

European and Croatian Identity: *Cognitive Mobilization or Latent Conflict*¹

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ABSTRACT The focus of the analysis is attachment to Europe and Croatia as an indirect measure of identity. Variables used to explain these different attachments are demographic, social and ideological. The attachment to Croatia is best explained by the ideological variables, with those being more nationalistic, religious, socially conservative having a closer attachment to Croatia. Closeness to Europe, on the other hand, is more determined by social variables like occupational position. People with a higher position within the division of labour and decision-making processes feel closer to Europe compared with those lower down on the occupational scale.

We have found positive correlation between the attachments to Europe and Croatia. The attachment to Europe does not replace the national identification but can be seen as a part of the process of the broadening of the identity space. The European identification is not in contradiction with the national identification, but rather an expansion of it.

Key words: national identity, transnational identity, Croatian identity, European identity.

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1. Identification with Europe

The processes of European integration played an important role in the shaping of discourses in the former Yugoslavia. Could Yugoslavia integrate with Europe in spite of the fact that it was a socialist state? To what extent did the socialist system presents an obstacle to participation in the European integration? We can argue that the “West-East” division within Yugoslavia was also the dividing line of the sense of belonging to Europe. In the western part (Slovenia and Croatia), being part of Yugoslavia was perceived as an obstacle for participation in the European integration. The “belonging to Europe” was evoked as an “inborn” cultural trait of the people in the western parts of Yugoslavia in the intellectual debates that included the revival of the idea of “Mitteleurope”. In such constructs in the western parts of Yugoslavia, “Yugoslavism” was abandoned and replaced by Europeanism. Ethnic nationalism with its anti-Communist dimension was regarded as something that made the “western republics” of Slovenia and Croatia closer to Western Europe. As formulated by the first post-communist Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, “Croats belong to a different culture – a different civilization from the Serbs. Croats are part of Western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradition.... The Serbs belong to the East. They are Eastern peoples, like the Turks and Albanians. They belong to the Byzantine culture... Despite the similarities in language we cannot be together” (Viorst, 1991:74). The promoters of the ethno-nationalism were not aware of the prevailing anti-nationalist sentiment in that same Europe (Sekulić, 2001:158–59) to which they wanted to belong. They were not able to grasp the distinction between the support for those who were perceived as victims in the “wars of succession” in Yugoslavia and the rejection of ethno-nationalist claims in any form. European support was not about promoting one nationalism against another, but was for anti-Communist liberation and pro-European sentiment against communism and ethno-nationalism. Thus, after the first enthusiasm for Europe among the Croatian nationalists, the period of “awakening” followed and differentiation ensued in which ethno-nationalism and “Europeanism” parted. In that first phase Croatian nationalism and Europeanism, in the minds of nationalistic oriented Croats, had gone hand in hand. Croatia was “returning” to its European roots and was extricating itself from the “unnatural” Yugoslav community. However after the disappointments with the tepid European response to Milosevic policies during the war, and to the requests, after the war, to extradite the people accused of the war crimes, a new questioning about Europe was emerging. The nationalists were asking the question whether the national independence from Yugoslavia was achieved just in order to surrender their sovereignty to Europe? In the nationalist discourse, Europe was transformed from the positive pole of attraction to the negative image of supranational entity endangering the achieved independence. Those engaged in this discourse started to perceive more and more the European supra-nationality as an equivalent to the oppressive Yugoslavism during the communist times.

2. The problem and hypotheses formulation

In this paper the focus of the analysis are expressed attachments to different levels of territorial-political configurations: village, town or city, county, region, Croatia, South East Europe and Europe. Identity is measured indirectly as an attachment to different spatial configurations, but it indicates, nevertheless, the potential of solidarity and mobilization. The first question we ask is a descriptive one. To what extent is the person attached to different levels of territorial, political and cultural configurations? The nationalist interpretation of identity claims that the national identification must have privileged status among different identities. We will simply check the intensity of attachment to different levels of territorial and political constructs: from the place of living to nation and to Europe.

Understanding the relationship between the attachment to Croatia and to Europe will help us explore to what extent people feel attached to one or other level of these political-cultural configurations. The national attachment is generally stronger than supra-national (European) attachment in all European countries. In Eurobarometer surveys the same questions are used as in our present survey. The results show that the attachment to Europe is growing in time (from 1991 to 2000) and significantly varies between countries. The numbers of people saying that they are “somewhat” or “very” attached to Europe in 2000 are greatest in Sweden (77%), Spain (72%) and Luxemburg (80%) and lowest in United Kingdom (42%) and Greece (44%). On the other hand attachment to the nation is much higher but stagnating over time. It is highest in Denmark (96%) and lowest in Belgium and Netherlands (81%) (Citrin and Sides, 2004). Croatia would be likely to follow the same pattern. The only question can be to what extent the recent national emancipation and war of national liberation “increased” the difference in favour of national (Croatian) identification.

