

Karl Kraatz

Hunan University, Yuelu-Academy, 2 Lushan S Rd,
Yuelu District, CN-410012, Changsha, Hunan Province, China
k.kraatz@gmx.de

Resoluteness as a Philosophical Method

A New Look at *Being and Time*

Abstract

*I argue that one of the central concepts of the second part of *Being and Time* – resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) – represents a new way of doing philosophy and should therefore be understood as a philosophical method. Resoluteness is a specific way of comporting oneself towards things and is methodologically necessary to uncover these things as what they are. I draw on insights from the recently published *On My Own Publications*, in which Heidegger points to resoluteness as a crucial step towards his later methodological stance. In doing so, I illuminate important aspects of *Being and Time* and contribute to ongoing debates about Heidegger’s philosophical method. I demonstrate that it is Heidegger’s critique of transcendental philosophy and of the inquiry into possibility conditions that is meant to be overcome by developing the idea of resoluteness as a philosophical method.*

Keywords

Martin Heidegger, phenomenology, methodology, metaphilosophy, *Being and Time*, *On My Own Publications*

1. “Resoluteness” as a Philosophical Method

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had developed a new method that would later become essential for his late philosophy. The main goal of this paper is to show that what I will call “resoluteness” (*Entschlossenheit*) is this new method. *Resoluteness* is a specific way of comporting oneself towards things that is methodologically necessary if one is to uncover these things as what they are. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger calls this “letting beings show themselves in their Being”.¹² As well as contributing to an ongoing debate about Heidegger’s philosophical method, getting clearer on the notion of resoluteness will provide a new interpretation of *Being and Time*. According to this interpretation, resoluteness is the means by which Heidegger breaks out of the framework of traditional philosophy and develops his own approach, one that will become characteristic of his late philosophy.³ This methodological break is associated with a) the incompleteness of *Being and Time* (with only two-sixths of the book having been published) and b) what is known as the “turning” (*Kehre*) of Heidegger’s philosophy.⁴ Focusing our attention on resoluteness can shed light on both aspects of Heidegger’s methodological break.⁵ The idea, to be spelled out in more detail in what follows, is that transcendental inquiry into possibility conditions (something Heidegger attributes to traditional philosophy) lacks a component necessary for its success and is therefore inherently limited. These limitations, according to this reading of Heidegger, can only be overcome by resoluteness. The exact nature of these limitations will be explicated in what follows.

It is of note that this new interpretation is guided by Heidegger's own criticism of *Being and Time*, only recently published as part of *On My Own Publications*.⁶ *On My Own Publications* is of great importance, containing almost 400 pages of Heidegger's own comments on and criticisms of *Being and Time*. Heidegger gives clear hints as to what he thinks are his work's shortcomings and how they can be overcome. This extended self-criticism reveals that one main reason for Heidegger's dissatisfaction with *Being and Time* lies in the applied philosophical method. He describes this method as an "obsession with groundwork" (*Grundlegungssucht*)⁷ and, referring to the scientific nature of the book, says that:

"With this goes together the essential error in the method and in the approach: the scientificity, the intention to do research."⁸

Exploring how Heidegger's understanding of philosophical method changed between the 1920s and the 1930s will both help us understand what is known as the "turning" (*Kehre*) and shed light on *Being and Time*, as well as on the reasons for his abandonment of the project of a fundamental ontology.⁹

In the first part of this paper, I discuss Heidegger's criticism of the method of *Being and Time* in *On My Own Publications* (section 2). I then turn directly to *Being and Time*, with the aim of showing that resoluteness represents Heidegger's new method (section 3 and section 4). My argument for this claim turns on contrasting resoluteness with "disclosedness" (*Erschlossenheit*). Disclosedness represents traditional transcendental philosophy insofar it stands for the possibility conditions of our experience of the world. Resoluteness, by contrast, is a modified version of that disclosedness with which the shortcomings of the old way of doing philosophy can be overcome. Drawing attention to the relationship between disclosedness and resoluteness, will uncover the methodological significance of resoluteness – something that has not been picked up on in Heidegger-literature.

2. Shortcomings of *Being and Time*: The Method

The following passage from *On My Own Publications* provides an initial impression of Heidegger's view on *Being and Time* when looking back at it almost ten years after its publication:

"The inner difficulty of the 'understanding' of '*Being and Time*' – It has its origin in the ambiguity of the demeanor of the treatise. It claims, according to the wording, to be about the demonstration of "things" [*Sachen*], and yet it is essentially a new projection of being-human beyond and above the human to the appropriation of Being!"¹⁰

Reflecting on his previous work, Heidegger repeatedly states that he remained stuck in the old way of thinking, only occasionally succeeding in breaking out of it.¹¹ He now identifies those aspects of *Being and Time*, namely its scientificity and the transcendental inquiry into possibility conditions, as being necessary to overcome, claiming that *Being and Time* was already "a new projection".¹²

What I want to focus on in this paper is that Heidegger, reflecting on *Being and Time*, suggests that despite its traditional occidental methodology in terms of "groundwork" we can nevertheless find the seed of something new.¹³ This seed will later develop into a radically different approach to, and understanding of, philosophy and its method – an approach that would be manifested in Heidegger's second *magnum opus*, the *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936).

Heidegger captures the core of this new approach when he says that what is required is “not better transcendental engagement, but rather transformation of Da-sein and Being as such”.¹⁴ According to Heidegger’s self-criticism in the 1930s and 1940s, the main point of *Being and Time* is not the gradual refinement of traditional philosophy but rather the overcoming, the “overturning”,¹⁵ the “turnaround”,¹⁶ of it altogether:

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Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 298; translated by Joan Stambaugh as *Being and Time. A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, State University of New York Press, New York 1996. Hereafter cited as BT, followed by the German page number and (only when used) that of Stambaugh’s translation.

2

“Being” with a capitalised B stands for the German word “*Sein*”. “*Seiendes*” (singular) translates as “being” and “*Seiendes*” (plural) as “beings”. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.

3

The reason Heidegger’s method cannot be discussed independently of the object of his philosophy will become clear in what follows. In this paper, I take important insights from von Herrmann’s, from Crowell’s, as well as from Kisiel’s and Dahlstrom’s work on Heidegger’s method. See: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Weg und Methode*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1990). An important work that indirectly deals with Heidegger’s methodology is the collection of essays in: Steven Crowell, Jeff Malpas (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2007. This paper makes use of important insights from Steven Crowell’s work on conscience and on the second division of *Being and Time* in: Steven Galt Crowell, *Normativity and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013. Also, see: Theodore Kisiel and Daniel Dahlstrom’s work on the methodological status of language and on the formal indication in particular: Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications”, *The Review of Metaphysics* 47 (1994) 4, pp. 775–795; Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Das logische Vorurteil*, Passagen Verlag, Vienna 1994; Theodore Kisiel, “Die formale Anzeige der Faktizität als Frage der Logik”, in: Alfred Denker, Holger Zaborowski (eds.), *Heidegger und die Logik*, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam 2006.

