

Culture of Disobedience on the Military Frontier in the 18th Century: Survival of Ringleaders Simeon Filipović and Todor Kijuk

The paper investigates the development of the culture of disobedience on the Military Frontier. Based on a number of sources related to two rebellions on the Ban's Frontier or Banska krajina (1730/1731 and 1751), the paper analyzes a gradual change in the methods of protest, like long-term negotiation and lobbying, that the frontiersmen increasingly used instead of physical violence in order to protect and preserve their legal and social status. The early modern Habsburg state, on the other hand, began to deploy more lenient and educational measures instead of brutal physical punishment in order to control disobedient frontiersmen and further their interests. As a result, the ringleaders of two rebellions, Simeon Filipović and Todor Kijuk, escaped capital punishment, while the frontier society became more homogeneous and stable, as well as more responsive to Habsburg military needs.

Key words: Military Frontier, Military Border, 18th Century, Culture of disobedience, History of violence

The paper explores two interrelated processes in the Habsburg lands in the 18th century. The first is the homogenization of the society on the Military Frontier¹ through the fight for the protection and preservation of the legal and social status of frontiersmen. This was achieved through elaborate methods of protest and through increased use of negotiation and lobbying practices rather than through violent physical resist-

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1 The Military Frontier or Military Border (*Militärgrenze, Militär-Gränze, Vojna Krajina*) was a unique Habsburg institution in Central and South-eastern Europe opposed to similar Ottoman and Venetian military systems.

ance, as will be shown on the example of two rebellions on the Ban's Frontier (*Banska Krajina*²). The second process regards the endeavor of the early modern Habsburg state to control disobedient frontiersmen by using more lenient and educational measures instead of staged executions and extreme physical punishment.

It is well known that the early modern European state gradually monopolized violence by developing ever more comprehensive legal and institutional framework to reduce, supervise and punish violent activities – the process also known as the criminalization of violence.³ Similar efforts of the early modern Habsburg state were long obstructed on the Military Frontier due to the very nature of the frontier society⁴ – frontiersmen were heavily armed and trained for violence and they habitually used force as means of conflict resolution. Yet, one can trace important changes in the dynamics of social conflict in the 18th century Military Border, which went along with the changing function and administrative structure of the Habsburg state.⁵

In order to present these changes, the paper will focus on two rebellions on the Ban's Frontier⁶ that were spurred by military reforms in the 1730s and 1750s. It will accentuate specific traits of the frontier society, analyze the role of their leaders, inquire

2 Ban (*vicereus*, viceroy).

3 Basic studies are: Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation*, vol. 1-2, Basel 1939; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Penguin Books 1991 (1977¹); Julius R. Ruff, *Violence in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800*, Cambridge University Press 2001. Studies focused on violence in early modern European state: Robert Muchambled, "The Anthropology of violence in Early Modern France", in: *Violence and the Absolutist State. Studies in European and Ottoman History*, ed. Stepen Turk Christensen, Akademisk Verlag, Copenhagen 1990, 47-73; Gerd Schwerhoff, "Social Control of Violence, Violence as Social Control: The Case of Early Modern Germany", in: *Social Control in Europe: Volume 1, 1500-1800*, eds. Herman Roodenburg - Peter Spierenburg, The Ohio State University Press, Columbus 2004, 220-246; Kelly Hignett, "Co-option or criminalisation? The state, border communities and crime in early modern Europe", *Global Crime*, Vol. 9, Iss. 1-2, 2008/02, 35-51. On violence on the Military Frontier: Nataša Štefanec, "O istraživanju nasilja u vojnokrajiskom kontekstu," in: *Franz Vaniček i vojnokrajiska historiografija - Franz Vaniček and the Historiography of the Military Frontier*, eds. Robert Skenderović - Stanko Andrić, HIP, Slavonki Brod 2017, 75-94.

4 The best synthesis of the social history of the Military Frontier is: Kaser Kaser, *Slobodan seljak i vojniki (Vol. 1: Povojačenje agrarnog društva u Hrvatsko-slavonskoj Vojnoj krajini, 1535-1881; Vol. 2: Povojačeno društvo, 1754-1881)*, Zagreb 1997, 77-118 (German original published in Graz, 1986). See also a collection of articles by Fedor Moaçanin: Fedor Moaçanin, *Radovi iz povijesti Vojne krajine*, ed. Nataša Štefanec, Zagreb 2016.

5 See extensive monograph on the Habsburg administration and politics in the 18th century Croatia: Ivana Horbec, *Prema modernoj državi. Uprava i politika u Banskoj Hrvatskoj 18. stoljeća*, HIP, Zagreb 2018.

6 The Ban's Frontier or Ban's Border (*Banska Krajina, Banatische Grenze, Banatischen Confnien, Confinia banalia, Confinium banalium*) was ruled by the Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian Ban (*vicereus*) who was, in military terms, subordinated to the Aulic War Council in Vienna. In 1723 the Ban's Frontier consisted of 5,365 frontiersmen (and 3 chaplains/*Capellanen*). It was divided into sub-frontiers or captaincies: *Kostainizer Gräniz* (203 paid and 1941 unpaid soldiers), *Jassenovizer Gräniz* (49 paid and 228 unpaid), *Gliner und Transmontaner Gräniz* (195 paid and 1215 unpaid), *Zriner Gräniz* (93 paid and 933 unpaid) and *Dubizer Gräniz* (87 paid and 421 unpaid). Slavko Gavrilović (ed.), *Grada*

into the type of changes that served to provoke, homogenize and mobilize frontiersmen, investigate whether they were motivated by political, ideological or merely practical goals, and discern the differences between traditional and innovative rebellion patterns and methods. It will also examine the response of the military authorities in Zagreb and Vienna: how was the offence categorized and punished, was the punishment intended to restore (symbolic) social order or, in a more enlightened manner, to appease, reform and educate the frontiersmen?

Introduction: the Military Frontier

The Habsburg Military Frontier was first created in the 1520s; it existed until 1881, when it was formally abolished. During the four centuries of conflict and coexistence with the Ottomans and the Venetians, it changed its shape and width. In the period considered in this paper, it stretched from the Adriatic Sea to today's Moldavia. Prior to the Great Turkish War (1683-1699), the Military Frontier was administered and financed with a defensive mindset and military actions were of reactive nature. The Habsburg side strategically decided to absorb the Ottoman pressure while introducing a number of military and technical improvements and increasing the size of its unpaid army (runaway irregulars from the Ottoman side were provided with land and special status instead of cash).⁷ Frontal confrontation with the Ottomans was delayed until 1683; the ensuing war symbolized a turning point in centuries of imperial warfare. Christian reclamation of vast territories and the Treaty of Karlowitz (January 1699) notably changed the shape and position of the Military Frontier, prompted the reevaluation of its function and purpose, stimulated its reorganization and regulation, and imposed the need to control and reduce violence.

At first, the conquered lands were submitted to both military and civil administration. The Aulic Chamber (*Hofkammer*) and the Aulic War Councils (*Hofkriegsrat*) in Vienna and Graz strived to obtain control of new territories, expecting profits and gains. This brought great disorder to an already depopulated and devastated area, prone to migrations and ridden by crime, banditry and abuses of both chamber officials and

za istoriju Vojne granice u XVIII veku. *Banska krajina 1690-1783. Knjiga 1*, Beograd 1989, 250-265 (further cited as: Gavrilović, Građa).

7 József Kelenik, "The Military Revolution in Hungary", *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds. Géza Dávid – Pál Fodor, Brill, Leiden – Boston – Köln 2000, 117-159; Gábor Ágoston, "Empires and Warfare in West-Central Europe, 1550–1750: the Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation", in: *European Warfare 1350–1750*, eds. Frank Tallett - D. J. B. Trim, Cambridge University Press 2010, 110-134; Kaser, *Slobodan seljak*, Vol. 1, 1997, passim; Nataša Štefanec, *Država ili ne. Ustroj Vojne krajine 1578. godine i hrvatsko-slavonski staleži u regionalnoj obrani i politici*, Srednja Europa, Zagreb 2011, 139-168, 273-321.

military officers.⁸ Eventually, some parts of the conquered lands were submitted to the *Hofkammer* or handed to private owners, while others were attached directly to the Military Frontier.

The Viennese *Hofkriegsrat* established some new frontier sections and enlarged the old ones. It also started extensive military reforms: in the 18th century it implemented, with more or less success, 30 large reforms⁹ – the most intense ones lasted from the 1730s until the 1750s. They were aimed at a further territorialization and intense militarization and regulation of the frontier society¹⁰ in order to create a military system that could keep the Ottomans at bay and provide trained, uniformed and loyal troops for European wars.¹¹ In order to accomplish these aims one had to modernize, regulate and standardize 17 frontier regiments, 11 of which were situated in today's Croatian area (map 2). The latter were part of four generalcies, each with distinct tradition and organization. The Karlovac Generalcy was ruled from Graz from the 1570s and it maintained the most traditional organization; in 1712 it was enlarged by restored territories of Lika and Krbava. The Varaždin Generalcy was also ruled from Graz until the 1740s, but its organization was remodeled in 1630 when *Statuta Valachorum* were introduced in order to regulate the status of large communities of the newly settled 'Vlachs' that had hitherto served on the border as unpaid soldiers directly subordinated to the Emperor (and not to the Croatian-Slavonian Ban/*vicere*x and Diet).¹² The Slavonian Border was established just after the Great Turkish War and was subordinated directly to the Viennese Aulic War Council. Finally, the Ban's Frontier initially consisted of a stretch of dispersed fortresses between the Karlovac and Varaždin Generalcies that were supported by the great landowners such as the Zagreb Chapter and Bishopric. It was expanded after the Great Turkish War, when it was officially submitted to the Ban (*vicere*x) of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia in 1703 and used for the military promotion of local Croatian-Slavonian nobility. Hence, the first three generalcies were the arena for a long-lasting power struggle of various Austrian interest groups located in Graz and Vienna. Only the Ban's Frontier was dominated by local Croatian-Slavonian elites.

Reforms, which regulated and standardized these sections of the Habsburg frontier, were complex and long-lasting. Fortresses, watchtowers, sentinels and intelligence facilities were supplemented by the *Cordon sanitaire*, established in 1728, which

8 Darko Vitek, "Istočna Hrvatska. Austrijsko-osmanski ratovi i oslobođenje Slavonije i Srijema", in: *U potrazi za mirom i blagosanjem. Hrvatske zemlje u 18. stoljeću*, ed. Lovorka Čoralić, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb 2013, 283-300.

9 F. Močanin, *Radovi iz povijesti Vojne krajine*, 127.

10 On territorialization and militarization see: Kaser, *Slobodan seljak*, 1997.

11 Summary with extensive literature in: Alexander Buczynski – Lovorka Čoralić, "Sjeverna Hrvatska: austrijski ratovi i preustroj Vojne krajine", in: *U potrazi za mirom i blagosanjem. Hrvatske zemlje u 18. stoljeću*, ed. Lovorka Čoralić, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb 2013, 149-168.

