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PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF RIGHT-WING VIEWS AND A SOURCE OF CRIME

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This paper examines the subject of patriotism and nationalism - the two concepts that are apparently similar but in fact, there are essential and irreconcilable differences between them. The paper traces problems arising from the false understanding of the terms patriotism and nationalism. The aim of the paper was to answer the question if right-wing views may result in the harmful social attitudes that are close to nationalism and fascism. The first purpose of the paper was to define what patriotism, nationalism and fascism meant in the past and how they are understood nowadays. The second purpose was to reveal and expose how the right-wing patriotism has become one of the most severe security threats and how the false patriotism and nationalist trends may lead to abuse of law, excess of jurisdiction or even crimes against humanity. The article proves that nationalism-related ignorance and blindness have contributed to the deaths of billions of people around the world. Thus, the paper presents a scientifically and politically current and important issue, basing on the review of contemporary scientific literature.

Key words: *patriotism, nationalism, fascism, right-wing views, crimes against humanity, political terrorism*

1. INTRODUCTION

The migrations taking place in Europe, in particular, those of an intercultural nature, cause an escalation of radical and extremist sentiments, and they result from right-wing and extreme right wing views. Nationalist, chauvinistic, xenophobic and even anti-Semitic ideas are promoted. They call for hatred based on national, ethnic, racial and religious differences. Groups of people or individuals who are distinguished and victimized due to the above characteristics are met with physical and verbal aggression. In criminology, this pathological phenomenon is defined as hate crimes. Provisions for incitement to racial, national, ethnic or religious discord and propagation of fascism appeared in Polish criminal law as a reaction to the crimes of World War II. In the current Penal Code, hate crimes are classified under art. 119, 256 and 257¹. Until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, the total number of convictions for crimes under these articles did not exceed 50

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annually. However, in the last decade, there has been dynamic increase in the threat of this type of crime, in 2014 there were already 155 convictions.

The issue of hate crimes is therefore very topical and, at the same time, arouses social controversy. It should be noted that so far, there is a lack of exhaustive criminological research in this area. In addition, the analysis of the literature in the field of penal sciences leads to the conclusion that hate crimes are on the margin of research interests. It is therefore justified conducting scientific research aimed at determining the etiology of such crimes, characterizing their symptoms and proposing countermeasures.

The common understanding of patriotism and nationalism, and the false perception of the terms, result from ignorance and from the simple fact that the two concepts are confused by the most of people. This is why both terms are frequently used interchangeably. However, nationalism should never be confused with patriotism. Both words involve some connotations of pride in one's country, but there is an important distinction to be made between the two. Historically, both patriotism and nationalism were used roughly in the same way. But they significantly diverged along the way, and one has a much more positive connotation than the other. Nowadays, the connotation of the word "nationalism" is often negative. The conceptual framework and its semantic scope therefore needs to be put in order. In this paper, the basic method used was document research method, as well as the method of literature analysis (source analysis technique) and jurisprudence and sociology of law (formal-dogmatic method, historical-legal method, legal-comparative method).

2. PATRIOTISM, NATIONALISM AND FASCISM - ORDER OF CONCEPTS

The term "nationalism" generally represents negative connotations. It is used for political ideologies and movements and can easily become a source of hatred, aversion and conquest. Nationalism reflects the idea that a given nation should be granted with priority, supremacy and superiority. Such a thesis admits a fanatical, brutal intolerance to foreigners - glorifying power, resorting to rape and violence in relations between nations. Nationalism, perceived in this way, is associated with fascism, i.e. the ideology of the greatness and strength of one's own nation, disregarding the interests of other nations. False patriotism and nationalism lead to crimes against humanity: murders, exterminations and tortures.

In journalism and colloquial language, patriotism and nationalism are frequently used as synonyms and they mean "love for country" and "loyalty to the nation". Therefore, public and political discourse around both patriotism and nationalism is frequently marred by ignorance and lack of clarity due to the failure to distinguish the two. This is why the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. As a matter of fact, nationalism should not to be confused with patriotism. Patriotism represents

harmless approach, whereas the danger of nationalism takes place when the love for own nation turns into a narrow and blind apotheosis of what is own, and into an aversion, depreciation, and even hostility towards what is foreign. Nationalism can cause antagonism and hate. Additionally, nationalism demonstrates the idea that the good of the nation justifies all means. Such an approach allows for a fanatical and brutal intolerance while glorifying power politics and the primitive desire for expansion and conquest. Nationalism perceived in this way is usually associated with fascism, chauvinism and xenophobia.

