnik Diocese, no. 32.
Zellovello. Sadly, the document in which Lello is mentioned as Ragusan count cannot be dated with greater accuracy, so that the only thing that can be done is to place him first in order and assume that he held the office before 1207, possibly as early as 1205.

In the statute of the Confraternity of St. Andrew and other lists of counts, immediately after Lello, and according to the chronicler J. Resti in the first position,\(^n\) the name of Count Lorenzo Querini is cited. In 1204/5 he was the member of the Venetian Minor Council (\textit{sapiens}),\(^n\) that is, he belonged to the inner circle of experienced patricians. In his history of Ragusan bishops, S. M. Cerva mentions a charter between Dubrovnik and Kotor from the spring of 1207, in which Archbishop Leonard and Count Lorenzo Querini are mentioned side by side.\(^n\) Only one original document mentioning this count (“L. Quirino”), agreement between Venice and Omiš of 19 June 1208, has survived to date.\(^n\) Almost a quarter of a century later (1231/2), a certain Lorenzo Querini sat again in the Venetian Minor Council,\(^n\) yet it is quite possible that we have a case of the Ragusan count’s namesake.

While fairly little is known about Lorenzo’s \textit{cursus honorum}, the members of the numerous Querini family may be traced on high-ranking positions. Although we can merely speculate on their kin ties with the Ragusan count, it is noteworthy that in 1206 Giovanni Querini came in possession of the island of Astypalai (Stampalia), favourably located in the central part of the Aegean Sea;\(^n\) that Ottaviano, member of the Minor Council in 1200,\(^n\) in 1207/9 held


\(^{30}\) \textit{Codex} III: doc. 67, pp. 77-78; \textit{Listine} III: pp. 390-391; see also Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih dubrovačke sa mletačkom republikom tja do g. 1358.«: pp. 86-87; B. Krekić, \textit{Unequal Rivals}: p. 145. The original is currently kept in \textit{Miscellanea atti diplomatici e privati}, no. 63 (State Archives in Venice).


\(^{32}\) F. Thiriet, \textit{La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age}: p. 82.

\(^{33}\) G. Rösch, \textit{Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schliessung des Grossen Rats}: p. 102.
a prestigious office of the Venetian podestà in Constantinople;\textsuperscript{34} Paolo Querini, however, frequently sat on the Minor Council (1205/6, 1207/8, 1212/13).\textsuperscript{35} In the latter half of the century, the Querini were among the most prominent Venetian families according to the criterium of continuous representation on the Major Council; the number of their members in that body (10-20) was lower yet more stable than the proportion of the leading families—the Contarini and Dandolo.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Giovanni Dandolo and his family}

Unlike the reign of the first couple of counts, marked by a myriad of open questions due to the scarcity of documents, the period in which Count Giovanni Dandolo (1209?-1235) held his duty abounds in diverse historical sources, which not only provide insight into the nature of his countship, but at the same time afford illuminating details for the portrayal of his family and social background.

The Dandolo family belonged to the ranks of the Venetian patriciate which rose to prominence in the eleventh century, and by the early thirteenth century acquired a status of one of the most powerful families in Venice.\textsuperscript{37} Descending from one of the branches of this family was the famous doge, Enrico Dandolo, who was in command of the Venetian fleet in the Fourth Crusade, and a much mythologised figure of the Venetian past.\textsuperscript{38} During that campaign (1202-1205), in which he participated despite mature age and blindness, in Venice he was replaced by his son, Ranieri. Doge’s nephew, Vitale Dandolo, was at the time in command of the Venetian fleet which surveyed the Adriatic, and upon the capture of Zadar, he was installed there in 1205 as the first Venetian count.\textsuperscript{39} In 1229, another Dandolo was almost chosen as doge: Marino, son of Doge Enrico, who, among other things, was twice elected podestà of Treviso, count

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} G. Rösch, Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schliessung des Grossen Rats: p. 209.
\item \textsuperscript{36} G. Rösch, Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schliessung des Grossen Rats: p. 127.
\item \textsuperscript{37} G. Rösch, Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schliessung des Grossen Rats: pp. 65, 103.
\item \textsuperscript{39} T. F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo: pp. 153-154, 253.
\end{itemize}
of Zadar and vice-doge (1224), lost in the final stage of the elections against Giacomo Tiepolo.\textsuperscript{40}

The father of the Ragusan count Giovanni Dandolo, Iacopo, was a distant relative of the aforementioned Dandolos. Giovanni’s ancestors in at least two generations (father and grandfather Giovanni) were active in the lucrative Mediterranean trade, for a certain period of time stationed in the colony of Acre.\textsuperscript{41} Grandfather Giovanni appears in the circle of the doge’s council (\textit{iudices et sapientes}) in 1163 and 1166.\textsuperscript{42} The mentioned members of the Dandolo lineage drew their descent from the branch based in the parish of San Luca (\textit{de confinio S. Luca}), more precisely, from a collateral with a house on the \textit{Riva del Carbon}, which later Venetian genealogies refer to specifically as “Dandolo di San Luca” (as distinguished from the “Dandolo degli Zii”, who had a house in the same parish opposite the church).\textsuperscript{43}

The copy of Count Giovanni’s last will, kept in the State Archive in Dubrovnik, allows insight into his family ties, providing more solid evidence on his social background.\textsuperscript{44} Giovanni’s father, Iacopo Dandolo, died before 1190.\textsuperscript{45} It is possible that he was one of the envoys who in 1177 negotiated an agreement with Genova.\textsuperscript{46} His widow, Maria, remarried Iacopo Badoer from the \textit{confinio S. Giacomo de
Luprio (today S. Giacomo dell’Orio), also member of an old patrician lineage. Giovanni’s sister, Filippa, was married to Filippo Dolfin, from a family whose house was also located closely to San Luca. Giovanni was married to Orabile (Orabilis) Giustinian, with whose family he was connected through commercial activity. It appears that in 1235 Giovanni’s only living child was his daughter, Armina, wife of Balduino Querini of the confinio S. Polo. Giovanni’s brother, Marco, whom we know from some earlier documents, was no longer among the living when Giovanni drafted his will. Until 1225 the brothers lived in a property-based community known as fraterna, which was common among the Venetian patricians of the day. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in 1214 Marco visited Dubrovnik, where he collected some payments for his stepfather Badoer, while in 1216 in Venice he received certain payments on account of a debt that Ragusans owed to his brother, Giovanni.

From the ducal letter of 1226, we learn that Count Giovanni Dandolo was closely related to Doge Pietro Ziani (viro egregio Jo. Dandulo, propinquo suo dilecto, comiti), son of Doge Sebastiano (1172-1178). The Ziani belonged to a new generation of patricians who did not share the views regarding the reign of Vitale Michiel and his aristocratic circle, so that the choice of Sebastiano to hold the dogeship heralded a novel style of public administration and strengthening of communal institutions. Sebastiano’s son, Pietro Ziani, belonged to the generation of Giovanni’s father and was active in business in the Levant from as early as 1174. He was invested with the countship of Rab

47 Venetian documents from the period 1225-1227 mention the count of Zadar, M. Dandulo, and his son J. (Listine I: doc. 46, p. 34; doc. 66, pp. 42-43; doc. 67, p. 43; doc. 68, pp. 43-44). However, as grasped from a document dating from 1224, it was not Marco, but the already mentioned doge’s son, Marin Dandolo de confinio sancti Pauli (Listine III: Supplement, doc. 10, p. 394). He and the “Ragusan” Dandolos were not closely related.
48 J. Schulz, »The Houses of Titian, Aretino, and Sansovino.«: p. 93. Due probably to the fraterna, some genealogies record both of them as Ragusan counts (M. Barbaro, Arbori de’ patritii veneti, III, p. 189, ASVe Miscellanea codici, ser. I, Storia veneta, n. 19; two genealogies are cited by Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih dubrovačke sa mletačkom republikom tja do g. 1358.«: pp. 87-88).
49 Codex III: doc. 105, p. 125.
50 Codex - Supplementa I: doc. 35, p. 73.
51 Listine I: doc. 43, pp. 37-38.
in the period 1189-1205,\textsuperscript{54} and when elected doge, he was believed to be by far the wealthiest man in Venice.\textsuperscript{55} The fact that cousin Pietro Ziani headed Venetian state from 1205 to 1229 may have had certain impact on the grant of Ragusan countship to Dandolo, yet no reliable data confirm this.

Considering that in the branched-out Dandolo family of the time at least several members shared the same name,\textsuperscript{56} it is not quite certain that the “Ragusan” Giovanni was the same person who in 1200, as advocate of the commune (\textit{advocator communis}), signed an agreement between Venice and the Patriarch of Aquileia.\textsuperscript{57} Yet from the beginning of the century onwards his life and career may be traced with somewhat greater accuracy. Succeeding the already well-established commercial networks, developed thanks to the investments of his father-in-law, Pietro Giustinian \textit{de confinio S. Pantaleonis}\textsuperscript{58} and brothers-in-law, Stefano and Marco, in the first decade of the thirteenth century Dandolo attended to his commercial affairs in Syria.\textsuperscript{59} In 1204, he leased the collection of revenue for a period of five years in the Venetian colonies in Acre and in Tyre, with which the position of the head of Venetian community was associated


\textsuperscript{55} R. L. Wolff, »A New Document from the Period of the Latin Empire of Constantinople.«: p. 547.

\textsuperscript{56} For instance, Giovanni Dandolo of the \textit{confinio S. Polo} (T. F. Madden, \textit{Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice}: p. 221, note 118; p. 235, note 5); the son of Andrea Dandolo, doge’s brother (J. Schulz, »The Houses of the Dandolo.«: p. 408); of the \textit{confinio S. Apolinar}, who was a guarantor to the “Ragusan” Dandolo (\textit{Listine I}: p. 40; \textit{Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia}, I, ed. Roberto Cessi. Bologna: Cinola Zanichelli, 1950: p. 22).


\textsuperscript{58} Pietro Giustinian is mentioned both in 1187 and 1207 as procuratore di San Marco (\textit{Listine I}: doc. 18, p. 12; \textit{Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII}, II: doc. 487, p. 27; doc. 493, p. 34), which was one of the highest positions in the state.

(vicecomes et prelatus), which he held at least until the summer of 1210. In the lease of the aforementioned colonies the capital was actually invested by a trade company (compagnia), with Dandolo as the managing partner (with 1,500 libras of the 1,700 loaned to him by his father-in-law Pietro Giustinian), along with Enrico Navigaiso (also 1,500 libras) and Matteo Giustinian (400 libras). It seems that all partners were also related either by blood or marriage. In comparison with the commercial assets traced in contemporary documents, the capital of the mentioned company was substantial. In the lease of the mentioned colonies the partners invested a total of 2,200 libras, while the remainder was channelled into the trade ventures in the Levant.

