

OSVRT NA PREGLEDNI ČLANAK „100 GODINA RECEPCIJE NAGONA SMRTI,„ AUTORA TIMOA STORCKA U ČASOPISU PSYCHE – Z PSYCHOANAL 74(11), 2020.

/ AN END VIEW OF THE REVIEW ARTICLE “100 YEARS OF THE RECEPTION OF THE DEATH DRIVE” BY TIMO STORCK IN THE JOURNAL PSYCHE – Z PSYCHOANAL 74(11), 2020.

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Krajem 2020. izašao je 11. broj uglednoga njemačkog psihoanalitičkog časopisa „Psyche“ koji je bio posvećen stotoj godišnjici objave Freudova djela „S onu stranu načela ugone“. U tom je broju objavljen članak „100 godina recepcije koncepta o nagonu smrti“, autora Timoa Storcka, profesora psihologije i psihoterapije na sveučilištu u Berlinu. Johannes Picht objavio je članak „Ususret tumačenju ‘S onu stranu načela ugone’“, a Jenny Willner članak „Bioanaliza kao kritika kulture u ‘S onu stranu načela ugone’“.

Osvrnuo bih se na pregledni članak profesora Storcka o recepciji nagona smrti. U uvodnom dijelu navodi se kako je Freudovo djelo „S onu stranu načela ugone“ (1920) jedno od djela s najviše rasprava u povijesti psihoanalize te kako je koncept o nagonu smrti izvor

The 11th issue of the renowned German psychoanalytic journal “Psyche”, published at the end of 2020, was dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the publication of Freud’s work “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. The issue featured an article by Timo Storck, Professor of Psychology and Psychotherapy at the University of Berlin as well as the article written by Johannes Picht entitled “Towards an Interpretation of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’”, and Jenny Willner’s “Bioanalysis as a Critique of Culture in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’”.

Professor Storck’s review article on the reception of the death drive states in the introductory part that Freud’s work “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) is one of the most discussed works in the history of psychoanalysis, and that the concept of the death drive has been a source of controversial discussion for 100 years. The article describes Freud’s

kontroverznih rasprava već sto godina. Opisana je Freudova skica o nagonu smrti i dan pregled modifikacija od strane različitih autora (Klein, Bion, Lacan...). Kada se govori o kontekstu objavljivanja „S onu stranu načela ugođe“, navedene su četiri važne dimenzije tog konteksta: 1. povijesna dimenzija: Freud se susreo s užasima Prvoga svjetskog rata pa je i pojam traume tražio daljnje pojašnjenje; 2. teoretska dimenzija: s obzirom na posljedice uvođenja koncepta o narcizmu (Freud 1914c) na teoriju nagona i s obzirom na pitanje agresije bile su potrebne promjene u Freudovoj metapsihologiji; 3. klinička dimenzija: Freud se suočavao s neuspješnim analizama; 4. osobna dimenzija: Böhme (2017.) tvrdi kako je bilo mnogo smrti oko Freuda u to doba. Naime, 20. 1. 1920. preminuo je tada četrdesetogodišnji Antun von Freund, a pet dana nakon toga, 25. 1. 1920. preminula je Freudova kći Sophie. Osim toga, Freud je bio uvjeren da će sa 61 ili 62 godine umrijeti, dakle 1917. ili 1918. godine. Zatim autor opisuje osnovne postavke koncepta o nagonu smrti i to uz kompulziju repeticije kao sile koja nema za cilj ugodu, zatim uz Nirvana princip kojim se pobuda želi izbrisati stremeći ka anorganskom. Osim toga, autor se osvrće na ulogu biologije, agresije i mazohizma kao važnih čimbenika nagona smrti. Freud je na nagone gledao kao granične ili pak kao pove-

sketch on the death drive and gives an overview of modifications by various authors (Klein, Bion, Lacan...). When talking about the context of publishing "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", four important dimensions are listed:

1. Historical dimension: Freud encountered the horrors of the First World War, so the concept of trauma sought further clarification.
2. Theoretical dimension: Given the consequences of the introduction of the concept of narcissism (Freud 1914c) on the theory of instinct, and given the question of aggression, changes in Freud's metapsychology were necessary.
3. Clinical dimension: Freud faced failed analyses.
4. Personal dimension: Böhme (2017) argues that there was a lot of death around Freud at the time. Namely, Antun von Freund, then 40, died on 20 January 1920, and five days later, on 25 January, 1920 Freud's daughter Sophie passed away. In addition, Freud was convinced that he would die at the age of 61 or 62, in 1917 or 1918.

The author describes the basic postulates of the death drive through compulsive repetition as a force that does not aim at pleasure, and through Nirvana principle by which the arousal is to be erased, thus striving towards the inorganic. In addition, the author looks at the role of biology, aggression, and masochism as important elements of the death drive. Namely, Freud saw instincts as border-



znice između tijela i psihe, što se odnosilo i na nagon smrti. Na tom je području osobito bio aktivan Ferenczi (1924). Freud je općenito agresiju poimao kao prema vanjskom svijetu usmjereno djelovanje nagona smrti, što bi značilo da agresija spašava od biološkog samouništenja. Na mazohizam je gledao kao na „povratak na neku prethodnu fazu nagona” pri čemu je prisutno stremljenje protiv vlastitog ega. Sadizmom se to stremljenje preusmjeruje prema van što bi značilo da je sadizam ustvari mazohizam usmjeren prema van. To pak više ne pripada seksualnom nagonu, nego nagonu smrti. Zanimljivo je kako se nagon smrti u članku negdje označuje jedninom, a negdje množinom, što pridonosi kontroverzama povezanim s interpretacijom i općenito prihvaćanja postojanja nagona smrti. Nagon smrti u teoretskom je smislu u mnogome utjecao na Freudovu misao od 1920. do 1939. godine, pa je tako uveden pojam superega, zatim je dolazilo do izražaja kako se Freud intenzivno bavio odnosom između nagona smrti i agresije. Osim toga, koncept nagona smrti imao je velik utjecaj na konceptualizaciju uloge agresije u razvoju kulture. U članku su navedene i modifikacije nagona smrti od strane raznih autora, počevši od Freudovih suvremenika pa do danas. Među najranijim kritičarima bili su Abraham (1924.), Jones (1936.) i Fenichel (1935.), a posebno se Reich (1942.)

line, or as links between the body and the psyche, which also referred to the death drive. Ferenczi (1924) was especially active in this field. Freud generally understood aggression as an outward-directed action of the death drive, which would mean that aggression saves oneself from biological self-destruction. He considered masochism as a “return to an earlier stage of instinct” where there is a tendency against one's own ego. With sadism, this aspiration is redirected outward, which would mean that sadism is in fact outward-looking masochism. This, in turn, no longer belongs to the sexual instinct, but to the death drive. It is interesting that the death drive in the article is sometimes used in the singular and sometimes in the plural form, which contributes to the controversy related to the interpretation and general acceptance of the existence of the death drive.

In theoretical terms, the death drive greatly influenced Freud's thought from 1920 to 1939. This is evident in the introduction of the superego, in thinking about the relationship between the instinct of death and aggression, and in conceptualizing the role of aggression in cultural development. The article continues to describe modifications of the death drive by various authors, starting from Freud's contemporaries to the present day. Among the earliest critics were Abraham (1924), Jones (1936) and Fenichel (1935), and especially Reich (1942) who opposed the death drive. Reich vehemently opposed immanent