4

The so-called continuation thesis, stating that there is no sharp distinction between the philosophy of the early and the late Heidegger, receives further support from Heidegger’s

self-criticism in *On My Own Publications*. For an in-depth discussion of the supposed turning in Heidegger’s thought, see: Orlando Pugliese, *Vermittlung und Kehre. Grundzüge des Geschichtsdenkens bei Martin Heidegger*, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg – München 1965. The turning as an *immanent* reformation of Heidegger’s philosophy is a reoccurring topic in Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann’s work. See, for example *Heidegger’s Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1991.

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See: Charles Guignon, “The Place of Division III in Heidegger’s Plan for *Being and Time*”, in: Lee Braver (ed.), *Division III of Being and Time*, MIT Press, Cambridge – London 2015, pp. 105–115. Guignon emphasises the inadequacies of the method – pointing out that what was needed to overcome in *Being and Time* was a “new way of approaching the question” (p. 112). The aim of this paper is to demonstrate what, exactly, this “new way of approaching” amounts to.

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Martin Heidegger, *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*, in: Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 82, Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (ed.), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2018. Hereafter cited as GA 82.

7

M. Heidegger, GA 82, 28.

8

Ibid., 176.

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On My Own Publications provides new material and insights regarding the ongoing debate about Heidegger’s abandonment of the third division and his so-called “turning”. For the former, see: L. Braver (ed.), *Division III of Heidegger’s Being and Time*.

10

M. Heidegger, GA 82, 180. See: M. Heidegger, GA 82, 21: “The main cause of this is the uncertainty about the basic approach with the method: not description of possibility conditions, but rather the projecting-consolidating inleap into the ground of being-human as the guardian of the truth of Being.”

“... daseinsanalysis is not only a more adequate interpretation [...] [rather, it is] something completely different and therefore not comparable – a completely different basic approach.”¹⁷

Heidegger was ultimately dissatisfied with the method of *Being and Time* because he saw it as representative of the philosophical framework that he took it to be necessary to break out of.¹⁸ In the following sections I will argue that this “completely different basic approach” and “new projection” that Heidegger (retrospectively) attributes to *Being and Time* is partially constituted by resoluteness. Resoluteness, for Heidegger, therefore represents a new way of doing philosophy.¹⁹

That this is the case can be made plausible by contraposing the philosophical method we find in *Being and Time* and in the late Heidegger. According to his own account, one crucial error of *Being and Time* was its focus on providing descriptions, definitions, findings, evidence and research, on proceeding methodically, and on the importance of scientificity and groundwork.²⁰ These aspects of *Being and Time* reflect Heidegger’s own version of the phenomenological understanding of philosophy as rigorous science. In the 1930s and even more so in the 1940s, Heidegger criticises his earlier approach. This later Heidegger instead emphasises the active founding of essence (*Wesensgründung*) rather than the *intuition* of essences (Husserl’s *Wesensanschauung*), fundamental experiences (*Grunderfahrungen*), and working one’s way forward (*Vor-gehen*) towards phenomena instead of anonymously applying a fixed scientific method. This method, for Heidegger, involves preserving (*wahren*) and guarding (*bewahren*) truth, insisting and, at the same time, enduring to be in the openness of the clearing of Being (*Beständnis*, *Aus-stehen*, *In-ständnis*), transforming (*verwandeln*), establishing (*einrichten*), founding (*stiften*) and creating (*schaffen*).²¹

Heidegger does not explain these terms. However, it is obvious that what unifies these aspects is their commitment to a specific kind of engagement and activity. An engagement that is best understood according to the famous words of Heidegger’s “Letter about ‘Humanism’”:

“Thinking is l’engagement par l’Être pour l’Être.”²²

One could gesture at the contrast between the Heidegger of *Being and Time* and the later Heidegger by pointing out that in *Being and Time* Heidegger was strongly influenced by Kant’s transcendental philosophy and that he cared far more about the ideal of scientificity, exemplified by his attempt to build a secure foundation by rigorously uncovering preconditions.²³ The late Heidegger does not speak of methods or techniques. Instead, he emphasises the necessity of the philosopher to become an essential part of the research. The philosopher must create an openness and let something take place (*sich ereignen*) within that openness.²⁴

This contrast between the scientificity of *Being and Time* and the (allegedly mystical) evocation of fundamental experiences of the late Heidegger has become a popular way to generalise the development of Heidegger’s philosophy. This generalization has frequently become the subject of criticism by Heidegger-scholars, who try to give a more adequate account of the continuity of Heidegger’s thought.²⁵ The main gesture of these attempts is that the criticism of modern science and of the scientificity that is part of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* must *not* be identified with a proposal for irrationality. Instead, it could be the case that the rationality of philosophy is different from

the scientific, theoretical rationality which has become the foundation not just for science but for the modern age as such.

The main aim of modern science, Heidegger claims, is to overcome one's individuality in order to produce trans-subjective and trans-situational results. The scientist takes the point of view of a neutral observer, attempting

11

Ibid., 22, 28, 51, 58, 81, 102, 126, 184, 330, *et passim*.

12

Ibid., 177: "... the phenomenological existential-transcendental-ontological 'methodism' [*Methodismus*] – the constant insistence on identification [*Ausweisung*] – the giving [*Gebung*] – adequacy and so forth." M. Heidegger, GA 82, 28: "Being stuck in a modified transcendental phenomenology, whereas other things were intended [*gewollt*] from the ground up, what was intended was also still ambiguously conceived within the existentiell." Ibid., 104: "[giving] the appearance, As if a sufficient approach were to be gained by improvement"; See also M. Heidegger, GA 82, 38 and 274.

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Cf. *ibid.*, 142–43, 274.

14

Ibid., 29.

15

Ibid. Cf. *ibid.*, 184.

16

Ibid., 190.

17

Ibid., 51–52. See also, *ibid.*, 39, 104, 135, 149, 170, 177–179, 210, *et passim*.

18

Ibid., 245. Compare also, *ibid.*, 392.

19

Cf. *ibid.*, 127, 568–69.

20

Ibid., 43: "In phenomenology, the appeal to the 'intuition of essence'; description; however, essence is only created – not discovered and studied!" Ibid., 177: "Especially that which apparently has 'made an effect', the methodicism [*Methodismus*] and the existentiell [*das Existenzielle*], these two are the actual calamities of the attempt, and this lets the actual essential part – the questioning [*das Erfragen*], i.e. the creation of the essence of the truth of Being as the historical founding – not come forth."

21

Ibid., 43, 51, *et passim*. For example: *ibid.*, 176: "With this goes together the essential error in the method and in the approach: the

scientificity, the intention to do research. The essence of philosophy as creation unventured, because impaired by the in both directions identically erroneous either: science or: *Weltanschauung*." Ibid., 75: "... not describing, creating!"

22

Martin Heidegger, "Brief über den 'Humanismus'", in: M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, *Wegmarken (1919-1961)*, Friedrich Wilhelm v. Herrmann (ed.), Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1976, p. 145.

23

Even though Heidegger criticises the idea of a *fundamentum inconcussum* (a firm, or unshakeable, foundation), he never lost sight of the task that was associated with it: groundwork. Heidegger, GA 82, 38: "Overcome the understanding of Being and the possibility-question with 'ontology' – without forgetting about the grounding."

