The Metamorphosis of Love in Spinoza’s Ethics

Abstract
Spinoza’s Ethics has a robust and underappreciated theory of love. In this paper, I show that Spinoza’s discussion of love, which stands at a crossroads between his ethics and his epistemology, details the metamorphosis of love in the philosopher’s mind – from passionate love to intellectual love of God, and from imagination or opinion to scientia intuitiva. This metamorphosis is responsible for the philosopher’s morality and the perfection of their understanding, which are closely linked. Reading Spinoza’s guide to ethical and philosophical progress through the prism of his theory of love holds the key to understanding some of the most perplexing issues presented in the second half of Part 5, namely, the nature of the intellectual love of God and the object of the third kind of knowledge.

Keywords
Baruch de Spinoza, love, affectivity, knowledge, God, ethics

Introduction
Spinoza’s intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis) has long been the topic of animated discussion among commentators – most notably regarding its feasibility and its coherence with the rest of Spinoza’s philosophy. Traditionally, the intellectual love of God’s perplexing nature was presented in Anglophone scholarship as a metaphysical issue, bound together with the two other doctrines of the second half of Part 5 of the Ethics, namely, the eternity of the mind and the third kind of knowledge.1 Although these issues are, of course, very closely related, they do not in and of themselves provide the

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most accurate explanation of Spinoza’s conceptual movement from love of things, to love of God, to intellectual love of God, as well as the anomalous affective state that is attributed to the intellectual love of God, as an affect which does not entail transition or change. I argue that these issues can be resolved through a new appreciation of Spinoza’s robust theory of love and the metamorphosis of love that he describes in the *Ethics*. This is a process that originates in passionate love of images and culminates in the intellectual love of God, completing a transformation in the understanding of the object of affection and revealing it as God.

My argument is based on the connection between Spinoza’s theory of love and his theory of knowledge. An object of love or affection, insofar as it is an idea in the mind, is also an object of knowledge. Ideas understood by the first kind of knowledge, as existing in space and time, are necessarily perceived inadequately. These are the ideas that arouse passionate love. Intellectual love of God follows understanding by the third kind of knowledge; and although this understanding is defined as an understanding of the essence of singular things, it can have nothing to do with existence in space and time (because that pertains to imaginings linked to the body and is necessarily inadequate). It is a point rarely acknowledged by commentators that intellectual love is directed only at God. But this is crucial, since the object formerly understood and loved by the lover is in a sense replaced. This important distinction is the reason there is no intellectual love of people or things – only of God (and indeed, contrary to central interpretations, there cannot be intellectual love of a person or thing). The essence of the singular thing understood in the case of the intellectual love of God is God as indivisible, unique substance and nothing else.

With the increase of attention given to Spinoza’s psychological theory and his account of affectivity, it has become quite common to place Spinoza’s intellectual love of God in the context of his general discussion of love. Commentators often divide love into two major kinds: rational and irrational, which correspond with the two kinds of affects – active and passive. Since passive and active affects relate to inadequate and adequate ideas, respectively, the discussion of love is always linked in some way to Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. Spinoza’s theory of love, however, has not yet been explained systematically as based on his theory of knowledge, showing three kinds of love that track the three kinds of knowledge. I therefore dedicate the first section of the paper to a discussion of passionate love, whose object is perceived via the first kind of knowledge (i.e., imagination). The second section is an explication of the second kind of love (also referred to as friendship, in the case of love toward fellow human beings), based on *ratio*.

The final section is devoted to the love of God and the way the object of affection and understanding continues to evolve in its relation to the mind, in accordance with the emendation of the intellect. I differentiate between generic love of God (which is a form of second-order love) and intellectual love of God. The latter is defined as pertaining to the essence of singular things and yet it can have nothing to do with our perception of singular things as existing in space and time or even as distinct from the lover’s own perception of self. I show how my interpretation is consistent with other famously controversial claims Spinoza makes in *Part 5* and offer a solution to several objections, the strongest of which would question Spinoza’s claim that the intellectual love of God makes us more conscious of ourselves, God and things. I also explain the mysteriously “static”, non-transitional aspect of the intellectual love of
God, despite its definition as an affect; and the mystical reputation (or notoriety) it has earned, especially in Anglophone literature.

Love as a Passion

Knowledge, for Spinoza, is an affective state. According to 2p40s2, there are three kinds of knowledge: opinion or imagination, rational thought and intuitive knowledge. An idea in the mind, perceived or understood via one of the three ways of knowing, has necessary effects on the general configuration of ideas constituting the mind itself (i.e., its general affective state). As Spinoza makes clear in his definition of affects (3d3), insofar as affects pertain to the mind, they are ideas (ideas of the affections of the body, manifested as changes in the mind’s power of acting). A passion, which is of a subset of affects, is “a confused idea [...] which, when it is given, determines the mind to think of this rather than that” (General Definition of the Affects). Far from being inert, an affect has the necessary effect of prompting the mind to think of other ideas. The ideas of the affects, like all ideas, can be perceived or understood via the first, second or third kind of knowledge. This is because every idea in our mind is an idea that we know in some way; and the knowledge of these ideas vary in their clarity and distinctness. When we are subject to passions, the ideas in the mind which constitute these passions are confused and inadequate. When we aim to mend our intellect and free ourselves from bondage, we employ ideas of the second kind of knowledge, which have the affective power to destroy our passions (5p3, 5p4s).