Both words are used in so vague a way that any definition is liable, to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them. The word patriotism is a noun that means “devoted love, support, and defense of one’s country, national loyalty”.¹ The term often brings to mind all the people involved with the defense of a nation, namely military service members as well as state and local government representatives. Patriotism, however, can take many other forms outside serving in the military and public office. Diplomats, teachers, first responders, and so many more - they all exemplify patriotism in the many forms of good they do in service of their communities.²

There are thousands of people who volunteer their time in the interest of their country. Individual acts of pride, such as displaying a national flag at one’s home, are also examples of patriotism.³

Patriotic attitudes are politically and emotionally safe, but when love of country and nations turns into a petty and blind deification, hatred of, contempt for, and even hostility to foreigners, the danger of nationalism becomes apparent. In most contexts today, nationalism is “a policy or doctrine that advocates the interests of one’s own country as distinct from those of others or the common interests of all nations”.⁴ Someone who is nationalistic is very proud of their own country, but has no respect for people from other countries because they believe that their own country is better. Nationalism thus may be perceived as a kind of an excessive and aggressive patriotism. Modern nationalism is partly rooted in the French and American revolutions that fought for national sovereignty. But the fascist regime has confused nationalist fervor with notions of superiority, especially when it comes to ethnicity and religion. In such a context, a “patriot” would be someone who happens to agree with you or your appearance, and a “traitor” would be someone who doesn’t.

Nationalism has many faces. In the literature, there are numerous varieties of nationalism: secular, christian, neo-pagan, integral, contemporary. It is a mistake to equate nationalism with nazism, fascism, racism or chauvinism. Nor should

¹ *Collins English Dictionary*, New York 2007, p. 1137.

² *Patriotism vs. Nationalism: What’s The Difference?*, <https://www.dictionary.com/e/patriotism-vs-nationalism/>, 12 December, 2022.

³ op. cit. note 2.

⁴ Garner, R., *Nationalism*, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/nationalism>, 30 January, 2022.

nationalism be treated as a form of patriotism. Referring to history, the concept of nationalism was formulated at the end of the 19th century, but the phenomenon itself appeared already in the 18th century in France. On the other hand, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries political nationalist formations emerged. The leading ideologues of Polish nationalism were Jan Ludwik Popławski, Zygmunt Balicki and Roman Dmowski. In the Second Polish Republic, the National Democracy (Polish: *Endecja*) was the main political movement referring to the idea of Christian nationalism. After the defeat of September 1939, Polish nationalist organizations went underground and formed armed structures (the National Military Organization, the Lizard Union, the Cadre Shock Battalions, the National Armed Forces). After World War II, national parties were banned. Nationalism was discredited and eliminated from the political life of Europe. However, after the political transformations of 1989, there was a renaissance of the nationalist movement. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, Scottish, Flemish, Basque, Catalan, Northern Italian nationalism revived. In modern politics, however, the only example of nationalist activity is the French Front National led by Jean-Marie Le Pen.

According to B. Russel, nationalism, in theory, is the doctrine that men, by their sympathies and traditions, form natural groups, called “nations,” each of which ought to be united under one central government.⁵ Basically, this doctrine may be accepted. However, nationalism can easily become a source of hatred, aversion and conquest. Then nationalism demonstrates the idea that the good of the nation justifies all means. Such a thesis allows for a fanatical, brutal intolerance to what is alien; glorifying power, resorting to rape and violence in relations between nations, the desire for expansion and conquest. Nationalism, perceived in this way, is associated with fascism, i.e. the ideology of the greatness and strength of one’s own nation, disregarding the interests of other nations, and even striving to subjugate other nations.

This concept can aptly be illustrated by an excerpt from the publication by E. Traverso: “What does fascism mean at the beginning of the twenty-first century? When we say the word “*fascism*”, our associations go back to the years between the two world wars and envisions a dark landscape of violence, dictatorships, and genocide. These memories and connotations spontaneously surface as the rise of the radical right views, racism, xenophobia, islamophobia and terrorism, the last of which is often depicted as a form of “Islamic fascism”. Beyond some shallow analogies, however, all these contemporary tendencies reveal many differences from historical fascism, probably greater than their affinities. Paradoxically, the fear of terrorism nourishes the populist and racist views often mistaken and confused with patriotism”.⁶

The history of mankind knows numerous examples of the crime of genocide committed because of hatred based on national differences. Among the extensive

⁵ Russel, B., *Why Men Fight?*, Cossimo Classics, 2004, p. 68.

