

## INTERVJU BROJA – dr. sc. SINIŠA MALEŠEVIĆ

### INTERVIEW OF THE ISSUE – PROF. SINIŠA MALEŠEVIĆ, PhD



Siniša Malešević je redovni profesor u trajnom zvanju na Odjelu za Sociologiju na Sveučilištu u Dublinu. Uz to je član brojnih drugih uglednih znanstvenih institucija kao što su Kraljevska Irska Akademija, Academia Europaea, pridruženi član Akademije nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Uz sve to je i pridruženi znanstveni suradnik u francuskom Nacionalnom konzervatoriju za umjetnost i obrt. Prethodno je u surađivao s Institutom za međunarodne odnose u Zagrebu, Centrom za studije nacionalizma u Pragu, Nacionalnim sveučilištem Irske u Gallwayu, Londonskom školom ekonomije, Institutom za društvene znanosti u Beču, Slobodnim sveučilištem u Bruxellesu, Sveučilištom u Uppsali i Institutom za napredne studije u Amsterdamu. Preveden je na preko deset jezika, a od radova mu se posebno ističu monografije, koje su između ostalog prevedene i na hrvatski jezik: *Države-nacije i nacionalizmi: Organizacija, ideologija i solidarnost, Sociologija rata i nasilja*.

Siniša Malešević is a distinguished professor on the Department of Sociology in the University of Dublin. In addition, he is a member of many other respectable scientific institutions as Royal Irish Academy, Academia Europaea, Associated Member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, he is a Senior Fellow and Associate Researcher, at CNAM in Paris, France. He previously collaborated with Institute for International Relations in Zagreb, the Centre for the Study of Nationalism in Prague, NUI in Galway, the London School of Economics, the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Uppsala University and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Amsterdam. His works have been translated in over 10 languages, and his works particularly include monographs, which have been translated into Croatian, among others: *Nation-States and Nationalisms: Organisation, Ideology and Solidarity* and *The Sociology of War and Violence*.

**Monografijom *Države-nacije i nacionalizmi: Organizacija, ideologija i solidarnost* argumentirate da su najvažniji utjecaj na oblikovanje nacionalizma i države-nacije imali kumulativna birokratizacija prisile, centrifugalna ideologizacija i bliži odnos između intimnog mikrosvijeta i birokratskog makrosvijeta. Za početak, početak ćemo s Francuskom revolucijom za koju se općenito smatra da označava početak nacionalnih buđenja po Europi. Možete li konkretnije reći na koji je način, prema Vašem viđenju, Francuska revolucija zapravo utjecala na druge narode u organizacijskom i ideološkom smislu? Što se to promijenilo u svijesti malih naroda u relativno kratkom periodu između 1789. i 1848. godine?**

Francuska revolucija je, naravno, imala ogroman utjecaj na artikulaciju nacionalizma kao ideologije i kao državnog projekta u organizacijskom smislu. U europskom kontekstu ona je značajno doprinijela utemeljenju nacionalne doktrine kao ključne poluge političke legitimacije države. Umjesto božanskog porijekla vladara i drugih premodernih oblika legitimacije, od tada se vlast legitimira idejom narodnog suvereniteta. Ideje Francuske revolucije formulirane u *Deklaraciji o pravima čovjeka i građanina* (1789) je motivirala, a i danas motivira, mnoge nacionalne pokrete u cijelom svijetu. Znači ključne ideje (liberté, égalité, fraternité) revolucije su inspirirale čitav niz pokreta u svijetu, ali i organizacijski karakter države se dramatično promijenio i mnogi nacionalni pokreti su po prvi put imali organizacijski obrazac (nacija-država) koji su željeli kreirati u svojim društvima i koji bi zamijenio postojeće imperijalne i monarhijske državne strukture.

Međutim, termin 'nacionalnog buđenja' nije prikladan u ovom kontekstu jer sugerira da su nacije već postojale i samo

**With the monograph *Nation-states and nationalisms: Organization, ideology and solidarity*, you argue that, what had the most effect on the shape of nationalisms and nation-state were: cumulative bureaucratization of coercion, centrifugal ideologisation, and closer relationship between the intimate micro world and the bureaucratic macro world. In the beginning, we will start with the French Revolution, which is considered to be the starting point of the national awakenings across Europe. Can you explain in more details the way, in your opinion, the French Revolution had effect on other people in Europe, in organizational and ideological sense? What changed in the minds of smaller folk in a relatively short period from 1789 to 1848?**

Of course the French Revolution had a huge impact on the articulation of nationalisms as an ideology and the project of a state in an organizational sense. In the European context, it has significantly contributed to the establishment of national doctrine as a key lever of political legitimacy of the state—instead of the divine origin of the ruler and other traditional forms of legitimacy, from that moment on the power is legitimized only through the idea of national sovereignty. The idea of the French Revolution which was formulated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), motivated and continues to motivate many national movements across the world. The key ideas (liberté, égalité, fraternité) of the revolution have inspired a whole series of movements in the world, but also the organizational character of the state was dramatically changed, and many national movements have had for the first time an organizational pattern (nation-state) that they wanted to create in their societies and that would change the existing imperialistic and monarchist structures of the state.

However, the term “national awakening” is not the most suitable term in this context, because it suggests that nations existed and

ih je trebalo probuditi (taj pristup obično se označava kao 'teorija uspavane ljepo-  
tice', prema poznatoj priči braće Grimm). Francuska revolucija je inicirala stvaranje sasvim novog tipa države i društva. Ideja moralne jednakosti građana, koncept suverenosti svih stanovnika koji žive u istoj državi i ideja solidarnosti bez obzira na status po rođenju su dramatično promijenili karakter države i društva. Revolucija je utjecala i na reorganizaciju države u smislu veće centralizacije uprave, izgradnje birokratskog aparata koji pokriva cijelu državu, razvoj komunikacija, transportnih mreža, znanosti, tehnologije itd. U ideološkom smislu Revolucija je doprinijela standardiziranju vernakulara, uvođenju obaveznih obrazovnih sustava, što je u konačnici dovelo do izrazitog rasta pismenosti među stanovništvom, po Gellneru to je ključno za stvaranje moderne nacije). Sve ove promjene su transformirale francusko društvo i kreirale ideju nacije kao zajednice kojoj pripadaju svi građani. Te ideje su utjecale i na druga društva koja su se u 19. i 20. stoljeću postupno transformirala iz monarhija i carstava u države-nacije.

