

Anatolie Bajora

Centar za Hladni rat / *Center for Cold War*

Međunarodni povijesni studiji / *International History Studies (CCWISH)*

Sveučilište East China Normal / *East China Normal University*

CN – Shanghai

837979248@qq.com

UDK/UDC

94(497.1 : 498)“1948/1964“

doi: 10.15291/misc.3615

Izvorni znanstveni rad / *Original scientific paper*

Primljeno / *Received*: 5. X. 2021.

Bogdan-Tudor Constantinov

Sveučilište East China Normal / *East China Normal University*

CN – Shanghai

bogdan.constantinov@gmail.com

RUMUNJSKO-JUGOSLAVENSKI ODNOSI, OD SUKOBA DO SURADNJE (1948. – 1964.)



ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION (1948 – 1964)

Ovaj članak proučava razvoj rumunjsko-jugoslaven-
skih odnosa od 1948. do 1964. godine. Istražuju se dva
različita razdoblja u njihovim odnosima. Prvo je od
1948. do 1953. godine, kad je došlo do sovjetsko-jugo-
slavenskog i rumunjsko-jugoslavenskog sukoba koji je,
zapravo, predstavljao presedan koji će postupno razoriti
jedinstvo socijalističkog tabora. Za drugo razdoblje (od
1954. do 1964.) vezani su početak normalizacije i zbli-
žavanje Bukurešta i Beograda. To je odgovaralo njiho-
vim nacionalnim interesima i predstavljalo je protutežu
politici supersila. U vanjskoj politici dviju zemalja odra-
žavali su se ideološka neslaganja i potreba za društve-
no-ekonomskim razvojem, a osjećao se i snažan utjecaj i
iz komunističkog bloka i izvan njega.

Ključne riječi: Rumunjska; Jugoslavija; staljinizam;
titoizam; odnosi među komunističkim partijama.

This article examines the evolution of the Romanian-Yu-
goslav relations from 1948 to 1964. The study explores two
different periods in the relations of these two countries.
The first period was from 1948 to 1953, when the Sovi-
et-Yugoslav and Roman-Yugoslav conflicts occurred, prac-
tically constituting a precedent that would gradually ruin
the unity of the socialist camp. The second period (1954
– 1964) corresponds with the beginning of the normaliza-
tion, bringing Bucharest and Belgrade even closer and aim-
ing to satisfy their national interests and counterbalance
the policy of the superpowers. Ideological divergences and
the need for socio-economic development were reflected
in the character of the foreign policies of the two countries,
which were under a strong influence of interventions from
inside and outside the communist bloc.

Keywords: Romania; Yugoslavia; Stalinism; Titoism;
inter-communist relations.

UVOD

Na početku Drugog svjetskog rata Rumunjska i Jugoslavija nalazile su se u različitim taborima. Nakon puča od 23. kolovoza 1944. Bukurešt će svoje oružje okrenuti protiv nacističke Njemačke. Rumunjska će potpasti pod izravnu kontrolu sovjetskih snaga i bit će joj nametnut komunizam staljinističkog tipa. Sporazum između Churchilla i Staljina, postignut u Jalti 1945. godine, znatno je doprinio tom prisilnom prihvaćanju komunizma u Rumunjskoj. Prema sporazumu, Sovjetski Savez i Velika Britanija trebali su podijeliti utjecaj u njoj u omjeru 90 % naprama 10 % (u Jugoslaviji to je bilo 50 % : 50 %).¹

Za razliku od ostalih komunističkih partija u istočnoj Europi, u Rumunjskoj je partiji glavnu riječ između dva rata vodila Kominternu; osim toga, partija je bila u ilegali. Partija će svoju ideologiju nametnuti tek uz pomoć sovjetskog oružja.² S jugoslavenskim je komunistima bilo drukčije: oni su na vlast došli nakon borbe protiv sila Osovine. Osim toga, Josip Broz Tito, generalni sekretar Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (1939. – 1980.) i predsjednik Jugoslavije (1953. – 1980.), bio je oličenje težnji za nacionalnim oslobođenjem.³

Poslije rata obje su zemlje potpale pod izravan utjecaj SSSR-a, u kojem je već bio započeo proces društveno-ekonomske transformacije. Tijekom idućih nekoliko godina dvije će se susjedne zemlje preobraziti u istinske “narodne demokracije” s jednopartijskim sustavom i s novom ulogom u sovjetskoj interesnoj sferi. Zahvaljujući svojim bogatim prirodnim resursima, Rumunjska je postala važan trgovinski partner Jugoslavije.⁴

SSSR je namjeravao integrirati Rumunjsku u svoju sferu utjecaja što je brže moguće, namećući joj sovjetski model trogodišnje preobrazbe u komunističko društvo i dva petogodišnja plana tijekom kojih bi se razvile komunističke institucije.⁵ Rezultat tog plana bila je potpuna poslušnost Moskvi na

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of World War II, Romania and Yugoslavia were in different camps; after the coup d'état of August 23, 1944, Bucharest would turn its weapons against Nazi Germany. Romania would fall under direct control of Soviet troops and the Stalinist communist ideology would be imposed. The Yalta Agreement (1945) between Churchill and Stalin contributed significantly to this forced embrace of communism in Romania, with the Soviet Union having 90% influence and Great Britain 10% (in Yugoslavia, this ratio was 50% : 50%).¹

Unlike other communist parties in Eastern Europe, in the interwar period the Romanian Communist Party was dominated by the Comintern and was illegal; it would impose its ideology only with the help of the Soviet army.² In contrast to this Yugoslav communists took power by fighting against the Axis powers and Josip Broz Tito, General Secretary of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1939 – 1980) and President of Yugoslavia (1953 – 1980), represented the ideal of national liberation aspirations.³

After the war, both countries came under direct influence of the USSR, where the process of social and economic transformation had begun. In the next few years, the two neighboring countries will be transformed into true *people's democracies* with a single-party system and with a new role in the Soviet sphere of interest. Romania became an important trading partner for Yugoslavia due to its rich natural resources.⁴

USSR aimed to integrate Romania into its sphere of influence as quickly as possible by imposing the new Soviet model of three years of communization of Romania and two five-year plans to develop communist institutions.⁵ The result of this plan in foreign policy was total obedience to the directives from Moscow.⁶ As a result, Yugoslavia viewed the

¹ Resis 1978: 368–387.

² Final Report ..., 2006: 32.

³ Zbucea 2001: 86–87.

⁴ Cvetković 2021: 166–168.

⁵ Šerban 2018.

¹ Resis 1978: 368–387.

² Final Report ..., 2006: 32.

³ Zbucea 2001: 86–87.

⁴ Cvetković 2021: 166–168.

⁵ Šerban 2018.

⁶ Anton 2007: 17–51.

području vanjske politike.⁶ Jugoslavija je na SSSR i Crvenu armiju gledala kao na oslobodioc i proces sovjetizacije ondje je brzo završio. U Rumunjskoj, međutim, na iste te Sovjete gledalo se kao na okupatore te je stoga proces uvođenja komunističkog sustava bio sporiji i suočavao se s neusporedivo većim otporom.⁷

Jugoslavija je bila važna za nastojanja Moskve da konsolidira blok svojih satelitskih država u regiji; imala je načina da utječe na situaciju u susjednoj Grčkoj i osigura geopolitički izlaz na Sredozemlje. Osim toga, prije sukoba s Kominternom, Informbiro komunističkih i radničkih partija osnovan je upravo u Beogradu (1947.). Jugoslavija je zbog toga predstavljala izvrstan model za nove komunističke režime u istočnoj Europi. Publikacije rumunjske komunističke propagande često su hvalile izvanredna postignuća druga Tita.⁸

RUMUNJSKO-JUGOSLAVENSKI SUKOB (1948. – 1953.)

