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Review article

THE THREAT OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION CRISIS: INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER AND SOCIAL RECEPTION

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Abstract

A significant part of the crisis of our contemporary European societies can be attributed to misplaced and abused religious zeal in various forms of religious fundamentalism, both domestically grown as well as imported and shared by immigrants to Europe from Third World countries. To deal with this complex phenomenon in the European environment, it is necessary to conceive the analysis of the presented issue into a sociological scheme based on three premises: (1) diagnosis of migration processes in the context of growing population movements in Europe, (2) identification of determinants and factors that cause these movements, as well as (3) a proposal to solve

the current situation in the spirit of social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. Our paper is an attempt to interpret and compare the opinions of selected experts on this sensitive issue and, with the help of their opinions, to present some guiding ideas on a path to possible solutions to the current situation. We begin by describing the ideological deconstruction of the moral and cultural world as evidenced in the postmodern society, accompanied by processes of subjectivization and individualization, which acquired a societal context in Europe and North America in the 1960s. We then turn to exploring the context of religious change (from a theological-sociological perspective). The religiosity of postmodern man becomes a *mixture* of various *correct*, albeit often contradictory, discontinuous elements, involving a small dose of love for one's neighbour, often taking the form of friendly affection and showing emotions towards animals and the external environment, ideologically correct psychology as well as parapsychology, supplemented by esoteric, occult and astrological notions, while staying open to the possibility of Eastern philosophies and sects. Islamic fundamentalism is seen as a reaction to this religious-cultural context that is perceived (by conservative Muslims and Christians alike) as hostile to traditional values, ideas about the world, and ideals. The context of contemporary Islam's influence on the European religious landscape and culture is scrutinized in the next section of our article. In Europe, the number of Christians will fall from 74.5 percent to 65.2 percent between 2010 and 2050, while the number of non-believers (nones) will increase from 18.8 percent to 23.3 percent, and the number of Muslims will also almost double from 5.9 percent to 10.2 percent. The growth of Muslims in Europe will be affected by both birth rates and migration. A part of our critical analysis points to self-destructive tendencies of some European elites and cultural influencers/policy makers. After outlining some forecasts and developments, and offering initial critical views on the transpiring phenomena, we move on to delineating possible solutions to this situation. Due to the complexity of the problem, there is no ready-made, simple way to handle this situation. While immigrants have always played an important role in the European history, a growing number of political scientists talk in particular about the internal protection of Europe, that is, the inevitability of protecting its constitutive, fundamental values and rights. If Europe is not to lose its face and cultural/moral fibre, it is important to uphold its constitutive values. This will not be possible without an intentional struggle to reinvent its moral and spiritual heritage with every new generation without forfeiting the fundamentals upon which our culture and civilization has been built. The concluding section of our article focuses on the Catholic Church's position on this issue and its recent proposals for resolving the migration crisis. The Church teaches that state officials and others who profess Christianity but reject refugees are hypocrites because Jesus would accept these people should be balanced by a critical call to be aware that our obligation to love and care for our neighbour extends not only to the immigrants and their families but also to the families and individuals of the European host countries. Our fear of Islamization of the Christian Europe may be an indication that we Europeans have very little confidence in our own faith. Accordingly, we will not be able to preserve the Christian faith by living it secluded in our churches, but by presenting our Christian spirit – by accepting these refugees and by helping them in

their concrete circumstances, and by engaging them (as well as our secular counterparts) publicly with due respect in an open-ended discourse of metanarratives.

Keywords: migrant crisis, European religious landscape, Islamization, religious fundamentalism, demographic revolution

Introduction

In spite of remarkable scientific and technological developments, the contemporary world has found itself in the abyss of international conflicts, religious terrorism coupled with a growing threat of Islamization founded on selected misinterpreted chapters of the Qur'an – trends that threaten to destroy and abuse human dignity and the value heritage of the Western world. As stated above, much of the current crisis can be attributed to misplaced and abused religious zeal in various forms of religious fundamentalism. As Pope Francis argues: »Indeed, religious fundamentalism, even before it destroys human beings by committing horrific massacres, rejects God himself, reducing him to a mere ideological excuse. This unjust aggression, which also affects Christians and other ethnic and religious groups in the region, such as the Yazidis, requires a unanimous response that will halt the spread of violence under international law, re-establish harmony and heal the deep wounds that have triggered conflicts«.¹ Yet, religious fundamentalism has roots not only in religion itself, but also in the intricate web of socio-economic relations and local cultural dynamics. To deal with this complex phenomenon in the European environment, it is therefore necessary to conceive the analysis of the presented issue into a sociological scheme based on three premises: (1) diagnosis of migration processes in the context of growing population movements in Europe, (2) identification of determinants and factors that cause these movements, as well as (3) a proposal to solve the current situation in the spirit of social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.

We have at our disposal various statistics and diagnostics for the current situation of migration crisis in Europe, but what we need now is a viable solution to the situation. Our article is an attempt to interpret and compare the opinions of selected experts on this sensitive issue and, with the help of their opinions, to present some guiding ideas on the path to possible solutions to the current situation. We will focus, in particular, on the views and attitudes

¹ Pope FRANCIS, *The Threat of Fundamentalism*, Radio Vatican (13. I. 2020.), <http://sk.radiovaticana.va/articolo.asp?c=843513> (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

of selected political scientists, university professors and representatives of the Church. Our ambition is not to provide a complex, conclusive solution but rather a solution proposal that will stimulate further discussion and inspire scholars within as well as *outside* the Church.

1. Context of the Second Demographic Revolution: body culture in the trajectory of social change in the Modern Era

The ideological deconstruction of the moral and cultural world of the post-modern society is accompanied by processes of subjectivization and individualization, which acquired a societal context in Europe and North America in the 1960s. The underlying purpose of these changes was to elevate the position of the individual and his subjectivity above any tradition, institution, objective truth or moral norm. Of course, a similar situation has persisted since modern times, but it was not until the dawn of the postmodern era that the individual radically opposed tradition, moral norms or institutions.² The subjectivism of the individual has been elevated above all objective reality that surrounds us. In accordance with the assumptions of subjectivism, man is understood as an intrinsically good, harmonious and non-conflicting being. The human individual conceived of in this way usurps the attributes of God, determining the norms and values that govern his daily behaviour and life. His subjective beliefs, emotional experiences and efforts are always right, justified and most important, with qualified exceptions pertaining to psychopaths and other *unsound* minds. The subjectivity of a given person, his individual »I«, becomes the highest and sometimes the only norm of thinking, behaviour, and meaningfulness. From the perspective of postmodern man, one no longer must, nor can one take into account and be guided by the observation of objective facts and determinants, as such endeavour is unwarranted and often abused by those in power. From this follows that one does not even need to make a logical analysis of one's own behaviour because any system of logic employed might in the end be found as oppressive. Subjective beliefs, subjective conscience, the desire for immediate experience and paranormal experience become intuitively normative human thinking and behaviour.³

² Cf. Leila B. OMAROVA – Aydar M. KALIMULLIN – Ludmila Yu. GRUDTSINA – Andrey V. KORZHUEV – Maria Ye. ZHUKOVA, *Philosophical Anthropology in Postmodernism*, in: *Xlinguae*, 11 (2018) 3, 76.

³ Cf. Leon SZOT, *Ruch hospicyjny w rozwoju postaw społecznych*, in: *Wypalenie zawodowe pracowników służb społecznych*. Ed. T. Zbyrad, Stalowa Wola, 2008, 151–167. See also:

In addition, we see the once clear distinction between good and evil fading against the ever more fragmented moral vision of humans.⁴ Postmodernism transforms the immutable, transcendence-shaped objectivity into intersubjectivity (i.e., as a result of social consensus). Consequently, moral norms become not only the subject of social debate, but also its creation.⁵ Gradually, this leads to ethical relativism. This relativism, even ethical permissiveness, have freed man from his traditional certainties and led to autonomy. All this gives impetus to a very bold use, even exploitation, of earthly reality, and ultimately leads to the belief that it is possible to rule over it. Man believed that he could rule not only over the world of nature, as was thought at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, but also over human nature. And because it has such tools at its disposal, it only needs consent in order to use and exercise this power. Therefore, freedom began to be emphasized as a property and a fundamental right of the human person. According to postmodernists, it is necessary to care for freedom, rejecting the absolute truth that would restrict human behaviour.⁶

The current crisis of individual identity on the European continent is the result of the dominant humanistic anthropology, which has been inspired by the philosophical utopian vision of J. J. Rousseau and psychological ideas of C. Rogers. In this vision, the main qualities of man are: the body (instincts), subjective beliefs and the emotional sphere. Humanists typically claim that man is born internally harmonious, non-conflicting, balanced, far removed from any weakness and imperfection. Therefore, he does not need to work on himself, discipline, or moral norms. This type of humanistic anthropology is a vision that reduces man and forgets the moral, spiritual, religious, social side, the sphere of love and responsibility.⁷ It is in fact a naive utopia because it

Marek Dziewiecki, *Ponowoczesność – człowiek – wychowanie*, http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/I/ID/ponowoczesnosc_wychowanie.html (originally published: 25. VIII. 2012).