We are unable to follow Dandolo’s business in the Levant in the ensuing couple of years, apart from the fact that he built a house in Tyre on the plot that belonged to the Basilica of San Marco in Venice. For some reason—perhaps the revenue in Tyre and Acre did not turn out as Dandolo had expected or some other business ventures had failed—by the summer of 1209 Giovanni (as well as his brother Marco with whom he was associated in fraterna) was in serious financial crisis. In October 1209 he renounced the house in Tyre, possibly to avoid the payment of land lease. A new loan of 800 libras, borrowed from his father-in-law, Pietro Giustinian, and which was to be reimbursed in Acre on the basis of the issued bill of exchange, remained unsettled; in November 1209, through his brother, Giovanni claimed that he had no sources to pay off the

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61 Although by the turn of the twelfth to the thirteenth century other libras of greater value had already been introduced (libra denariorum grossorum), the custom of expressing higher amounts in librae denariorum parvorum persisted for some time. In the Ragusan documents cited in this study the amounts are expressed in traditional Venetian librae denariorum parvorum, most frequently indicated simply as “lib. ven.”. On this see Frederic C. Lane and Reinhold C. Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice, 1 - Coins and Moneys of Account. Baltimore-London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985: p. 123.


63 Concrete comparisons cannot be given due to the diversified nature of the businesses; in the main it concerns collegancia to the value of a couple of hundred libras, and rarely capital investments exceeding 1,000 libras (Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, II, passim).

64 Nuovi documenti del commercio veneto dei sec. XI-XII: doc. 90, pp. 102-104.


debt, as reconfirmed in July 1210 in a reply to an appeal submitted on behalf of his father by Pietro’s son Marco, Giovannì’s brother-in-law (...dictus Iohannes Dandulo vicecomes respondit dicens quod non habebat unde persolveret illos bìçancios nec persolvebat...).\(^67\) Considering that being a debtor to the father-in-law was not looked upon with approval, and according to contractual terms the amount of unpaid debt was to be doubled, as well as the fact that the repayment of debt was guaranteed by the brothers’ own property, the insolvency statement must have been bitter reality. In other words, shortly before the lease of Ragusan countship, Giovanni was burdened by serious, long-term financial difficulties. It appears that after March 1211, Giovanni and Marco Dandolo completely abandoned the trade in the Levant, developed by their family over the decades.\(^68\) In these unfavourable financial circumstances, an investment into Ragusan countship probably seemed as a road to recovery from the brink of bankruptcy because it offered much-needed revenues devoid of risk.

Dandolo was entrusted with Ragusan countship in perpetuity, that is, with no definite term of office,\(^69\) which he held until his death for approximately a quarter of a century.\(^70\) Namely, although the documents related to his Ragusan countship are extant only from 1214, it seems that Dandolo assumed that function a couple of years earlier. Terminus ante quem non was the early spring of 1208, when Lorenzo Querini was still count.\(^71\) There are certain indications that Dandolo

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\(^67\) Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, II: doc. 509, pp. 48-49; doc. 510, pp. 49-50; doc. 514, pp. 53-54; doc. 521, pp. 61-63.

\(^68\) After that date they no longer appear in Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, II. Apart from the already mentioned persons from the Dandolo family circle, capital investments in trade were also made by Giovanni’s mother Maria and wife Orabile (Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, II: doc. 510, pp. 49-50). A certain Iohannes Dandolo—presumably a kin—has been traced in 1260 in the function of baiulo, that is, dux in Acre; see G. L. F. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, »Der Doge Andreas Dandolo«: pp. 96-97.

\(^69\) For the counts of Krk it is explicitly stated that they should hold the countship for life (usque dum vixerimus). Listine o odnošajih između južnoga slavenstva i Mletačke Republike, III, ed. Sime Ljubić [Monumenta spectantia historia Slavorum meridionalim, III]. Zagreb: JAZU, 1872: Supplement, doc. 3, p. 389.

\(^70\) Dedicated to Dandolo is the article by Giuseppe Gelcich, »Il Conte Giovanni Dandolo ed il dominio veneziano in Dalmazia ne’ secoli di mezzo. Contributo alla storia dei Municipi dalmati«: Trieste: G. Caprin, 1906; offprint from Archeografo Triestino, III serie, 2/2 (1905). The article is strewn with incorrect data and attempts at idealisation of Dandolo, so that it was virtually of no use for my research.

\(^71\) Codex III: doc. 67, pp. 77-78 and Listine III: pp. 390-391; see also Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih dubrovačke sa mletačkom republikom tja do g. 1358«: pp. 86-87; B. Krekić, Unequal Rivals: 145. It should be noted, however, that in the agreement of 19 June 1208 Ragusan count Querini is
became the count of Dubrovnik in 1209, yet it is beyond any doubt that in October that year he was still *vicecomes* in Acre, where he stayed with his brother. An “overlapping” of the Acre and Dubrovnik episode is not impossible, however, primarily because Ragusan countship was of “lease” nature, and it did not require the count’s personal presence and a precise transition of power. In March 1211 the brothers Giovanni and Marco were still in Tyre, either Giovanni had already been invested with the Ragusan countship, or it followed afterwards.

The obscurity surrounding the exact date of Dandolo’s assumption of countship of Dubrovnik is associated with the fact that in the early thirteenth century Venetian authorities did not insist on the continuous presence of their administrator in the community which he headed, Dubrovnik being no exception. In the course of 1214-1215 Dandolo was known to leave Dubrovnik on a couple of occasions. Later too gaps in his countship have been traced: in early September 1225, for example, we find him in Venice. In 1231 he was also absent from Dubrovnik mentioned as the first mediator in soothing the relations after the raid of Omiš, which had taken place on St. Lucia’s Day the previous year. Given the time necessary to organise communication, involvement of other mediators, drawing of the agreement proposal etc., I assume that Querini was contacted in the early spring of 1208.

That year as the beginning of the countship was entered in the manuscript genealogy of Marco Barbaro, *Arbori de’ Patritii Veneti*, III (State Archives of Venice, Miscellanea Codici, ser. I, Storia veneta, n. 19), p. 189, yet with an information that Giovanni shared his countship with his brother Marco: “Zuanne Co. di Ragusi 1209. Marco Co. di Ragusi 1209.” and a note that the said Marco delivered the body of St. Theodore to Venice. According to the tradition cited by Pietro Antonio Pacifico, the translation of the saint’s relics took place in 1256, leading thus to a conclusion that the man concerned must have been Marco’s namesake, though of younger age (*Cronica veneta sacra e profana*. Venezia: appresso Francesco Pitteri, 1736: p. 264).

Giovanni and his brother Marco signed a document issued in Acre in October 1209 (*Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII*, II: doc. 513, pp. 52-53).

In Tyre they issued a bill of exchange to Giovanni’s brother-in-law, Stefano Giustinian, by which they agreed to reimburse 540 lib. ven. for an amount received in local currency (*Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII*, II: doc. 529, pp. 69-70); it seems that it was not a maritime loan, with which the risk rests upon the creditor.

*Codex* III: doc. 105, p. 125 (the editors entered a note that the document of 21 March 1214 is dated *more veneto*, which would imply that it was actually from 1213; however, it was drafted by the Ragusan notary Vlaho, and in the Ragusan chancery it was not customary to use *mos venetus*, so I am truly convinced that it dates from 1214); doc. 114, p. 133; doc. 115, pp. 133-134. In October 1215 Dandolo was in Venice, where he issued a certain document (*Codex* III: doc. 118, pp. 135-136).

*Listine* I: doc. 49, p. 35.
for some time, because *vicecomes* Andrija Dabrana acted on behalf of the Ragusan commune.\textsuperscript{77}

Given that by 1196 he was already married\textsuperscript{78} and by 1204 held a responsible duty, and that in 1235 his mother and stepfather were still living, he might have been in his thirties when he was invested with the countship of Dubrovnik.\textsuperscript{79}

In some documents Dandolo is recorded as *miles*.\textsuperscript{80} In medieval Latin *miles* was sometimes used as a synonym for *nobilis*,\textsuperscript{81} yet does not feature as a standard title of the Venetian patricians. However, Venice used this title on Crete to distinguish feudal administrators from old Venetian families,\textsuperscript{82} and therefore Jacoby probably rightly assumes that Dandolo earned it as a feudal lord on the territory of Tyre.\textsuperscript{83}

*The “lease” model of countship and count’s business interests*

In order to understand the character of the Venetian rule in Dubrovnik in the time-frame under study we should go back at least half a century and

\textsuperscript{77} Codex - Supplementa I: doc. 54, p. 94. The mentioned document of 3 June 1231 was issued in Rimini as a reply to Dabrana’s letter, which may roughly be assumed to have been drafted a couple of months earlier.

\textsuperscript{78} Nuovi documenti del commercio veneto dei sec. XI-XII: doc. 90, pp. 102-104.

\textsuperscript{79} In a document published in Codex III: doc. 152, pp. 178-179, there is mention of a certain Ragusan count Giovanni as a young man. The document is undated. However, for a possible link with Count Dandolo and its dating around 1219 no convicing arguments can be supplied considering that Petar Balislava, named in the document, was active in Ragusan politics from at least 1215 to 1252 (Nenad Vekarić, *Vlastela grada Dubrovnika, 4 - Odabrane biografije (A-D)*. Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, 2013: p. 44). In Balislava’s day there were another three Ragusan counts by the name of Giovanni, which tends to confirm my assumption that this information does not necessarily concern Dandolo.


\textsuperscript{81} See Du Cange’s dictionary of medieval Latin (http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/MILES#MILES-102, accessed on 19 November 2015).


\textsuperscript{83} D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: p. 92.
examine the models and parallels of the Ragusan “lease model” in other Venetian outposts in the Mediterranean.

The examples of Constantinople and Acre clearly show that jurisdiction and collection of revenue constituted the innermost functions around which public administration was constructed. First examples of the Venetian lease of functions, that is, certain offices of public administration and collection of revenue related to it, date from the 1170s and pertain to the colonies of Venetian merchants in Acre and Tyre which operated as autonomous enclaves. Although the problems with the local magnates prompted Venice to reshape the former model of administration at the turn of twelfth to the thirteenth century, it remained based on the lease of office. It was then that Giovanni Dandolo, future count of Dubrovnik acting as bailo of the Venetian colonies in Acre, and Tyre, became well acquainted with the financial and administrative elements of the lease of public function. In the early thirteenth century the lease model was also practiced in Coron and Modon in western Peloponnese. An observing remark made by David Jacoby that the lease model in these strategically very important centres presupposed peaceful relations with the surrounding areas may well be applied to early thirteenth-century Dubrovnik, whereby one should add that the stability of internal relations was just as essential. If the assumption on the “coup” against Count Damjan Juda and his clan is correct, introduction of a model of “leased countship” would imply that the defeated were not only leaderless, but were also extremely powerfully and expediently subjected to the rival clan, and that by around 1209 at the latest (for which we have reliable sources) the situation in Dubrovnik fully stabilised.

