

centralized political system seemed to be allowing space for a public discussion of the past, the regime grew alarmed at where this discussion could lead and silenced dissenting views.

If there is one limitation to the chapter on Yugoslavia, it is the absence of an exploration and discussion of post-war repression and reprisals carried out by the Partisans and Communists. Wolfgram briefly mentions the massacre at Bleiburg, but does not discuss in any detail how it or the so-called *Križni put* or Death Marches were remembered or even acknowledged by the regime, the victims or their relatives. This feels like quite an oversight, as both events became central to the idea of Croat victimhood which was often served (and serves) as a counterweight capable of contradicting, undermining and contesting both the Communist regime's narrative and those of the NDH's victims about events in the Second World War, including the crimes committed at Jasenovac. As I am not as familiar with the histories of the other cases, I wonder if there could be similar oversights among them.

Antigone's Ghosts is a bold undertaking, and a book that should inspire the field to engage in a more comparative approach towards collective and social memory. The book's framework is an especially valuable method to understand how societies remember their crimes and their victims, and it should become a regular tool in the discipline's methodological toolbox.

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Book Review

Mykola Davydiuk
**Як працює путінська
пропаганда? (How Does
Putin's propaganda work?)**

Smoloskyp, 2019, 208 pp.

Putin's hybrid war in Ukraine is being waged not only by using weapons and military equipment. Russia has fought against Ukrainians for decades with specially created technologies – fakes, disinformation, propaganda, and bots. Since 2014, Ukrainian researchers have systematically studied Russian propaganda technologies. They are discussed in detail in the book by Ukrainian political scientist Mykola Davydiuk *How Does Putin's propaganda work?*

Davydiuk opens the book with the chapter called Ideology, which is critical to understanding the Kremlin's war against Ukraine. The author begins his research by asking, "Did Putin plan to attack Ukraine?". Moreover, he gives answers consistently, revealing the concept of the "Russian world" with the specifics of the preparation of actions, and the calculation of weak points in Ukrainian society. According to the author, preparations for war began after the joint meeting of the Security Council and the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which took place on the 25th of December, 2008. From that moment, narratives created in the Kremlin began to penetrate the information field of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. These

narratives were produced around the division of Ukraine into separate regions, the presence of Russian capital in Ukrainian society, Russian Crimea, the development of fascism and far-right movements in the country, and Russia's "gas" wars against Ukraine. For seven years, these and similar narratives were planted in the Ukrainian and international audience with the help of pro-Russian media. Similar processes were observed in Russia as preparing for the upcoming war was necessary. Russian population has been filled with the narrative of a so-called Nazi regime in Ukraine oppressing the Russian-speaking population. The information campaign's apogee appeared on the 24th of February, 2015 in the Russian "Novaya Gazeta" as the plan to separate the eastern regions of Ukraine. This is why many Russians start to believe that annexing eastern Ukrainian regions is part of historical justice. Along with the concept of the "Russian world", which includes the grieving for the Soviet past, the narrative of protecting Russian language, literature and culture, promoting orthodoxy, and the remnants of the leftist ideology that was widespread in the USSR.

Davydiuk states that the concept of the "Russian world" was promoted with the help of a specially created fund of the same name, which has branches in more than 45 countries. At first, the concept spread to Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, but then it was extended to Syria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. In spreading the concept, the Kremlin relied on people's nostalgia for the USSR, on the Russian-speaking population, the imagination of protecting the orthodox Christianity, and the images and symbols associated exclusively with the Russian Federation – for example, a

nesting doll, vodka, and a Kalashnikov assault rifle. The Russian language and religion were organically combined in the "Russian world", so they found a quick response among people who became Moscow's support in Ukraine and abroad, for example in the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, and Germany, especially its eastern part where there is still strong support for the Kremlin among pro-Russian political elites and people from the former USSR.

