Contesting Classical Philosophical Dispositions / Hinterfragung klassischer philosophischer Dispositionen

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Who Does Pinocchio Think It Is?

When Deleuze and Guattari Encounter Pinocchio in Plato’s Cave

Abstract
In this article, I imagine a scene in Plato’s cave where Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari encounter Pinocchio, the most famous puppet. I want to examine the forms of resistance created by the expressions of the Body Without Organs during the process of Pinocchio’s formation and bring together the elements that undermine the pedagogical causality established between telling a lie and the elongation of the nose to show that a different reading of The Adventures of Pinocchio is possible. I hope to achieve this reading by demonstrating the constant conflict of the two logics in The Adventures of Pinocchio: the logic of punishment and the logic of symptoms. This research can also be read as preparing a possible strategic escape plan for Pinocchio, Deleuze and Guattari for a permanent escape from Plato’s cave.

Keywords
becoming, subject, logic of punishment, logic of symptoms, body without organs, limit, threshold, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Pinocchio

Other than Itself

In Parmenides, Plato investigates which things have the form separate from themselves and what can eidos be attributed to, on three levels, where he focuses on the problem of One and Many (Plato 1997a: 130b, p. 361). At the first level, there are concepts such as beauty, goodness, and justice. Socrates does not doubt that there is a form of beauty that is common for and independent of all beautiful things as the source of their beauty. Individual things will be beautiful to the extent that they partake and resemble the eidos of beauty. While beautiful individuals change, beauty itself has an unchangeable nature.

On the second level, there are material things such as fire, human being and water (Plato 1997a: 130c, p. 361). Socrates is ambivalent about whether there is a form for them because they are both in change with one side, and
a common invariance can be found in the objects that name them all. These material things will be investigated concerning how they can partake in the immaterial form, and Plato will assign *eidos* to them, removing the ambivalence he left here in the following phases of the dialogue.

But the core of the problem concerns the absurd things of the third level: can absurd things like *mud, hair and dirt* have an idea? Can *eidos* be attributed to them? Parmenides asked Socrates:

“And what about these, Socrates? Things that might seem absurd, like hair and mud and dirt or anything else totally undignified and worthless?” (Plato 1997a: 130d, p. 361)

Socrates is sure they cannot have a form, but the main reason here is that they are always other than themselves, not that they are ugly, dirty and absurd. Socrates says that “these things are in fact just what we see” (Plato 1997a: 130d, p. 361); in other words, it is impossible to assign them a form separate from themselves because they are not themselves, they are just what they appear to us. Strictly speaking, “to be” is preceded by “to appear” for them. As Deleuze puts in *Difference and Repetition*, the whole Platonism “is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and simulacra” (Deleuze 1994: 66).

This third level of beings, which are always other than themselves, is located within the external boundaries of the law of the form. It is impossible to gather them under any form since they lack the stability they need to exist and are just what they appear. They are stuck in a strange space where what constitutes them cannot be determined or captured. For example, even if the ugly is determined as having the least or no share of beauty, this determination does not show that it has a unique form. Today, those things that remain formless and unrepresented, that cannot even be represented by themselves, are strongly resisting the intended oblivion for centuries which tries to erase all traces of idea of becoming and reproduces the idols of hierarchical thought. I think that in the crisis of today’s thought, there lays the legacy of these unrepresented absurd things which are unrepresentable because of their process of becoming.

Perhaps this is where we should take another step and dive daringly into Plato’s cave, where we need to look again at the shadows reflected on the cave walls in order to find the origin of the legacy of these absurd things. At this point, we can bring up the alliance of artificial things in Plato’s cave with these absurd things that answer the question “Who?” by creating a gigantic paradoxical surface. While describing the general view of the cave in the seventh book of *Republic*, Plato mentions the shadows of puppets reflected on the low wall in front of the fire where a long path reaches out:

“Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of puppeteers above which they show their puppets.” (Plato 1997b: 514b, p. 1132)

People who walk behind the wall carry all kinds of tools, puppets made of stone, and wood, similar to humans, animals and other things (Plato 1997b: 514c, p. 1132). So why might Plato choose the puppets for this philosophical allegory?

This question can be answered within the formation of hierarchical thought, especially in the search for a solid ground of being in *Parmenides* outlined above as well as in the context of the myth of metals or the necessary lie which Plato gave a founding role in *Republic* (Plato 1997b: 415a, p. 1050).
Although hierarchical thinking is instilled in philosophical thought as a habit of looking for the puppet master the moment one talks about the puppet, in the philosophical and literary imagination of humanity, puppets have become carriers of a special kind of vitality, autonomy and the idea of disobedience that subverts these hierarchical thought structures. One of the best examples of this is the formation process of the puppet in Carlo Collodi’s *The Adventures of Pinocchio*. Pinocchio, like the absurd things on the third level, is constantly recorded in an adventure of becoming other than itself, in a state of metamorphosis. I think that, unlike the logic that places it in a pedagogical narrative of punishment, another approach is possible to its interpretation. This approach can be made more visible by deepening the alliance mentioned above. As Deleuze and Guattari show when describing the connective structure of the multiplicities in the “Introduction: Rhizome” plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*, when we consider the relationship between the puppeteer and the puppet over the multiplicities of threads that connect them, rather than the hierarchical relationship between the puppeteer as a Subject and the puppet as an Object, we get another contact with the universe of events at a pre-individual level. Now, it is not a question whether of a puppet is an imitation, a copy, a shadow or even whether it has an *eidos* or not. The puppets are not just the manifestation of the free will of the puppeteer, nor are they victims of the historical burden of that third kind of absurd things. In this sense, it is remarkable that Herr C. tells the narrator in Heinrich von Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theatre” that one “must not suppose that every limb, during the various movements of the dance, was placed and controlled by the puppeteer” (Kleist 1972: 22). Puppets can be thought of as the persona of becoming other than itself. The source of this metamorphosis is the complex and rhizomatic structure of the puppet strings. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

“Puppet strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or puppeteer but to a multiplicity of nerve fibers, which form another puppet in other dimensions connected to the first.” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 8)

One difference in Pinocchio is that it is shaped as an autonomous entity without strings; another is that its body and identity cannot be formed and completed despite all efforts that cannot eliminate the multiplicity of the forces leading Pinocchio to be other than itself or another puppet.