More details on the financial aspect of the Ragusan countship in the early thirteenth century we gather from the data related to the difficulties arising from the yield of annual revenue in 1215 and 1216 which the Ragusan commune was obliged to pay to Dandolo. On 12 July 1215, it was established that the count’s revenues, to which he was entitled on various grounds, amounted to a total of (summata ratione) 439 and a half perpers per year. Ragusan commune acknowledged this debt, yet claimed that it was unable to reimburse it “due to wars” (propter

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84 D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: pp. 82-84.
85 For more details, see D. Jacoby, »The Venetian Government.«: pp. 21-22; D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: pp. 90-91.
86 D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: p. 98.
87 D. Jacoby, »The Expansion«: p. 98.
This was the reason why the debt was rescheduled, i.e., an agreement was reached by which the annual debt payment (for the period from 1 November 1214 to the same date in 1215) would exceptionally be reimbursed (non pro consuetudine set propter paupertatem et indigentiam quam comune Ragusii habuit propter guerras) from the provisional three per cent duty on Ragusan goods imported from Venice until the final settlement of the debt. By March 1216 the whole debt was paid off as agreed, which also provides very valuable information on the volume of Ragusan trade in Venice: within 8 months Venetian port saw a traffic of Ragusan goods worth at least 14,650 perpers.

Ragusan commune was to reimburse 400 perpers to the count on All Saints’ Day every year, along with other usual revenues and regular rewards besides those from salt (introitus et honorificientiae comitatus consuetae). The mentioned amounts were similar to those received by the Venetian administrators on Crete in 1224 (350 perpers) and in Negroponte (450 perpers). In 1215 the total revenues from countship (reditus Ragusini comitatus) amounted to 439 and a half perpers. If we are right in our assumption that the amounts were not subject to any change in the meanwhile, we may conclude that approximately one tenth above the regular amount was yielded from other sources, first of all from fines, which until 1244 were channelled directly to the count. Namely, the thirteenth-century Ragusan penal system, like that of Venice, was based on the system of fines for virtually all criminal offences except a small group of the most serious crimes. Extant sources clearly show that fines were also included in the count’s revenues on Krk and Cres/Osor, as was equally the case on the dominions of Venetian feudal lords on the territory of Lampsacus.

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88 Codex III: doc. 114, p. 133; on the notion of guerra see below.
89 Listine III: doc. 115, pp. 133-134; these terms are also cited in doc. 118, pp. 135-136.
90 Codex - Supplementa I: doc. 35, p. 73.
93 Listine III: doc. 115, pp. 133-134.
94 Codex - Supplementa I: doc. 83, p. 121.
96 Listine I: doc. 25, p. 17.
97 Listine I: doc. 69, p. 44.
in Asia Minor.\(^98\) A similar model, in which the fines belonged to the representative of the sovereign authority, was widely implemented outside Venetian territories.\(^99\)

It appears that count’s revenues were not paid all that regularly, because in the summer of 1234 Ragusan commune acknowledged a debt of 1,426 perpers and 4 grossi to Count Dandolo, which is a delay of nearly three years.\(^{100}\) Of the mentioned sum he received an immediate reimbursement of 1,000 libras (= 500 perpers), while the remainder Dandolo was to receive by 1 November and the end of the administrative year.\(^{101}\) The permanent lease of countship probably accounts for the fact that the revenues were to be collected until Dandolo’s death, because the debt claim of Dandolo’s heirs against Ragusan commune had reached 2,284 libras (= 1,142 perpers), for which in 1238 a settlement was negotiated whereupon a gradual pay off would be made through provisional one per cent duty on Ragusan goods passing through Venice.\(^{102}\) One instalment was paid in February 1239, while the total sum was settled by August 1241.\(^{103}\) This amount again confirms the volume of Ragusan trade in Venice of at least 228,400 libras (= 114,200 perpers) over a period of approximately three years. Almost twice the amount in relation to the minimum value of commercial turnover in 1215-1216 is a telling testimony to the fact that in reality the agreements of 1232 and 1236 did not hinder Ragusan trade in Venice. If we

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100 One cannot rule out the possibility that some other reason stood behind the mentioned debt, of which no sources have survived.


102 *Codex* - *Supplementa* I: doc. 64, pp. 104-105; *Codex diplomaticus Regni Croaticae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, IV, ed. Tadija Smičiklas. Zagreb: JAZU, 1906: doc. 54, pp. 61-62. In the document from the *Supplementa* in many places it has been erroneously transcribed as “libre grossorum Venetorum” while in the original it reads as “libre denariorum ven[e(cialium)]”, which is a significant difference in terms of value. Cf. *Miscellanea saec. XIII*, no. 8 (State Archive in Dubrovnik).

103 *Codex* - *Supplementa* I: doc. 69, pp. 109-110; *Codex* IV: doc. 122, pp. 132-133.
project the two amounts from 1216 and from the period 1238-1241 on the annual level, we reach the minimum turnover of around 22,000, i.e., 30,000 perpers.

From a warrant deed dated 1225 we learn that for his countship Dandolo paid an annual amount of 400 libras to the Venetian state (pro soluzione comitatus eius),¹⁰⁴ which clearly defines him as a “leaseholder” of a revenue-yielding public function. At approximately the same time (1208) the counts of Osor of the Morosini house for the countship (pro comitatu) also paid 400 libras ven. annually to the Venetian commune,¹⁰⁵ while the Counts of Krk in 1229 for the countship revenues (redditus comitatus Vegle) 350 romanates, in addition to the amount of 40 romanates for regalian rights per year.¹⁰⁶ Venetian state, evidently, classified the countships into specific categories according to the expected public revenues, on the basis of which it set the lease price, whereby Dubrovnik fell within the same category as the Kvarner possessions.

What was the net profit of Dandolo’s income from Ragusan countship? In those days, one (the so-called Komnen’s) perper was equivalent to 2 libras (ven. parvorum).¹⁰⁷ Therefore, from 439 perpers one should first deduce 200 perpers (400 libras) which the count paid to Venetian authorities, leaving the net income (without fines and port fees) of 239 perpers (478 libras). A document concerning damage from a pirate attack may serve as a useful indicator of the real value.

¹⁰⁴ Listine I: doc. 50, p. 36; Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio I: p. 91. In October the following year two Venetians guaranteed for Dandolo’s debt to the state of 300 libras, most likely also concerning Ragusan revenues in the first three quarters of the year (Listine I: doc. 58, p. 40).
¹⁰⁶ Listine I: doc. 73, p. 46. The obligation to this amount the counts of Krk accepted on the grounds of a concession charter (carta concessionis) and confirmed it by oath in 1199 (Listine III: Supplement, doc. 3, p. 389). It seems that the collection of count’s revenues (collecta, banna, facta foris) was already a common practice, later also regulated by the provisions of two Venetian military commanders (statutum... capitaneorum). Listine I: doc. 25, pp. 16-17. This raises the question of the monetary value of a romanate. In principle, romanate is the same as solidus (Nikola Jakšić, »Solidus romanatus na istočnoj jadranskoj obali.« Starohrvatska prosvjeta 12 (1982): pp. 175-176). Herkov makes no attempt at the interpretation of its value, but provides several Krk examples from the beginning of the fourteenth century from which one may conclude that it was used as an equivalent to libra (Zlatko Herkov, Građa za financijsko-pravni rječnik feudalne epohe Hrvatske, II. Zagreb: JAZU, 1956: p. 359). It is virtually impossible that the amounts cited in the sources pertaining to the countship of Krk concerned solidi and not libras.
¹⁰⁷ The problem of value and equivalence of Venetian moneys of account and effective currency is incredibly complex and changes over the eras. In the period mentioned, the perper: libra conversion ratio must have been 1 : 2. For more details see F. C. Lane and R. C. Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice I: p. 122.
Two Venetians in a smaller boat (barca) were sailing from Ancona towards Pescara when they were attacked by a pirate gang of the Kačići and men of Split, who seized their boat laden with goods. The merchandise included fabrics, iron, copper and miscellaneous articles, to a total worth of 1,600 libras (ven.).

Therefore, the count with his fixed annual income from the Ragusan service could load with goods slightly more than one quarter of the boat of this type. Or, Cecilia, granddaughter of the Zadar count Giovanni Michiel, brought in 1237 to her husband Vid, youngest brother of the Krk counts Ivan, Fridrih and Bartol, a dowry (though above the average) of 1,000 libras (equivalent to 500 perpers).

In 1225 in Venice, the price of a gown ranged around 3 libras, and of a boat 3-5 libras. On the basis of all these micro indicators one may conclude that the earnings from the Ragusan countship were such that they did not allow any large-scale accumulation of capital, yet it did offer certain opportunities to the Dandolos who as business venturers in the eastern Mediterranean were on the verge of financial ruin.

However, it is far more useful to view Dandolo’s income through the business prism. An investment of 400 libras into Ragusan countship was not substantial, and in a year’s time it was to bring over 78 libras, i.e., earn at least 20%, or considerably more if all the fines and port fees were added. Its major advantage was that it excluded any business risk and guaranteed minimum profit. What made it particularly attractive was that the “lease” had to be paid, apparently, at the same time when the bulk of the revenues was collected, and there was no need to immobilise any capital or invest “hard cash”, as the debt to the Venetian state could have been aptly settled with the means freshly collected in Dubrovnik. In practice, however, this benefit did not endure until the end of Dandolo’s countship. Considering that in 1234 Ragusan commune was in an approximately three-year delay with the count’s instalments, it is clear that by far the greatest disadvantage was the extended pay-off term, that is, a relatively long term of the maximisation of the capital, due to which neither the stake nor profit could be reinvested into new ventures.

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108 Listine I: doc. 43, p. 33.
110 L. Buenger Robbert, »Money and prices in thirteenth-century Venice.«: p. 383. Focused mainly on inflation, Robbert also brings a series of salary indicators of the Venetian office-holders of the day, yet fails to add other earnings connected to their office, and therefore is of little or no use to our analyses.
According to a permanent arrangement, refreshed in the agreements of 1232 and 1236, on behalf of the regalian rights from Dubrovnik Venetian commune was entitled to an annual amount of 100 perpers. Doge himself, on the same occasion and due to the same title, was to be paid 12 perpers, while indeed the Promissio of Doge Iacopo Tiepolo from 1229 and his successors also mentions the regalian right (regalia) of the Ragusan countship. The mentioned sums remained on the same level for quite some time and were so low that they were obviously of no value but purely symbolic.