usprotivio nagonu smrti. On se žustro protivio imanentnoj samodestruktivnosti i tvrdio kako i agresija služi nekoj vrsti zadovoljenja te bi mazohizam bio pokušaj izbjegavanja još neke gore patnje. Što se tiče otpora prema konceptu o nagonu smrti, ili pak nekog „principa zla u nama,“ kako je to formulirala Melanie Klein (1925.), svakako treba uzeti u obzir povijesni i socijalni kontekst onoga vremena. Naime, o nagonu smrti izvorno se najvećim dijelom raspravljalo u njemačkom govornom području, a tridesete godine obilježene su usponom nacionalsocijalizma. Sve je više psihoanalitičara moralo bježati pred nacistima, pogotovo onih koji su prihvaćali i pisali o nagonu smrti, Freudove su knjige spaljivane, a na kraju je i sam morao pobjeći u London. U poslijeratnoj Njemačkoj bilo je vrlo teško prihvatiti postojanje „zlog principa u nama,“ ili, kako piše Claudia Frank (2015.) „Hitlera u sebi“. Stoga recepcija nagona smrti ima i socijalno-povijesno-političku težinu. No vratimo se osvrtno na članak koji se ipak fokusira na psihoanalitičku razinu učinka pojave koncepta o nagonu smrti. Tako je u Klein-Bionovoj tradiciji nagon smrti u mnogome prihvaćen. Klein (1948.) je smatrala da nagon smrti iznutra prijete samouništenjem, takva opasnost onda se ublažava projekcijom prema van pa bi tako izvanjski objekt sekundarno postao izvorom opasnosti. Bion (1990.) je

self-destructiveness and argued that aggression also served a kind of gratification and that masochism would be an attempt to avoid some worse suffering. As for resistance to the concept of the death drive, or some “principle of evil in us” as formulated by Melanie Klein (1925), the historical and social context of the time should certainly be taken into account. Namely, the death drive was originally mostly discussed in the German-speaking area, and the thirties were marked by the rise of National Socialism. More and more psychoanalysts had to flee from the Nazis, especially those who accepted and wrote about the death drive. Moreover, Freud’s books were burned, and eventually Freud himself had to flee to London. In post-war Germany, it was very difficult to accept the existence of an “evil principle within us” or, as Claudia Frank (2015) puts it: “Hitler in ourselves.” Therefore, the reception of the death drive also has a socio-historical-political weight.

The review of the article nevertheless focuses on the psychoanalytic effect of the concept of the death drive. Thus in the Klein-Bion tradition, the death drive is widely accepted. Klein (1948) believes that the death drive threatens self-destruction from within. Such a danger is then mitigated by outward projection, so that the external object would secondarily become a source of danger. Bion (1990) writes about “nameless fear” as a reintroject that evokes the fear of destruction, which in turn gives birth to the death drive that attacks relations



pisao o „bezimenom strahu,“ kao rein-trojektu koji izaziva strah od uništenja, iz tog straha rađa se nagon smrti koji onda napada odnos, veze i povezano-sti. Lacan (1959./1960.) opisuje nagon smrti „suspektnim“, no naglašava kako „onaj koji izbjegava poučavati o nago-nu smrti uopće ne poznaje tematiku koju poučava“. Nagon smrti za njega je ime za želju da princip ugone prijede u nezasiťnu želju za zadovoljenjem (*jo-uissance*). Slično piše i Kirchoff (2011.) opisujući „onu stranu ugone“ kao težnju za apsolutnim ispunjenjem nesvjesnih želja, što se pak može postići jedino po cijenu života. Laplanche (1988.) piše o interakciji Erosa i nagona smrti: Eros oživljava nagon smrti i brine se o tome da psihičko nikada ne padne na nulu, a nagon smrti brine se o tome da se pobuda primiri zadovoljenjem. Stoga je Laplanche smatrao da su životni nagon i nagon smrti u stvari „dva aspekta seksualnih nagona“. Dakle, različito od Freudove podjele na eros (samoodrža-vajući i seksualni nagon) i na nagon smrti. Green (2004.) je smatrao da je nagon smrti odgovoran za pucanje veza u psihičkom. Tako je prema nje-govu mišljenju životni nagon taj koji stremi uspostavi odnosa s unutarnjim i vanjskim objektom, a nagon smrti vodi u „deobjektivizaciju,“ tako da napa-da odnos. Ta „deobjektivizacija“ ima za posljedicu stvaranje „negativnog nar-cizma“. Stoga se za francusku psiho-analitičku školu može reći da se nagon