⁶ Traverso, E., *The New Faces of Fascism. Populism and the Far Right*, London New York 2019, p. 38, <https://www.versobooks.com/books/2876-the-new-faces-of-fascism>, 30 January, 2023.

list, one can mention for example: persecution of Christians in ancient Rome, medieval pogroms against Jews, the genocide of Armenians by the Turks in 1915-1917, the Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, the extermination of Jews during World War II, the Volyn massacre in 1943-1944, the genocide of the Tutsi people in 1994 in Rwanda, the massacre of Muslim Bosniaks by Serb troops in Srebrenica in 1995 and the genocide during the conflict in Darfur already in the 21st century.

3. MANIFESTATIONS OF PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM

The right-wing patriotism is one of the most severe security threats, nationally and internationally.⁷ Japanese right-wing nationalism arising out of World War II led to the spread of fascist ideology, imposing on every citizen the obligation to sacrifice their own lives to defend the country. Prejudice and racism are deeply rooted in both Japanese, German, Polish and many other societies. The 1923 massacre of the eye, during which several thousands of Koreans were killed as a result of the Japanese aggression, is an evidence of the diverse forms of prejudice spread by right-wing organizations in Japan.⁸ During World War II, Japanese soldiers infected the inhabitants of terrorized and occupied regions with plague and cholera using biological weapons of mass destruction.

When in 1945 the United States decided to use nuclear weapons until the end of World War II, a special Commission appointed for the study of the effects of the use of atomic weapons, the Japanese society accused of inhumane and nonhuman treatment consisting of just examining the impact of using weapons on people without helping them. No one at the time analyzed these activities in comparison with the activities undertaken by the Japanese and the massacres carried out by this country in the conquered and occupied territories - activities that brutality and cruelty exceeded the use of nuclear weapons, because the activities of the Japanese army focused on direct terror, the indirect effects of which were the destruction of growing regions. Right-wing nationalism developed in the entire period of the formation of the state, and one of its assumptions remained the formation of artificial divisions, allowing the manipulation of public opinion and social activity. The post-war Japanese constitution became a source of additional political protection for right-wing organizations, which significantly enabled the development of organized criminal groups (*yakuza*) and professional corporate extortion (*sōkaiya*). It brings to the creation of false right-wing groups responsible for the increase of extortion, intimidation, and political corruption.⁹

⁷ Doering, S., Davies, G., *The Contextual Nature of Right-Wing Terrorism across Nations*, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 33, 2021 - Issue 5, p. 1075.

⁸ Asahina, Y., *Becoming right-wing citizens in contemporary Japan*, Contemporary Japan, Vol 31, No. 2 (17 August 2019), pp. 122-140.

⁹ Szymkowiak, K., Steinhoff, P. G., *Wrapping up in something long: Intimidation and violence by right-wing groups in postwar Japan*, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1995), pp. 265-298,

Right-wing nationalism is often synonymous with right-wing terrorism. The essence of right-wing political terrorism is focused on divisions - the radical right achieves its goal by developing a primary conflict with the “worse” part of the community and a secondary conflict with the government, which allows the creation of one of the six subtypes of right-wing terrorism: *revolutionary, racist, reactive, vigilant, countercultural oriented on youth and terrorism for millennia*.¹⁰ Divisions built in this way are most often transmitted using the media - including social media, thanks to which racist and xenophobic attitudes are strengthened and promoted as the only appropriate ones.

Right-wing patriotism associated with such emotions as shock, fear, and anger allows for generating permanent divisions into ‘we’ and ‘they’ based on transforming short-term emotions into long-term ones and consolidating negative views and attitudes. Nationalist and far-right beliefs were noticeable in the growing number of acts of violence based on hate speech, referred to in Japan as *Heito Supiichi*¹¹ and spreading through the participation of diverse media. Hate speech is at the heart of conservative right-wing organizations, not only in Japan. This term, grounded in literature in the 21st century, became the subject of discussion in many countries around the world, emphasizing the importance of verbal and non-verbal violence as a critical factor determining the nature of the modern extreme right.