5 Colin Marshall gives a clear and illuminating presentation of this issue and it is related, albeit different, from my own reading of Spinoza’s theory. Marshall acknowledges that philosophizing is the mental activity Spinoza points at when he discusses destroying the passions and also states that “this activity necessarily draws attention away from the particulars of our surroundings” (C. Marshall, “Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason”, p. 153), but does not define it, as I argue here, as a
Love of an object perceived inadequately is passionate love. It is defined as “joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause” (3p13s). The two important elements of this definition are joy, the affect by which the mind passes to greater reality, powerfulness or perfection (3p11s); and the external nature of the cause of joy. Due to this external nature, the idea of the object of love in the lover’s mind is necessarily inadequate (2p25). An inadequate idea, also referred to as an image, is only partially caused by the mind it’s in (2p17–18, 2p40s2). Therefore, passionate love is always first and foremost an affect which originates and is sustained by an image of something (3p3). Spinoza states, unequivocally, that the “idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body” (2p25). Therefore, the beloved external object, which is the definitive cause of passionate love, perceived as distinct from the lover, can never be understood adequately or loved in a fully active way. Insofar as the beloved retains his features as individual, external and with certain properties that relate to a specific existence in space and time (such as having been born on a certain day, having a certain color of eyes or having met the lover at a certain point in time) – they are loved only by the first, passive kind of love.

I now turn to the distinctive characteristics of the first kind of love. Spinoza gives various examples of the possible objects of passionate love. In the explanation of the definition of love, as it appears in article 6 of Definitions of the Affects, Spinoza criticizes former attempts (such as Descartes’, in Passions of the Soul) to define love as “a will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved”. Spinoza claims that this is wrong because will of unification is a property of love and does not constitute its essence. Spinoza is aiming for an analysis of love that corresponds with his most basic metaphysical and (relatedly) most basic psychological concepts. Therefore, the mind’s desire for empowerment must be recognized as the basis for any “will” it may experience and act on. When a lover seeks to unite herself with her beloved, it is nothing but her desire for the joy that it causes – that is, the empowerment and affirmation of life that it generates.

The affect of love in the lover is nothing but the idea of the object interacting with the lover’s mind. The mind of the lover and the idea of the beloved are both constituents as causes of the affect, with the body of the lover having even greater effect on the emotion than the beloved’s body (2p16c2). The lover’s desire to unite physically with the beloved is only one expression of the mind’s effort to conjure up the beloved in order to feel joy and be empowered. This unification is achieved through various ways: actual physical presence, by which the lover’s mind is affected with images of the beloved as a result of their bodily proximity (the parallel ideas of the physical occurrence are presented in the mind); imagining the beloved and conjuring their image without their physical presence, or daydreaming about them; and simply remembering the beloved. All three of these strategies are taken by the lover’s mind in order to experience the joy of unification with the beloved and in all of these cases the idea of the beloved in the mind is of the first kind of knowledge – corruptible, fallible and inconstant.

This inconstancy gives rise to what Spinoza calls “vacillations of mind” (3p31). Insofar as it perceives via the first kind of knowledge, the mind experiences itself as a discrete entity interacting with an external object. This relation makes the lover’s mind and the perception of its beloved deeply influenced
by other external objects. The more the beloved is loved and admired by others, the more the lover loves him (3p27, 3p31). Superficial knowledge of the beloved puts the lover’s idea of him and hence the affect generated by him, in a precarious position. Conversely, the more the lover comes to know or understand the beloved, the more constant her feeling; the harder it will be for external sources to influence her.

The beloved’s qualities which the lover perceives via the first kind of knowledge are superficial traits that originate from sensory perception. Among these are the appearance of the beloved, his smell, the sound of his voice; also, opinions of him, the emotions he generates in the lover and memories of these emotions. These qualities are susceptible to ‘others’ opinions of the beloved and their relationship. Moreover, a relationship based on the first kind of knowledge is highly influenced by thoughts of the past and the future. This makes the romantic relationship a continuous source of hopes, fears and longing. Vacillations of mind are damaging, saddening and weakening for the mind.

The imagination, or perception in the mind, of the beloved is strengthened with this actual presence. This presence will be all the more frequent and intense if the beloved were himself affected with joy accompanied with the idea of the lover – that is, if the beloved loved the lover in return. This love or joy will ensure that the beloved will himself strive to be more with the lover, thus progression through the three kinds of knowledge. Marshall sees philosophizing about the passions as “killing the mood” and likens it to a mental distraction; but I do not think this gets to the core of Spinoza’s meaning. What Spinoza is aiming it at is direct engagement, which, when done well and correctly, creates the only sort of change we are capable of making: change in our understanding of the object of thought. One of the major disadvantages of Marshal’s reading and the main way in which it differs from mine, is the lack of relevance or continuity to the second half of Part 5, in which Spinoza uses his discussion of the movement from passivity to activity and the destruction of the passions as the basis for attaining the third kind of knowledge and experiencing the intellectual love of God.


By this logic, it is already quite clear that another person (perceived as a person) can never truly be loved with the intellectual love of God. As far as Spinoza is concerned, this ought to be quite obvious – it is precisely why intellectual love is defined solely as intellectual love of God. There is no intellectual love of a partner, a child, a pet or a country; nor of fame, money or food. Only intellectual love of God. I return to this below.

Ultimately, there are as many species of love as there are objects by which a mind is affected. Moreover, “as each [man] is affected by external causes with this or that species of joy, sadness, love, hate and so on, that is, as his nature is constituted in one way or another, so his desires vary and the nature of one desire must differ from the nature of the other as much as the affects from which each arises differ from one another” (3p56d).

