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TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EMOTIONS

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Summary

Relying on theoretical and research approaches that developed in the last thirty years in the area of sociology of emotions, in the introductory part of the work I am introducing issues that served as the starting point for introducing the phenomenon of emotions into sociological discourse. I continue to give criticism of stated theoretical contributions, state their limitations regarding inadequate sociological conceptualization of emotions, as well as give attention to possible overlapping of all approaches. After this I am proposing guidelines that would lead toward sociological definition of emotions as social facts, so that emotions would be conceptualized not only through micro but also macro sociology, which would enable their connection with key sociological terms such as social order, structure and function as well as meaning and action. I conclude with the assumption that the dialogue between all theoretical scopes within sociology that deal in emotions is crucial for further efforts to understand the connection between modern social events, relation toward life and emotions, and also that such dialogue is possible if basic sociological conceptualization of emotions is established.

Key words: *emotions as social facts, emotional conceptions, emotional currents, emotionalization of society, macro-approach to emotions, sociology of emotions, sociological conceptualization of emotions*

INTRODUCTION

Examining what is the role of emotions in the context of the relationship between humans, nature, and society is the driving force and the framework of this paper. Even though this question is quite extensive, it points to the need for a sociological foundation of the phenomenon of emotion, as the analysis of the above relation is one of the basic problems of the sociological field.

Before entering into a sociological reflection of emotions, however, it is necessary to list some of the basic facts upon which to conclude the existence of sociological interest in emotions and its contribution to the more precise identification of some modern social problems. Insisting on introducing emotions into a sociological analysis helps, among other things, explain those contemporary social activities that reduce human freedom and which are presented as the best possible activities, and uncover those hidden factors that can serve as the key to understanding many social events.¹ For example, Neuman

¹ I found inspiration in the statement by sociologist Ivan Kuvačić (2004:24): "The real task is not in a description and analysis of what is on the surface and what is clearly seen, but the finding of hidden factors that are keys to understanding of events."

(1992) discusses the importance of understanding fear as a social mechanism of control, while Milton (2002) suggests that the lack of positive emotional attachment to the living environment has serious consequences for the survival of everything on the planet Earth. Cifrić (2007) also contributes to the aforementioned idea by identifying the need for an emotional perspective to understanding the relationship of human beings with other living beings.

Emotions can thus be important as an explanatory variable in the study of attitudes towards life in general. They are also important for understanding social relations because on the one hand, they can mediate the creation of social movements and the maintenance of relations, while on the other they can be a consequence of social construction, and tendencies of sociability itself can be discerned from them.

Additionally, the social world is permeated with emotions and they are an integral part of institutions, ideologies, private and public relations, interest communities, social projects (Jasper, 1998), wars, terrorist attacks, ethnic-national-racial-religious problems (McLaughlin, 1996), gender relations, etc. Emotions are also an integral part of globalization processes, multiculturalism, consumerism, conformism, subjectivity; anti-globalization, eco and feminist actions (Goodwin et al., 2003), etc. We can observe emotions with respect to all of the above, along with many other problem areas, as an element that contributes to the further creation of social tendencies and vice versa. There are many reasons that have led to slow introduction of emotions as a regular sociological phenomenon in this modern-mechanistic-technical image of the world, ranging from Descartes' distinction of body and mind, up to the cognitivist approach by the founder of sociology, to the domination of rationalist myths, and all these together have determined contemporary science as well as a practical thought.²

There are different approaches to emotions in different scientific disciplines. Firstly, it is necessary to define the frameworks of the sociological approach, for which only those aspects of emotions that can be associated with other social processes and phenomena are important. We are thus framing the phenomenon within sociology. For such an undertaking, however, it is first necessary to provide a research, categorical and conceptual basis. Therefore, what needs to be determined is what are emotions for sociology and how are they related to social activity and relationships. Below I provide basic attempts to determine the relationship between society and emotions and attempts at the sociological conceptualization of emotions.

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO EMOTIONS

Regarding the methodological level, the question arises as to whether emotions affect the social structure and processes or if they are the consequence of their impacts. Terpe (1999) identified two approaches to emotions. The first approach observes emotions as

² Barbalet (2001) details the reasons that caused the long-term exclusion of emotions in sociology and criticizes the myth on rationality.

a dependent variable, where emotions are understood as a *consequence* of socio-cultural relations and of social meanings that arise from cultural patterns. The second approach considers emotions as an independent variable that *participates in creating* social reality. In the first approach, emotions represent an objective phenomenon and are defined as interactions and relationships, for example in the categories of power and status (Kemper, 2006), or as meanings prescribed by social roles (Hochschild, 2003). In the second approach, emotions are a key variable in designing reality and have even more impact on the creation of social relationships than cognitive powers do. Accordingly, one can speak about an emotional construction of reality which explains how social reality arises (Collins, 1990; Terpe, 1999). Kemper (1978, 1990) also gave an important contribution to the discussion of how emotions developed – socially or biologically – which resulted in two basic contradictory points of view on emotions: *biological* and *constructivist*. According to the first, emotions are biologically grounded and conditioned by genetic inheritance, while according to the second, they are conditioned by society and culture. Kemper (1978, 1990) seeks to integrate both approaches with arguments that only the interplay between these two levels of analysis can help to understand social processes and emotion, assuming that emotions are both biologically grounded and socially constructed, and that sociology should consider both positions.