From this analysis we can formulate several hypotheses regarding the attachments to different levels of territorial configurations. In accordance with the research in other European countries and especially taking into account the high levels of nationalist mobilization in the period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and formation of national states, we can expect high levels of association with the national (Croatian) level. Identification with supra-national levels would be lower. Especially the identification with South Eastern Europe will be low because of the negative connotations of the image of the Balkans in Croatia as a “counterpoint” of the “belonging to Europe” (Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004; Rihtman-Auguštin, 1997).

The second hypothesis probes the interrelationships between different levels of attachments. Here we can start from different theoretical perspectives. One is classical Durkhemian evolutionary optimism. In such a vision, the broadening of identity is perceived as a constant march toward the more inclusive identity. As society spreads over a vaster surface, the common conscience is obliged to rise above local diversities, to dominate more territory and, consequently, to become more abstract. The national identity is just one step in the march toward the uni-

versal identity – the attachment to humanity being the most important human attachment. In Durkheim's evolutionary view the "patria" is the highest level of complexity with which people can identify at the achieved evolutionary stage. Localism and regionalism are replaced with patriotism ("a sentiment that joins the individual to the political society"). The next step in that evolution will be the replacement of patriotism with the sentiment of attachment to humanity in general (Durkheim, 1986). Very similar to the classical Durkheimian theory is Inglehart's concept of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1990; 1997). Inglehart claims that with modern educational, political and cultural developments, individuals are more capable of identifying with more abstract political communities. For Durkheim the highest community people could identify with in his time was patria. But he projects the possibilities of future evolution of identification until the individual starts to identify with the whole of humanity. In Inglehart's thinking, people committed to one abstract community (nation) may be ready to commit to other political abstract communities (Europe), providing that no conflicts exist between these different objects of identification. Durkheimian evolutionary theory and Inglehart's cognitive mobilization combined with the Croatian ideology of "belonging to Europe" would predict no contradiction between the European and Croatian identifications. If these assumptions are correct, these two identifications can be regarded as simple "stages" on the path of the gradual expansion of identification levels. As in the past local identities were gradually replaced by "higher" and more embracing national identities, so today's national identities are on the way to be replaced by the "higher" supra-national, in this case the European, identity. The replacement does not mean the disappearance. The regional identities did not disappear when replaced by the national identity; they simply became less dominant in the whole spectrum of identities characterizing every individual. However we can formulate an opposing hypothesis concerning the inherent tensions between Croatian and supra-national identification. In that perspective the identification with Europe is not viewed as a simple extension of the Croatian identification but is in contradiction with it. In the same way, during the existence of Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav identity was in some kind of contradiction with the ethno-national (Serbian, Croatian and other) identities (Sekulić, Hodson, Massey, 1994). European identification can be comprehended as a functional equivalent of the lost Yugoslav identity. Namely, with the disappearance of Yugoslavia, the chance of supranational, Yugoslav identification was lost. The European identity can be perceived as a replacement for the lost supranational Yugoslav identification. In that case European identification would be in opposition, and not an extension of the Croatian identification. We can then perceive the European / Croatian dichotomy resembling the Civic / Ethnic dichotomy (Sekulić, 1997; 2004). In that perspective Yugoslavism is viewed as a form of civic identity counterpoised to ethno-national identifications. After its disappearance, its functional equivalent becomes civic European identification.

If that hypothesis is correct we can formulate an additional hypothesis that these identifications are parts of broader ideological orientations. Where strong Croatian identification forms part of a more conservative-nationalistic orientation, the Eu-

European identification can be viewed as a part of a broader cosmopolitan-civic orientation. In that case the Croatian orientation would be part of the conservative value system and more correlated with variables that are connected with it (lower education, rural origin etc.). Opposite to this, European identification will be part of a more cosmopolitan-civic orientation and connected with indicators of higher social status.