For a different analysis of romantic love according to Spinozistic concepts see: A. O. Rorty, “Pathos”. I follow Rorty in claiming that there is a continuity in the different ways one can love their object of affection; I disagree with her claim that through understanding the object of love in different ways, the lover loses her sense of individuality and yet somehow aims to comprehend her beloved as an individual caused by an infinite chain of external causes (this points at a confusing theory of individuation, which is, of course, already itself a complicated issue in Spinoza). Moreover, for Rorty, intuition (i.e., the highest form knowledge) is nothing but a sort of amalgamation of rational perception of common knowledge and particular knowledge of an individual (p. 81). I think this is not the case: scientia intuitiva differs from ratio in both the aspect of the object understood and the method of knowledge.
aiding her quest for more time in his presence (3p33). As a result of having the beloved love and experience joy in the presence of the lover, the lover exults at the sense of Esteem that bringing joy to her beloved entails; being loved in return adds a new joy to the love of the external object. It begets a joy and love toward the self (3p34).

In the Appendix to Part 4, Spinoza uses two consecutive articles to discuss sex, love and marriage. In article 19, purely sensual love (lust based on external appearance) is categorically defined as a love not born of freedom of mind, but of bondage. This type of love passes easily into hate, in case it is not a form of madness, which Spinoza regards as a worse predicament. Marriage is the result of a different form of love – a love that agrees with reason (more on love that is the result of reason in the following section). This form of love is advantageous specifically if it is not solely based on physical attraction (article 20). Spinoza points to a mutual love of begetting and educating children wisely as the desire which leads to a good, beneficial marital union; as well as a surprisingly egalitarian approach to both the man and the woman’s love of each other, which is to be caused not by external appearance but “mainly by freedom of mind”.

As I have shown, passionate love is based on images and it runs its course with the use of imagination and memory. The dominance of the senses and the lasting impression of their ideas on the mind is the most important feature of passionate romantic love. The lover’s connection to her beloved is founded on passivity, bondage, and confused and inadequate ideas (i.e., the first kind of knowledge). What kind of love is experienced when the lover understands things by the second kind of knowledge? This is the issue I turn to now.

Friendship or Second-Order Love

Epistemically, a result of the connection between love and knowledge is that the more the lover comes to understand the beloved, the more adequately she conceives his idea, the more she “internalizes” his idea, and the more her own mind constitutes its cause. In other words, the more the beloved understands the object of her affection, it becomes less and less of an external object. As a result, the beloved is conceptually stripped of his external features, such as the ideas of his physical appearance, his odor and the sound of his voice. The familiar feeling of identification or unification with the beloved (the feeling that the beloved and lover are a part of one whole or that the beloved is a part of the lover) is conceptualized by Spinoza’s epistemology as a true internalization by the lover’s mind of the idea of the beloved.

The movement from the first to the second kind of knowledge is the result of a rational understanding of some aspect of the idea of the object of perception. That is, the mind regards external objects not exclusively through bodily affections, but in an internally-directed fashion, with a rational method that expresses the nature of the mind itself. In 2p29s this is presented, in a nutshell, as the mind’s ability to “regard a number of things at once, to understand their agreements, differences and oppositions”. For Spinoza, the most fundamental rational act is making some form of comparison between things perceived simultaneously; this process is an action the mind performs on the objects which it originally perceived passively and randomly. The result of this action is a comprehension of common properties which the mind understands adequately. These notions are equally in the part and in the whole, and
are common to all (2p38c). Proceeding from the first to the second kind of knowledge means that the lover understands the beloved as an idea which is a part of her own mind, insofar as both her mind and the idea of the beloved are modes of God or Nature and insofar as they share common properties. The movement from the first to the second kind of love is a transferal of the emphasis of the relationship from a physical and emotive connection to that of deep friendship. Unlike its popular conception, Spinoza’s friendship is not a bond which is associated with an incidental fondness between individuals, based on idiosyncratic, almost accidental connections which are actually passionate love-attachments. Spinozistic friendship is more akin to fraternity, comradeship or a strong, ideal relation between compatriots. It is a form of simple humanism: the love one ought to have for fellow men and women by

10 Despite some references to women and romantic attachments that appear misogynistic (e.g., 3p2s and 3p35s, as well as a couple of infamous passages in the unfinished Political Treatise), in 4p68s Spinoza very clearly describes the ideal bond between man and woman (as presented in the Biblical story of the Garden of Eden) as a bond that completely agrees with man’s (or a human’s) nature and therefore the most valuable and beneficial thing he could find (an almost identical phrasing to the description of the rational friend to be discussed shortly). For redeeming feminist accounts of Spinoza, see: Beth Lord, “‘Disempowered by Nature’. Spinoza on The Political Capabilities of Women”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2011) 6, pp. 1085–1106; Genevieve Lloyd, Part of Nature. Self-Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1994, pp. 160–168. For a specific reading of the passage in 4p68s within the context of the TP, which is similar to my understanding of the passage, see: Hasana Sharp, “Eve’s Perfection: Spinoza on Sexual (In)Equality”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2012) 4, pp. 559–580, doi: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2012.0068. I return to this below.