Although this is hardly an occasion for a comprehensive discussion on the contemporary situation on the islands Korčula, Lastovo and Mljet, in the investigation of the count’s income one cannot circumvent a document of 17 August 1215, by which Ragusan commune promised to pay 250 perpers to Count Dandolo over a period of five years in compensation for the damage he suffered on Korčula and Mljet (propter damnum, quod idem comes habuit in insulis videlicet Corcera et Meleta). This source led V. Foretić to conclude that Dandolo “made an attempt ... with his Dubrovnik income to gain Mljet and Korčula...”, which were “under Zahumlje” (Hum, in fact), yet there is little ground for his thesis. Apparently, the lords of Hum had already lost lordship over the mentioned islands in the twelfth century. The source mentions

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112 Entered into the text of doge’s promissio of 1280 are updated amounts of the “leases” of particular possessions. For the revenues (redditus) of the countship of Krk and Osor 700 libras den. were to be paid annually, therefore, a uniformly increased amount; the nature of the “lease-based”, semifudal government on these islands had not yet changed. Interestingly, the term “feudal” in that context (in feudum eis concessum) is also used in some documents related to Pag (Codex III: doc. 43, p. 47). What was received from Zadar and Dubrovnik was defined in a completely different way: as revenues from the communes of Dubrovnik and Zadar (a comuni). In the meantime, Dubrovnik witnessed a new government model (regimen), similar to that of Zadar, and was no longer “leased” to an individual who would govern it. This explains the amounts of far lesser range: Zadar was to pay 1,000 rabbit skins (cunicule), and Dubrovnik no more than 180 libras. See Le promissioni del doge di Venezia: pp. 118-119, 147-148. In the early thirteenth century rabbit skins were calculated at a rate of 20 skins for a perper (see Listine I: doc. 30, p. 22).
114 V. Foretić, Povijest Dubrovnika I: p. 83. I leave aside the documents of Count Desa from 1151, because they are not essential to this issue; discussion on their authenticity is encapsulated by Josip Lučić, »Stjecanje, dioba i borba za očuvanje Dubrovačkog primorja 1399-1405.« Arhivski vjesnik 11-12 (1968-1969): p. 101, note 11a.
damage, and it seems quite plausible that Dandolo, who in the late summer that
year sailed from Dubrovnik to Venice, was robbed somewhere in the vicinity
of Vratnik. These water routes were continuously raided by the pirates of Omiš,
and so was the island of Korčula. Though not particularly high, the amount
was still worthy of attention—less than one third of the merchandise worth
carried by a smaller boat. However, in this “scenario” it does strike as odd as
to why Ragusan commune would compensate the damage caused by the pirates
it did not control, on the islands which allegedly did not belong to the commune.
In 1234 Ragusan commune also compensated the damage on cattle that a certain
Kaceta of Split suffered on Korčula. Therefore, we should not set aside the
question regarding the nature of the relationship of these islands and the Ragusan
commune if it paid for the committed damage on them.

Interpretation of the data from other sources related to the aforementioned
islands is hindered by the fact that different levels of administration tend to
overlap in them: virtual administration of those who upon certain grounds
claimed right to these islands regardless of the true rule, on the one side, and
on the other, effective power which someone occasionally exercised. To make
things even more complex, in both cases the grantees freely disposed of their
right and entrusted it to other persons or entities. Classic historiography
erroneously argued that such dispositions implied unique and effective govern-
ment, whereby in the approach to historical material it introduced anachronistic
concepts. I believe that continuous coexistence of several virtual rights and
interchange of effective power may even explain some of the seemingly
contradictory sources relating to these islands.

In my opinion, in dealing with the supreme authority over Korčula, Mljet and
Lastovo of much greater significance is the document of 22 May 1240 than all
virtual dispositions of those who claimed their right to these islands. In it, Grubeša
and his son Toma of Dubrovnik swear loyalty to the doge, promising to guard
his peaceful possession of the islands of Korčula, Lastovo and Mljet, to the honour

116 In late July he was in Dubrovnik (Codex III: doc. 115, p. 133), and in October in Venice
(Codex III: doc. 118, pp. 135-136).
117 Codex III: doc. 346, p. 403.
118 Thus in 1221 the pope confirms the grant of rights on Brač, Hvar, Korčula and Lastovo of
the Hungarian and Croatian king Andrew II to the Counts of Krk (Codex III: doc. 165, pp. 190-191).
119 Codex III: doc. 165, pp. 190-191; doc. 197, pp. 223-225; doc. 303, p. 345; doc. 346, p. 403;
IV: doc. 102, p. 111. On the “war of titles” and other issues relevant to this topic see M. Ančić, Na
of the doge and the Ragusan count in office.\textsuperscript{120} The oath mostly dwells on commonplaces, as befits an act of this kind, yet it clearly delineates the supreme authority of Venice and the relationship with the function of the Ragusan count, which leads to an assumption that this was an oath taken by new collectors of the revenue from the island countships that belonged to the count of Dubrovnik. Namely, a series of documents confirms that well into the fourteenth century, perhaps up until 1358, Ragusan count did give in concession the collection of the revenues of the Lastovo countship.\textsuperscript{121} The earlier mentioned damage compensation to Kaceta of Split in 1234 is already solid proof that Korčula in some way or another was connected to the Ragusan commune too, although this relationship was discontinued by 1254 at the latest, when the island countship was permanently granted to Marsilio Zorzi.\textsuperscript{122} The “damage” in the mentioned document of 1215 might therefore concern the loss of count’s revenue from Mljet and Korčula, as suggested by some of the older authors (Šišić, Medini, Gušić, Solovjev).\textsuperscript{123} All considered, the count’s revenues from these islands and the concession of their collection remain in the sphere of speculation, although there can be no reasonable doubt about the supreme rule of Venice over them in the first half of the thirteenth century and their relationship with Ragusan countship.

No reliable data may confirm that Dandolo, during his countship in Dubrovnik, was engaged in some other activities. In this period Venetian feudal lords and counts-leaseholders were allowed to pursue other activities. For instance, in 1227 Niccolò Querini, count of Cres, kept over 1,000 head of cattle (mainly sheep and goats for milk) and colts.\textsuperscript{124} In Dubrovnik only in the formula of the count’s oath

\textsuperscript{120}...ut libere et bene ac quiete possint manutenere insulas, videlicet Corciram, Lastam et Meletam ad honorem dominorum nostri duces et predicti domini Nicolai comitum et comitum qui pro domino nostro duce eruunt in Ragusio, ad salutem Ragusii... (Codex III: doc. 102, p. 111). Foretić translates the document accurately, but errs in its interpretation (V. Foretić, Povijest Dubrovnika I: p. 85).


\textsuperscript{122} Discussion on the supreme authority over the island until the mid-thirteenth century is detailed by Vinko Foretić, Otok Korčula u srednjem vijeku do g. 1420. Zagreb: Tisak Narodne tiskare, 1940: pp. 46-61.

\textsuperscript{123} Their views are encapsulated by V. Foretić, Otok Korčula: p. 58.

\textsuperscript{124} Listine I: doc. 69, p. 44.
to the doge from the end of the thirteenth century are his investments in businesses limited to the amount of the received salary. Given that Dandolo on his previous “leased function” in Tyre and Acre developed a large business network, it is quite possible that the lease of Ragusan countship, which yielded modest earnings, was initially meant to serve as a position from which he could have good control of the commercial business and invest money into other business ventures. From a debt payment receipt dating from 1214, it is possible to grasp that in Dubrovnik 271 perpers (= 542 libras) were also invested by Dandolo’s stepfather Iacopo Badoer (quos tu suprascripte comes obligatus es dare eidem Jacobo pro comuni Ragusii), although according to the wording of the text it is not quite clear whether it was Badoer’s investment in the lease of Ragusan countship, Dandolo being the nominal leaseholder, or a loan given to the commune.

**Turbulent times on land and sea**

During Dandolo’s countship Dubrovnik witnessed most turbulent circumstances. In a document from 1215 the Ragusans apologise to the count for not being able to reimburse the mature part of debt due to the wars (propter guerras). On this V. Foretić based his assumption on the attack of Dubrovnik that year by the Great Župan Stefan of Serbia, arguing also that the treaty of the same year was issued to confirm peace. That assumption, however, is not convincing. Stefan’s charter, which is not dated but was most certainly issued before the coronation in 1217, as well as the analogous charter issued by Stefan’s nephew and protégé, Great Count Andrija of Hum, do not depart from the usual trade

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126 D. Jacoby, »The expansion«: p. 92.
128 Codex III: doc. 114, p. 133.
privileges. Moreover, Stefan’s direct attack on the “Venetian” Dubrovnik would have annulled the effects of his pro-western policy, sealed by the marriage with Anna Dandolo, granddaughter of Doge Enrico.\footnote{For more on this topic in: Božidar Ferjančić, »Odbrana Nemanjinog nasleđa - Srbija postaje kraljevina«, in: Istorija srpskog naroda, I, ed. Sima Ćirković. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1981: pp. 299-300; Ivana Komatina, »Ana Dandolo – prva srpska kraljica?« Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 89 (2014): p. 15. The Ragusan count Giovanni Dandolo was a very distant relative of the descendants of Enrico Dandolo. As he had no political power, it appears unlikely that he might have had any influence on that marriage on account of his family descent; cf. contradictory opinions quoted in: I. Komatina, »Ana Dandolo – prva srpska kraljica?«: pp. 15-16, note 29.}

The term guerre, as in the cited document of 1215, notably in its plural form, was used in the sources from the first half of the thirteenth century to denote clashes with pirates. For example, in an agreement from 1232, the Ragusans promise to “wage war” with all pirates and plunderers (facient werram),\footnote{Listine I: doc. 307, p. 353.} while in 1227 a coordinated action of the Venetians and Frederick II was launched against the pirates of Omiš (pro facto guerre Caciciorum).\footnote{Listine I: doc. 66, pp. 42-43.}

It appears likely that the mentioned document pertains to the period marked by fierce piracy at sea which halted or hindered normal trade routes, resulting in the financial deficit of the Ragusan treasury. The pirates of Omiš, who in the late twelfth century raided the waters of Dubrovnik and southern Adriatic as far as the shores of Apulia\footnote{By an agreement from 1190 they promised not to seize the ships sailing from Apulia in the waters between Vratnik and Molunat. Codex II: doc. 226, p. 241.} around 1214, approximately at the same time when the Ragusan document was drawn up, were active in the entire Adriatic, for even the cities in Istria feared their raids.\footnote{Mladen Ančić, »Srednjovjekovni Omiš«, in: Omiš i Poljica, ed. Žarko Domljan. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2006: p. 50.}