**Jačanje i pobjeda nacionalnih opcija na izborima u Austro-Ugarskoj Monarhiji, pojava novih nacionalnih država na jugoistoku Europe i njihova ekspanzionistička politika, okretanje carske Rusije nacionalističkom diskursu te ujedinjenja Njemačke i Italije obilježavaju drugu polovicu devetnaestog stoljeća u Europi. Jesu li ovi događaji ostvareni uz podršku širih slojeva društva? Može li se reći da je u ovom periodu već postojao bliži odnos između mikrosvijeta i birokratskog makrosvijeta?**

Riječ je o vrlo turbulentnom vremenu u kojem su se odigrale velike društvene i političke transformacije. Tradicionalna

all that they needed was awakening (this approach is usually labeled as a "sleeping beauty theory" according to the famous tale of the Grimm brothers). The French Revolution initiated the creation of a totally new type of state and society. The idea of the moral equality of the citizens, concept of sovereignty of all the people that live in the same country, and the idea of solidarity ignoring the status that you were given by birth have dramatically changed the character of the state and society. The revolution also had an effect on the reorganization of the country in the sense of a greater centralization of the management, creation of bureaucratic apparatus that is the same in the entire country, development of communication, transport connections, science, technology etc. In an ideological sense, the Revolution brought the standardization of the vernacular, obligatory education systems, which ultimately led to a big increase in literacy among the population (according to Gellner that is the key for the formation of modern nation). All these changes transformed French society and created the idea of the nation as a community of all its citizens. These ideas also influenced other societies that gradually transformed themselves from monarchies and empires into nation-states in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

**The strengthening and the victory of the national elections in Austria-Hungary, the emergence of new national states in the southeastern Europe and their expansionistic policy, turning of the Russian Empire towards a nationalist discourse, and the unification of Germany and Italy marked the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe. Did these events occur with the support of wider sections of society? Can it be said that, in this period, there was already a closer relationship between the micro world and the bureaucratic macro world?**

historiografija obično označava ovaj period kao doba nacionalnih revolucija ili 'Proljeće naroda'. Međutim, važno je naglasiti da su gotovo svi ovi događaji bili projekti političkih, kulturnih ili ekonomskih elita, a velika većina stanovništva nisu bili svjesni niti voljni sudionici ovih promjena. Iako se ujedinjenje Italije i Njemačke tradicionalno označavaju kao nacionalni projekti, njihova osnovica i dalje je bila puno više imperijalna nego nacionalna – kao što Alon Confino pokazuje u njegovoj knjizi 'Nation as a Local Metaphor', većina stanovnika Württemberg i ostalih pokrajina u Njemačkoj su ujedinjenje doživjeli kao okupaciju od strane Prusije. Slična situacija je bila i s Piedmontom u Italiji – velika većina stanovništva nije se nikako identificirala s projektom 'ujedinjenja'. Čak ni političke elite u Italiji nisu još bile većim dijelom talijanizirane jer kad se sastala prva talijanska skupština u Torinu 1860. godine zastupnici su govorili na francuskom, a ne na talijanskom. Možemo slobodno reći da sredina, pa čak i kraj 19. stoljeća još nisu doba punog nacionalizma jer većina ljudi još uvijek nisu u potpunosti nacionalizirani, nego se i dalje uglavnom više identificiraju s religijom, regijom, mjestom boravka (grad ili selo), širom obitelji, klanom ili srodstvom. U Austro-Ugarskoj monarhiji stvari su još više komplicirane zbog neobične organizacije države te jakog utjecaja različitih aristokratskih grupacija. Ono što se u tradicionalnoj historiografiji označava kao 'nacionalno buđenje' i borba protiv 'tamnice naroda' uglavnom su politički sukobi elita – isprva 'nacionalnih' aristokracija, a onda postupno i organiziranih pripadnika srednje klase. Nove knjige Pieter Judsona (*The Habsburg Empire: A New History*, 2018) i Tare Zahra (*Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in*

It was a turbulent time in which great social and political transformations took place. Traditional historiography usually marks this period as an age of national revolutions or "Springtime of the Peoples". However, the important thing to mention is that almost all these events were products of the political, cultural and economic elites, and that the majority of population was not aware or were not willing to be a part of these changes. Although the unifications of Italy and Germany are traditionally marked as national projects, their basis was still more imperial than national-as Alon Confino states in his book 'Nation as a Local Metaphor', majority of the population of Württemberg and other German regions saw the unification as an occupation from Prussia. A similar situation was with Piedmont in Italy-the majority of the population did not identify themselves with the concept of "unification". Even the political elites in Italy were not fully Italianized, on the first Italian assembly in Turin (1860) representatives spoke in French and not in Italian. We can say that the mid and even late 19<sup>th</sup> century were not the time of complete nationalism because most of the people were not fully nationalized, but still identified themselves with religion, region, place of residence (village or town), extended family, clan or kinship. In Austria-Hungary things were even more complicated because of the because of the unusual organization of the country and strong influence of various aristocratic groups. What is in traditional historiography marked as "national awakening" and the struggle against the "dungeon of the people" are mostly political conflicts of the elite-at first "national" aristocrats and later organized members of the middle class. New books by Pieter Judson (*The Habsburg Empire: A New History*, 2018) and Tara Zahra (*Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian*

the Bohemian Lands, 1900 – 1948, 2011) odlično analiziraju tu kompleksnu dinamiku i sve izraženije društvene sukobe u Austro-Ugarskoj krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća. Oni pokazuju da je upravo imperijalna država značajno doprinijela stvaranju nacio-centričnih kategorija u svakodnevnom životu. Istina je da u ovom periodu carstva sve više prodiru u mikro svijet jer imaju veći organizacijski kapacitet i veću ideološku penetraciju, ali to je prilično neujednačeno – puno više u centru, ali vrlo malo na periferiji. Na primjer, Bosna i Hercegovina bila je inicijalno zamišljena kao ‘model kolonija’, ali imperijalna vlast nikad nije ni pokušala prodrijeti u mikro svijet bosansko hercegovačkih seljaka, čak nije napravila ni osnovnu agrarnu reformu.