11 The most recent substantial reference to this issue in Spinoza is to be found in: Andrew Youpa, The Ethics of Joy. Spinoza on the Empowered Life, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, pp. 160–179. Youpa conceives friendship as a form of love and also differentiates it (as I do) from passionate love and love of God. He does not, however, tie these forms of love with the three kinds of knowledge. An important contributor to this debate is: Jeanette Bicknell, “An Overlooked Aspect of Love in Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’”, Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1998), pp. 41–55. Bicknell defines friendship, or “self-determined love” for others as the most rewarding of human relationships. I disagree with Bicknell in her assessment that friendship is based on adequate knowledge of the self and of the loved one – an adequate knowledge of a particular thing is defined as the third, and not the second kind of knowledge (which relates to common properties).

12 Here, I follow Marshall’s argument in: Eugene Marshall, The Spiritual Automaton. Spinoza’s Science of the Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, pp. 41–53. Put very briefly, there is a necessary connection between adequacy and innateness: since having an adequate idea means understanding its cause fully (3d1 and 3d2) and since this can only be done when the mind is itself the sole cause of the idea (and there is no other external cause in the mix), adequate ideas are innate.

13 I have mentioned above that passionate love can be of things and not only of people (e.g., food, money or fame). Proceeding to the second kind of knowledge regarding these objects is emblematic of a tenacious person. I focus here on nobility and friendship because the original object I took up was another person, an object of romantic affection, and I am continuing this route in describing the metamorphosis of this object in the mind.

14 Matthew J. Kisner argues that these shared properties, which he regards as common essential properties, can be found in anatomical similarities between human beings, such as the circulatory system and the general structure of the brain. Cf. Matthew J. Kisner, “Spinoza’s Benevolence. The Rational Basis for Acting to the Benefit of Others”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009) 4, pp. 549–567, here p. 553, doi: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.0.0161. This, is of course, true, but the parallel similarities of the mechanisms of the mental life are even more important in this respect.
virtue of their humanity (and, minimally, by virtue of their shared circumstances as fellow citizens). This is because friendship is a love based upon an understanding of the commonality between myself and another, the similarities and not the differences between us, which I have arrived at rationally. In a friend one does not see the accidental properties that differentiate, but the common properties that bind and unify. It is the understanding that eventually gives rise to the philosophical imperative to “love thy neighbour as thyself”. Regarding this issue of friendship, Spinoza taps into a rich historical tradition of philosophical discussion (most famously, perhaps, that of Aristotle, who memorably claimed the true friend to be “another self”). In 4p18s Spinoza argues that nothing is more useful to an individual than another who is similar and agrees with their nature. This “other” is a friend – it is a fellow human being who shares as much as possible the nature of the self. And this nature is expressed to the fullest only when the passions of both individuals are reduced to a minimum (because “insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree in nature”, 4p32).

Friendship is a form of love that is emblematic of ratio on two counts. First, the degree to which the friends’ passions are kept at a minimum is the degree to which they are rational and this is what guarantees their second-order love. That is, friendship is based on the rationality of each person in the relationship. Second, the lovability of the friend is grounded in the lover’s ability to understand their common properties and recognize what is common to them both, and also equally in the part and in the whole of both. Spinoza ties agreement in nature between humans to reason in 4p35; and in 4p37s defines being honorable as “the desire by which a man who lives according to the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship”. The remainder of this long scholium is a discussion of the civil state, its constitution of justice and injustice, and human right as it is bestowed by nature – it shows that Spinoza’s notion of friendship, as a rational relationship based on common properties between humans, is a vision of democratic citizenship and compatriotism.

In the scholium of 3p59, which deals with the actions (as opposed to passions) of the mind, Spinoza writes:

“By nobility I understand the desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship.”

Nobility is an action of the mind, related to joy and empowerment. The object to which the mind is directed, other individuals and the friendship the individual desires to create with them, all point to this form of comradery as Spinoza’s second-kind-of-knowledge love.

The love toward a friend is an affect which stems from reason and freedom of mind, and therefore is beneficial, empowering and cannot be excessive (4p37, 4p71d). In a way, the friend is not an external cause or object, but a bond between minds which makes the minds as one. This is precisely what Spinoza is pointing to in 4p18s:

“There are […] many things outside us which are useful to us, and on that account ought to be sought. Of these, we can think of none more excellent than those which agree entirely with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one. To man, then, there is nothing more useful than man.” [My emphasis]
The image of two individuals becoming one, twice as powerful, is highly relevant to understanding the evolution of a good love-attachment that is the core of a marriage or partnership; it helps to illustrate the metamorphosis of romantic love discussed above. After the initial period of passion and the need to weather the turmoil that comes with it, partners hopefully transition to a high degree of unification: in their goals, their methods and their values. In the challenges they encounter, such as raising children and achieving financial success as a household, it is best they are indeed twice as powerful as they were before the union.

As I have shown, Spinoza equates the achievement of a deeper knowledge of the beloved (an understanding of the common properties they partake in) with what can be interpreted as a deeper love for them; this deeper knowledge, insofar as it is an action of the mind, also tracks an increase of power and joy to the mind. To know better is to love better and vice versa. Although these different kinds of love are not presented as such (passionate love and noble love are described separately), it is quite clear that this process is similar to the process of emending the intellect and achieving better understanding. Through overcoming the passions and achieving a relationship which sees the beloved as another self, an individual who shares the lover’s very nature, the lover actually comes to better understand, as well as love, the beloved.