24

Already in the earliest lectures of Heidegger, one can find a similar emphasis on the activity and the engagement of the philosopher in what he calls the "enactment sense" (*Vollzugssinn*). [I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for this important reminder.] In what follows I argue that "resoluteness" does in fact stand for the genuine enactment sense of philosophy as it is the embodiment of what Heidegger calls "counter-ruinance" (*Gegenruinanz*) in the 1921/22 lecture and what he identifies with doing philosophy. See: Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 61, Walter Bröcker, Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1985, 153: "The philosophical enactment of the interpretation is a counter-ruinant movement [*gegenruinante Bewegtheit*] [...]." Also, *ibid.*: "... the enactment of philosophizing [*Vollzug des Philosophierens*] is always at the same time the battle of the philosophical factual interpretation against its own factual ruinance [*gegen ihre eigene faktische Ruinanz*]." See the following section 4 for the discussion of "resoluteness" as the enactment of the "counter-ruinant movement".

25

See footnote 3; See also Matthew Burch, Irene McMullin (ed.), *Transcending Reason*.



to remain outside of events and not interfere with the unfolding process. This pointed neutrality is something the late Heidegger strongly opposes. In this later work, the philosopher is fully engaged with the events they are presented with. The central tasks of the philosopher that are mentioned throughout *On My Own Publications* (founding, creating, transforming, preserving, and guarding) certainly could not be carried out by a neutral observer who is simply applying a designated tool to generate predicted outcomes. Throughout his extensive reflection on his work, Heidegger repeatedly returns to the distinction between his infatuation with scientificity, findings, and groundwork in *Being and Time* and his later insight that philosophy is rather about a specific kind of engagement with what has to show itself *from itself*. An engagement that is nevertheless conceived of as a unique way of grounding.²⁶

Heidegger takes his earlier self to have allowed the possibility to understand the philosophical method as something that can be applied in essentially the same way as the scientific method – giving the impression that philosophy is simply a different way of doing science.²⁷ The late Heidegger, however, maintains that it is a mistake to see the philosophical method as a tool at all.²⁸ For example, the early Heidegger often associates the philosophical method with certain techniques, speaking of the phenomenological method, of description, analysis, eidetic variation, *epoché*, formalization, formal indication, destruction and of repetition (to only name a few). Despite his protestation that these techniques *cannot* be used as tools,²⁹ this earlier work nevertheless contains the potential for a de-contextualisation of these methods. Heidegger warns us against *mindless* application of these methods as if they were something that can mediate between subject and object without any kind of participation from either of them. Even accepting what Heidegger says, we may nevertheless wonder *why* Heidegger criticises this instrumental understanding of the philosophical method and why he protests using his methods mindlessly (as if they were tools): What is the difference between the *mindless* application of the scientific method and the *mindful* application of the philosophical method? In the next section, I appeal to the notion of resoluteness to shed light on this. Working through the role that resoluteness plays in *Being in Time*, I make the case that it encapsulates the transformation of Heidegger's understanding of the philosophical method, thereby transforming his philosophy – turning the early Heidegger into what is known as the late Heidegger.

3. *Being and Time*: Transcendentalism and Resoluteness

In this section, I aim to show that *Being and Time* contained the beginnings of the philosophical method that would be developed in Heidegger's later work. In doing so, I put forward a novel interpretation of *Being and Time* according to which Heidegger's line of argument does not culminate in time, or temporality, but in resoluteness. On this interpretation, *Being and Time*'s analysis of temporality represents the old Heidegger whereas the development of resoluteness is an exploration of new ground. This interpretation explains why, in the years following the publication of *Being and Time*, the concepts of time and temporality get pushed into the background as Heidegger explores the possibilities of a new philosophical method.³⁰ The growing importance of resoluteness in Heidegger's thought is responsible, also, for the increased emphasis on activity and engagement discussed in the previous section. By developing the idea of resoluteness, Heidegger transcended the framework of

the methodology of the traditional, that is, primarily, the Kantian transcendental philosophy – a framework that was still very much in place when he started working on *Being and Time*.³¹

3.1. *Disclosedness and Resoluteness*

Central to the argument given here is the relationship between two key concepts appealed to in *Being and Time*: disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) and resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*). As suggested by the original German, we have here a close conceptual relationship.

It will be instructive to begin with disclosedness. Figuratively speaking, disclosedness is the *openness* of our world. The world is open to us in the sense that the things in it are, to a certain degree, intelligible. It is because the human being is disclosing that these things are intelligible (Heidegger refers more broadly to “beings”, encompassing things as diverse as other living beings, plants, and numbers). Another figurative means of capturing disclosedness is to think of the human being as a light in total darkness. According to Heidegger, every one of us is such a light: because we illuminate the things around us, they become intelligible and disclosed by this light.³²

To provide a more philosophical gloss, it is instructive to recall that the intelligibility of things has traditionally been explained by retracing it to the *transcendentality* of the human being. Kant, for example, identifies this transcendental-ity with the subjectivity of the subject. According to transcendental philosophy, things around us are intelligible in virtue of being rendered intelligible by

Heidegger on Rationality, Rowman & Littlefield International, London 2020.

26

Gethmann gives a detailed account of how the concept of “grounding” is modified by Heidegger’s fusion of transcendental philosophy and ontology. See: Carl Friedrich Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung. Das Methodenproblem in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers*, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1974.

27

In *Being and Time* and the lecture that complements it, Heidegger still describes his philosophy as a scientific enterprise. See: M. Heidegger, BT, 50, 52, 153, 171. A change in his thinking is reflected in the lecture of 1928/29, where he draws a clear distinction between science and philosophy, arguing that philosophy cannot be called science not because of a lack of what is associated with science (its objectivity and rigorosity), but because of a totally different quality of the rigorosity of philosophical research. See: Martin Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, in: Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 27, Otto Saame, Ina Saame-Speidel (eds.), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1996.

28

Hegel formulated the same criticism of an “instrumentalism of knowledge” in the

introduction of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. For an in-depth account of their respective takes on philosophical methodology, see: Karen de Boer, *Thinking in the Light of Time. Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel*, SUNY Press, Albany 2000.

29

Cf. M. Heidegger, BT, 27.

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It is a specific interpretation of “time” that gets pushed into the background, namely the attempt of a schematism of time similar to the Kantian approach in the first *Critique*, see: Dietmar Köhler, *Martin Heidegger. Die Schematisierung des Seinssinnes als Thematik des dritten Abschnitts von ‘Sein und Zeit’*, Bouvier, Bonn 1993. In *On My Own Publications*, Heidegger differentiates between this old interpretation of time and what he then calls “time-dom” (*Zeit-tum*) or “tyme” (*Zeyt*). See: M. Heidegger, GA 82, 364, 251–254.

31

See: Chad Engelland, *Heidegger’s Shadow. Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental Turn*, Routledge, New York 2017.