12 Between 1743 and 1748 the *Hofkriegsrat* in Graz was abolished and Inner-Austrian Estates detached from the administration of the Military Frontier. Kaser, *Slobodan seljak*, Vol. 1, 117 et passim.

further increased the physical barrier towards the Ottomans.¹³ In 1745 the Military Frontier was finally delineated and detached from the so-called *Zivilkroatien* or 'provincial Croatia'.¹⁴ Parallel to the process of territorialization, the frontier society was thoroughly militarized. Ultimately, the *Militär Gränitz-Rechten* – a unifying legal package that comprehensively regulated and homogenized judicial functioning of the Military Frontier sections – were implemented in 1754.¹⁵ After much optimization and planning, the Frontier became a recruitment source of self-sustained frontiersmen who were used to guard the border against the Ottomans and to wage Habsburg (and Napoleon's) European wars. Hence, until the 1750s frontiersmen had to endure constant changes and reforms. At first, they rebelled against them but, with time, they embraced new administrative procedures and adapted to legal practices that aimed to regulate the system and impose clear rules of conduct.

Old Rights, Old Freedoms and Old Duties – Homogenization of the Frontier Society

Early modern frontier society was, for a long time, a society in the making. During the 16th and well into the 17th century there were practically no rebellions in *krajina*, as the frontier territories were also called. Quite the opposite, numerous rebellions took place in the neighboring feudal, civilian parts where serfs and peasants prevailed (over 40 rebellions in the 17th century).¹⁶

The Military Frontier society developed slowly, on desolated fringes of the Hungarian, Croatian and Slavonian Kingdom. Groups of settlers and newcomers lived in various stages of adaptation and status. Often, landlords would provide help to migrants and newcomers in return for military services. Special rights (often called privileges) and exemptions from serf's dues were given to Catholic and increasingly Orthodox settlers from Ottoman domains who promised to serve as military. These were granted for a limited period of time (10-20 years) depending on the purpose and conditions of settlement and overall circumstances. For example, special status was given by local landlords like Zrinski and Frankopan throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, by

13 On the establishment and functioning of the *Cordon sanitaire* see: Ivana Horbec, *Zdravlje naroda – bogatstvo države: prosvijećeni apsolutizam i počeci sustava javnog zdravstva u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb 2015, 85-120, 249-314.

14 In 1775, the Habsburg Monarchy provided 206,813 soldiers, while sections of the Military Frontier from the Adriatic Sea until Moldavia participated in this amount with 44,854 of their soldiers. Alexander Buczynski, *Pa to su samo Hrvati! Građa za povijest kantonske reorganizacije Vojne krajine 1787. godine*, Zagreb 2011, 21.

15 Later on, the Military Frontier was additionally regulated by the two General Military Border Laws (1807, 1850). Kristina f, "Položaj časnika prema zakonskoj regulativi za Vojnu krajinu: Krajiška prava (1754.) i Osnovni krajiški zakon (1807.)", *Povijesni prilozi*, 31, 2006, 161-182.

16 Josip Adamček, *Bune i otpori. Seljačke bune i otpori u Hrvatskoj u 17. stoljeću*, Zagreb-Ljubljana 1987.

count Drašković on his “private frontier” (*Kraina Nassa*) around Steničnjak in 1747,¹⁷ as well as by the Habsburg military authorities.¹⁸ Various phases of settlement caused a stratification of settlers, and intensified internal social conflicts on the frontier.¹⁹ Consequently, a constant flux of population and its diverse statuses as well as unstable circumstances in general worked against the speedy homogenization of the society. The first significant point of integration was based on legal rights. The so-called *Statuta Valachorum* provided legal framework for the settlement of thousands of Vlachs from the Ottoman frontier to the Varaždin Generalcy²⁰ where they settled as valuable unpaid soldiers on parcels of land provided by the Emperor and the local nobility. *Statuta* regulated the self-government of new Vlach communities, administration of apportioned land, terms of military service, obligations and rights of frontiersmen, punishments, etc. *Statuta* and various legal arrangements with the local nobility or the crown became the salient point for the regulation of frontiersmen’s status.²¹

When frontiersmen accepted certain conditions of settlement and military service, and had lived and served in one place long enough, their communities became increasingly stationary and stable. Specific legal and social status resulted with common interests, conventions, customs, habits and practices. In due course the frontier society started to homogenize and frontiersmen started to speak about their traditional rights, old freedoms and old rights (*stare pravice, alten Freyheiten, ubralten Freyheiten, ad normam et usu robotarum consuetudinem*),²² and started to be provoked and incensed by the introduction of new duties and obligations (*excessivorum ... modorum et novitatum, eine abermahlige Novitaet, Erneuerungen*) – quite similar to the rebellious 17th century serfs and peasants.²³

17 Original contract between the count Josip Drašković and priests, judges, voivods, counts (*knez*) and leaders of frontiersmen (mostly Orthodox Vlachs): Gavrilović, Građa, 371-374. On settlers in Gomirje and Ogulin region: Nataša Štefanec, “Tolerance and Intolerance in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom at the Turn of the 17th Century. Contest for Gomirje”, in: *Tolerance and Intolerance on the Triplex Confinium. Approaching the “Other” on the Borderlands. Eastern Adriatic and Beyond, 1500-1800*, eds. Egidio Ivetić – Drago Roksandić, Padova 2007, 125-151.

18 Siegfried Gruber, “Good Luck for Pioneers and Bad Luck for Latecomers: Different Settlement Patterns in Resettling Lika around 1700”, in: *Constructing Border Societies on the Triplex Confinium*, eds. Drago Roksandić – Nataša Štefanec, CEU, Budapest 2000, 141-155.

19 Demographic flux and stratification continued after the Great Turkish War too: Kaser, Slobodan seljak, Vol. 2, 43-64 et passim; Gruber, Good Luck, 141-155.

20 On *Statuta Valachorum*: Zrinka Blažević (trans. & ed.), *Statuta Valachorum. Prilozi za kritičko izdanje*, Zagreb 1999; Kaser, Slobodan seljak, Vol 1, 77-118; F. Močanin, Radovi iz povijesti Vojne krajine, 108-120, 156-165, 212-282; Nataša Štefanec, “Demographic Changes on the Habsburg-Ottoman Border in Slavonia (c. 1570-1640)”, in: *Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburger Monarchie in der Neuzeit*, ed. Marlene Kurz – Martin Scheutz – Karl Vocolka – Thomas Winkelbauer, Oldenbourg Verlag, Wien-München 2005, 551-578.

21 In the Varaždin Generalcy, they were replaced by the similar act on January 26, 1737 (*Statuta Confinianorum Varasdiensium*). Kaser, Slobodan seljak, Vol. 1, 116.

22 Gavrilović, Građa, 271, 287, 291, 292 et passim.

23 Gavrilović, Građa, 283, 289, 291. Causes of some 40 peasant rebellions in the 17th century in: Adamček, Bune i otpori, 343-344 et passim.

Hence, from the 1650s until the 1750s frontier rebellions occurred much more often, their motives were more coherently formulated and some rebellions were better organized and far-reaching than before. From the middle of the 17th century frontiersmen were even aided by neighboring peasants and serfs, as shown by Nada Klaić.²⁴ Peasants and serfs saw the military status as superior to theirs and they strived to become free soldiers. On the other hand, frontiersmen dreaded the possibility of being reduced to serfs and peasants.²⁵

The two rebellions on the Ban's frontier discussed here (1730/1731 and 1751) were not sudden, impulsive and unorganized like many previous frontier rebellions had been,²⁶ but quite the contrary. Motives on both occasions were manifold: they were triggered by inadequate communication and one-sided imposition of new, reformed Regulations (*Regulament*) on the Ban's Frontier.²⁷

On April 15, 1730 the new *Regulament* for the Ban's frontier was proclaimed;²⁸ even though it acknowledged some of the frontiersmen's old complaints it, nonetheless, changed the conditions of their service. This led to a rebellion in 1730-31, that was partly launched from the so-called *Kostanizer Gräniz* and partly from the *Zriner Gränitz* on the Ban's Frontier. In their dispatches, frontiersmen addressed two main issues as the causes of the rebellion.²⁹

Firstly, the frontiersmen reported having issues with the commander of Kostajnica Frontier, count Emeric Erdödy³⁰, his vice-commander Nikola Petković, his secretary Joseph Kurill, with Petar Kos and chieftain (*knez*) Pejak who systematically abused and

24 Nada Klaić, *Društvena previranja i bune u Hrvatskoj u XVI i XVII stoljeću*, Beograd 1976, 213-252; Adamček, *Bune i otpori*, passim; Nataša Štefanec, "Soziale Unruhen im Königreich Dalmatien, Kroatien und Slawonien (16.-18. Jahrhundert)", in: *Die Stimme der ewigen Verlierer? Aufstände, Revolutionen und Revolutionen in den österreichischen Ländern (ca. 1450-1815)*, eds. Peter Rauscher – Martin Scheutz, Böhlau Verlag - Oldenbourg Verlag, Wien-München 2013, 177-200, especially 192-199.

25 For example: (...) *von dero selben ... Emerico von Erdeody vollkommen enslavirt werden mächten; zu eigenem privat-Nutzen unterwürfig, dienstbar und gar knechtlich machen zu dürfen*, (...): Gavrilović, Građa, 296.

26 Examples in: Željko Holjevac - Nenad Močanin, *Hrvatsko-slavonska Vojna krajina i Hrvati pod vlašću Osmanskoga carstva u ranome novom vijeku*, Zagreb 2007, 63-68.

27 Numerous sources were published: Gavrilović, Građa, passim; Vojin Dabić, "Građa o bunama u Baniji od kraja 17. do polovine 18. veka", in: *Mešovita građa (Miscellanea)*, 11. Beograd 1983, 9-38.

28 Latin original in: Gavrilović, Građa, 313-321. The formula of the aid from the same date: Gavrilović, Građa, 322.

29 Extensive lists of complaints can be found in documents published in: Gavrilović, Građa. The complaints of frontiersmen were listed and elaborated by Vojin Dabić, too. Vojin S. Dabić, *Banska krajina, 1688–1751. Prilog istoriji srpskog i hrvatskog naroda i krajiškog uređenja u Baniji*, Beograd - Zagreb 1984, 116-125. The simultaneous rebellion of peasants in 1730/1731 was first elaborated by Vjekoslav Klaić, "Nepoznata dosad buna krajiških i kmetskih seljaka u Banovini (1730.—1731.)", in: Vjekoslav Klaić, *Crtice iz hrvatske prošlosti: s uvodom D^{na} Josipa Nagya*, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb 1928, 14-18.