The Intellectual Love of God or Third-Order Love

Before I turn to the intellectual love of God, there is an important point to address regarding the neat division of love into three kinds, corresponding to Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge. Passionate love goes with opinio vel imaginatio; friendship with ratio; and intellectual love of God with scientia intuitiva. But there is a fourth kind, namely, love of God. This is presented in the first half of Part 5 (e.g., 5p15–16, 19), preceding the presentation of the intellectual love of God in 5p32c.19 I call this the generic love of God. It is indeed a step in the metamorphosis, but in terms of epistemology it remains attached to the second kind of knowledge. The object of love changes from a person or a thing to a general love of God, insofar as God is understood as the totality of the world and the laws by which it operates. This love correlates


18 Spinoza’s political notion of friendship emerges quite clearly in chapters 17, 19 and 20 of the TTP (as a covenant between fellow citizens of a democracy).

19 Most commentators do not observe a difference between these two kinds. A rare discussion in English language of this distinction appears in: S. Nadler, “The Intellectual Love of God”, p. 302. This difference can also be found in Francophone readings of Spinoza such as: Ferdinand Alquié, Le rationalisme de Spinoza, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1981, pp. 320–321.
with adequate knowledge of common properties and represents rational understanding of eternal truths regarding the object, while retaining the object’s existence in imaginative space and time. Thus, the lover experiences love for the world and the people around her in a way that promotes her wellbeing “in this present life”.

The reason that the generic love of God is situated between love of people and intellectual love of God is that it is easier for the mind to recognize its common properties with the modes to which it is most similar, i.e., other human beings (an understanding that results in friendship). In order to proceed to love of God that encompasses the whole of nature, the mind must have a better understanding of itself not only as human (which relates to its most basic notion of self-consciousness), but as a mode inseparable from the whole of nature. The similarities between myself and a horse, a caterpillar and a rock are increasingly more difficult for my imagination to grasp. But this is precisely the leap the mind has to take in order to rationally understand the mind as a part of nature as a whole.

Understanding my own mind as a part of Nature involves what Spinoza calls in the Preface to Part 3 a consideration of “human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies”. This type of understanding does not only lead to moral behavior, as in the case of friendship (the second kind of love discussed in the previous section), but to conclusions such as that presented in 2p48:

“In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.”

That is, the generic love of God positions the human mind as an inseparable part of Nature, bound by the laws that express its common properties, along with the infinitely many modes that are also a part of Nature. The crucial difference between this generic love of God and the famous intellectual love of God, is that the former takes as its objects common properties (understood rationally), while the latter takes as its object essences of things.

The intermediary position of the generic love of God with relation to friendship and to the intellectual love of God can be better understood through an analysis of 5p15–16. In 5p15 Spinoza writes:

“He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and does so the more, the more he understands himself and his affects.”

The focus put on understanding one’s own affections clearly and distinctly, and their constitution as necessary parts of Nature, is an important step toward loving God as the whole of Nature, in contrast with loving other people as oneself. The expansion of love toward the whole of Nature marks a further emendation of the intellect and one that is more difficult to achieve. In 5p16 Spinoza points to the fact that the more we love Nature, the more our mind and body will be engaged with this love; therefore, the more joyous and powerful the mind will become. But this is not the final step in love’s transitions, since having some clear and distinct understanding of the ideas of bodily affections is still only partially rational: it still involves an idea with some aspect of duration.

The next and final step is the intellectual love of God – one of the most controversial and perplexing notions presented in Part 5, which is famous for its discussion of some sort of existence that Spinoza refers to as beyond “this
present life” and “those things which pertain to the mind’s duration without relation to the body” (5p20s). The overarching goal of Part 5, according to its preface, is to demonstrate the power of reason over the passions. This demonstration is not meant as an instruction manual designed to guide the reader to freedom and blessedness, but a road map of sorts, which shows (as in a best-case-scenario) what an emended intellect, endowed and led by reason, can do. This roadmap is of a passage of the mind from the first, through the second and, ultimately, to the third kind of knowledge. Intertwined through this description of the philosopher’s quest for adequate and true knowledge, is a continued reference to love: first as a passion, then as a rational understanding that engenders morality and, finally, as a joy far superior to the transitional joy of passionate affections.

In Part 5 Spinoza ties the highest form of knowledge with love; and when he does so, it is radically unequivocal:

“This from the third kind of knowledge, there necessarily arises an intellectual love of God.” (5p32c) [My emphasis]

In his declaration that the third kind of knowledge necessarily generates an intellectual love of God, Spinoza embraces and reinforces his previous commitments to love as a form of joy, knowledge as an affect of the mind, and the difference between objects of love being external or innate ideas with respect to the mind. Intellectual love of God is solely of God or Nature as he is conceived philosophically, not to be confused with a joy caused by an image of God:

“… from [the third kind of knowledge] there arises a joy, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is, love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present, but insofar as we understand God to be eternal.” (5p32c)

It is somewhat of a challenge to maintain a sense of identity regarding the beloved object in the movement from the first to the second kind of knowledge and from passionate love to friendship. By moving on from loving someone passionately as a unique individual, to loving them rationally as a friend, the beloved fundamentally changes in their perception in the lover’s mind. The lover is no longer preoccupied with things such as appearance or wit, but with common properties, morality and a shared desire for knowledge and truth. The further movement to intuitive understanding and intellectual love of God is even more dramatic, epistemologically as well as affectively. As a result of understanding an object via the third kind of knowledge, the mind’s love (its joy) which accompanies it is “transformed” into a love of God. That is, the object of love, which was previously perceived (for our present purposes) as another person, is revealed as God.

This is why I chose to label it the “generic” love of God. It pertains to the human’s existence as a mode reacting and acting with infinite other modes, perceived under an aspect of duration. But the objects of this love are not necessarily other humans, but Nature as it is experienced in duration.