32

M. Heidegger, BT, 133.

transcending. Rather than being thought of as an intentional, conscious act, transcending in this sense is a precondition of experience. In short, our experience has the features that it has *because* we are built in a certain way. Our knowledge of transcendental philosophy comes via our realizing that it is a precondition of the kinds of experiences that we do in fact have. There are many passages in *Being and Time* demonstrating that Heidegger understands the notion of disclosedness as standing in this tradition.³³ For example, Heidegger says:

“Only for a being thus cleared existentially do objectively things become accessible in light or concealed in darkness. By its very nature, Da-sein brings its there along with it. If it lacks its there, it is not only factually not of this nature, but not at all a being. *Da-sein is its disclosure.*”³⁴

For Heidegger, disclosedness is not only a precondition for the experience of objects but also of our very existence in a world. Whereas Kant was primarily interested in the possibility of knowledge of objects, Heidegger (following his teacher Husserl) is concerned with the possibility of beings having experiences of *any* kind. In this sense, Heidegger stands in the tradition of transcendental philosophy, taking and then extending key insights from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.³⁵

In this sense, Heidegger’s remarks in *Being and Time* can be placed squarely in the tradition of modern philosophy and constitute a radicalisation of Kantian transcendental philosophy, progressing from possibility conditions of the experience of objects (what Kant calls “categories”) to the possibility conditions of the experience of beings (what Heidegger calls “existentials”). The hallmark of Heidegger’s transformation of transcendental philosophy is that the ground of the world’s intelligibility (that is, its disclosedness) is not subjectivity, but time. Heidegger lays bare the necessary relation between our understanding of Being (the world’s intelligibility) and time (what grounds this intelligibility). This is, of course, a simplification. Nevertheless, this highly condensed account of the core of *Being and Time* reveals how disclosedness represents the framework of the old philosophy.

What Heidegger’s recently published reflections reveal is that this kind of “cascading” of the transcendental inquiry³⁶ – the iterated search for more fundamental possibility conditions – is what he was most dissatisfied with. He calls his methodology the “subsequent underlying”³⁷ of possibility conditions and the “transcendental cascading of enabling conditions”.³⁸ In *On My Own Publications*, Heidegger takes the central error of *Being and Time* to be its identification of the (transcendental) question about the intelligibility of Being (*Seinsverständnisfrage*) with the question about Being (*Seinsfrage*).³⁹ Heidegger takes this to be an error because while answering the transcendental question uncovers possibility conditions of the intelligibility of the world, there remains something missing from even the most complete analyses of these conditions. It is resoluteness that reveals, exactly, what is missing from these analyses and necessitates the turning in Heidegger’s philosophy.

3.2. *The Problem with Disclosedness*

One way to explain what is missing from answers to the transcendental question is to inquire as to the role that the second division of *Being and Time* plays in that work’s larger project. If the radicalization of transcendental philosophy is the main goal of *Being and Time*, how does the second division’s discussion of death, anxiety, and the ominous “call of conscience” contribute to this goal? Attempting to get clearer on how these parts contribute to the

whole reveals a way in which Heidegger's account of disclosedness (and time as its ground) remained unsatisfactory.

Making the case for this claim requires, first, returning to the concept of disclosedness. Recall that disclosedness concerns possibility conditions – the necessary conditions of existence or, more specifically, possibility conditions for the experience of beings. These possibility conditions hold for any individual and are conceived of as part of the necessary underlying structure of every relation between things in the world. These conditions hold regardless of any particular features of a given individual and their environment; disclosedness is not context sensitive. From the scientific point of view, this is ideal. In *On My Own Publications*, however, Heidegger is dissatisfied with this aspect of his earlier work, describing it as the “emptiness of *thin*, homeless ‘conditions’”.⁴⁰

On reflection, it should be clear that this aspect of disclosedness sits uneasily with the wider Heideggerian picture. Recall that a distinguishing feature of Heidegger's philosophy is its insistence on facticity, situatedness, and the historical boundedness of human experience.⁴¹ In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that “mineness” (*Jemeinigkeit*), which is his word for the first-personal character of human experience, is a constitutive feature of existence.⁴² The anonymity and context insensitivity of disclosedness is at odds with these parts of Heidegger's earlier thought, and with the emphasis on individuality and situatedness throughout *Being and Time*.

The central question concerns whether an analysis of *Dasein* be regarded as complete if it fails to consider what is introduced as one of its essential features: namely, what Heidegger calls “mineness”. If this question must be answered in the negative, and if this completeness is methodologically important,⁴³ then we must further inquire as to how disclosedness and mineness

33
Ibid., 3, 14, 22–27, 38, 133.

34
M. Heidegger, BT, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 125.

35
For this transcendental interpretation of *Being and Time*, see C. F. Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*; S. Crowell, J. Malpas (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*.

36
M. Heidegger, GA 82, 171.

37
Ibid., 83.

38
Ibid., 171. At ibid. 350, Heidegger also talks of the “potentiated transcendental question”.

39
Ibid., 350: “The question about the right for such a potentiated carrying-over [*potenzierte Übertragung*] of the transcendental question to the understanding of Being as the relation of the human to Being is not asked.” For a more detailed account of this criticism, see: Karl Kraatz, “A New Look at Being and

Time: Martin Heidegger's Self-Criticism in *On My Own Publications*”, *The Review of Metaphysics* LXXV (2022) 3, pp. 501–524.

40
“The not adequately recognized but still effective reason for the discontinuation [*Abbrechen*] of the publication of ‘Being and Time’ was the anticipation that the interpretation of Being out of time [*aus der Zeit*] in the first form leads into the emptiness of *thin*, homeless ‘conditions’ [and] that the transcendental, even though it is a source area of them [of the conditions.], but as the transcendental it is still too preliminary, certainly as such it is a wrong track – a logging-path [*Holzweg*].” – Ibid., p. 182.

41
M. Heidegger, BT, §31–32.

42
M. Heidegger, BT, §9.

43
For Heidegger's criticism of this concept of completeness, see: M. Heidegger, GA 82, 96–97, 124–25.

can be fruitfully integrated. By interrogating the concept in more detail, I will now argue that resoluteness can play this crucial role. Resoluteness, we will see, represents an attempt to bring two of the essential features of the human being *together*: its transcendental and its mineness.

3.3. *Resoluteness as a Specific Mode of Self-Awareness*

Given the number of divergent potential understandings, it is useful to make explicit how “resoluteness” is being used. For the current purposes, I follow John Haugeland and Steven Crowell in taking resoluteness to consist in a specific kind of self-awareness.⁴⁴ The term is introduced by Heidegger in the second division of *Being and Time* as a specific way of being a self. According to Heidegger, there are two fundamental ways in which a self can be itself: authentically and inauthentically.⁴⁵

We can get clearer on this distinction by first attending to the inauthentic way of being a self, which Heidegger calls “*Man-selbst*”.⁴⁶ Heidegger argues that, for the most part, every one of us lives inauthentically, indistinguishable from the others. Importantly, he maintains that in making this claim, he is merely reporting that we live our lives in a typical or standardised fashion, rather than making a normative assessment.⁴⁷ Heidegger shows that this extends to our self-conception, which begins with broad and general statements and assessments from the third-person perspective. Heidegger maintains that, regardless of the richness and depth of this description, there is an epistemological gap between the list of descriptive facts and the self that is being described. How, he asks, can I know that it is *me* that is being picked out by this description? There must be something else, Heidegger presses, that confirms this.⁴⁸

Heidegger argues that in order to know that it is being described in this manner, the self must be capable of a certain kind of self-identification that is only possible if it has the potential to become aware of itself in a non-typical and non-standardised way – a genuine first-person-perspective that bridges the gap between the typicality of the description from the third-person-perspective and the person who is described by it.⁴⁹ Reconstructing this line of reasoning found in the second division of *Being and Time*, Crowell argues that Heidegger successfully shows us that, and how, the self can become aware in this special sense.⁵⁰ By doing so, Heidegger also proves that there are indeed two ways (or *modes*) of how the self can be itself: inauthentically, having only a typical understanding of itself, and authentically, having an explicit understanding. This explicit self-understanding is gained in what Heidegger describes as “becoming resolute”.⁵¹ Resoluteness thus is a specific mode of self-awareness, or self-understanding. When Heidegger refers to this process as “individuation”,⁵² he is not implying the factual isolation of the individual but rather the experience of becoming self-aware.⁵³

There is much more to be said about the role played by angst, death, and the call of conscience in the process of becoming resolute.⁵⁴ Doing so, however, would take us too far afield. What is important for our current purposes is the relationship between resoluteness and disclosedness.