and connections. Lacan (1959/1960) de-scribes the death drive as “suspicious”, but emphasizes that “he who avoids teaching about the death drive does not know the subject he teaches at all.” The death drive is for him the name for the desire to turn the principle of pleasure into an insatiable desire for satisfaction (*jouissance*). Kirchoff (2011) writes simi-larly, describing “the other side of plea-sure” as the aspiration for the absolute fulfilment of unconscious desires, which in turn can be achieved only at the cost of life. Laplanche (1988) writes about the interaction of Eros and the death drive: Eros revives the instinct of death and makes sure that the psychic appa-ratus never falls on the zero level, and the death drive is concerned with calm-ing the impulse through gratification. Therefore, Laplanche considers the life instinct and the death drive to be in fact “two aspects of sexual instincts.” This is so different from Freud’s division which opposes Eros (self-sustaining and sexual urge) and the death drive. Green (2004) claims that the death drive is responsible for breaking ties in the psychic appa-ratus. Thus, according to him, it is the life instinct that seeks to establish a rela-tionship with the inner and outer object, and the death drive leads to “disobjec-tivization” by attacking the relationship. This “disobjectification” results in the creation of “negative narcissism.” Thus, for the French psychoanalytic school it can be said that the death drive was un-derstood in part as an exaggeration, so that they introduced the concept of the

smrti shvaćao dijelom kao pretjerivanje, zatim su uveli pojam seksualnog nagona smrti te su se bavili značenjem negativnosti. Ego-psiholozi, npr. Hartman (1947.), bavili su se više ulogom agresije u psihičkom te se za agresiju smatralo da pripada „s ove“ a ne „s one“ strane ugone. Za Kernberga (1985.) su afekti temelj svega, pa tako i nagona. Za njega je nagon smrti posljedica patološkog razvoja teške agresije koja je zbog razvojnih razloga usmjerena prema sebi samome. Prema tome, prema Kernebergu nagon smrti nema poziciju neke primarne težnje.

Od ostalih autora koji su se bavili nagonom smrti treba spomenuti Bruna (1953.), a u posljednje vrijeme Vogta (2001.) koji su uz prorađu biološke, metapsihološke, kliničke i filozofske razine došli do zaključka kako malo toga uopće ide u prilog postojanju nagona smrti. Od autora dijalektičkog pristupa spominje se Zagermann (1988.) koji smatra nagon smrti važnim te mu pripisuje ulogu „gasitelja napetosti uz želju za fuzijom s majčinim/incestuo- znim objektom“. Schmidt-Hellerau (2003.) smatra kako nagon smrti ima svoje izvore u biogenim zonama, objekt je tog nagona *self*, cilj postizanje pasivnosti, a energija kojom se služi „Lethe“. Warsitz (2005.) smatra da je nagon smrti u službi života. On se oslanja na rad od Spielrein (1912.), naglašavajući važnost separacije za daljnji razvoj; na-

sexual instinct of death and dealt with the meaning of negativity. Ego psychologists, such as Hartman (1947), deal more with the role of aggression in the psyche, and aggression is considered to belong “within THIS” and not “within THAT” side of pleasure. For Kernberg (1985), affects are the foundation of everything, including instinct. For him, the death drive is a consequence of the pathological development of severe aggression which is, for developmental reasons, directed towards oneself. Therefore, according to Kernberg, the instinct of death does not have the position of a primary aspiration.