**Void in the Beginning**

Carlo Collodi’s *The Adventure of Pinocchio* is not the story of a king or a hero, but a piece of wood, as the opening sentences tell the children readers:

“Centuries ago there lived – ‘A king!’ my little readers will say immediately. No, children, you are mistaken. Once upon a time there was a piece of wood.’” (Collodi 2009: 2)

At the very first moment, something strange happens in this introduction that opens up a void, and the question of beginning inevitably manifests itself. How might one begin? Collodi will answer this twofold question by applying the imagination and using a beginning that takes place both in language and in the body. The story of a king, a princess or a child is full of predictable elements, whereas the piece of wood in our story is something rootless, shapeless, and distorted:

“Just a common block of firewood, one of those thick, solid logs that are put on the fire in winter to make cold rooms cozy and warm.” (Collodi 2009: 2)
Among those worth telling, it suddenly appears and serves as a surface recording the operations of the imagination machine to which Collodi’s narrative is linked.

How might one begin? In the traditional logic of sense, the beginning becomes meaningful only with the end, the geography, in which it occupies, is itself occupied by two gigantic figurative concepts: Origin and End. The beginning is surely located at another end, whether linear or cyclical, and this myth of origin is precisely a residue left by chronos to the logos, whereas those absurd things do not find a place for themselves in the successive sequences of chronos. They are not seen as a term worthy of counting, since they are constantly other than themselves and, of course, they are absent in the end because they are not in the origin; they have neither a beginning nor an end. Therefore, they are not worth telling and even dangerous to be told, especially to children, from the perspective of the traditional hierarchical logic of sense. But Collodi made a remarking discovery and offered us a strange way to follow the philosophical adventure of becoming. One of his creative moves is to begin with those who are not given a share in the Platonic hierarchy, those who are not considered to be, the absurd things, so now for the imagination that is left alone, not with the kings and the princesses but with a shapeless piece of wood, endless roads have been opened. There is such a huge void that one of the main motivations throughout the whole story will be to try to close this irreversible gap by including numerous subjects into the child’s world.

Indeed, Collodi’s *The Adventures of Pinocchio* is an incomparable work in terms of character plenitude, dozens of characters that appear and reappear, who seem to appear in order to disappear, wander like ghosts in the void Collodi opened. Of course, there are more dominant names that inhabit this space and appear to be fixed characters. For example, the role of the Fairy has a distinct place in the text and it sets her apart from all other characters by giving her the opportunity to represent the familial personas like older sister and mother. However, the interesting aspect is the encounters that traverse the whole text beyond these familial personas. They present some scenes where the battle between the logic of symptoms and the logic of punishment is strongest. There is an obvious pedagogical logic in the text for which the author is responsible, and the logic governing the formation of Pinocchio’s self seems to depend on this pedagogy. Still, when the text is read closely, among the pure phenomena of imagination, another logic is at work, which sometimes cancels the logic of pedagogical punishment. It can also be seen that, at times, the logic of symptoms, oppressed by the pedagogical approach, wanders like a ghost in Collodi’s *The Adventures of Pinocchio*. The dominant voice of the text is coloured by the logic of punishment that triggers Pinocchio’s all bad temper and drives it to feelings of guilt. As long as this voice is dominating, the reader finds themselves enclosed between Origin and End. By affirming the innocence of life against “plaguing the innocence of becoming with ‘punishment’ and ‘guilt’”, as Nietzsche puts it in *Twilight of the Idols* (Nietzsche 1998: 32), and by connecting events temporally in the mode of “when”, the logic of symptoms creates completely different holes, small gaps and creative swerves in the text. The logic of pedagogical punishment puts the burden of the predicate on the child’s shoulder by assigning the subject to each verb and therefore it expects that a child will take responsibility for its action, reap the rewards, pay the price, and accept a strict logic of cause and effect that confuses cause and consequence in general, as Nietzsche identifies...
in *Twilight of the Idols* as an error “among the most long-standing and recent of humanity’s habit” (Nietzsche 1998: 27). It aims to shape a child who looks at the world through the mentality of punishment, which for this logic is always attached to the Origin and, therefore, the answer to the question “How might one begin?” is already given. It starts with the order and wants to reach another image of it because any accident that occurs in between seems trivial to it, just as the beginning is subordinated to the Origin, the process becomes meaningful with the End.

However, the imagination at work in Collodi’s text made possible a beginning that was not subjected to Origin and End. It succeeded by preferring not to choose the gigantic figures like major subjects and transcendent personas interrupting between the writer and the reader, thereby giving the first formula of an encounter: open such a void that no major subject or set of subjects could close in forever. Just like the absurd things, Pinocchio is now in the process of becoming other than itself, that is, like Alice of *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* by Lewis Carroll, it enters the states where its story cannot be itself at certain thresholds. It is altered from itself. In the scene where Alice meets the Caterpillar, we see that the question “Who are you?” loses its meaning:

“ʼI can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, Sir’ said Alice, ’because, I’m not myself, you see.’” (Carroll 1990: 42)

Symptoms of the Body

The story develops when Master Antonio, i.e., Master Cherry, finds a particular shapeless piece of wood in his carpentry shop, where Collodi depicts it without any kind of Origin:

“I do not know how this really happened, yet the fact remains that one fine day this piece of wood found itself in the shop of an old carpenter.” (Collodi 2009: 2)

Which tree does this piece of wood belong to? Who brought it there? These questions do not matter. Now the forces of imagination have realized that for a new beginning, to open a gigantic and irrepressible void, they must eradicate the Origin and, therefore, remove the first element that imposes completeness so that the child’s imagination can work. Nobody knows how it happened, but the piece of wood somehow “found itself in the shop”, just as the reader and the writer found themselves in the same narrative space, where there is an opportunity to hold together without worrying about how and why I got to this space while I wasn’t supposed to be here. This is an opportunity with which narrative space thereby affirms its contingencies by providing the conditions for a surprising encounter for reader and writer.