3.4. *Disclosedness, Resoluteness and their Relation to Truth*

Recall that Heidegger draws on the linguistic similarity between *Erschlossenheit* (*disclosedness*) and *Entschlossenheit* (*resoluteness*). This is not mere wordplay. The linguistic similarity reflects that both concepts are

tightly connected to what Heidegger calls “truth”. Rather than the sense in which propositions can be true or false, by “truth” Heidegger is referring to the openness of things that we discussed earlier when explicating the nature of disclosedness. Truth, understood in this way, is the condition of possibility for propositional truth. It is also the condition of possibility for any relation to things in the world. For Heidegger, then, truth is what is disclosed.⁵⁵

Heidegger calls disclosedness the original truth (*ursprüngliche Wahrheit*).⁵⁶ This should not surprise us, given his claim that other forms of truth originate in the truth of disclosedness. What *is* surprising, however, is that he calls resoluteness the “most original, authentic truth” and describes it as a modification of disclosedness.⁵⁷ By doing so, Heidegger is signalling an increase or an intensification of the truth of disclosedness: Disclosedness is the “original truth”, and resoluteness is the “most original, authentic truth”.⁵⁸ Consider the following passage:

44

Steven G. Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 169–190, see for example, p. 170: “I shall argue that Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience (*Gewissen*) is an account of first-person self-awareness.” Also, pp. 172–173: “In presenting Heidegger’s existential reinterpretation I shall not focus on the first sense of first-person authority, concerning a special warrant regarding the content of my mental states, but on the second sense, concerning the peculiar character of first-person self-awareness. [...] The trick is to say what such a form of self-awareness can be.” Cf. John Haugeland, “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism”, in: Mark A. Wrathall, Jeff Malpas (eds.), *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity. Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus*, vol. 1, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2000, pp. 43–78.

45

M. Heidegger, BT, 146, 191, 304.

46

Ibid., 267.

47

Ibid., 176.

48

See: S. Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology*, pp. 173–190.

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More specifically, the precondition of becoming self-aware in this manner is an *implicit* self-awareness. Becoming self-aware means making this implicit self-awareness *explicit*. See: Hermann Schmitz, *Husserl und Heidegger*, Bouvier, Bonn 1996, where Schmitz argues that self-awareness cannot be learned but is a precondition of

learning (something about oneself). See also: Dan Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston (IL) 1999.

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See: S. Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology*, pp. 169–190.

51

Heidegger discusses the possibility of becoming resolute in §§54–64 of *Being and Time*.

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Heidegger uses the term “individuation” only once. See: M. Heidegger, BT, 38. Elsewhere, he uses the German word *Vereinzelung* instead. See: *ibid.*, 39, 188, 263, 266, 336, 339.

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M. Heidegger, GA 26, 244–45.

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For a detailed account see Steven G. Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology*. See also: Katherine Withy, “The Methodological Role of Angst in *Being and Time*”, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 43 (2012) 2, pp. 195–211, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0071773.2012.11006767>.

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Cf. M. Heidegger, BT, 38 and §44.

56


Ibid., 297.

57

Ibid.

58

Ibid. It is important to note that Heidegger is not coherent in this regard. Before the introduction of resoluteness, he repeatedly refers to disclosedness as the “most original truth”.



“Resoluteness is an eminent mode of the disclosedness of Da-sein. But in an earlier passage disclosedness was interpreted existentially as *original truth*. [...] Now, in resoluteness the most original truth of Da-sein has been reached, because it is *authentic*.”⁵⁹

Bringing this together with what was said about resoluteness in the previous section, we get a first glimpse of this idea’s deep implications: What Heidegger calls the “truth of disclosedness” is modified when the self becomes resolute (thereby becoming aware of itself). This means that truth, as understood in *Being and Time*, is ultimately bound to modes of self-awareness: there is an authentic truth of disclosedness (called *resoluteness*) and there is an inauthentic truth of disclosedness (*irresoluteness*). What Heidegger is saying here is that the truth of disclosedness, that is: the intelligibility of the things in one’s own world, can be modified by becoming resolute.

The salient point is that Heidegger says 1. there are (at least) two modes of how the self can be “itself”: it can be authentic, and it can be inauthentic, and 2. that there are, correspondingly, two modes of disclosedness. This shows that Heidegger discusses the concept of “authenticity” within a transcendental framework (and not as a normative, existentialist purer, ideal form of living one’s life).

There are two more passages in *Being and Time* that provide further proof that this idea is of methodological significance: In an earlier passage, Heidegger articulates this point by saying that there is a relation between truth and the Being of Dasein:

“Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s Being.”⁶⁰

For Heidegger, the truth of disclosedness is linked to Dasein’s Being. The second passage is found even earlier in *Being and Time* where Heidegger links this idea of becoming self-aware (resoluteness) more explicitly with the concept of Dasein’s transcendental: Heidegger describes this conceptual connection between resoluteness and the truth of disclosedness as a link between individuation and Dasein’s transcendence. Heidegger’s use of these two terms, “individuation” and “transcendence”, should not surprise, given that the truth of disclosedness is made sense of in terms of Dasein’s transcendental and, on the other hand, that resoluteness is described as a way of becoming self-aware. Becoming self-aware then is exactly what is meant by individuation. Heidegger draws our attention to the conceptual connection between the two:

“The transcendence of the being of Da-sein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical *individuation*.”⁶¹

My point here is that in the second division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger demonstrates that the possibility of this radical individuation is attested with the possibility of becoming resolute. What is left to do, is explaining its *necessity*. I will explain the necessity of radical individuation in terms of its methodological significance.

4. The Methodological Significance of Resoluteness

The concept of two different modes of the disclosedness of the world might still strike one as strange, because it suggests that Dasein’s mode of existing is the determining factor in the constitution and predetermination of the world’s

intelligibility. This is because merely noting that the manner in which Dasein is aware of itself determines how beings in its world appear is not sufficient to grasp how and why this relationship obtains. In the final section, I address this lacuna by discussing exactly what it is that changes when this modification occurs. In doing so, and by showing that becoming resolute is methodologically significant, I demonstrate the necessity of the before mentioned radical individuation which will reveal itself also as the necessity of going beyond disclosedness.