3. Research design

Sample

The data used here were collected as part of the “South East European Social Survey” under the leadership of Prof Albert Simkus. The Norwegian research council financed the survey. The data were collected using door-to-door interviews on the representative sample of the Croatian population, N=2500. Because the split sample design was used, the variables used are from only one half of the sample with N of 1250. The data were collected by the “Puls” agency, Zagreb. The whole project included all the countries and territories of the former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia plus Albania). Here, we limit our analysis only to the Croatian data. The data were collected in January 2004.

Variables

The dependent variable “attachment to the place” was derived from the question “How close do you feel to the following places? Some people love their home village and identify themselves as a person from there. Others don’t feel so close to their village, but instead more to the region of the country, the whole country, or their region of the world.” The level of identification with the six levels of territorial-political configurations was probed: the village, city or town, county (*županija* in Croatia), the region of the country, Croatia, South-East Europe and Europe. Four levels of intensity of attachment to every territorial-cultural level were offered: very close, close, not very close, and not close at all. The “can’t choose” alternative was also available.

The independent variables are comprised of three groups. The *first* group are the standard demographic variables of gender and age, while the *second* group of variables indicate the social position of the respondent such as education, occupations, household income, place of residence and nationality.

Education comprises seven levels starting with no schooling as the lowest and PhD and MA as the highest. *Occupation* is in the form of a five-point scale starting from farmers, continuing with blue-collar workers, white-collar employees, professionals and managers, with political functionaries as the highest level. *Household*

income is grouped in seventeen categories with increments of 999 kuna's and *place of residence* is grouped into eight categories depending on the number of inhabitants. The respondents were asked for *nationality self-identification*. Because of the high level of ethnic homogeneity of Croatia, we divided the whole sample into Croats (90.6% of the sample) and non-Croats (8.5%).

The *third* group of independent variables are based on the statements of the respondents regarding nationalism, social conservatism, isolationism, religiosity, and the feeling of pride in being Croat. (Full wording of all items for all scales is given in the Appendix.)

The *nationalism scale* (based on 16 items having Cronbach's Alpha = 0.893) is designed to measure national sentiment and is based on a set of statements about nationalist values like "Survival of our nation should be the main goal of every individual", and "The common origin of our people is the basis of social trust". It also includes several statements about how well nationalities can get along like "Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nationality" or "Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust".

The second is the scale of *social conservatism* based on four items measuring attitudes toward abortion, pre-marital sexual relations, divorce and homosexuality. Cronbach's Alpha of the scale is 0.798.

The *isolationism scale* is based on the support for measures like limiting foreigners' ability to buy real estate in Croatia, a statement that international organizations are taking too much power from the national government, and the like. Altogether there were six such items with Alpha 0.726.

The measurement of *religiosity* is based on the self-placement of the respondent on the scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious).

We also have a separate scale of "*being proud to be Croat*." It comprises four items in the form that the "world will be better if all people would be like Croats", or "that the respondent is happier to be Croat than anything else".

4. Results

Attachment to different levels

Table 1


How close do you feel to the following places?

	Not close at all		Not very close		Close		Very close		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Close to village, town or city	20	1.6	88	7.0	455	36.4	681	54.5	1244	99.5
Close to your county	38	3.0	175	14.0	563	45.0	447	35.8	1223	97.8
Close to your region	31	2.5	157	12.6	541	43.3	496	39.7	1225	98.0
Close to Croatia	10	.8	76	6.1	448	35.8	702	56.2	1236	98.9
Close to Southeast Europe	315	25.2	414	33.1	352	28.2	104	8.3	1185	94.8
Close to Europe	220	17.6	322	25.8	463	37.0	193	15.4	1198	95.8

The results (Table 1) are clearly showing that people in Croatia feel the strongest attachment to the national level (Croatia) with 56.2% of respondents expressing very close attachment to it, followed by 54.5% expressing a very close attachment to their village, city or town. The middle level of attachment is felt to the county (35.5% feeling very close) and to the region (39.7% feeling very close). The third group is obviously Europe (with 15.4% feeling very close) and Southeast Europe (with only 8.3% very close). These results are not substantially different from the earlier quoted Eurobarometer data. The closeness to the nation (summing close and very close responses) is within the same range as in the Western European nations (around 90%). Even expressed closeness to Europe is within the range characterizing the populations of the European Union members. Although it is on the lower end of the range, it is for example higher than in Greece or Great Britain in 2000 (Citrin and Sides, 2004).