30 Mirko II. Juraj Erdödy (Emericus ab Erdödy, Emeric Erdödy) (? - 1736.), commander of Kostajnica, Jasenovac and Novi, Captain of Petrinja (1734). The Emperor promoted him to colonel in May 1718. Ivan Filipović, "Ispisi iz središnjeg arhiva obitelji Erdödy u Središnjem državnom arhivu Slovačke u Bratislavi" *Arhivski vjesnik*, 21-22, No. 1, 1979, 181-200.

mistreated them.³¹ I will paraphrase several complaints to illustrate their usual sets of grievances. Frontiersmen claimed that c. 40 years earlier Ban Michael von Erdödy³² and his successor, Ban Adam Batthyány³³ had guaranteed their freedoms and rights to be free soldiers acquitted of all duties (*ab omni onere frey sein und blos allein vor Militarisch gehalten werden solten*) if they settled on imperial lands. Based on this promise they left the Ottoman lands under commander count Franz von Erdödy and submitted themselves to the Emperor and Ban, inhabiting along the way desolated and barren lands. They claimed that their previous commanders Franz von Erdödy, count Peter von Keglević, Sir Franjo Vragović and count Delišimunović had protected them (*protegiert*) and requested only their military service. They wanted to remain solely in military status. They studiously listed their traditional duties and complained about the introduction of new duties and obligations. For example, they wanted to continue building and maintaining bridges but they refused to pay the bridge toll from which they were customary exempted. They wanted to use their oak woods, but the commander forbade it. They wanted to sell wine throughout the year (*das gantze Jahr hindurch ihren freyen Schanck gehabt*), as customary, but the commander prohibited it. They wanted to hunt and fish as well as trade and transport goods, and they were even willing to assist the commander in these activities, but only according to previous regulations, dismissing new excessive burdens and obstacles. They wanted to “keep regular watch as imperial watchmen and not watch after commander’s and vice-commander’s ... chicken, ducks, geese and other poultry, let alone their turtle and snail huts (*Schildkrotten und Schnecken hütten*)”. In case of lost or perished poultry or cattle, they refused to compensate the commander with two animals/birds for each lost one. They were gravely insulted by the fact that they were losing their honor and their reputation of imperial soldiers: “Turks ... started to ridicule and scold us as turtle and snail keepers”, they complained.³⁴ They even had to take care of commander’s hair and wash the clothes of his maids, so the ‘Turks’ called them washers of women’s shirts. Touts and insults were “highly painful to us as imperial soldiers”,

31 Gavrilović, Građa, 271, 308-309 et passim. Dabić also mentions problematic corporal Nikola Bunjevac from Kostajnica. Dabić, Banska krajina, 119-120.

32 Actually, it was the Ban of the Kingdom Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, Count Nikola III. Erdödy (1680-1693) known also as Miklós Erdödy de Monyorókerék et Monoszló III.

33 Count Ádám Batthyány, Ban of the Kingdom Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia (1693-1703).

34 Long letter of frontiersmen from Kostajnica and Zrin to the Aulic War Council complaining about the new Regulament in 26 articles (1728), Gavrilović, Građa, 282-291, citations 282, 284. More: ... *zwey Herren kann niemand dienen, als dann wann wir ins Feld gehen und auch die Viehe halten solten quod absurdum est, dann dadurch musten wir die kayserlichen Diensten quittiren. ... Wann wir des Commendanten und vice Commendanten sein Vieh halten solten, tempore Belli, so thun wir den Commendanten lieben, und die kayserliche Dienste hassen, wo doch schrifilich stehet Date Caesari quod Caesari et Deo quod Deo, als befinden wir, das Gott selbsten sich dem Kayser submittiret habe, indeme er den Kayser vorgesetzt und sich nachgesetzt, ...* Gavrilović, Građa, 284, 287. In another long letter they mention commander’s: ... *Viehe, Schaafé, Schweine, Gännse, Änter, Indianisches und anderes Geflügel in summa alle seine altilia hütthen...* Gavrilović, Građa, 297. Summary of complaints in: Dabić, Banska krajina, 116-118.

they lamented.³⁵ They also opposed commander's excessive physical punishments and his ruthlessness. For example, Emeric Erdödy ordered a whipping of their shirtless colleague with 300 strikes saying that he "does not fear God or Ban of Croatia" after which the man had to be wrapped in warm sheepskin and carried by four people outside of the castle to die.³⁶ In sum, frontiersmen wanted to keep the old duties and customs because they did not receive salary and were already overburdened: *der Herr Commendant Graff Emericus ab Erdödy uns arme gränizer opprimirt und unterdrucket... and we want to be kept ... ad normam et usu robotarum consuetudinem, wie sonsten unter dem Herrn Graf Keglevich ... weilten wir so wohl Mondur-gewöhr, Pulfer, und Pley und andere zum Kays. diensten nöthige sachen uns selbstnen produciren müessen, und nich salarierte seyn.*³⁷

Secondly, the frontiersmen addressed changes in the military sphere proposed by the new *Regulament*: they vehemently refused to standardize their weapons (*das gleiche Gewehr zu schaffen ist uns fast unmöglich*); they wanted to see a clear differentiation between ensigns (*Vexillifern*) and *Voyvoden* because the latter were unpaid and could not afford to pay prescribed taxes; they agreed to repair the old fortress complex in Kostajnica (*gratuitis laboribus repariren solten*), but they wanted to be assisted and paid for the work on the new one (*Berg Teck*); they wanted to continue to guard their officers during travel (*wir uns verobligiren sie allzeit zu convoyern*), but refused to give them their private horses for transport of baggage because they had to keep their horses healthy and ready for battle in accordance with regulations; they refused to work in the field; in cases of internal settling of inheritance rights they refused to pay high fees to their commanders (if their commander resolved the inheritance dispute they were required to give him one entire ox). They wanted to keep old penalties for internal brawls that differentiated bruises from bleeding cuts – *wann einer den anderen blau geschlagen, den Commandanten einen Gulden, wann aber bluthig, einen Ducaten bezahlen müssen.*

In general, they refused to provide additional and new labor duties for their officers and for the maintenance of the frontier arguing that they were burdened with unbearable expenses as it was.³⁸ Provoked by willful and arduous demands of local officers as well as new duties and obligations introduced by the authorities, they insisted on old freedoms and justices.

35 *... ja so gar den Haar ausraupfen, einwasseren und ausbrechen, der Kammerdienerin ihre Waschehemder waschen und sauberen, ... die Schildkrotten sogar die Schrecke (vjerovatno Schneken, kao gore, N.Š.) so sich vergriehen hütten müssen ... ohngeachtet wir noch alles erdulden und ausstehen wollten so ferne nicht nur unser ärgste Feind der Türke welcher gleich anderseits den Fluss Una alles siehet, und uns nur verspottet und lachet, dass wir keine kayserliche Graniz Soldaten sondern Schreck Schuldkrotten und Weiber Hembdern Wascheren wären, welche Beschümpfung von denen Türken uns als kayserlichen Soldaten höchst schmerzlich fallet...* Gavrilović, Građa, 307-309, citation 308.

36 Long list of complaints of Kostajnica frontiersmen to the Emperor in 1728: Gavrilović, Građa, 295-300, here 299.

37 Deputies of frontiersmen from Kostajnica to the Aulic War Council in Vienna in 1728. Gavrilović, Građa, 291-292.

38 Protests against the 26 articles of the newly proposed *Regulament* in: Gavrilović, Građa, 282-291, citations 283, 284, 285. See also: Dabić, Banska krajina, 116-118.

Frontiersmen obtained support from the civilians in the adjacent civil territory whose motives for the rebellion were similar to motives of some of the 17th-century peasants.³⁹ Namely, serfs and peasants from the estates Hrastovica, Topusko and Gore (belonging to the Bishopric of Zagreb run by bishop Juraj Branjug⁴⁰ and the Chapter of Zagreb run by Sigismund Sinerspergh), wanted to obtain frontiersmen's rights and status. Since the *Regulament* was written for all frontiersmen between Una and Kupa rivers, they saw a chance to finally be included into frontiersmen's ranks and become proper frontiersmen. Some of the peasants habitually served as paid *haramijas* in frontier fortresses or *đumlijas* in Dubica fortress, run by the Chapter of Zagreb. One of the peasant leaders was a *haramija* from Kostajnica Matija Milaković, who was literate and served as their secretary.⁴¹

Peasants and frontiersmen were eventually suppressed and the new *Regulament* was enforced for existing frontiersmen only. However, small scale conflicts persisted for the next 20 years. The Aulic War Council issued numerous additional regulative acts in the meantime: on the organization and size of villages, on the number of horsemen, footmen and officers, on clothing, arms, banners and drums (1735), on military commands and oaths for paid soldiers and frontiersmen on the battlefield (1737), etc.⁴² They further regulated the affairs and strengthened the discipline. However, in 1733 and 1745 frontiersmen again compiled an extensive list of grievances about the repeated mistreatment by officers who did not respect the 1730 *Regulament*. These abuses were an even more pressing issue than the debate about the new, enforced Regulation.⁴³ Grievances did not result with immediate effects but they prompted the delegation of the Croatian Diet to begin work on the new *Regulament*. In 1749 the work was well under way and supported by the Diet,⁴⁴ the Ban and his personnel, the Empress and the Aulic War Council.⁴⁵

39 Nada Klaić argued, rather successfully, that many 17th-century peasant rebellions in areas close to the frontier were motivated by the acquirement of frontiersmen's status. N. Klaić, *Društvena previranja*, 213-252.

40 Juraj Branjug (1677-1748), bishop of the Diocese of Zagreb (1723-1748).

41 V. Klaić, *Nepoznata dosad buna*, 14-18. V. Klaić uses the report of baron Sigismund Sinerspergh, prepositus major of the Chapter of Zagreb and archdeacon of Gore. See also: Jaroslav Šidak, "Dva priloga za hrvatsku povijest u XVIII stoljeću", *Arhivski vjesnik*, 9, No. 1, 1966, 129-136; Jaroslav Šidak, "Ponovne bune u Banskoj krajini", in: *Historija naroda Jugoslavije*, Zagreb 1959, 1028-1031; Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, "Hrvati za nasljednoga rata", *Rad JAZU*, 38, Zagreb 1877; Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 120 et passim.

42 *Norma* from August 7, 1735 in: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 343-346. Military commands and oath from July 13, 1737 in: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 348-354.

43 GIVK, 338-339, 357-362. Dabić points to their complaints to Croatian estates (1743, 1746): Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 124-125.

44 The introduction of the Regulation was just one aspect of the change. Among others, not analyzed here, was the financing of the Ban's Frontier, which Maria Theresa now fully transferred to Ban, despite the disapproval of local estates.

45 Projects, propositions and opinions from 1749 and beginning of 1750: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 375-409. On the regulation of the status of the Ban's Frontier see: Franz Vaniček, *Spezialgeschichte der*

The newest Regulation was signed by Ban Karlo Batthyány⁴⁶ on November 15, 1750 in Vienna. It was written in Croatian and consisted of 36 articles listing military duties and obligations towards officers.⁴⁷ Just prior to the newest Regulation, on August 12, 1750 count Ludovik Erdödy as *locumtenens banalis* sent a proclamation in Croatian (kajkavian) concerning various changes, including the obligation to wear uniforms and pay for them.⁴⁸

The proclamation of the Regulation and accumulated concerns and tensions resulted with rebellion in 1751.⁴⁹ Frontiersmen feared that the newest Regulation would legalize some newly imposed dues and workload, reducing them to peasants.⁵⁰ In terms of motives, the lists of grievances from 1751 – as recorded by a witness to the events, canon of the Chapter of Zagreb, Baltazar Adam Krčelić⁵¹ – gives a thorough insight into new-old set of problems. I will paraphrase the frontiersmen's grievances: officers treated them worse than cattle, beat them without mercy, seized their things by force and used their horses at will. Their lands and movable property were conscripted,⁵² causing fear that they would simultaneously have to go to war and pay taxes. They could not obey the new regulation because they were unable to pay for the uniforms, nor would be able to do so in the future. This year, money for uniforms was extorted from 2000 people – it impoverished all of them because they had to sell their cattle well below value in order to procure money. From one house or family (*zadruga*)⁵³ three, four or five men were enrolled into military service: their families could not pay for so many uniforms while those few workers that remained at home were not sufficient to farm the lands. Moreover, during the regulation of the frontier

Militärgrenze, Vol. I, Vienna 1875, 544-553; F. Moačanin, Radovi iz povijesti Vojne krajine, 127-128; Jaroslav Šidak, "Regulacija Banske Krajine i buna Todora Kijuka (1751)", in: *Historija naroda Jugoslavije*, Zagreb 1959, 1038-1040; Dabić, Banska krajina, 149-158.