The development of right-wing terrorist groups closely related to the radical right was also noticeable in post-war Germany in the 1970s, where violent attacks such as bombings and murders were observed.¹² The extreme right also developed in many countries of West, Central and Eastern Europe, including Spain, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Turkey, Greece and many other countries.¹³ It is characterized by far-right discourse where the core common ground is non-negotiable, and the history and religion are used to preserve the national Self as a strategy of justification.¹⁴ The policy of building a national identity based on the divisions “We” - “They” is one of the most commonly used mechanisms introducing and increasing social inequalities. The purpose of dividing society is, on the one hand, to increase social susceptibility to manipulation by discrediting the opposition and showing “Others” as a common enemy, on the other maintaining power, aimed at combating “a common enemy.”

The new rhetoric of public discourse among far-right members focuses on promoting negative, hateful attitudes that lead to a threat to security and public order. The hate discourse creating a division between “better” and “worse” people causes violence and aggression, becoming the cause of discrimination against minority

¹⁰ Sprinzak, E., *Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization*, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 7, No 1(1995), pp. 17-43.

¹¹ op. cit. note 8, pp. 122-144.

¹² Manthe, B., *On the Pathway to Violence: West German Right-Wing Terrorism in the 1970s*, Terrorism and Political Violence, (October 2018).

¹³ Malczewski, J., Kaliński, M., Eckhardt, P. (edit.), *Nationalism. Historical and Contemporary Faces*, Kraków 2012, p. 8.

¹⁴ Baider, F., *Double speech act: Negotiating inter-cultural beliefs and intra-cultural hate speech*, Journal of Pragmatics, Vol. 151 (October 2019), pp. 155-166.

groups.¹⁵ Its extreme manifestation is hate-crime - a crime caused by an attitude based on the language of hatred. A similar mechanism of creating artificial divisions is also visible in contemporary Poland. The political discourse has artificially divided the society into 'Worst' and 'Better,' trying to focus the community's attention on an imaginary common enemy. The consequence of intensified media coverage presenting the ruling party's views was the increase in social dissatisfaction resulting from the actions of the authorities described as contrary to the democratic order and threatening public security.

In addition to the heated political debate manifested as hate speech, one more important manifestation of right-wing nationalism should be stressed. As pointed out by P. Chlebowicz, the popularity of extreme right-wing ideas among football "fans" is particularly dangerous social phenomenon.¹⁶ It comes up from the fact that the violence and hatred glorified by nationalist movements stimulate and feed hooliganism in stadiums. There is no doubt that today we can talk about the consolidation of stadium hooligans around extreme ideologies, especially right-wing ones. This is a disturbing phenomenon that makes football stadiums one of the main places for the dissemination of nationalist ideology. This, in turn, plays a key role in a hate-driven crime. Nationalism among fans is a combination of racist ideology, criminality and organized crime.¹⁷

4. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF FALSE PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM

In today's Poland, patriotism is a battlefield, on which the battle for the understanding of citizenship and nation, is fought. This is confirmed by the fact that today various groups and ideological options claim their right to the ideology and heritage of the Underground State. These are political parties, fans, reconstruction groups, extreme right-wing circles, paramilitary organizations, and even left-wing intellectuals who have noticed that the total negation of patriotism is a suicidal act and a kind of political own goal. All these groups are increasingly reaching for new methods of patriotic education and numerous tools of historical policy, which has lately become a fashionable trend. Historical policy, also known as the policy of memory, is the deliberate shaping of historical awareness and it makes the public discourse about the past. This phenomenon, which is a close relative of nationalism, originated in Germany in the 1980s, was intended to use history in the process of

¹⁵ Levy, B. L., Levy, D. L., *When love meets hate: The relationship between state policies on gay and lesbian rights and hate crime incidence*, Social Science Research, Vol. 61 (January 2017), pp. 142-159.

¹⁶ Chlebowicz, P., *Przestępczość stadionowa jako nowy obszar badań kryminologicznych*, Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2009, issue 6, p. 221.

¹⁷ Chlebowicz, P., *Ekstremizm a przestępczość stadionowa – wzajemne oddziaływania*, [in:] Pływaczewski, W., Lubiewski, P. (edit.), *Współczesne ekstremizmy. Geneza, przejawy, przeciwdziałanie*, Olsztyn 2014, p. 48. shares this view J. Sochacka (Sochacka, J., *Chuligaństwo stadionowe jako samodzielne zjawisko społeczne*, Archiwum Kryminologii 2010, Vol. XXXII, p. 229).

shaping the country policy. It resulted from the need to mythologize the past in order to create the cultural heritage of the nation. With the beginning of the 1990s, the public debate on the events of history became increasingly important.¹⁸