We can conclude that our initial hypothesis is confirmed. People in general feel much closer to the national level than to the supranational levels. The closeness to South East Europe is an outlier with much weaker attachment than to all other levels. The national and sub-national attachments are much higher than the supranational. Also local attachment (to the place of living) is on the same level as the attachment to the national (Croatia) level. The initial result is that the closeness to different territorial-political levels differs mostly in accordance with the expectations expressed in our first hypothesis.

Graph 1



We must be aware that the distribution of results reflects also the method used in obtaining the data. The fact that people were asked to rate and not to rank their levels of closeness to the different territorial-cultural levels produced the possibility that they could express equal closeness to all levels. When discussing the controversy between rating and ranking, Inglehart says; “It is perfectly true that most people would like to eat their cake and have it too –and this poses no problem when no choice is necessary” (Inglehart, 1997:115). Thus Inglehart’s statement is intended to justify ranking as a better and more realistic technique reflecting real life where we are forced to make choices. Taking into account this ranking-rating debate and the determination of the results by the technique employed, let us emphasize two conclusions. First, that in spite of the fact that people were not forced to choose or rank their responses, the majority of respondents did make some choices. Substantial numbers of people varied their responses and indicated that they felt more attached to some levels than to others. Thus we can explore the different patterns of choice. One possible way to depict the data is given in the following typology.

Table 2
Typology of closeness

		<i>Closeness to Europe</i>	
		<i>Not close</i>	<i>Close to</i>
<i>Closeness to Croatia</i>	<i>Not close</i>	1 Not close to any (5.6%)	2 Close to Europe (1.0%)
	<i>Close to</i>	3 Close to Croatia(37.5%)	4 Close to both (51.4%)

In the first cell we find respondents who did not express closeness to any of the territorial levels. They were not very close, or not close at all to Europe and to Croatia. In cell two are those who expressed closeness to Europe (close to or very

close to) but at the same time were saying that they were not close to Croatia (not close or not close at all). We can see that only 1% of the sample fits into that category. Opposite to them are those who are close to Croatia but not to Europe (37.5% of the sample). Finally, the largest category is composed of those expressing closeness to Croatia and to Europe (51.4%).

Based on this typology, we can derive a second conclusion, that if unconstrained by a ranking system, a large proportion of people chooses to express an equal attachment to more than one level of identity, which provides an interesting contradiction of loyalties. But it is equally telling that only 1% of the sample is expressing closer attachment to Europe than to Croatia. We must be aware that the distribution of “types” would probably be very different if ranking instead of rating was used. In 1995, the World Value Survey in Croatia used a ranking instead of a rating system and respondents were forced to make a first and second choice among the same levels used in the present research. Under such conditions 80.5% of respondents chose sub-national levels (from village to the city) as their level of closest attachment, 15.5%, and 3.5% chose two offered supra-national levels (Sekulić, 1997; 2004). That means probably when forced to choose, large number of respondents, who are now expressing equal attachment to Croatia and to the lower levels (village or city levels), will choose the lower level as the object of most intensive attachment.²

The second question is can we detect that identification with different levels expresses some underlying tensions? Looking at the intercorrelations between attachments to different levels of territorial-political configurations we can observe a positive correlation among all levels, except between the two most distant ones, Europe and the most local. That is the only cell where correlation does not reach the statistical significance.

Table 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients among variables that measure closeness

	Close to your county	Close to your region	Close to Croatia	Close to South East Europe	Close to Europe
Close to village, town or city	.568(**)	.477(**)	.377(**)	.084(**)	.046
Close to your county	1	.695(**)	.409(**)	.240(**)	.213(**)
Close to your region		1	.514(**)	.239(**)	.220(**)
Close to Croatia			1	.169(**)	.246(**)
Close to Southeast Europe				1	.651(**)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

² Similar results were obtained by Banovac (2004) for regional samples of Istria, Lika and Kordun in 2003, and by Bjelajac and Pilić (2005) for the students of pedagogical academies in Split.

These correlations are to certain extent the result of the unconstrained nature of the rating technique. It is easy to express attachment to all levels and not to make choices. But in spite of this unconstrained nature of the rating technique we can clearly detect a pattern. The correlation coefficients among national and sub-national levels are much higher than among these levels and two supra-national levels. The range for the correlation coefficients of expressed attachments among national and sub-national levels is from .377 (local and Croatia) to .695 county and region. On the other hand the correlation between attachment to Europe and to the village is statistically insignificant and between Europe and Croatia is only .246.