The story continues and, although Master Cherry was delighted to find the piece of wood, his end would be a real fiasco as the first design of Subject to come across the piece of wood. He decides to make a table leg out of this piece of wood and as he is going to give the first blow to the piece of wood to shape it, he hears a voice:

“Please be careful! Do not hit me so hard!” (Collodi 2009: 3)

The Master is surprised, because there is nobody in the shop. So where does the voice come from? He looks around but cannot find the source of the voice and then when he struck another blow on the piece of wood, he hears a cry:
“Oh, oh! You hurt!” (Collodi 2009: 3)

Master Cherry, who thinks that he has heard voices from nowhere, takes the grater to level the piece of wood this time and startle with the same sound:

“Stop it! Oh, stop it! Ha, ha, ha! You tickle my stomach.” (Collodi 2009: 4)

When Master heard this voice, he collapsed on the ground and his red nose, which caused him to be called Cherry, turned purple with fear.

In this extraordinary story told to us by the forces of imagination at the entrance of Carlo Collodi’s *The Adventures of Pinocchio*, sound and body meet in a specific relationship. The existence of a body that has not yet been formed is expressed as a scream or cry with the direct expression of the voice. There is no living creature that is supposed to be the source of voice and imagination reverses relationships: source and voice, production and product are intertwined in a world where new relationships are established. Where is the puppet? In a piece of wood? Is it just to throw away the excess? No, of course. If it were, we could think of Pinocchio as a Model, assign it an *eidos* and give it a share in the hierarchical realm of beings. However, there is only a formless piece of wood in the middle and even though the first subject who came to shape it wanted to make a table leg out of it, the effects produced by the piece of wood in the form of voices and cries assume the functions of a simulacrum that seeps between the model and the copy “insofar as it contests both model and copy at once” (Deleuze 1990: 2), the imitator and the imitated, as Deleuze describes in *The Logic of Sense*, and thus it become a strategic ally with those absurd things that have no share in the being.

It is an object that cannot be distinguished whether it is living or not. In this respect, the negative aspect of choosing an object is based on not preferring a king or a princess. It opens the gap and its positive aspect is to prefer an object from an imaginary combination rather than from the world of familiar objects or beings that are categorically divided into living and non-living. Suppose we also accept the aspects of this object that came out of the author’s control. In that case, it becomes clear that it was the subject who started to work by giving it the name Pinocchio, which made us think that it was there before Pinocchio took shape. This subject would not be Master Cherry who fails to shape the piece of wood, but Geppetto, the carpenter, who will also become Pinocchio’s father. The story of Pinocchio, however, shows that the subject always comes into the world in a vacuum, and no puppet has yet taken shape. There is only a piece of wood, but it is not a passive object either. The first lesson it teaches the subject who confronted it was to reverse their relationships captured in *active – passive* and *animate – inanimate* forms. What appears to be a lifeless body is surrounded by an incorporeal voice. Pinocchio’s body presents some expressions to the world before it takes shape, and these expressions will be our main moments where we will trace the logic of symptoms. However, this body does not fit well with the established concepts of body. It makes it possible to think of the body in formation by expressing the emotions posed by the piece of wood before it becomes a puppet. Yes, the voice comes from a piece of wood, a piece of wood that is shapeless, rootless and without origin. In fact, all these symptoms are the expressions of the matter and affirmation of its affections. If one asks what these symptoms belong to, there will be no answer other than the concept of matter; in short, a logic of symptoms is nothing other than the logic of the expressions and affections of the matter.
Well, why does the logic that postulates that the sculpture is in the marble need to look for the puppet in the piece of wood? Where does this determinism and teleology come from? The phrase “Master Cherry cut his chopper down to a piece of wood.” is an event at the level of chronos, but if we look at the Stoic thought, the event is considered as the effect of the incorporeals or “the surface effects” (Deleuze 1990: 7), that is, we cannot understand the event as the loading of a subject into a verb. On the contrary, we conceive it as the effects of infinitive form of the verb that cannot be attributed to any kind of subject. The effects that the piece of wood produces in the form of voice converges with the definitions of event in the Stoic cosmos. For the piece of wood that resists to being shaped, the state of resistance that can produce the effects similar to that of the “schizophrenic’s visible resistance to oedipalization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 52), now expresses the propagation of events. It is here that the logic of sense can coexist with the nonsense. Strictly speaking, there is an “intrinsic relation” or a “mode of co-presence” (Deleuze 1990: 68) between sense and nonsense, as Deleuze puts in The Logic of Sense. But this voice is now not the sound of the cut or the grater; it is not the sound of bumping and pushing but the expression of the adventure of becoming an unformed being. Instead of thinking that Pinocchio already exists in the piece of wood, it is necessary to try to think how the imagination seeps into the circulation of events in undetermined trajectories and leap to the level of pre-individual processes. It leaves us in the realm of essences to think that Collodi describes the carpenter removing the puppet from the piece of wood, just as the sculptor removed the sculpture from the marble. Here, all possibilities for changes between states, in short, phase changes are closed. There is neither space nor motion here and the ontological roadblock to which the subject is stuck can never be understood on an essentialist basis. There, an expression that emerges from where it stands (ex-istence) and another expression (sub-sistence) that runs towards the bottom of where it stands are together. The concern of the subject is to present this togetherness in the form of representation and to create a world out of these representations by sealing the meaning onto the surfaces. That’s why the piece of wood looks like a passive object. However, the effects produced by the piece of wood in the gigantic void Collodi opened both dissipate this passive layer and meet the interventions applied by the subject to establish the representation mode with a state of re-sistance.

Then, another subject will come while the Master Cherry is on the ground in fear with his purple nose and the same surfaces of the sense will also confront it. The piece of wood will be shaped, but this time a new state of resistance will develop and the autonomy of organs will emerge. Meanwhile, the theme of lie will come to the fore for the first time in the fight between Geppetto and Master Cherry. A false subject will be sought and accusations will fly in the air. As the logic of punishment develops gradually, the enormous void will be tried to be bridged by major subjects.

**Subject of Lie**

As Master Cherry fainted with fear, Geppetto enters the stage and talks about the puppet he wanted to make, but at this very moment, the voice that causes Master Cherry to faint comes into play again: Who is speaking? Unknown:
"‘Bravo, Polendina!’ cried the same tiny voice which came from no one knew where.” (Collodi 2009: 5)

Geppetto thinks that it is Master Cherry who calls himself Polendina, after all, a voice without a source, a pure incorporeal subsistence does not take place in the repertoire of the logic of punishment that dominates daily life. Then, there must be a subject and the verb must be attributed to it. In short, the infinitive form of verb must be converted to the predicate.