⁴ Cf. Robert PETKOVSEK, *Theology Facing the Challenges of the Modern Anthropological Crisis: Preamble of the Apostolic Constitution Veritatis Gaudium*, in: *Bogoslovni Vestnik*, 79 (2019) 1, 17–31.

⁵ Cf. Paweł GRYGIEL, *W stronę niewidzialnego? O religijności młodzieży końca wieku*, in: *Katolicyzm polski na przełomie wieków mity, rzeczywistości, obawy, nadzieje*. Poznań, 2000, 236; Leon SZOT, *Pojem a otázka súčasnej religiosity*, in: *Nové náboženské hnutia, sekty a alternatívna spiritualita v kontexte postmodernity*. Ed. K. Kardis, M. Kardis, Prešov, 2010, 191–199.

⁶ Cf. Zigmund BAUMAN, *Czy istnieje postmodernistyczna socjologia*, in: *Współczesne teorie socjologiczne II*. Ed. A. Jasińska-Kania et al., Warszawa, 2006, 789–802.

⁷ Cf. Shugyla DUANAIEVA – Yerzhan KALMAKAN – Amrekuł ABUOV – Shuga ABEUOVA – Tolen BARAKBAYEVA, *Religious Determinant of a Person's Value – Emotional Sphere*, in: *Xlinguae*, 13 (2020) 3, 22.

does not take into account the basic, self-evident empirical fact that it is easier for man to do evil than good and that only man is a being (an animal is not capable of that) who is capable of harming himself. The consequence of the accepted vision of man is also the dominant pedagogical utopia penetrating Western Europe and creeping into the more conservative European societies in the East, which seeks to promote spontaneous self-realization, and education without stress and limitations, which is thought to be worldview-neutral and sterile.⁸

This cultural coup is described by the German sociologist Gabriela Kuby as an attempt to create an autonomous, manipulable, controllable person. This experiment is accompanied by the following ideologies:

- Malthusianism⁹ – derived with the idea of reducing the world's population, which is said to be growing faster than food production. Malthus states: »A man who is born into an already occupied world and his family has no means of subsistence or society does not need his work, such a person has not the slightest right to demand any share of food and is really redundant on earth. It is not at all covered for him at a great feast of nature. Nature commands him to resign, and he cannot carry out this command on his own – whether through illness, misery and death, or the worldwide efforts of population controllers where natural decimation is not enough«. ¹⁰
- Eugenics – comes from the idea of creating a perfect society and humanity through the application of the principles of Social Darwinism and removal in various ways (gas chambers, euthanasia, abortion, hormonal abortion pills) from the society of weaker races, intermediates and malignant, elements/persons who are deemed undesirable for a perfect society – such as the old or disabled people.
- Influential personalities who, with their ideas and methods, sought a total deconstruction of social reality.

⁸ Cf. Thi Thanh Quy TRUONG, *The Importance of Personality in the Context of Human Education: Global Experience and Vietnamese Philosophical Perspectives*, in: *XLinguae*, 12 (2019) 4, 192–211.

⁹ Anglican priest Thomas R. Malthus (1766–1834) is the author of a speculative 'population law,' according to which natural disasters and induced disasters (such as famine) alike are necessary to prevent the human population explosion that would overcrowd the planet. For a critical analysis of this view, Cf. Gabriele KUBY, *Globálna sexuálna revolúcia*. Bratislava, 2013, 38.

¹⁰ Cf. Gabriele KUBY, *Globálna sexuálna revolúcia*. Bratislava, 2013, 38–39.

- Communism – as an ideology of evil that sought to destroy the family as a natural institution of social life, as well as religion, the only source of unchanging and absolute truth in order to create on earth a kind of utopian paradise and classless society.
- Feminism – as an ideology and movement that seeks to break the natural relationship of love between a man and a woman and free the woman from the »slavery« of marriage and motherhood.¹¹
- Radical versions of the homosexual movement that seek to challenge the family model based on the heterosexual union of a man and a woman as a unique community of love essential for an integral development of the child. This ideology (with substantial financial resources and supported by several political parties as well as media influence) that accompanies the activities of these movements seeks to present the traditional family as something outdated, a source of pathology and violence. Under the guise of preventing domestic violence, tyranny and child abuse, these movements wish to dismantle the traditional institution of heterosexual marriage, substituting it with alternative ways of cohabitation.¹² As stated by prominent Slovak sociologist Jozef Matulník, we observe frequent tendencies »to recognize various other forms of cohabitation as new and often preferred models of family. It has become fashionable to speak of the need for a »plurality of family forms«. This misleading label (in the spirit of the deconstruction of the value system, according to which the abnormal and once considered deviant is now referred to as an alternative form of cohabitation)¹³ is accompanied by the effort to reinterpret the very essence of family as a natural institution of social life, based on the marriage of a man and a woman, a community of love characterized by mutual devotion, fidelity and trust.¹⁴

To summarize, the goal of the postmodern »new morality« is one's self-fulfilment as opposed to striving for virtues, developing one's potential in altruistic endeavours, or complying with a higher purpose (as understood either

¹¹ Cf. Gabriele KUBY, *Globálna sexuálna revolúcia*. Bratislava, 2013, 38–40.

¹² Cf. Gabriele KUBY, *Globálna sexuálna revolúcia*. Bratislava, 2013, 38.

¹³ Cf. Pavol TOMANEK – Katarina VALCOVA – Gabriel PALA – Nigina S. BABIEVA – Nina I. KRYUKOVA – Dinara G. VASBIEVA, Abortion and Euthanasia as Threats to Traditional Family a Comparative Case Study on Slovakia and the Russian Federation, in: *European Journal of Science and Theology*, 15 (2019) 5, 49–66.

¹⁴ Cf. Jozef MATULNÍK, *Oslabenie rodiny v súčasnosti na Slovensku*, (13.I.2019), <http://www.mostykrodine.sk/mosty5.pdf>. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

in secular or religious terms) that leads to self-transcendence.¹⁵ The community and the state now serve the individual, not vice versa. The tension between the original »higher purpose« morality and the contemporary »self-fulfilment«, »non-violence« morality seems to be the main driver of current culture wars in Europe.

1. The context of religious change

The context presented above and the sketched trajectory of sociocultural change correlate with religious change. The religiosity of postmodern man becomes a *mixture* of various *correct*, albeit often contradictory, discontinuous elements. It involves a small dose of love for one's neighbour (especially towards those who are famous and rich at the moment, or also in relation to sexual subcultures, and all this is done under the blanket of tolerance and respect for human rights), often taking the form of friendly affection and showing emotions towards animals and the external environment (forgetting, however, the protection of man and his internal environment),¹⁶ ideologically correct psychology (inspired in particular by such figures as C. Rogers), as well as parapsychology, supplemented by esoteric, occult and astrological notions. And it is this context that opens the possibility for Eastern philosophies and sects that emanate from them to gain foothold in a traditionally Judeo-Christian environment. Part of the appeal of these new movements and sects can be traced to human curiosity – they offer something different, something new that has not been known so far.¹⁷

Such a shift in perception and moral outlook has brought significant consequences for the life of the society. There seems to be no viable possibility to clearly identify and emphasize good and evil, because human individuals in their freedom each determine these categories themselves.¹⁸ Both personal and collective religiosity, therefore, became an axiological choice and an individual decision.¹⁹

¹⁵ Cf. Branko KLUN, Transcendencja, samo-transcendencja in časovnost: fenomenološki razmisleki, in: *Bogoslovni vestnik*, 77 (2017) 3/4, 503–516.

¹⁶ Cf. Eva Vymetalova Hrabakova – Peter Kondrla – Vera K. Vlasova – Svetlana V. Dmitrichenkova – Olga V. Pashanova, Human as the protector of creation, in: *Xlinguae*, 13 (2020) 3, 13.

¹⁷ Cf. Marek DZIEWIECKI, *Wizja człowieka według gejów*, http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/P/PS/md_wizjag.html. (Accessed 22. XII. 2018).

¹⁸ Cf. Karl MONGRAIN, Anxiety or Equanimity: Christoph Schönborn and Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Relationship of Science and Christian Truth, in: *Theologos*, 19 (2017) 2, 34–48.

¹⁹ Cf. Janusz MARIĄŃSKI, *Kościół w warunkach radykalnych zmian społecznych*, in: *Metodologiczne problemy badań nad religijnością*. Eds. J. Mariański, S. Zareba. Ząbki, 2002, 22.

This does not mean, however, that religiosity is waning globally. According to P. Berger, the present world is as religious as it has ever been before, and perhaps more so. Paradoxically, secularization in a pluralistic society leads not only to the marginalization of religion, but also to religious and spiritual revitalization. In this context, French sociologist Gilles Kepel points to the ascending re-Christianization, re-Judaization, and re-Islamization. We observe a certain nostalgia for the religiosity of the past, more traditional societies, regardless of the level of technological and scientific advancements.²⁰

In recent years, there has been a deprivatization of religion, which has been taking place not only in Third World countries but also in modern Western societies. Gradually, there has been a growing number of new religious movements, imported from the East and various others, that promote spiritual renewal or renewal of the spirit, stimulated by the perceived threat of materialism and consumerism of the present world. Immigrants from Third World countries also bring their own religious ideas. An example is the presence of Islam in Western Europe, which causes social tensions and conflicts (most notably in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). Ultimately, there are open interfaith disputes over the religious ideas of the true faith and its implementation in practice, with mutual accusations of imperialism. This phenomenon sometimes leads to armed conflicts and terrorism.²¹ Since the 1950s, the political-religious leaders of the so-called »sleeping Islam« have taken over and unleashed a massive wave of Islamic religiosity. Newly revived Islam has thus channeled immigrants to Europe to solidify the newly established Islamic communities and their way of life.