**Zanima nas Vaše mišljenje o tome kako je Drugi svjetski rat utjecao na razvoj nacionalističke ideje? Koja je razlika između nacionalizma prije i poslije ovog događaja?**

Iako tradicionalna historiografija naglašava 19. stoljeće kao doba ‘nacionalnih revolucija’ za mene je 20. stoljeće puno značajniji period za razvoj i širenje nacionalizma. Drugi svjetski rat je imao veliki utjecaj iz dva ključna razloga. Prvo, porazom nacizma i fašizma suverena država-nacija je postala centralna kategorija međunarodnih odnosa i svakodnevnog života. Naravno, fašizam i nacizam su bili utemeljeni na radikalnom nacionalizmu, ali su oni isto tako bili i imperijalni projekti. Nacionalsocijalisti su biologizirali naciju i pretvorili je u rasnu kategoriju. U tom smislu oni su radikalizirali imperijalne doktrine legitimizacije osvajanja teritorija na osnovu prava jačeg. Riječ je o do kraja biologiziranoj ideji ‘civilizacijske misije’ koju su koristili skoro svi imperijalni projekti od Rimskog,

Lands, 1900–1948. 2011) analyze in great manner the complex dynamics and more pronounced social conflicts in Austria-Hungary in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. These books state that the imperial state is what greatly contributed to the formation of nation-centric categories in everyday life. What is true is that, in this period empires were increasingly penetrating the micro world because they had greater organizational capacity and greater ideological penetration, but this was quite uneven - much more in the center of the cities but very little on the periphery. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina was thought to be a “model colony” but the imperial rulers never tried to penetrate inside of the micro world of a common Bosnian and Herzegovinian villager, they did not even make a basic agrarian reform.

**We are interested in your opinion on how World War II influenced the development of the nationalistic idea? What is the difference with nationalisms before and after this event?**

Although traditional historiography marks the 19<sup>th</sup> century as the one of “nationalistic revolutions”, for me 20<sup>th</sup> century was a much more meaningful period for the development and the spreading of nationalisms. World War II had a great influence because of two key reasons. Firstly, with the defeat of Nazism and fascism, the modern nation-state became the central category of international relationships and everyday life. Of course, Nazism and fascism were based on radical nationalisms but they were also imperialistic projects. National Socialists turned nation, through biology, into a category of race. In that sense, they radicalized imperialistic doctrines of legitimization of conquered territory on the basis of the rights of the stronger one. This is an idea of a “civilization mission” which

Kineskog do Britanskog ili Francuskog Carstva. Talijanski fašizam puno se manje oslanjao na biologiju, ali je jednako bio orijentiran prema teritorijalnoj ekspanziji i kolonizaciji stanovništva od Etiopije i Eritreje do Hrvatske, Slovenije, Albanije i Crne Gore. Porazom ovih radikalnih imperijalnih projekata, ideja Carstva je u potpunosti delegitimizirana. Direktna posljedica ovoga je proces dekolonizacije koji je krenuo ubrzo nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. Porazom fašizma i nacizma, nacija-država je postala jedini legitimni tip teritorijalne organizacije u svijetu. S hegemonijom ovog državnog okvira nacionalizam je dobio na značaju. Znači, možemo reći da je paradoksalno upravo porazom nacizma i fašizma nacionalizam, kao ideologija koja legitimira postojanje nacija-država, postao dominantan ideološki okvir za legitimaciju vlasti u cijelom svijetu.

Drugo, kraj Drugog svjetskog rata je stvorio novi međunarodni poredak zasnovan na ideji da je suverenost država-nacija neupitna. To je jedna od ključnih odrednica UN-a. Time se promjena granica država nasilnim putem u potpunosti delegitimizirala. Stvaranjem ovakvog relativno stabilnog međunarodnog okvira omogućila je dalje jačanje države-nacije u organizacijskom i ideološkom smislu. Tako da u razdoblju od 1945. do danas vidimo sve veću penetraciju makro birokratskih aparata u mikro svijet svakodnevnog života. Nacionalne kategorije postaju dominantne, a lokalne identifikacije su sve više ugrađene u nacionalne narative. Ako pogledate globalna ispitivanja javnog mnijenja, od 50-ih godina do danas, vidjet ćete da stalno raste postotak onih koji doživljavaju naciju kao važnu ili vrlo važnu kategoriju identifikacije.

was used by almost all imperialistic projects from the Roman and Chinese to British and French empire. Italian fascism did not rely so much on biology, but was equally oriented towards territorial expansion of and colonization of the population from Ethiopia and Eritrea to Croatia, Slovenia, Albania and Montenegro. With the defeat of these imperialistic projects, the idea of the empire was completely delegitimized. The direct consequence of this was the process of decolonization that started not long after World War II ended. With the defeat of Nazism and fascism, the nation-state became the only legitimate type of a territorial organization in the world. With the hegemony of this frame, nationalism became more important. We can paradoxically say that, with the defeat of Nazism and fascism, nationalism, as an ideology that legitimizes the existence of the nation-state, became a dominant ideological frame for legitimizing power in the entire world.

Secondly, the end of the World War II created a new international order based on the idea that sovereignty of the nation-state is out of the question. That is one of the key definitions of the UN. With this, the change of boundaries in a violent manner was completely delegitimized. Creation of this relatively stable international frame allowed a continuing strengthening of nation-state in an organizational and ideological sense. So, in the period from 1945 onwards, we can see a bigger penetration of macro bureaucratic apparatus into the micro world of everyday life. National categories are becoming dominant and local identities are increasingly embedded in national narratives. If you look at global public opinion polls from the 1950s to the present, you will see that the percentage of those who perceive a nation as an important or very important category of identification is constantly growing.

Postoji rasprava o tome što je imalo ključni utjecaj na pad komunizma u Europi. S jedne strane postoji mišljenje da su tomu razlog autokracija i siromaštvo, dok se s druge strane uzrok pronalazi u nacionalizmu. Je li nacionalizam uzrok ili posljedica pada komunističkih režima, odnosno možete li reći kakvu je zapravo ulogu nacionalizam igrao u svemu tome?

Kolaps državnog socijalizma u Istočnoj Europi posljedica je različitih procesa – ekonomsko zaostajanje, autoritarna vlast, geo-političke promjene i zaostajanje u utrci u naoružanju te čitavog niza više specifičnih razloga. Međutim, nacionalizam je također vrlo važan čimbenik u tim procesima. Pojednostavljene analize obično suprotstavljaju nacionalizam i državni socijalizam i vide nacionalne pokrete kao ključne za rušenje starog režima. Nasuprot tom pristupu, historijski sociolozi pokazuju da, iako se državni socijalizam nominalno predstavljao za protivnika nacionalizmu, to nije tako bilo u stvarnosti. Na primjer, Roger Brubaker u 'Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe' (1996), kao i Terry Martin u 'The Aftermath of Action Empire' (2001) pokazuju uvjerljivo da je sovjetski model državne organizacije razvio i ojačao nacionalne kategorije identifikacije. Nova država stvorila je kulturne i političke kategorije prakse i nove nacio-centrične institucije (nacionalne akademije znanosti, brojna nacionalna sveučilišta, nacionalne muzeje, domove kulture itd.) koje su bile nominalno socijalističke u sadržaju, a nacionalne u formi – kako je glasila poznata sovjetska parola – a u stvari su operirale kao nacionalne u sadržaju, a socijalističke u formi, zato nije nimalo neobično što se Sovjetski Savez raspao po nacionalnim granicama. U mojoj prvoj knjizi 'Ideology, Legitimacy

There is a discussion about what had the biggest influence on the fall of communism in Europe. On the one hand, there is a belief that autocracy and poverty are responsible for it, and on the other hand, the cause for that is seen in nationalism. Was nationalism the cause or the consequence of the fall of communist regimes, that is, can you tell us which role nationalism had in all of that?