Considering the paradigmatic trends whose production is ever increasing, I will refer to the following basic approaches within sociology with a brief explanation.³

The evolutionary approach (Kardum and Gračanin, 2004) considers emotions as a biological adaptation to the environment that enabled an evolutionary advantage for humankind. Their influence is important for association, finding partners and educating offspring, and avoiding of dangers. Emotions are defined as a synchronized response to events that are important to survival, goals and the needs of people and community. Situations that were important for the survival of human beings such as struggles, loss of status, community relations, and reproduction brought forth the selection of adaptations in which emotions have evolved. These are solutions to the problem of harmonizing subsystems in the body and organism with the environment in order to survive. In short, emotions are phylogenetically very old mechanisms created by the process of evolution whose function is to quickly and reliably solve important life problems of the survival of the human species.

Power and status theories (Kemper, 2006; Turner and Stets, 2006) consider the influence of power (authority) and status (prestige/respect) to stimulate emotions. The basic premise is that holders of higher positions of power and status enjoy positive emotions (trust, satisfaction) while those in lower positions have a lack of self-esteem and experience negative emotions (fear, guilt, depression, anger). There are variations, and in case

³ I do not intend to give much space to recounting previous theories about emotions within sociology as such surveys already exist in quite extensive and thorough form in Stets and Turner (2006), and Turner and Stets (2005, 2006). Here I will only explain them for a better understanding and further discussion in this paper.

participants take on the responsibility for lowering the status and power themselves then they feel shame and guilt, and if they attribute it to others then they feel anger and aggression against them. Structural conditions and position in the hierarchical rank determine positive or negative emotions so that different characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, profession, etc., are differently valued in a wider culture, and social participants have different expectations regarding the position at which they are found, accompanied by different emotions. When a lower status group attributes the causes of its lower status to external factors or to any other group, they then experience anger and hatred towards others, while solidarity is developed towards their own group. Barbalet (2001) raises this issue to a macro level and analyzes a larger population, concluding that there is a different distribution of fear, hate and confidence in the macrostructure. The distribution of resources determines the hatred of those who have no resources, and the fear of those who perceive the lack of their power if they consider themselves responsible, and hatred if they consider others responsible for it. In conclusion, an unequal distribution of power, status and resources in individuals and collective actors generates specific emotions depending on the attribution of who is the cause of unequal distribution.

Dramaturgical theories (Turner and Stets, 2005, 2006; Hochschild, 2003a, 2003b) are primarily focused on managing impressions and strategic behaviors that the person is using in order to align with the cultural rules on emotional behavior. They are based on Goffman's idea of dramaturgical representation of the ideal image of oneself and on concepts of managing impressions by which people play roles for the public. Social actors invest efforts in the direction of strategic action that is directed by cultural scripts so as to present themselves in accordance with emotional ideology, which precisely defines which emotions in which context they can and should express. The result is daily manipulation with emotional expressions in accordance with the "norms of feelings" (Hochschild, 2003b) in order to achieve micro-economic and micro-political advantages in interaction. Culture defines expectations as to which emotions in which context should be expressed and so social actors are thus forced to manage their emotional impressions according to them, by which a case of conflict most often appears between emotional rules and ideologies against actual feelings.

Symbolic interaction theories (Fields et al., 2006; Shott, 1979) observe the *self* and identity as a central dynamic that lies behind emotional excitement, relying on the works of Mead. It is assumed that both the *self* and identity are contextually dependent and that the behavior of the social actor is oriented towards achieving their own goal within the group. Social actors look for acknowledgement from others that would be consistent with their self-perception, and if they receive acknowledgement, they feel a positive emotion (joy, pleasure, pride), and if they receive no acknowledgement then they experience negative emotions (shame, sorrow, fear, anger). The social actor is regarded as motivated to achieve positive emotions through the confirmation of their self-perception. It is similar with the issue of identity. If the response of others is incompatible with their identity, this gives way to negative emotions, and vice versa. On the other hand,

emotions signal whether events in the environment support or do not support personal meaning. If the events support the personal meanings, then they develop a positive emotion, if not, then negative. As each identity has its standards that are created from social meanings representing a framework for behavioral regulation, social actors will adapt to the cultural expectations and standards that direct their emotional behavior.

