SOME NOTES ON EXPERIENCER CAUSATIVES AND DOM IN ROMANIAN

This paper focuses on object experiencer (OE) causatives in Romanian, identifying a less discussed pattern of variation. The results of a pilot study indicate that for a class of speakers such predicates are not grammatical with an indefinite object, if the latter is not differentially marked. A second class of speakers can accept unmarked objects but only if access to direct evidence of the event is available. As these restrictions set aside OE causatives from physical causatives, a non-trivial question refers to the nature of this difference. An analysis is proposed that revolves around a pragmatic distinction between OE verbs and physical causatives. More precisely, insights put forward by pragmatic investigations of OE verbs have consolidated the observation, which we follow here, that these types of predicates presuppose a perception event in which the object of the asserted event is a perceiver. We further propose that the perception presupposition can be established in the context either by differential object marking (DOM), which has an independently motivated sentience feature, or by direct evidence. Subsequently, we also show that an analysis along these lines gives better results when addressing these types of splits against more general interactions between causatives, inanimate subjects and DOM; under previous accounts, the facts under discussion are either unpredicted or not straightforward to derive.
1. Introduction

The main focus of this paper is a type of variation involving object experiencer (OE) causatives in Romanian. Although not previously discussed in descriptive and theoretical accounts, the split under investigation here revolves around the morpho-syntactic status of the object. More specifically, we will focus on two classes of speakers. For some speakers, structures with OE verbs are not well formed, if differential object marking (DOM) is not present on the object, as seen in (1). We label speakers with this restriction Class A speakers.

(1) Class A Speakers – OEs need obligatory differential object marking

Context: Out of the blue
Reclama *(îl) amuză *(pe) un trecător.¹
ad.DEF.F.SG CL.M.SG.3ACC amuses DOM a.M.SG pedestrian
‘The ad is amusing/amuses a pedestrian.’

A second class of speakers (Class B) allow an unmarked object but only under direct evidence, that is if the speaker is directly witnessing the event under discussion.

(2) Class B speakers – OEs and unmarked object but only under direct evidence

Context: Looking out the window and seeing a pedestrian laughing
Reclama amuză un trecător.
ad.DEF.F.SG amuses a.M.SG pedestrian
‘The ad is amusing a pedestrian.’ (and the event is directly witnessed)

For both classes of speakers OE causatives are different from regular physical causatives, as in (3), which are possible without differential marking in an out of the blue context.

¹ Abbreviations: ACC = accusative, CL = clitic, DAT = dative, DEF = definite, DOM = differential object marking, F = feminine, GEN = genitive, INF = infinitive, LOC = locative, M = masculine, N = neuter, NEG = negative, PL = plural, POSS = possessive, SG = singular, 1/2/3 = person.
(3) Physical causative

   Context: *Out of the blue* for both Class A and Class B speakers

   Reclama rănește un trecător.

   ad.DEF.F.SG injures a.M.SG pedestrian

   ‘The ad is injuring/injures a pedestrian.’

In this paper we address the following question: why is DOM or direct evidence obligatory with OE verbs, but not with physical causatives? The analysis we propose builds on two, independently motivated, ingredients: i) OE verbs, unlike physical causatives, presuppose a perception event in which the object of the asserted event is a perceiver, and thus must be sentient; ii) the sentience requirement can be satisfied in two ways: through differential marking (Class A) or through direct evidence (Class B).

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief background on Romanian DOM, its interaction with causative predicates, and the experimental set up. In Section 3 we address a special requirement of OE verbs, namely the presupposition of a perception event. Section 4 spells out the analysis we propose, while in Section 5 we provide some remarks about previous accounts of the interaction between DOM and causatives and the problems the Romanian data raise. Section 6 contains the conclusions.