At the time, the Kačići acknowledged the suzerainty of the Hungarian and Croatian ruler, yet Andrew II could not keep them under control. Best proof of this is a grant of four large Dalmatian islands to the Counts of Krk in 1221, by which through privileges he tried to shift over the “dirty work” regarding the curbing of Kačić’s power in that territory,\footnote{M. Ančić, »Srednjovjekovni Omiš«: p. 51; Ivan Majnarić, »Papinski poslanik Akoncije u Dalmaciji i Hrvatskoj 1219.-1223. godine«, in: Humanitas et litterae. Zbornik u čast Franje Šanjeka, ed. Lovorka Ćoralić and Slavko Slišković. Zagreb: Dominikanska naklada Istina and Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2009: pp. 88-90.} and possibly at the same time securing...
the legal basis for the intervention of Venice, which was their overlord. In the 1220s, namely, Omiš pirates faced the allied forces of Venice, papal curia and Emperor Frederick II, who were highly motivated to crush the piracy and plunder, and secure peaceful passage in the Adriatic. Dubrovnik was to be included in that plan as a Venetian dominion, and Pope Honorius III invited the Ragusan chapter to choose an archbishop who would assist in the action against the Omiš pirates, whom he blamed not only for a series of most notorious offences and atrocities, but also heresy for robbing Christians. Yet judging by the Venetian reprimands from 1226, Dubrovnik showed little activity in the “anti-Omiš alliance”, and moreover, it is questionable whether its inhabitants consistently observed the trade embargo. It seems that the loyalty of Zadar was just as disputable, because in 1227 in Venice it was discussed that Frederick II, who evidently imposed himself as the leader of the alliance in the war against the Omiš pirates, might demand Zadar hostages. One could say that Dandolo’s entire countship was marked by a constant threat of the Omiš pirates in the Adriatic, and it was not until their defeat in the struggle against Split in 1240 that the Omiš menace finally declined.

The situation in the immediate and farther hinterland was equally unstable. In the 1220s, Stefan the First-Crowned managed to establish his rule over Hum, in that over the western part (from the Neretva to Omiš) he ruled directly, while the

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138 This assumption has no confirmation in the sources. One should certainly take into account a broader context of the relations between Andrew II and the Counts of Krk, to whom in this period he also issued a grant deed for Vinodol and Modruš. See Mladen Ančić, »Dva teksta iz sredine 14. stoljeća. Prilog poznavanju “društvenog znanja” u Hrvatskom Kraljevstvu.« Starohrvatska prosvjeta, III series, 40 (2013): p. 170, with reference to older literature.
139 M. Ančić, »Srednjovjekovni Omiš.«: p. 51.
142 Listine I: doc. 66, pp. 42-43.
143 Vidi Codex III: doc. 303, pp. 345-346 and Listine I: doc. 74, p. 46; Codex III: doc. 377, p. 43 and Listine I: doc. 78, pp. 51-52; Codex III: doc. 382, pp. 439-440. Ančić argues that the cities such as Dubrovnik, Šibenik and Rab must have provided logistic support to the Omiš pirates, without which they could not control the sea routes throughout the Adriatic basin (M. Ančić, »Srednjovjekovni Omiš.«: p. 53).
144 M. Ančić, »Srednjovjekovni Omiš.«: pp. 51-53.
eastern part (from the hinterland of Dubrovnik to the Neretva, i.e., former Zahumlje) he ceded to his nephew Andrija. Stefan’s sudden death in the autumn of 1228 gave way to insecurity, marked by incidents in the Ragusan borderland. Thus in Dubrovnik on 9 October strict orders were issued with an aim to neutralise all the potential sources of conflict and prepare the city for a possible attack: all farming activities and cattle grazing outside the city area and immediate surroundings had to be discontinued, i.e., on the territory which was governed according to specific terms with the Serbian rulers. Also, traffic between the Elaphite islands and the mainland that was under Ragusan rule was discontinued, departure from the Dubrovnik area was prohibited, and the guard obligation was intensified.

In the beginning, Serbian king Radoslav enjoyed the support of his father-in-law, Epirus despot Theodore Angelos (Komnenos Doukas), who at the time allied with Frederick II. Yet his luck turned after Theodore was defeated in battle in 1230 by the Bulgarian emperor John Asen II (1218-1241), whose daughter Belosava happened to be married to Vladislav, Radoslav’s brother and rival. In the rebellion of Serbian nobility Radoslav was finally dethroned in 1233, having soon found refuge in Dubrovnik, to which at that grave moment, as gratitude for the Ragusan hospitality, he issued a charter with significant privileges, which, indeed, would have been effective only if he restored the throne. Although

146 B. Ferjančić, »Odbrana Nemanjinog nasleda«: p. 308.
147 On account of daily robberies of “their enemy king” the Ragusans obviously appealed to Grgur of Bribir, Split and Šibenik count (1227-1234), for the settlement of disputes involving the seizure of goods. As the document is undated, it is not quite certain whether it concerns the early reign of King Radoslav (1228-1233) or the early rule of his brother Vladislav (1234-1243). *Listine I*: doc. 81, pp. 55-56; *Codex III*: doc. 373, p. 431. For a detailed account on Grgur of Bribir see Damir Karbić, »Šubići Bribirski do gubitka nasljedne banske časti (1322.).« *Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti HAZU* 22 (2004): pp. 6-9.
148 *Diplomata et acta saec. XIII*, no. 52; *Codex III*: doc. 261, p. 292.
hostile at first towards the city that sheltered his rival and opponent, the new Serbian king Vladislav understood the benefit from Ragusan trade, and thus in 1234 an agreement was concluded by which, among other things, the Ragusans were guaranteed free trade throughout the territories under his rule. That same year, as if by a chain reaction, Dubrovnik also negotiated an agreement with the count of Hum, Andrija and obtained a confirmation of ban Kulin’s trade privileges on behalf of the Bosnian ban Matej Ninoslav. This finally put an end to direct threats and provided a legal framework for the relations with the lords in the hinterland.

Yet the safety and prosperity of Dubrovnik did not only rely on the circumstances in the close neighbourhood, but just as equally on the relations between the big players on the territory of the eastern Balkans and northern Greece: Bulgarian emperor John II Asen (1218-1241), Thessaly despot Manuel Angelos (also known as Komnenos Doukas, 1230-1241) and his nephew, Epirus despot Michael II Angelos (Komnenos Doukas, 1231-1267). Their relations ranged from conflict to alliance, sealed by marriage bonds. Dubrovnik was skilful at establishing good relations with all parties, and took every opportunity to obtain privileges: around 1230 from John Asen II, in 1234 from Manuel Angelos, cousin and protector of Radoslav Nemanjić, and in 1237 from Michael II Angelos, namely on behalf of the renewal of an old privilege issued by his father Michael I (c. 1205-c. 1215).

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156 Monumenta Serbica: doc. XXX, pp. 24-25.


In the third circle of the politically powerful figures were even bigger names with whom the mentioned three rulers were connected: emperor of Nicaea John III Vatatzes (1222-1254)\textsuperscript{161} and his father-in-law, Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen (1194-1250).

The fact that the two documents, issued in Dubrovnik in 1235 were dated according to the regnal years of both the pope and Emperor Frederick II,\textsuperscript{162} raises the question whether the supreme rule of Venice was discontinued that year and Dubrovnik briefly acknowledged the emperor’s supreme power.\textsuperscript{163} In order to understand the context, one should concentrate on the preceding documents. Namely, in the period 1229-1235 Dubrovnik signed agreements on the free passage of merchants and provision of legal protection with Fermo and three cities from the Po delta: Ferrara, Rimini and Ravenna, of which Ferrara was the most important, in a strong ascendant at the time.\textsuperscript{164} The agreements were concluded through an exchange of parallel documents of the Italian cities and Dubrovnik. The mentioned cities acknowledged the supreme rule of Frederick II, with whom Venice was on good terms at the time. Because of the key importance of Ferrara for the passage along the Po River towards the markets in the interior, as early as 1230 Venice concluded a commercial contract with it.\textsuperscript{165} In Ferrara on 26 May 1231 a document was issued to the Ragusan envoy Andrija Balislava,\textsuperscript{166} only ten days later (3 June) of very similar content in Rimini,\textsuperscript{167} and probably following the same sequence the third document in Ravenna.\textsuperscript{168} The “tour” of Andrija Balislava around the mentioned cities was

\textsuperscript{161} G. Ostrogorski, \textit{Povijest Bizanta}: pp. 162-164.
\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Listine} I: doc. 79, p. 52; \textit{Codex III}: doc. 383, pp. 440-441.
\textsuperscript{163} Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih«: pp. 96-97; V. Foretić, \textit{Povijest Dubrovnika} I: p. 63.
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Codex - Supplementa I}: doc. 54, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Listine} I: doc. 83, p. 57; \textit{Dubrovačka akta i povelje} I: doc. 24, pp. 33-34. The document is undated, yet in it too the letter is carried by the envoy Balislava, while from the formula besides the signature in the document of 1235 it is clear that it was no other but Andrija.
in conformity with Venetian policy. Moreover, in the first agreement with Fermo it is explicitly stated that it was initiated by Count Dandolo, i.e., that Venetian government stood behind it.\textsuperscript{169}  Responsive documents to Rimini and Ravenna were issued in Dubrovnik only in 1235, and on the same day, 1 August.\textsuperscript{170} They were drawn up in such a way that the entire central part, i.e., the dispositive (from \textit{omnibus} to \textit{bannis nostre civitatis}) was word by word borrowed from the document issued by the city of Rimini in 1231, with formulas which were otherwise never used in Dubrovnik (e.g. \textit{damus parabolam et plenam fidantiam}). Equally, I assume that the notary Pasko Capalu, having given it no prior thought, copied from the original text also the date formula according to the regnal years of the pope and Emperor Frederick. As far as we know, Dubrovnik had no direct contact with Frederick II, although his power and the relations with Venice inevitably reflected on the situation in Dubrovnik.

Towards Frederick’s policy in northern Italy Venice remained neutral for quite a long period.\textsuperscript{171} In March 1232 the emperor even visited Venice, on the occasion of which he issued it significant commercial privileges aimed at the development of trade in southern Italy,\textsuperscript{172} yet the first signs of the Venetians’ shift towards the opposite camp were already anticipated.\textsuperscript{173}

The situation at the “sea front” also witnessed a change. John III Vatatzes, son-in-law of Frederick II, sided with the rebellion against Venice on Crete in 1228.\textsuperscript{174} In 1231 an agreement was prepared between Vatatzes and Genova to the detriment of Venice, but considering that Frederick was on hostile terms with Genova, the agreement was abandoned.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{169} Codex III: doc. 274, pp. 308-309.