This is the subject of extensive scholarly debate and is firmly beyond the scope of this paper. A recent and persuasive contribution is found in: Mogens Lærke, “Spinoza on the Eternity of the Mind”, Dialogue 55 (2016) 2, pp. 265–286, doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217316000445. He argues for an interpretation of eternity which does not see rational and eternal existence as mutually exclusive, but as pertaining to different aspects of the mind (insofar as it is an idea in God).
Spinoza is claiming that if the lover succeeds in understanding her beloved to the highest degree, via the third kind of knowledge, she will no longer be experiencing love for that object as he is perceived by the senses even to the smallest extent; she will experience an intellectual love of God. This love is a joy that arises as a reaction to understanding the eternal and necessary aspect of his idea (understanding him under a species of eternity), in a way which eliminates the beloved’s separateness from the lover’s mind in all ways. In the union of the ideas of the lover and the beloved, the love becomes a love of God, and also a love of the mind, insofar as it is God, for itself. The sense of elation which accompanies the intellectual love of God is in many ways removed from the original perception of the idea of the beloved as a unique individual. This is interesting to note especially since the third kind of knowledge promised what seemed to be the most intimate of understandings: a knowledge of the essences of the thing.

The transformation of the object of love and the unification of the lover’s mind with it (i.e., the loss of its uniqueness and separateness) and, therefore, the continuity between the kinds of love and their internal consistency, can only be understood through the analysis presented above, namely, of love as an affect which is determined by knowledge. This is presented by Spinoza lyrically (and clearly) in the opening lines of his dialogue in the Short Treatise, where Love turns to Intellect and says:

“I see, Brother, that my being and perfection depend entirely on your perfection; and since the perfection of the object you have conceived is your perfection, and mine in turn proceeds from yours, tell me, I beg you, whether you have conceived a supremely perfect being, which cannot be limited by anything else, and in which I too am contained.” (I/28/5–10)

In this quote Spinoza uses the common medium of philosophical dialogue to show the necessary correlation between the way in which the object is loved and the way in which it is conceived. The perfection or the power with which the mind is endowed through love is dependent on the perfection and power of the intellect. The stronger the intellect, the better it understands the objects which engage the mind and then the better and more empowering the love. When the intellect is at its most powerful, it conceives God, the most perfect being; this understanding of God leads to joy, an increase in power of the intellect and therefore love of God; this love of the most perfect being, which is limitless and encompasses the thinking, loving mind itself, ends up being a self-directed love (the love by which God loves himself, insofar as he is conceived as constituting the mind). It is revealed that the most intimate of understandings is understanding things as they truly are – in God under an aspect of eternity.

The metamorphosis of love and the beloved are complete when the mind reaches the intellectual love of God. Insofar as the mind understands things inadequately (via the first kind of knowledge), its love is inconstant. This love regards the object as set in a particular time and place, with imaginative properties which are subject to change and corruption; more importantly, the mind regards the object as external. In the case of the intellectual love of God, which arises as a result of the third kind of knowledge, we find the opposite. The imagined uniqueness and externality of the object of love is replaced with an intuitive perception of it under a species of eternity – there is no more option of corruption or change, nor vacillation of mind. The explicit comparison between kinds of love and kinds of knowledge appears in 5p20s, which I will quote at length:
Susan James claims that love as unification is generally feared in the worldly realm of passions and therefore causes anxiety in the image of unification in knowledge with God. Cf. S. James, *Passion and Action*, pp. 250–252.

Spinoza does not directly address the issue of anxiety that accompanies love (except insofar as it causes vacillation of mind and then only in the realm of passionate love), but it is an interesting topic for a separate investigation.

The mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained by the human mind’s essence, considered under a species of eternity; that is, the mind’s intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.” (5p36)


I address this quote from the *Short Treatise* in order to illustrate the point regarding the relationship between love and knowledge argued for in the *Ethics*. The development of Spinoza’s view of love from the earlier works, especially this point made in the *Kv* as well as the discussion of love in the famous opening paragraphs of the *TdIE* (regarding the importance of loving the right things, i.e., God and his knowledge, in order to be truly happy) is more a matter of the type of argument used and less of the content of the argument or the definition of love. In all mentions, love is considered both as a potentially empowering affect, when directed toward God, and as the most important affect in human life, due to its intrinsic relation to value.
The object of love, now understood to be God or Nature, is what the mind is unified with, or the thing of which the mind understands itself to be an inseparable part. Through an emendation of the intellect and a progression from the first to the second, and the third kind of knowledge, the “transformation” of the object is presented as nothing more than improved understanding. The unification of the mind with the “new” object, that is, God, is nothing but the mind’s understanding of itself under a species of eternity (i.e., the necessary existence of the unique, indivisible substance of which it is a part).

Objections and Implications

I will now present possible objections to this interpretation, my replies and the implications it might have on future research. The first issue that emerges from my suggestion regarding scientia intuitiva is this: In what sense is the third kind of knowledge a greater consciousness of the self, God and things, and how does the intellectual love of God complement this knowledge? Understood under an aspect of eternity, the mind itself and the “things” that were previously perceived as external to it (under an aspect of duration) are actually unified, as presented in 1p14c1 following the argument for God’s necessary existence as substance:

“This from this it follows most clearly, first, that God is unique, that is (by 1d6), that in Nature there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite (as we indicated in 1p10s).”