Following in the footsteps of Germany, other European countries began to use history using modern multimedia techniques. Since 2015, Poland has thoughtfully exposed its own narrative about World War II. The narrative was gradually emerging from the exhibition of the Warsaw Uprising Museum, coloring books and comic books for the youngest, popular TV series and historical projects. The tools of historical policy are state-funded scientific research, specialized institutions (such as museums, memory chambers, institutes), time organization (calendar of national holidays), topography of memory, use of mass media, national heroes, and the use of narrators (e.g. scientists and witnesses of events) in historical articles. Historical policy affects the naming of streets, squares, patrons of educational institutions and other public bodies, as well as cultural and educational activities supported by the state and local governments. In the simplest terms, historical politics is a story about a heroic and crystal-clear nation fighting for independence, about righteous soldiers, about knights “without blemish or fear”, bravely defending women and children. In this sense, historical policy is an important manifestation of patriotism, but it can contribute to blurring the fine line between patriotism and nationalism.

In the opinion of many Poles, the greatest problem of Polish education about World War II seems to be its methodological nationalism – reducing history to the role of a machine producing and legitimizing a specific, militarized vision of national identity. It is accompanied by a reluctance to include any threads that could undermine the ethical primacy of the national narrative. Even during the presidential elections, candidates invoked patriotic elements of family biography in their campaigns. Bronisław Komorowski assured in a TV spot that his brave ancestors fought in all wars and all uprisings, and Jarosław Kaczyński informed the media that his father was active in the underground and his mother was a member of the Gray Ranks (Polish: Szare Szeregi).

Meanwhile, the painful experiences of World War II could become the basis for a completely different civic education than the national-military one. They could be a starting point for education that strengthens democratic values and respect for human rights, counteracts violence and discrimination based on nationality or gender.

In the Polish dimension, the issues of patriotism and nationalism gained particular importance upon the accession to the European Union. In deliberations on the future of Europe, three concepts stand out. The first is conservative and assumes that nation states will remain fully sovereign economic and political entities. The second approach, referred to as reformist, assumes the possibility of gradual adaptation of the existing nation states to the changing political and economic reality. The third, radical concept postulates the destruction of nation states and their transformation

¹⁸ Saryusz-Wolska, M. (edit.), *Pamięć zbiorowa i kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka*, Kraków 2009, p. 29.

into supranational structures. Which of the above concepts will turn out to be closest to reality will depend on further developments in the geopolitical situation, and in particular on the course of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Apart from Polish policy of memory, Ukrainian historical policy is a subject to various assessments, both in Ukraine itself and on the international forum. T. Olszański believes that V. Yushchenko's historical policy contributed to perpetuating the memory of Ukrainians about the Great Famine (Holodomor), and revived numerous initiatives to commemorate the victims of this tragedy.¹⁹ The memory of the victims of the Holodomor is maintained by the authorities of independent Ukraine, constituting an important element of the Ukrainian nationalism. In the 21st century, a Ukrainian court found the leaders of the USSR guilty of genocide. The Great Famine was so assessed by R. Lemkin, the creator of the concept of genocide, as well as a number of countries, including independent Ukraine, Poland and the United States. Russia, on the other hand, unsurprisingly, does not agree with such a legal qualification. Criticism and negative assessment are primarily those threads of Ukrainian historical policy that relate to the history of the OUN-UPA, and their historical policy regarding the period of World War II. Both problems arouse the greatest interest. However, an attempt to popularize the cult of the OUN and UPA throughout Ukraine failed.²⁰ It has remained a local phenomenon. Critics claim that the victims of these formations are being sacralized, which results in the exclusion of victims of other nationalities from the collective memory (e.g. non-Ukrainian victims of the Great Famine or Jews murdered during the Holocaust). Thus, it excludes the possibility of suspecting Ukrainians of any crimes and negates the crimes committed by them, or presents the victims of Ukrainian nationalists as guilty of their own fate.

In order to adapt the image of the OUN-UPA to Western liberal models, these inconvenient issues are concealed or negated, and the importance of those elements of the OUN's program and activities that fit the chosen concept is exaggerated. This results in negationism at the state level. In 2007, Viktor Yushchenko announced during his visit to Israel that the UPA was not involved in any anti-Jewish actions. In the same year, he also denied accusations of crimes against Poles.