The South East Europe/Europe correlation is high .651. From these prevailing high correlation coefficients can be concluded that the first, “cognitive mobilization” hypothesis is corroborated. But on the other hand, taking into account the unconstrained character of the rating technique and the emerging pattern of different magnitudes of correlation levels among different levels of political-territorial configurations, the possibility for further analysis opens.

This conclusion that there are different associations among different “subgroups” of attachments is even more visible if we perform a factor analysis as is shown in table 4.

Table 4
Rotated Component Matrix


	Component	
	1	2
Close to village, town or city	.788	-.089
Close to your county	.843	.145
Close to your region	.832	.186
Close to Croatia	.680	.195
Close to Southeast Europe	.119	.888
Close to Europe	.107	.903

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

The factor analysis gives a clear two-component solution. These two factors explain 70.316% of the total variance. Initial conclusions from the inspection of the correlation matrix are confirmed. There is a clear tendency for the attachment to different national-sub-national levels and for the two supra-national levels to be grouped separately. That means that our six indicators of different attachments

reflect two underlying “basic” attachments.³ The correlation between the factors is .229. These two groupings of attachments are also clearly visible on the Component Plot in Rotated Space.

Graph 2



Legend: B066A = close to village B067A = close to the municipality
B068A = close to the region B069A = close to Croatia
B070A = close to South East Europe B071A = close to Europe

³ We will not discuss here the difference that is usually obtained in rotated and unrotated solutions. The Unrotated solution (not shown here) is indicating one more general factor (component) and the second more “specific” factor with all variables having loadings on the first factor. This result is to a large extent a consequence of the rating method used. As stated by Inglehart “...the rating method tends to produce a one-dimensional solution: insofar as it encourages response set, it produces a first principal component on which everything is positively correlated with everything else, regardless of content, so that all items have high positive loading on the first principal component” (Inglehart, 1997:115) The rotated solution does not show general and specific factors but two principal factors (E. A. Pedhazur, L. P. Pedhazur, 1991:607–622). For our purposes, the eventual distinction between some “general attachment” component and “specific” (in our case “supranational” attachment component) is irrelevant and probably only a statistical artefact of the rating method used. What is important is that, according to our hypothesis, we can clearly distinguish between two types (underlying factors) of attachments

The two-factor solution indicates that the tendencies towards national-sub-national and supranational identifications are reflecting different underlying factors. In accordance with the second hypothesis, these two attachments are belonging to different underlying value systems. Those more attached to national and sub-national levels are more conservative and those expressing attachment to the supra-national levels are more liberal in their world views. Let us examine whether this hypothesis can be empirically confirmed. In order to explore the second hypothesis about the ideological structure underlying different attachment levels, we turn first to the correlations among all analyzed variables.

Table 5
Correlates of different attachments

	National closeness	Close to S. E. Europe	Close to Europe
National closeness ⁴	1	.230 (.000)	.226(.000)
Close to S.E. Europe	X	1	.651(.000)
Close to Europe	X	X	1
Demographic			
Gender	.029(.307)	.037(.208)	-.028(.324)
Age	.226(.000)	.024 (.410)	.007(.812)
Nationality	-.078(.006)	.065(.025)	.030(.302)
Social position			
Education	-.150(.000)	-.042(.078)	.031 (.187)
Occupation	-.041(.197)	-.034(.303)	.074(.022)
Household income	-.042(.184)	-.038(.236)	.075(.018)
Ideological scales			
Religiosity	.116(.000)	-.043 (.138)	-.072(.013)
Left-Right	.127 (.000)	-.043(.198)	-.019(.575)
Isolationism	.177 (.000)	.021(.462)	-.014(.618)
Conservatism	.101(.000)	-.005(.834)	-.026(.255)
Proud to be Croat	.211(.000)	-.005(.833)	.015(.517)
Nationalism	.167(.000)	.003 (.907)	-.009(.669)

Pearson Correlation coefficients with Significance (2-tailed) in parenthesis.

⁴ In order to simplify further analysis we created a scale of national-sub-national closeness based on expressed attachments to four levels (from village to Croatia). It has a satisfactory reliability (Cronbach alpha =.805). This was not possible to do with the two supra-national levels so we treat them separately in the further analysis.

The main hypothesis that the ideological factors are underpinning the expressed attachments is confirmed regarding the national-sub-national attachments. All ideological scales indicating “conservative” direction are positively correlated with national-sub-national closeness. The more religious people are closer to the national and sub-national levels as are those positioning themselves towards the right on the left-right political scale. Such correlations do not exist in the case of the two supra-national levels. Although in most cases the coefficients have negative signs they do not reach statistical significance. From this we can derive the conclusion that the closeness to the national-sub-national level is a part of the general conservative ideological orientation. At the same time it cannot be claimed that the more intensive closeness to the supra-national levels indicates less conservative or more liberal orientations although the negative signs of the correlation coefficients indicate that direction. In any case the supranational attachments are much less ideologically determined than the national-sub-national ones.