Ritual theories (Collins, 1990; Summers-Effler, 2006) take over Durkheim's concept of "collective effervescence" created by rituals guided by the totem symbols. A ritual initiates collective effervescence in which positive emotional energy is raised, and has the consequence of connecting with group symbols, after which the solidarity and experience of belonging to the group grows. It is assumed that the social actor is motivated to seek an increase of positive emotional energy. The capacity to increase positive emotional energy is culturally mediated through rituals, meanings, and common gatherings. The ritual and its emotional consequences are set as the center of social life, whose manifestations can best be seen in the behavior of small groups, larger collectivities, and mass gatherings. This theoretical approach is most appropriate for analyzing collective emotional excitement, such as those connected to sports, large events, demonstrations, and social actions in which the rhythmic synchronization of the gathered bodies results in amplifying the positive or negative emotions.

Cultural theories (Denzin, 1990; Hochschild, 2003a, 2003b) emphasize the influence of cultural values and norms that shape life experience through emotional concepts. For example, the media (films, commercials) suggest cultural emotional codes that are internalized in people, thus determining the emotional experience that appears on the surface individually, but is common to the entire population. Market and media spheres as well as cultural standards prescribe the frames of emotional behavior and thus create individual emotional experiences. In this respect, emotions are culturally objectified and reproduced through cultural institutions. Institutions form emotions and thus mediate lived emotional experiences⁴, determine the contexts and situations in which they should be happy or frustrated. They create connectivity with artefacts that offer happiness and pleasure if they are bought. In this way culture determines emotional behavior in private and formal relationships. In addition, the labor market and the social division of labor roles create the norms of emotional behavior that are specific to individual jobs. For instance, flight attendants, secretaries and educators are expected to have certain "emotional work" (Hochschild, 2003b), mostly positive emotions. It follows from the above that the emotional experience must be described and linked to the structural and cultural formations of the immediate environment.

Exchange theories (Lawler and Thye, 2006) presuppose that human behavior is motivated by the exchange of rewards and benefits and the avoidance of damages and penalties. The basic model suggests that people avoid the damages and invest in receiving awards from others with the goal of experiencing positive emotions. Positive emotions occur when a person receives a prize and negative ones occur if the prize is missing. Expecta-

⁴ For example, films, as a visual representation of society, mediate a cultural experience.

tions, comparison with others, and attribution of causes of profit or loss also determine positive or negative emotions. If the causes of the profit/prize are attributed to the social unit to which one belongs, then positive emotional connection with it grows, but if the damage is attributed to the other collectivity then hatred, anger and aggression towards it grows. In this sense, positive emotions strengthen cohesion and affiliation with the associated group, and negative emotions stimulate hostility towards other social collectivities. What can be concluded from this is that the common emotional connection is the basis for coordinating social actions and that social order is easier to maintain if the members are positively associated with the relevant social group. In this way, the social structure can strengthen or weaken emotional attachment within the group and the social network, which can be the basis for social order and solidarity.

WHAT ARE EMOTIONS FOR SOCIOLOGY?

From all abovementioned approaches, I can detect several problems, disadvantages and key moments that have remained unresolved and resulted in the ambiguous determination of what emotions as the subject of study mean in sociology.

The first problem with these approaches is their *focus on the micro-level*, which results in a kind of psychologization, and the avoiding of examining macro-social processes. Naturally, as will be shown below, without precisely determining what emotions are for sociology, it is not possible to shed light on the macro approach and that is why the borrowing of concepts from other disciplines was the only viable option. Of course, this must be started from somewhere. If the theories are mostly micro-approaching and directed at face-to-face interactions or relationships between groups, what remains is the unexplored relationship between social movements and emotions. Moreover, such an approach does not allow for the connection of emotions with modern time macro-social phenomena.

The second problem is the theoretical focus on *interpersonal interactions* and with it fully omitted emotions towards artefacts, non-human beings, the environment, world, and nature. I believe it is very important for sociology to note that apart from interpersonal emotionality, there are many other forms of emotionality that determine social behaviors and contemporary macro phenomena. For example, emotions towards artefacts that make us happy and we buy them, emotions of fear of terrorism, emotions of respect towards institutions, emotions of love for science and books, lack of positive emotions towards nature, etc. This approach allows us to look at emotions as an essential variable in understanding the relationship to life, as indicated by Cifrić (2007).