Fortunately, their fight does not last long and they make peace by vowing to remain friends forever. Then Geppetto tells him that he needs a piece of wood to make the puppet in his mind, and Master Cherry handed him the little piece of wood that causes trouble to him. But at this very moment the piece of wood jumps out of his hand and lands on Geppetto’s legs. This peculiar self-acting object realizes the first synthesis between the logic of punishment and the theme of the lie, right at the beginning of the text. Before Geppetto and Master Cherry, who had just made peace and took an oath, get into a fight again, the logic of punishment comes into play:

“‘It’s the fault of this piece of wood.’
‘You’re right; but remember you were the one to throw it at my legs.’
‘I did not throw it!’
‘Liar!’” (Collodi 2009: 10)

The theme of lying came to the fore for the first time here, but the subject who told the lie could not be found and the fight started because of this. If the subject had appeared and admitted its lie, that is, if the subject had been predicated, there would not have been a fight here. The logic of symptom here has created a short circuit and created resistance to the logic of punishment that tries to break up the state of subsistence and the state of existence, and the subject can only represent itself when it acquires this resistance. But the problem is that the logic of symptom always records the lie on another surface. Where is this surface? What is recorded there? In fact, the most critical move is to remove the lie from the dilemma of crime – punishment, that is, to put the paradoxical nature of the lie against the search for a subject who tells a lie. In that case, the logic of symptoms versus the logic of punishment that attributes the sense to the subject arises from the clinging of the sense to this surface. While the logic of punishment establishes a dialectic between the object of the crime and the subject of the punishment, the logic of symptoms works by suspending this dialectic.

Some strange debates on the shores of the history of philosophy express exactly the backstage of the fight between Geppetto and Master Cherry. One of these discussions took place between Pericles and Protagoras about two thousand and five hundred years ago. According to Hegel, with the end of the period when poets dominated thought, Sophists flocked to Athens and invented a new type of knowledge, more precisely a new relation to knowledge. Protagoras, one of the most famous Sophists, also came to Athens during this period and encountered Pericles, who had an extraordinary influence in Greek culture. There was a very interesting discussion between them about the logic of crime and punishment. Hegel’s narration is as follows:

“Indeed, the two once argued for a whole day as to whether the dart or the thrower or he who arranged the contest was guilty of the death of a man who thus met his death.” (Hegel 2009: 372)

Can this example be adapted to the situation of our piece of wood? What is the picture here, when viewed through the distinction between the logic of
punishment and the logic of symptoms? In fact, the situations of the piece of wood and the dart are different. The dart has a thrower, but our shapeless piece of wood moves by itself. The death of a person as a result of the throwing the dart can be explained chronologically. The actor is obvious, but still the issue cannot be resolved by taking full responsibility on the archer in the discussion between Protagoras and Pericles. Perhaps they should have taken into account who made the dart and the bow. They turn to the organizer of the contest and touch vaguely on the problem of Fate running in the background. Did the arrow really cause death by the thrower’s own intent, as a result of the will of the thrower? What if there was no intention? The arrow hit the person’s heart and killed him. But did the dart really do it?

Sharing the blame between the dart and the thrower is also a possible solution. But how will the dart be punished? The accusation of lying, which emerged in the fight between Geppetto and Master Cherry, was in vain in the face of the absence of a subject to whom neither the crime nor the punishment could be attributed. In other words, there is neither a dart and a thrower nor an organizer of the competition. In short, there is neither nobody who brings the wood to Master Cherry’s carpentry shop, no one who drops the wood at Geppetto’s feet, nor a Fate that manages the process. However, the absence of the subject and the suspension of the logic of punishment does not mean the destruction of the subject, nor does it mean the abolition of the logic of punishment. On the contrary, it acts as a trigger for the search for the subject and the dialectic of crime – punishment to infiltrate into the layers of sense. Especially since Collodi’s enormous void goes against the established uses of the logic of pedagogical punishment, this logic enters into a fundamental struggle to intensify its operations and seeks to establish a subject from a piece of wood. It will try to turn it into a puppet first and then a child, but the logic of symptoms will see each of these transformations as thresholds of metamorphosis and move the thought into a geography of sense that cannot be governed by Origin and End.

The first subject assignment (Master Cherry) has resulted in a fiasco, the piece of wood stands still in its own resistance, but the void triggers the motion and replaces the first subject with the other (Geppetto). The Geppetto-Master Cherry fight breaks out twice and finally the peace is achieved. Master Cherry gives the piece of wood to Geppetto, which is a gift that the subject will convey its agency to it.

Body without Origin

To create a puppet, Geppetto has a piece of wood, a chipping tool and an idea of making an amazing puppet that knows how to dance, use a sword and somersaults like an acrobat. But as soon as Geppetto begins carving and sculpting the piece of wood, a number of unusual events occur. He first makes the eyes of the puppet and as soon as the eyes take shape, they begin to move and stare. Then he shapes the nose of puppet, but as soon as the nose is shaped it begins to grow, grows bigger and bigger, and turns into a giant nose. Geppetto tries to cut the nose, but the more he cuts, the longer the nose gets longer:

“After the eyes, Geppetto made the nose, which began to stretch as soon as finished. It stretched and stretched and stretched till it became so long, it seemed endless.” (Collodi 2009: 13)

Then Geppetto, who started to carve the mouth of the puppet, was astonished by the rising laughter and suddenly sarcastic words started to come out of
the mouth of the puppet. When the hands are finished, the hand blows off Geppetto’s wig, and when the feet are shaped, Geppetto gets a kick in his nose (Collodi 2009: 15).