2. Romanian causatives and DOM

2.1 Romanian DOM: a general background

As is well known, many Romance languages exhibit differential object marking (DOM) via an oblique marker (see especially Moravcsik 1974; Jaeggli 1982, 1986; Givón 1984; Bossong 1991, 1998; Torrego 1998; Cornilescu 2000; Lazard 2001; Aissen 2003; De Swart 2007; Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2007; Tigău 2011; López 2012; Ormazabal and Romero 2007, 2013; Manzini and Franco 2016; Hill and Mardale 2021, a. o.). DOM refers to splits in the morpho-syntactic encoding of objects, which are generally regulated by various traits, such as grammaticalized animacy, definiteness, specificity, etc. (Aissen 2003; Bossong 1991, 1998;

In Romanian, certain types of objects are differentially marked using a locative preposition, based on conjunctive sets of features, which normally include animacy (Farkas 1978; Dobrovie Sorin 1994; Cornilescu 2000; Mardale 2009, 2015; Tigău 2011; Hill 2013; Irimia 2020; Hill and Mardale 2021, among many others), as can be seen in the contrast below.

(4) Romanian

a.  Îl                       văd               pe             un      copil.
    CL.3M.SG.ACC            see.1SG          LOC=DOM   a.M.SG  child
    ‘I see a child.’

b.  (*Îl)                  văd               (*pe)         un      copac.
    CL.3M.SG.ACC            see.1SG          LOC=DOM   a.M.SG  tree
    Intended: ‘I see a tree.’

Despite their oblique appearance, such objects have accusative syntax; for example, they can be clitic doubled using the accusative form of the clitic, as in (4) a. The inanimate in (4)b, on the other hand, is not grammatical with differential marking and cannot be clitic doubled either.

2.2 Interactions between causatives and DOM

In both typological and formal accounts (Comrie 1981; Torrego 1998, a. o.) it has been shown that crucial, important insights into the nature of differentially marked objects come from their interaction with causatives. Romanian, however, exhibits a nuanced picture, which goes beyond current analyses, as further discussed in Section 5. Here we are interested in a puzzling split, which separates physical causatives (lovi ‘hit’, răni ‘hurt’, ucide ‘kill’, etc.) from object experiencer (OE) causatives (amuza ‘amuse’, înfuria ‘enrage’, etc.). The former allow unmarked objects, even if animates. OE verbs, however, result in ill-formedness for a class of speakers (Class A speakers), if their animate object is left unmarked. Another class of speakers (Class B speakers) allow unmarked objects with OE verbs, with a twist – an evidentiality restriction appears to be imposed.
More specifically, class B speakers mention that they can use unmarked nominals with OE verbs only if there is direct evidence of the eventuality – for example, in the context in which the speaker is directly witnessing the eventuality under discussion. The examples inserted below illustrate our core observation. First, a physical causative is well formed with an unmarked object, as in (5), for both Class A and Class B speakers. Secondly, an OE causative imposes restrictions: Class A speakers do not tolerate it without DOM on the object, as in (6), while Class B speakers tolerate an unmarked object only under direct evidence, as in (7).

(5) Physical causatives – DOM not obligatory

(Out of the blue context for both Class A and Class B speakers)

a. Furtuna a ucis/lăsat invalid un bătrân.
   storm.DEF.F.SG has killed/left invalid a.M.SG old man
   ‘The storm has killed/left invalid an old man.’

b. Furtuna l-a ucis/lăsat invalid pe un bătrân.
   storm.DEF.F.SG CL.M.3SG.ACC-has killed/left invalid LOC=DOM a.M.SG old man
   ‘The storm has killed/left invalid a (specific) old man.’