This comprehension of the uniqueness and infinity of God is circled back to the discussion of the intellectual love of God:

“The mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained by the human mind’s essence, considered under a species of eternity; that is, the mind’s intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.” (5p36)

It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for the precise nature of the third kind of knowledge. My working hypothesis is that it is a form of understanding of things insofar as they are eternal. Therefore, when the mind understands things via the third kind of knowledge, the mind understands itself and all other things as eternal modes of God, as described in 5p40s:

“… our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect.”

I argue that in this quote, Spinoza is claiming that the kind of knowledge that begets the intellectual love of God is an understanding of the mind and all other ideas only insofar as they are eternal modes of thinking. As such, they are actually constituents of the indivisible substance understood as eternal and infinite intellect (i.e., the essence of substance understood immediately through the attribute of Thought). Therefore, they are not, strictly speaking, separate things. Although Spinoza writes of the mind, God and things as if these are three different types of things, the meaning behind his phrasing is that they are not different, but one and the same. This is precisely why this particular phrasing is repeated, always with the same order and in similar contexts. In the case of scientia intuitiva, the mind, God and things are one and the same. Therefore, in its final metamorphosis, love that originated as an
affection directed toward an external thing becomes intellectual love of God; and this intellectual love of God is the love by which God loves himself.

A second issue is also connected to the mind’s divorce from duration in the context of the third kind of knowledge. How is the non-transitional affective state that characterizes the intellectual love of God explained? Affects, according to their original definition (3d3), are transitions. They are initially defined by Spinoza as changes to the power of the individual thing. In the second half of Part 5, where the intellectual love of God is discussed, the two major notions which constitute the definition – namely, individuality and change – are reconceptualised. Since these propositions do not pertain to perception under an aspect of duration (they are strictly beyond “this present life”), change is no longer a coherent concept (since it relates to time). Similarly, individuality or a comparison between the powers of distinct things, is also incoherent.

Under an aspect of eternity, the substance is understood as wholly indivisible and it allows no separate or distinct individuals whose powers are comparable. Intellectual love of God, therefore, tied to the third kind of knowledge, cannot be transitional. Why, then, is this still conceived as an affect? Because experience-based notions are retained even when their meaning is radically different when they are used to describe divine concepts. The intellectual love of God is as much an affect as the mind is a human mind, understood as unified with the divine intellect under an aspect of eternity. That is, since all ideas are necessarily understood differently under an aspect of duration and under an aspect of eternity, the static, a-temporal element of the intellectual love of God is consistent with the use of the term love in rest of the Ethics. If anything, Spinoza makes a point of describing the intellectual love of God in a way that defies equivocations – retaining the denomination of love shows that in its most empowered, the mind is perfectly joyful, to the point of beatitude.

Consciousness of the mind itself, God and things, is described (especially in 5p39s and 5p42s) as the highest achievement in this life and equated with the third kind of knowledge.

This is consistent with Spinoza’s reference in the same scholium to 1p21, which reads: “All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.” Since all things understood thus are infinite, they are actually united as one into the idea of God understood through his essence. Their finitude, which pertains to understanding under an aspect of duration, is nullified.

I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the apparent similarity between this interpretation and Hegelian acosmism, and clarify my views on acosmism. In a nutshell, acosmism serves as an emendation of Spinoza’s reputation as an atheist and states that, contrary to 18th century common perception, Spinoza “favored” God over the world. That is, he was not against deity, but against the cosmos. The most basic problem I see with this interpretation, is that Spinoza was not really against either – on the contrary, God is the world (this is the obvious meaning behind the phrase Deus sive Natura). Nevertheless, Spinoza’s frequent derogatory remarks regarding the perception of modes as disparate entities show that there is a serious problem with understanding individual things, perceived in time and space, as real things. I interpret Spinoza as restricting the third kind of knowledge to an understanding of things only insofar as they are inseparable parts of God or Nature, thus understanding quantity as indivisible in essence (as mentioned in 1p15s and the Letter on the Infinite). Therefore, understanding things’ essence via the third kind of knowledge means understanding them under a species of eternity, as inseparable parts of God.

For a discussion of this idea see: Alexandre Koyré, “The dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal”, trans. Oberto Marrama, The Leibniz Review 24 (2014), pp. 95–108.
The third issue originates from some commentators’ perception of Spinoza’s intellectual love of God as a mystical lapse. I suggest that it actually has the most striking resemblance not to religious or mystical forms of elation, but to the Aristotelian model of the contemplative life. In the tenth and final book of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, the scholastics’ Philosopher famously asserts that the highest form of happiness, the *telos* of human life, is contemplation. This activity of the intellect (what Spinoza would call the power, virtue or essence of the mind, e.g. in 3p7, 4d8 and 5p25), is characterized by self-sufficiency and has its own particular pleasure. Aristotle’s choice of contemplation as the highest good of human life in the culmination of his discussion of ethics has its basis in his naturalistic account of teleology. The teleological aspect of his reasoning is, of course, highly inconsistent with Spinoza’s; but its naturalism is reminiscent of it. Moreover, Aristotle and Spinoza both agree that the blessedness to be found in the life of contemplation is extremely rare, not sustainable for an entire lifetime, and that friends or human companionship and support are key for its durability. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue the comparison between Spinoza and Aristotle further. But I do think that it is not by chance that Spinoza’s profound and relatable theory of love and knowledge seems to become so very puzzling at the end. In the final propositions of the *Ethics*, Spinoza is tapping into a rich tradition of philosophical fascination with a life of lonely, intellectual self-sufficiency. For all of his pragmatic and insightful observations of “mundane” human affairs, Spinoza reveals himself at the very end to be a true philosopher’s philosopher: the ultimate intellectual activity is a matter of lonely, autarkic contemplation; love is the philosophical unification of the mind with the divine, and not with others. This, for Spinoza, is the purest form of a philosopher’s love—a complete metamorphosis of the love of *hoi polloi*.