46 Count Károly József Batthyány of Némethújvár, also known as grof Karlo Josip Batthyány (1697-1772) served as Ban of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia (1743-1756). He was also a general and field marshal.

47 Original in: Gavrilović, Građa, 416-423.

48 Original in Gavrilović, Građa, 409-411. His other proclamation in: Gavrilović, Građa, 423-424. See also: Dabić, Banska krajina, 162-163.

49 One of the main sources, along with documents published in Gavrilović's collection, is the account of the witness Baltazar Adam Krčelić, *Annuae ili Historija 1748-1767*, trans. Veljko Gortan, JAZU, Zagreb 1952 (further: Krčelić, *Annuae*). The original was titled *Annuae sive historia ab anno inclusive 1748 et subsequis (1767) ad posteritatis notitiam*. It was first published 1901 in a series MSHSM (vol. 30) and edited by Tadija Smičiklas. Literature on the 1751 rebellion: Dabić, Banska krajina, 149-175; Šidak, Regulacija Banske krajine, 1038-1040.

50 See also: Dabić, Banska krajina, 163-167.

51 Baltazar Adam Krčelić (1715-1778) was a Croatian historian, theologian and lawyer. In 1747 he became the canon of the Cathedral Chapter of Zagreb. He was a highly influential figure in political life of the Kingdom. He also served as the rector of the *Collegium Croaticum Viennense* (1747-1749).

52 The idea that their lands could be taxed as those of serfs, contaminating their military status provoked anguish.

53 From extended families, men from 16 to 60 years old were recruited while mostly women, children and older men had to take care of land and cattle and provide cash for taxes.

no one paid attention to the Orthodox people: they were not promoted and their chieftains (*knezovi*) came into subordination, similar to serfs. Even when Orthodox people were promoted, their salaries were half of what the salaries of officers coming from outside of the frontier were. Officers undermined and disdained their Orthodox religion and priests, ignoring the privileges granted by the Habsburgs in the past. The new regulation brought additional damage and expenses. They could not possibly build so many houses for the officers, especially not on the lands paid or won by spilling their own blood for years. In addition, they could not relinquish their own better lands to officers, as required of them. Officers needed stables, gardens, pastures and hay fields at the expense of frontiersmen, without any compensation. Finally, they wanted to know exactly – as serfs know in detail – which lands were enjoyed in return for military service, free of dues, and which lands were surplus, enjoyed in return for various dues, so that those with more lands could, from the surplus, financially aid those who had less.⁵⁴

In some other recorded complaints frontiersmen also emphasized their dissatisfaction with the conscription and allotment of land, obligation to build officers' houses and appointment of foreign officers. Due to mistreatment and overexertion, "some people are dead, some are wounded to death and some vomit, spit or piss blood" so we need domestic officers who know how to take care of us – they complained in vivid detail.⁵⁵ The subject of uniforms was often reiterated:⁵⁶ they were much happier with traditional, comfortable garments but they had to dress uniformly and even pay for expensive, new uniforms. These complaints served as a trigger for the 1751 rebellion.

To conclude, causes and motives in both rebellions were manifold but concrete and rational and there were some important common denominators, too. Firstly, the motives for dissatisfaction in 1730 and 1751 accumulated for a long period of time and open dissatisfaction escalated only after the insufficiently negotiated Regulations that threatened to disrupt established patterns of life were officially proclaimed. The goal of the rebellion was to remove excessive cruelty, erase new obligations and randomly invented duties, and to restore previous order. Thus, while in 1730 frontiersmen wanted to abolish the new Regulation and restore old customs and practices, in 1751 their explicit goal was to restore the 1730 regulation.⁵⁷ Secondly, the most pressing problem were those segments of new regulations which introduced new military duties and changed the legal and symbolic status of frontiersmen. Thirdly, high on the agenda in

54 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 73; Šidak, *Regulacija Banske krajine*, 1040; Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 159.

55 Gavrilović, *Grada*, 457-459, citation 459.

56 Petar Škrlec writes to Krčelić (July 20, 1751) that uniforms and abuses are huge problems: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 481.

57 Frontiersmen were explicitly in favor of the 1730 *Regulament* claiming on July 6, 1751 that they would not forsake it (... *dobili su od ceszara Carola privilegium, od kojega odsztupiti nikak ne mogu, niti ove nove dispositie kakti takai nove officzere imati nehte.*" Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 125, citation 171; Gavrilović, *Grada*, 428-429, 471-471, citation 471.

both rebellions was abusive and tyrannical behavior⁵⁸ of officers, as well as fear of the legalization of some of their novel demands that could lead to the serfdom of frontiersmen. Fourthly, the military frontier system was not questioned per se. However risky and demanding, military life was still attractive, even to serfs. The rebellions were not so much about the political and ideological, but about practical issues (except in the religious domain where Orthodox hierarchy strived to be the advocate for the Orthodox frontiersmen who formed the majority in these parts, as will be shown later).

Changes in Patterns of Protest and Rebellion – the Culture of Disobedience

In feudal areas adjacent to the Military Frontier one can notice a shift from violent 16th century rebellions to more numerous but also more organized and comparatively less violent peasant dissent in the 17th century. In rural communities one can follow a development of the culture of disobedience, which reduced physical violence. Civilian rebels dispatched commissions to the court, engaged legal representatives and educated people who wrote complaints (*gravamina*) for them, invited imperial commissions to inspect the situation and so on. They lobbied for their rights at the level of the court, local government and local community. They practiced passive resistance for years, if necessary.⁵⁹

Patterns of rebellion on the frontier were different. Both in the 17th and in the first half of the 18th century frontiersmen who rebelled were often more violent and dangerous than peasants and serfs. They were armed and trained in weapons. As a rule, they had less time and understanding than civilians to think through and resolve problems peacefully. Moreover, high rate of employment in military service, high death rate and a high number of invalids caused difficulties in providing regular food and shelter for

58 Frontiersmen labeled Erdődy as despot (*obnerträglichem Despotismo*) and felt their resistance was justified. Gavrilović, Građa, 300. Instructive is the case of a peasant rebellion on the Novigrad estate (1653-1659) belonging to one more Erdődy, Mirko I or Emeric I Erdődy (1620–1690), captain of Petrinja and Koprivnica, who was quite a violent person, too. The estate was close to the Frontier and serfs threatened they would cross to the Ottoman side to run away from Erdődy's abuses. There was fear that serfs from the Chapter Estates would join in. Ban Nikola Zrinski VII bluntly interfered into Erdődy's private affairs and urged the Diet to appoint a commission in an attempt to solve problems near the Frontier. He commented on the rebellion, clearly supporting the idea of justified resistance to tyrants. He claimed that those peasants were not rebels because they did not rebel against God, against the king or country or against their own landlord provided that he kept them in justice that every Christian lord, who is not a tyrant and a cutthroat, ought to administer to his subordinates. (... *quod Rustici isti non sunt Rebelles, nec enim rebellarunt contra Deum, nec Regem, nec Patriam, id est Regnum, nec contra proprium Dominum, dummodo illos teneat comes in illa iustitia, quam unus quisque Christianus tenetur suis subditis administrare, ne sit Tyrannus in illos, ne excoriet ne deglubat, sed tondeat*). Vjekoslav Klaić. "Ban Nikola Zrinski i seljaci (1653-1659)." in Vjekoslav Klaić. *Crtime iz hrvatske prošlosti: s uvodom D^{na} Josipa Nagya*. Zagreb, 1928, 10-13, citation 12-13.

59 Adamček, Bune i otpori, 335-347 et passim; Štefanec, Soziale Unruhen, 186-191.

their families. Life in risky circumstances and dependence on war-economy increased their stress and anxiety. Psychologically, the military society was very vulnerable. Violence was for a long time the standard method of conflict resolution. Rebellions were led by capable and charismatic warriors. Quite often, a group of frontiersmen would attack and kill problematic, or emblematic, officers as, for example, in 1619 (Žumberak), 1661 (Otočac), 1693 (Brinje), 1700 (Plaški) and 1702 (Ribnik), etc. Sometimes they attempted to kill them but failed.⁶⁰ The most typical motives were high and unlawful taxes, forced labor, abuses and excessive physical punishments, imposition of feudal dues to frontiersmen, providing accommodation or *Bequartierung* for foreign soldiers (Koprivnica captaincy in 1697, Maritime Border in 1719, Lika and Krbava in 1732), increase in salt prices which was a valuable commodity for mobile communities of herders that served as unpaid military, etc. Rebellions were in most cases spontaneous and impulsive: a short outburst of dissatisfaction was usually coupled with poor organization. Rebellions were brief and had limited spatial reach, sometimes receiving support from neighboring military men or peasants.⁶¹ Even though they shared certain motives with mentioned rebellions, the rebellions of 1730/1731 and 1751 differed from the described pattern.

The military rebellion in 1730/1731 was an outburst of discontent, but a fairly moderate outburst. It was just a tip of a much longer dispute. Prior to the outburst we can discern multiple elements that were part of the emergent culture of disobedience. For years, frontiersmen lobbied for their interests across the region; the new *Regulament* was discussed from the mid-1720s, and most vehemently in 1728. Frontiersmen wrote numerous complaints and appeals, addressing them to the Aulic War Council, the Emperor, the Croatian Diet, the Ban (count Ivan Pálffy⁶² who mostly resided in Pozsony), the *locumtenens banalis*, count Ivan Drašković⁶³ and others. In 1728 delegates from the Kostajnica Frontier went to Vienna and Pozsony to complain to the authorities. The same delegates complained that “after five years of lengthy solicitations and great costs” they were sent back and forth between these two cities without proper resolution.⁶⁴ They even appealed to prince Eugene of Savoy for protection and informed the Ortho-

60 Holjevac-Moačanin, *Hrvatsko-slavonska Vojna Krajina*, 63-67.

61 Vaniček, *Spezialgeschichte*, 182-185, 231-236, 254-256, 547-549; F. Moačanin, *Radovi iz povijesti Vojne krajine*, 108-138, 139-192, passim; Holjevac-Moačanin, *Hrvatsko-slavonska Vojna krajina*, 63-70; Štefanec, *Soziale Unruhen*, 177-200. On violent rebellions incited by *Bequartierung der deutschen Truppen* and salt taxes: Drago Rokandić, “Bune u Senju i Primorskoj krajini (1719-1722)”, *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest*, 15, 1982, 33-106.

62 Count Ivan IV Pálffy de Erdőd (Pálffy János) (1663-1751) was a Ban of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia (1704-1732) during which time he had many deputies. He was a Hungarian palatine (1741-1751). He participated in the Great Turkish War and was present at the siege of Vienna in 1683.

63 Count Ivan Drašković V (*graf Johan Draskovich*) (1660-1733), *locumtenens banalis* (1718-1732), Ban of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia (1732-1733).