Prije razlaza, rumunjsko-jugoslavenski odnosi imali su sve predispozicije za suradnju, a ne za sukob. Već 15. travnja 1948. godine potpisan je novi trgovinski sporazum s ciljem unaprjeđivanja ekonomskih odnosa. Međutim, nakon izbijanja sukoba s Jugoslavijom u lipnju 1948. godine, odnosi su odmah prekinuti.⁹ To se zbilo na šestoj sjednici drugog zasjedanja Informacijskog biroa komunističkih i radničkih partija, 28. lipnja 1948. Jugoslavija je izbačena iz Kominforma jednoglasno usvojenom rezolucijom pod naslovom "O stanju u Komunističkoj partiji Jugoslavije", i to zato što su "napustili marksističko-lenjinističke ideje i usvojili nacionalističku poziciju".¹⁰ Po izbijanju sovjetsko-jugoslavenskog sukoba Moskva je prisilila svoje komunističke satelite da osude Tita. Rumunjska je kritizirala stav jugoslavenskog rukovodstva rekavši da su "napustivši pozicije revolucionarnog marksizma, zauzeli neprijateljski stav prema Sovjetskom Savezu i Svesovjetskoj komunističkoj

USSR and the Red Army as liberators, and the Sovietization process ended quickly, while in Romania, the same Soviets were seen as occupiers and the communization process was slower and met incomparably more serious resistance.⁷

Yugoslavia was important for Moscow's efforts to consolidate its satellite block in the region; it had the leverage to influence the situation in neighboring Greece and ensure a geopolitical access to the Mediterranean. Moreover, before the Comintern conflict, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties was set up in Belgrade (1947). As a result, Yugoslavia constituted an excellent role model for the new communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and Romania's communist propaganda publications often praised Comrade Tito's remarkable achievements.⁸

THE ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAV CONFLICT (1948 – 1953)

Before the split, the Romanian-Yugoslav relations showed a predisposition to cooperation rather than conflict. As early as on April 15, 1948, a new trade agreement was signed in order to improve economic relations; however, after the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict in June 1948, the relations were immediately suspended.⁹ It happened at the 6th meeting of the Second Bureau of the Communist Party and the Bureau of Workers' Information, in the unanimously adopted resolution "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," on June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, "because they abandoned Marxist-Leninist ideas and adopted the position of nationalism."¹⁰ After the outbreak of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, Moscow forced its communist satellites to condemn Tito. Romania also criticized the attitude of Yugoslav leaders because, "slipping away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism, they have taken a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)..."¹¹

⁶ Anton 2007: 17–51.

⁷ Cvetković 2021a: 114.

⁸ Final Report ..., 2006: 39.

⁹ Cvetković 2021: 188.

¹⁰ Cominform meetings ..., 1998: 455–461.

⁷ Cvetković 2021a: 114.

⁸ Final Report ..., 2006: 39.

⁹ Cvetković 2021: 188.

¹⁰ Cominform meetings ..., 1998: 455–461.

¹¹ Scînteia 1948: 1.

partiji (boljševika) ...”¹¹ te da poriču ulogu SSSR-a i njegovih oružanih snaga, ostvarenu “pobjedom nad Hitlerovom Njemačkom”.¹²

Rumunjska je stoga poduzela snažne korake protiv utjecaja titoizma, posebice na područjima uz granicu s Jugoslavijom, gdje je živjeli brojni Srbi. Ondje je podigla gustu mrežu obrambenih utvrda, organizirala vojne vježbe i pozivala mase da sudjeluju u “borbi za likvidaciju Titove fašističke bande”.¹³ Ujedno je pružala utočište članovima “ilegalne anti-titovske mreže”.¹⁴

Rumunjska se aktivno pripremala za rat uvoženjem sovjetskog oružja, opreme, tehnologije i licenci. Ti su koraci rezultirali brzim iscrpljivanjem njezinih materijalnih i financijskih resursa. Do ožujka 1954. godine, u obrambenu industriju investirano je 952.434.000 leja (što odgovara količini od 75.571,828 kg finog zlata). Konačni je gubitak iznosio 196.706.533 leja (20,65 % od investiranog iznosa).¹⁵

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, prvi sekretar Rumunjske radničke partije (1948. – 1956.), čvrsto je slijedio naredbe iz Kremlja, a sjedište Kominforma premješteno je iz Beograda u Bukurešt.

Rukovodstvo Rumunjske radničke partije iskoristilo je sukob kao opravdanje za politiku terora tijekom unutarpartijskih sukoba; mnogi predani komunisti bili su optuženi da su “titoističko-fašistički” agenti i špijuni zapadnih tajnih službi.¹⁶ To se pričalo čak i o samom Gheorghiu-Deju.¹⁷ Vlasti su stoga poduzele niz mjera “za izbacivanje stranih i neprijateljskih elemenata koji su se infiltrirali u Partiju ...”.¹⁸

Rumunjsko-jugoslavenski sukob bio je umjetno stvoren. Bio je to ideološki sukob između dvije partije, dva režima i dvaju komunističkih vođa koji se nisu suštinski razlikovali. Oba sustava bila su podjednako ideološki dogmatska i podjednako represivna.¹⁹ Napetost među njima umjetno je stvorila

and have denied the role of the USSR and its armed forces achieved “by winning the victory over Hitlerist Germany.”¹²

As a result, Romania took strong measures to counter Titoism, especially in the area along its border with Yugoslavia, inhabited by numerous ethnic Serbs. A dense fortification network was built, organized maneuvers, and called the masses to participate “in the fight to liquidate Tito’s fascist gang.”¹³ It also offered shelter to the members of “anti-Tito underground network.”¹⁴

Romania was actively preparing for war by importing Soviet weapons, equipment, technology, and licenses. These actions led to a rapid depletion of the country’s material and financial resources. Until March 1954, 952,434,000 lei (equivalent to 75,571.828kg of fine gold) was invested in the defense industry. The final loss was 196,706,533 lei (20.65% of the invested amount).¹⁵

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party (1948 – 1956), firmly followed the Kremlin orders and the Cominform headquarters was relocated from Belgrade to Bucharest.

The RWP leadership used the conflict as a justification for the policy of terror during the Party’s internal struggle; many dedicated communists were accused of being *Titoist-fascist* agents and spies of the Western secret services.¹⁶ Even Gheorghiu-Dej did not escape these rumors.¹⁷ As a result, the authorities took a series of measures “to expel foreign and enemy elements infiltrating the Party...”¹⁸

The Romanian-Yugoslav conflict was a fake one, created on an ideological basis between two parties, two regimes and two communist leaders, which fundamentally did not differ. Both systems were equally dogmatic in ideology and equally repressive.¹⁹ The tensions were artificially created by Moscow, and the Romanians merely executed

¹¹ Scînteia 1948: 1.

¹² DOKUMENT 9.

¹³ DOKUMENT 1.

¹⁴ DOKUMENT 10.

¹⁵ Opriş 2012.

¹⁶ Vidjeti također slučaj Pătrăşcanu, Final report ..., 2006: 53.

¹⁷ DOKUMENT 18.

¹⁸ DOKUMENT 1.

¹⁹ Lambru 2013.

¹² DOCUMENT 9.

¹³ DOCUMENT 1.