What is it that gets these organs out of control that makes them so much accelerated? Obviously, what is in question is a pure dynamism against a structuring in the form of an organism, form and shape. The Adventures of Pinocchio, which is told as an ordinary pedagogical story for children, is occupied by an imagination machine that makes it possible to think about the body in pure dynamism. Every attempt to synthesize the pedagogical narrative with the processes of this imagination machine or to subordinate the later to the former, encounter this enormous resistance from the organs. Of course, it may be asked where this resistance comes from. If we try to answer without allowing a grammatical distinction between the resisted and the resisting, we find the concept of “blocks of becoming”. According to Daniel W. Smith, in Deleuze’s Essays Critical and Clinical, Goethe and Kleist are presented as the paradigmatic examples of two tendencies in literature. As the sense settles into the order of the Subject that attains Form in a harmonic tone in Goethe,

“… there is no Subject in Kleist, but only affects and precepts of a life that combine into ‘blocks of becomings’, blocks that may petrify in a catatonic freeze, and then suddenly accelerate to the extreme velocity of a flight of madness.” (Smith 1998: XXXVI)

Considering these remarks, it can be said that while Pinocchio’s “blocks of becoming” resist every logic that tries to organize its body on a harmonic plane, the imagination machine calls us towards another geography of sense that deviates from the pedagogical narrative in Collodi’s text in which an ontological barrier of the resistance is created by the affects and percepts of the body. The uncontrolled actions or the “flight of madness” of the organs classified under the impishness of the puppet are in fact a state of resistance to the transcendental representation that the Subject tries to place between the state of existence of the piece of wood and its state of subsistence. The ontological barrier has presented itself in another phase: this formless and rootless piece of wood has become a special resistance to the forces trying to shape it. In Deleuze’s repertoire, this resistance is a move against hierarchical configurations in the form of organisms. However, an organism has not yet formed here, ultimately the organism does not consist of organs. In order for the organism to form, it is necessary to create a closed whole that gives a certain function to all organs, imposes the division of labour and organizes them according to a logic independent of them. In the case of Pinocchio, none of the organs that act uncontrollably perform the function expected of them but the most striking thing is the continuous and spontaneous stretching of the nose. Here is the first moment when the text itself refutes the proposition that “Pinocchio’s nose gets longer because it lies”, which was instilled in our minds pedagogically. The nose, like other organs, did not fit into the shape given to it and get longer uncontrollably. There is no topic on the theme of lies here and no causality that can be predicated to it. But how can one articulate the sum of these organs as a puppet? Shouldn’t the organs be brought into same line, trained, and turned into an organism in order to be a puppet?

There is nothing in Master Cherry’s mind other than making a simple table leg out of this absurd piece of wood, whereas Geppetto wanted to make an unusual puppet from a piece of wood. The first question he asks himself when he comes home with a piece of wood is:
“What shall I call him?” (Collodi 2009: 12)

Actually, Master Cherry is a Megarian at best (he says A=A) when he thinks of making a table leg out of wood. He is an unsuccessful Aristotelian (because he says A=B, but cannot achieve the syllogism). But Geppetto is a good Platonist. He has a name as well as a puppet model in his mind:

“I’ll call him PINOCCHIO. This name will make his fortune. I knew a whole family of Pinocchi once – Pinocchio the father, Pinocchia the mother, and Pinocchi the children.” (Collodi 2009: 12)

However, it is clear here that the name Pinocchio is not a personal name. Thus, what kind of name is Pinocchio? What or who does it refer to? Is it a family name? Here at least we need to realize that Pinocchio as the proper name that will point to our puppet is always plural. It derives from a lack of origin that no one knows about. Later, other puppets in the puppet theatre call Pinocchio brother and recognise it even when they see it for the first time, which is a manifestation of this interesting situation of plurality. But this plurality also shows the abandonment of the puppet. It is all alone and, therefore, a Pinocchio family must be created. This process, which started when Pinocchio regards Geppetto as its father, developed by naming Fairy first as sister and then as mother, and finally reached its peak with the transformation into a child, tries to complete the family. This is one aspect of naming, but another is priority of the name:

“After choosing the name for his Marionette, Geppetto set seriously to work to make the hair, the forehead, the eyes.” (Collodi 2009: 12)

A Platonist would behave exactly like that.

According to Deleuze’s analysis in *The Logic of Sense*, just like simulacrum reversing Platonism by reviving another duality that disrupts the *model – copy* duality in the middle of the Platonic system whose aim is “to bring about the triumph of icons over simulacra” (Deleuze 1990: 259), the adventure of Pinocchio’s becoming has revealed an autonomy that disrupts the *organ – organism* relation. Even though the copies are subject to and share with models, simulacrums reverse the relation of similarity and imitation, and assert the dissimilar, the inimitable. Likewise, Pinocchio’s organs are neither part of the organism nor subject to the organism and, therefore, Geppetto’s Platonism is reversed by the autonomy of the organs which means “glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections” (Deleuze 1994: 66); but the system will try to continue by attributing Geppetto’s Platonism to other characters in order to reproduce itself in the middle of the huge void. Now the idea of autonomy is at the target. Logic of punishment takes this idea as its object and surrenders it to pedagogy: Geppetto sets autonomy on target after seeing his yellow wig at Pinocchio’s head:

“You are not yet finished, and you start out by being impudent to your poor old father.” (Collodi 2009: 14)

However, Geppetto really left the puppet incomplete. He forgot to carve Pinocchio’s ears. Or does the puppet’s autonomy stem from this incompleteness?
Limits and Thresholds

Our puppet is attached to the image of an incomplete body, a body in a state of resistance that resists being transformed into an organism. In a cosmos where Platonism is reversed, the logic of punishment that seeks the subject will not only describe this body, but will try to extract an organism from it. Like the absurd things, it did not get a share of the complete and the absolute, but it also did not surrender to major dualities. The birth of autonomy and its perception presents an axis that works against organism, on the one hand, and against the transcendence of form, on the other. But among the extreme behaviours of these uncontrolled organs, the nose was chosen as a special point. As the story continues, one will try to correlate the nose with the lie, but before this connection is established, it witnesses the scene where Pinocchio’s feet are formed:

“When his legs were limbered up, Pinocchio started walking by himself and ran all around the room. He came to the open door, and with one leap he was out into the street. Away he flew!” (Collodi 2009: 14)

Geppetto, who was running after Pinocchio as it ran away from home, could not catch up with it and was out of breath. At this moment, a Carabineer steps in and “grabbed it by the nose” (Collodi 2009: 13). Autonomy was interrupted at this moment. The Carabineer grabbed this long-nosed puppet from the tip of his nose and handed it over to Geppetto. Here the imagination reveals its struggle with the logic of punishment and presents the irrefutable existence of a formless, shapeless body in the form of a story.