(6) Object experiencer (OE) causatives – DOM obligatory even under direct evidence

(Class A speakers)

a. ?? Reclama amuză un trecător.
   ad.DEF.F.SG a muse.3SG a.M.SG pedestrian
   Intended: ‘The ad amuses a pedestrian.’

b. Reclama îl amuză pe un trecător.
   ad.DEF.F.SG CL.M.SG.ACC amuse.3SG LOC=DOM a.M.SG pedestrian
   ‘The ad amuses a pedestrian.’

c. ?? Amenda a înfuriat un șofer.
   fine.DEF.F.SG has enraged a.M.SG driver
   Intended: ‘The fine has enraged a driver.’
d. Amenda l-a înfuriat pe un șofer.
  fine. DEF.F.SG CL.M.SG.ACC-has enraged LOC=DOM a.M.SG driver

‘The fine has enraged a driver.’

(7) Object experiencer (OE) causatives – DOM not obligatory, but direct evidence is necessary (Class B speakers)

a. Reclama amuză un trecător.
  ad.DEF.F.SG amuse.3SG a.M.SG pedestrian

Intended: ‘The ad amuses a pedestrian and I have direct evidence for this.’

b. Amenda a înfuriat un șofer.
  fine.DEF.F.SG has enraged a.M.SG driver

Intended: ‘The fine has enraged a driver and I have direct evidence for this.’

The examples we use in this paper are constructed with inanimate subjects (i.e., stimulus or causer). This is because predicates such as *amuse, enrage,* etc. are ambiguous between agentive and non-agentive readings when they have animate subjects. Only the non-agentive readings are OEs that have the restriction we are interested in. The same predicates with inanimate subjects are unambiguously OE verbs.

Our data come from a pilot study run on IbexFarm in the summer of 2021. The study had a 2x2 design with four conditions: 1) sentences with OE verbs and no DOM, as in (6)a; 2) sentences with OE verbs and DOM, as in (6)b; 3) sentences with physical causatives and no DOM, as in (5)a; and 4) sentences with physical causatives and DOM, as in (5)b. Participants (N = 9, recruited through social media) were asked to grade 6 sentences in each condition as natural or unnatural on the 7-point Likert scale (7 = most natural). The sentences were randomized. The study was within subjects with 1:1 filter:item ratio and included a practice session. The mean judgements for each condition are shown in Table 1 together with the judgments for grammatical and ungrammatical control sentences. For ungrammatical controls, we have used both syntactically ill-formed, as well as semantically anomalous structures.
Table 1: Results of the pilot study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mean judgments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OE verbs with no DOM</td>
<td>4.535714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE verbs with DOM</td>
<td>6.535714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical causative verbs with no DOM</td>
<td>6.071429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical causative verbs with DOM</td>
<td>6.535714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grammatical control</td>
<td>6.660714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ungrammatical control</td>
<td>1.214286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results do show the effects of the absence/presence of DOM with OE causatives, but they are not as robust as one might expect. To further investigate this outcome, we followed up the pilot study with individual discussions with some of the participants who accept OE causatives without DOM. It was during these focused discussions that the participants indicated the necessity of the evidential requirement in the absence of DOM. Therefore, we preliminarily divided the speakers into two classes, as discussed above; more rigorous testing, however, needs to be left for further investigation.

Given this background, the data present us with two questions: i) what blocks the presence of unmarked nominals with OE verbs for Class A speakers; ii) why is direct evidence obligatory with OE verbs for Class B speakers? In this paper we argue that these restrictions are due to pragmatic differences between physical causatives and OE verbs. In the next section we introduce an important characteristic of OE verbs that sets them apart from physical causatives.

3. OE verbs: presupposition of a perception event

OE verbs (a type of psych predicates) have been mostly studied from the syntactic and lexico-semantic points of view (see especially Grimshaw 1990; Pesetsky 1995, etc.). What is less discussed are the pragmatic aspects of these types of verbs, although the unique flavor of OE predicates is arguably tied to them. The intuition that OE verbs encode some kind of mental representation is present in all types of accounts, including those that postulate an unaccusative syntax (e.g., Belletti and Rizzi 1988; Grimshaw 1990), a causative one (Pesetsky 1987; Iwata 1995, a. o.), or a locative structure (e.g., Landau 2010). But to the best of our knowledge, this intuition has not been fully investigated, nor formalized.
In what follows, we present evidence that in addition to structural characteristics, OE verbs have pragmatic requirements that distinguish them from physical causatives and constitute an integral part of their construal. We present the evidence collected in Oyama (2003).