Davydiuk claims that Putin, having begun to spread the "Russian world" around, moved to a more aggressive strategy. Because the concept was part of Moscow's soft power, he bet on separatism for implementing the "Russian world". The plan was to create a strategy with a standard set of internal problems for each of the republics of the then USSR. These included fabricating the problems with language, territories, and culture. On this basis, and at the right moment, the Kremlin intended to launch a plan to incite conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova with an individual approach to each country. The set of "Russian world" components were standard, but they were applied differently in the case of Transnistria, Gagauzia, Ossetia, Abkhazia, Donbas, and Crimea. The common feature of these fabricated conflicts is the narrative about protection of national minorities, similarly to what Hitler did in relation to the Sudetenland, or Milošević regarding the Serbs in Croatia.

It is worth noting that Lukyanov's doctrine, imagined as a doctrine for propping up separatism, was also aimed at other territories – Nagorno-Karabakh (conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia), northern Kazakhstan, Narva in Estonia, and Latgale

in Latvia. Using these examples, the author proves that modern Russia has developed a comprehensive conflict management system. It is specially created in territories beyond Russian control. The mechanism for creating the desired situation was launched if there was a threat of losing influence on these territories. At first, Moscow acted through pro-Russian supporters in the selected region, then began to manipulate public sentiment with the help of “its” parties. The next stage was to change or attempt to change the political regime. The Kremlin resorts to this stage only when the country’s government is about to change its foreign policy course. For the Lukyanov doctrine to work, Russia created unique mechanisms to “keep” countries under its control – each mechanism was based on the Russian investments and money coming to Ukraine and other countries in various forms. Davydiuk singles out several of them – the creation of a pro-Russian oligarchy, financing of Ukrainian business people and entrepreneurs who produced goods and services for the Russian market, sending Russian oligarchs to Ukraine or another country to manage a business for the benefit of the Russian Federation, and formation of a group of pro-Russian officials and politicians. The Kremlin, for example, implemented a strategy of bribing business and political elites and bringing to power officials loyal to Russia. As a result, according to the author, Moscow succeeded in disuniting Europe and weakening it.

Another strategy, which Davydiuk also highlights, is reliance on Russian migrants abroad. They were chosen as the target audience because they need to speak the language of the host countries and inte-

grate into society. Migrants who move to countries that are economically or politically close to Russia become pillars of promoting the ideas of the “Russian world” through pro-Russian parties, Russian non-governmental organizations, mass media, sports and cultural organizations. The involvement of Russian and Russian-speaking migrants takes place in the following ways – playing on feelings of injustice and inciting hatred, condemning imposing foreign values that migrants do not want to accept, and promoting the idea that foreigners cannot become part of a different society and culture. According to Davydiuk, these narratives work well because the migrants tend to be passive members of the countries they have moved to. They mostly rely on the Russian TV channels and the Russian internet sources as well.

Thus, the book’s first chapter is essential for understanding the ideology of the “Russian world”, its main components and strategies used by the Kremlin in Ukraine and abroad. The author’s significant contribution is that he shows the variety of actions taken by the Kremlin to realize the “Russian world”.

The second chapter, Propaganda, is a logical continuation of the previous discussions. The author analyzes specific examples of propaganda and manipulation in the media, showing the responsibility for them, and identifying the target audiences as well as tools for spreading disinformation. This section emphasizes the ways in which Moscow selects content for a specific audience, looking for experts. Each case of disinformation necessarily has its plan, the channel for spreading lies, and professional commentators. Because of this, Russian propaganda takes various forms. The main tasks

of disinformation campaigns are to maintain internal stability in a particular country and to prepare Russians for the “correct” actions of the Russian authorities. TV channels with broader, including international, audience were chosen to manipulate public opinion and spread disinformation. For example, the Russia Today channel became the propaganda mouthpiece in the war against Ukraine. Auxiliary tools have become social networks, bots, bot farms, SMS messages, and mobile communication. Social networks have helped spread fakes and manipulate public opinion of Russians, and turned into an ideal shelter for bots. They created fake pages, groups, and accounts of experts, to involve as many users as possible in the propaganda network. In the Russian war against Ukraine, Facebook became the leading platform for spreading fakes, where politicians, public figures, public organizations, opinion leaders, and voters have personal accounts, blogs, or thematic groups. The use of text messages and mobile communication is also part of the propaganda activities of the Kremlin. The author compares these tools to a more traditional method of propaganda – leaflets, which were widely used during the Second World War.