\textsuperscript{170} Rimini: Listine I: doc. 79, p. 52; Dubrovačka akta i povelje I: doc. 21, pp. 27-28; Ravenna: Codex III: doc. 383, p. 440.


\textsuperscript{175} I trattati con Genova: p. 184.
Around 1232 the relations between Venice and Frederick II were, therefore, on a turning point, which could explain the postponement of the “ratification” of the Ragusan agreements with the “imperial” Rimini and Ravenna. However, it is hard to say whether the conclusion of the Venetian-Ragusan contract from 1232 was dictated solely by the objective of the Venetian government to have a firmer political and legal control over the Ragusan dominion or it may have been influenced by the general enhancement of legal instruments during the dogeship of Giacomo Tiepolo, elected in 1229.176

The first pactum with Venice of 1232

When Dandolo became count of Dubrovnik there was not yet a contract that would regulate the relations between the commune and Venetian authorities. It appears likely that prior to his departure from Venice he received a grant charter (privilegium, carta concessionis) and took an oath on the governing of Dubrovnik (iuramentum or promissio, of which carta promissionis was drawn up),177 similar to the procedure with the counts of Krk in 1199178 and the Morosini for Osor in 1208.179

During Dandolo’s countship the first pact between Dubrovnik and Venice was concluded (1232).180 Some authors argued that the first agreement was already concluded in 1205.181 However, the assumption that the agreement existed but has not survived is in contradiction with the great zeal with which the Venetian

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176 For the changes in state administration and legal order of the Venetian Republic during the reign of Doge Giacomo Tiepolo see G. Cracco, Società e stato nel Medioevo veneziano: pp. 158-173; G. Ortalli, »Venezia nel secolo di Federico II.«: p. 418.
177 For more details, see: N. Lonza, »Prisege i naputak«: pp. 59-95.
179 Cres document, issued to the heirs after the death of Rogero Morosini, is published in: Listine I: doc. 33, pp. 24-25; it also includes the oath by which the grantees, among other things, swear to comitatum... regere, conservare, manutener et deffensare.
180 Listine I: doc. 75, pp. 46-49.
chancery kept and copied the agreements of this kind into special registers.182 Further, had such a document already existed in 1205, either of the parties concerned would most certainly have called upon it as, for instance, in the case of Zadar.183 Moreover, in the supplement to the chronicle Venetiarum historia by Pietro Gustinian from the latter half of the fourteenth century it is stated incorrectly, though significantly, that “the city freely submitted to the Venetian commune in 1232, in the reign of Doge Giacomo Tiepolo” (... que civitas se libere tradidit comuni Venetiarum... MCCXXXII...).184 In the Visegrád Treaty of 1358 the Ragusans too mentioned that the relations with Venice were regulated by pacts “some 120 years ago” (abannis circiter centum viginti sub certis pactis et conditionibus sub dominio exiterrit Venetorum).185 Therefore, both cities were perfectly aware that it was not until the 1232 pact that a legal frame defined the relations between the two cities.

The authors writing about Venetian-Ragusan agreements tended to interpret them as a redefinition of the relations following a crushed rebellion against Venetian authority, that is, as a submission model which Venice imposed “as punishment”.186

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182 The keeping of the first register of this kind, known as Liber pactorum, was started at the close of the twelfth century. For a detailed account see: Marco Pozza, »I Libri Pactorum del comune di Venezia«, in: Comuni e memoria storica. Alle origini del comune di Genova. Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2002: pp. 195-212.

183 Count’s oath refers to conventio facta inter Veneticos et Jadertinos and pactum scriptum factum inter Venecias et Jadram (Listine I: doc. 31, p. 23).

184 Venetiarum historia vulgo Petro Iustiniano Iustiniani adiudicata, ed. Roberto Cessi and Fanny Bennato. Venezia: Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezie, 1964: p. 283. In the list of Ragusan counts, appended to the same chronicle, it is also evident that the year 1232 was taken as initial for the entries, although it is erroneously quoted that it was then that the first count was sent: Et primo destinatus fuit comes Raguxiensibus, anno Domini MCCXXXXII, tunc ducante domino Jacobo Teupolo duce illustro Venetiarum (Luca Fiori, Il codice autografo di Piero Giustinian: un esempio di genesi ed evoluzione della cronachistica medievale, unpublished PhD thesis of the University in Bologna, 2014: 203, http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6574/, accessed on 13 April 2021).


186 Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih«: p. 92; Gordan Ravančić, Vrijeme umiranja. Crna smrt u Dubrovniku 1348.-1349. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest: p. 58. G. Cracco persists on the entirely ungrounded arguments about the “continuously rebellious Dubrovnik” (G. Cracco, Società e stato nel Medioevo veneziano: p. 155). In an older study Krekic also argues that the 1232 pact was concluded after a rebellion (Bariša Krekic, »Y eut-il des relations directes entre Dubrovnik (Raguse) et l’Empire de Nicée.« Byzantinische Forschungen 4 (1972): p. 153), yet holds that the 1236 pact was just a renewal of the former one and that a new rebellion did not take place at the time (B. Krekic, Unequal Rivals: p. 13). The passage dealing with the period 1232-1236 Cessi concludes with a Pythian sentence “Non sono ribelli, ma si risentono i riflessi di una crisi lontana in atto e di
This interpretation, in my opinion, is incorrect. First of all, the word *pactum* (as well as *pax*) in medieval legal terminology, derived from Roman law, conveys a simple meaning of agreement, i.e., a contract stipulated with less formalities. The knowledge of the broader political context here too allows for the Ragusan *pactum* to be viewed in real light.

A tangible element that might point to the deteriorated relations with the Serenissima in 1231-1232 is the term “reconciliation” used in the arenga of the pact. The brief previously distributed to the envoys in Dubrovnik mentions, though in an entirely neutral manner, “order and pact” (*ordo et pactum*). The terms *concordia, pactum et reconciliatio* were entered into the document by the Venetian chancery, which gave a final frame to the pact. The same term appears again in the arenga of the 1236 pact, which most certainly was not preceded by any Ragusan rebellion, thus implying that the terms should not be understood literally. It is also noteworthy that in the text itself it is defined on four occasions as “agreement and pact” (*concordia et pactum*), and only once does the term *reconciliatio* also feature in the arenga.

The second indication of Ragusan revolt stems from *Chronicon Venetum* by Andrea Dandolo, which mentions that the Ragusans rebelled upon the incitement of the “Greeks and Slavs” (*Grecorum et Sclavorum sugestione*). However, Dandolo’s work was written in the mid-fourteenth century, and is not a first-hand source for the events that had taken place more than a hundred years before. Yet from the text it is clear that the author was familiar with the wording of the pact as he excerpted certain clauses from it, and it is possible...
that he too may have been misled by the word *reconciliatio*.\(^191\) Relying extensively on Dandolo’s chronicle, a somewhat younger chronicle by Pietro Giustinian adopts the information on the rebellion, erroneously adding a piece of data from another source about the recently installed Ragusan count Lorenzo Querini, who in fact was Dandolo’s predecessor on count’s position at the beginning of the century.\(^192\) Venetian chronicles from the thirteenth century are of little help as regards this issue: *Historia ducum Venetorum* chronicles no further than 1229, while Martin de Canal in his *Estoires de Venise* provides a detailed account of the Zadar rebellion, yet his first information on Dubrovnik is from 1275 at the earliest.\(^193\)

The third source relating to the alleged rebellion is the chronicle of the Ragusan patrician Junius Resti, written probably in the early eighteenth century. Resti affords his own reconstruction of the event, claiming that the Ragusans took advantage of the entry of the Genovese fleet and that of the Nicaean emperor John III Vatatzes into the Adriatic with an intention, wrapped in pretexts and politeness, to send off their count Giovanni Dandolo to Venice in 1230. According to the same author, Andrea Dabrana was then elected as vice-count (*viceconte*), but a year later, due to dissent among the patricians in the Major Council, it was decided to turn to Venice for a new count at a term no longer than three years, upon which Venice initiated an agreement.\(^194\) While constructing his narrative, it appears that at his disposal Resti did not have any sources which we are not familiar with, moreover, he was not acquainted with certain sources available to us. While we may still curb our doubts in his mention of the Major Council, as the existence of that body was confirmed only a couple

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191 We know that among the sources of Dandolo’s chronicle are the *pacta*, and his zeal should be credited for the compilation of the new registers (*Liber Albus* for the eastern, *Liber Blancus* for the western areas). See M. Pozza, »I Libri Pactorum.«: pp. 210-212; Dorit Raines, »Alle origini dell’archivio politico del patriziato: la cronaca “di consultazione” veneziana nei secoli XIV-XV« *Archivio veneto*, ser. V, 150 (1998): pp. 17-18; Şerban Marin, »A Double Pathfinder’s Condition: Andrea Dandolo and His Chronicles.« *Annuario dell’Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia* 12-13 (2010-2011): pp. 110-112. It was Jireček who first suggested that Dandolo “was speculating” about the possibility that the pact must have been preceded by a rebellion of some sort. See C. Jireček, *Die Bedeutung von Ragusa*: p. 51.

192 L. Fiori, *Il codice autografo*: pp. 83, 145. Giustinian’s source was evidently a list of counts according to territorial units, which he enclosed as a supplement to his chronicle, and in which as the first count features Lorenzo Querini. Cf. L. Fiori, *Il codice autografo*: p. 203.


of years later (1235), it is certainly not true that in 1230 Dandolo was sent off to Venice, considering that in the autumn of 1231 he was executing his regular duties in the City. It seems that in 1230 Vatatzes and the Genovese did not wage war against the Venetians and that he made no entry with his fleet into the Adriatic, but merely dispatched a few ships to Crete in order to fuel the insurrection. However, Resti’s construct is not only inaccurate in details, but equally so unconvincing in the general outlines: from his vantage point Dubrovnik independently decides whether to cancel the service to the Venetian count, hesitates and again seeks the count, whereby it dictates the years of his mandate, which Venice apparently passively accepts. Resti’s interpretations in this case are historiographically useless, mainly for his lack of knowledge on the broader context and the character of Venetian rule, while his patriotism spurred him to envisage the role of his city from an unrealistic and anachronistic standpoint.

The fact that older Ragusan chroniclers (Anonymous and Ragnina) do not mention any rebellion against Venetian authority is not essential in my opinion, because a gap of several centuries stood between them and these events. Yet there are other important arguments in my support of the assumptions that the rebellion had never actually taken place.