On the other hand, scales measuring ideological orientations are not significantly correlated with supra-national attachments (with the only exception of religiosity which is negatively correlated with closeness to Europe). However the two social position indicators of household income and occupational position are significantly correlated with the attachment variables with those having higher income and higher occupational position expressing more intensive closeness to Europe (not to South East Europe). These findings indicate that national-sub-national closeness is ideologically determined and closeness to Europe is more under the influence of social position. Those having higher occupational position (and income) are probably in a better position to reap the benefits of the international economy, and are more likely to be internationally oriented than those who are on the lower social positions. Their higher position allows them to perceive the benefits of integration with Europe and also enables them to create more internal or personal images of belonging to a wider identity rather than only a national one.

There is a difference between our data and that of the Eurobarometer (Citrin and Sides, 2004). In our data older people are more attached to the national-sub-national level but there is no age difference in the attachment to Europe. European data show that younger people are more attached to Europe than older people, but this is not the case among our Croatian sample. The only factor correlated with expressed closeness to South-East Europe is non-Croatian nationality. That is not surprising if we take into account that half of the non-Croats have origins or at least an “imagined” origin in South-Eastern Europe, and for them this (as in the case of many Croatian Serbs) is their homeland. However Croats would appear to hold the negative image of the Balkans referred to earlier, and reject any identification with this supra-national region.

5. Regression analysis

In order to elaborate on the bivariate findings, a regression analysis was performed to check on the causality and interrelationship among the variables. The first observation is that in all tables the explained variance is very small. It is greatest in the case of the national / sub-national closeness as dependent variable while in the case of the two supra-national attachments the variance is less than 1%. That means that some variables and constellations outside of our models⁵ may be contributing to or causing the variations in the closeness variables.

Table 6
Regression on National and Sub-national Closeness

<i>Variables</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Demographics										
Gender	.030	.374	.014	.697	-.003	.941	-.001	.986	.018	.611
Age	.186	.000	.190	.000	.185	.000	.149	.001	.145	.000
Nationality					-.068	.086	-.037	.351	-.040	.253
Social position										
Occupation	-.042	.348	-.041	.358	-.027	.599	-.013	.786		
Education	-.046	.325	-.022	.636	-.005	.920	.008	.879		
Home income	.073	.060	.082	.038	.072	.099	.075	.081	.051	.163
Ideological scales										
Religiosity			.091	.011	.038	.399	.006	.896	.006	.886
Left-Right					.093	.033	.029	.520	.029	.473
Proud							.142	.002	.184	.000
Conservatism							-.073	.110	-.025	.201
Nationalism							.145	.005	.099	.036
Isolationism							.021	.643	.035	.393
R square	.040		.045		.049		.094		.105	
R square (adjusted)	.034		.038		.037		.076		.093	

⁵ That small explained variance is also characterizing Butler's (2004) pilot study in which the reported explained variance is of the same magnitude as ours. Butler's explanation is that the suppressed variance arises from independent variables where only student populations were used. In our case we can argue that the unconstrained nature of the rating technique suppresses the variance of the dependent variable.

Returning to the explanatory power of individual independent variables, we can create here a more precise picture than from the bivariate correlations. If we look first at the model 1 for the national-sub-national closeness we can get a clearer picture of the ideological and social determinants. First only two ideological scales retain significance when all ideological variables are simultaneously included – the nationalism and the ‘proud to be Croat’ scales. Other conservative variables are acting through them on the national-sub-national closeness. A causal model explaining the pattern of relationships among ideological scales can be constructed. When only religiosity is added to the social position variables it has significant influence on our dependent variable. When left-right orientation is added to the model it is significant but religiosity loses its significance. That suggests that religiosity influences political orientation (the more religious are more right oriented), with the bivariate correlation between religiosity and right political orientation being 0.419 and significant, and political orientation influences the dependent variable. When all other ideological variables are added to the model, nationalism and the ‘proud to be Croat scale’ are significant and right political orientation loses significance. (The bivariate relationship between political orientation and nationalism is 0.432 and significant, and between political orientation and ‘proud to be Croat’ scale 0.324 and significant). In that way we can argue for and attempt to explain the causal sequence among the ideological variables. Religiosity influences right political orientation and right political orientation increases nationalism and pride in the nation.