These religiously newly revitalized communities (Muslim, Jewish, Christian or others) are often labelled as fundamentalist, and, therefore, inherently dangerous. Such view, however, is too simplistic and more often than not unjustified. The term fundamentalism was first used by American Protestants, who began to call themselves fundamentalists in the first decades of the 20th century. They wanted to differentiate themselves from the distorted faith of more liberal Protestants. They tended to point to an ideal past, which they then contrasted with the bankrupt present. The so-called fundamentalists rejected moral compromises and critical (and very often disrespectful and

²⁰ Cf. Peter BERGER, *Náboženství a globální občanská společnost*, in: *Náboženství v globální občanské společnosti*, J. Hanuš and J. Vybíral (eds.), Brno, 2008, 9.

²¹ Cf. Zdenek NEŠPOR – Dušan LUŽNÝ, *Sociologie náboženství*, Praha, 2007, 141–143; Mahmood AHMAD, *Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization: Islam's Quest for Global Participation*, in: *Globalization*, 5 (2005) 2, 1–13.

deconstructionist) interpretation of sacred texts. They proclaimed the return to Scripture as the only basis of all renewal of religious communities and the larger society. In a sense, fundamentalism has been a reaction to mediocre personal piety, growing doubt in the truth of religion and defence against modernism. Fundamentalists fear that modernism with all its advances in science and technology is ruining their religious beliefs and moral principles, which they consider to be as the only correct. The term fundamentalism later began to be used to refer to reform movements in other world religions. Hence, there is fundamentalism in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and even Hinduism, Buddhism, or Sikhism. All fundamentalists, whether Christian, Muslim or otherwise, are convinced that only their faith is true, while all other religious or non-religious beliefs are false.²²

Fundamentalism in the Islamic context is also referred to as Islamism. It has become a general term related to a wide array of political movements, encompassing the whole spectrum of radical and moderate political and intellectual groups. The first fundamentalist tendencies appeared in Islamic society during the controversy over the succession of the Prophet Muhammad, and this resulted in a religious schism and the division of believers into the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam.²³

The fundamental beliefs of Islamism (as a radicalized version of Islam) overlap with many of the beliefs of more moderate versions of Islam. Existing differences can be derived from its specific conception of God's sovereignty and the application of God's authority in the person's life and the earthly realm in general. Politically, it demands God's rule (hákimíja) and rejects what it calls paganism (džahilíja). Naturally, such theocratic outlook has no place for democracy of any sort, that is, any idea that power rests in the people being governed. Secular state must therefore be rejected, and Muslims are invited to embark on a journey of cleansing and spiritual submission. Islamism offers a meticulously prescribed lifestyle and a way of thinking pretending to be directly inspired/instructed by the divine revelation in the sacred Scripture.

Due to terrorist suicide attacks in the recent decades, however, Islamic fundamentalism has been considered a real threat in the general consciousness of the European populace. In a changed historical context, fundamentalists have been trying to organize a state so that it reflects Islamic values. Islamic fundamentalists tend to describe little about the particular system they

²² Cf. M. ELSER – S. EWALD – G. MURRER, *Encyklopedie náboženství*, Kostelní Vydří, 1997, 125; 296.

²³ Cf. Luboš KROPÁČEK, *Islámský fundamentalismus*, Praha, 1996, 72.

are heading for. In principle, however, they reject liberal democracy because, according to them, it is incompatible with Islam. A state can be legitimate only if a government of God is established with the full application of Sharia (Islamic law).

However, this context does not only apply to Islam as such. The tendency towards fundamentalism also appears against the background of the new religiosity. Conservative, orthodox and traditionalist movements of various types have been emerging, which refuse to compromise with some of the newly emerging principles and values of the (post)modern era.²⁴ In the context of the growing unrest resulting from the substantial changes that have taken place in recent decades, they emphasize one thing: any misery of mankind is the result of secularization and the rejection of the absolute truth contained in the sacred texts. Therefore, the only salvation for the corrupt world is to return to the realization of sacred religious norms in both individual and public life. Religious law is higher than secular law.²⁵

A diverse array of renewal movements within traditional religions emphasize the need to protect traditional ethical-moral and socio-cultural values. On the other hand, their efforts seem to be directed against what they perceive as a cultural imperialism of the United States and Western Europe. These movements then purport to offer a viable response to modernity and its dangerous consequences. The context for the emergence of these movements was the situation prevailing in the countries of the Third World, the Eastern Bloc and the Euro-American area. The decline of the Marxist system and model revealed the notorious »homo Sovieticus«, detached from God, a religion left to itself, its only authority being the party and utopian notions of materialistic paradise on earth. Thus degraded, impoverished and deprived of the meaning and purpose of life, man began to seek meaning and purpose in new religious movements that offered a black and white image of the world, a quick, effective and easy solution to problems and answers to his most important existential questions.²⁶

Within the above-mentioned renewal movements, the following directions and characteristics can be identified:

²⁴ Cf. J. L. SCHLEGEL, Nowa religijność Zachodu, in: *Encyklopedia religii świata*, F. Lenoir (ed.), Warszawa, 2369–2375. See also: Peter BERGER, Náboženství a globální občanská společnost, in: *Náboženství v globální občanské společnosti*, J. Hanuš and J. Vybíral (eds.), Brno, 2008, 9–22.

²⁵ Cf. G. KEPPEL, Pobudzenie religijne i niepokoje polityczne u progu XXI wieku, in: *Encyklopedia religii świata*, F. Lenoir (ed.), Warszawa, 2002, 2417–2425.

²⁶ Cf. Zdeněk NEŠPOR – Dušan LUŽNÝ, *Sociologie náboženstva*, Praha, 2007, 142–143.

- 1) opposition to certain strands of progressive liberalism and its value system, promoted by secular institutions, as well as a qualified refusal to compromise with it;
- 2) by questioning and rejecting secularization, understood as an attempt to eliminate religion and weaken its influence on various spheres of society promoting thereby the trend of privatization of religion;
- 3) the restoration of traditional religious contexts, truths and values, as opposed to new religious movements that adapt to modern and consumer society.²⁷

Religion, in the context of the mentioned characteristics, is understood as the only right and real institution, which is the guarantee and guarantor of truth, justice and order, integrity in a society permeated by axiological chaos and injustice, unchecked consumption and egoism. Secularism as an ideology presents a worldview that rejects the existence of the sacrum, absolute truth and values.²⁸ With its scientific-technical mentality, it reduces man to a purely biological, bodily being, whose sole goal is to ensure his individual and material values, selfish interests, and biological reproduction.²⁹ The referenced conservative, orthodox and traditionalist movements (evangelical movements in the Protestant Church, religious conversions and renewal movements in the Catholic Church, religious revival in the Orthodox Church, religious revitalization in Islam, Judaism, Indian religions) take a negative and critical attitude in relation to the consequences of modernity, namely (1) rationalization, (2) differentiation, (3) individualization and (4) economism.³⁰ Some researchers point out that these movements tend to reject the world. In this way, they become attractive, on the one hand, to people who do not cope with the demands of society and are excluded, marginalized on its margins. On the other hand, the operation of these movements addresses people from the so-called subcultures, social groups that create specific values and norms different from the values of most of society.³¹

²⁷ Cf. Zdeněk NEŠPOR – Dušan LUŽNÝ, *Sociologie náboženstva*, Praha, 2007, 308; Zdeněk NEŠPOR, *Mezináboženský dialog*, <http://www.socioweb.cz/index.php?disp=temata&shw=182&lst=115> (7. III. 2018).

²⁸ Cf. Eberhard SCHOCKENHOFF, On the ethos of theology: A Science of faith between the Church and Secular society, in: *Bogoslovni Vestnik*, 74 (2014) 1, 7–28.

²⁹ Cf. David VÁCLAVÍK et al., *Příručka sociologie náboženstva*, Praha, 2008, 309; Zdeněk NEŠPOR – Dušan LUŽNÝ, *Sociologie náboženstva*, Praha, 2007, 144.

³⁰ Cf. Kamil KARDIS, *Základy sociologie*, Prešov, 2009, 74.

³¹ Cf. David VÁCLAVÍK et al., *Příručka sociologie náboženstva*, Praha, 2008, 309.