This final section answers two questions at once. Revealing what is changed when the human being becomes resolute simultaneously also demonstrates the methodological significance of becoming resolute. In order to carry out this dual task, it is necessary to return to one of the first paragraphs of *Being and Time*. Here, Heidegger introduces the reader to the philosophical, phenomenological method.⁶²

Consider Heidegger's formulation of one of the main principles of phenomenology:

“Beings can show themselves from themselves in various ways, depending on the mode of access to them.”⁶³

It should be clear from the above what is meant by this, and how resoluteness, as a modification of disclosedness, is a special mode of access to them. However, the possibility of beings showing themselves raises the puzzling possibility of beings showing “themselves as they are *not* in themselves”.⁶⁴ Given that beings can be concealed, or can show themselves in a distorted way,⁶⁵ the task of phenomenology is to uncover these beings. In doing so, phenomenology can reveal what Heidegger calls that which “remains *concealed* in an exceptional sense” and what, at the same time, “essentially belongs” to beings.⁶⁶ In order to show beings “as they show themselves in themselves”⁶⁷ phenomenology must uncover the *Being* of beings.⁶⁸

This aim of the phenomenological method brings us to resoluteness. In what follows, I argue that the phenomenological method as described in §7 is

See, for example, *ibid.*, 221, 223, 226, 256. He *is* consistent, however, in describing resoluteness as the authentic version of disclosedness. See: *ibid.*, 221, 297.

59

Ibid., 297 (273 in Stambaugh's translation). Stambaugh translates *ursprünglich* as “primordial”. I have translated it as “original” to draw attention to its connection to the concept of an origin, which is important for the early Heidegger (in relation to possibility conditions).

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Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. John Macquarrie – Edward Robinson, Blackwell, Malden (MA) 1962, p. 227/270. Macquarrie's and Robinson's translation is, in my opinion, more accurate than Stambaugh's in this case. Compare the original: “Alle Wahrheit ist gemäß deren wesenhafter das-einsmäßiger Seinsart relativ auf das Sein des Daseins.”

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M. Heidegger, BT, 38.

62

Cf. M. Heidegger, BT, §7.

63

Ibid., 28/25.

64

Ibid., 28/25.

65

Cf. *ibid.*, 35/31.

66

Ibid., 35/31.

67

Ibid., 35/31.

68

Cf. *ibid.*, 35/31.

constituted by resoluteness. I explore this claim further by showing the way in which resoluteness uncovers, or discloses, the Being of beings. If resoluteness is in fact doing what Heidegger says the phenomenological method is meant to do, then there can be no doubt that resoluteness should be understood *as* the phenomenological method.

4.1. The Correlation between (In)Authenticity and (Un)Concealment

Throughout *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes the case that there is a philosophically important relationship between the self and the world. The fact that Heidegger took there to be this important relationship explains why he speaks of the self not as an enclosed and isolated being but rather as being-in-the-world. In the following passage, Heidegger clarifies the link between the authentic self and the disclosedness of its world by turning to what happens to Dasein's understanding when it becomes authentic.

What is important for our purposes is that this relationship between the self and the world (its intelligibility) is non-static and has as its relata a concrete living being and the world. In claiming that the relationship is non-static and changing, Heidegger means that how the self *understands* its world is dependent on how the self understands itself.⁶⁹ If the self understands itself in an inauthentic way, then so too will it understand its world. By the same token, the self becoming resolute too has consequences for how it sees the world:

“In understanding the world, being-in is always also understood. Understanding of existence as such is always an understanding of world. [...] Existent beings glimpse ‘themselves’ only when they have become transparent to themselves equiprimordially in their being with the world, in being with others as the constitutive factors of their existence.”⁷⁰

One consequence is that if the human being understands itself inauthentically, then the beings in its world remain covered up and concealed. In other words, there is a dependency relation between inauthenticity and the concealment of beings.⁷¹ To uncover beings, it is necessary for Dasein to overcome this inauthenticity. Fortunately, we find in Heidegger's thought the resources needed for this necessary move towards authenticity.⁷²

In the second division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes one way in which Dasein can become authentic: by becoming resolute. It is at this point familiar that by becoming resolute, Dasein gains an authentic understanding of being-in-the-world.⁷³ In virtue of the dependence relation between self and world, becoming resolute influences how beings appear and uncovers their Being.

The discussion thus far has been highly abstract. What remains to be shown is how exactly resoluteness brings about the unconcealment of beings. What *exactly* is changing when Dasein becomes resolute and when its disclosedness is modified?

Answering this question begins with the recognition that Dasein must overcome what is at the root of this concealment. Heidegger presents two different accounts of the concealment's origin. According to the early Heidegger's existentialist response, this concealment can be traced back to the human being's constant yet implicit state of discomfort. Heidegger calls this “uncanniness” (*Unheimlichkeit*)⁷⁴ and traces it back to the groundlessness of existence.⁷⁵ Wishing to remain unaware of this uncanniness, we flee from it. We flee from the discomfort of being aware of it into the comfort of being unaware of it. Heidegger describes this as fleeing towards the world, away from genuine

self-awareness.⁷⁶ We develop an inauthentic understanding of ourselves and in turn an inauthentic understanding of the world, which Heidegger identifies with the concealment of the Being of beings.⁷⁷ The solution to this problem is as obvious as it is difficult to execute: stop fleeing and come to terms with the uncanniness. Becoming resolute is one way of “owning up”, as it were, to the uncanniness of existence.⁷⁸

The late Heidegger repudiates this account as “too existentialistic” (referring to the rise of existentialism in Germany and France).⁷⁹ The concealment of Being, according to *On My Own Publications*, is *not* the result of failing to own up to the uncanniness of existence. Instead, the uncanniness must be understood as a feature of Being.⁸⁰ What is uncanny is not primarily one’s own existence, but that this existence is taking place within the horizons of Being (and that the necessity of the question about Being has been forgotten).⁸¹ Being *itself* is concealing and disclosing,⁸² and there is no way of getting rid of this concealment.⁸³ While concealment cannot be overcome, it can be *dealt* with in a number of ways. One way of responding – the inauthentic and modern inclination towards thought which is objectifying, scientific, technical, metaphysical and representational – is little more than another means of fleeing.⁸⁴

Alternately, one can respond authentically and resolutely. In *The Essence of Truth*, Heidegger calls this the “re-soluteness to the secret” (*Entschlossenheit zum Geheimnis*)⁸⁵ and later simply refers to it as “thinking” (*Denken*).⁸⁶ Thinking here is understood in terms of the main characteristics

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“Understanding” is a Heideggerian term introduced in *Being and Time* for the pre-theoretical grasp of one’s situation. This “understanding” can, but must not, become explicit. See: *ibid.*, §31.

70
Ibid., 146/137.

71
Cf. *ibid.*, 44, §38, 130, 186, 189, 251, 260.

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See footnote 24, in which I drew the attention to one of the earlier lectures of Heidegger where he identifies the enactment of philosophy with a “counter-ruinant movement”. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is attributing this movement to “resoluteness”.

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Cf. *ibid.*, 146/137. In this passage, Heidegger notes that authentic understanding in resoluteness is “not a matter here of perceptually finding and gazing at a point which is the self, but of grasping and understanding the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world *throughout all its essential constitutive factors*”.