More specifically, this author argues that OE verbs have a two-way causal relation. The first direction of this causal relation assimilates them to physical causatives and is presumably associated with the truth-conditional content of the utterance. It goes from the subject to the object experiencer and indicates that the subject causally affects the object. For example, in (8) the hammer is a cause of the window’s broken state and in sentence (9) Sue’s letter is a cause of Dale’s joy.

(8) The hammer broke the window.
(9) A letter from Sue overjoyed Dale. (Oyama 2003: 76)

The second direction goes from the object experiencer to the subject and is unique to psych-verbs. It indicates that the object experiencer is a perceiver in a perception event in which the subject is the entity to which the perceiver’s attention is directed. This second direction of the causal relation is part of the non-truth conditional meaning of OE verbs.

Let us consider again (8) and (9). Although in both cases, the subjects are causes of the effect on the objects, there is a difference in their interpretations. In (8), the hammer refers to an object-particular, that is to say a physical entity easily identifiable. But in (9), a letter from Sue has a representational interpretation. It refers to the object as it is represented in Dale’s mind. This is a reflex of the non-truth-conditional content that there is a perception event in which Dale is a perceiver and a letter from Sue is a perceived object.

Linguistic evidence for the presence of this non-truth-conditional meaning with psych-verbs (but not physical causatives) comes from the examples in (10). They show that for knock over to have a psych-verb interpretation, the object has to be a perceiver. Otherwise, the sentence is infelicitous.

(10) a. #The view that I couldn’t see knocked me over.
    b. The car that I couldn’t see knocked me over.
Similarly, if the experiencer object is deprived of some sensory input which is essential for the perception event, the sentence feels contradictory. This is illustrated in (11).

(11) a. #The color of the lamp amused the blind man.
    b. The shape of the lamp amused the blind man.

Finally, only psych-verbs in sentences where the perception relation is not disrupted show backward-binding, a key feature of OE verbs. Note that these facts are problematic for strictly syntactic and lexico-semantic accounts of the distinction between psych predicates and physical causatives. The syntactic structures and lexical meanings of the grammatical and ungrammatical examples below illustrating OE causatives (12) and physical causatives (13) are identical. Thus the unavailability of backward binding cannot be derived by syntax alone or lexical differences. Oyama (2003) argues that this unavailability is due to the fact that the perception event is defective. We adapt the illustrative examples below from Oyama (2003).

(12) a. A picture of herself surprised Ruth.
    b. *A picture of herself surprised Ruth because of its colour.
    c. *A picture of herself embarrassed Ruth, who was asleep.

(13) a. That biography about himself frightened the president because of its revealing details.
    b. That biography about himself frightened the president because of its bright colour.

Building on the observations above, we propose the following condition of use for OE verbs:

(14) A sentence S with an OE verb can be felicitously uttered in context c only if it is established in c that there is a perception event in which the experiencer object is a perceiver and the subject is the entity to which the perceiver’s attention is directed.
In the next section we show how this requirement of OE verbs accounts for the restrictions mentioned above.

4. Towards an explanation

We hypothesize that the observations discussed in section 2 are due to the pragmatic requirement in (14). In particular, we propose that in languages that have differential marking like Romanian, the condition in (14) can be satisfied in two ways. First, the existence of the perception event can be established using linguistic material like differential object marking. This strategy is employed by Class A speakers and is discussed in Section 4.1. Secondly, the existence of the perception event can be established contextually by using an evidential basis, that is when the speaker has direct evidence. This accounts for Class B speakers and is addressed in Section 4.2.

4.1. Class A speakers: DOM and the perception event

In order to derive the obligatory presence of DOM with OE verbs with Class A speakers, we start by providing evidence for a sentience feature in DOM. We hypothesize that this feature is sufficient to establish the existence of the perception event. This is because the characteristic property of a perception event is the presence of a sentient perceiver.