1.1. *The context of Islam*

At the turn of the millennium, up to 20 percent of the world's population professed the Islamic religious tradition. The percentage of Muslims will continue to rise as a result of the population explosion within their communities and is expected to slightly exceed the proportion of Christians after 2050, reaching around 30 percent. The Muslim population worldwide will grow by as much as 73 percent from the current 1.6 to 2.76 billion between 2010 and 2050. It will reach the number of Christians, who will grow by a small margin from 2.17 billion to 2.92 billion, likely remaining the largest religion until about 2050. However, if current trends continue, Muslims will catch up with Christians in 2070 and then overtake them as they continue to grow. Islam will thus become the world's most widespread religion. In 2100, Christianity is expected to account for 34.9 percent to 33.8 percent of the world's population.³²

According to the forecasts of American professor Philip Jenkins, the number of Muslims in Europe will have tripled by the year 2100, which means that one in four Europeans will be Muslim. The dynamic growth of the Muslim population in Europe has been a matter of the last 50 years in Western Europe. Muslims began to come to Europe (mostly Western countries, such as Germany, France, the UK) for work and began to settle there. Their integration in the European societies has been challenging due to various factors on both sides of the equation (i.e., on the side of the home majority as well as the immigrant minorities). If not resolved properly, these tensions and contentions will likely prove even more difficult to deal with given a growing population of Muslims in the host societies.³³

In Europe, the number of Christians will fall from 74.5 percent to 65.2 percent between 2010 and 2050, while the number of non-believers (nones) will increase from 18.8 percent to 23.3 percent, and the number of Muslims will also almost double from 5.9 percent to 10.2 percent. The growth of Muslims in Europe will be affected by both birth rates and migration. As much as 53 percent of the growth of the Muslim population can be attributed to migration. The main reasons are also the number of Muslim youth and the higher birth rate.³⁴ The available data shows that if the current demographic development of Muslims continues, the Islamization of the West will soon become irreversible.

³² The source is available at: <http://historyweb.dennikn.sk/clanky/detail/povod-islamskeho-fundamentalizmu#WFKmeebhDIV>.

³³ Cf. Mária POLIAKOVÁ, *Vybrané problémy zo štúdia judaizmu a islamu*, Prešov, 2011.

³⁴ The birth rate among Muslims in Europe is 2.1 compared to the European average of 1.6.

Of the 51 foreign terrorist organizations on the US Department of State's list, 38 are predominantly Muslim, ideologically Islamist. The ReligionOfPeace.com website monitors terrorist attacks after 9/11 and reports that there were as many as 25,000 attacks (each killing at least one person). The BBC, in collaboration with King's College, counted what they had labelled jihadist violent attacks in a single month, November 2014, and found that there were 664 of them, killing 5,042 people. Opinion polls show that most Muslims reject murderous acts as perpetrated by the ISIS fighters. But the minority of Muslims who do not reject terrorism is not negligible.³⁵ Nevertheless, a substantial majority of intellectuals, politicians, businessmen and ordinary believers in the Islamic environment consider radical Islamism an unacceptable concept. Gallup's research a few months after 9/11 in nine predominantly Muslim countries found that a great majority in most of them considered the attack »totally unjustifiable.« However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia did not even allow such a question to be asked in public opinion polls, probably out of fear of what they might uncover.

At present, modern industrial societies such as the United States, Canada, European countries, Australia and New Zealand are characterized by a relatively high proportion of immigrants to the domestic population, and – given the low birth rate of the indigenous population in these societies – the tendency (at least in Europe and politically) is to promote immigration. In this context, Van de Kaa notes that for some countries of the Old Continent (specifically Western Europe), it is the influx of immigrants that protects their countries from declining populations, safeguarding their future economic prosperity.³⁶ Let us add that, according to the UN Population Division, more than 82 million immigrants currently live in Europe, followed by Northern America with 59 million immigrants.³⁷ Dirk J. van de Kaa further emphasizes that »the influx of immigrants has had an extremely great influence on the ethnic, racial, cultural and linguistic composition of the structure of many European populations,«³⁸ adding that »Multicultural Europe is already

³⁵ Cf. Joshua MURAVCHIK, Allahu akbar! Alebo: Moze islam vrazdit?, in: *Postoj.sk* [online] (16. XI. 2015), <https://www.postoj.sk/8473/allahu-akbar-alebo-moze-islam-vrazdit>.

³⁶ Cf. Joshua MURAVCHIK, Allahu akbar! Alebo: Moze islam vrazdit?, in: *Postoj.sk* [online] (16. XI. 2015), <https://www.postoj.sk/8473/allahu-akbar-alebo-moze-islam-vrazdit>.

³⁷ Cf. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: The number of international migrants reaches 272 million, continuing an upward trend in all world regions, says UN, New York, (17. IX. 2019), <https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/international-migrant-stock-2019.html>.

³⁸ Cf. Dirk J. van de Kaa, *Europe's Second Demographic Transition*, in: *Population Bulletin*, 42 (1987) 1, 41.

a reality.«³⁹ However, it should be noted that the structure of immigrants in Europe is quite uneven: Northern, but particularly Western and Southern Europe, have significantly more immigrants than the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. According to van de Kaa, however, there is an assumption that as the economic situation in these countries gradually improves, they will become more and more attractive for immigrants.⁴⁰ Slovenia might serve as a good example here. The immigration rate here is currently comparable to Western European countries.

Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) further states that in the early 1990s, two thirds of immigrants to Europe were Muslims, suggesting that Europe's immigration problems are primarily Muslim immigration problems.⁴¹ More specifically, Huntington cites surveys according to which more than 1.5 million Turks lived in Germany in 1990 and 4 million Muslims lived in France alone. The total number of Muslims in Europe in 1990 was 13 million.⁴²

In one of his studies, Dirk J. van de Kaa also describes the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants in Europe. It is typical for immigrants that: (a) the number of men usually exceeds the number of women, (b) they have high birth rates⁴³ and mortality rates, and (c) by default they profess a religion other than the majority domestic society.⁴⁴ From the above-mentioned characteristics of immigrants, their high birth rate undoubtedly comes to the fore. Huntington picks up on this with the following comment: »Migrants have high fertility rates and hence account for most future population growth in Western societies. As a result, Westerners increasingly fear 'that they are now being invaded not by armies and tanks but by migrants who speak other languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures, and, they fear, will take their jobs, occupy their land, live off the welfare system, and threaten

³⁹ Cf. Dirk J. van de Kaa, *Europe's Second Demographic Transition*, in: *Population Bulletin*, 42 (1987) 1, 43.

⁴⁰ Cf. Dirk J. van de Kaa, *The Idea of Second Demographic Transition in Industrialized Countries*, Tokyo, 2002, 22–23.

⁴¹ Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Střet civilizací. Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu*, Praha, 2001, 235.

⁴² Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Střet civilizací. Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu*, Praha, 2001, 235.

⁴³ Let us add that the Turks (living mainly in Germany) have the highest birth rate among immigrants in Europe, namely 3.7 – 4.5 children per woman. Cf. Dirk J. van de Kaa, *Europe's Second Demographic Transition*, in: *Population Bulletin*, 42 (1987) 1, 43.

⁴⁴ Cf. Dirk J. van de Kaa, *Europe's Second Demographic Transition*, in: *Population Bulletin*, 42 (1987) 1, 42–44.

their way of life.’⁴⁵ Huntington prophetically warns that that the overall situation of social, cultural and moral decay »then leads to the stage of invasion ‘when the civilization, no longer able to defend itself because it is no longer willing to defend itself, lies wide open to ‘barbarian invaders,’ who often come from ‘another, younger, more powerful civilization.’⁴⁶

As numerous Muslim communities (such as Turkish in Germany or Algerian in France) have not internalized Western culture – and thus not integrated into European societies – Europeans have developed a markedly hostile attitude towards immigrants. This was convincingly confirmed by sociological research. In the cited book, S. P. Huntington presents the results of two such studies: »In 1990, 76 percent of the French public thought there were too many Arabs in France, 46 percent too many blacks, 40 percent too many Asians, and 24 percent too many Jews. In 1994, 47 percent of Germans said they would prefer not to have Arabs living in their neighbourhoods, 39 percent did not want Poles, 36 percent Turks, and 22 percent Jews.... Public opposition to immigration and hostility toward immigrants manifested itself at the extreme in acts of violence against immigrant communities and individuals, which particularly became an issue in Germany in the early 1990s.«⁴⁷ A growing number of incidents against immigrants in Europe is indicative of continuing deterioration of the situation. Huntington offers an incisive, provocative comment in this regard: »The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.«⁴⁸ The negative demographic trends in the postmodern Western world are already implicitly testified by the titles of some books, on which we focus in this work, for example, *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization* by Patrick J. Buchanan (2001). In this context, Mark Stein notes that »we are experiencing a remarkable period of self-destruction of a culture that (...) has shaped the modern world.«⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Střet civilizací. Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu*, Praha, 2001, 235.

⁴⁶ Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Střet civilizací. Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu*, Praha, 2001, 265.

⁴⁷ Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Střet civilizací. Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu*, Praha, 2001, 236.

⁴⁸ Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Střet civilizací. Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu*, Praha, 2001, 259. For an analysis of the situation in the USA with relation to Mexican immigrants, see: Patrick J. Buchanan, *Smrt Západu. Jak vymírání obyvatel a invaze přistěhovalců ohrožují naši zemi a civilizaci*, Praha, 2004, 175–176.

⁴⁹ Cf. M. Steyn, *Taková je demografie, hlupáci*, Praha, 1996, 10.