The third problem is the *lack of a clear and explicit definition of emotions* within the sociological frame. For instance, some basic conclusions of the above contributions can be summed up in generalizations: rhythmic synchronization of the body stimulates group emotions that create solidarity, acknowledgement of self-perception encourages positive emotions that are a stimulus for action while blaming another group raises negative emotions towards it, profitable exchange resulting in positive emotions, power

and status relationships determine emotionality, adaptational function of emotion creates sociality, emotions trigger social action. Although I do not intend to diminish the importance of these contributions that have made a large step to shedding light on the relationship between emotions, action and society, still, in my opinion I would like to draw attention to the fact that this large step has not determined a precise sociological conceptualization and definition of emotions.

The fourth problem concerns *terms* that are not unambiguous, and what is first needed is a sociological definition of emotions and their conceptual clarification and only then can a connection with basic sociological terms be created in order to define specific paradigmatic interventions that adjust the fundamental definition of emotions to its goals. This also means that depending on how and from which angle we look at emotions, we will create an approach and a problem. Accordingly, the focus then determines the sociological conceptualization of emotions rather than the subject alone. Placing emphasis on how to access emotions can solve the problem with the definition of emotions in sociological terms.⁵ In case emotions are placed in a framework of sociological thought, since the same subject can be accessed from a variety of angles, this means that emotions need to be brought closer to the specific sociological point of view and connected with basic sociological categories.

Therefore, my basic thesis is that moving towards a sociological reflection of the relationship between emotions, society, and the environment should be based on a precise definition of what is meant by the notion of emotions within sociology, so that the first step would be to do a sociological framing of the concept of emotions. In that view, there are several possible *levels* of a categorization of emotions.⁶ With regards to their *quality*, they can be understood as long-lasting or short-lasting; as burdensome or subtle (when there is no visible bodily excitement); or as positive and negative. Considering their *causes*: as neurobiologically conditioned; or as culturally and socially conditioned. Regarding their *visibility*: as manifest or latent; or as conscious or unconscious. In connection with *rationality*: as interactive with rationality and as independent. Related to their *position* and basic characteristic: as a process and state of society; as a process in a person and the condition of a person; as a process among people; or as a process between the environment (nature, non-human beings, artefacts, abstract objects...), people, and society.

5 Ivan Kuvačić (2004:16) states that sociology defines the specific sociological angle of view, so “the differentiation does not come from the subject of the study, rather it comes from the way in which this subject is accessed”.

6 This categorization is indirectly taken from literature as a result of ten years of reflection on and reading about emotions within sociology, ecology, biology, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy and anthropology, and from the abstraction of masses of findings to which the authors came. This means that it is composed as an attempt to answer the question of how emotions are generally, without specifying certain emotions (shame, anger, sadness, joy, hatred, fear, jealousy, etc.) systematized by the causes, the connection to another phenomenon, position, visibility, and appearance mode. I also want to note that with this the categorization is certainly not already exhausted because it is only an attempt at such.

Relying on the above categories of sociology, one needs to deal with long-lasting, subtle, latent emotions associated with rationality, which are culturally and socially conditioned and positioned within society, directed towards objects in the environment, as well as those that determine the social processes.⁷ Only now can we follow the sociological determination of emotions by finding a sociological intervention that implies that they are linked to society and social phenomena. This means determining emotions in terms of interaction, social structures and processes, social actions and meanings. In that regard Shilling (2002) states that for now the problem with the introduction of emotions into sociology has not been solved in the right way because theorists have largely avoided relying on the classic sociological basis. Rejecting general concepts and reducing debate on the questions of individual sentiment can seriously harm the further development of the sociology of emotions. Therefore, he proposes an orientation based on basic classical contributions in two directions, the first according to an analysis of *social order* (Comte and Durkheim) and emotions, the second towards an analysis of *social action* (Simmel and Weber) and emotions. Barbalet (2002) also suggests that emotions can be the organizational principle in exploring and explaining social life if they are conceptualized to link the structure and the social actor. Namely, emotions should be added in the analysis of the functioning of the social order and structure because there is no action happening without emotional involvement.

In view of the above-mentioned suggestions and criticisms, I will try to set the starting basis that is directed at the definition of emotions in terms of “social facts” and “social currents” (Durkheim, 1999, 1997), and continue with proposals that would help in the establishing of sociological definitions of emotions.