There are at least two pieces of evidence that support the connection between DOM and sentience. We will present the relevant data below. First, DOM is obligatory in the context of pain predicates (*durea* ‘hurt’, *mânca* ‘scratch, itch’, etc.), as seen in (15). In the absence of sentience, this restriction would be surprising because in Romanian specific animates do not need obligatory DOM, as illustrated by the sentences in (16).

(15) Pain predicates and DOM in Romanian

a. *(Îl)* doare capul *(pe)* un copil.
   cl.3.m.sg.acc hurts head.def.n.sg loc=dom a.m.sg child
   ‘A child’s head hurts.’
b. *(Îl) doare capul *(pe) copil.

CL.3M.SG.ACC hurts head.DEF.N.SG LOC=DOM child

‘The child’s head hurts.’

(16) Specific animates do not need DOM in Romanian

a. Am văzut un copil.

have.1 seen a.M.SG child

‘I have seen a (specific) child.’

b. L-am văzut pe un copil.

CL.3M.SG.ACC-have.1 seen LOC=DOM a.M.SG child

‘I have seen a (specific) child.’

a. Am văzut copilul.

have.1 seen child.DEF.M.SG

‘I saw the child.’

d. L-am văzut pe copil.

CL.3M.SG.ACC-have.1 seen LOC=DOM child

‘I saw the child.’

Secondly, oblique DOM triggers co-occurrence restrictions for which more adequate results are obtained under DOM encoding a specification more similar to [PERSON] or Sentience (Irimia 2020, a.o.). In (17)a2 we see a context in which DOM cannot co-occur with a dative clitic interpreted as a possessor. To obtain grammaticality, either DOM or the dative possessor clitic must be removed. Irimia (to appear) has provided evidence indicating that the problem here is not a clash of licensing in terms of Case (as unmarked nominals also need Case), but rather the need to license more than one PERSON feature (one on DOM and the other one on the dative possessor clitic).

---

2 See also Onea and Hole (2017) for discussion of the data under a different type of analysis, that builds on licensing position. Irimia (to appear) has provided various counterarguments against reducing these restrictions only to licensing position.
(17) Romanian DOM and co-occurrence restrictions\(^3\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item a. *Şi/mi-
        ajută pe prieten.
        \begin{align*}
          \text{CL.DAT.POSS.3SG/CL.1SG.DAT-CL.M.SG.3ACC} & \text{ helps LOC=DOM friend} \\
          \text{Intended: 'He helps his own/my friend.'}
        \end{align*}
  
  \item b. Îşi/îmi ajută prietenul.
        \begin{align*}
          \text{CL.DAT.POSS.3SG/CL.1SG.DAT} & \text{ helps friend.DEF.M.SG} \\
          \text{ 'He helps his own/my friend.'}
        \end{align*}
  
  \item c. Îl ajută pe prietenul meu/său.
        \begin{align*}
          \text{CL.M.SG.3ACC} & \text{ helps LOC=DOM friend.DEF.M.SG my.M.SG/his.M.SG} \\
          \text{ 'He helps my/his own friend.'}
        \end{align*}
\end{itemize}

To sum up, the observations above show that DOM has a [Sentience] feature that can be thought of as a felicity requirement. This treatment is similar to the proposal in Heim and Kratzer (1998) according to which gender features introduce a presupposition satisfied only for individuals of a corresponding gender. Similarly, we propose that the [Sentience] feature on DOM requires that DOM marked objects are viewed as sentient entities. Thus, a simple sentence as in (18) is felicitous only if the child is viewed as a sentient entity by the participants of conversation.