¹⁴ DOCUMENT 10.

¹⁵ Opriş 2012.

¹⁶ See also Pătrăşcanu’s case, Final Report ..., 2006: 53.

¹⁷ DOCUMENT 18.

¹⁸ DOCUMENT 1.

¹⁹ Lambru 2013.

Moskva, a Rumunji su samo bez oklijevanja izvršavali naredbe Kremlja.²⁰ Animositet između dvije zemlje nastao je kao posljedica raskida između Staljina i Tita. To je narušilo međudržavne interakcije Rumunjske i Jugoslavije. Titoistička je prijetnja bila konstrukcija i nije se temeljila na točnim i objektivnim činjenicama.²¹

Prema A. S. Gladiševoj, antijugoslavenska kampanja u Rumunjskoj odražavala je političku represiju i mjere protiv nacionalnih manjina, ponajprije rumunjskih Nijemaca i Srba. Za vlasti su oni bili “politički nepouzdana elementi” u uvjetima sovjetsko-jugoslavenskog sukoba te su stoga predstavljali prijetnju rumunjskoj nacionalnoj sigurnosti.²²

Dok god je Staljin bio na čelu SSSR-a, Bukurešt nije mogao zahtijevati autonomiju i neovisnost jer za to nije postojala domaća i međunarodna politička inicijativa. To je omogućavalo Moskvi da ima kontrolu nad Rumunjskom.

SREĐIVANJE ODNOSA S JUGOSLAVIJOM I POČETAK DESATELITIZACIJE RUMUNJSKE (1954. – 1964.)

Smrt J. V. Staljina, prvog generalnog sekretara Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza, smanjila je rizik od sovjetske invazije na Jugoslaviju. Moskva je obnovila odnose s Beogradom obećavši – u duhu Ženevskog sporazuma iz 1954. godine – da će raditi na miroljubivoj suradnji Istoka i Zapada te da će povući sovjetske trupe iz Austrije.

Iako skeptično po pitanju sovjetskog novog kursa i destalinizacije, bukureštansko je rukovodstvo slijedilo sovjetske vanjskopolitičke direktive. A kad je sukob između Beograda i Moskve završio, Rumunji su pohitali popraviti svoje odnose s Titom. Rumunjska je 19. lipnja 1954. obnovila diplomatske odnose s Jugoslavijom, a poduzet je i niz koraka na obnavljanju normalnih i dobrosusjedskih odnosa između dviju zemalja. Tijekom pregovora koji su se odvijali u duhu razumijevanja i suradnje, dvije su zemlje riješile nekoliko pitanja od obostranog interesa: na primjer, postignut je

without hesitation the orders given by the Kremlin.²⁰ The animosity between the two countries arose as a result of the Stalin-Tito split. It affected the Romanian-Yugoslav interstate interactions. The Titoist threat was a fabrication, not an attestation of accurate and objective facts.²¹

According to A.S. Gladysheva, the anti-Yugoslav campaign in Romania reflected the political repression and measures against national minorities, primarily Romanian Swabians and Serbs. In the eyes of the authorities, they were “politically insecure elements” in the conditions of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict and thus posed a threat to Romania’s national security.²²

As long as Stalin ruled the USSR, Bucharest could not claim autonomy or independence because of the lack of domestic and international political initiative. This allowed Moscow to exercise its power in Romania.

SORTING OUT THE RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BEGINNING OF DE-SATELLIZATION OF ROMANIA (1954 – 1964)

The death of the first secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, J. V. Stalin, reduced the risk of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, and Moscow restored its relations with Belgrade, promising – in the spirit of the Geneva Treaty (1954) – to work on peaceful cooperation between East and West and withdraw the Soviet troops from Austria.

Although skeptical about the Soviet new course and de-Stalinization, the Bucharest leaders pursued Soviet foreign policy directives. And when the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow was over, the Romanians hurried up to fix their relations with Tito. On June 19, 1954, Romania resumed its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. It also undertook a series of actions to restore normal and good-neighborly relations between Romania and Yugoslavia. As a result of the negotiations in the spirit of understanding and cooperation that took place between

²⁰ Herța 2011.

²¹ Herța 2011.

²² Moscow and Eastern Europe ..., 2017: 307.

²⁰ Herța 2011.

²¹ Herța 2011.

²² Moscow and Eastern Europe ..., 2017: 307.

dogovor o Đerdapskoj klisuri kojom prolazi granica između tih dviju riječnih zemalja. Potpisana je konvencija o granici i formirane su rumunjsko-jugoslavenske komisije koje će istraživati, rješavati i sprječavati pogranične incidente. Razmijenjeni su veleposlanici i poduzete su mjere za ponovnu uspostavu trgovinskih odnosa. Upućen je apel da se u medijima i na javnim događanjima više ne koriste neprijateljski tonovi i uvredljivi izrazi kad se govori o jugoslavenskom režimu i jugoslavenskim političarima.²³ Osim toga, prekinuto je djelovanje "Saveza jugoslavenskih domoljuba" i izdavanje njihova biltena na rumunjskom teritoriju.²⁴

Dinamiku rumunjsko-jugoslavenskih odnosa moguće je shvatiti uz pomoć onkološkog identiteta.²⁵ Prvo, rumunjsko komunističko rukovodstvo percipiralo je krizu između Beograda i Moskve – a kasnije i Hruščovljev "tajni" referat (1956.) – kao prijetnju socijalističkom sustavu te kao pristranost prema ugledu njihove zemlje.

Ponovna uspostava diplomatskih aktivnosti dovela je do ponovnog otvaranja komunikacija (kolovoz 1954.). Tijekom sljedećih dviju godina sklopljeni su sporazumi i konvencije o carini, graničnim prijelazima, kulturnoj razmjeni, dostavljanju pošte i željezničkom, zračnom i – posebice – riječnom (dunavskom) prometu.²⁶ Usvojene su mjere povoljne za srpsku manjinu: deportiranima iz pograničnih područja dopušten je povratak i izgradnja porušenih domova, a oni koji su osuđeni zbog događaja iz 1948., oslobođeni su. Kad je Tito posjetio Rumunjsku (23. – 26. lipnja 1956.), na željezničkoj stanici u Temišvaru obratio se okupljenoj masi sljedećim riječima: "Ovdje žive pripadnici srpske manjine. Mogu im reći da sam, što se tiče njihove situacije, naišao na potpuno razumijevanje kod rumunjskih drugova. Stoga se ne bojte, jer sve će se riješiti na najbolji način. Želim da vase prijateljstvo i simpatije prema našoj zemlji ne budu nauštrb lojalnosti zemlji u kojoj živite. Naše zemlje su sada prijateljske. Kao prijatelji, gradit ćemo sretniju budućnost".²⁷

²³ DOKUMENT 2.

²⁴ DOKUMENT 3.

²⁵ Steele 2008.

²⁶ DOKUMENT 4.

²⁷ DOKUMENT 4.

the two countries, several issues of interest for both countries were settled – for example, an agreement was reached about the situation at the Iron Gates Gorge that forms part of the boundary between the two riparian countries, and a border convention was signed, thus setting up joint Romanian-Yugoslav commissions for investigation, resolution and prevention of border incidents. They exchanged ambassadors and took measures to resume trade relations. Appeals were made to relinquish the hostile tone and insulting expressions against the Yugoslav regime and politicians, both in the press and in public.²³ Furthermore, the activities of the Union of Yugoslav Patriots and their bulletin on the RPR territory were terminated.²⁴

The dynamics of the Romanian-Yugoslav relations can be understood with the help of the concept of oncological identity.²⁵ First, Romanian communist leaders perceived the Belgrade-Moscow crisis and, later, the Khrushchev speech (1956) as a threat to the socialist system and a prejudice against the image of their country.