74
Ibid., 189.

75
Cf. *ibid.*, 276 and §58.

76
Cf. *ibid.*, 184.

77
Cf. *ibid.*, 44, §38, 130, 186, 189, 251, 260.

78
Ibid., 287.

79
M. Heidegger, GA 82, 92.

80
Ibid., 60–61, 72, 94–95.

81
Ibid., 325, 328–329, 362.

82
M. Heidegger, GA 9, 198.

83
Ibid., 195.

84
Heidegger calls this “be-irrende Irre” in his famous talk *The Essence of Truth*. See M. Heidegger, GA 9, 196–198.

85
Ibid., 198.

86
Most famously in M. Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?* (GA 8), ed. Paola-Ludovika Coriando, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002).

of the philosophical method introduced in previous sections: activity and engagement.⁸⁷

Both the early and late account share the idea that we are held captive by a default way of living and that the only way to break from this is via disruption. The earlier Heidegger describes this, from a minor perspective, as a disruption of dealing with tools⁸⁸ and, from a major perspective, as the emergence of uncanniness “out of nowhere”.⁸⁹ There is much more to be said about this than can be said here. For the current purposes, it suffices to demonstrate that there is a relationship between resoluteness (or authenticity) and the unconcealment of beings and that becoming resolute is, for Heidegger, a way to unconceal beings. There is, in other words, a methodological necessity of individuation (the possibility of which Heidegger demonstrated in the second division of *Being and Time* in the passages on resoluteness).

Before concluding, it will be useful to recap this section’s main line of argument. Heidegger’s description of resoluteness demonstrates that what is modified by becoming resolute is the disclosedness of the world. By changing how it discloses the world, the resolute human being allows beings to show themselves unconcealed, that is, in their Being. Becoming resolute gives the human being the ability to do so in virtue of constituting a way of breaking out of the normal way of living. Becoming resolute, in other words, is a form of disruption that does not lead into chaos. It is an experience of becoming self-aware. Due to the relationship between self and world, self-awareness brings about an awareness of the world and an uncovering of that which was covered up. The key methodological term that Heidegger uses for what is gained by this “well-understood ‘knowledge of the Self’” (*die wohlverstandene ‘Selbsterkenntnis’*) is “transparency” (*Durchsichtigkeit*),⁹⁰ as in: the transparency of how Dasein is in his or her own world.

Heidegger is making the following claims: a) for the most part, things in our world are covered up; b) to uncover these things, we need to overcome what is covering them up; and c) once this is overcome (for example, by becoming resolute), things appear as themselves (uncovered). In the case of being with other people, this means that my self-awareness is a precondition of other people being “themselves” in the sense of the Heideggerian potentiality-to-be.⁹¹ They are regarded as other people and neither as means to specific ends, nor as a copy of myself. In the case of dealing with things, the resolute human being is newly aware of its transcendental and thus aware of what is constituted within this transcendental. This idea is arguably the basis for what Heidegger called “regional ontologies” in *Being and Time*. It is picked up in later lectures in terms of the idea of “explicit transcending”.⁹²

The broader methodological point being made here is a *specific* mode of existence is required if the philosopher is to uncover the Being of beings. This methodological upshot undermines existentialist interpretations of the second division. This is how, and where, Heidegger transforms the philosophical method. After this transformation, it is no longer possible to understand this method as a tool or technique that can be used regardless of the context, i.e. regardless of what either the philosopher or the thing *is*. More importantly, by focusing in on what is gained with “resoluteness” as a philosophical method, Heidegger can rightfully claim that *Being and Time* already entailed all that was needed to overcome what he criticised about his own transcendental approach as the “emptiness of *thin*, homeless ‘conditions’”.⁹³ The philosophical method has been transformed into a *way of being* or, somewhat more

neutrally, into a *stance*. Resoluteness is a specific mode of access to the Being of beings. Resoluteness is a mode of *letting* beings *be* (unconcealed).

Conclusion

As is familiar, *Being and Time* offers us a (traditional yet more radical) transcendental inquiry leading to an analysis of possibility conditions and, ultimately, to time. In addition, however, the second division of *Being and Time* also introduces resoluteness as a specific way of *letting beings be*.⁹⁴ The detailed explication of resoluteness offered in this paper has demonstrated that Heidegger understands becoming resolute as one way of uncovering beings. More precisely, becoming resolute uncovers the *Being* of beings. It is important not to mistake this for an essentialist metaphysical claim about a true Being hidden behind beings, as it were. Rather, what we find in Heidegger is a transcendentalist claim about the relationship between how the self is aware of or understands itself (authenticity) and how it understands its world (the intelligibility of Being). The crucial aspect of *Being and Time*'s transformation of the philosophical method is that Heidegger locates resoluteness on the level of Dasein's transcendental. That is, resoluteness is a *specific*, and methodologically necessary, way of transcending that leads to the uncovering of the Being of beings. Rather than being a tool, resoluteness is a phenomenological methodology. This methodology is based on the insight that the way one, as the philosopher, is comporting oneself towards things, is constitutive of how these things appear. Doing so in the described resolute manner in turn allows these things to show themselves in their Being.

Working through these aspects of Heidegger's thought also reveals what is lacking in disclosedness – something that Heidegger in *On My Own Publications* repeatedly pointed out: namely, that the concealment of beings had not yet been overcome. Answering the transcendental question concerning the intelligibility of Being suggests that time is the most fundamental possibility condition. Nevertheless, time does not, on its own, lead to Being and therefore leaves its concealment unaddressed.⁹⁵ In virtue of the human being's

87

The term “letting be”, first used in *Being and Time*, becomes central and described as a higher form of activity in later work. See: M. Heidegger, *Feldweg-Gespräche* (GA 77), ed. Ingrid Schüßler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995).

88

Heidegger, BT, §16.

89

Ibid., §40 and §§51–64.

90

Ibid., 146, 230, 299, 333.

91

Cf. *ibid.*, 298.

92

See M. Heidegger, GA 27, 213. See also, M. Heidegger, GA 24, 454–469.

93

M. Heidegger, GA 82, 182: “The not adequately recognized but still effective reason for the discontinuation [*Abbrechen*] of the publication of ‘Being and Time’ was the anticipation that the interpretation of Being out of time [*aus der Zeit*] in the first form leads into the *emptiness* of *thin*, homeless ‘conditions’ [and] that the transcendental, even though it is a source area of them [of the conditions.], but as the transcendental it is still too preliminary, certainly as such it is a wrong track – a logging-path [*Holzweg*].” – See also, *ibid.*, 142–143, 274.

94

M. Heidegger, BT, 298.

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See, for example, M. Heidegger, GA 82, 392: “Why is there no ‘Second Part’ [of *Being and Time*]?” Not because there is no coming through from what has already been said (published) and because everything dissolves



unique nature, namely their relationship to the world discussed in section 4.1, the unconcealment of Being must be *first-personal*. The transcendental argument developed in *Being and Time* about the relation between the self and the world is bound to a specific enactment in which what has been described *conceptually* can prove itself *phenomenally*.⁹⁶ This point is stressed early in *Being and Time* when Heidegger writes:

“The transcendence of the being of Da-sein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical *individuation*.”⁹⁷

Resoluteness, as we have shown, is exactly such a radical individuation. Becoming resolute is methodologically necessary to overcome the concealment of Being.