(18) Maria îl vede pe un copil.

\begin{align*}
  \text{Maria} & \text{ CL.M.3SG.ACC see.3SG LOC=DOM a.M.SG child} \\
  \text{ 'Maria sees/is seeing a specific child.'}
\end{align*}

4.2. OE verbs and evidentiality

We hypothesize that the perception presupposition is also at the core of the evidentiality restriction seen with the second class of speakers. In a nutshell, object experiencer predicates require a sentient perceiver. Thus, the perceiver needs to satisfy the existence presupposition; at a more abstract level, this implies that objects that are of type \(<e,t>\) (semantically predicates, narrow scope indefinites)

\(^3\) The alternation in the shape of the possessor dative clitic is only due to phonetic reasons – the presence of the accusative clitic in (17a).
and undergo incorporation with the verb are not allowed, as they do not meet the existence presupposition. Evidentiality is simply a grammatical means to force the existence presupposition on the object. An entity that the speaker can personally see and who undergoes an eventuality the speaker can personally witness passes the existence presupposition and is thus semantically well-formed.

This strategy is employed by Class B speakers for whom sentences like (19) repeated from above are infelicitous when there is no access to (direct) evidence that the object experiencer is a perceiver.

(19) OE verbs and evidentiality: unmarked noun only possible if direct evidence is available

\[\begin{align*}
a. \quad \text{Reclama amuză un trecător.} \\
& \text{ad.DEF.F.SG amuse.3SG a.M.SG pedestrian} \\
& \text{Intended: ‘The ad amuses a pedestrian and I can see the event happening.’}
\\
b. \quad \text{Amenda a înfuriat un șofer.} \\
& \text{fine.DEF.F.SG has enraged a.M.SG driver} \\
& \text{Intended: ‘The fine has enraged a driver and I witnessed this directly.’}
\end{align*}\]

In summary, OE verbs, unlike physical causatives, presuppose a perception event in which the object of the asserted event is a perceiver, and thus must be sentient (Lakoff 1995; Oyama 2003, a. o.). The presupposition of a sentience entity forces an evidentiality requirement in the context of a predicate that presupposes a perception event. The result is that the latter has to be directly witnessed by the speaker, accounting for the restriction seen with Class B speakers. For Class A speakers, on the other hand, DOM, possibly due to its specificity, is enough for satisfying the restriction imposed on the object by the perception event.
5. The bigger picture: where does Romanian DOM fit?

Although the interaction between causatives and DOM has been explored before and has been proved to provide important insights into DOM, the Romanian data are hard to derive under most previous accounts. Here we will illustrate two prominent analyses, pointing out the ways in which the Romanian facts we have just discussed are problematic.

For example, Comrie (1981, et subseq.) has addressed regular transitive clauses with causative semantics, which also contain DOM (when the relevant conditions are met). The leading idea in this work is that DOM is a disambiguation strategy in those contexts in which the object has characteristics more similar to the subject. The most common event frame is the one that has agents (and thus subjects) which are animate entities. In those configurations in which objects (too) are animate (and specific, definite, etc.), a processing clash arises, as the agent cannot be correctly identified. As a result, DOM is seen as a morphological means to signal the object, so that confusion with the subject can be safely avoided. The main problem with this account for the Romanian data is that it cannot unstipulatively distinguish between the two types of causatives – the physical causative and the OE causative. These two classes can both have animate agents, as seen in the examples (20) and (21). However, only the OE causative requires obligatory DOM or triggers an evidentiality requirement. Obviously, one cannot claim that in physical causatives the animate agent is not a subject. Therefore, the source of obligatory DOM with OE verbs for Class A speakers cannot be the need to avoid interpretive ambiguity caused by a configuration containing both an animate subject and an animate object.

(20) Criminalul a omorat un bătrân.
‘The murderer has killed an old man.’

(21) Magicianul l-a amuzat pe un copil.
‘The magician has amused a child.’
Moreover, we have seen that the same split also holds with inanimate agents, as in the two examples we repeat below in (22), (23), and (24). In this case, the objects are animate and this makes them more similar to subjects. The processing bias would predict the systematic presence of differential marking in these contexts. However, this is clearly contradicted by the data – as we have seen, differential marking is only obligatory with OE predicates, and only for Class A speakers. Class B speakers allow even an unmarked object, if an evidentiality constraint is imposed.