Patrick J. Buchanan goes even further in his analysis when he compares the demographic consequences of the current birth rate in Russia to the number of people murdered in the communist Soviet Union under Stalin: »With a birth rate of 1.35 children per woman, the Russian population will fall from 147 million to 114 million by 2050, a greater loss than the 30 million deaths attributed to Stalin.«⁵⁰ In one of his works, Dirk J. van de Kaa even states that the possibility of the demise of European culture and civilization and its replacement by other cultures and civilizations is already being discussed openly in the social discourse of society.⁵¹

Thus, it is no wonder that the question pertaining the integration and social reception of immigrants stimulates heated debates in the West. The silent majority among the Muslims which fails to decisively reject and condemn religiously induced violence against non-Muslims contributes to the general sense of uneasiness among the Europeans. Based on the Pew Research Center's results, as well as other surveys targeting the issue of European immigrants and religious relations, only in Germany a significant majority of Muslims rejected violence against civilians. In France, Spain and the United Kingdom, Pew found that 15–16 percent of respondents agreed *often* or *sometimes* to such violence. In France, another 19 percent answered *rarely*, meaning that more than a third of French Muslims support such violence, at least occasionally. About 20 percent of Muslims in the world approve of terror *sometimes* or *often*, which represents about 300 million people, and another 15 percent *rarely*, which is about 500 million Muslims.⁵² The fundamentalism of Islamic radicals hence seems to be qualitatively different from most of the current fundamentalists from Judaism or Christianity. We can argue that Islamic religious fundamentalism does not allow free thinking, nor does it tolerate freedom of speech, which makes it clearly incompatible with the principles and ideals of Western democracy. In addition, its propensity to violence makes it a dangerously destabilizing social and political phenomenon.

Muslim countries are characterized by authoritarian, centralized power, which allows only limited freedom of speech and citizens' activities (especially if they are critical of the ruling power). In addition, Sharia law is imposed on

⁵⁰ Cf. Patrick J. Buchanan, *Smrt Západu. Jak vymírání obyvatel a invaze přistěhovalců ohrožují naši zemi a civilizaci*, Praha, 2004, 40–41.

⁵¹ Cf. Dirk J. van de Kaa, Europe and Its Population: The Long View, in: *European Populations: Unity in Diversity*, Dordrecht, 1999, 33.

⁵² Cf. Joshua MURAVCHIK, Allahu akbar! Alebo: Moze islam vrazdit?, in: *Postoj.sk* [online] (16. XI. 2015), <https://www.postoj.sk/8473/allahu-akbar-alebo-moze-islam-vrazdit> (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

the society without exceptions. Islam does not recognize any democratic equality, nor any cohabitation with members of other religions, nor with unbelievers governed by the principle of equality. Furthermore, it also does not recognize the separation of religious and political matters. Political order and religion have the same sacral significance. Theories of human rights and equality are at best an expression of weakness for the majority of Islamic teachers.⁵³

The question of whether it is possible to apply Sharia, Islamic law in the West, where Muslims are still only a minority, has drawn much attention lately. The European Union has had a clear approach to this problem until now. Any requirements for the application of Islamic law must respect freedom and equality as fundamental principles, which can no longer be waived. It follows that if Islamic law contradicts European values, Muslim believers will not be allowed to promote their own values. It is not possible to invoke anti-discrimination laws to promote one's own interests while at the same time upholding gender inequality and demanding restrictions on freedom of expression.⁵⁴

2. Prognosis

»The problem of humanity in the next millennium will not be racism, but fundamentalism, which is the political and social AIDS of today. Europe's declining and decadent culture is unable to resist Islam.«⁵⁵

To be able to address the current situation in Europe (pertaining to migration) adequately, it would be helpful to focus on forecasting and examining how the situation in Europe may develop in the future decades based on the available sociological data. Of course, there are many possible development scenarios, but we will focus mainly on those whose origins are currently visible.

Firstly, we can observe the split between the Western states of Europe and the states of the Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary), which lies in their basic attitudes towards migrants. While the Eastern European countries have been closing themselves off from migrants, the Western ones have been open to them until now. However, we can already see a certain shift in this area. In an interview on the migration crisis, political scientist Josef Mlejnek stated as follows: »Attitudes towards the migration crisis are changing within Germany and the rejection of the approach taken by the Visegrad

⁵³ Cf. Mária POLIAKOVÁ, *Vybrané problémy zo štúdia judaizmu a islamu*, Prešov, 2011.

⁵⁴ Cf. Jarmila DROZDÍKOVÁ, *Lexikón islamu*, Bratislava, 2005, 51–52.

⁵⁵ Cf. Hammudah ABDALATI, *Islam in Focus*, American Trust Publications, 1993, https://www.muslim-library.com/dl/books/English_Islam_In_Focus.pdf (Accessed 20. IV. 2020).

Four states is becoming more frequent on the political scene of the old member states.«⁵⁶ As he further explains, the prevailing view in Germany is that migration should be curtailed, as the country will soon no longer be able to absorb more migrants. From this, Mlejnek concludes that the division between Eastern and Western Europe could be reduced, because once the capacities of the Western states are filled, it can be assumed that they will not criticize Hungary for its position from autumn 2015.⁵⁷

As for the Western states, in particular France and Germany, political scientist Jacques Rupnik says: »The original (European Union) project was based on Franco-German reconciliation and would not have been possible without the two. This is not to say that it is enough for France to reach an agreement with Germany and to do so. It is true, however, that the two states are so different that when they find a way out of a problem, most will join such a solution.«⁵⁸ Nevertheless, he immediately points out that if this does not happen and the states do not find a common solution, as at present the agreement of the elites is not enough, then the nation-states will return. And the small states, the states of Eastern Europe, which are closing their borders to migrants, will suffer the most because of this.⁵⁹

The importance of European unity in connection with its development is crucial, as Mlejnek pointed out. His forecast of the future development is rather chilling: »If millions of people roll into Europe and Europe fails to integrate them, it could lead to the European Union being torn apart. The danger is not just in the wave of migration as such, but in the fact that, under its influence, European states are quarrelling and no solution is found.«⁶⁰ We should also

⁵⁶ Cf. David DANIEL, *Politológ Mlejnek odhaduje ďalšie dianie v Európskej únii. Hrozbu nie sú iba imigranti*, (22. III. 2020.), <http://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/politologovia/Politolog-Mlejnek-odhaduje-dalsie-dianie-v-Europskej-unii-Hrozbu-nie-su-iba-imigranti-260916>. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

⁵⁷ Cf. David DANIEL, *Politológ Mlejnek odhaduje ďalšie dianie v Európskej únii. Hrozbu nie sú iba imigranti*, (22. III. 2020.), <http://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/politologovia/Politolog-Mlejnek-odhaduje-dalsie-dianie-v-Europskej-unii-Hrozbu-nie-su-iba-imigranti-260916>. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

⁵⁸ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (Accessed 22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzujte-nase-podminky-20151219.html. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

⁵⁹ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzujte-nase-podminky-20151219.html. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

⁶⁰ Cf. David DANIEL, *Politológ Mlejnek odhaduje ďalšie dianie v Európskej únii. Hrozbu nie sú iba imigranti*, (22. III. 2020.), <http://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/politologovia/>

realize that some parties are using this situation to their advantage: »We are rediscovering the concept of the nation-state, drawing out increasingly coarser and vulgar expressions. Politicians are using the migration crisis to escalate tensions.«⁶¹ As this author points out, an atmosphere of uncertainty and threat is created for one's own success by providing protection for one's own people. Such actions only irritate society, exacerbate tensions and make finding a solution even more difficult.⁶²

Finally, it is necessary to draw attention to another line of development, which is pointed out by the professor of sociology at the University of Amsterdam, Hein de Haas. Professor de Haas says that such a rich society, which has developed in Europe, naturally attracts thousands of migrants for a vision of a better life. Migrants who come here for economic reasons are also attracted by the labour market and the vision of wealth.⁶³ »These societies inevitably attract migrants, and if you close their doors to them, we know what will happen – more smuggling, more illegal migration, because there are no legal ways to cope with the demand for work.«⁶⁴ Professor de Haas warns us that closing borders could pose even more problems, as we would indirectly encourage illegal migration and smuggling, because whether or not we close borders, society in Europe will still attract people from countries affected by poverty or war.⁶⁵

Politolog-Mlejnek-odhaduje-dalsie-dianie-v-Europskej-unii-Hrozbou-nie-su-iba-imi-granti-260916. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

⁶¹ Cf. Jozef KASZONYI, *Migračná kríza ešte stále má riešenie (I)*, in: *Dennik SME*, (12. VIII. 2020), <https://dennikn.sk/blog/utecenecka-kriza-mohla-mat-riesenie-i/> (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁶² Cf. Jozef KASZONYI, *Migračná kríza ešte stále má riešenie (I)*, in: *Dennik SME*, (12. VIII. 2020), <https://dennikn.sk/blog/utecenecka-kriza-mohla-mat-riesenie-i/> (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁶³ Cf. Nick ROBINS-EARLY, *Why The Debate Over Europe's Migration Crisis Is Full Of Myths. An Interview With Migration Expert Hein de Haas*, in: *Huffington Post*, (12. VIII. 2020), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe-migrant-crisis-myths-facts_us_55df64e5e4b08dc09486d510. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁶⁴ Cf. Nick ROBINS-EARLY, *Why The Debate Over Europe's Migration Crisis Is Full Of Myths. An Interview With Migration Expert Hein de Haas*, in: *Huffington Post*, (12. VIII. 2020), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe-migrant-crisis-myths-facts_us_55df64e5e4b08dc09486d510. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁶⁵ Cf. Nick ROBINS-EARLY, *Why The Debate Over Europe's Migration Crisis Is Full Of Myths. An Interview With Migration Expert Hein de Haas*, in: *Huffington Post*, (12. VIII. 2020), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe-migrant-crisis-myths-facts_us_55df64e5e4b08dc09486d510. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