The resumption of diplomatic activities led to reopening of communications (August 1954), followed in the next two years by several agreements and conventions on customs, border crossings, cultural exchange, mail delivery, and railway, air and – in particular – Danube River traffic.²⁶ Favorable measures benefiting the Serb minority in Romania were adopted: those deported from the border regions were allowed to return to their homes and to rebuild them; those convicted in connection with the events after 1948 were released. During J. Broz Tito's visit to Romania from June 23 – 26, 1956, at the train station in Timișoara, he addressed the crowd with the following words: "A Serb minority lives here. I can tell these people that, regarding their situation, I found the greatest understanding among my Romanian comrades. Therefore, you should not be afraid, because everything was solved in the best order. I want your friendship and sympathy for our country not to harm loyalty to the country in which you live. Our countries are now

²³ DOCUMENT 2.

²⁴ DOCUMENT 3.

²⁵ Steele 2008.

²⁶ DOCUMENT 4.

Delegacije Rumunjske radničke partije i Saveza komunista Jugoslavije sastale su se 27. listopada 1956. na Brijunima da bi poboljšale odnose, izmijenile iskustva i uspostavile kontakte i suradnju između dviju partija.²⁸ Stav Rumunjske bio je da "sve partije i vlade socijalističkih zemalja [trebaju] biti nezavisne u upravljanju svojim odnosima, što u potpunosti odgovara interesima svake zemlje".²⁹

Reguliranje sovjetsko-jugoslavenskih odnosa omogućilo je Rumunjskoj da ponovno aktivira inicijative koje su u njezinu interesu. Sjedinjene su Države 7. ožujka 1956. pozitivno odgovorile na zahtjev rumunjske vlade da se regulira status ureda američke obavještajne službe u Bukureštu, ukine trgovinski embargo, riješe problemi američkih građana u Rumunjskoj te započnu pregovori o neriješenim financijskim pitanjima. Francuska i druge zapadne zemlje također su bile zainteresirane za obnavljanje diplomatskih veza, ali Rumunjska se još nije usudila uspostaviti diplomatske odnose s njima.³⁰

Zato su se sovjetsko-jugoslavenski odnosi ponovno pogoršali; već na međunarodnoj konferenciji komunističkih i radničkih partija u Moskvi (16. – 19. studenoga 1957.), SSSR i njegovi saveznici kritizirali su Jugoslaviju.³¹ Neuspjeh pomirenja 1957. godine pripisan je produblivanju sovjetsko-jugoslavenskog ideološkog raskola, što je rezultiralo isključenjem Jugoslavije iz komunističkog pokreta.³² SSSR je odbacio novi program jugoslavenskih komunista³³ i natjerao je svoje satellite da kritiziraju jugoslavenski revizionizam.³⁴ Ni Rumunjska tu nije bila iznimka te je naposljetku odbila poslati svoju delegaciju na Sedmi kongres SKJ 1958. godine.³⁵

Tog puta, međutim, vanjskopolitičke mjere koje je SSSR poduzeo bile su demokratskije i prikladnije od onih u prošlosti. Na plenarnoj sjednici Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza (održanoj u svibnju 1958.)

friends, and as friends, they will build their happier future."²⁷

On October 27, 1956, talks were held in Brioni Islands between the delegations of the RWP and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), in order to extend relations, share experiences and establish contacts and collaboration between the two parties.²⁸ Romania's position was that "all parties and governments in socialist countries [should] independently establish their line of conduct, which corresponds entirely to the interests of every nation."²⁹

The regulation of Soviet-Yugoslav relations allowed Romania to resume initiatives in its own interest. On March 7, 1956, the United States responded positively to a request from the Romanian Government to regulate the status of the US intelligence office in Bucharest, lift the trade embargo, resolve US citizens' problems and start negotiations on unresolved financial issues. France and other Western states also became interested in resuming diplomatic ties, but Romania was still too timid in resuming its diplomatic relations with them.³⁰

Therefore, Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorated again; as early as at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow (16–19 November 1957), USSR and its allies criticized Yugoslavia.³¹ The failure of reconciliation in 1957 contributed to the deepening of the Soviet-Yugoslav ideological schism, resulting in Yugoslavia's exclusion from the communist movement.³² The USSR rejected the Yugoslav communists' new Program³³ and pushed its satellites to criticize Yugoslav revisionism.³⁴ Romania was no exception, finally refusing to send its delegation to the Seventh Congress of LCY (1958).³⁵

Instead, this time USSR took more democratic and appropriate measures in its foreign policy than in the past. At the May 1958 plenary session of

²⁸ DOKUMENT 17.

²⁹ DOKUMENT 5.

³⁰ De la conformism ..., 2008.

³¹ Daniels 1987: 249.

³² Rajake 2004: 347.

³³ Seventh Congress of the LCY (1959).

³⁴ DOKUMENT 7.

³⁵ DOKUMENT 8.

²⁷ DOCUMENT 4.

²⁸ DOCUMENT 17.

²⁹ DOCUMENT 5.

³⁰ De la conformism ..., 2008.

³¹ Daniels 1987: 249.

³² Rajake 2004: 347.

³³ Seventh Congress of the LCY (1959).

³⁴ DOCUMENT 7.

³⁵ DOCUMENT 8.

Hruščov je negativno ocijenio jugoslavensku ideološku pobunu, ali je ujedno ukazao na besmislenost neuvjerljivih optužbi protiv Tita i njegove politike, iznesenih u Staljinovo doba.³⁶

Te iste godine, na osnovi složenih dogovora između Rumunja, Rusa i Jugoslavena, sovjetska se okupacijska vojska povukla iz Rumunjske. Hruščov je tako pokušao povratiti prestiž SSSR-a, znatno narušen nakon intervencije u Mađarskoj 1956. godine. Želio je, također, postići i „ublažavanje međunarodnih tenzija“.³⁷ Rumunjska je tako postala jedina zemlja Varšavskog ugovora bez sovjetskih trupa i vojnih baza.³⁸

SKJ nije poslao svoje predstavnike ni na konferenciju komunističkih i radničkih partija europskih socijalističkih zemalja u Moskvi (2. – 3. veljače 1960.) ni na konferenciju predstavnika komunističkih i radničkih partija u Bukureštu (24. lipnja 1960.).³⁹ Unatoč tome, sudionici su razmijenili stavove o aktualnim pitanjima u međunarodnim odnosima. Ujedno su i potvrdili odanost principima Deklaracije komunističkih i radničkih partija socijalističkih zemalja i Manifesta za mir, usvojenim na moskovskim konferencijama 1957. godine.⁴⁰

Kubanska kriza (1962.) i kinesko-sovjetski sukob (1962. – 1963.) doveli su Hruščova u težak položaj. Bukurešt je to iskoristio za dodatno udaljavanje od Moskve. Bukurešt je odbio sovjetske ekonomske nazore, posebice „Valevljev plan“ čiji je cilj bio stvoriti poljoprivredni kompleks na sovjetskom, bugarskom i rumunjskom teritoriju.⁴¹ Prema tom planu, Rumunjska bi imala pretežno poljoprivrednu ulogu i morala bi odustati od svojih težnji za industrijalizacijom.