(22) Physical causatives – DOM not obligatory

*(Out of the blue context for both Class A and Class B speakers)*

Furtuna a ucis/lăsat invalid un bătrân.

*‘The storm has killed/left invalid an old man.’*

(23) Object experiencer (OE) causatives – DOM obligatory even under direct evidence

*(Class A speakers)*

a. Reclama amuză un trecător.

*Intended: ‘The ad amuses a pedestrian.’*

b. Reclama îl amuză pe un trecător.

*‘The add amuses a pedestrian.’*

(24) Object experiencer (OE) causatives – DOM not obligatory, but direct evidence is necessary *(Class B speakers)*

Reclama amuză un trecător.

*Intended: ‘The ad amuses a pedestrian and I have direct evidence for this.’*
5.1. DOM and position

A second type of analyses for the interaction between DOM and causatives comes from accounts which link the differential marker to a specific position of the object. A very insightful discussion in this direction can be found in Torrego’s (1998) work for Spanish. An important observation is that in certain types of causatives, more specifically the analytical ones, DOM is obligatory on the causee. More specifically, when the causee (*una niña ‘a girl’) precedes the verb, it must be differentially marked. An example is below:

(25) Spanish

El fantasma hizo *(a) una niña llorar.

‘The ghost made a girl cry.’

(Torrego 1998, ex. 7a, p. 80; adapted)

For Torrego (1998), marked objects can only be licensed after scrambling to a [Spec, v] position (more accurately, a second specifier of v), as shown in (26). In that domain they are too close to the subject, and thus differential marking signals that they are not subjects nor agents.

(26) (based on Torrego 1998)

The question is how to apply this analysis to the Romanian data. Given what we have seen regarding the obligatoriness of DOM with OE verbs, for Class A speakers it must be the case that in these contexts the animate object must raise to a Spec, v. This operation, however, must be blocked from applying with the animate object in physical causatives. It is not clear how this can be done unstipulatively. This, compounded with the fact the precise position of DOM in...
Romanian cannot be unambiguously related to raising, indicates that a different analysis would be more adequate for the data at hand.

A second type of accounts connecting DOM with a raising operation comes from López (2012). In this work, differential morphology is derived as resulting from a licensing need objects with special types of characteristics (animacy, specificity, etc.) have. The requirement that these objects must be properly licensed forces their raising to a position between VP and vP, as in (27). More specifically, the marked object raises to a specifier position of a functional projection (abbreviated as α) which bundles aspectual and applicative features (hence the special marking which is homophonic with the dative in Spanish).

The problem with analytical causatives as in (25) is precisely that they contain an embedded domain in which an argument cannot be properly licensed. This is represented in (28) – the causative predicate hacer ‘make’ has a non-finite infinitival complement where the DP the girl cannot be licensed in terms of Case, as the defective infinitival structure cannot license Case. A second possibility of licensing a nominal, namely via incorporation, is not available in this configuration. Incorporation can only take place in a complement position, but the relevant nominal is not found in a complement position. This is schematically represented in (29), adapting the structures from López (2012). As a result of both the impossibility of licensing in the embedded domain and of lack of incorporation, the nominal can only be licensed by raising into the domain of V_caus. This forces obligatory differential marking.

(27) \[ ...v \]

Subject \[ v \]

\[ v \quad aP \]

\[ \text{DO} = \text{DOM} \quad a... \]

\[ a \quad \text{VP} \]

\[ V \quad < \text{DO} > \]

\[ [+\text{specific}] \]

\[ [+\text{ANIMATE}] \]

(based on López 2012)
As we already mentioned above, it is not easy to prove that Romanian DOM is licensed in a high or low position or, crucially, that it is licensed in a different position from unmarked objects (see especially Hill and Mardale 2021 for extensive discussion). Moreover, Romanian DOM is not obligatory on analytical causatives. The difference we see instead is a difference between two types of causatives, the physical and the OE one. These observations make it difficult to fully extend analyses along these lines to Romanian.