64 ... und zu Complänirung dessen wir uns nacher Pressburg verfügen solten, da wir aber zu Pressburg anlangeten ... wir uns nacher zu Wienn zurück verfügen solten (...). Gavrilović, *Grada*, 302-306.

dox hierarchy in detail:⁶⁵ they regularly communicated with the Metropolitanate of Karlovci⁶⁶ as well as with lower echelons of Orthodox hierarchy.

The grievances of mostly illiterate frontiersmen were, quite amazingly, written in Latin, German, Croatian and Old Slavonic (in Cyrillic letters). The letters abounded with legal phrases in Latin and German as well as references to various legal documents and practices, which points to the fact that frontiersmen started to consistently employ literate and educated men. They also started to negotiate. It points to the fact that frontiersmen started to believe this type of activity could consequently benefit their cause in the increasingly bureaucratized Monarchy and bring better results than physical violence.

The official *Regulament* for the Ban's Frontier was proclaimed on April 15, 1530; the rebellion ensued at the end of June 1730 and lasted a year. V. Klaić mentions some rebel leaders from Kostajnica: Orthodox priest (*Popa Vallacus*), Šimun Grbešić, Cvijo Srbljanin and Rodić.⁶⁷ Dabić states that frontiersmen rebelled during the muster-roll in Gvozdansko (Zrin Frontier) after the articles were read to them. One ensign was killed and frontiersmen gathered in their assemblies (*zbor, congressum*⁶⁸) to discuss the issues. They sent delegates to Vienna in order to convince the ruler of their loyalty as well as of their righteous cause for dissent. They did not disturb officers in fortresses and they continued to keep watch and fulfill their military duties. *Locumtenens* Drašković wanted to apply force, but the Aulic War Council appealed for a peaceful solution against such a moderate resistance.⁶⁹

As already mentioned, peasants in adjacent lands started to rebel as well, attempting to join frontiersmen's ranks. On April 3, 1731 Bishop Branjug, *locumtenens* Drašković and frontier officers discussed how and when to send the soldiers to peasant villages to quell the protests. Hearing about it, by the end of April most villagers gave up; they were also promised amnesty upon surrender of their weapons. Few villages persisted but were eventually attacked, plundered and burned by several thousand frontiersmen brought in from the Karlovac Generalcy. This was in fact a premeditated act by the landlords in order to exile rebellious (mainly Orthodox) peasants from the civil territories for good. In brief: peasants who tried to escape with the cattle were intercepted by bishop's men and the cattle was taken away; the Bishop forcefully imposed some

65 Original documents in: Gavrilović, Građa, 269-312.

66 *Karlovačka mitropolija* (*Карловачка митрополија*) was a Metropolitanate of the Serbian Orthodox Church (1708-1848).

67 V. Klaić, *Nepoznata dosad buna*, 17. Šidak corrects Rodić to Radić: Šidak, *Dva priloga*, 132. Transcript of the original in: Šidak, *Dva priloga*, 131-134.

68 From 1630 such assemblies were prohibited on the Frontier because they could lead to rebellion.

69 Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 118-119, 121. Dabić believes that the *Regulament* was the main motive, cause and a trigger to the rebellion. Moreover, that the attempts of the Bishop of Zagreb to submit Orthodox population and reduce the power of the Orthodox church also played part, which sounds less likely, but still cannot be discarded. See also V. Klaić, *Nepoznata dosad buna*, 16-17; Šidak, *Ponovne bune*, 1030.

new obligations on his peasants, as did the Chapter of Zagreb; some peasants asked for mercy but were forbidden from returning to their villages.⁷⁰ In the end, many villages on these estates were then settled by more submissive population from the North.

In 1751 we have another important break with the tradition of impulsive, unorganized rebellions in military areas. The course of events can be reconstructed from the report of one of the key witnesses, Baltazar Adam Krčelić, as well as from numerous other sources.

Following repeated abuses by the officers and hearing about the introduction of the new Regulation, frontiersmen approached Ban Karlo Batthyány during a military exercise in Ptuj in early summer 1750 and obtained his promise that their complaints would be heard. Upon return to the Ban's Frontier, their worries about new, expensive, and less comfortable, uniforms prompted them to assemble anyhow. They sent delegates to Vienna; however, one such delegation was escorted from Vienna to Zagreb in chains and questioned there;⁷¹ another delegation was detained midway in Zagreb in September 1750 and four of their chieftains (*knezovi*) were captured. Detainments caused great anxiety (even later on, in summer 1751, frontiersmen were still angry because their delegates were in chains⁷² awaiting death). Yet another delegation was interrogated in Vienna in October 1750. Investigation records cite previous delegations and delegates and mention *Thesso Kiuk* in relation to Ban's promise in Ptuj.⁷³ From these records one can discern that while a number of chieftains like Petar Kulojević and Vučimir Trivanović led the first phases of the revolt,⁷⁴ it was Todor (Tešo, Todor) Kijuk, a literate person (*deak* or *diak*), who was subsequently identified as the ringleader. In Vienna, Kijuk famously managed to acquire a copy of the Regulation from April 1730.⁷⁵ This Regulation, though contested in the past, seemed quite acceptable now. More importantly, in present circumstances this copy became a valuable weapon, marking a great symbolic shift from violent resistance to legal battle in the frontier conflicts.

The rebellion in the form of assemblies started at the beginning of June 1751. On June 18, 1751, Maria Theresa wrote to general Carl Gustav Count von Kheul (+1758) about the need to stop the spread of dissatisfaction and to suppress the rebellion instigated by Kijuk who, apparently, already complained to her (*ein sogenannter Küuck, welcher schon in verwichenem Jahr ein und andere ungegründete Beschwerden bey Uns vorgebracht*).⁷⁶

70 V. Klaić, *Nepoznata dosad buna*, 17; Šidak, *Ponovne bune*, 1029-1030; Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 120-123, 124.

71 Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 167-168.

72 Complaints of frontiersmen from July 6, 1751: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 471-472 (on captured rebels p. 472).

73 Gavrilović, *Grada*, 411-412, 450. Transcript of their hearing in Vienna in: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 413-416. Report on captured frontiersmen in: Krčelić, *Annue*, 73.

74 A number of other names in: Vaniček, *Spezialgeschichte*, 547-548; Gavrilović, *Grada*, 413-414.

75 Gabrijel Škrlec wrote from Komogovina (June 7, 1751) how *Diak* Kijuk convoked an assembly and presented the 1730 *Regulament* that he acquired in Vienna (*quae privilegia idem Diak Vienna acquisivit*). Gavrilović, *Grada*, 428-429, 471 et passim.

76 Gavrilović, *Grada*, 430-431. See also an order to general Kheul on June 19, 1751: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 432.

The rebels were mainly Orthodox frontiersmen who comprised the majority in those parts of the Ban's Frontier. Kijuk devised a plan to avoid bloodshed and he accordingly issued clear instructions to his collaborators. He visited frontiersmen's houses, offering words of support and hope. He instructed them to visit frontier officers on a designated day and, without harming anyone, ask them to calmly leave their posts. Although officers were scattered across border towns, Kijuk's plan was executed almost to perfection: only one rogue Vlach fired a musket, accidentally killing Lieutenant Ignjat Greguroci's horse. As advised, the officers withdrew into regiment centers Glina and Kostajnica and remained there, and the frontiersmen even kept watch until the end of the rebellion.⁷⁷

Rebels then gathered in a field next to Komogovina (near Kostajnica) and deliberated for eight days. They took an oath, put their complaints on paper (according to Vaniček) and returned home ready to gather again if needed or if invited by Todor Kijuk. A colonel from Kostajnica, Venceslav Kleefeld, sent delegates to Komogovina asking for their motives, but they returned empty-handed. Kleefeld then sent a report to Maria Theresa who was at the session of the Pozsony Diet.⁷⁸ She ordered General Leopold Eugen Scherzer to immediately depart from Marburg to the Karlovac Generalcy and to take care of the rebellion instigated by *Kiuch*.⁷⁹ A new Orthodox Bishop (*episkop*) in Plaški, Danilo Jakšić, was invited to intervene and help his fellow believers in order to avoid escalation and bloodshed. The Metropolitan Pavle Nenadović⁸⁰ wrote a letter to rebels asking them to obey their officers; he also sent the heads of Lepavina and Šišatovac (today's Serbia) monasteries to the Ban's Frontier to keep Orthodox priests away from the rebellion.⁸¹ The assembly in Komogovina was consequently abolished. In sum, during and of June and beginning of July Austrian officers collected data on rebels and their assemblies, they detained and questioned frontiersmen and their reports indicated that the revolt was settling.⁸² However, across the frontier, the troops were on standby, ready to react at any moment. Frontiersmen still claimed that they wanted to solve matters peacefully and they kept sending delegates to Vienna.

77 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 72. Dabić also notices that this rebellion was not a spontaneous outburst of anger as was usually the case. Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 170-171.

78 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 72; Apparently, priest Filip Trbuhović, Kosta Dragojević, Trifun Častebec and Komogovina monk Mojo recorded complaints and sent them to *Warasdiner Obrist-Wachtmeister* Mikašinović. Vaniček, *Spezialgeschichte*, 548.

79 Aulic War Council's order to generals Scherzer and Helfreich (June 18, 1751): Gavrilović, *Građa*, 431. On June 21, 1751, Franjo Kušević briefed Scherzer on an assembly of frontiersmen in Babina Reka. Gavrilović, *Građa*, 435-436.

80 Pavle Nenadović (Павле Ненадовић), Metropolitan of Karlovci (1749 – 1768).

81 Maria Theresa to Nenadović (June 23, 1751): Gavrilović, *Građa*, 441. Kleefeld to Nenadović on other possible instigators (*Vicarius Ephrem and der hier entstandenen Rebellion mit dem Poppen Mojo schuldig und ... der größte Aufwiegler seye*). Gavrilović, *Građa*, 444. Also: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 444-445, 452-453, 473, 476, 479, 481, 485-486 etc.

82 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 448-456, 467, 470-471. *Vice-ban* Ivan Rauch also wrote about settling of revolt (456).

They warned the authorities that people were crossing or would cross to the Ottoman side,⁸³ which was confirmed by the Habsburg officers who feared possible Ottoman assistance to the rebels, especially regarding Ottoman gatherings near the border (*und Erbfeind ohnweith von Kruppa auf etliche 1000 Mann starkh ... alldorthen Randevu halten sollen*).⁸⁴ General Scherzer and other officers were keeping an eye on revolts raised in support in Lika and Varaždin Generalcies, and suppressed them efficiently.⁸⁵ The military structures feared the worst. Count Joseph von Harrach, president of the *Hofkriegsrat* (1739-1762), appealed to the Empress to simply quash the rebels in Ban's Frontier as a lesson;⁸⁶ he was not alone amongst the military and Kingdom's officials,⁸⁷ but negotiations as a tactic prevailed.