It is as if two paths have emerged. On the first path, the path of traditional transcendental philosophy which is criticised by Heidegger in his rereading of *Being and Time* as insufficient,⁹⁸ you arrive at possibility conditions: Being is made intelligible by time, care, being-in-the-world, and by existentials. There is a second path: hardly visible, overgrown, and covered with brushwood. This path leads to resoluteness. We are now in a position to make sense of Heidegger’s claim in *On My Own Publications* that *Being and Time* breaks new ground when it offers “not better transcendental engagement, but rather transformation of Da-sein and Being as such”.⁹⁹ Heidegger is here concerned with the *experience* of Being, rather than its intelligibility. This will later be described in *The Essence of Truth* as an experience of the concealing and disclosing of Being. Heidegger calls this experience “re-soluteness to the secret”,¹⁰⁰ and takes it to consist in asking the question of Being in a novel way.¹⁰¹

Before concluding, I will briefly consider a potential objection. If this relation between modes of existing and truth is as important as I have argued, to the point of being central to Heidegger’s method, how should we explain the apparent lack of attention that he paid to it?

This worry dissolves when we realise that this lack of attention is, indeed, merely apparent. Heidegger in fact addresses this relation multiple times in his lectures between 1927 and 1930. In the lectures given directly after *Being and Time*’s publication, he develops this idea of a relationship between modes of existence and how beings in one’s world appear. In the 1928 lecture, Heidegger talks about the relation between Dasein’s transcendence and its freedom, an idea hinted at in *Being and Time* when he claims that *how* the human being is disclosing is a “matter of its freedom”.¹⁰² One of the main topics of the 1928/29 lecture is what Heidegger calls “explicit transcending”, identified with doing philosophy. The same claim can be found at the end of the 1927 lecture.¹⁰³ Heidegger returns to the idea in *On the Essence of Ground*, where he problematizes questions of justification on the basis of the relation between freedom and transcendence.¹⁰⁴ In *The Essence of Truth*, he draws on the notion I have argued is already present in *Being and Time*, speaking of freedom as the *letting be* of beings and describing it as a specific kind of projection.¹⁰⁵

In addition to this textual evidence, there is another way of responding to this concluding concern. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that this relation between Being and truth is the work’s “central problematic”¹⁰⁶ and would have been the topic of its unfinished third division. He also makes clear that its preliminary understanding of phenomenology (understood as the method

of ontology) would have been further developed.¹⁰⁷ Several comments in *On My Own Publications* also support these claims about what would have been included in the third division.¹⁰⁸

Although this worry can be adequately responded to, what I have said here is only an initial exploration of a matter with many implications. The claims made here about the relationship between resoluteness and transcendence should be understood as a foundation for future work.

Karl Kraatz

Odlučnost kao filozofijska metoda

Novi pogled na *Bitak i vrijeme*

Sažetak

Argumentiram da je jedan od središnjih pojmova drugog dijela Bitka i vremena – odlučnost (Entschlossenheit) – predstavlja nov način filozofiranja i trebao bi se, stoga, razumjeti kao filozofijska metoda. Odlučnost je poseban način odnošenja prema stvarima i metodologijski je nužno za otkrivanje kakve jesu te stvari. Oslanjam se na uvide na recentno objavljeno djelo O mojim tiskovinama u kojem Heidegger ističe odlučnost kao ključan korak prema kasnijem metodologijskom stavu. Čineći to, rasvjetljujem važne aspekte Bitka i vremena i doprinosim trenutnoj raspravi o Heideggerovoj filozofijskoj metodi. Dokazujem da se idejom o odlučnosti kao filozofijskoj metodi nastoji nadići Heideggerova kritika transcendentalne metode i ispitivanja u uvjetima mogućnosti.

Ključne riječi

Martin Heidegger, fenomenologija, metodologija, metafilozofija, *Bitak i vrijeme*, *O mojim tiskovinama* [*Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*]

into ‘anthropology,’ but rather because what has been published thus far is not sufficient for what follows: the experience of Being out of Being.” – Also 402: “The danger of getting entangled remained, even though the ‘transcendentally’ posed question about the objectivity of objects in the usual sense was avoided, it [this transcendental question] still tricked its way into the question of Being that took the shape of the question about the possibility conditions (not of knowledge of beings) but of the understanding of Being as Being.”

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See M. Heidegger, BT, 133/172, *et passim*. Stambaugh’s translates “phänomenale Bewährung” as “phenomenal confirmation”.

97

M. Heidegger, BT, 38/34.

98

Cf. M. Heidegger, GA 82, 176. See also footnotes 10 and 12.

99

M. Heidegger, GA 82, 29.

100

M. Heidegger, GA 9, 198.

101

See also, *ibid.*, 198.

102

M. Heidegger, BT, 366.

103

M. Heidegger, GA 24, 459.

104

M. Heidegger, GA 9, 126 and 135.

105

See also, *ibid.*, 188.

106

M. Heidegger, BT, 357.

107

Ibid., 57.

108

M. Heidegger, GA 82, 342: “... the centerpiece of the whole book.” – See also, *ibid.*, 288.

Karl Kraatz

Entschlossenheit als philosophische Methode

Ein neuer Blick auf Sein und Zeit

Zusammenfassung

Ich argumentiere, dass einer der zentralen Begriffe des zweiten Teils von Sein und Zeit – Entschlossenheit – eine neue Art des Philosophierens repräsentiert und demzufolge als philosophische Methode aufzufassen ist. Entschlossenheit ist eine spezifische Art, sich den Dingen gegenüber zu verhalten, und ist methodologisch unentbehrlich, um diese Dinge als das aufzudecken, was sie sind. Ich rekurriere auf Erkenntnisse aus dem neulich erschienenen Werk Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen, in dem Heidegger auf Entschlossenheit als einen einschneidenden Schritt in Richtung seiner späteren methodologischen Gesinnung verweist. Hierdurch beleuchte ich belangvolle Aspekte von Sein und Zeit und leiste einen Beitrag zu laufenden Debatten über Heideggers philosophische Methode. Ich beweise, dass es Heideggers Kritik an der Transzendentalphilosophie und an der Untersuchung von Möglichkeitsbedingungen diejenige ist, die es durch die Entfaltung der Idee der Entschlossenheit als philosophische Methode zu überwinden gilt.

Schlüsselwörter

Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie, Methodologie, Metaphilosophie, *Sein und Zeit*, *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*

Karl Kraatz

Résolution anticipante comme méthode philosophique

Nouveau regard sur Être et Temps

Résumé

*J'affirme que l'un des concepts centraux de la seconde partie d'Être et Temps – Résolution anticipante (Entschlossenheit) – représente une nouvelle manière de faire de la philosophie et devrait, par conséquent, être entendu comme une méthode philosophique. La résolution anticipante est une manière spécifique de se rapporter aux choses et, d'un point de vue méthodologique, est nécessaire pour découvrir les choses telles qu'elles sont. Je m'appuie sur les idées de l'œuvre récemment publiée *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen* (De mes publications) dans laquelle Heidegger met en avant la résolution anticipante comme une étape cruciale pour sa position méthodologique tardive. De cette façon, je mets en lumière les aspects importants d'Être et Temps et contribue aux débats continus sur la méthode philosophique d'Heidegger. Je démontre que c'est la critique d'Heidegger de la philosophie transcendantale et le questionnement sur les conditions de possibilité qui tentent d'être dépassés.*

Mots-clés

Martin Heidegger, phénoménologie, méthodologie, métaphilosophie, *Être et temps*, *De mes publications*