3. Towards a viable solution to the present situation

After outlining some forecasts and developments, we would now like to move on to the possible solutions to this situation. As complex as this problem is, so is its solution, therefore we cannot expect to find a ready-made, simple way to handle this situation. At the outset, we wish to interpret the views of two political scientists on the so-called solution to the situation that is has been promoted in parts of Europe as of late – the quota system. Mlejnek argues the following: »So far, quotas have not worked at all, their whole mechanism does not work, and it is probably difficult for anyone to start another debate about it. Therefore, I do not expect the EU to try to push quotas again, and if this should happen, it will be accompanied by strong measures to seal the borders.«⁶⁶ On the contrary, Czech political scientist, Oskar Krejčí, stated in an interview for the weekly magazine *Hospodarske noviny* (Economic Magazine) that he still gives this system hope if their mathematical-political meaning changes – i.e., if they are understood as a relative value from an unknown number and not an absolute value from a hitherto known number. We should also admit that the representatives of the Visegrad Four were right when they had pointed out another problem with quotas – that even if we accommodated a certain number of migrants in a certain area, it would not take away their desire to go to another country at some later point in time (most notably to Germany). Krejčí also considers Germany's statement about the number of refugees they are about to receive to be a mistake.⁶⁷ »Berlin de facto invited contemporary migrants to head towards this promised land [i.e., Germany].«⁶⁸ Such statements do not promote the case for quotas. The quota system, as Mlejnek reminds us, has not worked so far, which is why we need look elsewhere for solution.⁶⁹ Failure to admit this will lead to rising anxieties stemming from a general

⁶⁶ Cf. David DANIEL, *Politológ Mlejnek odhaduje ďalšie dianie v Európskej únii. Hrozbou nie sú iba imigranti*, (22. III. 2020), <http://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/politologovia/Politolog-Mlejnek-odhaduje-dalsie-dianie-v-Europskej-unii-Hrozbou-nie-su-iba-imi-granti-260916>. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

⁶⁷ Cf. Oskar KREJČÍ, *Exkluzívne v HN: Nemecká kríza Európskej únie*, (10. VIII. 2020), <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/566338-exkluzivne-v-hn-nemecka-kriza-europskej-unie>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁶⁸ Cf. Oskar KREJČÍ, *Exkluzívne v HN: Nemecká kríza Európskej únie*, (10. VIII. 2020), <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/566338-exkluzivne-v-hn-nemecka-kriza-europskej-unie>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁶⁹ Cf. David DANIEL, *Politológ Mlejnek odhaduje ďalšie dianie v Európskej únii. Hrozbou nie sú iba imigranti*, (22. III. 2020), <http://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/politologovia/Politolog-Mlejnek-odhaduje-dalsie-dianie-v-Europskej-unii-Hrozbou-nie-su-iba-imi-granti-260916>. (Accessed 20. V. 2020).

sense of insecurity among the Europeans if Shengen is not respected, as Rupnik shows in the example of Germany, which has invited migrants across its border. The ensuing widespread uncertainty benefits irresponsible populist politicians and populist parties such as Marine Le Pen National Front, the Swedish Democrats, and many others across Europe.⁷⁰

On a more balanced note, Rupnik also reminds us that »migrants are an integral part of European history. The average for the last 25 years is one and a half million immigrants a year; Europe has never been an impregnable fortress. Now the situation is unusual due to the concentration of many people in one time period.«⁷¹ A growing number of political scientists talk in particular about the internal protection of Europe, that is, the protection of its values. Petr Robejšek, Czech political scientist, says that it is essential to protect European values, because so far politicians have only spoken about them pathetically. He says that these values are not as natural as breathing, they evolve according to the population that either upholds and cherishes them, or neglects and ignores them. Therefore, if Europe is not to lose its face and cultural/moral fibre, it is important to uphold its constitutive values. This will not be possible without an intentional struggle to reinvent its moral and spiritual heritage with every new generation without forfeiting the fundamentals upon which our culture and civilization have been built.

In one of his studies, Rupnik notices that many people are afraid of the Islamization of our society and culture if we admit migrants here. He lists the example of Viktor Orban whose solution aimed at »protecting European civilization« includes closing its borders. However, the legitimacy and efficacy of this solution are highly questionable. We can argue that if we were really able to articulate and cultivate our inner values, the so-called European values, we should not be afraid of losing or changing our culture by the newly arrived immigrants. They would namely arrive in a healthy environment with a robust sense of cultural and moral identity – an environment which is not afraid to be confronted with new views and competing moral narratives.⁷² European host

⁷⁰ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzuje-nase-podminky-20151219.html (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷¹ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzuje-nase-podminky-20151219.html (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷² Cf. Jacques RUPNIK, *The Other Europe*, (12. VIII. 2020), <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-09-11-rupnik-en.html>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

countries do not need to be apologetic about their socio-cultural and religious landscapes and core values. Rupnik states his conviction clearly in this regard: »We must tell them [immigrants] clearly at the outset that these are our European values. And whoever wants to integrate and live here with us must respect them.«⁷³ On the subject of integration, he also points out that there are many migrants in Europe who have integrated seamlessly, live here, work, their children go to our schools. Nonetheless, there will always be a group that does not want to integrate. At the end of the article, he talks about Europe as a peace project that we must try to sustain. From the outset, the European Union was the result of reconciliation and the result of efforts to end any military conflict in Europe. Rupnik reminds us that it required great courage from its founders, because at the beginning this plan did not appear with great hope of success. We are thus bound to approach the current problem with relentless hope in an effort to maintain this peace, even though it does not always look promising.⁷⁴

What we question, however, is the intentionality and seriousness with which the contemporary European institutions and politicians approach the issue of European values. While values are being addressed in the European documents and, we may even argue, that the trend has recently been to emphasize these more than before, »these values are not specified in any way for migrants; in essence, the notion of human rights, which is enshrined in the Union documents, is appealed to, as is the general notion of solidarity within the European Union, and the emphasis on humanity and charity. This appeal is so abstract that it conflicts with practical politics and necessarily provokes new tragedies.«⁷⁵ Krejčí criticizes European countries for misunderstanding migration problems. According to him, any solution will be predicated upon a self-critical realization that these problems are not located at the German or Schengen border. The main problem has to do with phenomena that expel people from their original homes in their home countries.⁷⁶ What is appealing

⁷³ Cf. Jacques RUPNIK, *The Other Europe*, (12. VIII. 2020), <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-09-11-rupnik-en.html>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷⁴ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzuje-nase-podminky-20151219.html (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷⁵ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzuje-nase-podminky-20151219.html (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷⁶ Cf. Oskar KREJČÍ, *Exkluzivne v HN: Nemecká kríza Európskej únie*, (10. VIII. 2020), <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/566338-exkluzivne-v-hn-nemecka-kriza-europskej-unie>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

with this author is that he has been looking for the real essence of this crisis and turns our attention to solving its roots rather than merely focusing on ameliorating the symptoms. This, of course, does not mean that we should not be talking about managing the influx of migrants or integrating migrants who are already in Europe.

Syed Kamall, a Member of the European Parliament, says that it is very important to distinguish between people fleeing from a political regime and people driven out by their economic circumstances. While it is our moral duty to help, Europe cannot become a destination for all people who are simply looking for a better life. According to him, it is important to follow the rules, to follow the Dublin Accord.⁷⁷ On the other hand, Francois De Smet, director of the Belgian Centre for Migration, says that we should not send economic migrants away either. De Smet argues that we can solve this crisis with only two parallel programmes: one that includes continental asylum policy for people fleeing a political system or war, but on the other hand we should have a system of registration and integration for people who came here looking for work and open to them a labour market with offers at all levels. De Smet also asserts that it would be appropriate to build a system that would allow asylum seekers to be registered from home, thereby preventing smuggling and further chaos when migrants arrive in Greece, Italy, etc.⁷⁸

These are all partial solutions to a big and complex problem, as we have outlined at the beginning. However, two things are especially important: to help and to keep one's own integrity (or, one's own face). This was also stated by Jacques Rupnik in response to the direct question of resolving this crisis: »We must lend a helping hand to the drowning person, this is an elementary matter, a moral and legal obligation. The right to asylum exists, but its rules must be respected, not only Shengen but also Dublin must be respected. In addition, we must make it clear to the refugees who we are and under which conditions they can stay with us. If you are fleeing the terror of the Islamic State or Assad's militias, welcome but abide by our laws and customs.«⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Cf. POLITICO, *How to Solve Europe's Migration Crisis*, (22. VIII. 2020.), <http://www.politico.eu/article/solve-migration-crisis-europe-schengen/>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷⁸ Cf. POLITICO, *How to Solve Europe's Migration Crisis*, (22. VIII. 2020.), <http://www.politico.eu/article/solve-migration-crisis-europe-schengen/>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁷⁹ Cf. Kateřina PERKNEROVÁ, *Politolog Jacques Rupnik uprchlíkům: Vítejte u nás, ale dodržujte naše podmínky*, (22. VI. 2020), http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/politolog-jacques-rupnik-uprchlikum-vitejte-u-nas-ale-dodrzuje-nase-podminky-20151219.html (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