The institutions implementing the policy of remembrance are accused of publishing documents selectively, highlighting those that confirm the interpretation of history promoted by the institutions. The critics of President Yushchenko's policy pointed out that, for example, by putting Ukrainian veterans of the Red Army on the enemy side, historical policy does not unite but it divides and deepens the antagonism between eastern and western Ukraine. In response to the erected monuments to Ukrainian nationalists, local governments in central and eastern Ukraine fund monuments to the victims of the OUN and UPA (the so-called War

¹⁹ Olszański, T. A., *Wielka dekomunizacja. Ukraińska polityka historyczna czasów wojny*, Warszawa 2017, pp. 18–19., Olszański, T. A., *Polityka historyczna Juszczenki – próba podsumowania*, Warszawa 2017, p. 41.

²⁰ Rudling, P. A., *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths*, Carl Back Papers No 2107, pp. 26-27.

of Monuments). In addition, the glorification of the OUN, UPA and their activists provokes negative reactions on the international arena - in Israel, Poland, Russia, Belarus, and also in the European Union. This issue was addressed in a more intensive way during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich. This was particularly true of the history of the UPA during the war and in the post-war period. Earlier attempts to recognize UPA soldiers as World War II veterans, unsuccessful for a long time due to the resistance of the Red Army veterans' organizations (often supported from Moscow), were successful. The fight of the OUN and the UPA on two fronts against the two largest totalitarian regimes, i.e. the USSR and the Third Reich at the same time, was chosen as a positive model of patriotic attitudes. It was not decided to expose the motive of these organizations' struggle with Poland. The OUN and the UPA, contrary to the facts, are presented as democratic, tolerant and multi-ethnic organizations in favor of Ukraine, which laid the foundations of the present Ukrainian democracy. Participants of the nationalist underground are presented as heroes ready to selflessly give their lives for Ukraine's independence, allegedly fighting throughout the country within its contemporary borders. Easy to guess, in the stories about them, reality is mixed with myth and legend. David R. Marples lists the following components of the myth of the UPA warrior: idealism, sacrifice, courage, bravery, chivalry and references to the Cossacks.²¹

According to G. Motyka, avoiding an unambiguous assessment of the crimes of these nationalist formations against Poles is an unofficial course of Ukraine's historical policy. During Viktor Yushchenko's tenure, his administration performed numerous acts of glorification of the OUN and UPA and their individual activists. The title of Hero of Ukraine was awarded to Yuri Shukhevych (2006), Roman Shukhevych (2007) and Stepan Bandera (2010).²² Numerous commemorations of Ukrainian nationalists take place at the local level. By 2010, in western Ukraine, thanks to the subsidies from local governments, about 1,000 monuments and plaques in honor of the UPA and the SS "Galizien" were unveiled.

False patriotism and nationalism led to crimes against humanity understood as various acts: "murder, extermination, enslavement, torture, forcible transfers of populations, imprisonment, rape, persecution, enforced disappearance, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population".²³ Especially in the digital, misinformation-based era, nationalist trends have growing potential thanks to new weapons of mass destruction. The international environment classified the incitement of genocide, murder, or hate crime among crimes, but many of the terrorism act exists only because of hateful propaganda.²⁴

²¹ D. R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, Central European University Press, 2007, p. 139.

²² Motyka, G., *Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji „Wista”*, Kraków 2011, p. 463.

²³ Vernon, R., *Crime Against Humanity*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/crime-against-humanity>, 30 January, 2023.

²⁴ *The Use Of The Internet for Terroris Purposes*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations, New York, 2012, p. 18.

There is an ignorance that contributes to the deaths of billions of people around the world, based on arrogance and manipulation.²⁵ From a strategic point of view an ignorance, as a result of avoiding information about negative consequences,²⁶ affects the extension of the scope of the hate speech phenomenon, resulting, among others, from maintaining a deliberate unconsciousness determining the individual's decision-making process.²⁷ It can protect before threats by giving illusory of power.

Intentional ignorance correlated with conservative views excludes the possibility of adopting a different perspective, despite the existence of scientific and rational arguments proving that the decision is wrong.²⁸ A society convinced of the life of the only truth is devoid of critical and creative thinking, treating questioning views and information as a value measured by the patriotism factor expressed in absolute obedience related to, among others, with arrogance and intentional silence.²⁹

Misinformation and deliberate misrepresentation by attempting to give traditional concepts a new semantic dimension is aimed at maintaining the arrogance of ignorance at a level that allows further illegal practices. These practices are often situated on the border of unethical or immoral, like the practices from Christian fundamentalism based on the arrogance of ignorance.³⁰ Reading the truth in the conditions of having incomplete information can be more difficult when the more significant part of the public opinion has a certain shared level of ignorance and similar views on a particular topic.³¹

Intentional data manipulation aimed at emphasizing the principal role of one fact over the others or completely changing the value and properties of the message itself is a tool enabling the spread of misinformation and the resulting consequences.³² In the situations of war, ignorance and manipulation help to maintain a strategic

²⁵ Dossey, L., *Agnotology: On the Varieties of Ignorance, Criminal Negligence, and Crimes Against Humanity*, Explore The Journal of Science and Healing November/December 2014, Vol. 10, No. 6, p. 331-344, Schabas, W. A., *Genocide in International Law. The Crime of Crimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 29, 173, 446.

