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An Intuitive Relationship Between Existential Psychoanalysis and Evolutionary Biology via Empirical Psychoanalysis

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Summary

This paper is an exploration into an (intuitive) relationship between the existential psychoanalysis of Jean–Paul Sartre and the contemporary neurobiological approach in evolutionary biology. Sartre argues that the source of normative behavior lies in the nothinging activity of consciousness which necessarily has its neurobiological correlate. We argue that their relationship can be explained when considered together with Freudian psychoanalysis. After the introduction, the article explicates the relationship between Sartre's existential psychoanalysis and Freud's empirical psychoanalysis. The latter provides an intuitive ground for the former. The last part of the article focuses on the neurobiological account of the sublime emotions and motivations which influence the social behavior of human beings. It is found that group formation is an evolutionary product which plays a vital role in determining social behavior. It is concluded that existential psychoanalysis is compatible with empirical psychoanalysis and neurobiological analysis of the human psyche, and together they can present a comprehensive picture of human existence. Sartre uses the intuition developed by Sigmund Freud and connects it with phenomenological ontology so as to understand human affairs, and evolutionary biologists seek a neurobiological basis for the Freudian psyche. Thus, they are compatible.

Keywords: *Jean–Paul Sartre; Sigmund Freud; evolutionary biology; existential psychoanalysis; neurobiology*

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Introduction

Jean–Paul Sartre (1905–1980) developed the method of existential psychoanalysis to enable people to comprehend their proper fundamental project or original choice by which they make themselves in the world. The method is elaborated in his significant work Being and Nothingness (hereafter BN) as a tool »to bring to the light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each individual makes himself; makes known to himself what he is« (Sartre, 1993, 574). Thus, the method is supposed to present the subjective choices which make the life of an individual meaningful from a third–person point of view (i. e., in objective terms). In order to grasp the fundamental choices of an individual, existential psychoanalysts seek to reconstruct the life of a person by utilizing personal communication, intimate diaries, the accounts of acquaintances, and social interactions much like empirical psychoanalysis (Sartre, 1993, 569). They attempt to decode and interpret these empirical data to identify and understand the original choices of the subject. The originality of the choices lies in the fact that the subject himself/herself is their author and therefore cannot relinquish the responsibility ensuing from them. »The peculiar character of human–reality is that it is without excuse« (Sartre, 1993, 555). Moreover, "project" is a basic concept in Sartre's ontology which represents the very goal chosen by the subject as a mode of being–in–the–world.

Sartre claims that people are incapable of grasping their fundamental project comprehensively, and as a result, they appear to be languishing: such individuals need assistance and guidance. Assistance and guidance are required even in cases where people are pre–reflectively aware of their own experiences and desires but lack an awareness of their fundamental project — what they want to be. Thus, a clear cataloging of empirical desires and a definite recognition of various patterns of behaviour are the main objectives of existential psychoanalysis. According to Sartre, analysis aims to transform an impure reflection — a preliminary unclear natural attitude — of the subject on his/her conscious experience into a pure reflection. The locus of impure reflection is an ego ill–formed. Such a formation exhibits an attitude of possessing a stable and determinate thing–like structure which hides the spontaneous character of the individual consciousness. Pure reflection, on the other hand, is a process demonstrating the awareness of one's subjectivity as a free intentional being, whose identity is created through interactions and social engagements with other individuals and objects in the world. In pure reflection there is a disengagement of one's conscious awareness from the natural attitude. The core principle of existential psychoanalysis is to study a person holistically, for the person expresses himself/herself as a whole even in the simplest behavioural response (Sartre, 1993, 568).

Sartre suggests that impure reflection grasps all the conscious acts as an amorphous whole without analyzing, distinguishing, or classifying them. It simply furnishes the undifferentiated raw data towards which the existential psychoanalyst adopts an objective attitude (Sartre, 1993, 571). After his observation, the

psychoanalyst prescribes necessary tools for an analysis and conceptualization of the knowledge which can be used to refine and catalog the raw data for attaining a greater and systematic awareness of one's conscious experiences. Thomas Anderson (1993) therefore argues that the analysis and conceptualization of knowledge plays a vital role in the classification of the complex whole of different conscious acts in order to determine which acts are of least importance and which are more significant and fundamental.