First of all, chronology clearly speaks against the rebellion thesis. Namely, it is certain that Count Dandolo was in Dubrovnik until 15 November 1231 and

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197 Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih«: p. 93. This issue has most thoroughly been examined by Bariša Krekić, without doubt the greatest expert on the relations between Dubrovnik and the Levant in the Middle Ages. According to the author, there is no evidence that the fleet of the emperor of Nicaea joined by the Genovese entered the Adriatic, which thus discards the rest of Resti’s statements. B. Krekić, »Y eut-il des relations directes«: p. 153.
in the dispute with the pirates of Omiš he performed his regular duty.\textsuperscript{199} By 13 January 1232 Ragusan envoys were given the power of attorney to conclude the agreement with Venice.\textsuperscript{200} Is it plausible for a rebellion to be raised and put down and the normal situation restored within less than two months, particularly bearing in mind that there is no other trace left as testament?\textsuperscript{201}

Yet the most important proof is the text of the agreement itself. Had it been a real rebellion, the content and style of the agreement would most certainly have been different, as is the case with the virtually simultaneous agreements after the rebellion on Crete (1234) and after the Zadar rebellion of 1247. For example, in 1234 the \emph{dux} of Crete, as doge’s envoy, formally administers pardon to the Cretans and warrants not to seek revenge against them, while they, among other things, promise to kill and capture the ringleaders of the rebellion.\textsuperscript{202} The Zadar Treaty of 1247 has an unusually long arenga with pure rhetoric of penance and humbleness, making it clear that the people of Zadar were incited by the “enemy of human kind”, that the rebellion was “unfounded” and that in fact “they are not worthy” and that “they fall flat praying for mercy”.\textsuperscript{203} Ragusan agreements feature nothing similar to the rhetoric of penance and pardon, moreover, nothing points to any change of the political and economic frames that existed until then. Had the Ragusans really rebelled and dethroned the Venetian count, some sort of negative repercussion would have followed, yet there was none.

Although a serious rebellion, raised on Crete as early as 1228, lasted up until 1234,\textsuperscript{204} in the early years of the dogeship of Giacomo Tiepolo Venetian administration on the coastal possessions tended to stabilise. Tiepolo had previously been on administrative positions in that area and was well acquainted with the

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{199} \textit{Codex} III: doc. 303, pp. 345-346; \textit{Listine} I: doc. 74, p. 46; \textit{Dubrovačka akta i povelje} I: pp. 20-21.
\bibitem{200} \textit{Listine} I: doc. 75, p. 47.
\bibitem{201} Ljubić argues that it is possible and that “full Ragusan independence lasted ... then not more than a few days ” (Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih«: p. 92). I find it utterly unfounding to speak of a couple-of-days full independence. Ljubić’s thesis on the short rebellion has been adopted by V. Foretić, \textit{Povijest Dubrovnika} I: p. 60.
\bibitem{202} The text of agreement in: \textit{Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig} II: doc. 290, pp. 322-326.
\bibitem{204} The rebels received substantial military support from the emperor of Nicaea, John III Vatatzes. See F. Thiriet, \textit{La Romanie Vénitienne au Moyen Age}: pp. 97-98.
\end{thebibliography}
prevailing political circumstances, so that he developed a successful diplomatic activity: during his administration agreements with Aleppo (1229), Rodos (1234) and Alexandria were concluded (1238 and 1244). Towards agreements with a number of Mediterranean cities Venice may have been prompted by the expansionistic influence of Frederick II, who in 1231 added yet another title—king of Jerusalem. Until that time Venice maintained good relations with him, moreover, in 1230 it was granted financial privileges, yet around 1232 first signs of disruption of their political alliance emerged. Venetian-Ragusan agreement of 1232, which provided the Venetian administration in Dubrovnik with a more solid, formal framework, proved a useful “anchor” in the period marked by tensions in the power relations on the territory from the eastern Adriatic and the coast of Epirus as far as the wide Aegean aquatorium and the eastern Mediterranean.

The text of the Venetian-Ragusan agreement from 1232 obviously leaned on the Venetian-Zadar treaty from 1204 (or early 1205), or both were shaped using the elements of the same template. Wherever the relations between Venice and Dubrovnik or Zadar are regulated in the same manner, the clauses are identical word by word (of course, except for the name of the city and its inhabitants).

In fact, certain elements in the Venetian-Ragusan relations had already existed in practice well before being officially framed in a full-length written agreement. For example, in April 1226 Venetian Senate warned the commune of Dubrovnik to adhere to the practice of considering the enemies of Venice its own, not to collaborate with the Kačići, and to send the hostages. That same year the Senate twice issued the decrees by which the Venetians were

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207 *I trattati con Genova*: pp. 116-117.
209 *Listine* I: doc. 30, pp. 21-22; *Codex* III: doc. 42, pp. 45-47. The first to note the similarity was C. Jireček, *Die Bedeutung von Ragusa*: p. 51.
210 This concerns the following terms from the Ragusan agreement: *Et si forte contigerit... usque dum steterit ibi, Tollent... et tercia sit comunis, Omnes qui erunt... pro inimicis habebunt. Listine* I: doc. 75, p. 48.
forbidden resale and storage of Ragusan goods,\textsuperscript{212} evidently aimed against the evasion of commercial taxes.

One of the elements from the agreement which would allegedly testify to the unfavourable conditions with regard to Dubrovnik was the obligation to dispatch the members of the patriciate as hostages to Venice. Yet this obligation the Ragusans already had from earlier times, as evident from the document in which, in April 1226, Ragusan commune was requested to finally send some twenty hostages, designated by name or by family.\textsuperscript{213} Another request containing a new list of names was sent on 10 October 1226,\textsuperscript{214} probably not because the Ragusans had not yet fulfilled their first obligation,\textsuperscript{215} but because the usual rotation of the hostage group took place on half-a-year basis.\textsuperscript{216} The obligation of the “hostages” was to remain permanently in Venice as a warrant of loyalty to the Venetian authority and that they would comply to doge’s request in case he wished to submit an order to them.\textsuperscript{217} Some of the mentioned examples clearly show that those persons were actually guarantors whose role was to reinforce the obligation from the oath, and not hostages with their heads on the wooden stump, exposed to Serenissima’s whims. If the Ragusans failed to fulfil the request and if they sent no “hostages”, Venetian Republic threatened to confiscate the property of their citizens in Venice.\textsuperscript{218} Given that the sanction with which it was threatened always exceeds the primary obligation, it is quite apparent that on the political-economic balance the “hostages” weighed far less than the

\textsuperscript{212} Listine I: doc. 52, p. 37 and doc. 60, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{213} Listine I: doc. 53, pp. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{214} Listine I: doc. 57, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{215} V. Foretić, Povijest Dubrovnika I: p. 60.
\textsuperscript{216} Among Ragusan “hostages” from 1226 the members of the defeated “Juda’s clan” prevail (N. Vekarić, Nevidljive pukotine: pp. 31-32). However, it is disputable whether this should be understood as a measure against dethroned political opponents or as an understandable urge of the Venetian administration to seek ever “socially stronger” guarantors. Only six years later (1232), we encounter the members of these patrician lineages holding important positions in the Ragusan commune, they outlined the instructions for the negotiations in Venice, and two of them even participated in the mission, where they took the oath on behalf of the inhabitants of Dubrovnik. What remains to be investigated is whether a series of indicators of their collaboration with the Venetian government can be interpreted as an example of the political opportunism of the defeated. The new supreme government of Venice most certainly paid attention to the “social capital” of the individuals and families, regardless of their initial attitude towards the change of supreme authority and clan affiliation.
\textsuperscript{217} Listine I: doc. 56, p. 39; doc. 70, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{218} Listine I: doc. 53, pp. 37-38.
Ragusan goods and the investments in the Rialto, as well as the fact that the instruments of coercion in Venice’s hands were limited.

It should be emphasised that in the Middle Ages it was quite common for the supreme authority to demand from the subjected cities “hostages” from the most distinguished houses, who in turn would remain in the capital. For example, in 1105 ban Kledin by order of the Hungarian and Croatian king cancelled Zadar’s obligation to provide “hostages” (obsides). Archdeacon Thomas writes that in 1262, upon the murder of two members of the royal entourage in Klis, Split was ordered to send 12 boys as “hostages” to the king, whom the royal couple “received with joy”, and promised good treatment as well as prompt release. A personal warrant of this kind may have accompanied any other political relationship if the dominant side insisted on it. For instance, during the military campaigns against the Kačići the defeated Omiš pirates not only promised Frederick II to give hostages as a warrant of their refrainment from piracy against his subjects, but in 1227 the emperor demanded three to six “hostages” from Zadar, which Venice as supreme power approved! It is true that the clause on the “hostages” appears in the agreement with the recently conquered Zadar from 1204/5, however, the Counts of Krk too, taking the count’s oath in 1199, pledge that one of them or one of the close cousins would live in Venice as a “hostage” (obses). For other countships the sources are available not earlier than the 1220s, yet it is possible that the documents with concrete names, bearing in mind their provisional character, were not copied into the register Liber comunis. Documents from 1224-1228 testify that in Venice lived the “hostages” from Rab, Cres and Zadar, in that in some cases the hostages

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222 Listine I: doc. 66, p. 42.
223 Listine I: doc. 30, p. 21-22.
explicitly concerned small boys and girls (*puer, puella*). Further, the “hostages” did not appear only in the submission relations, but also served as guarantors in the settlement of compensations between the two communities. For example, in 1206 seven “hostages” (*obsides*) from Brač were to be transported by a galley to Dubrovnik and serve as warrant for an obligation we have no knowledge of. Very similar was the practice in the relations between Venice and the cities which were not under its supreme rule: Rolandino of Padua in his chronicle from 1230 cites a document by which the Venetian count demanded that Verona should send off some citizens to Venice upon a specific term, with a comment that it was not unusual and to anyone’s harm, and was commonly practiced in Lombardy, the March of Treviso and throughout Italy. Therefore, it is wrong to read the Ragusan obligation of “hostage giving” as an imposed humiliation ritual.

A constituent part of the agreement was the choosing of a Venetian for archbishop. As soon as the pope approved it, the archbishop was to be subjected to the Patriarch of Grado, in conformity with a policy by which patriarch’s jurisdiction was to follow the secular expansion of doge’s authority. In the case of Zadar, the siding of the diocese with the Venetian Church hierarchy was confirmed on paper already in 1155, although in reality it proved a far harder goal until the consolidation of the Venetian rule in the early thirteenth century. On the former Byzantine possessions Venice also intended to establish control over the Church, in Constantinople with an explicit demand that not

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226 Codex III: doc. 54, p. 59.
230 *Codex II*: doc. 79-81, pp. 79-84; T. F. Madden, *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice*: pp. 36-37.
only the patriarch, but also all canons were to be Venetians. Incorporation of the local archbishop into the Venetian Church hierarchy was important as a prevention against an alternative “power channel” which would strengthen the local Church, because it would start from the canons who chose him, across the archbishop to the pope who confirmed him. On the basis of surviving documents it is impossible to say whether the choice of a Venetian for archbishop was conducted by the book; later, however, there were cases when the Venetian administration allowed a foreigner as choice.