EMOTIONS AS A SOCIAL FACT

Through reflecting on which processes/states form almost every human activity, I concluded that emotions are one of those processes/states. By this I understand that emotions are at the same time both within a person but also within society as a social fact, which covers both the macro and micro approach. This proposed understanding of emotions is based on a suggestion of Barbalet (2001:9) that “emotion is a social fact”. But as this suggestion has, in my opinion, remained unelaborated, in order to clarify this, we need a brief dedication to Durkheim’s theory of social facts as subjects of sociology. Thus, I

⁷ By introducing the category of emotions into relation with the environment and non-human beings, a bioethical and socio-ecological approach can be developed. I was inspired in this direction by the following ideas: “life-sensitivity” (Cifrić, 2007:80) and “emotionality as a motive for human treatment of plants and animals” (Cifrić, 2007:83), which can serve as an important component in explaining social impact that endangers life and non-human beings. Developing such an approach was basically my primary goal, but as I was not satisfied with the conceptualization of emotions in sociology, I started first by identifying emotions as a sociological variable that determines social behavior and which is determined by society as the basic motive of this work, leaving the social-ecological and bioethical discussion from the perspective of sociology for further research.

developed a sociological conceptualization of emotions on the foundations of Durkheim's approach. Below I will outline the key moments of Durkheim's (1999, 1997, 2003) conclusions and Thomson's (2002) interpretations of Durkheim, and connect them with the notions of theoreticians who have explicitly mentioned the issue of emotional connection with society as a whole. My goal is to determine if it is possible to assert that emotions are social facts, and thus conceptualize them sociologically.

Social facts are an *impersonal* social force that structure human action which have various degrees of crystallization, morphological (visible sphere), institutional (normative sphere), and collective representations (symbolic sphere) (Durkheim, 1999; Thompson, 2002). In this regard, Barbalet (2001) has extensively analyzed the key aspects of the social structure and has shown that emotions are fundamental to explaining social behavior: they constitute institutions, relationships, and social processes. Fear, hatred, shame, and confidence play a major role in social processes. With this it is important to distinguish forward-facing, visible emotions from background emotions, which are not as visible but are determinative to the social action. According to Hochschild (2003b), emotions are experienced in accordance with "norms of feelings" and social behaviors and actions are determined through them. Society uses and determines emotions to bring people into the production-consumer processes, making them become an instrument of survival of socio-market logic. Hochschild (2003b) gives a precise argument of the mentioned theses through an analysis of social management of emotions via the "emotional norms" ideology and stratification. She concludes that social control of emotions determines the way of emotional signification, interpretation, expression, and perception (Hochschild, 2003b). In a similar tone, Denzin (1990) cites the importance of emotional concepts that are imprinted in social actors through "culture-making-institutions" (Denzin, 1990:103), primarily referring to the media, whose aim is to set up a recipe for lived emotional experience. Consequently, emotions, as social facts, structure social action through socialization processes into the emotional culture of society. By this they are crystallized through the normative sphere and through collective ideas as internalized patterns of emotional experience and expression.

Social facts have the characteristics of *externality*, *compulsion* and *generality* (Durkheim, 1999; Thompson, 2002). From this standpoint, emotions within society are a result and consequence of social processes (Barbalet, 2002) – indicating their externality with regards to a person, and there is no social action that is not motivated by emotions (Barbalet, 2002) – indicating their generality. Emotions produce compulsion over individuals by determining behavior in the direction prescribed by social norms, social meanings, and social expectations (Hochschild, 2003a, 2003b; Barbalet, 2002; Fisher & Chon 1989). It follows that emotions, as social facts, have these characteristics: externality, compulsion, and generality.

Collective representations are social facts as the way a group understands itself considering the relationship with the objects that affect the group. Collective representations are socially generated and represent the social perception that structurally coincides with social organization and are relatively autonomous – they have their own rules

(Durkheim, 1999; Thompson, 2002). Similarly, emotional concepts and notions are also socially generated, imposed by socialization, and they determine the relation to the world (Milton, 2002). Emotional meanings have been adopted by socialization (Hochschild, 2003a, 2003b; Shott, 1979) under the influence of the media (Denzin, 1990); they depend on the structural organization of power and status (Kemper, 1978), they develop their own “emotional rules” (Hochschild, 2003a, 2003b), and represent the general social meanings (Denzin, 1990; Fields et al., 2006). From the above it can be concluded that emotional representations are social facts that determine the way people relate to the world; they are socially generated and represent social understanding, they are structurally related to social organization, and have their own rules.

Social currents are social facts that do not have clear crystallization, but have objectivity and come to a person from the outside (Durkheim, 1999, 1997). They are a set of meanings that are buried among people as a tendency of the whole social body (Durkheim, 1999, 1997; Thompson, 2002). An analysis of cultural influences on the experience of fear (Povrzanovic, 1991) and of political manipulations of fear in national contexts (Koradi, 1985) provides the contribution to the thesis that emotions in the form of emotional currents are shown as objectivity imposed from the outside with their meanings that reflect the tendency of the whole society. For example, socially modified fear⁸ impairs the freedom of decision-making (Neuman, 1992:227) and society creates fear for keep people in unconscious obedience in order to govern their behavior and aspirations. Further, the market uses and creates human emotions (Horney, 1987) to keep the masses in unconscious susceptibility to consumerism, conformism and obedience as extensions to the pursuit of governance over human beings and nature. Similarly, Fromm (1989) starts from the assumption that a person’s preferences from love to hatred and to craving for power are not only biologically established but derive from a social process that forms them. The influence is not one-way because passions, desires and emotions change as a result of social processes that shape everyday life. As a result, emotions manifest themselves as emotional currents that are not explicitly visible but have objectivity and come to a person externally.