²⁶ Grossman, Z., Weele, J., *Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions*, Journal of European Economic Association, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 2017), pp. 173-217.

²⁷ See for example: Aligica, P. D., *Ignorance, Political Decision, and the Philosophical Foundations of Administrative Sciences*, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July 2020), pp. 528-531; Miley, F., Read, A., *Suffer Little Children: Power, Boundaries and the Epistemology of Ignorance in Accounting for Church and State*, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, (April 2020), art. No. 102162; Pianezzi, D., Ashraf, M. J., *Accounting for Ignorance: An Investigation into Corruption, Immigration and the State*, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, (February 2020), art. No. 102147; Nyborg, K., Pauls, A., *Save the Planet or Close Your Eyes? Testing Strategic Ignorance in a Charity Context*, Ecological Economics, Vol. 161 (July 161), pp. 9-19.

²⁸ Shamir, J., *Pluralistic Ignorance Revisited: Perception of Opinion Distributions in Israel*, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 22-24.

²⁹ Tanesini, A., *I – 'Calm Down, Dear': Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance*, Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Vol. 90, No. 1 (June 2016), pp. 71-72.

³⁰ Mayer, W. V., *The Arrogance of Ignorance – Ignoring the Ubiquitous*, p. 423.

³¹ Matthes, J., Knoll, J., Sikorski, Ch., *The "Spiral of Silence" Revisited: A Meta – Analysis on the Relationship Between Perception of Opinion Support and Political*, Communication Research, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 3-33.

³² See, for example, Henkel, L. A., Mattson, M. E., *Reading is Believing: The Truth Effect and Source Credibility*, Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2011), pp. 1705-1721.

position, and all decisions are made complying with calculating to relate to human losses. In a state of peace, ignorance and misinformation can help keep the peace or deliberately seek to change the balance of political and economic forces.³³ The ignorance seems to be the domain of international politics, especially in all those cases that involve crimes against humanity, such as genocide.³⁴

If, during the Second World War, the international environment did not ignore the reports on mass murders and extermination camps prepared by Nazi Germany, the tragedy of the Holocaust and crimes against humanity would have ended much faster. A similar situation occurred in 1993, when the international community ignored warnings against the Rwandan genocide, evidence, and reports of mass murders, and political crimes and incitement to genocide were enough to prevent further massacres.³⁵

5. CONCLUSIONS

Patriotism has generally positive connotations, whereas the connotation of the word “nationalism” is definitely negative. The word “patriotism” is used to reflect warm associations: opinions, attitudes, and actions involving love for one’s country. Patriotism plays an important role in creating social consciousness and it holds one of the leading positions in the hierarchy of values. Patriotism is a factor that integrates nation, both in the time of triumph and crisis. However, there is a tendency for the concept of nationalism to gradually take over the function of patriotism as a political identity. This means the emergence of several competing types of patriotism and nationalism in the social consciousness.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the consequence of right-wing nationalism can pose a lot of dangerous social phenomena. Some of them seem to be most important: the escalation of the existing stereotypes, the search for authoritarian leadership and blind obedience to it, collective fear or collective hatred of a given group, unfavorable change in the existing social structure, leading to social exclusion of some groups, lowering the level of education, social discontent, less respect for the law, activation of criminal groups, increased sense of personal threat, propaganda activity, ethnic revisionism, increasing chauvinism.

³³ Muhammet A. B., Schub, R., *Peaceful Uncertainty: When Power Shocks Do Not Create Commitment Problems*, p. 852, Paul, T. V., *Recasting Statecraft: International Relations and Strategies of Peaceful Change*, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 1 (March 2017), pp. 1-13.