Other authors who have dealt with the death drive include Bruno (1953), and more recently Vogt (2001), whose study of the biological, metapsychological, clinical and philosophical levels led to the conclusion that there is little in favour of the death drive. Among the authors of the dialectical approach, Zagermann (1988) is mentioned, who considers the death drive important and attributes to it the role of “extinguisher of tension through the desire for fusion with the maternal / incestuous object.” Schmidt-Hellerau (2003) believes that the death drive has its sources in biogenic zones. The object of that instinct is the self, while the goal is to achieve passivity, and the energy it uses is “Lethe.” Warsitz (2005) holds that the death drive is in the service of life. He relies on the work of Spielrein (1912), emphasizing the importance of separation for further development, namely that an object needs to be symbolically



ime, objekt treba simbolički čak i ubiti kako bi ga se u sebi ponovo izgradilo. Romanov (2017.) gleda na nagon smrti kao na silu koja se „hrani“ strahom od gubitka objekta te stoga napada i presijeca sve veze u psihičkom.

U dijelu članka u kojem se autor bavi odnosom nagona smrti i filozofije kulture spominje se utjecaj Schopenhauera na Freuda. Zatim se navodi nekoliko filozofa od kojih se ističe Derrida (1987.) koji tvrdi „život JE smrt“, Žižek (2016.) kaže kako se „u carstvu nagona smrti negativitet i inercija preklapaju na strašan način“. Za Zupancić (2018.) nagon smrti u stvari je manje nagon, a više „ontologijski umor“ kao jedan od ključnih životnih afekata. Osim toga, ona tvrdi da „osnovni cilj kompulzivne repeticije nije postizanje umirenja, kao kod principa ugone, nego se napetost neprestano mora ponavljati“. Što se tiče odnosa nagona smrti i socijalne psihologije, autor navodi jednu zanimljivost. Naime, Reich, Fenichel i Fromm kao autori koji su se bavili političkom i sociopsihološkom mišlju bili su uporni kritičari Freudove hipoteze. Nisu „nasjele“ na to što je jedna od sudbina nagona smrti bila njegovo usmjerivanje prema van, što bi trebalo imati važan utjecaj na kolektivne procese. Kernberg (1988.) tvrdi, u kontekstu socijalne psihologije, da nagon smrti može kao „fundamentalna težnja ka uništenju biti usmjeren prema van i time utjeca-

even killed in order to rebuild it within itself. Romanov (2017) views the instinct of death as a force that “feeds” on the fear of losing an object and therefore attacks and cuts all ties in the psyche.

In the part of the article in which the author deals with the relationship between the death drive and philosophy of culture, the influence of Schopenhauer on Freud is mentioned. It then cites several philosophers, most notably Derrida (1987) who argues that “life IS death” as well as Žižek (2016) who says that “in the realm of the death drive, negativity and irrationality overlap in a passionate way.” For Zupancic (2018), the death drive is in fact less of an instinct, and more of “ontological fatigue” as one of the key life affects. In addition, she argues that “the basic goal of compulsive repetition is not to achieve calm, as with the pleasure principle, but the tension must be constantly repeated.” As for the relationship between the instinct of death and social psychology, the author cites one interesting fact. Namely, Reich, Fenichel and Fromm, as authors who dealt with political and socio-psychological thought, were persistent critics of Freud’s hypothesis. They did not “fall for” the fact that one of the destinies of the death drive was its outward direction, which should have an important impact on collective processes. Kernberg (1988) argues in the context of social psychology that the death drive, as a “fundamental aspiration for destruction, can be directed outward and thus influence collective processes.”

ti na kolektivne procese". Wirth (2002.) smatra da u hipotezi o nagonu smrti postoji „sloboda ka zlu“ ili „mogućnost (izbor) za destrukciju.“ Na taj je način pokušao objasniti fanatizam i destrukciju kao kolektivne fenomene.