The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe was a consequence of a variety of reasons-economic inferiority, autocratic power, geo-political changes, and lagging behind in the arms race and a whole host of more specific reasons. However, nationalism was also an important factor in these processes. Simple analysis usually put nationalism and state socialism as two opposites, and view national movements as key in bringing the old regimes down. On the contrary of that, there are historic sociologists who say that, although state socialism is perceived as being against nationalism, that actually is not the case. For example, Roger Brubaker in 'Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe' (1996), as well as Terry Martin in 'The Aftermath of Action Empire' (2001), show very convincingly that the Soviet model of state organization developed and strengthened national categories of identification. The newly formed state created cultural and political categories of practice and new nation-centric institutions (e. g. national academy of science, numerous national universities, national museums, homes of culture etc.) which were nominally socialistic in their content, but nationalistic in their form-as the famous Soviet slogan would say-but were actually operating as national in their content, but socialistic in their form. That is why it is no surprise that the Soviet Union fell apart according to national boundaries. In my first book 'Ideology, Legitimacy

and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia' (2002) isto tako nastojim pokazati kako je državni socijalizam u Jugoslaviji reproducirao nacio-centričke kategorije u svakodnevnom životu. Znači, nacionalizam i državni socijalizam nisu nužno bili neprijatelji, komunističke partije oslanjale su se na nacionalističke diskurse te su ih koristili za svoju legitimaciju.

**U posljednjoj rečenici petog poglavlja knjige *Države-nacije i nacionalizmi: Organizacija, ideologija i solidarnost* rekli ste da smo svi nacionalisti, prihvatili to ili ne. Zašto je nacionalizam uspio nadvladati druge ideološke subjekte i postao, kako ste jednom upotrijebili Billigovu metaforu, "zastava koja mirno stoji iznad ulaza u javnu zgradu", odnosno nešto što je normalna svakodnevica? Što to neki drugi ideološki sadržaji, kao što je primjerice komunistički, nisu sadržavali pa nisu postigli taj status?**

U tom poglavlju nastojim pokazati kako i zašto je nacionalizam postao tako duboko utemeljen u modernim društvima. Ta rečenica je namjerno malo provokativna da nas potakne na razmišljanje o svijetu u kojem živimo. Ljudi obično poistovjećuju nacionalizam s njegovim radikalnijim oblicima, a ne primijete kako je nacionalizam utemeljen u skoro svim institucijama modernog svijeta. Čak i neki znanstvenici, koji se bave ovim fenomenom, budu iznova iznenađeni kad se pojavi val radikalnog ili agresivnog nacionalizma. Međutim, ne možemo razumjeti radikalna ispoljavanja nacionalizma bez razumijevanja kako su nacionalno-centrične kategorije prakse postale dominantne u svakodnevnom životu. Billigova knjiga potaknula je mnoge istraživače da izučavaju banalne forme nacionalizma, to jest svakodnevnu reprodukciju nacionalnih kategorija i praksi, ali taj pristup se baš

and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia' (2002), I also try to point out that state socialism in Yugoslavia reproduced nation-centric categories in everyday life. So, nationalism and state socialism were not necessarily enemies, communist parties leaned on the nationalist discourse and used it for their legitimacy.

**In the last sentence of the 5<sup>th</sup> chapter of the book *Nation-states and nationalisms: Organization, ideology and solidarity* you said that we were all nationalists, whether we liked it or not. Why did nationalism manage to overcome all other ideological subjects and become, as you once used Billig's metaphor, 'the flag that stands peacefully above the entrance into a public building', that is, something that is normal in everyday life? What did some other ideological contents, such as the communist ones, not contain so they could not achieve that status?**

In that chapter I try to point out how and why nationalism became so deeply based in modern societies. That sentence is intentionally provocative so that it urges us on thinking about the world in which we live in. People usually identify nationalism with its radical forms, but don't notice that nationalism is based in almost all institutions in the modern world. Even some scientists that deal with this phenomenon are surprised over and over when some new wave of radical or aggressive nationalism appears. However, we cannot understand the radical manifestations of nationalism without understanding how nationally centric categories of practice have become dominant in everyday life. Billig's book has prompted many researchers to study banal forms of nationalism, that is, the daily reproduction of national categories and practices. But that approach does not deal with the transformation of nationalism



ne bavi transformacijom nacionalizma kroz povijest te ne može objasniti kako i kad habitualni nacionalizam postaje agresivan i obrnuto. U mojoj novoj knjizi 'Grounded Nationalisms' (2019), koja bi uskoro trebala izaći u hrvatskom prijevodu (u izdanju Jesenski & Turk iz Zagreba), ja se baš bavim tim problemom i nastojim objasniti zašto je nacionalizam uspio postati i ostati tako hegemoničan u modernosti. Naglašavam da je nacionalizam meta-ideološki okvir koji može uspješno inkorporirati različite ideologije, od ekstremne desnice do krajnje ljevice i sve između. Ovaj ideološki okvir se reproducira kroz dominaciju države-nacije kao jedine legitimne teritorijalne organizacije u suvremenom svijetu. S rastom organizacijskog kapaciteta države, jačom ideološkom penetracijom u društvo i većim prodorom u mreže mikro solidarnosti, nacionalizam se utemeljuje u organizacijskim, ideološkim i mikronterakcijskim sferama društvenog djelovanja.

**U monografiji *Sociologija rata i nasilja* pišete kako rat nije čovjekovo obilježje, ali je li nasilje? Jesmo li mi kao vrsta inherentno nasilni i jesmo li organizirano i strukturalno destruktivniji kad uspoređujemo moderno i predmoderno doba?**

Ljudi su plastična stvorenja koja su sposobna biti i miroljubiva i nasilna. Čak isti ljudi mogu u jednoj situaciji ubijati druge ljude, a u drugoj situaciji boriti se da im spase život ili čak se žrtvovati za druge. Sociolozi i psiholozi nasilja su objavili mnoge studije koje pokazuju da je nasilje kontekstualno te da se ljudi prilagođavaju okolnostima u kojima žive. Znači, nasilje nije urođeno nego nešto što se uči. Potrebno je razlikovati agresivnost od nasilja. U knjizi koju spominjete, a još više u mojoj drugoj knjizi iz 2017. godine ('The

through history, and cannot explain how can even a habitual nationalism become aggressive and vice versa. In my new book 'Grounded Nationalisms' (2019) that will soon be published on a Croatian subtitle (in the Jesenski & Turk edition from Zagreb) I deal with this problem and try to explain why nationalism managed to become and remain so hegemonic in modern times. I point out that nationalism is a meta-ideological frame that can successfully incorporate different ideologies, from the far-right to the far-left and everything in between. This ideological frame is reproduced through the domination of nation-state as the only legit territorial organization in the contemporary world. With the growth of the organizational capacity of the state, stronger ideological penetration in society, and bigger breakthrough in the chains of micro solidarity, nationalism establishes itself in an organizational, ideological, and micro-interactive spheres of social action.