The credibility and authenticity of the objective method of existential psychoanalysis depend on whether it enables the person to grasp his/her fundamental project. The existential psychoanalyst presents the psychological make–up of the person so that the person begins to realize his/her image as a true picture right from its formative state (Sartre, 1993, 573). The veracity of the picture is confirmed by none other than the original person in view of his/her own subjectivization of the presented (objective) knowledge. Moreover, the presentation of such objective knowledge does not degrade or reify the subject's existence, instead, it assists the individual in attaining greater self–awareness of his/her fundamental choices and their consequences as lived realities. Sartre however calls such realization as "quasi–knowing" (Sartre, 1993, 571) for two reasons:

(1) It is not derived from one's own subjective analysis and conceptualization, instead, the realization is prompted by the presented image of the person through an objective methodology of existential psychoanalysis and the resultant conceptualization by the psychoanalyst.

(2) Since the objective knowledge provided by the psychoanalyst is based on the empirical evidence and recollected facts of the subject's life, it reveals only one dimension of the human condition, namely, facticity, and fails to disclose the other dimension of human reality, namely, transcendence.

Facticity represents the factual conditions of the subject available for third–person observation. It however does not speak of the way the subject wants to–be–in–the–world. Sartre rejects the existence of any fixed essence of a human being and claims that an individual can create his/her own image–to–be and the set of values leading to fulfillment of the valued project (i. e. an independently chosen project). In his ethical framework, Sartre defines value as lacking and denies any essentiality to them as well. Therefore, possibilities of future roles and alternative projects remain open (Sartre, 1993, 626).

Humans, in their being, involve both, facticity (what one is) as well as transcendence (what one wants to be). Sartre says that human beings are lodged between these two dimensions. Thus, he defines the human condition paradoxically as that »which is what it is not and which is not what it is« (Sartre, 1993, 58). An awareness of one's existential condition is essential for leading an authentic life. Existential psychoanalysis is supposed to empower a person to make deliberate choices and rational decisions. In order to make better sense of the formulation of existential psychoanalysis, it is useful to juxtapose his psychoanalysis with Freudian psychoanalysis.

1. Existential psychoanalysis vis–à–vis Freudian psychoanalysis

Sartre proposes existential psychoanalysis as an alternative to Freudian psychoanalysis. He rightly claims that the purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis is »to determine the *complex*« which influences human behaviour without being noticed (Sartre, 1993, 570, emphasis original). Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) introduced his method to treat nervous people medically. The method departs from the general pattern of medication where the patient's role is largely passive. Since the Freudian psychoanalytic method aims at deconstructing the accumulated complexities in the patient's mind, it requires an active engagement of the subject by way of resorting more frequently to the subject's understanding, adaptability, and perseverance. With such a reciprocal engagement of the patient and the doctor, the complexities of the mental life of the patient are disentangled and he/she is relieved from the distressing effect of childhood memories and events. Since the mental life of a neurotic person becomes disorderly, the suppressed/hidden complex of unconscious mental forces needs to be brought to the conscious level through psychoanalytic treatment (Freud, 2014). During treatment the patient is impelled to encounter the unconscious and discover the structure of its formation. Such an encounter and discovery have a cathartic effect on the mental state of the patient. Alternatively, existential psychoanalysis attempts »to determine the *original choice*« with clarity (Sartre, 1993, 570, emphasis added). The original choice is the fundamental choice of an individual through which he/she creates his/her identity in a particular situation in this world. It constitutes human reality as a whole and not as an aggregation of parts.

1.1. The fundamental project and the unconscious

The fundamental project is radically different from the unconscious complex, the influence of which the subject is ignorant. The subject is however generally aware that the influence of certain things including the unconscious complex is unknown, hidden, or unapproachable but not unreal, for certain conscious experiences are not explainable without its postulation (Freud, 1963, 117). The unconscious is also understood as a "distorted substitute of dreams" which are very much conscious and often retrievable experiences. Freud's hypothesis of the unconscious seems very close to modern neurophysiology — the explanation of the functions of the nervous system from the perspective of the natural sciences (Churchill & Reynolds, 2013). His analysis includes the classification of psychic reality (unconscious/subconscious, pre–conscious and conscious) physically supported by neuronal functions. It is no surprise that he believes in a complete theory of psychophysical determinism and predetermination of all associations including the ones thought of as free choices (Freud, 2014, 96). On the other hand, the fundamental project, being a free project, elicits an impulsive response from the person.