Na samom kraju članka autor si postavlja tri pitanja:

1. Je li u „s onu stranu načela ugođe“ opisan neki princip koji zaista i jest s onu stranu? Nijemci imaju za takvu situaciju izraz „jaein“, u prijevodu „i da i ne.“ Tako se autor pita je li nagon smrti oduvijek i bio dio principa ugođe. Naime, ako se nagon smrti „brine“ za nastup umirivanja kod načela ugođe, to čini i na način da ograniči pobudu do one razine do koje pražnjenje te pobude izaziva zadovoljstvo, onda je nagon smrti „s ove strane načela ugođe“.
2. Je li nagon smrti uopće nagon? Autor upućuje na veliku nekonzistentnost i kod Freuda i kod drugih autora. Dakle, nagon je nešto što samo po sebi „tjera“, pritišće kako bi došlo do zadovoljenja, no neki autori tvrde kako nagon smrti nema u sebi to „pritisakanje“, nego je odgovor na taj pritisak. Tako postoje prijedlozi da se umjesto nagona uvede pojam principa smrti (Bernfeld i Feitelberg 1930., Caruso 1983., Ermann 2015.).
3. Znači li zadržavanje koncepta o nagonu smrti da je psihoanalitička

Wirth (2002) holds that through the death drive hypothesis there is “freedom to evil” or “the possibility (choice) of destruction.” In this way, he tried to explain fanaticism and destruction as collective phenomena.

At the very end of the article, the author asks himself three questions:

1. Does “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” describe a principle that really lies on the other side? The Germans have the term “jaein” for this situation, translated as “yes and no.” Thus the author wonders whether the death drive has always been part of the pleasure principle. Namely, if the death drive “cares” for the onset of appeasement in the pleasure principle, and does so in such a way as to limit the arousal to the level to which the emptying of that arousal causes satisfaction, then the death drive is “on THIS side of the pleasure principle.”
2. Is the death drive an instinct at all? Here the author points to great inconsistency in both Freud and other authors. So, the instinct is something that in itself “pushes”, presses in order to achieve satisfaction, but some authors claim that the death drive does not have that “pressure” in itself, but is a response to that pressure. Thus, there are proposals to introduce the notion of the principle of death instead of drive (Bernfeld & Feitelberg 1930, Caruso 1983, Ermann 2015).
3. Does maintaining the concept of the death drive mean that the psychoanalytic theory of instinct is dualistic?



teorija nagona dualistička? Freudov nagoni dualizam razlikuje se od Jungova monizma. Laplanche (2011a), Kimmerle (1988.) i Zupančić (2018.) daju više argumenata za monizam. Prof. Storck završava članak sljedećom tvrdnjom: Nagon smrti štiti od bezgranične pobude (i tako omogućuje ugodu), a životni nagon štiti od bezgraničnog umirenja (na čijem je kraju psihička smrt). Dakle, autor pokušava integrirati, stopiti ta dva nagona u dva naličja istog principa.

Članak općenito nije sugestivan, autor ne tvrdi da se nagon smrti mora prihvatiti ili odbiti, nego prikazuje vrlo živu raspravu na tu temu koja traje već cijelo stoljeće. Nagon smrti očito je važna tema kad se toliko autora njome bavi. Uz aktivnu raspravu došlo je do evolucije misli o nagonu smrti. Dakle, nagon smrti kao nešto što vodi kraju, završetku „uspio je evoluirati.“ Mislim da se pravo u tome krije intrigantnost tog koncepta koji će očito i dalje nastaviti evoluirati.

Freud's instinctive dualism differs from Jung's monism. Laplanche (2011a), Kimmerle (1988) and Zupančić (2018) give more arguments for monism.

Prof. Storck concludes the whole article with the following statement: The death drive protects from boundless arousal (and thus provides pleasure), and the instinct of life protects from boundless appeasement (at the end of which is psychic death). Thus, the author tries to integrate, to merge these two instincts into the two reverses of the same principle.

The article as a whole is not suggestive, the author does not claim that the death drive must be accepted or rejected, but presents a very lively discussion on the subject that has been going on for a century. Obviously, the death drive is an important topic when so many authors deal with it. Through active discussion, the thought of the death drive has evolved. Thus, the death drive, as something that leads to the end, "has succeeded in evolving." I think that is where the intrigue of this concept lies, which will obviously continue to evolve.

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