Thus we have disentangled the threads and provided a more precise explanation of the causal influences among the ideological variables. It is also important to note that age stays an important predictor in all the presented models. Older people are more attached to the national-sub-national level than the younger. This finding corresponds to the findings of the Eurobarometer surveys (Citrin and Sydes 2004:173) which show that younger people are also less attached to the national level than older ones.

One of the social status variables, household income, is also significant in some of the models. It is interesting to note at what point of adding new variables to the model it loses its significance. When we introduce right-left self-identification, the significance of household income is erased. This suggests that we have detected a causal sequence where household income is correlated with political orientation (the bivariate correlation is $-.069$ with significance of $.052$. The negative sign in the table below means that more right political identification is positively correlated with lower income and left with higher). This political orientation “explains” the influence of income on national closeness. When it is introduced into the model, the explanatory power of income disappears.

Table 7
Determinants of “Closeness to Europe”

Independent Variable	Beta (Significance)	Beta (Significance)	Beta (Significance)
Gender	-.053 (.130)	-.039 (.280)	-.045 (.077)
Age	.001 (.989)	-.005 (.889)	-.021 (.626)
Nationality	.056 (.112)	.037 (.303)	.038 (.343)
Education	-.044 (.356)	-.058 (.231)	-.077 (.156)
Household Income	.076 (.056)	.074 (.067)	.036 (.427)
Occupation	.089 (.056)	.081 (.081)	.092 (.078)
Religiosity		-.063 (.095)	-.100 (.032)
Left-Right			.040 (.372)
R square	.018	.020	.025
Adjusted R square	.011	.011	.012

On the other hand the explanatory power of our regression model of ‘Closeness to Europe’ is extremely low. The picture we obtain from using the regression model is somewhat different from the bivariate correlations. From the bivariate table we can see the positive and significant correlations of two of social status indicators, occupation and household income (.074 and .075 both statistically significant) and the negative and statistically significant correlation with religiosity. In the regression model, the significance of the two social status indicators disappears and that of religiosity stays. That can probably be interpreted by suggesting that household income and occupation are producing lower religiosity levels and this in turn influences the closeness to Europe scores. In the same way, ideological orientations can be interpreted as the decisive determinants of national-sub-national closeness. The first level correlation of the social status variables is “explained away” when ideological variables are introduced into the model.

Finally, the regression model for the closeness to South East Europe (not shown here) did not produce any new information in comparison with the bivariate correlations. The only independent variable with explanatory power is the nationality of the respondents. Non-Croats express more closeness to South-Eastern Europe than Croats.

6. Discussion and conclusions

What can we conclude regarding our main dilemma of whether national-sub-national and European attachments are in contradiction or in harmony with each other? Are they reflecting cognitive mobilization in Inglehart’s term or is attachment to Europe allowing or reflecting an expression of dissatisfaction with ethno-

national identification in the same way as Yugoslavism had that function earlier? From the fact that there is a positive correlation between national-sub-national levels and European attachment we could conclude that cognitive mobilization theory best describes our findings. But on a closer look the picture dramatically changes. First, the factor analysis clearly indicates that national-sub-national attachments and supranational attachments reflect two different underlying factors. That alone suggests that these two attachments belong to different parts of the “ideological space”. This preliminary conclusion is confirmed when we look at the correlation of these attachments to other ideological orientations. It is clear that national-sub-national attachment is part of the conservative nationalist orientation. On the other hand attachment to Europe is not. Although the correlations with ideological attachments are not statistically significant they are all consistently pointing in a negative direction. The only negative correlation reaching significance is ‘religiousities’ indicating that people who express more attachment to Europe are less religious. These findings justify the interpretation of these attachments as reflecting an ideological stance. People who are less conservative and less nationalistic express more attachment to Europe, when the opposite is the case with people who are more conservative and nationalistic. It can be argued that expressing a stronger attachment to Europe is an opportunity for the people who are less attached to conservative ideological orientation to express their dissatisfaction with the prevailing nationalist discourse. On the other hand, weak correlations reflect the fact that attachment to Europe in general has a positive connotation. From recent history, being “European” meant some kind of anticommunist and anti-Yugoslav declaration.