Prema izvještaju kineskog veleposlanstva u Bukureštu iz šezdesetih godina, rukovodstvo rumunjskih komunista više neće imati tako oštar stav prema Jugoslaviji kao prije: „Rumunjski stav prema Jugoslaviji je konfuzan; oni [Rumunji] odbijaju javno izreći svoj stav o Jugoslaviji. Ni novine neko vrijeme

the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev, while assessing the Yugoslav ideological revolt negatively, also pointed out the absurdity of the unconvincing accusations made in Stalin's days against Tito and his policy.³⁶

Based on complex arrangements between the Romanians, Russians and Yugoslavs made that same year, the Soviet occupation army left Romania. This way Khrushchev aimed to repair the USSR's prestige, much affected after the intervention in Hungary (1956). It was also supposed to lead to “a relaxation of international tension.”³⁷ As a result, Romania became the only country in the Warsaw Pact with no Soviet troops and military bases.³⁸

LCY did not send representatives neither to the Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties of the European Socialist Countries held in Moscow (February 2–3, 1960) nor to the Conference of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties in Bucharest (June 24, 1960).³⁹ Nevertheless, the participants there exchanged views on the pressing issues in international relations. They also reaffirmed their loyalty to the principles of the Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties in the Socialist Countries and the Manifesto for Peace, the documents adopted at the Moscow Conferences of 1957.⁴⁰

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the Sino-Soviet hostilities (1962 – 1963) put Khrushchev in difficulty, with Bucharest taking advantage of these to move further away from Moscow. Bucharest refused to accept the Soviet economic views, especially the “Valev Plan”, which aimed to create an agricultural complex, including USSR, Bulgaria, and Romanian territories.⁴¹ Romania had to have a predominantly agrarian role and give up its ambitions for industrialization.

The Romanian communist leaders will not take an acidulous position towards Yugoslavia as before, according to the Chinese Embassy in Bucharest report in the 1960s: “Romanian perspective on Yugoslavia was

³⁶ Stykalin 2017.

³⁷ DOKUMENT 6.

³⁸ Scurtu 2010: 108.

³⁹ Jones, Kevill & Day 1985:19.

⁴⁰ Soviet Encyclopedia 1979.

⁴¹ Valev 1964.

³⁶ Stykalin 2017.

³⁷ DOCUMENT 6.

³⁸ Scurtu 2010: 108.

³⁹ Jones, Kevill & Day 1985: 19.

⁴⁰ Soviet Encyclopedia 1979.

⁴¹ Valev 1964.

nisu pisale o Jugoslaviji. Jedan je profesor izjavio da je 'Jugoslavija napola socijalistička država.'⁴²

Rumunjsko se suprotstavljanje Sovjetskom savezu pojačalo, što se jasno vidi u Deklaraciji od 22. travnja 1964. godine, u kojoj su osnovne ideje suverenitet i nezavisnost.⁴³ Isto tako, Bukurešt je osudio Kominternine neumjerene napade na Jugoslaviju i nepostojanje ravnopravnosti u međudržavnim odnosima: „Nijedna partija nema, niti može imati, privilegiran položaj te ne može nametati svoju liniju i mišljenje drugim partijama“.⁴⁴ „Na temelju tih načela, Rumunjska radnička partija zaključuje da je SSSR loše postupao sa Savezom komunista Jugoslavije. Činjenicu da je SKJ usvojio program s određenim oblicima izgradnje socijalizma ne bi trebalo smatrati odbacivanjem socijalizma“.⁴⁵ Tito je smatrao da „izjava Rumunjske radničke partije [predstavlja] dobar dokument...“⁴⁶

Travanjska deklaracija predstavljala je iznenađenje za međunarodnu i rumunjsku javnost zbog čvrstih stavova bukureštanskog rukovodstva o preliminarnim integracijskim vizijama unutar SEV-a.⁴⁷ Deklaracija je bila preduvjet da bi se zadržala autonomija unutar SEV-a, a na temelju Varšavskog ugovora. Redefiniranjem unutarnje i vanjske politike s ciljem postizanja konkretnog političkog kapitala unutar socijalističkog bloka, rukovodstvo Rumunjske radničke partije smanjilo je napetost unutar režima: oslobodilo je političke zatvorenike i zaustavilo je proces rusifikacije ukinuvši institute za ruski jezik i tečajeve ruskoga.⁴⁸

Iako se na površini činilo da se Rumunjska približava Titovu antisovjetskom modelu (što bi dovelo do unutarnje liberalizacije kroz ekstenzivnu desovjetizaciju), Rumunjska radnička partija u stvarnosti nije dopuštala nikakvu destaljinizaciju i kategorički je kontrolirala rumunjsko društvo.⁴⁹

confused, and they [Romanians] refuse to announce their views on Yugoslavia publicly. News agencies also did not cover Yugoslavia for a while. One professor said once that 'Yugoslavia is a half-socialist state.'⁴²

Romania's opposition toward the Soviet Union increased and was clearly reflected in the Declaration of April 22, 1964, in which sovereignty and independence were the basic ideas.⁴³ Bucharest also denounced the abusive practices of the Comintern toward Yugoslavia and the lack of equality in relations between states: "No party has and cannot have a privileged place, it cannot impose its line and opinions on other parties."⁴⁴ "Based on these principles, the RWP concluded that the USSR mistreated the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. However, the fact that the LCY has developed a program that has adopted certain forms in the construction of socialism should not be seen as a renunciation of the position of socialism."⁴⁵ In turn, Tito considered that "the RWP statement is a good document..."⁴⁶

The April Declaration surprised the international and Romanian public because of the firm positions displayed by the Bucharest authorities regarding preliminary integrationist visions within the Comecon.⁴⁷ In order to maintain autonomy in Comecon, based on the Warsaw Pact, the Declaration was a precondition. By redefining domestic and foreign policy in order to gain particular political capital within the socialist bloc, the RWP leaders eased the tension in the regime by releasing political prisoners and stopping the Russification process by dissolving Russian language institutions and courses.⁴⁸

Although Romania seemed to approach Tito's anti-Soviet model on the surface (which could have led to internal liberalization through extensive de-Sovietization), in reality, RWP did not allow any de-Stalinization, categorically controlling Romanian society.⁴⁹

⁴² DOKUMENT 11.

⁴³ April Declaration 1964.

⁴⁴ DOKUMENT 12.

⁴⁵ DOKUMENT 13.

⁴⁶ DOKUMENT 14.

⁴⁷ DOKUMENT 16.

⁴⁸ DOKUMENT 15.

⁴⁹ Final report ..., 2006: 94.

⁴² DOCUMENT 11.

⁴³ April Declaration 1964.

⁴⁴ DOCUMENT 12.

⁴⁵ DOCUMENT 13.

⁴⁶ DOCUMENT 14.

⁴⁷ DOCUMENT 16.

⁴⁸ DOCUMENT 15.

⁴⁹ Final Report ..., 2006: 94.

ZAKLJUČAK

Prije sukoba, Rumunjska i Jugoslavija bile su bliže suradnji nego sukobu. Neprijateljstvo između tih dviju komunističkih država bilo je posljedica raskida između Staljina i Tita. Napetost između Rumunjske i Jugoslavije (od 1948. do 1953.) nije bila uzrokovana njihovom ratobornošću ili nepomirljivošću, već regionalnom konfiguracijom nastalom zbog sveukupnih značajki staljinizma i optužbi protiv jugoslavenskih komunista.