Conclusion: the Church's stance

In this section, we would like to focus on the position of the Catholic Church on this issue and its recent proposals for resolving the migration crisis. A clear position on this matter is often presented by the Pope, which is why we find fewer divisions here (although they certainly exist) than we see among secular experts. Pope Francis has made it clear that all those who reject refugees and close the door to those who seek asylum should ask God for forgiveness.⁸⁰ State officials and others who profess Christianity but reject refugees are hypocrites because Jesus would accept these people, as the Bible says, Christians should »receive pilgrims.«⁸¹ Rich Stearns concurs and adds: »Instead of turning away from Syrian refugees in fear, we must see in them the wonderful opportunity to show the love of Jesus.«⁸²

While such statements are theologically and ethically difficult to dispute, from a traditional, biblical-Christian perspective, we are fully aware that our obligation to love and care for our neighbour extends not only to the immigrants and their families, but also to the families and individuals of the European host countries.⁸³ The Pope responds to this challenge by reminding us that »the current wave of migration seems to undermine the foundations of the humanitarian spirit that Europe has always loved and protected.« He further expresses his conviction that »Europe can find a middle ground between two responsibilities: protecting domestic rights and providing assistance and reception for migrants.«⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Cf. Arijeta LAJKA, *Pope Francis Says Those Who Deny Migrants Should Ask God for Forgiveness*, (22. VIII. 2020), <https://news.vice.com/article/pope-francis-says-those-who-deny-migrants-should-ask-god-for-forgiveness>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸¹ Cf. Julie ROYS, *Is There Only One Christian Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis?* (21. VIII. 2020), <http://www.christianpost.com/news/syrian-refugee-crisis-christian-response-migrants-fleeing-isis-150477/#qDbprB1XW0rQI4BV.99>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸² Cf. Julie ROYS, *Is There Only One Christian Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis?* (21. VIII. 2020), <http://www.christianpost.com/news/syrian-refugee-crisis-christian-response-migrants-fleeing-isis-150477/#qDbprB1XW0rQI4BV.99> (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸³ Cf. Julie ROYS, *Is There Only One Christian Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis?* (21. VIII. 2020), <http://www.christianpost.com/news/syrian-refugee-crisis-christian-response-migrants-fleeing-isis-150477/#qDbprB1XW0rQI4BV.99> (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸⁴ Cf. THE GUARDIAN, *Pope Francis calls for bold response to migration crisis*, (20. VIII. 2020.), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/11/pope-francis-migration-crisis-europe-refugees>. For a useful study on this topic from a Czech perspective, see: Pavel HOŠEK, *Czech Church and Secular Society: The Challenge of Islam*, in: *Church and Society: Towards Responsible Engagement*, Lubomir M. ONDRASEK and Ivan MODOROSÍ (eds.), Ružomberok, 2015, 285–299.

This means that the Church, in spite of all criticism or problems, stands behind the view of lending a helping hand. Pope John Paul II had already called on people not to remain indifferent to migrants but to be in solidarity with them and to stay open.⁸⁵ He was succeeded by Benedict XVI with a similar challenge, when he pointed out that »the Nazarene family itself (Jesus, the Virgin Mary, St. Joseph) was for some time a refugee family who found asylum in Egypt, where they had to flee from the cruelty of power.«⁸⁶ Finally, the current Pope has come up with the term »church without borders« meaning »a church that spreads a culture of acceptance and solidarity in the world.«⁸⁷ The Pope constantly reminds us that we should see Jesus in every refugee. »Jesus Christ is still waiting to know him in migrants and refugees, in the fugitives and exiles, and even so he calls us to share our resources and sometimes to also give up some of the goods we have acquired.«⁸⁸ The answers from the Church's point of view to the questions concerning this crisis were also presented by the Archbishop of Vienna, Mons. Schonbrunn, in an interview with the magazine *Týždeň* (one of the most influential magazines in Slovakia). He said that the Judeo-Christian tradition of caring for refugees is essential to the nature and mission of the Church. He also pointed out that »we have all signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms. And yet, here we face the basic human right of a person who is in danger to be accepted, regardless of religion, age or race.«⁸⁹ On the question of the Islamization of Christian Europe, he suggested that we Europeans have very little confidence in our own faith and that is why we are afraid of Islamization. Accordingly, we will not be able to preserve the Christian faith by living it secluded in our churches, but by presenting our Christian spirit – by accepting these refugees and by helping them in their concrete circumstances.⁹⁰ When reflecting on the sensi-

⁸⁵ Cf. Marian BALÁZS, *Migračná kríza a kresťanstvo: výzvy a podnety pápežov*, (20. VIII. 2020), <http://marianbalazs.sk/migracna-kriza-a-krestanstvo-vyzvy-a-podnety-papezov/>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸⁶ Cf. Marian BALÁZS, *Migračná kríza a kresťanstvo: výzvy a podnety pápežov*, (20. VIII. 2020), <http://marianbalazs.sk/migracna-kriza-a-krestanstvo-vyzvy-a-podnety-papezov/>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸⁷ Cf. Marian BALÁZS, *Migračná kríza a kresťanstvo: výzvy a podnety pápežov*, (20. VIII. 2020), <http://marianbalazs.sk/migracna-kriza-a-krestanstvo-vyzvy-a-podnety-papezov/>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸⁸ Cf. Marian BALÁZS, *Migračná kríza a kresťanstvo: výzvy a podnety pápežov*, (20. VIII. 2020), <http://marianbalazs.sk/migracna-kriza-a-krestanstvo-vyzvy-a-podnety-papezov/>. (Accessed 20. IX. 2020).

⁸⁹ Cf. Štefan HRÍB – Anton VYDRA, *Čo sa to, prosím vás, stalo?*, in: *Týždeň*, 7 (2015) 51, 22.

⁹⁰ Cf. Štefan HRÍB – Anton VYDRA, *Čo sa to, prosím vás, stalo?*, in: *Týždeň*, 7 (2015) 51, 22.

tive issue of terrorism, Mons. Schonbrunn concedes that »there are terrorists among the immigrants« but asks incisively whether »anyone really thinks that a person planning a terrorist attack would be allowed to come in a rubber boat on a stormy sea? In danger of life? Those who planned the attacks in Paris did not come in rubber boats. Terrorism is a global problem.«⁹¹ In his concluding remarks on the question of migration, Schonbrunn pointed out that the message of the Gospel has not changed. It is always consistent, powerful, and it is always an inspiration for renewal.⁹² The Gospel, not bureaucracy. We need bureaucracy, but the Gospel makes the difference. Its message, summed up in Jesus' words in the Gospel, is addressed to all people, not just Christians: »I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me a drink, I was a wayfarer and you hugged me.«⁹³

The Church's role, however, extends far beyond feeding the hungry and caring for the disadvantaged. Latest research in the field of sociology of religion indicates that we should no longer cling to the established axiom that chaos, destruction and terrorism arise primarily among the socially excluded and disadvantaged. »No one can immerse himself in description of the consciously perpetrated horrors of the twentieth century without recognizing, first, that such evil was perpetrated in large part by the well-socialized and obedient,«⁹⁴ as Peterson rightly argues. Extremism and terrorism are spawned not only in socially deprived environments but also in the contexts of a broader cultural and existential alienation. Yes, the Church should look for ways of helping the immigrants in their immediate needs but then also go beyond »to facilitate immigrants' religiosity in such a way that it may serve as a 'bridge', helping immigrants in the integration process in Europe's highly secularized environment. If increased religiosity continues to serve primarily as a 'buffer,' i.e. a protective cushion to mitigate the effects of social exclusion, discrimination, and overall cultural alienation, tensions will likely continue rising among immigrants and natives.«⁹⁵ Roy may be right in his incisive conclusion that »Islam is the mirror in which Europe is looking at its own identity,« because, as

⁹¹ Cf. Štefan HRÍB – Anton VYDRA, Čo sa to, prosím vás, stalo?, in: *Týždeň*, 7 (2015) 51, 22.

⁹² This point has been argued by many theologians. For a recent compelling argument, see: L. SZEWCZYK, Preaching the word of God in a secularised community, in: *Theologos*, 19 (2017) 2, 88–89.

⁹³ Cf. Štefan HRÍB – Anton VYDRA, Čo sa to, prosím vás, stalo?, in: *Týždeň*, 7 (2015) 51, 25.

⁹⁴ Cf. Jordan PETERSON, *Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief*, New York – London, 352.