At the end of June 1751 Maria Theresa sent Kingdom's (not imperial) commissioners to Hrastovica near Petrinja to examine the affairs. They were count and *locumtenens* Ljudevit Erdödy,⁸⁸ baron Adam Patačić⁸⁹ and Canon of Zagreb, Baltazar Adam Krčelić, who was given the task of appeasing the serfs in neighboring bishop's estates over Kupa, in order to prevent them from joining the rebels. Accompanied by the fourth commissioner, Franjo Kušević, they came to Hrastovica where they were to meet the rebels who were guaranteed free passage. They prompted rebels to send a delegation to the official hearing and on the fifth day, rebels sent six representatives and one Orthodox priest, Filip Trbuhović, Kijuk's secretary. They came humbly, bowed their heads to the ground in respect and declared that they were not rebels but loyal soldiers. They listed complaints (presented in the previous section) and commissioners wrote them down. Afterwards, baron Adam Patačić addressed the rebels with a long speech where he defended the new *Regulament* and barely touched upon their grievances related to promotions and land issues. One frontiersman from Zrin replied: *You are a priest so you uttered many words, but you should know we will not be swayed by empty words any more*. Count Erdödy asked them to allow the officers to return to their posts and to hand over Todor Kijuk whom rebels carefully guarded. He also told them to dismiss the assembly in Komogovina which the rebels refused but invited the representatives to

83 Gavrilović, Građa, 457-459.

84 Gavrilović, Građa, 456-457, 460-462 et passim, citation 480.

85 Letters of *Leopold Freyherr von Scherzer, General Feld Wachtmeister* and other officers: Gavrilović, Građa, 437-440, 442, 451, 455-456, 460, 462, 464-465, 467 et passim.

86 ... *Ihnen Banalisten ... die nicht aufhören wollende Tumultuanten allererst auf ainlaufenden Allerhöchsten Befehl mit aller Macht und Schärfe zum gehorsam zwingen würde, darinnen einen besseren Eindruck zur künftigen Subordination vor ihre Vorgesetzte indeme gegeben hätte*. Pozsony, July 2, 1751. Gavrilović, Građa, 467 citation, 478.

87 Gavrilović, Građa, 468.

88 Count Ljudevit I Erdödy (Ludvig Erdödy) (1694-1753): served in Habsburg military service as sergeant major general; from 1748 (confirmed in January 1749) *locumtenens banalis* in Croatia; county mayor of Požega County.

89 Count Adam Aleksandar Patačić (1716-1784) was the Archbishop of Kalocsa (1776-1784). His court in Oradea (Nagyvárad, Großwardein, Veliki Varadin) was famous for promotion of music. He was a Croatian lexicographer.

Kostajnica. Count Erdödy, baron Patačić and Kušević went there with several cavalry officers. After additional debate, Patačić was dispatched to Pozsony with a report and generals started to prepare troops to quash the rebellion.⁹⁰ On July 14, Kingdom's Conference closed all routes from military to civil lands, also preparing for the suppression of the rebellion. News on the movement of rebels began to spread, but abated later on.⁹¹

According to Krčelić's and several other letters, Scherzer came to Gora on July 20, 1751. There he met with count Erdödy and colonel Kleefeld. He addressed some threatening words to the rebels – *Ich sehe die reisende Flamme und des Schneidende Schwerdt über eüern Kopf schwebend mit Betrübten augen an!* – and invited them to appear in front of royal delegates in 24 hours or they would be *auf das Schärfste Bestrafen* and godless Komogovina would be burned to ashes. They refused and asked Scherzer to come to them with an imperial commission.⁹² Rebels even sent a letter stating that everything was already said in Hrastovica and they had nothing further to add. In Gora, some cavalrymen from their ranks were eventually forced to take an oath of fidelity (though begrudgingly). The oath was probably staged in order to undermine the rebellion and hint at the discord between the frontiersmen. Maria Theresa was informed of the developments and at the beginning of August she sent a regiment led by Molck and field marshal Kheul to smother the rebellion. Kheul took 3,000 soldiers from the Varaždin Generalcy and 2,000 from the Karlovac Generalcy and raised a camp near Petrinja.⁹³ While generals angrily opted for the attack, Ban Karlo Batthyány officially notified the Pasha of Bosnia regarding the possible arrival of the army. However, Ban still urged the queen on July 30 to settle things peacefully because a frontal attack could get out of control, which was also the opinion of Gabrijel Škrlec.⁹⁴

According to witness Krčelić, rebels were ultimately invited to the Petrinja camp in the hope that they would desist when they saw the gathered army. They came assuring the authorities that the purpose of their gathering in Komogovina was to be heard, not to fight. They invited generals to their part of the border. Generals Kheul and Scherzer accepted and arrived to the designated village, Četvrtkovec, near Sunja, at the beginning of August 1751. In Četvrtkovec, generals meticulously wrote down the grievances and requests and sent them to the queen. Frontiersmen claimed that they were provoked by the detainment of their delegation in Zagreb, that they wanted to avoid conflict and that they continued to fulfill all their military duties – they emphasized

90 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 73-74. See also: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 473.

91 Gavrilović, *Grada*, 474-475, 476-478, 481.

92 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 175. Letter of general Kheul that angrily mentions this meeting in: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 482-484. Scherzer threatens on July 22, 1751 in Gora: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 484-485. Scherzer also reports on Turkish threat. Letter to the Empress, Gora, July 25, 1751: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 488-490.

93 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 74. Letters of general Kheul from Petrinja: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 495-496.

94 Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 173-174; Gavrilović, *Grada*, 481, 492-493. Numerous letters on the preparation of troops in: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 428-494 *passim*. Letter to Pasha of Bosnia: Gavrilović, *Grada*, 494-495.

that they kept watch on the Ottoman border and in Glina and that they would like to keep watch in Kostajnica, too, if allowed.⁹⁵ General Kheul reported that the rebels were appeased thanks to certain *Räzischen Bischöfen von Carlstatt*, stressing that a proper investigation had to be made into the causes of the revolt and the instigators punished. During August groups of rebels were gradually put under control.⁹⁶

In sum, the rebels, as well as parts of the civil and military hierarchy, attempted to avoid armed conflict. The peace was concluded under several conditions. First, generals had to listen to the grievances against the officers which they did and even detained guilty officers. According to Krčelić, some officers would have lost their lives if it were not for the help of colonel Kleefeld who stood up for them. Second, field marshal, count Carl Gustav Kheul, had to inform the queen about all unsolved problems and assist the rebel delegation to reach Vienna. Rebels, on the other hand, promised to obey their officers, to allow them to return to their posts and to repeat an oath of loyalty to Her Majesty – on August 28. Two Molck's Regiments were left in the area to patrol the region along with local frontiersmen.⁹⁷ On September 5, the Empress noted that the rebels were pacified (*Unruhen ... völlig gestillet*).⁹⁸ At the end of September the army completely dispersed as the situation fully calmed down.

All in all, in both rebellions we witness a long-lasting effort and premeditated attempt on behalf of frontiersmen to act rationally and to protect their interests in an institutional and legal way. After so many rebellions crushed in blood, the frontiersmen were homogenized enough to conduct an organized revolt and to attempt to resolve conflict through dialogue. They were experienced enough to recognize the benefits of finding literate people who could record their complaints in several languages, in a clear and legally adequate way. Instead of instantaneous discharge of anger they lobbied across the region in order to convey their message to people in power, from Vienna and Pozsony to Zagreb and Karlovci. Long and planned legal battles, followed by organized dissent, were designed to reduce danger and incite the authorities to treat them as partners. All these elements were part of a developing culture of protest and disobedience in the frontier areas, comparable to those in the *Zivilkroatien* in the 17th century.

95 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 72-74; Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 170.

96 Gavrilović, *Grada*, 495-496, 496, 498.

97 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 74.

98 Gavrilović, *Grada*, 505.

Habsburg Response: Monopolization and Criminalization of Violence as an Enlightened Goal

Rebellions in civil parts were frequent in the 17th century but the authorities mostly, though not always, abstained from capital punishments and heavy tortures.⁹⁹ One of the reasons was good organization of rebelling communities and their growing inclination to use legal channels of dissent, but also the fact that the landowners needed serfs and peasants in the depopulated kingdom. The Crown often interfered, too, sending commissions and demanding from landlords to abstain from illegal practices and introduction of new duties and obligations.¹⁰⁰

On the Military Frontier, even lesser crimes such as thefts, desertion or counter-espionage were punishable with capital sentence. It was not uncommon to see rebellion leaders tortured and executed as an example and a deterrent. Cruel executions of leaders happened in 1666 (Varaždin Generalcy), also after the rebellions in Lika and Krbava that started in 1728, 1732, 1746 and 1751. As a rule, leaders and rebels were incarcerated and heavily tortured.¹⁰¹ In the rebellions under consideration, the military authorities and the court in Vienna – as well as the Diet and the Ban of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia – anticipated that frontiersmen would act aggressively and violently as usual. They were constantly on the alert, fearing a possible escalation and preparing the counterattack. To suppress revolts, they habitually used frontiersmen from other border sections who did not sympathize with local ones. In 1730/1731 and 1751 these troops were also on standby and partially used.

On the other hand, the authorities were aware that they put high demands on frontiersmen in terms of standardization and unification of the frontier (uniforms, weapons, training, horses) and numerous imposed duties in kind, cash and work.¹⁰² They were also aware of officer's abuses which prevented productive functioning of the Frontier. Hence, in both rebellions on the Ban's border the Aulic War Council and the highest officials in the Kingdom were keen to swiftly settle disputes between officers and frontiersmen, to remove obstacles for an imposition of the *Regulament* and to steer the Frontier to its envisaged purpose.

At the end of the 1720s frontiersmen were convinced that it was no other than their commander Emeric Erdődy who schemed to introduce harmful changes to the newly proposed *Regulament*. Frontiersmen from Kostajnica frontier firmly believed that Emeric was supported in his malicious intent by his peers, primarily *locumtenens*

99 The exception was the punishment of peasants and serfs by *vicebanus* Ivan Rauch in the last large rebellion in 1755. The rebellion is well elaborated in literature.

100 Adamček, *Bune i otpori*, passim; Štefanec, *Soziale Unruhen*, 177-191.

101 Holjevac-Moačanin, *Hrvatsko-slavonska Vojna krajina*, 63-68.

102 Instead of keeping watch and going to war they had to enter regular training. Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 161. Maria Theresa especially insisted on the introduction of new training (*neu-eingeführten Kriegsexercitii*). Gavrilović, *Građa*, 431. The training had to enable the frontiersmen to apply linear tactics in battlefields across Europe.

Drašković, but also Ban Pálffy, which they explicitly stated on several occasions in a letter to the emperor in 1728 asking for *ohnparteyischen Untersuchungs-Commission*.¹⁰³ However, their allegations were not completely founded. The civilian and military authorities were aware of corrupt officials and officers. Already in 1725, writing about the new organization of the part of the Ban's Frontier, count Ivan Drašković urged the Aulic War Councilors to expressly, or via Ban, order count Erdődy to dismiss his secretary (*Würtschafts-Secretary*) Joseph Kurill who provoked frontiersmen and caused numerous complaints. Drašković also noticed that count Erdődy (*diser unruhige Graf*) caused constant problems. Though he was servile in his writings he was not obedient, stated Drašković.¹⁰⁴ In September 1727, Ban Pálffy ordered the commanders in Kostajnica and Glina – who *citra antiquam eorum Consuetudinem, miseri Confiniary molestentur* – to cease with their abuses, assuring them that he would continue to listen to frontiersmen's complaints.¹⁰⁵ Ban Pálffy openly noted in one letter from 1728 that Emeric Erdődy was a highly problematic figure, stating that while previous commanders solved problems well and without much noise, this commander caused him to have more work with this section of the border than with an entire empire.¹⁰⁶ A corporal on the Kostajnica Frontier, Jovan Lubisich, sent a letter to the Aulic War Council and described in detail how he and his family suffered at the hands of Emeric Erdődy and Nikola Petković, from imprisonment to commissioned murders. Lubisich asserted that Drašković helped him and his family and repeatedly ordered Emeric and his men to stop, but all in vain.¹⁰⁷ In November 1728, Pálffy promised to make an objective inquiry into Erdődy's abuses (*die Sache recht umständlich und unpartheisch zu inquiriren*).¹⁰⁸ Unruly commanders became a problem for the authorities, too.