**In the monograph *The sociology of war and violence*, you state that war is not characteristic for humans, but is violence? Are we a species that is inherently violent, and are we organizationally and structurally more destructive when comparing the modern and pre-modern time?**

Humans are plastic creatures that are capable of being both peaceful and violent. Even the same people can in one situation kill other people, and in another situation struggle to save their lives or even sacrifice their own for others. Sociologists and psychologists that study violence have published many studies that show that violence is contextual and that people adapt to the circumstances in which they live. So, violence is not something we were born with, but something that we learn. It is necessary to make a difference between aggression

Rise of Organised Brutality: A Historical Sociology of Violence'), nastojim pokazati da kod ljudi postoje neke biološke predispozicije za agresivno ponašanje (u smislu potrebe za preživljavanjem i slično) koje dijelimo s ostalim životinjskim vrstama. Međutim, nasilje je fenomen kojije oblikovan društvenim kontekstom. Na primjer, kad dva boksača jako udaraju jedan drugoga i imaju ozbiljne fizičke ozljede, društvo to ne definira kao nasilni akt, nego kao sport, dok čin pljuvanja nepoznate osobe na cesti je karakteriziran kao nasilje iako nema fizičkih ozljeda. Ovaj kontekstualni karakter vrlo je važan i kako američki sociolog Randall Collins naglašava, bolje je analizirati 'nasilne situacije' nego 'nasilne pojedince' jer nitko nije nasilan 24 sata dnevno, a svi možemo biti nasilni u određenim kontekstima.

U svojim knjigama koristim istraživanja iz više disciplina (od arheologije i paleontologije do antropologije, povijesti i sociologije) pokazujući da nasilje raste kroz vrijeme. S razvojem društvenih organizacija, a pogotovo države, u posljednjih 10 000 godina vidimo kako se različiti oblici organiziranog nasilja šire u svijetu. S porastom organizacijskog kapaciteta država i drugih organizacija te s njihovom sve većom ideološkom penetracijom u društvo predispozicije za nasilje isto tako rastu. Moja knjiga iz 2017. godine nastoji pokazati da su optimističke analize Pinkera, Goldsteina, Gata i drugih o padu nasilja u povijesti empirijski neutemeljene i teorijski problematične. U posljednjih 300 godina organizirano nasilje je dramatično naraslo kulminirajući u 20. stoljeću kad je stradalo više od 200 milijuna ljudi. U knjizi analiziram povijesnu transformaciju i eskalaciju ratova, revolucija, genocida i terorizma.

and violence. In the book that you mention and even more in my other book from 2017 ('The Rise of Organised Brutality: A Historical Sociology of Violence') I try to show that there are some biological predispositions in people for aggressive behavior (in the sense of the need for survival and similar) which we share with other animal species. However, violence is a phenomenon which is shaped in a social context. For example, when two boxers hit each other hard and have serious physical injuries, society does not define it as a violent act but as a sport, while the act of spitting at a stranger on the road is characterized as violence even though there are no physical injuries. This contextual character is very important and, as American sociologist Randall Collins points out, it is better to analyze 'violent situations' than 'violent individuals' because no one is violent 24 hours a day and we can all be violent in certain contexts.

In my books I use research from various disciplines (from archeology and paleontology, to anthropology, history and sociology) showing how violence grows through time. With the development of state organizations, and especially the state in the last 10 000 years, we can see how different shapes of organized violence are spread throughout the world. With the increase of organizational capacity of the state and other organizations as well as bigger ideological penetration in the society, predispositions for violence also grow. My book from 2017 tries to show that the optimistic analysis of Pinker, Goldstein, Gat, and others about the fall of violence in history are empirically unfounded and theoretically problematic. In the last 300 years violence has dramatically grown, culminating in the 20<sup>th</sup> century when more than 200 million people died. In the book I analyze the historical transformation and the escalation of wars, revolutions, genocides, and terrorism.

**Pričajući o raspadu Jugoslavije, smatrate li da se ta država mogla mirno raspasti, čak i s bujajućim nacionalizmima bivših država koje su sačinjavale Jugoslaviju?**

Da, naravno, rat nije bio neminovan. Kroz svoje postojanje druga Jugoslavija se sve više decentralizirala, a s Ustavom iz 1974. godine samo je potvrđen taj proces. Taj proces decentralizacije mogao se i dalje nastaviti bez nasilja, ali na žalost to se nije dogodilo. Vidjeli smo da su neke druge državno socijalističke federacije kao Čehoslovačka pa čak i Sovjetski Savez (s manjim izuzetcima) uspjele izbjeći rat u procesu raspada. Radikalni nacionalizam je bio važan čimbenik u mobilizaciji stanovništva za rat, ali i u ovom slučaju vidjeli smo da su inicijalni ideološki i politički sukobi počeli unutar Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Kad se raspao SKJ raspala se i jugoslavenska federacija. Znači, državni socijalizam nije nimalo bio imun na nacionalizam. Upravo suprotno, državni socijalizam je bio duboko utemeljen na nacio-centričkim kategorijama prakse. Zato su različiti komunistički aparatici kao Milošević mogli radikalizirati već postojeće nacionalističke diskurse te mobilizirati stanovništvo i generirati sukobe unutar SKJ, a potom prenijeti te sukobe na cijelo društvo. Rat je uglavnom bio posljedica borbe za premoć i vlast – isprva unutar komunističke partije, a poslije na nivou federacije te republičkih centara moći.