Moreover, the idea of division within the unity of consciousness in the context of existential psychoanalysis is radically different from the view of division within

the unity in relation to Freudian psychoanalysis. In existential psychoanalysis, the division of reflective and pre–reflective consciousness refers to the same conscious subject. On the other hand, Freudian psychoanalysis depicts the psyche as comprising separate domains, namely, there is a topographical division in terms of the conscious and unconscious, and a structural division in terms of ego, superego, and id.[1] Sartre underlines interesting similarities between his and Freudian psychoanalysis: (1) the expressions of the psychic life of an individual person are objectively discernible, and they can be used profitably to discover the inner structure of the person: (2) »there are no primary givens such as hereditary dispositions, character etc.« Sartre further clarifies that »existential psychoanalysis recognizes nothing *before* the original upsurge of human freedom, and empirical psychoanalysis holds that the original affectivity of the individual is virgin wax *before* its history« (Sartre, 1993, 569, emphasis original). The emphasis on the expression "before" is conspicuous. An understanding of one's individual history and the formation of inner life from the beginning is essential to facilitate any kind of psychological effect on the subject. Sartre, however, rejects the hypothesis of the "unconscious complex" since it admits a fissure in the continuity of consciousness.

According to Sartre, »the catalog of empirical desires ought to be made the object of appropriate psychological investigation, observation, and induction and, as needed, the experience can serve to draw up this list« (Sartre, 1993, 568). In order to understand the existential situation of an individual entirely, it is beneficial to draw from the psychological constitution (facts) which is regarded as concrete fixations. Nevertheless, for Sartre, the concrete fixations are not inert possibilities, instead, they are perpetual forces undergirding and influencing the future choices and decisions of an individual. Despite their driving force, they do not diminish the ability of an individual to choose freely. Even if an individual chooses to flee from responsibility, this very escape is taken to be the choice exercised; hence, the individual is condemned to choose regardless.

2. Locating the ethical nudge

One may pause here and raise the question: how can an individual be free to choose, given the influences of concrete fixity? In the concluding section of BN, Sartre discusses the ethical implications of ontology and existential psychoanalysis that he has set forth. He argues that ontology itself cannot formulate

1 The ego, according to Freud, represents what may be called reason or common sense; the id is an entirely unconscious part of the mind containing instinctual urges and passions which sometimes have a greater influence upon the behavioural response. The superego is referred to as the "ego ideal" which may assume forms of aggression or sublimity. It may be taken to be the source of the aspirations one wishes to fulfill (Pick, 2015, 46–47). Freud's advice to his patients was not to disregard anything relating to mental life, howsoever unpleasant it may be in order to achieve the optimum effect of the treatment (Pick, 2015, 5). Such openness is supposed to help the patient disentangle the shackles of the unconscious complex.

ethical norms because it is concerned with facts, and one cannot derive values from facts. Values are defined by Sartre as lacking — as necessities, exigencies, imperatives because they are not experienced as "what is" or real entities but as "what is not". Thus, one feels values as lacking or as necessities which can be brought to the level of being by the concrete actions of individuals. Their imperative force is the felt necessity. Objectively existing circumstances or "what is" cannot be considered as a desideratum or necessity, for the desideratum is always considered as a certain circumstance, condition, or state of affairs which is recognized as desirable necessary demands.

It is, however, not always the case that the actual state of affairs is to be qualified as a desideratum — that which is needed. Consider, for instance, the case of workers in a factory who are provided with good working conditions and wages. Once they are satisfied, their present conditions would not prompt them to protest against the owner of the factory. However, if circumstances were not conducive or satisfactory, they would most likely feel the necessity to change the existing state of affairs through revolt or protest. The desirability of the continuation or discontinuation of a state of affairs is based on the felt nihilation pertaining to the state of affairs. The felt nihilation related to the desirability of the continuation of an existing state of affairs is associated with the uncertain and unstable character of the state of affairs. In this case, one desires to extend one's present state of affairs to avoid the feeling of dread caused by the uncertain and unstable character of the state of affairs. On the other hand, the felt nihilation related to the desirability of the discontinuation of the existing state of affairs reflects that one is not satisfied with present circumstances. Therefore, one desires to bring about a completely new state of affairs.

2.1. Values as lacks

From the above discussion, we can see that one acts on the basis of "what is not", the actualization of which is necessarily felt by the individual. The feeling of negation is always realized on the subjective plane of consciousness with a definite motive. Moreover, values as "lacks" are recognized through the negating activity of consciousness. Thus, the existence of values is dependent on one's subjective conscious activity. Since these values are realized as non–substantial things, an inert passive being cannot be their source of origin. Therefore, only human consciousness, which is identical with no–thing, can conceive them as values. Non–substantial consciousness as an activity of nothinging is supposed to be foundational to values as lacks. Sartre argues that only human freedom has the potential to make these values real because only human freedom can transcend "what is" and posit "what is not": only human freedom can bring these values to the level of being. Thus, he maintains that human freedom is the source of all moral values.