**Conclusion**

I have shown that Spinoza has a coherent and robust theory of love in the *Ethics*. The notion of love plays important and unique roles in Spinoza’s ethics and epistemology. In the former, love serves as a clear compass regarding one’s understanding of his or her own essence (i.e., desire) and the moral values that it entails. In the latter, love accompanies different kinds of understanding (via the first, second or third kind of knowledge) and emphasizes Spinoza’s views on the affectivity of knowledge. Spinoza’s theory of love is characterized by a metamorphosis of love which reflects the changes in the individual’s mind as they become more conscious of themselves, things and God. From the first kind of love, passionate love, the mind can proceed to the second kind of love (which manifests itself both in friendship and the generic love of God or Nature) and, finally, to the intellectual love of God. I believe that the most interesting and novel implications of this argument have to do with the intellectual love of God and the third kind of knowledge. I have shown that by focusing interpretive attention on the mind’s evolving understanding of the object of love, we get a clearer picture of what *scientia intuitiva* is: an understanding of everything, the mind and mind’s object of understanding, as one thing in God. This understanding, the greatest achievement of the mind and its greatest virtue, is accompanied by love or joy which constitute the greatest blessedness one can realize.
Metamorfoza ljubavi u Spinozinoj Etici

Sažetak
Spinozina Etika ima robustnu i podcijenjenu teoriju ljubavi. U ovom članku pokazujem da Spinozina rasprava o ljubavi, smještena na križištu između njegove etike i njegove epistemologije, opisuje metamorfozu ljubavi u filozofovu umu – od strastvene ljubavi do intelektualne ljubavi prema Bogu, te od imaginacije ili mnijenja do scientia intuitiva. Metamorfoza je odgovorna za međusobno usko povezanu filozofovu moralnost i usavršenje razumijevanja. Čitati Spinozine upute za etički i filozofijski napredak kroz prizmu njegove teorije o ljubavi sadrži ključ za razumijevanje nekih od najviše zbanjujućih problema predočenih u drugoj polovici Petog dijela, točnije, prirode intelektualne ljubavi za Bogom i predmeta treće vrste znanja.

Ključne riječi
Baruch de Spinoza, ljubav, čuvstvo, znanje, Bog, etika

30 The most prominent of these is: J. Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 357. He regards Spinoza’s presentation of the intellectual love of God as “lame” and goes so far as to refuse to discuss it at all: “I shall not expound the details, as the burden of error and confusion has become unbearable.” – Ibid., p. 370. This issue has been dealt with extensively especially through its relation to the eternity of the mind. Cf. Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy. Immortality and the Jewish Mind, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2001, pp. 94–130. A recent discussion of the intellectual love of God in this vein is made by: Y. Melamed, “The Enigma”. But he remains inconclusive whether Spinoza manages to rationalize or fully explain the coherence of the intellectual love of God with the rest of his project.


32 NE 1177b25–30; see Sp10s for Spinoza’s claims regarding our abilities to sustain true knowledge and love of God. For a more general review of Spinoza’s version of eudaimonia, see: Jon Miller, Spinoza and the Stoics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, pp. 189–202.

33 A comparison with Aristotle, the philosopher of phila, seems somewhat off the mark in a discussion of love, when the philosopher of eros, Plato, is the more obvious choice. I would like to thank an anonymous reader for suggesting an acknowledgement of the similarities between my interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of love, as a metamorphosis into better and better objects, and the ascent described by Socrates and Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. Ultimately, I believe that Spinoza can be regarded as part of an eros-inspired philosophical tradition, which originates most prominently from Plato. Similarly to Plato, Spinoza’s theory is based on a radical naturalization of love (applicable from the “lower” animals and all the way to the philosophically-minded human). It is closely linked with morality, well-being and a quasi-religious notion of happiness. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue with the depth it deserves, but it is without a doubt worthy of comment and further articulation.
Noa Lahav Ayalon

Die Metamorphose der Liebe in Spinozas Ethik

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter
Baruch de Spinoza, Liebe, Affektivität, Wissen, Gott, Ethik

Noa Lahav Ayalon

La métamorphose de l’amour dans L’Éthique de Spinoza

Résumé
L’Éthique de Spinoza a une théorie de l’amour robuste et sous-valorisée. Dans cet article, je montre que le débat de Spinoza sur l’amour, qui se situe au croisement entre son éthique et son épistémologie, décrit la métamorphose de l’amour dans l’esprit du philosophe – de l’amour passionnel à l’amour intellectuel envers Dieu, et de l’imagination et l’opinion à la scientia intuitiva. Cette métamorphose est responsable de la moralité du philosophe intimement liée à la perfection de sa compréhension. La lecture des conseils de Spinoza, en vue d’un progrès éthique et philosophique à travers le prisme de sa théorie de l’amour, contient la clé pour comprendre certains des problèmes les plus déroutants présentés dans la deuxième moitié de la Cinquième partie, plus précisément, la nature de l’amour intellectuel de Dieu et le sujet du troisième genre de connaissance.

Mots-clés
Baruch de Spinoza, amour, affection, connaissance, Dieu, éthique