This positive image of “Europe” weakened after Europe’s wobbling response to the Serbian (Milosevic’s) rearrangement of the post-Tito Yugoslavia and later, after the European insistence on cooperation with the War Crime Tribunal in Hague. Attachment to South East Europe is strongest among non-Croats whose large numbers have ethnic ties with the area. From all of this we can conclude that attachment to the nation and to the supranational entities reflect different underlying ideological orientations. One is more traditional and nationalistic and the other more cosmopolitan and pro-European. It must be emphasized that these attachments are not correlated with status and demographic variables. Except for the fact that age is positively correlated with national-sub-national closeness, age and gender are not significant explanatory variables. Also the fact that the status variables lose explanatory power when added to the regression model emphasizes the importance of ideological orientations. That is different from our earlier findings regarding Yugoslav identity and civic-ethnic identification, where the determination of status and demographic variables was much stronger (Sekulić, Hodson, Massey, 1994; Sekulić, 2004). Part of this difference can also be explained by the technique then used. Yugoslav identity was the expressed identity of the respondents; they were either Yugoslavs or something else. In addition the technique used then to measure civic-ethnic dichotomy was ranking. However, in our current study, we used rating measures for attachment (closeness) that did not force respondents to choose. They could have strong national attachments but also still express their

attachment to supra-national levels. They were allowed to express equal identification with more than one level and thus avoid choosing among them. We believe that if they were forced to choose, the majority of the respondents would be classified as ethnic identifiers, because they would most likely choose national over supranational identification.

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Europski i hrvatski identitet: Kognitivna mobilizacija ili latentni konflikt

Sažetak

U centru analize je osjećanje privrženosti Europi i Hrvatskoj kao indirektna mjera identiteta. U objašnjavanju raznih oblika privrženosti korištene su demografske, socijalne i ideološke varijable. Privrženost Hrvatskoj najbolje je objašnjena ideološkim varijablama – oni koji ističu svoju nacionalnost, koji su religiozniji, konzervativniji osjećaju veću povezanost s Hrvatskom. S druge strane bliskost Europi više je determinirana socijalnim varijablama, kao na primjer socijalnim statusom i položajem u zanimanju. Ljudi koji imaju viši položaj u društvu i zanimanju, a time i veću moć odlučivanja, osjećaju se bliže Europi, u usporedbi s onima koji se nalaze niže na skali zanimanja. Zanimljivo je da postoje i pozitivne korelacije između privrženosti Europi i Hrvatskoj, kao i da ta dva odnosa ne moraju uvijek isključivati jedan drugoga. Privrženost Europi ne zamjenjuje nacionalnu identifikaciju nego više može biti promatrana kao proces širenja identiteta. Zaključujemo da europska identifikacije nije negacija nego proširenje nacionalnoga identiteta.

Ključne riječi: nacionalni identitet, transnacionalni identitet, hrvatski identitet, europski identitet.

Primljeno: veljača 2008.

Prihvaćeno: travanj 2008.

Appendix

Scale of composed ideological variables

<p>Ideological variables – Questions Scale</p>
<p>Nationalism 1–5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Survival of your nation is the main goal of every individual. – Everyone has all they need when the country is strong. – Without leaders, every nation is like a man without a head. – The common origin of our people is the basis for social trust. – The peasant is the best protector of the nation. – A nation that does not honor their traditions deserves to perish. – We get our dignity when we fight for our country. – The past of our people for all of us must be a secret holy object. – Every inch of our country should be treated as a secret holy object. – The nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others. – Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation. – Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust. – In choosing a spouse, nationality should be one of the most important considerations. – Every nation should have its own state. – It is best that villages, towns, and cities should be composed of only one nationality. – It is best that people work with their own nationals, and not try to build relationship with people of the other groups.
<p>Social conservatism: 1–5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Abortion should be illegal. – It is wrong for couples to live together without being married. – Divorce should be prohibited by law. – Homosexuals are no better than criminals and should be punished in the extreme.
<p>Isolationism: 1–5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Croatia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy. – For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solution. – Croatia should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations. – Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Croatia. – Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in Croatia. – Free trade leads to better products becoming available in Croatia. – In general, Croatia should follow decisions of international organizations to which it belongs. – Increase exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures. – International organizations are taking away too much power from the Croatian government.
<p>Religiosity: 0–10</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – How religious would you say you are?
<p>Proud to be Croat: 1–5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – I would rather be a citizen of Croatia than of any other country in the world. – There are some things about Croatia today that makes me feel ashamed. – The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Croats. – I am often less proud of Croatia than I would like to be.