In the concluding pages of BN, Sartre raises a paradoxical question: is the ultimate value and goal for every individual to be God, that is, to attain a state of complete stability and automaticity? Since humans are contingent beings and

contingency is dreadful, it is natural for them to desire to be a necessary being who can justify his/her own existence in terms of a chosen one. Thus, they want to exist by "the right", Sartre says, and not as they do, "by chance". Whatever an individual desires to be is discovered as "an option on being" in his/her awareness. This possibility of being is introduced in the world by none other than the being–for–itself, which is its own possibility. According to Sartre, »if the possible can in fact come into the world only through a being which is its own possibility, this is because the in–itself, being by nature what it is, cannot žhave' possibilities« (Sartre, 1993, 99). The being–in–itself is inert and passive, it is complete in itself, it is "what it is". Contrary to it, the being–for–itself is characterized as dynamic and is impregnated with new possibilities. The position of values is an expression of its nihilating dynamism. Since Sartre acknowledges that, in order to comprehend existential psychoanalysis one must have a prior understanding of Freudian psychoanalysis, it is beneficial to see how the Freudian "complex" relates to values.

2.2. Normativity of Freudian psychoanalysis

According to Freudian psychoanalysis, the human psyche is believed to have a tendency to lower the tension caused by the unsatisfied instincts to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. This process of the human psyche works under two principles, namely, the pleasure principle and the reality principle. The pleasure principle is a tendency to seek pleasure through an immediate gratification of instincts, such as the fulfillment of basic desires such as hunger and thirst. On the other hand, the tendency to seek pleasure, not instantly, but gradually, through the delayed gratification of instincts is known as the reality principle; for instance, managing resources in order to ensure their continuous supply. This principle guides the person to satisfy his/her needs in a realistic and socially acceptable way. It is an opposing force which counters the instinctual drives of the pleasure principle. Whereas pre–reflective living is driven by the pleasure principle, the pursuance of long–term objectives is driven by the reality principle.

The early–stage distinction (in childhood) between good and bad, right and wrong is defined by what does or does not lead to an immediate gratification of instincts (Zweig, 1970). These instincts, drives, or urges are deeply rooted in the unconscious domain which largely dominates the psychic life. The role of the unconscious is recognized by Freud in every decision: »There is nothing arbitrary and undetermined in the psychic life,« he claims (Freud, 1901, 102). In explaining the Freudian concept of values, Wallwork (1991) argues that an ethics of the other, that is, regard or respect for others, has its origin in the love and affection shown by others towards the child. Love and respect for others develop when children learn how to relate their basic pleasurable and painful moments or events to their parents and other individuals who take care of their needs and try to fulfill them. Desirable moments also occasion an analogical extension of a child's love and affection for its family and consequently respect and affection for those whose instrumentality in its well–being is experienced.

Later on, in adulthood, the initial criterion for distinguishing the good from the bad is replaced by the moral standards of parents, family, and society, which have been internalized by the individual. One grasps these standards as one's own and thus forms one's moral worldview. These internalized ideals develop one's conscience or super–ego which enables a person to differentiate between what is morally good and bad, right and wrong (Zweig, 1970). Conscience is alternatively understood as an evolutionary product by the evolutionary biologist. The ethics developed on the basis of the fundamental principles of evolutionary biology is called evolutionary ethics. The empirical psychoanalyst, Freud believes that the psychic life of an individual is determined by the unconscious complex which can also be called an evolutionary product of the physico–chemical constitution of a human being. Freud is believed to have engendered the hope that his hypothesis of the unconscious would one day come upon a scientific foundation through the development of the biological sciences. The methods and findings of contemporary neuroscience appear to be fulfilling his dreams. A brief account of its parent discipline — evolutionary biology — will help us see a physical basis for the interconnection between the normative dimension of the perspectives in question, namely, Sartre's and Freud's psychoanalysis.