Rumunjsko-jugoslavenski sukob bio je, dakle, privremeni, situacijski i egzogeni konstrukt, potaknut moskovskim nametanjem smjernica za djelovanje. Za rukovodstvo rumunjskih komunista on je predstavljao objektiviziranu stvarnost čije je značajke bilo potrebno asimilirati.

U razdoblju od 1954. do 1964. godine rumunjsko-jugoslavenski odnosi počeli su se normalizirati zahvaljujući novoj politici sovjetskog rukovodstva nakon Staljinove smrti i eliminacije remetilačkih faktora u odnosu Beograda i Moskve. Hruščov je potaknuo pomirenje s Jugoslavijom, čime je prekinuta standardna rumunjska vanjska politika u odnosima s Jugoslavijom. Do tog trenutka Dej je pokušavao učvrstiti i osigurati svoj položaj potvrđivanjem rumunjske odanosti SSSR-u te su sva ta nastojanja uključivala aktivno održavanje neprijateljstva prema Jugoslaviji i izražavanjem vlastitog identiteta kao opreke tome. Bukurešt je nastojao zaštititi svoju državnost. Njegovo je djelovanje bilo povezano s njegovim slabostima jer je ovisio o vanjskom sovjetskom čimbeniku. Za razliku od Rumunjske, Jugoslavija se rano oslobodila ovisnosti o Sovjetskom Savezu jer je imala ambicioznog vođu kojeg su podržavali Partija i narod i jer je imala povoljniji zemljopisni položaj od Rumunjske (potonja se nalazi u neposrednoj blizini SSSR-a).

Nakon povlačenja sovjetskih trupa 1958. godine i Rumunjska je odlučila više ne biti sovjetski satelit te je odbila SEV-ove planove da je podjarmi. Rumunjski komunisti imali su svoje vlastite ambicije, uključujući plan industrijalizacije usvojen na trećem kongresu Rumunjske radničke partije 1960. godine.⁵⁰ Osim toga, nisu mogli zanemariti ni model svojih

CONCLUSION

Before the conflict, Romania and Yugoslavia were more likely to cooperate than to confront. The hostility between these two communist states was a consequence of the Stalin-Tito split. The Romanian-Yugoslav tensions (1948 – 1953) were not the result of a bellicose or irreconcilable nature of their relationship, but rather a result of a regional configuration based on the aggregate attributes of Stalinism and the blame for Yugoslav communists' actions.

Thus, the Romanian-Yugoslav conflict was a temporary, situational, and exogenous construct, triggered by Moscow's imposition of the guidelines for action, which represented an objectified reality for the Romanian communist leaders whose attributes had to be assimilated.

In the period from 1954 to 1964, the Romanian-Yugoslav relations began to normalize due to the new policies initiated by Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin and elimination of the disturbing factors from the Belgrade-Moscow relationship. Khrushchev initiated reconciliation with Yugoslavia, which interrupted Romania's standard foreign policy in its relations with Yugoslavia. Although, until that moment, Dej tried to consolidate and secure his position by affirming Romania's loyalty to the USSR, all these efforts involved an active line in maintaining hostility to Yugoslavia and contrasting self-identification with it. Bucharest struggled to protect statehood, and their actions were linked to their weakness because they depended on the external Soviet factor. Unlike Romania, Yugoslavia broke away from Soviet dependence early because it had an ambitious leader supported by the Party and the people and a more advantageous geographical location than Romania, which is in immediate vicinity to the USSR.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops (1958), Romania also chose de-satellization from the USSR and rejected Comecon's decisions to subjugate the country. Nevertheless, Romanian communists had their own ambitions and their industrialization plan adopted at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party (1960).⁵⁰ Also, the model of the

⁵⁰ Treći kongres Rumunjske radničke partije 1960: 645–688.

⁵⁰ Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party 1960: 645–688.

jugoslavenskih susjeda. Sve to dovelo je do jačanja diplomatskih, političkih i ekonomskih odnosa s Jugoslavijom na liniji miroljubive koegzistencije.

Dejov nasljednik Nicolae Ceaușescu, generalni sekretar Rumunjske komunističke partije od 1965. do 1989. godine, nastavit će jačati vanjsku politiku uz pomoć vješte diplomacije i razvijati prijateljske odnose s Jugoslavijom.

Yugoslav neighbors could not be ignored. All this led to intensification of the diplomatic, political and economic relations between them along the lines of peaceful coexistence.

Dej's successor Nicolae Ceausescu, the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (1965 – 1989), would continue extending his foreign policy through skillful diplomacy and developing friendly relations with Yugoslavia.

Bibliografija / Bibliography

Kratice / Abbreviations

ANIC, Fond CC al PCR-Secția Relații Externe – Rumunjski nacionalni arhiv, zbirka dokumenata Centralnog komiteta Rumunjske komunističke partije / Vanjski odnosi / *National Archives of Romania, corpus of the Central Committee of the RCP / Foreign Relations*

ANIC, Fond CC al PCR-Secția Propagandă și Agitație – Rumunjski nacionalni arhiv, zbirka dokumenata Centralnog komiteta Rumunjske komunističke partije / Odsjek za propagandu i agitaciju / *National Archives of Romania, corpus of the Central Committee of the RCP/Propaganda and Agitation Section*

Izvori / Sources

April Declaration 1964 – *Declarația cu privire la poziția Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mișcării comuniste și muncitorești internaționale*, în *Scinteia*, aprilie 1964 [“Declaration on the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party in the problems of the international communist and workers’ movement”, in *Scinteia* newspaper, April 1964], (Anul 33, nr. 6214-6243) 1964-04-26 / nr. 6239, https://adt.arcanum.com/en/view/Scinteia_1964_04/?query=%20P%20M%20R%20din%20aprilie%201964&pg=116&layout=s (pristupljeno / accessed 21/10/2021).

Cominform meetings..., 1998 – *Совещания Коминформа. 1947, 1948, 1949. Документы и материалы, Адібеков Г.М. и др. (ред.)*. Москва, РОССПЭН [Cominform meetings. 1947, 1948, 1949. Documents and materials, edited by Adibekov G. M., et al., Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN)], 1998.

DOKUMENT 1 / DOCUMENT 1 – “Meeting of the Secretariat of the Information Bureau – Steps to Counteract Titoism in Romania,” November, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives of Romania, corpus of the Central Committee of the RCP/Foreign Relations, File no. 10/1950, p. 1,4-17. Translated for CWIHP by Ionas Rus. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114541> (pristupljeno / accessed 20/04/2021).

DOKUMENT 2 / DOCUMENT 2 – *Notă a CC al PMR adresată membrilor de partid, referitoare la eforturile întreprinse în direcția normalizării*

relațiilor cu SPRY (Fără dată), [Note of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party addressed to the party members, regarding the efforts undertaken in the direction of normalizing the relations with Socialist People’s Republic Yugoslavia, (No date)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR-Secția Relații Externe, dos. 28/1954, ff. 14–15.

DOKUMENT 3 / DOCUMENT 3 – *Scrisoarea CC al UCI adresată CC al PCUS, referitoare la oportunitatea organizării unei întâlniri sovieto-iugoslave la nivel înalt*, [League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, regarding the opportunity to organize a high-level Soviet-Yugoslav meeting (No date)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 8U/1955, ff. 72–73.

DOKUMENT 4 / DOCUMENT 4 - *Raport cu privire la vizita efectuată în România, între 23-26 iunie 1956, de către delegația Iugoslavă condusă de Iosip Broz Tito, (6 Iulie)*, [Report on the visit made to Romania, between June 23-26, 1956, by the Yugoslav delegation led by Josip Broz Tito, (July 6)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 84/1956, ff. 8–15.