**Kada nastaje terorizam? Je li bio moguć prije modernog doba, uzevši u obzir da je 20. stoljeće vidjelo razvoj oružja masovnog uništavanja?**

Rudimentarni oblici terorizma se pojavljuju još u predmodernom razdoblju. Na primjer, početkom nove ere u Palestini imamo pokret Sicarii koji se bori protiv

**Talking about the fall of Yugoslavia, do you believe that, that country could have fallen apart peacefully, even with the inflating nationalisms of the former states that were a part of Yugoslavia?**

Yes, of course that war was not inevitable. Through its existence the 2<sup>nd</sup> Yugoslavia was becoming more and more decentralized, and the constitution from 1974 only confirmed that process. That process of decentralization could have kept going without violence, but unfortunately that did not happen. We have seen that some other state socialist federations as Czechoslovakia and even the Soviet Union (with smaller exceptions) managed to avoid war in the process of their breakdown. Radical nationalism was an important factor in mobilizing population for war, but we saw in this case also that initial ideological and political conflicts started inside of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. When they fell apart, so did Yugoslavia. So, the state socialism was not immune on nationalism. On the contrary, state socialism was deeply embedded in the nation-centric categories of practice. That is why various communist apparatchiks, such as Milošević, could have radicalized their pre-existing nationalist discourses, mobilize population, and generate conflicts within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and then transfer those conflicts on the entire society. The war was largely the result of a struggle for supremacy and power - first within the Communist Party and later at the level of the federation and republican centers of power.

**When does terrorism arise? Was it possible in the pre-modern era, taking into consideration that weapons of mass destruction were created in the 20<sup>th</sup> century?**

Rudimentary forms of terrorism appear in the pre-modern times. For example, at the beginning of the Common Era, we have a

rimske vlasti. Kasnije u Perzijskom Carstvu između 11. i 13. stoljeća pojavljuje se Ismailisakta Ḥashashiyankoja napada i ubija sve one koje smatra neprijateljima države, odakle dolazi riječ *assassin* (atentator). Međutim, terorizam kao sociološki i politički fenomen je produkt modernosti. Prve utjecajnije terorističke organizacije se pojavljuju sredinom 19. stoljeća. S izumom dinamita i masovnom proizvodnjom eksploziva krajem 19. stoljeća, terorizam postaje masovni fenomen. Nije slučajno u tom razdoblju dinamit nazvan 'džepna revolucija' jer je omogućio svojevrsnu 'demokratizaciju' nasilja. U ovom periodu anarhisti najviše izvode atentate na predstavnike vlasti te postavljaju eksplozive na državne institucije. Najutjecajnija anarhistička organizacija iz tog vremena je svakako ruska Narodna volja (Narodnaya volya) koja je odgovorna za atentat na cara Aleksandra II. 1881. godine. Osim anarhista, nacionalističke organizacije su također koristile terorizam, od Armenske Revolucionarne Federacije (Dashnak) do Američko-irske Clan na Geal i mnogih drugih.

Kao i druge društvene organizacije, terorizam je postao utjecajniji s razvojem tehnologije, ideološke penetracije i povećanjem prisilno organizacijskog kapaciteta. Od sedamdesetih godina 19. stoljeća vidimo ekspanziju različitih tipova terorizma. Inicijalno su to bili radikalno lijevi pokreti (Crvene Brigade, Baader-Meinhof, Weather Underground itd.) ili neo-fašističke organizacije (Charles Martel Group u Francuskoj, Avanguardia Nazionale u Italiji, Sivi Vukovi u Turskoj), a u novije vrijeme dominiraju organizacije inspirirane religijskim fundamentalizmom kao Al Kaida, Boko Haram ili ISIL. Kako terorističke organizacije ne posjeduju moć države, oni se nužno oslanjaju na spektakularne

movement Sicarii in Palestine who fought against the Romans who were at power there. Later, in the Persian Empire between the 11<sup>th</sup> and the 13<sup>th</sup> century, there was an Ismaili sect Ḥashashiyān that fought and killed everyone that was perceived to be enemies of the state. From there the word assassin has its origin. However, terrorism as a sociological and political phenomenon is a product of modernity. First influential terrorist organizations appeared in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. With the invention of dynamite and massive production of explosives at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, terrorism became a massive phenomenon. It is no coincidence that in that period dynamite was called the 'pocket revolution' because it enabled a kind of 'democratization' of violence. During this period, anarchists were the ones that mostly assassinated government officials and planted explosives on state institutions. The most influential anarchist organization of that time was the Russian Narodnaya Volya which was responsible for the assassination of the emperor Alexander II in 1881. Apart from anarchists, nationalist organizations also used terrorism—from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnak) to the American-Irish Clan na Gael and many others.

As other social organizations, terrorism became more influential with the development of technology, ideological penetration, and the increase of organizational capacity. From the 1970s onwards we see an expansion of different types of terrorism. Initially it was the far-left movements (Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, Weather Underground, etc.) or neo-fascist organizations (Charles Martel Group in France, Avanguardia Nazionale in Italy, Grey Wolves in Turkey), and in the recent time what dominates are organizations inspired by religious fundamentalism like Al-Qaida, Boko

akcije koje imaju za namjeru izazvati strah kod običnog stanovništva te pokazati da je država nemoćna zaštititi svoje građane.

**Ove godine obilježavamo 75. obljetnicu Holokausta. Kako objašnjavate da su nacional-socijalističkom pokretu glavna meta bili Židovi? Koliko se to može povezati s time da su Židovi (ali i Romi) stoljećima bili meta drugim narodima? Što mislite, postoji li nešto zajedničko tim višestoljetnim antisemitskim pojavama?**

Anti-semitizam ima dugu povijest u Europi. Naravno, Njemačka nije bila jedina država gdje je netrpeljivost prema Židovima bila sastavni dio svakodnevnog života. U većem dijelu Europe antisemitizam je bio izražen u društvu te se svjesno širio od strane vladara, države, crkvenih institucija do običnih ljudi. Od srednjeg vijeka do rane modernosti anti-semitizam je uglavnom bio produkt religijskih predrasuda. Židovi su obično bili jedino nekršćansko stanovništvo u mnogim dijelovima Europe. Krajem 19. stoljeća uvriježene religijske predrasude prema Židovima su polako transformirane u kvazi-biološke teorije superiornosti Arijevaca i inferiornosti Semita. Nationalsocialisti su bili motivirani takvim socijalno darvinističkim interpretacijama gdje su Židovi postali žrtveni jarac njemačkog nacionalnog i imperijalnog projekta. Hitleru i ostalim nacističkim liderima Židovi su bili prikladan izvor krivnje za sve nedaće u kojima se Njemačka nalazila poslije Prvog svjetskog rata – od poraza u ratu do ekonomske stagnacije, političke nestabilnosti i siromaštva većine stanovnika. Anti-semitizam je isto tako poslužio kao propagandni paravan u ideološkom sukobu s komunistima i liberalima. Da bi prikazali jednu vrlo malu etničku i religijsku zajednicu kao veliku opasnost za Njemačku, bilo je neophodno

Haram or ISIS. As terrorist organizations do not possess the power of the state, they necessarily rely on spectacular actions that are intended to cause fear among the common population and to show that the state is powerless to protect its citizens.