³⁴ See, for example: Wolfe, R., *Flaws in the Nuremberg Legacy: An Impediment to International War Crimes Tribunals’ Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity*, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 12, No 3 (Winter 1998), pp. 434-453, Zimmermann, A., Boos, F., *Bringing States to Justice for Crimes Against Humanity: The Compromissory Clause in the International Law Commission Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity*, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No 4 (September 2018), pp. 835-855, Tochilovsky, V., *Crimes Against ‘Humaneness’?: The Russian Interpretation of Crimes Against Humanity*, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 5 (December 2018), pp. 1011-1019.

³⁵ Schabas, W. A., *Genocide in International Law. The Crime of Crimes*, Hamburg 2003, p. 29.

Undoubtedly, there are social and political environments, in which presenting nationalist views meets with approval, and it is considered fashionable. Right-wing extremist organizations are eager to follow pathological ideology. In Poland, these are the National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski), the National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny), the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska).³⁶ There is no doubt that crimes inspired by nationalism have a stronger impact on victims than any other crimes. First of all, they are the perpetrator's message passed on to the group not accepted by the society. It seems, therefore, that ignoring or neglecting nationalism deepens the harm caused by this ideology. The negation of nationalist attitudes and views by the police, prosecutors or judges results in greater humiliation and isolation of victims. Other effects of nationalism include a violation of faith in justice, a change in the perception of the majority group, excessive identification with one's own group or, on the contrary, rejection of one's own group. Needless to say, nationalism constitutes the specific "value added" i.e. particular implication of nationalist ideology: polarization of society, the loss of mutual trust and the resulting sense of threat.³⁷

Nevertheless, the most far-reaching consequences of nationalism are intolerance and hostility towards some social groups. The hatred can lead to an escalation of hate crimes and, in extreme cases, to the crime of genocide. At the root of this crime lies the furthest hatred against a group, expressed in the desire to destroy it. As the history and reality show, the spread of hatred often leads to conflicts between groups of people on the basis of national, religious, etc. differences, and the extreme form of these conflicts: ethnic cleansing and mass murder. In conclusion, the lack of a proper reaction to manifestations of nationalism may be a signal to the society that potential perpetrators may feel unpunished. In the longer term, this may lead to criminal acts against minority groups who are victims of crimes inspired by nationalist ideology. In the author's opinion, the escalation of nationalist attitudes may lead to murders, lynchings, pogroms, wars, ethnic cleansing, terrorism and genocide.³⁸

³⁶ Duda, M., *Przestępstwa z nienawiści. Studium prawnokarne i kryminologiczne*, Olsztyn 2016, pp. 37-38, Wrzosek, T., *Nacjonalizm i hegemonia. Przypadek Młodzieży Wszechpolskiej*, Historia i Polityka, No. 5(12)/2011, pp. 263-269.

³⁷ See: M. Duda, *Przestępstwa z nienawiści. Studium prawnokarne i kryminologiczne*, Olsztyn 2016, p. 70.

³⁸ Wydra, M., Rauhut, R., Wołoszyn-Siemion, M., Malmon, A., Prejs, W., *Przestępstwa z nienawiści. Materiał pomocniczy dla trenera*, Warszawa 2010, p. 37.

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PATRIOTIZAM I NACIONALIZAM KAO POSLJEDICA DESNIČARSKIH STAVOVA I IZVOR ZLOČINA

Ovaj rad propituje temu patriotizma i nacionalizma – dvaju pojmova koji su naizgled slični, ali zapravo između njih postoje suštinske i nepomirljive razlike. Rad prati probleme koji proizlaze iz pogrešnog razumijevanja pojmova patriotizma i nacionalizma. Cilj rada bio je odgovoriti na pitanje mogu li desničarski stavovi rezultirati štetnim društvenim stavovima koji su bliski nacionalizmu i fašizmu. Prva svrha rada bila je definirati što su patriotizam, nacionalizam i fašizam značili u prošlosti i kako se oni shvaćaju danas. Druga je svrha bila otkriti i raskrinkati kako je desničarski patriotizam postao jedna od najtežih sigurnosnih prijetnji te kako lažni patriotizam i nacionalistički trendovi mogu dovesti do zlouporabe zakona, prekoračenja nadležnosti ili čak zločina protiv čovječnosti. Članak dokazuje da su neznanje i sljepoća povezani s nacionalizmom pridonijeli smrti milijardi ljudi diljem svijeta. Dakle, u radu se, na temelju pregleda suvremene znanstvene literature, prikazuje znanstveno i politički aktualna i važna tema.

Ključne riječi: *patriotizam, nacionalizam, fašizam, desničarski stavovi, zločini protiv čovječnosti, politički terorizam*