⁹⁵ Cf. Michal VALČO, Immigration and the Future Religious Landscape of Europe, in: *Theologos*, 22 (2020) 1, 51–52.

we can legitimately argue, »the debate in the West is not between Islamic and Western values, but within the West: 'What are Western values?«⁹⁶

This question points us to yet another important issue. Once we determine what the constitutive values of our civilization are, we must figure out ways to cultivate them and employ them in social practice as well as in actions and deliberations of individual moral subjects. Church representatives should not be shy to argue that it is precisely in closely knit local communities where desired values become internalized and practiced as virtues in day-to-day human interactions, as well as through participation in the local group's rituals, narratives and behavioural patterns. Religion, if conceived properly, plays an indispensable role in cultivating civic engagement⁹⁷ (i.e., civic virtues) and fostering social responsibility and altruism. It is important to realize the true potential of religion and, in our case, Christianity here. Its metanarrative setting,⁹⁸ cultic and cultural rituals, moral norms exemplified and embodied in influential community leaders (past and present) and practiced in acts of charity and compassion comprise a rich and comprehensive tradition (in MacIntyrean sense)⁹⁹ that shapes moral characters and life visions of its members. We are therefore convinced that policy makers, Church representatives and intellectuals in general ought to reject the Enlightenment project »of creating a universal, context-free morality...« As Jonathan Haidt correctly observes, »cultures that have shared values and rich traditions invariably generate a framework in which people can value and evaluate each other. ... Strip away all identity and context, however, and there is little to grab on to. How much can you say about the virtues of a generalized Homo sapiens, floating in space with no particular sex, age, occupation, or culture?«¹⁰⁰ Thus, our task and

⁹⁶ Cf. Olivier ROY, *Islam in the West or Western Islam? The disconnect of religion and culture*, in: *Hedgehog Review*, 8 (2006), 1/2, 132.

⁹⁷ Cf. Bojan ŽALEC – Martina PAVLIKOVA, *Civic virtues and functions of religion in public life*, in: *European Journal of Science and Theology*, 15 (2019) 6, 75–84.

⁹⁸ A good study on the importance of metaethics (or metanarrative ethics) for applied ethics was recently published by Marian AMBROZY, *Regarding the intersection of metaethics and applied ethics*, in: *XLinguae*, 13 (2020) 3, 255.

⁹⁹ In his seminal work *After Virtue*, MacIntyre argues for the constitutiveness of what he calls a » living tradition« for the moral starting point (character) of persons: »I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. (...) A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.« Alasdair MACINTYRE, *After virtue: A study in moral theory* (Third Edition), Notre Dame, 2007, 222.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Jonathan HAIDT, *The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science*, London, 2006, 166–167.

opportunity is to build on the latest research in developmental and positive psychology, emphasizing the fundamental and indispensable role of a robust moral context or, in MacIntyre's words, living tradition, for the life vision and moral character of people living our (post)secular societies.

Naturally, the Church is not in the position to impose its teaching or overall vision of life (based on the Trinitarian metanarrative of the creation, redemption and final renewal of the world by its sovereign and benevolent Creator) on the secular society. This, however, does not mean relinquishing one's voice in the public arena. Commenting on Charles Taylor's ground-breaking *A Secular Age*, Bojan Zalec rightly reminds us that »The secular age¹⁰¹ is an age in which no »views« are firm, neither of believers nor of unbelievers, theists or atheists.« This means, among other things, that all of us are to learn with a penetrating uncertainty that we »can be wrong and that [our] belief or unbelief can be false. Upon such intellectual and experiential background, the questions about belief and religion become very relevant.«¹⁰² This fundamental epistemological uncertainty should not scare us (Christians) as we enter an open public discourse in our (post)secular age. Rather, it should invigorate us to bear witness based on *weak ontology* in an open competition with secular ideologies and philosophies to give the most sensible, comprehensive, and viable (liveable) account of our world and our place in it. Jewish, Islamic, Christian (and other) scholars have an opportunity to engage in open-ended dialogues wherein competing metanarrative accounts of reality confirmed by tangible ethos of historically embodied living traditions of these religions can try to captivate human hearts, intellects, and imagination, while respecting the other's account as one that has a place in our society – providing mutual respect and fundamental human rights are upheld.

¹⁰¹ Žalec refers here to Taylor's secular – which we might rather label as post-secular, environment of late postmodernity.

¹⁰² Cf. Bojan ŽALEC, *Between Secularity and Post-Secularity: Critical Appraisal of Charles Taylor's Account*, in: *Bogoslovni Vestnik*, 79 (2019) 2, 422.

Sažetak

**PRIJETNJA RELIGIJSKOG FUNDAMENTALIZMA I EVROPSKA
IMIGRACIJSKA KRIZA: INSTITUCIONALNI TRANSFER I SOCIJALNA
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Značajan se dio krize naših suvremenih europskih društava može pripisati deplasiranom i zloupotrijebljenom vjerskom žaru u različitim oblicima religijskog fundamentalizma, kako domaćeg tako i uvezenog i dijeljenog od strane imigranta u Europu iz zemalja Trećeg svijeta. Za rješavanje ovog složenog fenomena u europskom okruženju potrebno je analizu prikazane problematike koncipirati u sociološku shemu temeljenu na tri premise: (1) dijagnozi migracijskih procesa u kontekstu rastućih kretanja stanovništva u Europi, (2)) utvrđivanju odrednica i čimbenika koji uzrokuju ova kretanja, kao i (3) prijedlogu rješavanja postojećeg stanja u duhu socijalnog nauka Rimokatoličke crkve. Naš je rad pokušaj da se protumače i usporede mišljenja odabranih stručnjaka o ovoj osjetljivoj problematici te da uz pomoć njihovih mišljenja iznesemo neke ideje vodilje na putu do mogućih rješenja postojećeg stanja. Počinjemo s opisom ideološke dekonstrukcije moralnog i kulturnog svijeta koja se očituje u postmodernom društvu,

praćenog procesima subjektivizacije i individualizacije, koji su u Europi i Sjevernoj Americi 1960-ih dobili društveni kontekst.

Potom se okrećemo istraživanju konteksta vjerskih promjena (iz teološko-sociološke perspektive). Religioznost postmodernog čovjeka postaje mješavina raznih ispravnih, premda često kontradiktornih, diskontinuiranih elemenata, koji uključuju malu dozu ljubavi prema bližnjemu, često poprimajući oblik prijateljske naklonosti i ispoljavanja emocija prema životinjama i vanjskom okruženju, ideološki ispravne psihologije kao kao i parapsihologije, nadopunjene ezoterijskim, okultnim i astrološkim pojmovima, dok ona ostaje otvorena za mogućnosti istočnjačkih filozofija i sekti. Islamski se fundamentalizam doživljava kao reakcija na ovaj vjersko-kulturni kontekst koji se (i od strane konzervativnih muslimana i kršćana) percipira kao neprijateljski prema tradicionalnim vrijednostima, idejama o svijetu i idealima. Kontekst utjecaja suvremenog islama na europski vjerski krajolik i kulturu pomno se razmatraju u sljedećem odjeljku našeg članka. U Europi će broj kršćana pasti sa 74,5 posto na 65,2 posto između 2010. i 2050. godine, dok će se broj neovjerujućih (nedeklariranih) povećati sa 18,8 posto na 23,3 posto, a broj muslimana također će se gotovo udvostručiti s 5,9 posto na 10,2 posto. Na rast muslimana u Europi utjecat će i natalitet i migracije. Dio naše kritičke analize ukazuje na autodestrukтивne tendencije nekih europskih elita i kulturnih utjecajal/kreatora politike. Nakon što iznesemo neke prognoze i razvoje, te ponudimo početne kritičke poglede na događaje koji se događaju, prelazimo na ocrtavanje mogućih rješenja za ovu situaciju. Zbog složenosti problema ne postoji gotov, jednostavan način rješavanja ove situacije. Dok su imigranti oduvijek igrali važnu ulogu u europskoj povijesti, sve veći broj politologa posebno govori o unutarnjoj zaštiti Europe, odnosno o neizbježnosti zaštite njezinih konstitutivnih, temeljnih vrijednosti i prava. Da Europa ne izgubi svoj obraz i kulturno/moralno tkivo, važno je podržati svoje konstitutivne i fundamentalne vrijednosti. To neće biti moguće bez namjerne borbe da se sa svakom novom generacijom iznova osmisli svoje moralno i duhovno naslijeđe, a da se pritom ne izgube temelji na kojima je izgrađena naša kultura i civilizacija. Završni dio našeg članka usredotočuje se na stav Katoličke crkve o ovom pitanju i njezine nedavne prijedloge za rješavanje migracijske krize.

Crkva uči da su državni dužnosnici i drugi koji ispovijedaju kršćanstvo ali odbacuju izbjeglice licemjeri jer bi Isus prihvatio te ljude, no taj stav valja uravnotežiti kritičkim pozivom da budemo svjesni da se naša obveza ljubavi i brige za bližnjega ne proteže samo na useljenike i njihove obitelji, veći i na obitelji i pojedince iz europskih zemalja domaćina. Naš strah od islamizacije kršćanske Europe može biti pokazatelj da mi Europljani imamo vrlo malo povjerenja u vlastitu vjeru. Sukladno tome, kršćansku vjeru nećemo moći sačuvati živeći je povučeno u svojim crkvama, nego predstavljanjem našeg kršćanskog duha – javnim prihvaćanjem tih izbjeglica i pomažući im u njihovim

konkretnim okolnostima, te njihovim angažmanom (kao i naših svjetovnih parnjaka) uz dužno poštovanje u otvorenom diskursu metanarativa.

Ključne riječi: migrantska kriza, europski religijski krajolik, islamizacija, religijski fundamentalizam, demografska revolucija

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