The social fact, whether established or not, is a mode of action that exhibits external compulsion on a person, it is general in society, and possesses its own survival (Durkheim, 1999). Argumentation of this definition stems from Durkheim himself, who claims that social facts consist of “ways, actions, thoughts and *feelings* that are external to the individual and endowed with compulsive power on the basis of which they are imposed on him” (Durkheim, 1999:25) (cursive K. S.). After all, Durkheim mentions feelings in many places as social facts⁹. Moreover, the aforementioned authors have explicitly

8 Various structures of society modify forms of fear that are institutionalized and thus become a means of maintaining the authority, making fear as an incentive to obey orders (Neuman, 1992).

9 To cite a few quotes: “The creative causes of common perceptions, *feelings* and tendencies are not some states of the individual’s consciousness, but rather the conditions of the whole social body (Durkheim, 1999:101). “The reason for it is that these *feelings* come from collective construction, and they are by no means its basis (Durkheim, 1999:102). “There could not exist any society that would not *feel*, in regular

explained in various ways the premise that emotions are socially constructed phenomenon (Povrzanović, 1991), that are general (Koradi, 1985), they enforce oppression on individuals (Neuman, 1992, Barbalet, 2001, Denzin, 1990), and although they may be invisible, which is of interest to society, they do exist in reality (Horney, 1987; Fromm, 1989). Emotional patterns that match the emotional norms are external to the person, they have coercive power, and they correspond with the patterns of the entire society they support.¹⁰ As such, emotions are social facts as collective images and social currents, which are not always clearly crystallized but possess the characteristic of compulsion, and generate human action.

EMOTIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY

From all the above, one can conclude that the regulation of behavior in accordance with social structures and processes is the most important function of emotions as social facts. The processes of market use of emotions, social creation of emotions, and their reversal to maintain social relations can be conceptualized as a kind of emotionalization of society. Emotional meanings as social pressure determine emotional experiences and expressions that organize social life. In this regard, Durkheim believes that the inner milieu of society is internalized in individuals, so there is a correlation between the organization of society and collective ideas, which keeps society in continuous reproduction (Thompson, 2002). Through socialization, society imprints emotional perceptions, emotional norms and codes into actors, which results in corresponding emotions that stimulate further emotional behaviors that are consistent with the organization of society and with the patterns of relations. Further, according to Durkheim the sources of social phenomena should be sought in the interior construction of society (Thompson, 2002), so we can look for sources of emotionality in the inner constitution of the contemporary western market, which uses emotions to reproduce itself, for example, by creating emotionally driven consumption. In this way constructed emotions stimulate action that is socially acceptable, for example susceptibility to authority, obedience, and consumerism. The whole market and marketing sphere of contemporary society uses emotional messages and communicates directly with emotionality to arouse people's buying and lending actions. Durkheim has pointed out the importance of revealing the hidden institutional and social functions which enable the maintenance of a social

intervals, the need to maintain and strengthen the collective *feelings* and collective ideas, consisting of its unity and personality. And this moral renewal can only be achieved through gatherings and congregations, congregations on which individuals connected with each other reaffirm the common *feelings*. Hence come the ceremonies that are by nature not different from religious ceremonies, neither by purpose, nor by the results they produce, nor by the methods they use" (Durkheim, 2003:396), (cursive K. S.).

10 Briggs (2001) has shown that although basic emotions are considered to be innate (anger, fear, happiness, disgust, jealousy), the emotion of anger, its experience and expression, depends on cultural and social influences, so that some traditional communities have a completely different emotional range from the Western ones as well as different sets of emotions (they do not have some emotions).

structure (Thompson, 2002). Emotions then may have a latent, not so visible function of maintaining the social system which needs to be more accurately elaborated. They can represent socially integrating as well as disintegrating forces, which specifically determine the private and public relations, behaviors and actions that enable the survival of the entire social body.

It is important to emphasize that social consciousness, while exerting pressure on individuals, is not thereby materialized, nor in the case of coercive social facts is it about realism and substantialism¹¹. It does not exclude a whole range of individual nuances, but it establishes that “the permissible variations are limited” and sooner or later boundaries are reached that cannot be crossed (Durkheim, 1999:18). In short, the phenomenon of emotions, though most often latent, is exposed through emotional meanings, emotional currents, emotional norms and internalization. Through these external features it can be concluded that emotions are associated with the essential properties of society such as coercion, order, control and organization of everyday life. As such, one of the social functions of emotion is maintaining of the social structure and the survival and reproduction of the very society which I labeled as a phenomenon of the emotionalization of society, which needs to be sociologically elaborated.

SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EMOTIONS

Even though the above listed works concerning the sociology of emotions avoided a clear definition of emotions, their contributions are extremely significant because they have clearly shown that for sociology it is important to analyze emotional relations. Each contribution made it possible to highlight a specific segment of emotions, which together, to summarize, were able to show that there were concrete social aspects of emotions and that they needed to be addressed. Therefore, the sociological conceptualization of emotions, which can rely on the synthesis of these contributions, is extremely important in order to accurately identify and distinguish the sociological approach to emotions from other disciplines, and to avoid splitting them into other disciplines.¹² The main goal of this work is to crystallize the sociological approach of emotions, in order to come to its clear definition within sociological concepts¹³. With that assumption, such conceptualization helps in determining the subject of research, and with the intention to define emotions as a subject of sociological research, I propose the following sociological conceptualization of emotions. Emotions for sociology are a social fact as well as a component of individual consciousness. In one way they are crystallized as a social

11 “In spite of the fact that we have revealed on numerous occasions that consciousness, both individual and social, are not for us something substantially, but only a more or less systemic whole of phenomenon sui generis, they accused us of realism and ontologism” (Durkheim, 1999:7).

12 For example, psychology has a long-lasting tradition in emotion analysis, and most often emotions are considered as a psychological phenomenon.

13 It is important to understand that the phenomenon of emotion has many aspects, namely biological, neural, mental, cultural and social. Sociology observes mainly the social aspect of emotions.

process that implies meanings, cultural scripts and structural relationships; in another way the emotions turn out to be a state of society, social actors and collectives that promote action and social activity; in a third way emotions turn out to be a mechanism for maintaining social control through social currents and concepts. The same determination from a micro-perspective presupposes that emotions, as a state of consciousness, crystallize as an internal process that implies meanings and which stimulates action. In doing so, emotions are viewed as having a dual character, they are at the same time both, in person and in society. They are distributed throughout the macro and micro spheres, are implicit in all forms of behavior in which regularities have yet to be found, and reveal which emotional states induce people to certain behaviors and how these emotional states are generated. Therefore, emotions are both social fact and human traits, and as such they are interesting for sociology, but at the same time problematic for analysis. Thereby, in the context of sociology, emotions should be approached from the standpoint of a joint dialogue among paradigmatic approaches, which would enable to see their relationship with social issues more clearly.

CONCLUSION

This work is dedicated to the foundation of emotions within the framework of the sociological conceptual matrix, where my basic premise was the assumption that the initial conceptual solution determines how we will see the relationship of emotions with society, and that the approach determines which aspects of this relationship we will notice. If the cause of social phenomena could be explained from multiple levels, and if we assume a visible and invisible face of reality, the understanding of emotions allows us a view into a latent reality. Furthermore, a sociological determination of emotions sheds light on the broader perspective of social life, as it shows that both society and man have the same dichotomous structure – both are permeated with rationality and emotionality. As long as one side of this dichotomy is hidden and unexplored, one cannot unravel the social confusion, and the greater the confusion is, the easier it is to maintain the illusion and irrational belief in the most meaningless activities that have been sold to the people as sacred. According to some authors, such a state contributes to the cognitivist orientation¹⁴ in sociology which denies the acceptance of emotions as a research-analytical subject, and which does not recognize that their inclusion in a wider sociological debate enables a more complete approach to social problems.¹⁵ On the other hand, emotions are at the same time complicated and an interesting phenomenon because they spread, systemically speaking, into more analytic spheres, into the neuro-biological, psycholo-

14 Barbalet (2001), Kemper, (1990) and Hochschild (2003a) advocate such claims.

15 The same authors assert that avoiding the explicit introduction of the concept of emotions into sociology is caused by incorrectly looking at and understanding emotions as solely biological and psychological processes. But if they are perceived as essentially having been groomed in society, which emphasizes the conceptualization established here, then this confirms the need for sociology to deal with emotions and reveals how they affect social processes and actions, and what are their consequences.

gical, socio-cultural and ecological sphere, and can be approached from more levels. I find that sociological interest has illuminated their eco-cultural-social component, and in that regard we can integrate emotions in an integral framework together with the phenomena of experiences, rationalities, norms, values, attitudes, ideas and beliefs. By this I would like to emphasize once again that certain aspects of emotions are visible depending on the starting approach. For a sociological approach it is appropriate to look at those aspects of emotions that participate in the creation of sociality and relationships with the world and to illuminate their social determination. For this reason, I have strived to propose a sociologically based conceptualization of emotions as social facts, with the aim of developing an approach to emotions that avoids the dissociation of sociology into other close disciplines, and thereby reinforces the sociological engagement with the phenomena with which emotionality is associated. In addition, further efforts should be directed to a theoretical summation of all paradigmatic attitudes that would highlight the specific, structural, social, actional, cultural and biological conditions that activate specific emotions and the ways of their expression.