Ban Pálffy accurately noticed that frontiersmen were antagonized by Erdődy to such an extent that Erdődy became the stumbling block to the mutual agreement (*beederseits rechtlichen Zufriedenheit*).¹⁰⁹ Using this wording, Pálffy also acknowledged that

103 Gavrilović, Građa, citation 300. *Erstens die Ersinn- und Aufsezung des quaestionirten Regulamenti betreffend, so hat selbiges seine Natales niemanden anderem als Seiner Excellenz des Locumtenetiis Grafen von Draskovicz subtilem und für des Commendanten Grafens Emerici von Erodedy Interesse allzuviel portirtem Ingenio seinen Progressum und Approbation aber sein Grafens von Draskovicz besonderer Geschichlichkeit zu zuschreiben, unter welcher er diesen seinen immaturum ignerii coeteroquin maturissimi partum des Bani Croatiae Grafens von Pálffy Excellenz ingeheim- und mit gefliessener Hinderhaltung dessen, das ser nur die einseitige Draskovizinsche uns niemahlen zu wissen gekommene gedanken seyen, beygeschoben, und also selbige auf die irige Meinung angeleitet. Gavrilović, Građa, 297; ... dass selbiges zu unserem Untergang, hingegen aber zu des Commendanten Favor und Nutzen von seiner Favoriten eingerichtet ... Gavrilović, Građa, 299.*

104 Gavrilović, Građa, 266-269, here 268.

105 Gavrilović, Građa, 269.

106 Pálffy to the Aulic War Council on April 8, 1728, Gavrilović, Građa, 294-295, citation 295.

107 Gavrilović, Građa, 307-309

108 Gavrilović, Građa, 309-310.

109 Pálffy's letter to the Aulic War Council (April 8, 1728): Gavrilović, Građa, 294-295. Palfy's letter to the Aulic War Council (November 29, 1728): ... meiner ... vormahls vorgetragener Meynung widerhole, nemlich der Erreichenden Endschafft dieser Sache sehr zutrüglich zu seyn, so das Regulament ante

the *Regulament* should be implemented consensually. However, frontiersmen were too persistent with complaints so he came to the idea to exclude them. On a couple of occasions Pálffy proposed to proclaim the *Regulament* without the knowledge of the frontiersmen. Pálffy reasoned that even if they solved the problems with commanders, frontiersmen would still present new accusations against Emeric Erdődy and block the *Regulament*. There, he wrongly estimated the level of their aggravation and the problems that could occur if they, in such a high emotional state, were to be excluded from the process.

Frontiersmen, on the other hand, started to fear that the *Regulament* would be proclaimed without their knowledge and consent. In the first half of 1728 frontiersmen from the Kostajnica and Zrin frontier still commented on copies of the proposed *Regulament*¹¹⁰ and Pálffy responded to their comments.¹¹¹ Later on in 1728, it becomes obvious from their writings that they were increasingly left out of the process. They started to ask for a new copy (*authentische Abschrift*) in order to comment on it. They emphasized the contractual nature of the Regulation (*weil oftbemeltes Regulament per modum contractus eingerichtet ist worden*). They claimed that the *Regulament* would not be legitimate if proclaimed without their consent and knowledge and that they would not allow a one-sided proclamation because it could become a contractual liability for their children and grandchildren. Finally, they feared that if they were not provided with authentic transcripts, Emeric Erdődy would get a copy and interpret the provisions of *Regulament* as he saw fit.¹¹²

In sum, besides the fact that Erdődy was seen as a huge liability by both sides, it is obvious that years of legal processes preceded the rebellion. Finally, replacements pacified the situation as Emeric Erdődy was replaced by a new commander of Kostajnica Ivan Franjo Čikulín (1730-1738), who was a bit more prone to embezzlement than to cruelty.¹¹³ In June 1730, Petar Paraminski, who had until then commanded the Zrin frontier, became the new commander of the Glina frontier and the Sredičko vice-frontier.

Thus, during the rebellion of 1730/1731 the troops were employed, as outlined above, but they were not officially sent to undertake undue physical retributions. Instructive in this sense is also the letter from March 19, 1731 where Ban Pálffy asserts to the Aulic War Council that rebelling serfs and peasants should be immediately

Publicationis, denen Confinariys nich kundt gemacht würde, allermassen sie widrigen fals, wann ihnen auch alles zugestanden, widerumb etwas de novo, auss obberührten motiven (Erdődy, NŠ) zu excipiren suchen würden. Gavrilović, Građa, 309-310.

110 Gavrilović, GIVK, 275-280, 282-291, 291-292, 295-300, 301-302.

111 Gavrilović, Građa, 274-275, 281, 294-295.

112 Gavrilović, GIVK, 303, 304.

113 Ivan Franjo Čikulín (1681-1746) was educated in Zagreb, Trnava and Graz. He was known as a poet. He wrote in Croatian and Latin. He also served as captain of Kostajnica between 1730 and 1738. Already in December 1732 he was accused by Ban of various property scams in the Kostajnica region and infringement of sanitary measures on the border with the Ottoman Empire. Gavrilović, Građa, 331-334.

subdued by the frontier militia but using weaponless methods (*mit einigen Compagnien von der Confiniar-Miliz des Königreichs sich zum Schröcken, ..., doch nicht mit Wafen sondern mit anderer Arth und Territion zu bringen*).¹¹⁴ Eventually, on a trial in Pokupsko in June 1731, five of the bishop's subordinates were sentenced to death and five to galleys, while one Chapter's subordinate was branded and banished together with his family.¹¹⁵ It was quite a grave punishment for a civil area.

On the Frontier, however, there were no known executions. Apparently, at the beginning of June 1731, 6,000 soldiers from the Varaždin and Karlovac Generalcies surrounded the targeted villages on Glina and Zrin Frontiers – Sračica and Lužac respectively. The rebellion of frontiersmen was thus halted and their connections to peasants severed. With no recorded executions and punishments, it can be stated that the frontier rebellion was smothered more delicately than in the civil area.¹¹⁶

One person was designated as the ringleader – the Orthodox vicar from Kostajnica, Simeon Filipović. He was to be incarcerated and even executed on imperial order so he was escorted to the prison in Osijek. The *Erzbischof und Metropolit* of Karlovci, Vićentije Jovanović¹¹⁷ put a lot of effort in his release, offering guarantees to military authorities and paying visits to Ivan Drašković – they were both in Vienna at the time.¹¹⁸ Jovanović was deeply offended by the fact that his priest was captured, escorted and held in prison without trial¹¹⁹ and without consultation with him as the arbiter. Eventually, Filipović was released without charges, and Jovanović appealed to the Aulic War Council asking for official information about the charges or for an apology. In January 1732 Filipović was again suspected of instigating an assembly of frontiersmen. Jovanović arbitrated again and Filipović was given several weeks to settle his debts and collect his belongings in the Ban's Frontier before Jovanović transferred him out of the country.¹²⁰ The military authorities made some concessions to Jovanović who was the spiritual leader of Orthodox frontiersmen in the area, in order to avoid straining the relations with the Orthodox Church. Obviously, they aspired to appease the Frontier and implement the *Regulament* as soon as possible.

114 Gavrilović, Građa, 323-324.

115 Dabić, Banska krajina, 124; Šidak, Ponovne bune, 1030; V. Klaić, Nepoznata dosad buna, 18.

116 Dabić, Banska krajina, 121, 124-125.

117 Metropolitan of Karlovci Vićentije Jovanović (Vikentije Jovanović, Vincentius Joannovich), (1731-1737). Jovanović resided in Belgrade but traveled the region.

118 In Jovanović's diary there is a short description of the meeting: *Pak 13 odosmo Draškoviću. Poslasmo lokaja, možemo li s njim govoriti. Poručil: da me oproste zašto baš sad imam komisiju neki odgovor pisati, ali ću ja gnu arhiepiskupu sam danas ili sutra doći. Slaga i ne dođe.* (translit. from Cyrillic letters, N.Š.) Gavrilović, Građa, 326.

119 (...) a *C.V. i u poslednjej zapovedi piše da se ne imaju crkovne persone bečasno traktirati nego kako i rimske crkve sveštenici poščovati, a vi naše nego Cigane povlačite bečasno* (transliteration from Cyrillic letters, N.Š.). Gavrilović, Građa, 326.

120 All letters of Jovan Stefanović, Vićentije Jovanović, the Aulic War Council and count Ivan Drašković on Simeon Filipović, from June 1731 to May 1732 in: Gavrilović, Građa, 324-331.

In 1751, six main instigators of the rebellion were found guilty and apparently sentenced to death, according to Krčelić, which deserves additional investigation. Several others were imprisoned and put on trial. Delegates and those who signed the complaints were removed from office after the introduction of the new *Regulament*,¹²¹ and there were no further physical punishments. On the other hand, a number of Habsburg officers who abused the frontiersmen and overstepped their authorities were detained in an effort of the authorities to prevent abuses that presented a serious internal problem for the Military Frontier system. Some officers nearly lost their lives. In addition, the officers on the Frontier received an order to avoid brutal physical punishments – though the order was kept a secret in order to maintain the discipline.¹²²

The ringleader Todor Kijuk escaped the capital punishment as well. There were many reports on what became of him. At first, the *Ertzt urheber dises gantzen Tumults mit nahmen Kiuk* wanted to save himself by crossing to the Ottoman side. However, he did not trust Vlachs that crossed to the ‘Turkish’ side too, afraid that they could “capture and even massacre him there” for a reward, so he thought about escaping to the Venetians.¹²³ Official reports mention that *Diack Kiuck* as *Capo der Rebellen* sent some Vlachs from Kostajnica to the Karlovac Generalcy during the rebellion.¹²⁴ On July 5, 1751 Habsburg officers discussed how to capture the *Rädelführer* Kijuk (*Armata Manu habhaft zu werden trachten sole*), and how to form an investigating committee.¹²⁵ On July 16, he was wanted dead or alive: *Boshaften Kiugh lebendiger oder todten einzu-bringen*.¹²⁶ In the second half of August, general Kheul still hurriedly searched for Kijuk and other leaders. He was ordered to speedily start the inquiry process, to establish peace and to listen to and solve complaints of well-minded frontiersmen (*gutgeneigte Banalisten*). Soon, he formed investigating committees.¹²⁷

Kijuk was in hiding in the meantime, but was eventually betrayed by his supposed uncle (so Krčelić) Mikašinović from the neighboring Varaždin Generalcy, who had secretly invited him to his home, promising him safety. On his way out Kijuk was ambushed by frontiersmen from the Karlovac Generalcy. He and his secretary, the Orthodox priest Filip Trbuhović, were taken to Kostajnica, shackled and thrown into

121 Dabić, Banska krajina, 175.

122 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 74; Šidak, *Regulacija Banske krajine*, 1040; Dabić, Banska krajina, 168, 175. One of the orders to the officers to respect the *Regulament* and not the burden the frontiersmen in: Gavrilović, Građa, 521-522.