3. Normative neurons

Evolutionary biologists speak of the role of natural selection behind the emergence of every feature of every creature. Variation or diversity in nature facilitates the process of natural selection which leads to the development of congenial hereditary features in different species. Consideration of hereditary features enables us to understand human behaviour from the biological perspective of the survival instinct and of motivations. The formation of the unconscious complex appears closely linked to the genetic make–up of an individual. The primary biological concern is the security and perpetuation of life. The survival instinct, which is expressed in general adaptive tendencies, leads to the formation of a group. The tendency to form and live in a group is the unconscious strategic physical behavior of its members to ensure nourishment and also to avoid external threats. Group formation has its evolutionary roots in the recognition of similarities and differences among its members. The individual survival instinct not only enables individuals to adapt and preserve themselves but also further develops to ascertain the common welfare of the members of the group. Thus, the social instinct is also motivated by the same concern for safety and security.

According to evolutionary biologists, the group members start developing a conscience on the basis of social instinct which, in turn, is the outcome of group selection or natural selection. The competence of the group is naturally enhanced through this process (Thompson, 1999). The emergence of intellect in a species is the expression of such competence. Intellect is understood as the ability to use knowledge to organize the resources of survival in a fitting way. From a biological perspective, »intelligence in its simplest form can be thought of as the

genetic flexibility that allows organisms to adjust their behaviour to relatively rapidly changing environments« (Zentall, 2011, 310). Moreover, its instrumental role is obvious in the formation of a group and regulation of behaviour for collective survival and growth.

Human intelligence is also often linked to peculiar biological features. Socrates is said to have advocated the uniqueness of human beings in terms of their upright postures, the availability and usage of hands, a unique tongue to articulate one's voice, the ability to guard against hunger or thirst, the cold or the heat, the willingness to help sick members, training of fellow–beings to increase their strength, toiling in order to learn and the ability to remember what is seen, heard or learned (Xenophon, 1994, 24). Aristotle also recognizes reasoning as the unique ability through which human beings use symbols and derivations for making rational choices and decisions (Gabora & Russon, 2011).

3.1. A contemporary response

In contemporary neurobiology, Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, seeks to discover the neurophysiological basis for the Freudian hypothesis of the unconscious. He is inspired particularly by the Austrian–born American Nobel Laureate neuroscientist Eric Kandel who discovered that storage of any information in the memory results in a change in the structure of the connections between cells called synapses (Kandel, 2001; Kandel, 2013; Kandel & Hawkins, 1992). Since Freud founded his method on his observations of dream experiences, Solms takes up the task further to see the neurobiological basis of dreams and calls his proposal "neuropsychoanalysis". In his proposal, he seeks to connect the subjective states of mind such as thoughts, feelings, memories, etc. with the objective anatomical structure and functions of the brain. For instance, with reference to his observations using positron emission tomography, he states that the "wishful" *seeking* circuits light up like a Christmas tree during dreaming sleep, while the inhibitory prefrontal lobes are essentially "switched off" (Solms, 2021, 36).

The conscious feelings are thus discovered in the brainstem and hypothalamus areas of the brain. Solms remarks that this part of the brain is related to (what Panksepp calls) homeostatic affects (Freud calls them drives) and it follows the Pleasure principle (Solms, 2021, 48). The mental demands (*seekings*) for the well–being of the body are functionally related to this region. In order to arrive at a comprehensive picture of the inner life of a person, Solms combines psychoanalytic methods with neurobiology resources and claims to present the subjective states of the subject in an objective form without the disadvantage of third–person accounts of subjective states. Earlier biologists, such as Francis Crick, reduced mental phenomena to »a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules« — objectively observable regions of the brain, a project at which Freud already failed for lack of appropriate methods (Solms, 2021, 300).

The question as to how subjective conscious states are caused by objectively discoverable neuronal firings remained unresolved. Despite its intense familia-

rity, claims Colin McGinn, the human mind is incapable of resolving this problem (McGinn, 1999). The solution offered by Solms is that physiological and psychological phenomena can be reduced to unitary causes rather than to each other. For him, these underlying unitary causes are functional mechanisms of biological phenomena. This mechanism however does not explain the "what it is likeness" of the mental phenomena for the reason that such a feeling does not form part of the causally closed universe, and therefore, it cannot be said to be an essential feature of every consciousness. For example, affect — an essential feature of sentient beings — is recognized as "the foundational form of consciousness" which is generated by the upper brainstem and does not involve the "what–it–is–likeness" feeling. However, this emotional dimension helps a sentient being to adjust to the conditions by prioritizing the needs of survival. Solms says that »the actions that are generated by prioritised affects are voluntary« (Solms, 2021, 303). Moreover, things in nature tend to remain in a state of stability. Being a part of nature, the human brain also aspires to attain a state of stability and automaticity in its function. The formation of group and society can be seen as the essential biological strategy of an organism to ensure a feeling of safety and security. The moral and cultural constructs can also be seen as a larger part of this strategy.