**This year marks the 75th anniversary of the Holocaust. How do you explain that the main target of National Socialists were the Jews? How much can this be related to the fact that Jews (but also Roma) have been a target for other nations for centuries? Do you think there is anything in common with these centuries-old anti-Semitic phenomena?**

Anti-Semitism has a long history in Europe. Of course that Germany was not the only country where the intolerance towards Jews was a part of the everyday life. In the most part of Europe, anti-Semitism was expressed in society, and was knowingly spread from the part of the rulers, the state, church organizations and common people. From the Middle Ages to early modernity, anti-Semitism was largely the product of religious prejudice: the Jews were usually the only non-Christian population in many parts of Europe. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, ingrained religious prejudices against Jews were slowly transformed into quasi-biological theories of Aryan superiority and Semitic inferiority. National Socialists were motivated by these socially Darwinian interpretations, where the Jews became a scapegoat of German national and imperial project. For Hitler and other Nazi leaders, the Jews were the appropriate source of blame for all misfortunes that happened to Germany after World War I—from the defeat in the war to economic stagnation, political instability, and poverty of the most of the population. Anti-Semitism was also used as a propaganda screen in ideological conflicts with liberals and communists. In order to portray

kreirati teorije zavjere u kojima su Židovi upravljali svijetom preko Sovjetskog Saveza ('Židovsko-boljševička urota') ili Wall Streeta ('Židovski kapital kontrolira svjetsku ekonomiju'). Naravno, ova nacistička propaganda oslanjala se na već postojeće anti-semitske predrasude koje su bile jake ne samo u Njemačkoj, nego i diljem europskog kontinenta i drugdje u svijetu.

**Holokaust predstavlja jedan od najžasnijih zločina u povijesti čovječanstva, organizirano i industrijalizirano masovno ubijanje pripadnika jednog naroda – Židova. Kako je bilo moguće provesti ovakav plan tako sustavno i precizno?**

Postoji nekoliko odličnih knjiga iz historijske sociologije koje dobro objašnjavaju fenomen Holokausta i drugih genocida. Ja bih izdvojio 'Modernity and the Holocaust' (1989) od Zygmunta Baumana te 'The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing' (2005) od Michaela Manna. Ove knjige su imale utjecaja na moje razumijevanje genocida. I Bauman i Mann vide genocid kao proizvod modernosti – iako je kroz povijest bilo puno slučajeva masovnih ubojstava i pokolja običnog stanovništva, ljudi su uglavnom ubijani ili protjerani ne zato što su bili nego gdje su bili. Naglasak je bio na teritoriji i u većini slučajeva smrt se mogla izbjeći kroz prelazak na drugu religiju, pristajanje na ropstvo ili kmetstvo ili kroz priznavanje novog vladara. U modernosti fokus je na ideološkom projektu koji se mora ispuniti bez obzira na žrtve. U tom smislu sve moderne ideologije imaju utopijske elemente gdje je naglasak na realizaciji ideološkog projekta. Za nacionalsocijaliste to je bio tisućljetno kraljevstvo Arijevca. U takvom projektu nema mjesta za Židove, odnosno projekt se može realizirati tek kad Židovi

a very small ethnic and religious community as a great danger to Germany, it was necessary to create conspiracy theories in which the Jews rule the world through Soviet Union ("Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy") or through Wall Street ("Jewish capital controls the world economy"). Of course, this Nazi propaganda relied on pre-existing anti-Semitic prejudices that were strong not only in Germany but throughout the European continent and elsewhere in the world.

**The Holocaust is one of the most horrific crimes in the history of mankind, an organized and industrialized mass murder of members of one nation - the Jews. How was it possible to implement such a plan so systematically and precisely?**

There are several great books from historical sociology that explain very well the phenomenon of Holocaust and other genocides. I would single out 'Modernity and the Holocaust' (1989) from Zygmunt Bauman and 'The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing' (2005) from Michael Mann. These books had an effect on the understanding of genocides. Both Bauman and Mann view genocide as a product of modernity-although through history there was a lot of cases of mass murders and slaughter of common people, they were mostly killed or banished because of the place where they lived, and not because of the fact who they were. The emphasis was on territory and in most cases death could be avoided through conversion to another religion, consent to slavery or serfdom, or through the recognition of a new ruler. In modern times the focus is on an ideological project that has to be fulfilled, no matter what the casualties could be. In that sense all modern ideologies have utopic elements where the stress is on the realization of an ideological project. For the National Socialists, it was the millennial

prestanu postojati. Znači Židovi ne mogu ništa napraviti da izbjegnu genocid – lojalnost novom režimu, prelazak na drugu religiju, otkup slobode jednostavno nisu opcije za Nationalsocijalizam. U takvoj ideološkoj matrici genocid je na krajnje perverznan način zamišljen kao najracionalnije rješenje ‘židovskog pitanja’. Sjetimo se da su nacisti inicijalno imali više planova kako da se riješe Židova – od preseljenja u Palestinu ili Madagaskar do potpunog istrjebljenja. Osim ideologije, za genocid je važan i organizacijski kapacitet države. Moderni državni aparat i tehnološka razvijenost društava (transportne i komunikacijske mreže, podjela rada, centralizacija autoriteta itd.) omogućuju industrijalizirano ubijanje milijuna ljudi. U tom kontekstu modernost postaje preduvjet za holokaust.

**Promatrajući prosvjede od pokreta *Black Lives Matter*, primjećujemo rušenje kipova dotadašnjih američkih heroja koji su u isto vrijeme imali i robovlasničku pozadinu. Kako je moguće da su robovlasnici uspjeli ostati nacionalnim herojima nakon svih promjena koje su uslijedile borbama za crnačka prava? Gledaju li se simboli prošlih vremena previše jednoznačno, odnosno je li moguće sintetizirati dva različita značenja u jednom simbolu?**

Većina spomenika komemorira pojedince i događaje na mitološki način. To se posebno odnosi na nacionalne heroje čiji postupci su obično neprimjereno idealizirani, dekontekstualizirani u povijesnom smislu, a u nekim slučajevima i izmišljeni. Kako se dominantni nacionalni narativi mjenjaju kroz vrijeme, onda dolazi do prevrednovanja postojećih komemorativnih simbola. U tom kontekstu možemo razumjeti ovo što se događa u SAD-u. Povjesničari su znali i ranije da su mnogi od američkih nacionalnih heroja

kingdom of the Aryans. In that project there is no place for the Jews, that is, the project can be finalized only when the Jews become extinct. So the Jews cannot do anything to avoid genocide-loyalty to the new regime, conversion to another religion, buying of freedom are simply not the options for National Socialism. In that ideological matrix genocide is the most perverse way imagined as the most rational solution of the “question of the Jews”. Let us remember that the Nazis initially had several plans on how to get rid of the Jews - from moving to Palestine or Madagascar to total extermination. In addition to the ideology for genocide, the organizational capacity of the state is also important. Modern state apparatus and technological developments of societies (transport and communication networks, division of work, centralization of authority etc.) enable an industrial murder of millions of people. In that context modernity becomes a precondition for the Holocaust.