Deleuze and Guattari, in their collaborative work A Thousand Plateaus, consider the concept of limit as a starting sign before the end, and at this very moment we learn the reason for their affirmation of threshold (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 438). Thresholds are the signs of an inevitable change. Limits can be reverted or even crossed, but the difference between those who crossed the limit and those who stayed behind it does not have the kind of radicalism experienced by those who jump over the threshold. The limit imposes an inside – outside distinction, moving from inside to outside crosses the limit, but cannot break the split between inside and outside. The one who experiences the thresholds is neither inside nor outside, it is in an intermediate zone. It is at the threshold that it passes under the rainbow. When we think of the puppet’s process of becoming through the concept of limit, we actually get stuck on a negative axis. Although we think that these limits are not fixed and that definite distinctions cannot be made between interior and exterior, we cannot afford to pierce the historical walls built between the body and what it can do. If we remove the limit and try to think in terms of the transcendent infinite, we register the creative activities of desire and labour in the domain of antinomies.

On the other hand, we can activate thresholds as a concept that will enable us to rethink the currency of this problem now. How can one think of the body with thresholds? The architecture of a thought that defines the body with the actions it can perform, without separating the relationship between the body and what it can do, is based on thresholds. Threshold, in this sense, can be thought of by the processes of affecting and being affected of a body with other bodies, not as a threshold of pain or a threshold of hearing. Because in the example of threshold of any sensation, the threshold is conceived as the limit and it determines the limits of the highest frequency sounds with the
lowest intensity that the human ear can hear. Sounds of certain intensity fall outside these limits, whereas the thresholds are not between the sounds, but the sounds are between the thresholds. This is how the intermediate regions can also be formed. Thresholds invite us to think of each body in relation to another bodies. In this respect, there is not a body that has a substance or presence independent of the interactions it enters. We are all under the “influx of the other”, just as Alfred North Whitehead said in *Adventures of Ideas* (Whitehead 1993: 233). Thresholds are spaces of transition, of change; there is no static and fixed existence and, therefore, any object cannot insist on its identity. It overflows beyond itself and touches other bodies. These contacts are the conditions of the new. For the creation of the new, global reference fields that define all bodies from above must be collapsed. Every thought that describes these breakdowns confronts a moment of transformation, the idea of a radical and inevitable metamorphosis. To be able to think of a body in metamorphosis, that is, to think of a body freed from inside or outside, connected to others and the earth as pure dynamism, we must break down global systems of definition resulted from the traditional logic of sense. We call the conditions of this destruction as thresholds. Pinocchio’s body is a new body in this respect and a body on the thresholds for the same reason. However, it is mostly read as a story about the taming of the disobedient child. What happened to the nose was always considered a punishment. From the point of view of the relation established between nose and lying, Pinocchio’s thresholds are masked under a bad pedagogy.

**Nose without Lie**

Reading closely *The Adventures of Pinocchio* reveals that twice the nose gets longer even when Pinocchio does not tell any lies. The nose, which shows a natural stretching when Geppetto completes the nose of the puppet, appears again in different events as the story progresses. Surprised by the stretching of the nose, Geppetto tried to shorten it, but the more the nose was cut, the longer it became. Considered as a sign of disobedience and rebellion in Carl Ipsen’s comments (Ipsen 2006: 109), the nose gets longer when Pinocchio is in a state of sadness for the second time. The reason for its sadness is that it is hungry:

> “Poor Pinocchio ran to the fireplace where the pot was boiling and stretched out his hand to take the cover off, but to his amazement the pot was only painted! Think how he felt! His long nose became at least two inches longer.” (Collodi 2009: 23)

At this very moment, Pinocchio, who wants to suppress its hunger with the egg that catches its eye, finds a surprise when it breaks the egg. A chick emerges from the egg, salutes and flies out the window (Collodi 2009: 24). In fact, bodies and logics are here caught in the reverse operations of the imagination machine. Just as a puppet without a mother grew up before it was born, the egg developed itself and became a chick. The sadness of the puppet, whose hunger is increasing, is getting bigger. Ignoring the advice of the Talking-Cricket, Pinocchio’s nose has elongated for the second time as a feeling-symptom. There is a collision between the two logics here. The first is a logic of punishment that evaluates everything that happened to Pinocchio from a pedagogical perspective according to which Pinocchio’s nose gets longer because it is lying. Is it coincidental that the image of Pinocchio is referred to as the object of such a logic of punishment, while nowhere in the story there is a direct relationship of cause and effect between the act of lying
and stretching of the nose? If we look closely at the statements in the story, we will see a string that tells that Pinocchio’s nose can also stretch when it lies, but never tells that it stretches because it lies. Of course, a statement taking into account that the mostly shortened versions of The Adventures of Pinocchio have been translated into world languages can say that the details have been lost. However, this is of no use in analysing how the separation between when and because has been exceeded for the sake of because.

The logic of punishment has expanded its repertoire through this expression of because. Could Pinocchio’s lying really be the main reason for its nose’s stretching? The phrase “Pinocchio’s nose gets longer because it lies” makes no sense before the lies are embodied. Pinocchio, who started to lie, has actually awakened to a world filled by symptoms. This is the second logic. The logic of symptoms marks all the movements of collision, disobedience, and pure dynamism of uncontrolled organs. On the one hand, there is the logic of pedagogical punishment that finds all expressions of body in the “mode of because”, and on the other hand, there is a logic of symptoms in the “mode of when” that traces the possibilities of affecting and being affected by the bodies that come side by side in the flow of events. Imagination now equips the mind it occupies with excesses to claim the authenticity of its narrative.