An important, or perhaps the most important part of the agreement dealt with economic policy, because with its system of customs fees Venice blocked some, and encouraged other directions of the development of Ragusan commerce: in Venice no customs fee was levied on the goods from the Balkan hinterland, since that was the territory in which Venetian merchants were not particularly active; on the goods from Sicily the rate was 2.5%, on the goods from the Byzantine territories 5%, while on the goods from north Africa, due obviously to unwelcome competition, it was 20%. These elements confirm the thought that Venetian policy did not revolve around territorial expansion, but around trade. Here too it should be noted that these were standard fees on commercial goods in terms of competition, and not a fiscal measure aimed at the suppression of trade of a submitted city: in the Genovese territory the same fees were paid, for example, by Venetian merchants. As mentioned earlier, it seems that the traffic of Ragusan goods in Venice significantly increased in that period. In addition, the Ragusans apparently found ways to evade the payment of these taxes, among others also by dealing fictively through Venetian agents, a practice which the Venetian authorities explicitly prohibited in 1226.

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233 See overview in Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih«: pp. 93-94.


235 See the agreement terms between Venice and Genoa from 1218 in: I trattati con Genova: p. 82.

236 Listine I: doc. 60, p. 41.
Further, it was agreed that four Ragusan ships to the capacity of 70 milliari were allowed to land in Venice per year. Venetian Maritime Statute of 1255 provides provisions regarding the ships of the capacity between 200 and 1,000 milliari, evidently deeming the vessels of lesser capacity unworthy of consideration. As a 200-milliari ship required a crew of 20 mariners,\textsuperscript{237} it implies that only smaller Ragusan boats with less than ten crew members were to be allowed to land in Venice, and at merely four landings per year. In other words, Ragusan trade channelled towards Venice must have used Venetian charterers, which we might refer to as a protectionist measure in favour of domestic shipping agents. Despite of this, as has already been elaborated, Ragusan trade in Venice flourished in that period.

As stressed by Ermanno Orlando, the pacts between Venice and the cities under its supreme rule confirmed their submission and dependence, but at the same time promoted the principle of negotiation and pursuit of compromise, which was deeply interwoven in the Venetian governing policy in that period. The governing of the remote overseas possessions, with a yet undeveloped state apparatus, could not be based on force but on the balance of interests in the dialogue with the local social power networks.\textsuperscript{238}

The pact of 1232 was agreed to remain in effect for a period of three years. In Venetian practice it was customary to conclude agreements from the public domain to a definite term. For instance, the agreement between Venice and Genoa from 1218 was to remain in effect ten years, while the pacts from 1228 and 1232 four years;\textsuperscript{239} the agreement with William, king of Sicily, of 1175 was concluded to a term of twenty years.\textsuperscript{240} Yet it is important to note that in the case of Dubrovnik it was explicitly stated that the pact remained in effect even longer should the doge wish so. Therefore, while Dubrovnik after three years could not withdraw unilaterally from this model of administration, Venice took the privilege to reconsider after the trial period whether it wished to retain the mentioned arrangement or change it. By introducing the termination date in


\textsuperscript{239} I trattati con Genova: pp. 93, 118.

\textsuperscript{240} Š. Ljubić, »Ob odnošajih«: p. 82.
the pact, the supreme authority could easily adjust the text if any changes in
the relations should take place.241 Yet another element of the pact reveals that
it was taken into account that a pact of this or similar kind would tacitly define
the Venetian-Ragusan relations over a longer period of time. Namely, it was
proposed that every ten years all inhabitants above thirteen renew the oath of
loyalty to the doge and count.242

Dandolo’s departure from Dubrovnik and his death: towards a new model
of administration

In the summer of 1234, together with the representatives of the Ragusan
commune, Dandolo settled financial issues, promising to remain on duty (servire
comitatui) until All Saints’ Day,243 the usual term that marked the end of the
fiscal year. The fiscal account of this kind (ratio de suo comitatu) points to
Dandolo’s true intention to leave Dubrovnik in the first days of autumn. He
was not yet old aged, but having in mind that he drafted his will a year later,
his health may have seriously deteriorated.

By 1235 Dandolo had already permanently settled in Venice, while his
functions in Dubrovnik were assumed by the vice-counts (vicecomites) Petrus
Balislava and Teodorus Crosii, the same two who somewhat earlier executed
the duty of consul, i.e., the most prominent members of the local élite.244 In July
1235 Dandolo drafted his will,245 and died between that date and July 1237,
when Giovanni Tiepolo was invested with the countship of Dubrovnik. The
fact that among the signatories of the Ragusan document dated 1 August 1235
is Petar Maressa/Manane, mentioned as vicarius Ragusii,246 might testify that

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241 In that sense, relating to Venice’s agreement with the Byzantium in 1265, Giorgio Ravegnani,
»Introduzione«, in: I trattati con Bisanzio 1265-1285, ed. Marco Pozza and Giorgio Ravegnani.
242 Renewal of the oath every ten years was obviously already well established in Venetian
practice, e.g., it appears in the agreement with the pirates of Omiš from 1208 drawn up by the Venetian
243 Codex III: doc. 357, p. 413.
244 Listine I: doc, 78, p. 51; doc. 79, p. 52; Dubrovačka akti i povelje I: doc. 20, pp. 26-27; doc.
21, pp. 27-28; Codex III: doc. 377, p. 434; Gregor Čremošnik, »Nova istorijska grada iz Dubrovnika.«
Novosti iz Bosansko-hercegovačkog muzeja 10 (1933): doc. 2, pp. 5-6.
245 Codex - Supplementa I: 100-102.
Dandolo passed away shortly after having drafted the will. Although in practice Maressa’s functions departed little from those of vicecomes, the change of title into vicarius (deputy) might point to count’s death.

Unresolved probate issues after Dandolo’s death, which included a debt claimed from the Ragusan commune, were settled through 1238 and a couple of ensuing years. These financial data reveal that Dandolo, although having left Dubrovnik, formally remained count, and until the spring of 1235 claimed all his entitlements. If, however, from all the probate claims we deduce the amount which Ragusan commune paid in the summer 1234 and was obliged to reimburse by All Saints’ Day, it is quite evident that the amount of 228 perpers concerns the period after 1 November 1234. It approximates the “net” half-a-year count’s earnings, the last to which he was entitled.

Interregnum with the local vice-counts/vicarii lasted almost two years after Dandolo’s departure from Dubrovnik. In literature one is likely to come across an opinion that a rebellion then followed, the crushing of which resulted in the conclusion of a new pact in 1236, although no serious arguments speak in favour of this assumption. Most importantly, it should be noted that the pact of 1236 is identical to that of 1232, except for one inserted sentence, and that again it would take only one sentence for the pact of 1252 to differ from the previous agreements. Had there really been a succession of rebellions, would the conditions under which the city submitted itself to the supreme rule of Venice have been almost identical? Amendment of clauses for the purpose of adaptation to the changed conditions was by custom legally and technically performed through a renewal (novation) of the entire agreement, as in the case of the pacta between Venice and the Latin Empire. Added to the 1236 pact was merely a prohibition for Ragusan ships to land north of the line Ancona-Point Kamenjak (on the cape of Istria), except for the traffic of food produce to Venice, which implied the blockage of trade with Italian cities loyal to Frederick. While the pact of 1236 was being concluded, Frederick II had already launched a campaign against the cities in Lombardy, whereas the Venetian Republic openly sided

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247 Codex - Supplementa I: doc. 64, pp. 104-105; doc. 69, pp. 109-110; Codex IV: doc. 54, pp. 61-62; doc. 122, pp. 132-133.
249 Listine I: doc. 80, pp. 53-55; doc. 106, pp. 82-85.
250 A. Rizzi, »Dominante e dominati«: p. 241, note 16.
with the anti-imperial league. By the end of 1235, with the first preparations for the renewal of the Venetian-Ragusan agreement, the relations between Venice and Frederick II were far from the former harmony.

Although no open insurrection occurred, Venetian fear of Dubrovnik’s siding with Frederick’s block was not ungrounded. As mentioned earlier, Ragusan commercial contracts with Ferrara and other cities under emperor’s sovereign rule were in 1231 fully harmonised with the Venetian politics and interests, yet their sudden “ratification” in Dubrovnik on 1 August 1235 had quite a different tone. We may rightly ask ourselves whether the Venetian government had any knowledge of this “ratification” whatsoever, but it is plausible that they anticipated something and with the new pact wished to cement Ragusan loyalty. One may not discard the possibility that the interregnum allowed the local élite to spread its wings: in a document issued in Rimini mentioned for the first time is the seal of the Ragusan commune (sigillum comunis civitatis Ragusii).

However, the reason for the pact renewal may equally be sought in Dandolo’s death, because at the time the agreements of the public domain had a strong personal element: for instance, the clause in the pact of 1232 did not state that the Ragusans would be loyal to the doge of Venice (as an abstract function), but to Doge Giacomo Tiepolo until his death (usque dum vixerit in ducatu). Therefore, it would be logical for the death of a perpetual count to be the reason for the renewal of the pact.

Upon Dandolo’s death, Venetian authorities did not lease Ragusan countship to a new count, as they were preparing the transition to a new model of governing over Dubrovnik. In accordance with the model already practiced in some other Venetian possessions, Ragusan counts were soon to become elected state officials with a two-year mandate. Perhaps not by chance, as the first Ragusan count of the new type, Giovanni, son of doge-reformer Giacomo Tiepolo,

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251 G. Rösch, Venezia e l’Impero: p. 46.
252 Gregor Čremošnik, »Dubrovački pečati srednjega vijeka.« Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku 4-5 (1956): p. 32. Of course, due to a relatively small number of preserved documents, one cannot assert that it had not also been used earlier.
253 Listine I: doc. 75, p. 48. Similar example in the document on the submission of Trieste to Venice and the oath of allegiance to the doge from 1202 (Codice diplomatico istriano, II, ed. Piero Kandler. Trieste: Tipografia del Lloyd Austriaco, 1850: doc. 195, p. 363). In the Poreč oath from the mid-twelfth century it is stated that it would be renewed with every new doge (ibidem: doc. 201, p. 373).
assumed countship in July 1237.\textsuperscript{254} This finally marked the abandonment of the “lease model” that accompanied the establishment of Venetian rule over Dubrovnik and inaugurated a period of regular administration \textit{(regimen)} that would last until 1358.

\textsuperscript{254} Codex IV: doc. 28, p. 32.