By using the faculty of intellect, human beings choose the best possible way to realize the projects of personal and social instincts. Normative behavior is said to be determined by conscience. Within the neurobiological framework, both intellect and conscience are seen as biological evolutes. Thompson (1999) remarks that fundamental dispositions, such as conscience, »are a direct legacy of evolution«. As a result, the domain of human moral theorizing rests with the intellect: »what are the best routes to achieving the impulses (resulting from evolution) of conscience« (Thompson, 1999, 476). Human intelligence operates to model anticipatory interactive planning at the cognitive level. An effective social life requires the anticipation of actions, intentions, and consequences of the behaviour of others as well as of one's own behaviour (Goody, 1995, 39).

Conclusion

The above discussion indicates how moral and other social affairs in human life are seen from the different perspectives of evolutionary biology, empirical and existential psychoanalysis. Evolutionary biology provides a genetic explanation which is supposed to provide a neurobiological basis for Freudian psychoanalysis. The psyche remains the focal point of both approaches. Sartre, in his existential psychoanalysis, proposes a connection between the psyche and social situations. Stability, safety, and security remain the primary concern at both biological and at social levels. Any account which leaves behind *concern* (the psychic reality) cannot be called comprehensive. The practitioners of existential psychoanalysis rely on the conceptual resources developed by existentialist thinkers. In their exploration, they analyze the patients' perspectives on death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness to help them overcome their existential crisis

(Yalom, 1980, 8–9). This approach, on the one hand, retains the dynamic psychic structure proposed by Freud; on the other hand, it introduces new content from existentialism which can work in cases where the patient is counsellable. The neurobiological findings are significant in emergency cases or cases where induced physical intervention is beneficial.

In summary, the article proposes an intuitive relationship between existential psychoanalysis, empirical psychoanalysis and neurobiological analysis. Sartre uses the intuition developed by Freud and connects it with phenomenological ontology to understand human affairs, and evolutionary biologists seek a neurobiological basis for the Freudian psyche. They all wish to retain human subjectivity in their purportedly objective analysis. Subjectivity ensues from our phenomenal experiences (which have necessary physical correlates) and is shaped by intersubjective interactions. The issue of subjectivity can be seen as a point of convergence between the above theories, and it could have significant normative implications. This could be an interesting point for further exploration.

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Intuitivni odnos između egzistencijalne psihoanalize i evolucionarne biologije kroz empirijsku psihoanalizu

Sushain Raina[*], *Anil Kumar Tewari*[**]

Sažetak

Ovaj rad istražuje (intuitivni) odnos između egzistencijalne psihoanalize Jean–Paul Sartrea i suvremenoga neurobiološkoga pristupa u evolucijskoj biologiji. Sartre tvrdi da se izvor normativnoga ponašanja nalazi u nothinging *aktivnosti svijesti, koja ima nužno svoj neurobiološki korelat. Njihov je odnos moguće protumačiti kad se razmatraju zajedno s freudovskom psihoanalizom. Nakon uvoda, članak tumači odnos između Sartreove egzistencijalne psihoanalize i Freudove empirijske psihoanalize. Potonja nam daje intuitivnu podlogu za prethodnu. Završni dio rada stavlja težište na neurobiološki prikaz uzvišenih emocija i motivacija koje utječu na društveno ponašanje ljudskih bića. Ustanovljeno je da je stvaranje skupina posljedica evolucije, koja ima ključnu ulogu u određivanju društvenoga ponašanja. Zaključuje se da je egzistencijalna psihoanaliza kompatibilna s empirijskom psihoanalizom i neurobiološkom analizom ljudske psihe, te da zajedno mogu objasniti sveobuhvatnu sliku ljudske egzistencije. Sartre se služi intuicijom, koju je razvio Sigmund Freud, i povezuje ju s fenomenološkom ontologijom kako bi razumio ljudske probleme, a evolucijski biolozi traže neurobiološki temelj za Freudovsku psihu. Stoga su kompatibilni.*

Ključne riječi: *Jean–Paul Sartre; Sigmund Freud; evolucijska biologija; egzistencijalna psihoanaliza; neurobiologija*

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