On the other hand, Carlo Collodi’s quarrel with authority, his experiences of censorship that lead him to put his first political writings to the point of locking in a drawer and his anger at obligations, come across in many episodes of The Adventures of Pinocchio he wrote for a serialized children’s newspaper. For example, in the first designed finale of Pinocchio, the puppet was hung from the tree and executed by the Fox and the Cat, who disguised as murderers. Later, the reaction of the readers to this end increased and Collodi took Pinocchio from the tree without dying. At the basis of Collodi’s fight are the expressions of the logic of punishment. In a letter to a minister, Collodi criticized Italy’s situation that day:

“Look, what a long, boring list! It is compulsory to be a member of the jury, to do military service, to pay taxes, to be a member of union commissions, and lastly, primary education is compulsory.” (Guaspari 2006: 234)

When someone confronted with the imperatives asks why they are necessary, they can immediately get an immediate answer in mode of because. The imperatives are simple, they arise with clarity that seems irrefutable with their explanations. Yet the violence underlying what is necessarily presented is hidden by precisely mode of because. What is rooted in the insensitive transitions from why to because is the logic of punishment in our daily lives.

At this point, we should take a closer look at how the plane on which we will locate the conflict of two logics can be defined within the narrative of imagination. Here, the representation that detaches body’s power to become other than itself from it while defining it is basically the representation that expresses it in the mode of because. The reason why the puppet’s nose stretches is not that it is lying, the puppet’s nose does not stretch because it is lying. Thus, how can the judgment that causes such a mode of because by ignoring all the details of the story be broken? An example of David Hume is at work to explain the origin of this judgment. Hume says:

“When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience.” (Hume 2004: 129)
Yes, when the puppet’s nose stretches first time there is no reason, thus the first stretching of the nose is a reaction to be formed, not a disobedience. However, when it stretches for the second time, it takes place as a feeling-symptom. In fact, the expression “the nose of the puppet gets longer because it is sad” is also completely wrong. Imagination asks us to think in a way that things are reversed. The egg evolved on its own, the nose extended on its own and this not only disables any model in which a subject in itself manages the entire ontogenetic process, but also allows the autopoietic processes of repressed autonomies to emerge. As Félix Guattari clearly emphasizes in *Chaosmosis*:

“We are not confronted with a subjectivity given as in itself, but with process of realisation of autonomy, or of autopoiesis.” (Guattari 1992: 7)

Autonomy creates an ontological barrier against the subject in request, and the sense is produced in a surface, where the major subjects become larvae of the process of autopoiesis. Imagination demands a break from the logic of punishment. We have thrown the piece of wood into the fire thousands of times and each time the flames rose up, engulfing the piece of wood. Yet the rise of fever (the elongation of the nose) is never found in throwing the piece of wood into the fire (lying), it is completely different from it. If we ask what we have lost while catching a *cause – effect* relationship, we will find events in front of us. Events subsist in continuity and discontinuity regimes and when we add the first (lying) to the next (elongation of the nose) through a strict causality between the events, the mode of because comes into play. The logic that exploits desire-events under the category of satisfaction also exploits labour-events within the category of wages. The incomplete body is expected to surrender its powers in the form of desire and labour.

For Pinocchio, a puppet who does not want to work, desire and labour have been transformed into two opposite categories. But there comes a moment in the story that Pinocchio falls into a village where everyone works like a bee and here it instils in its mind that labour is only possible by delaying desire. Yet the contrast between desire and labour is not essentially sealed into the body. It is only possible on a social surface where the exploited body and the body images left incomplete can be articulated. Before the shaping process of Pinocchio’s body began, desire and labour were not separated from each other in this ugly piece of wood; there is only a Body Without Organs.

Body Without Organs is an imageless pure body, a “body without image” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8) and even it is “the anorganism of the body” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 276), that is in a state of fight with organism, not with organs, which according to our terminology becomes a resistance against hierarchical models of organisms. If this resistance is analysed within the genealogy of the Epicurean theory of *clinamen*, rather than the distinction between hylomorphism and hylozoism, contrary to the model presented to analyse the process of *autopoiesis* by Slavoj Žižek in *Organs Without Bodies* in which the writer states that “autopoiesis is part of the ‘idealist’ tendency of *hylozoism*” (Žižek 2004: 120), the conditions for the attachment of the Body Without Organs that produces the resistance in Pinocchio’s body to the imagination machine that wanders in the text will also be revealed. The Body Without Organs is a real deviation (a kind of productive *clinamen*) from all established images of the body; it is therefore imageless and precisely because of that it is directly connected to the imagination. This counter-hierarchical productive blockade, which blocks the hierarchical use of the productive forces of the virtuality, dissolves a coded body in which desire and labour
are divided into the levels of autonomy again. In this body, labour is neither an opposing category to nature nor is desire against culture. Everything is tied in the pure productive capacities of the body. But Desire and labour are embodied in Pinocchio’s nose as the two forces of the body!

**Follow the Nose!**

If we enter Plato’s cave once again, we can find a puppet theatre in front of us. Renewing the powers of thinking on a non-hierarchical plane, this theatre invites us to look at the universe with a logic of symptoms. We can now see that the puppets are the inventors of the very concept that was deprived of them: *autonomy*. Here we should state that the autonomy in question is possible through an autopoietic process and that *autopoiesis*, far from being an idealist category, takes the matter as a model for its motions and self-production. The autopoietic process is not an idealistic category. It is an amalgamation of the affects of the matter. Finally, it remains to elaborate the distinction between the logics of punishment and symptom, and to rethink the phenomenon of stretching of the nose.

If the elongation of the nose is considered as a punishment – this is the case from the Fairy’s point of view – the object and subject of this punishment are identified and Pinocchio is closed in a pedagogical narrative. Imagination, on the other hand, allows us to read the phenomenon of the prolongation of the nose as a symptom that invalidates this closure in the puppet’s own experience. The nose stretches as a symptom, not as a punishment. For example, Pinocchio has a feeling of sadness when it is hungry and desperately searches for food, and at this time the nose grows as a sign of sadness. In other characters and events, the logic of symptom of the imagination also works. The nose of the Master, who was named Cherry because of his red nose, turned purple when he was angry. At the puppet theatre, Fire-Eater, who was about to set Arlecchino on fire, sneezed and forgave the puppets. Sneezing occurs as a symptom of pity. After Pinocchio is brought to house of Fairy, the strangest forms of the logic of symptoms emerge. Unable to understand whether Pinocchio is alive or dead, lying motionless in bed, Fairy summons three doctors – the Crow, the Owl and the Talking-Cricket. According to Crow the puppet “is dead and gone; but if, by any evil chance, he were not, then that would be a sure sign that he is still alive!” (Collodi 2009: 79). However, Owl has the opposite view. According to it, the puppet “is alive; but if, by any evil chance, he were not, then that would be a sure sign that he is wholly dead!” (Ibid.: 79). As for Talking-Cricket, it prefers to say “a wise doctor, when he does not know what he is talking about, should know enough to keep his mouth shut” (Collodi 2009: 80).