In sum, the Romanian data are challenging for previous accounts that attribute obligatory marking to parsing or structural constraints. By contrast, the analysis proposed in this paper links obligatory marking on the object of certain types of predicates to pragmatic factors. Moreover, the present account captures the different behavior of OE verbs versus physical causatives by appealing to an independently motivated fact, namely the presence of the perception event with OE verbs.
6. Conclusion

In this paper we discussed new data from Romanian concerning the interaction between differentially marked objects and various (two) types of causatives. In particular, we have seen that Object Experiencer (OE) causatives have a special requirement: either their object needs to be differentially marked (Class A speakers) or there is the need to have direct evidence of the OE event (Class B speakers). Physical causatives, on the other hand, do not have this type of restriction, unmarked objects being well formed for both classes of speakers.

We have proposed to explain these facts by taking into consideration non truth-conditional differences between OE causatives and physical causatives. The former contain a presupposition of a perception event that can be satisfied either by DOM marking on the object, signaling that it is sentient, or by direct evidence of the perception event. We have also shown that other proposals cannot derive this difference.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the audience at Colloque international à distance / International online conference L’expression de la causalité en langue maternelle et en langue étrangère / Expressing Causality in L1 and L2 (2021) and Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages 51 (LSRL 2021), the editors of the volume, and two anonymous reviewers for very useful comments and feedback.

References


Manzini, M. Rita; Franco, Ludovico. 2016. DOM and goal datives. Natural language and linguistic theory. 34/1. 197–240. doi.org/10.1007/s11049-015-9303-y.


**Nešto opazaka uz objektne iskustvenik i DOM u rumunjskom**

**Sažetak**

Tema su ovoga rada kauzativni glagoli s objektnim iskustvenikom u rumunjskom jeziku, kod čega se identificira jedan varijacijski obrazac koji je dosada bio manje pretresan. Rezultati pilot-istraživanja upućuju na to da su za jednu skupinu govornika ovakvi predikati s neodređenim objektom agramatični ako on nije diferencijalno obilježen. Druga pak skupina govornika može prihvatiti neobilježene objekte, ali samo ako je dostupna izravna bjelodanost događaja. Kako ova ograničenja razdvajaju kauzativne glagole s objektnim iskustvenikom od fizičkih kauzativa, netrivijalno pitanje se odnosi na narav te razlike. Predlažemo analizu koje je stožer pragmatička razlika među glagolom s objektnim iskustvenikom i fizičkim kauzativima. Preciznije, uvidi dobiveni pragmatičkim ispitivanjem glagola s objektnim iskustvenikom utvrđuju opažaj, koji ovdje slijedimo, da ova vrsta predikata pretpostavlja perceptivni događaj u kojem je perceptor objekt događaja za koji se veli da se je dogodio. Nadalje, predlažemo da se pretpostavka percepcije može ustanoviti u kontekstu bilo s pomoću diferencijalnoga obilježavanja objekta (DOM), koji ima nezavisno motivirano obilježje čutivosti ili izravnu bjelodanost. Zatim također pokazujemo da analiza u tom pravcu daje bolje rezultate kada se tematiziraju rascijepi ovoga tipa nasuprot općenitijim interakcijama među kauzativima, neživim subjektima i DOM-om; po prijašnjim tumačenjima činjenice koje se ovdje pretresaju ili su nepredvidive ili se ne mogu izravno izvesti.

**Keywords:** differential object marking, experiencer, causative, sentience, evidentiality, Romanian

**Ključne riječi:** diferencijalno obilježivanje objekta, iskustvenik, kauzativ, živost, evidencijalnost, rumunjski