Finally, in order to move the entire story away from reductionism, it was not my intention to state that the emotional aspects of social behavior are the only important aspects that determine society and the relationship with the environment, rather I endeavored to emphasize the importance of highlighting specific emotional threads in understanding the social fabric. It would be interesting in subsequent research and theoretical efforts to explain and understand how emotions are socially exploited and constructed, focusing on the factors that condition such tendencies, with an emphasis on social and life consequences which arise from them, for example by endangering the environment and life itself. Besides, other further research and theoretical endeavors should clarify the distribution of different emotional experiences in the population, for example, whether there are specific clusters of emotions which are characteristic for the population in terms of socio-economic status, demographic characteristics, national-religious commitment, workplace, etc. Also, it should illuminate emotional content that suggests culture, for example through mass media and the norms as well as the influencing of social stratification on emotional experience.

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PREMA SOCIOLOGIJSKOJ KONCEPTUALIZACIJI EMOCIJA

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Sažetak

Oslanjajući se na teorijsko-istraživačke pravce koji su se razvili u zadnjih tridesetak godina unutar područja sociologije emocija u uvodnom dijelu rada iznosim pitanja koja su služila kao polazište za uvođenje fenomena emocija u sociologijski diskurs. U nastavku upućujem kritiku na navedene teorijske doprinose, navodim njihove nedostatke s obzirom na neadekvatnu sociologijsku konceptualizaciju emocija, te usmjeravam pažnju na moguće dodirne točke svih pravaca. Nakon toga predlažem smjernice koje bi vodile prema sociologijskoj definiciji emocija kao društvenih činjenica, čime bi se emocije konceptualizirale osim mikro i makro sociologijski, što bi omogućavalo njihovo povezivanje s ključnim sociologijskim pojmovima kao što su društveni red, struktura i djelovanje te značenja i akcija. Završavam s pretpostavkom da je dijalog između svih teorijskih dosega unutar sociologije koji se bave emocijama neophodan moment daljnjeg smjerenja prema razumijevanju veze između suvremenih društvenih zbivanja, odnosa prema životu i emocija, te da je takav dijalog moguć ako se utvrdi osnovna sociologijska konceptualizacija emocija.

Ključne riječi: *emocije kao društvene činjenice, emocionalne predodžbe, emocionalne struje, emocionalizacija društva, makro-pristup emocijama, sociologija emocija, sociologijska konceptualizacija emocija*

ZUR SOZIOLOGISCHEN KONZEPTUALISIERUNG VON EMOTIONEN

Korana Simonović

Zusammenfassung:

In Anlehnung an theoretische Forschungsrichtungen, die in den letzten dreißig Jahren innerhalb der Soziologie der Emotionen entwickelt wurden, stelle ich im einführenden Teil der Arbeit Fragen dar, die als Ausgangspunkt für die Einführung des Phänomens der Emotionen in den soziologischen Diskurs gedient haben. In der Fortsetzung richte ich Kritik gegen die genannten theoretischen Beiträge, führe deren Mängel hinsichtlich der inadäquaten soziologischen Konzeptualisierung von Emotionen an und mache auf mögliche Berührungspunkte aller Richtungen aufmerksam. Danach schlage ich Richtlinien vor, die zu einer soziologischen Definition von Emotionen als sozialen Tatsachen führen würden, wodurch die Emotionen nicht nur mikro- sondern auch makrosoziologisch konzeptualisiert wären, somit wäre ihre Verbindung mit soziologischen Schlüsselbegriffen möglich, wie es z.B. gesellschaftliche Ordnung, Struktur und Wirkung, Bedeutung und Aktion sind. Ich schliesse mit einer Vermutung ab, dass ein Dialog unter allen theoretischen Reichweiten innerhalb der Soziologie, die sich mit Emotionen befassen, unbedingt nötig ist, wenn man die Beziehung zwischen dem zeitgenössischen gesellschaftlichen Geschehen, der Stellung zum Leben und den Emotionen verstehen will, und dass ein solcher Dialog möglich ist, wenn eine basische soziologische Konzeptualisierung von Emotionen festgestellt ist.

Schlüsselwörter: *Emotionen als gesellschaftliche Tatsachen, emotionale Vorstellungen, emotionale Ströme, Emotionalisierung der Gesellschaft, Makro-Ansatz zu den Emotionen, Soziologie der Emotionen, soziologische Konzeptualisierung von Emotionen*