123 Letter of Colonel Vuk Jelavić to general Scherzer (June 28, 1751): Gavrilović, Građa, 456-457. Military authorities promised rewards (*Taglia*) for capture of ringleaders in Lika at the time, even to “Turkish Vlachs” (Gavrilović, Građa, 460). Similar reward was probably offered for Kijuk’s head, too.

124 Gavrilović, Građa, 464.

125 Gavrilović, 468, 470-471.

126 Gavrilović, Građa, 477.

127 Letters from August 18th and August 25th: Gavrilović, Građa, 498-499. Frontiersmen from all sections of the Ban’s Frontier complained further. See a long letter full of vibrant and dramatic grievances: Gavrilović, Građa, 501-505, 512-516. On commission against the officer’s abuses presided by general Scherzer see: Gavrilović, Građa, 521-522.

dungeon. Mikašinović was rewarded with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Kijuk was put on trial. He was adamant to prove that during the rebellion he was loyal to Her Majesty and that she should even award him. He claimed that it was owing to him that officers were spared, rebels did not seize cannons, capture fortresses and burn Kostajnica, and that the majority of frontiersmen did not flee to the Ottoman territory as planned. Mikašinović urged field marshal Kheul to be mild to Kijuk, so he remained in the Kostajnica prison until further revision of the case in 1752.¹²⁸ Krčelić's account is partly confirmed by the Empress who states on September 5th that, among other villains, *Haupt-Rädelsführer Theodor Kiuck* was apprehended by *Obrist-wachtmeister* Mikašinović and put in custody in order to be trialed. On September 25th *locumtenens banalis* Ludovik Erdődy wrote to Ban Batthyány that the report on the rebellion was completed and that Kijuk underwent the hearing.¹²⁹ On October 15th and October 19th Ban Batthyány wrote from Schönbrunn to vice-colonel Kušević and *locumtenens* Erdődy respectively, informing them that the amnesty for rebels was discussed and Kijuk interrogated. It was decided that Kijuk would be transported to the Kufstein fortress in Tyrol where he would serve life sentence.¹³⁰ In the meantime, Kijuk counterfeited a letter from Bosnian Pasha Ibrahim that was meant to exonerate him and ensure his release, but he was found out.¹³¹ On February 9, 1752, he wrote from Kostajnica asking general Kheul to release him because he was in prison from August 10, 1751 and his father, who brought him food every day, had drowned in Una river, leaving behind an old mother and four small orphans that needed his care or would all die of hunger. He signed the letter as *Croat von Srin*.¹³² At the end of March it was decided that Kijuk and two monks would be transferred from Kostajnica to Zagreb, but on April 14, 1752, *locumtenens* Erdődy wrote to Ban that it would be better if he remained in the Kostajnica prison where he would be better guarded. Ban agreed a week later.¹³³ Finally, from the letter of Ban Batthyány dated March 24, 1753, we find out that Kijuk's death sentence was, due to Mikašinović's backing, modified to life in prison and that he was to be transferred to distant fortress Kufstein (*ad perpetuos carceres*). In April the Aulic War Council agreed. Letters from July and August 1753 discussing the payment of the costs of his imprisonment (*Ätzungs Gelder*) prove that he was finally transferred to Kufstein.¹³⁴ In late 1755 Kijuk attempted an escape from

128 Krčelić, *Annuae*, 74; Šidak, *Regulacija Banske krajine*, 1040. On Mikašinović see: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 440-441, 462-463, 528-531.

129 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 505, 517.

130 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 519-520; Short version in: Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 175. *Episcopus* Danilo Jakšić asked Batthyány to liberate Filip Trbuhović. Batthyány's letter to *locumtenens* on November 2, 1751: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 520.

131 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 528; Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 175.

132 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 529-530. In Kostajnica prison Kijuk managed to obtain all utensils for writing letters. Letters to various persons were found in his possession. Extensive letter on this issue in: Gavrilović, *Građa*, 530-531.

133 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 532-534.

134 Gavrilović, *Građa*, 540-542; Dabić, *Banska krajina*, 175.

Kufstein but was captured.¹³⁵ In November 1761 his appeal to be released was rejected by the Aulic War Council.¹³⁶

In May and June 1752, it was also decided that four other prisoners who were among the leaders of the rebellion (Petek, Svilokos, Čučković and Devetak) be released and that Petek be exiled from the frontier under the threat of death sentence.¹³⁷ In the meantime, in late 1751, Orthodox hierarchy even attempted to liberate priest Filip Trbuhović. In December 1758 we find him in Russia – Metropolitan Nenadović wrote to the Empress Maria Theresa that he should not be allowed to return, even though he was under the protection of Moscow, because this, *von Natur unruhige Popp Trbuhovich*, could incite frontiersmen on all three border sections.¹³⁸ It can therefore be concluded that a number of proven ringleaders escaped capital punishments.

Locumtenens Ludovik Erdődy even commented that the response to the rebellion was too weak since only Kijuk and two monks from Kostajnica were imprisoned. Everything suggests that the Viennese military authorities eventually chose a gentler tactic in dealing with the rebellion.¹³⁹ Frontiersmen in 1730/1731, as well as Kijuk and his associates in 1751, attempted a high-risk enterprise, but within the boundaries set by the authorities and accepting, in most instances, their position of power. There was an obvious effort on behalf of the authorities to recognize this endeavour and to calm the situation down in some respects. The state had to assert its monopoly to violence, so some lesser leaders were eventually punished, maybe even executed. However, in case of two examined rebellions the state carefully weighed its targets and methods of punishment, deliberating on the message such a treatment communicated. Officers, who were for a long time untouchable, were told to reduce abuses, some were dismissed and some narrowly escaped execution. The main leaders and a number of accomplices managed to survive and even be released from prison.

Conclusion

Rebellions on the Military Frontier were usually swift, violent and poorly organized outbreaks of violence and discontent, repressed by brute force, physical punishments and executions. In 1730/1731 and 1751 the frontiersmen on the Ban's border attempted to solve their problems by a continued, premeditated legal fight and moderate resistance. They appealed to the authorities to listen to their complaints and to help resolve them in order to implement reforms through consensus. The authorities showed some understanding and retributions were relatively moderate, adapted to this new culture

135 Letter from December 25, 1755. Gavrilović, Građa, 544.

136 Gavrilović, Građa, 553.

137 Gavrilović, Građa, 535.

138 Gavrilović, Građa, 520, 544-545, citation 545.

139 Gavrilović, Građa, 521-522.

of disobedience. An unwritten consensus was reached that the military society could not be kept together only by a firm hand and rigid discipline but also by well-defined and well-established rules and patterns. It was also agreed that the changes should be kept at a minimum because the military society, exposed to constant strain, strived for stability – *vollkommene Sicherheit, kayserlichen Privilegiis, Freyheiten und Rechten* – and was therefore not prone to frequent changes.¹⁴⁰ Tradition and stability became an ideal model for the Frontier and the state took notice. Another large set of reforms proclaimed in 1754 (*Militär Gränitz-Rechten*) further reduced the space for misinterpretations, new duties and obligations and their misuses. Authorities reacted to transgressions of officers and introduced better control of military society in general. Border society was appeased and a balance was found that kept the frontier in equilibrium.

In the second half of the 18th century, after main causes of disorder and discontent were removed, the military authorities introduced a number of additional cohesive elements. The aim was to create loyal soldiers and subordinates, homogenized around the idea of monarchical patriotism. Habsburgs introduced the orders of merit for bravery in combat, they started to appoint lower nobility titles to frontiersmen who distinguished themselves through decades of loyal and brave service, they established German schools in frontier villages that enabled local boys to learn German and advance in service, etc. The pursuit was successful: frontiersmen became loyal soldiers of the Monarchy and the Habsburg administration managed to fully monopolize violence on the Frontier, thus obtaining a strong weapon for their European wars.¹⁴¹

140 Gavrilović, Građa, 296, citation 300 et passim.

141 Milković, Položaj časnika, passim; Tea Šek Brnardić, “Upbringing of Competent and Patriotic Officers: Military Education at the Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt (1752-1805)”, *Povijesni prilozi*, 53, 2017, 109-132.

SAŽETAK

**Kultura neposluha na Vojnoj krajini u 18. stoljeću.
Opstanak kolovođa Simeona Filipovića i Todora Kijuka**

U radu se prezentira razvoj kulture otpora na Vojnoj krajini (Vojnoj granici). Ranomoderna država postepeno je monopolizirala nasilje, razvijajući širok pravni i institucionalni okvir ne bi li reducirala, nadzirala i kaznila nasilne aktivnosti, proces obično poznat kao 'kriminalizacija nasilja'. Slični su pokušaji na Vojnoj krajini dugo odlagani zbog prirode krajiškog društva u kojem je dominirala naoružana populacija, uvježbavana za nasilje, pa stoga i sklona nasilnom razrješavanju konflikata. Tijekom 18. stoljeća na krajini se može pratiti intenzivnije promjene u dinamici socijalnih konflikta, koje su bile dio širih procesa promjene funkcije i upravne strukture habsburške države. Analizirajući izvore vezane uz dvije bune na Banskoj krajini (1730./1731. i 1751.), koje su izbile kao reakcija na vojne reforme, u radu se prati kako su se na dijelu krajine počele mijenjati metode protesta. Krajišnici su zazivali poštovanje ustaljenih pravila i stare pravice (*vollkommene Sicherheit, alten Freyheiten, uhralten Freyheiten, kayserlichen Privilegiis, Freyheiten und Rechten*), dok su novosti i promjene (*excessivorum ... modorum et novitatum, eine abermablige Novitaet, Erneuerungen*) izazivali otpor i pobune. Ne bi li zaštitili i očuvali svoj pravni i socijalni status, krajišnici su počeli koristiti kompleksnije metode protesta, poput dugoročnog pregovaranja i lobiranja u centrima moći, najčešće preko školovanih posrednika ili čak vjerskih autoriteta. Apelirali su na vlasti da ih saslušaju s ciljem konsenzualnog donošenja reformi. Promjena taktike trebala je polučiti bolje rezultate uz manje žrtava. S druge strane, habsburške su vlasti svjesno počele primjenjivati blaže, pedagoški i prosvjetiteljski usmjerene mjere, umjesto da krajišnike kontroliraju samo teškim fizičkim kaznama i pogubljenjima. Time su poticale promjene u načinu razrješavanja sukoba na krajini te educirale lokalne vlasti u Zagrebu. Kratkoročno, vođe dviju spomenutih buna, Simeon Filipović i Todor Kijuk, izbjegli su smrtnu kaznu. Dugoročno, postalo je jasno da se krajiško društvo ne može držati u pokornosti samo rigidnom disciplinom i nasilnim odmazdama, nego reduciranjem zloupotreba te setom jasnih pravila i obrazaca života koji će promjene u ionako napregnutom društvu svesti na minimum. Krajiško je društvo, zahvaljujući, između ostaloga, boljoj kontroli nasilnih tendencija i konflikata, postalo homogenije i stabilnije, a lojalni, moderno trenirani krajišnici postali su jako habsburško oružje u europskim ratovima.

Ključne riječi: Vojna krajina, 18. stoljeće, kultura neposluha, povijest nasilja