DOKUMENT 5 / DOCUMENT 5 – *Notă privind discuția purtată la 16 februarie 1959 de către Nicolae Guină, fost ambasador RPR la Belgrad, cu Edvard Kardelj, vicepreședinte ale Vecei Federale Executive, referitoare la relațiile bilaterale româno-iugoslave, precum și la chestiunile divergente din interiorul mișcării comuniste internaționale (6 martie)*, [Note on the discussion held on 16 February 1959 by Nicolae Guină, former RPR Ambassador to Belgrade, with Edvard Kardelj, Vice President of the Executive Federal Office, on Romanian-Yugoslav bilateral relations, as well as on divergent issues within the international communist movement (March 6)], ANIC, CC Fund of the PCR – External Relations Section, dos. 43/1959, ff. 8–12], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 43/1959, ff. 8–12.

DOKUMENT 6 / DOCUMENT 6 – “Letter addressed by NS. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CC of the CPSU to the CC of the RWP concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Romanian territory,” April 17, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, Fond CC RCP - Foreign Relations Section, File 9U/1956-1958, pp. 227–228 (see English translation of the document at <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110460>; pristupljeno / accessed 03/07/2021).

DOKUMENT 7 / DOCUMENT 7 – *Scrisoarea lui Nikita S. Hrușciov, prim-secretar al CC al PCUS, adresată CC al UCI, referitoare la obiecțiile părții sovietice vis-a-vis de proiectul de program al UCI, (5 aprilie)*, [Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia regarding the Soviet Side's objections to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia draft program, (April 5)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 62/1958, ff. 1–4.

DOKUMENT 8 / DOCUMENT 8 – *Scrisoare CC al PMR adresată CC al UCI, referitoare la observațiile părții române vis-a-vis de proiectul de program al comuniștilor iugoslavi, precum la refuzul PMR de a trimite o delegație la Congresul al VII-lea al UCI (16 aprilie)*, [Letter of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party addressed to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, regarding the observations of the Romanian side regarding the draft program of the Yugoslav communists, as well as the refusal of the Romanian Workers Party to send a delegation to the VII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (April 16)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, Alfabetic, dos. 71/1944-1965, ff. 112–117.

DOKUMENT 9 / DOCUMENT 9 – *“Resolution on Yugoslavia of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party,” April 22, 1948*, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives of Romania, corpus of the Central Committee of the RCP/Foreign Relations, File no. 31/1948, p. 1-5. Arhiva Biroului Politic al C. C. al P. M. R. (The Archive of the Political Bureau of the C. C. [Central Committee] of R. W. P. [Romanian Workers’ Party]), Dosar (File) no. 337/1948. Translated for CWIHP by Ionas Rus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114539> (pristupljeno / accessed 24/10/2021).

DOKUMENT 10 / DOCUMENT 10 – *“The Anti-Tito Network in Yugoslavia,” 1949*, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives of Romania, corpus of the Central Committee of the RCP/Foreign Relations, File no.9/1949, p. 58-60. Translated by Ionas Rus. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114540> (pristupljeno / accessed 23/10/2021).

DOKUMENT 11 / DOCUMENT 11 – *“Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Romania, ‘Some Reflections on Romania’s Approach to Combating Revisionism’,”*

March 06, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-02666-01, 18-19. Translated by Max Maller. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119323> (pristupljeno / accessed 23/10/2021).

DOKUMENT 12 / DOCUMENT 12 – *Declarație cu privire la poziția Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mișcării comuniste și muncitorești internaționale adoptată de Plenara lărgită a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964*, Ed. Politică, București, [Declaration on the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party on the problems of the international communist and workers’ movement adopted by the enlarged Plenary of the Romanian Workers Party Central Committee in April 1964, Bucharest], 1964, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/istoria_comunism/documente_programatice/1964%20Declaratia%20PMR.pdf (pristupljeno / accessed 09/07/2021).

DOKUMENT 13 / DOCUMENT 13 – *Informare cu privire la vizita delegației de stat a RPR condusă de Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, președinte al Consiliului de Stat și prim-secretar al CC al PMR, în RSFI, (22-30 noiembrie 1963)*, [Information on the visit of the state delegation of the Romanian People’s Republic led by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, president of the State Council and first secretary of the Committee Central of the Romanian Workers Party, in Socialist Federative Republic Yugoslavia (22-30 November 1963)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR-Secția Relații Externe, dos. 34/1963, ff. 64–83.

DOKUMENT 14 / DOCUMENT 14 – *Stenograma discuțiilor organizate la Pișchia între delegația română condusă de către Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, președinte al Consiliului de Stat RPR și prim-secretar al CC al PMR, și delegația iugoslavă condusă de către Iosip Broz Tito, președinte al RSFI și secretar general al UCI, referitoare la divergențele româno-sovietice (22 iunie)*, [Transcript of discussions organized in Pișchia between the Romanian delegation led by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, president of the Romanian People’s Republic Council of State and first secretary of the Romanian Workers Party Central Committee, and the Yugoslav delegation led by Josip Broz Tito, president of SFR Yugoslavia and secretary general of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, regarding the Romanian-Soviet divergences (June 22)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 20/1964, ff. 70–89.

DOKUMENT 15 / DOCUMENT 15 – În contextul răcirii relațiilor dintre conducătorii PMR și PCUS și al derusificării instituțiilor, Secția de Știință și Artă a CC al PMR propune reducerea radicală a activității Institutului de Studii Româno-Sovietice și preluarea parțială a sarcinilor sale de către un Centru de documentare științifică al Academiei RPR, care să prezinte cercetătorilor realizările științifice nu doar din URSS, ci și din celelalte țări socialiste și din țările capitaliste, (9 septembrie), [In the context of the cooling of relations between the leaders of the Romanian Workers' Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the de-Russification of institutions, the Science and Art Section of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party proposes a radical reduction of the Romanian-Soviet Studies Institute. to a Center for Scientific Documentation of the Academy of the Romanian People's Republic, which would present to researchers the scientific achievements not only of the USSR, but also of other socialist and capitalist countries, (September 9)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, dosar 9/1963, ff. 20–26.

DOKUMENT 16 / DOCUMENT 16 – Sinteză referitoare la diferitele viziuni integraționiste preliminate în cadrul CAER, precum și la poziția asumată de PMR în cadrul divergențelor iscate ca urmare a formulării acestor viziuni, (fără dată), [Synthesis regarding the different preliminary integration visions within Comecon, as well as the position assumed by Romanian Workers Party in the divergences arising from the formulation of these visions, (no date)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 28/1964, vol. II, ff. 124–137.

DOKUMENT 17 / DOCUMENT 17 – Declarație cu privire la relațiile dintre PMR și UCI (27 octombrie), [Declaration on the relations between Romanian Workers Party and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (October 27)], ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dos. 85/1956, ff. 6-9. NAR1963a: 64-83 – Informare cu privire la vizita delegației de stat a RPR condusă de Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, președinte al Consiliului de Stat și prim-secretar al CC al PMR, în RSFI (22-30 noiembrie 1963), ANIC, Fond CC al PCR-Secția Relații Externe, dos. 34/1963, ff. 64–83.

DOKUMENT 18 / DOCUMENT 18 – “Transcript of Conversations between Delegations of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Excerpts),” March, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, fond CC

al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dosar 29/1964, f. 1-124; Document 8 in Budura (2008), pp. 147–151. Translated by Larry L. Watts and published in CWIHP e-Dossier No. 42. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117988> (pristupljeno / accessed 09/07/2021).