Symptoms repair all the surfaces destroyed by punishments within the text, and the imagination is resurrected whenever it is captured. In the world of signs, absolute certainty (Pinocchio’s nose gets longer because it lies) has little place. Pinocchio’s nose can sometimes be elongated and sometimes shortened. Pinocchio, whose feet were finished, ran away from the house after it kicked Geppetto’s nose, running so fast that no one could reach it. It is no coincidence that the gendarme, who was waiting in front of it, caught it by the nose, its nose is where Pinocchio is the weakest and the strongest. As soon as it was caught, almost all those uncontrolled organs calmed down and the organism’s temporary victory over the body was realized. But the Body
Without Organs has not disappeared and continues to present indications against the punishment to which the puppet has been subjected. In fact, the mentality of punishment is not just based on a rigid cause and effect relationship. It takes the relationship to such an extreme point that it turns causes and consequences into such closed wholes that it attempts to completely destroy the gaps where meaning will settle. Putting Pinocchio in jail and not the Fox or the Cat who stole Pinocchio’s gold, is the final extreme act of the logic of punishment. Conflict between the two logics continues at different intensities.

While telling its father what happened to it in the belly of a whale, Pinocchio enumerates the interconnected events of the logic of symptoms without falling into the mode of because and says:

“[T]hen I told a lie and my nose began to grow. It grew and it grew, till I couldn’t get it through the door of the room.” (Collodi 2009: 233)

Pinocchio, caught between events connected by the conjunction and, is in shame as it turns into a donkey a few days after arriving in the land of the toys. The ears start to protrude, as a feeling-symptom, the ears are elongated:

“He began to cry, to scream, to knock his head against the wall, but the more he shrieked, the longer and the more hairy grew his ear.” (Collodi 2009:198)

By making the same move, a strict cause-and-effect system can show that Pinocchio does not heed the advice given to it as the reason for the growth of the ears. In fact, the pedagogical procedure is so powerful that adventures might be thought otherwise incomprehensible. But symptoms resort to the imagination to displace limits with thresholds, procedures with successions. Pinocchio is a body in transformation and the reason it did not die is not because its body was wooden, but because it remained in a state of constant variation. It is the variant of itself. It is other than itself. What wants us to see variations as illusions is nothing but the logic of punishment, but a body is real only in its variations, proliferation and decay, bumps and pits, otherwise it remains a non-dynamic, abstract fiction. The effect is real, so is the influence. After Pinocchio’s legs are burned in the fire, Geppetto making him a new foot invites us to a scene of imagination where the distinctions between alive and non-living are invalid. The puppet is alive and, according to the doctors, if it is not alive this indicates that it is dead and vice versa.

If we live in the world of symptoms, we must be astonished at any moment, for we can get caught up in the experience of Pinocchio between the infinite transmissions of events to each other, the constant communication of bodies. Describing the destination to Pinocchio, who lost his way, an old man says:

“Take that path on your left and follow your nose. You can’t go wrong.” (Collodi 2009: 86)

The body and its two productive forces, labour and desire, can no longer be considered as objects of punishment. No one is guilty. The court has been closed. The judge gorilla issued amnesty, the ropeless puppet shed skin, turned into a child. The logic of symptoms has cancelled the scheme of teleological exploitation. We can no longer speak of ends and beginnings, but of intervals, contacts, spheres of chain activity. The feeling of sadness arising from hunger is attributed to the elongation of the nose, just like a lie, but the elongation of the nose also functions as a threshold that allows a chance to transition to other events. This time the woodpeckers rush to the aid of Pinocchio, whose nose is too long to fit in the room after three lies it told Fairy one after another and they shorten the nose by pecking. The carnival of events reaffirms the
innocence of life, the “triumph of multiplicity” (Deleuze 1992: 22) or “puppet strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity”, for one who looks at the world with the logic of symptoms. One lives, breathes and has a nose. So which way should it go now? Pinocchio might say: follow the nose, follow the nose, never catch it up! This could be a game everyone may play to get out of Plato’s cave.

**Bibliography**


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Za koga Pinocchio sebe smatra?

Kada Deleuze i Guattari susretnu Pinocčija u Platonovoj spilji

Sažetak

Ključne riječi
postajanje, subjekt, logika kazne, logika simptoma, tijelo bez organa, krajnja granica, granica promjene, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Pinocchio

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Für wen hält sich Pinocchio?

Wenn Deleuze und Guattari Pinocchio in Platons Höhle begegnen

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter
Werden, Subjekt, Logik der Bestrafung, Logik der Symptome, organloser Körper, Grenze, Schwelle, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Pinocchio

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Qui pense être Pinocchio ?

Lorsque Deleuze et Guattari rencontrent Pinocchio dans la caverne de Platon

Résumé
Dans cet article, j’imagine une scène où Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari rencontrent Pinocchio, la plus célèbre des poupées, dans la caverne de Platon. Je m’applique à rechercher les formes de résistance créées par les expressions du corps sans organes au cours du processus de transformation de Pinocchio et unifier les éléments qui sapent la causalité pédagogique instaurée entre la parole du mensonge et l’allongement du nez, en vue de montrer qu’une autre interprétation de Les Aventures de Pinocchio est possible. J’espère atteindre une telle lecture par la
démonstration de la constante lutte entre les deux logiques de Les Aventures de Pinocchio : la logique de la punition et la logique du symptôme. Cette recherche peut également se lire comme une préparation au plan stratégique de fuite de la caverne de Platon pour Pinocchio, Deleuze et Guattari.

Mots-clés
devenir, sujet, logique de la punition, logique du symptôme, corps sans organes, limite, seuil, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Pinocchio