**Watching protests from the *Black Lives Matter* movement, we notice the demolition of statues of the once American heroes that were also slave owners. How is it possible that slave owners managed to remain national heroes after all the changes that came because of the struggle for civil rights? Are the symbols of the past viewed too unambiguously, that is, is it possible to synthesize two different meanings in one symbol?**

Most of the monuments commemorate individuals and events in a mythological way. This especially applies to national heroes whose deeds are usually inappropriately idealized, decontextualized in a historical sense, and in some cases made up. Since the dominant national narratives change through time, then comes the reevaluation of the pre-existing commemorative symbols. In that context we can understand

bili robovlasnici uključujući 'očeve osnivača' - George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson i James Madison. Međutim, ta informacija nije se naglašavala. Velike socijalne promjene koje se upravo odigravaju u američkom društvu utječu na preispitivanje nacionalnih simbola i nacionalnih heroja. Tradicionalna dominacija WASP Amerikanaca polako, ali sigurno nestaje kako se struktura stanovništva mijenja te kako manjinske grupe postaju obrazovanije i utjecajnije u društvu. S tim i tradicionalni nacionalni simboli postaju upitni te se mijenjaju. Vjerujem da će nove generacije Amerikanaca kreirati nove nacionalne simbole ili će neki stari simboli biti reinterpretirani u novom svjetlu. Međutim, problem je što je većina današnjih država i društava nastala na nasilju iz prošlosti te je veliki broj 'nacionalnih heroja' bio upleten u nekakav oblik nasilja – od posjedovanja robova i oduzimanja nečije imovine do ubojstava. Same Sjedinjene Američke Države nastale su na genocidu domicilnog stanovništva – više od 90 % 'Indijanaca' (Native Americans) su ili pobijeni ili istrijebljeni kroz zarazne bolesti od Europljana te otimanja njihove zemlje. Radikalna promjena nacionalnih simbola onda bi mogla zahvatiti ne samo rušenje spomenika predstavnika konfederalnih vlasti iz Američkog građanskog rata nego i osnivača SAD-a. Ako su Washington, Jefferson i Franklin bili robovlasnici te doprinijeli istrijebljenju domicilnog stanovništva, onda je moguće napraviti legitiman zahtjev da se promijeni ime glavnog grada i jedne od država (Washington), da se promijene imena sveučilista, zamijene novčanice s njihovim likom, da se promijene nazivi ulica itd.

what is happening in the USA. Historians have known before that many of America's national heroes were slave owners including the "founding fathers"- George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. However, that information was not stressed. Great social changes that are just taking place in American society are affecting the re-examination of national symbols and national heroes. The traditional dominance of WASP Americans is slowly but surely disappearing as the population structure changes and as minority groups become more educated and influential in society. With this, traditional national symbols become questionable and change. I believe that new generations of Americans will create new national symbols, and that some old symbols will be reinterpreted in a new light. The problem, however, is that most of today's states and societies have been born out of past violence, and many 'national heroes' have been involved in some form of violence - from slave ownership and confiscation of property to murder. The United States itself originated from the genocide of the domicile population - more than 90% of the Native Americans were either killed or exterminated through infectious diseases by Europeans, and the plunder of their land. A radical change in national symbols could then involve, not only the demolition of the monument dedicated to Confederate representatives from the American Civil War, but also the founders of the United States. If Washington, Jefferson and Franklin were slave owners and contributed to the extermination of the domicile population, then it is possible to make a legitimate request to change the name of the capital and one of the states (Washington), to change the name of the university, to change banknotes with their image, to change street names, etc.



**I za kraj, davno ste otišli u Irsku na Sveučilište u Dublinu i postali član više akademija te se Vaši radovi redovito prevode na više svjetskih jezika. Možete li ambicioznijim mladim kolegama koji studiraju humanističke i društvene znanosti dati nekakav savjet kako da njihov rad postane zamijećen u široj akademskoj zajednici?**

Mislim da je najvažnije za svakog mladog istraživača da radi ono što ga iskreno zanima. Samo ako postoji strast za novim spoznajama o nekom problemu može se napraviti nešto novo i značajno. Isto tako je važno biti svoj i ne slijediti ono što je trenutno popularno u znanstvenim i profesionalnim krugovima. Važno je ostvariti i održavati kontakte s kolegama u Europi i svijetu i biti dio šire akademske zajednice. U današnje vrijeme je ključno objavljivati radove na velikim jezicima, prvenstveno na engleskom jer jedino tako nečiji rad može biti zamijećen izvan Hrvatske ili jugoistočne Europe. Iznad svega je važno biti posvećen i voljeti ono što istražuješ. Ako je čovjek predan svom radu i istraživanju, velika je vjerojatnost da će napraviti nešto značajno te da će neki od njegovih radova biti primijećeni i utjecajni. Kvalitetni radovi, zasnovani na dugoročnom radu i naporu, budu zamijećeni. Možda je za to nekad potrebno više vremena, ali kvaliteta se na kraju uvijek prepoznata.

**And finally, you went to the University of Dublin in Ireland a long time ago and became a member of several academies, and your works are regularly translated into several world languages. Can you give advice to some more ambitious young colleagues that are studying the humanities and social sciences, on how to make their work noticeable in the wider academic community?**

I think that the most important thing for every young researcher is to do what he is genuinely interested in. Only if there is a passion for new knowledge about a certain problem can something new and significant be made. Also, it is important to be yourself and not to follow something that is at one moment popular in scientific and professional circles. It is important to make and maintain contacts with colleagues in Europe and the world and to be a part of a wider academic community. Nowadays, it is crucial to publish papers in major languages, primarily in English, because only in this way can someone's work be noticed outside of Croatia or Southeast Europe. Above all, it is important to be dedicated and to love whatever it is that you research. If a person is committed to his work and research, there is a high probability that he will do something significant and that some of his works will be noticed and influential. Quality papers, based on long-term work and effort, will be noticed. It may sometimes take longer, but the quality is always recognized in the end.