Eastern Europe ..., 1997 – *Восточная Европа в документах российских архивов: 1944-1953 гг., Г. П. Мурашко (отв. ред.) и др., Т. I: 1944-1948 гг., Москва – Новосибирск: Сибирский хронограф* [Eastern Europe in the documents of the Russian archives: 1944-1953., G. P. Murashko (ed.) et al.), T. I: 1944-1948, Moscow – Novosibirsk: Sibirsky chronograph], 1997.

Foreign Relations USA ..., 1974 – *Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, in Foreign Relations of the United States, June 30, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*. Volume IV, Slany, William Z., Herbert A. Fine, and Rogers P. Churchilleds, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), Document 702.

Scînteia 1948 – Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Trădarea Principiilor Marxismului Revoluționar, în Scînteia* [Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, Betrayal of the Principles of Revolutionary Marxism, in the Scînteia newspaper], iulie 1948 (Anul 17, nr. 1158-1184)1948-07-04 / nr. 1160, https://adt.arcanum.com/en/view/Scinteia_1948_07/?query=iugoslavia%20banat&pg=6&layout=s (pristupljeno / accessed 22/10/2021).

Seventh Congress of the LCY (1959) – *Программа Союза коммунистов Югославии, вынесенная на 7 съезде Союза коммунистов Югославии состоя* – Београд: Угославија [The program of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, adopted at the Seventh Congress of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, consisted of – Beograd: Yugoslavia], 1959.

Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party (1960) - „*Directivele Congresului al III-lea al PMR cu privire la planul de dezvoltare a economiei naționale pe anii 1960-1965 și la schița planului economic de perspectivă pe 15 ani*”, în *Congresul al III-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român*, Editura Politică, București, [“Directives of the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party on the development plan of the national economy for the years 1960-1965 and the outline of the 15-year economic plan”, in the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party, Politic Publishing House, Bucharest], 1960.

Popis literature / Literature

- Anton 2007 – Mioara Anton, *Ieșirea din cerc. Politica externă a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej*, București: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2007, 17–51.
- Croitor & Borșa 2014 – Mihai Croitor & Sanda Borșa, *Triunghiul Suspiciunii: Gheorghiu-Dej, Hrușciov și Tito (1954-1964)*, Vol. 2, Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2014.
- Cvetković 2021 – Vladimir Lj. Cvetković, *Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije i Rumunije 1945-1948. godine, Tokovi istorije*, 29/1, 2021, 165–190. http://tokovi.istorije.rs/lat/uploaded/1%202021/9%20Tokovi%20istorije%201%202021,%2029.%204.%202021_9%20C4%8Clanak%20Vladimir%20Lj.%20Cvetkovi%20C4%87.pdf (pristupljeno / accessed 24/10/2021).
- Cvetković 2021a – Vladimir Lj. Cvetković, *Dvovlasnički režim i stanje na jugoslovensko-rumunskoj granici 1945-1948, Istorija 20. veka*, 39/1, 2021, 99–114, https://istorija20veka.rs/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021_1_6_cve_99-114.pdf (pristupljeno / accessed 24/10/2021).
- Daniels 1987 – Robert Vincent Daniels, *Documentary History of Communism*. I. B. Tauris, 1987.
- De la conformism .., 2008 – *De la conformism la frondă: politica externă a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej*, Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Romania, //150 de ani de diplomație românească modernă (1862 - 2012), Arhiva diplomatică, <https://www.mae.ro/node/15028?page=4> (pristupljeno / accessed 26/02/2021).
- Final Report .., 2006 – *Raport final – Comisia Prezidentala pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania*, ed. Vladimir Tismăneanu, et al, București [Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, Edited by Vladimir Tismăneanu, et al., Bucharest], 2006, http://old.presidency.ro/static/rapoarte/Raport_final_CPADCR.pdf (pristupljeno / accessed 25/02/2021).
- Herța 2011 – Laura Herța, *Relațiile Româno-Iugoslave în perioada 1950-1970, doktorska disertacija (rukopis) / Ph.D. dissertation (manuscript)*, Facultatea de studii Europene Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca, 2011. https://doctorat.ubbcluj.ro/sustinerea_publica/rezumat/2011/istorie/HERTA_LAURA_RO.pdf (pristupljeno / accessed 03/07/2021).
- Ionescu 1994 – Ghiță Ionescu, *Comunismul în România*, traducere de Ion Stanciu, București: Litera, 1994.
- Jones, Kevill, Day 1985 – Peter Jones; Siân Kevill; Alan John Day, *China and the Soviet Union 1949-84*, Longman, 1985.
- Lambro 2013 – Steliu Lambro, *Comunism versus comunism – conflictul româno-iugoslav*, https://www.rii.ro/ro_ro/comunism_versus_comunism_conflictul_romano_iugoslav-3045 (pristupljeno / accessed 31/05/2021).
- Moscow and Eastern Europe..., 2017 – *Москва и Восточная Европа. Советско-югославский конфликт и страны советского блока. 1948–1953 гг. Очерки истории*, Ред. Т. В. Волокитина, Л. С. Аникеев М.; СПб.: Нестор-История. [Moscow and Eastern Europe. The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict and the countries of the Soviet bloc. 1948-1953 History Essays, T. V. Volokitina, L. S. Anikeev (ed.), М.; SPb.: Nestor-History.], 2017.
- Opriș 2012 – Petre Opriș, *Reorganizarea Armatei Române, La începutul anilor '60, în Armata Română și Societatea Civilă*, în Studii și comunicări prezentate la sesiunea științifică dedicată Zilei Arhivelor Militare și aniversării a 92 de ani de la înființarea Centrului de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Istorice și a 145 de ani de la înființarea Serviciului Istoric al Armatei, Ed. Istros, Pitești, 2012.
- Rajake 2004 – Svetozar Rajake, *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, 1953-1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation*, Phd Thesis, University of London, 2004.
- Resis 1978 – Albert Resis, *The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement on the Balkans*, Moscow, October 1944, *The American Historical Review*, 83/2, 1978, 368–387.
- Scurtu 2010 – Ioan Scurtu, *Istoria Românilor de la Carol I la Nicolae Ceaușescu*, București: Mica Valahie, 2010.
- Soviet Encyclopedia 1979 – *Conferences of the Communist and Workers Parties*, The following article is from The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1979), <https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Conferences+of+the+Communist+and+Workers+Parties> (pristupljeno / accessed 31/05/2021).
- Steele 2008 – Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations. Self-Identity and the IR State*, London – New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Stykalin 2017 – Александр Стыкалин. Хрущев — Тито: траектории космических и идейных спутников, [Aleksandr Stykalin. Khrushchev – Tito: trajectories of space and ideological satellites], <http://russophile.ru/2017/10/08/хрущев-тито-траектории-космических-и/> (pristupljeno / accessed 15/04/2021).

Șerban 2018 – Alexandra Șerban, *Planul de comunizare a României: cele zece porunci din martie 1945*, <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/planul-de-comunizare-a-romaniei-cele-zece-porunci-din-martie-1945> (pristupljeno / accessed 06/07/2021).

Valev 1964 – E. B. Valev, "Problemele dezvoltării economice a raioanelor dunărene din România, Bulgaria și U.R.S.S.", în *Viața Economică*, Anul 2, nr. 24 (43), București, 1964.

Verona 1992 – Sergiu Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy. Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1992.

Zbucea 2001 – Gheorghe Zbucea, *Istoria Iugoslaviei*, București: Corint, 2001.