The Ukrainian authorities and law enforcement agencies began to fight against bots and bot farms, fake Facebook accounts, and pro-Russian social networks Odnoklassniki and V Kontakte back in 2014. The author examines in detail these methods in the book’s third chapter, Resistance. The resistance has begun almost simultaneously with the Russian invasion of Crimea and the occupation of the eastern regions of Ukraine. Davydiuk emphasizes a paradoxical situation according to which

the citizens resisted the myth that they were incapable of fighting back the military aggression of the Russian Federation, while the government, on the contrary, was on the Russian hook for a long time. Overcoming Russian aggression began with the appearance of volunteer battalions and a robust volunteer network. The cohesion of various social groups contributed to the fact that Ukrainian businesses and the diaspora began to provide powerful financial assistance to volunteers and society. At the same time, they launched an information campaign with patriotic slogans to boost the morale of Ukrainians both in the rear and at the front. IT specialists, journalists, activists, volunteers, authorities, and international organizations joined this information struggle. At the direction of the government, the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine created its information units. With the support of the international “Renaissance” foundation, the “Ukrainian Crisis Media Center” project was launched in March 2014, which turned into a platform for the independent experts, journalists, and specialists in various fields providing information about the war in Ukraine. They were faced with the task of identifying fakes and bots in order to combat Russian disinformation and propaganda. Media activists achieved effective results using open-source intelligence (OSINT), leading to various successful projects such as “Peacemaker” and “InformNapalm”. Also, the “Bellingcat” organization abroad was engaged in investigating the shooting down of the Malaysia “Boeing” with about 300 passengers on board over Donbas in the summer of 2014 by the Russian military. The scale of Russian disinformation in Ukraine led to the creation of the “Stop-

Fake” platform in the first days of Russian aggression engaged in media analysis and debunking fakes.

Another level of information resistance that the author highlights is the launch of special programs on the Ukrainian TV channels. Against the background of these methods of combating propaganda and disinformation, Ukrainian society moved to a final break with Russia and the Soviet past. Davydiuk writes that in this context, the experience of the Baltic countries and their process of decommunization benefits Ukraine, while later on the other post-Soviet countries will be able to use the Ukrainian experience. Since the communist heritage of the USSR was part of Russian propaganda, the break with that communist past has started with banning the activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine, removing monuments of communist figures, and changing the names of cities, streets, and trademarks to Ukrainian ones rather than the former Soviet and Russian. The author points out that Ukraine is now prepared for another war – for the Ukrainian knowledge and culture. Without this, it is impossible to create conscious, educated, and patriotic citizens as a barrier to the spread of Russian propaganda.

The book was written in Ukrainian, but is being also translated into Russian, so the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine will soon be able to read how they have been duped by the Kremlin, being tools of their political interests. Also, the book has been translated into German, Italian, and some other languages, so the broader audience can understand the world of Russian propaganda. Thus, in his great and informative book, that is definitely a recommended read, the Ukrainian political scien-

tist Mykola Davydiuk precisely discusses, along with numerous examples, how the Russian propaganda works, showing its mechanisms and analyzing the strategies and tools for combating it. The detailed coverage of the concept of the “Russian world” makes the book essential in studying modern propaganda narratives that Russia continues to use against Ukraine, Europe, and the whole world.

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Book Review

Daniela Nadj
**International Criminal Law
and Sexual Violence against
Women: The Interpretation of
Gender in the Contemporary
International Criminal Trial**

Routledge, Abingdon, 2020, 255 pp.

This book written by Daniela Nadj, a lecturer in Public Law at Queen Mary University of London, UK, aims to analyze the prosecution of wartime sexual violence in international criminal tribunals, mainly prosecutions held by *ad hoc* International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and in lesser measure those held by *ad hoc* International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), all seen through the lens of critical legal feminism theory.